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eScholarship provides open access, scholarly publishing
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Center for the Study of Law and Society
Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program
UC Berkeley
Title:
The Rule of Law and the European Human Rights Regime
Author:
Goldstein, Leslie, University of Delaware and Visiting Scholar for the Center for the Study of Lawand Society, UC BerkeleyBan, Cornel, University of Delaware
Publication Date:
07-01-2003
Series:
JSP/Center for the Study of Law and Society Faculty Working Papers
Publication Info:
JSP/Center for the Study of Law and Society Faculty Working Papers, Center for the Study of Lawand Society Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program, UC Berkeley
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TOAPPEARIN
ContendingPerspectivesonGlobalGovernance:Coherence,Contestation,andWorldOrder,
ed.MattHoffmanandAliceBa,forthcoming2004.
THERULEOFLAWANDTHEEUROPEANHUMANRIGHTSREGIME
byLeslieFriedmanGoldsteinandCornelBan
DepartmentofPoliticalScienceandInternationalRelations,UniversityofDelaware
Preface(andConclusion)
Manyofthechaptersinthiscollectionseeglobalgovernanceasareferencetotheway
theglobeasawholeglobalsystemisgoverned--inotherwords,asthewaythatso-called
international,orinter-statesystemsareorderedtheworldover.Thischapter,bycontrast,fits
intothatgroupofthechapters(whichincludesthosebyRosenau,Young,andOBrien)thatsee
globalgovernanceasaboutsayingandseeingthatgovernancetakesplaceontheglobeto
anincreasingdegree(notonlybystateandinterstateactors,butalso)bysuprastate,non-state,
andsubstateactors.Thischapterinparticularexaminesthestrengtheningofoneofthese
disaggregatedspheresofauthority(inthephraseofJamesRosenau),oneofthearenas
wheremodesofregulatinghumanbehaviorthatwerepreviouslymonopolizedbystate
sovereignshasbeentakenoverbyatrans-stateactor,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights.
Weseethestructureofglobalgovernanceasinfactanabsenceofstructureamong
thesedisaggregatedspheres,andtheprocessofglobalgovernanceasvaryingfromoneto
anothersphere.Withintraditionalinternationalorganizations,governanceisexercisedwiththe
rangeoftraditionaltoolsofinternationalrelations,althoughthesetoolsarenowoftenwielded
byanumberofnon-traditionalagents,suchasNGOs.Inaddition,trans-stateregimesof
governancehavemovedrecentlyintoprominence:some,intherealmofpoliticaleconomy
(e.g.,thoseoftheWorldBankandtheIMF);others,intherealmoftrans-statelaw,enforcedby
trans-statecourts.
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Thischapterzeroesinononeofthelatter,inordertoaddressaquestionposedinthe
chapterbyOranYoung:What,inatrans-stateregime,makesforregimeeffectiveness?
Specifically,bywhatprocessesdotrans-statelegalregimesmanagetotakehold?(Wedonot
addressinthischapterthepriorquestionwhysuchtrans-statejudicialgovernanceregimesget
putintoplaceatall;alargeliteratureonthissubjecthasalreadyaccumulated:Moravscik2000
andcitationsinGoldstein2001,Ch.6).
Thevantagepointfromwhichweexaminethegrowthandentrenchmentofthistrans-state
regimeisthatofpubliclaw.Thischapterfocusesonasingletrans-state,rule-of-lawregime,one
implementedbyamixoftrans-stateactorsoftheCouncilofEuropeanddomesticpoliticaland
legalinstitutions,allofwhomarechargedwithmakingandenforcinglaw.
Ourperspectiveonthisparticularpieceofglobalgovernance,andotherslikeit--i.e.,those
regimesconstructedandgovernedbytransnationalcourts,thenormslegitimatingthemandthe
normstheypropound,andtheactorsandinstitutionsthatimplementthesenormschangedin
thecourseofresearchingandwritingthischapter.Webeganpersuadedbythethesisof
variousscholarsininternationalrelations(hereafterIR)thattheareaswherethesetrans-state
judicialregimesmostsuccessfullymanagetotakeholdandtoalterthebehavioroferstwhile
sovereignstatesarethosestateswheredomesticculturealreadyexhibitsawell-entrenched
commitmenttotheruleoflaw.Inotherwords,wesawdomesticcultureatthesociety-wide
levelasdecisiveinshapingthereceptivityofagivenstatetosubordinatingitselftogovernance
byoneofthetrans-statejudiciariesthathavebeenproliferatingandgrowinginstrengtharound
theturnofthetwenty-firstcentury.
Theresearchinthischapterchangedourviewpoint.Wenowbelievethatamultiplicityof
causalvariablesshapethelikelihoodofregimeeffectivenessinthesejudiciallydominatedtrans-
stateregimes:Thedegreeofrule-of-lawcultureisimportant,butitsimpactcanbetrumpedor
bluntedbysuchphenomenaasstrongpoliticalleadership(asitwasinourstudy,onthepartof
judgesonconstitutionalcourtsaswellasindomesticexecutivebranchesandlegislatures)orby
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politicalforcesexogenoustothejudicialsystems(suchas,inourstudy,trans-statepolitical
mood,atleastamongelectedmember-stateleadersduringthemid-tolate-1980s).
1.Introduction
TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(hereafterECtHRortheCourt,orStrasbourg,its
home)wasfoundedin1959withinthestructureoftheCouncilofEurope(COE),agroupof
Europeancountriescommittedtotheprotectionofhumanrights(originally,Belgium,Denmark,
France,Ireland,Italy,Luxembourg,theNetherlands,Norway,SwedenandtheUnitedKingdom).
TheECtHRwastofunctionasinterpreterofthe1953EuropeanConventionofHumanRights
(hereafterECHRortheConvention).TheConventionregimebegandesignedlygradually,with
acumbersomeenforcementsystem,manyopt-outpossibilitiesonparticularrights,andan
enforcingcourtthatmetonlytemporarily.(Inthestatesthatchose toaccepttherightof
individualpetition,individualscouldfilecomplaintsagainsttheHighContractingPartiesfor
allegedhumanrightsviolations.Inter-statecomplaintswerealsopermittedagainstanymember
state.ThecomplaintswerefirstreviewedforadmissibilitybytheCommission,aquasi-judicial
body,andifnofriendlysettlementoccurred,theCommissionwouldissueareportstatingthe
factsofthecaseanditsopiniononthemeritsandsendittotheCommitteeofMinisters.Then,
theCommissionand/oranycontractingstateconcernedhadtherighttobringthecasebefore
theCourtforfinaladjudicationwithinthreemonthsfollowingthetransmissionofthereporttothe
CommitteeofMinisters.IfthecasewerenotreferredtotheECtHR,theCommitteeofMinisters
coulddecidewhethertherehadbeenaviolationofthehumanrightsprotectedbythe
Convention.IftheCommitteefoundaviolation,itwouldobligethestatetopaycompensation
tothevictimofthatviolation.IftheECtHRdidhandlethecase,itsdecisionwasfinal.The
CommitteehadtheresponsibilityofmonitoringtheexecutionoftheECtHRsjudgment.The
CouncilofEuropedramaticallystrengthenedthisenforcementsysteminthe1990s,asexplained
below.Asof2003,theAmericanConventiononHumanRights,fortheOrganizationof
AmericanStates,anothertrans-stateregime,operatesinmuchthesameformatastheearly
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ECHR.)Notuntiltheearly1970sdidtheECtHRbegintoissuedecisionswithrealteethinthem
i.e.,decisionsthatproducedpromptpolicycorrectionsbyoffendinggovernments(e.g.,De
Wilde,OomsandVersypv.Belgium,judgment18June1971--legalreformon6Aug.1971;
Ringeisenv.Austria,judgment16July1971promptreversalbyConstitutionalCourt;Golderv.
theUnitedKingdom,judgment21Feb.1975reformon22June1976).
Bytheendof1998,however,theECtHRbecameapermanentcourtandtherightof
individualstopetitionthecourtforviolations,whichhadnotevenexisteduntil1994,now
becamemandatoryonallCOEmembercountries. (Thestepsofchangewereasfollows:
Protocol9,1994,enabledindividualapplicantstobringtheircasesdirectlytotheCourtsubject
toagreementtothissystembytherespondentStateandalsotoacceptanceofthecasebya
ScreeningPanel.ProtocolNo.11,effectiveinNovember1998,replacedtheCommissionwith
whatwasnowapermanentECtHR.Nowtheobligationtopermitindividualcitizenstotake
humanrightscomplaintstothiscourtbecamemandatoryforallsignatoriestotheConvention;
nolongercouldstatesoptout.www.echr.coe.int).ThustheECtHRbecameaneffectiveco-
directoroftheECHRlegalregime,inunofficialpartnershipwiththeEuropeanCourtofJustice
(hereafterECJ),thecourtoftheEuropeanUnionwhoseowndoctrineobligesittohonorthe
ECHRwhenevertheConventionisrelevant.
ByapplyingablendofIRapproacheswithpubliclawanalyses,asrecommendedinrecent
yearsbyanumberofinfluentialIRandinternationallawscholarsofdifferingtheoretical
approaches(Abbot1989;Koskenniemi1990;Slaughter1993;Finnemore1996;Koh1997;Ress-
Smit1997;Keohane1997and2000;Slaughteretal.1998;Byers2000),thispaperexaminesthe
extenttowhichrulesderivedfromthisConventionhavebecomeembeddedinthedomestic
legalorderofthememberstates.Weviewthesetofrulesandtheorganizationalstructure
createdaroundtheConventionasatransnationallegalregime,onegroundedinpost-
EnlightenmentEuropeanculture.AlthoughthatculturehadobviouslybeenscarredbyWorld
WarIIandthecircumstancesthatledtoit, 1thePreambleoftheConventionnonetheless
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explicitlyidentifieditsownfoundationasthespiritualandmoralvalueswhicharethecommon
heritageoftheEuropeanpeopleandthetruesourceofindividualfreedom,politicallibertyand
therule-of-lawprinciplesthatformthebasisofallgenuinedemocracy(Emphasisadded.
www.coe.int).
WithintheIRliterature,acommonlyciteddefinitionofinternationalregimesisthatof
StephenKrasner:theyaresetsofissue-boundedimplicitorexplicitprinciples,norms,rulesand
decision-makingproceduresaroundwhichactorsexpectationsconverge(1983,2).(E.g.,One
oftheguidingprinciplesoftheECHRregimeasarticulatedbytheECtHRisthedoctrineofa
nationalmarginofappreciation;itstatesthatthepreeminenceofagivenConventionnorm
mustbeweighedagainstnationalinterestsandrestrictedtothedegreenecessaryina
democraticsociety,Lawlessv.Ireland,ECtHR1981.Theanalyticframeworkofaninternational
regimereachesbeyondthetraditionalinternationallawstudiesoftheECtHRthatconfinetheir
researchfocustoitslegaldoctrine(e.g.Delmas-Marty1992;Clementsetal.1999;Yourow1996).
ThispaperviewstheConventionandtheCourtaspartofthebroaderEuropeanhumanrights
regime,whichincludesotherorganizationswithwhichtheCourtcooperatesclosely(the
CommitteeofMinisters)orloosely(theEuropeanCourtofJustice,theEuropeanCommission2).
Thisapproachprovidesamorecompletepictureoftheforcesatworkincreatingaruleoflaw
forEuropethanwouldbeavailablethroughmerelydoctrinalanalysis.
WelabeltheECHRregime(i.e.,theregimecreatedaroundtheConventionandtheCourt)
transnationalratherthaninternationalbecauseitsrules,normsandproceduresarenotconfined
tointerstateinteraction.Forinstance,thepartiestotheConventioncommittoavarietyofdue
processmeasuresinArticle5,whichlistconcludeswithfollowing:
Everyonewhoisarrestedshallbeinformedpromptly,inalanguagewhichhe
understands,ofthereasonsforhisarrestandthechargeagainsthim.Everyone
arrestedordetainedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofparagraph1(c)ofthis
articleshallbebroughtpromptlybeforeajudgeorotherofficerauthorizedby
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lawtoexercisejudicialpowerandshallbeentitledtotrialwithinareasonable
timeortoreleasependingtrial.Releasemaybeconditionedbyguaranteesto
appearfortrial.Everyonewhoisdeprivedofhislibertybyarrestordetentionshall
beentitledtotakeproceedingsbywhichthelawfulnessofhisdetentionshallbe
decidedspeedilybyacourtandhisreleaseorderedifthedetentionisnotlawful.
Everyonewhohasbeenthevictimofarrestordetentionincontraventionofthe
provisionsofthisarticleshallhaveanenforceablerighttocompensation.
(Emphasisadded.)
Thus,thesestatespre-committhemselvestoallowthirdpartytransnationalinstitutionstohold
theirotherwisesovereigninstitutionsliableforcompensatorydamages,tothatdegree
abrogatingsovereignprerogatives.Clearly,thehierarchicalarrangementofthecombined
forceoftheCommitteeofMinistersandtheECtHRvisvisthedomesticcourtsthatimplement
theECtHRrulingsdiffersqualitativelyfromthesheerintergovernmentalismthattypifiespurely
internationalinstitutions.InsteadtheECHRregimestructuresnotsimplystate-to-staterelations
butmultiplepatternsofinteractionthosebetweenindividualsandthestate,between
elementsofcivilsocietyandstate,betweendomesticcourtsandnationalpolitical
constituencies,betweentheEUandindividualstates,andbetweentheECtHR/Committeeof
Ministersandeachoftheaforementionedcategories.TheConventionisoperationalized
primarilythoroughthemediumofdomesticlawandcourts(deBruynetal.1997,2-6),andfew
aspectsofdomesticpolicymakingpertainingtohumanrightsevadethereachofthe
Conventionanditsprotocols.WithintheECHRregime,statesroutinelyactupontheselimitations
oftheirownsovereigntybyconsciouslyshapingtheirpoliciesintopatternsadaptedtoECtHR
jurisprudence.
Significantly,thisisarule-of-lawregimeinthesensethatitgiveslifeviatheprovisionsofthe
Conventiontotheprinciplethattherelationshipsoftheindividualwiththestateshouldbe
regulatedbyaframeworkoflegalruleswhoseinterpretationandapplicationareinthehandsof
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independentjudgesandaretobeappliedeven-handedly(Merrills1993).Thisprincipleis
implicatednotonlyintheobviouscasesoftheprovisionsofArticle5(righttoliberty),Article6
(righttoafairtrial)andArticle7(noretrospectivecriminallaws)butbyallotherprovisionsofthe
Conventionandofits11additionalprotocols.
Thistransnationalregimehasenlargeditsjurisdictionintwosuccessivewavesofintegration.
Thefirstenlargementtookplaceinthe1970sandmovedsouthward.ItincludedSpain(a
dictatorshipfrom1936to1975)andPortugal(adictatorshipfrom1933to1974)--bothinitially
excludedfromtheEuropeanCommunityduetotheirperiodoffascistrulewhosignedthe
ConventiononthedayoftheiraccessiontotheCouncilofEurope,onNovember24,1977and
September22,1976,respectively.ThesamewaveincludedGreece,atthetime,recently
plaguedbyperiodsofinstabilityanddictatorship.(GreecehadsignedontotheConventionin
1950,butdidnotratifyitandthenwithdrewin1969,givingitpracticaleffectonlyin1974.) 3(This
expansionalsoincludedMalta,1967,Cyprus,1962,andSwitzerland,1974.WechoseGreece,
SpainandPortugalnotonlybecausetheyarebiggercountriesthanMaltaandCyprus,butalso
becausetheyrepresentedinterestingtransitionsfromdictatorialtorule-of-lawregimes.)
Thesecondenlargementtookplaceinthe1990s,whenallformercommuniststates,
includingRussia,wereadmittedtotheCouncilofEurope.Afterfiftytoseventyyearsofblatant
disregardforthevaluesprofessedbytheConvention,particularlyfortheruleoflaw,these
countriesformallyadoptedanalternativepoliticalandlegalparadigmfortheprotectionof
humanrights.ThenumberofCouncilofEuropemembersgrewfrom23attheendof1989to43
in2001,andthetotalpopulationofthememberstatesgrewfrom451to772million.Thenumber
ofapplicationstotheCourtgrewfrom1,013in1988to10,486(Report2001,4.)Since2001,three
newcountrieshavesignedontotheECHR:Bosnia,Armenia,andAzerbaijan.These
enlargementsexpandedthedemocraticWesternEuropeannormativecoreto800million
peoplelivingunderlegalregimesofremarkableheterogeneity.
Despitethevariegatedmosaicofdemocraticandlegaltraditionsamassedundertheaegis
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oftheCouncilofEurope,however,theECHRregimebythelateninetieswasbeingacclaimed
asastrikinglysuccessfultransnationalframeworkfortheprotectionoffundamentalhumanrights
andliberties(Gearty1997,x-xv).Itsverysuccessraisesintriguingquestions:Whatholdsit
together?Howdothecommonrule-of-lawstandardsoutlinedbytheEuropeanCourtofHuman
RightsinfactapplytocountriesasdifferentasEnglandandRomania?Isthisregimeembedded
uniformlyorunevenlyinthedomesticorderofthesignatorymembersoftheConvention?Ifitis
indeedunevenlyembedded,whatexplainsthevariations?ThebulkofECtHRstudieseither
describetheCourtsstructure,processesandjurisprudence(Merrills1993;Clements1999;Yourow
1996;RalphBeddard1993);orofferaseriesofcountrybycountrynon-analyticdescriptive
studiesofthereceptionofECtHRlaw(Gardner1993;Barkhuysen1999);ordoboth(Delmas-
Marty1992;Tavernier1996;andGearty1997).Wehavefoundonlytwoanalyticaccountsthat
attempttoexplainpatternsofcross-nationalvariationwithintheECHRregime(Drzemczewski
1983andLembert1999),andneitheroftheseexploresthevariableofexperiencewitharule-of-
lawculture
Toaddressthesequestions,webeganwithahypothesisbuiltontwofoundations.First,a
growingliteraturethatbeganinthemid-90sbothongeneralIRtheoryandspecificallyonEU
integrationpointstotheimportanceofrule-of-law-cultures(Seurin1994,625-636;Weiler1994;
Slaughter1995;Moravscik1995;Shaw1996;Alter1996,476;HelferandSlaughter1997;Goldstein
1996;1997;and2001,158-60).IfthereisvalidityintheclaimsoftheEUandIRliterature
postulatingaconnectionbetweenliberal,rights-respecting,rule-of-lawcultures,ontheone
hand,andacceptanceofintegrationintotheECJandECtHRlegalregimes,ontheother,then
weshouldfindlongerseniorityintheEU(becausethelatterisanassociationofliberal,rights-
respectingcountries)correlatedwithmorecompleteembeddingoftheECHRregime.(This
hypothesisisnotameretautology:Astrongdomesticruleoflawculturedoesnotnecessarily
implyawillingnesstoabrogatetraditionalelementsofsovereigntytothedegreenecessaryfor
acceptanceoftrans-orsupra-nationallegalauthorities.IndeedtheFrenchSupreme
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AdministrativeCourt,theConseildEtat,fordecadesinsistedthatFrenchlawmeantprecisely
thatFrenchsovereigntymustberetained,and,onthisground,openlyresistedclaimsofauthority
fromthetransnationalECJ[Goldstein2001;Alter2001,158-59].)Secondly,theveryfactof
membershipintheEEC/EC/EUhasentailedinvolvementwithpoliticalandlegalprocessesthat
forhalfacenturyhavebeenentrenchingprinciplesoflegitimacythattransfersovereignpower
tosupranationalinstitutions.Onecanplausiblyassumethatsuchinvolvementovertimewould
strengthenamemberstate'stransnationalcommitmenttoaEuropeanlegalidentity,onethat
includesprotectionforfundamentalrights.
Boththeseobservationssupportanexpectationthatthecountrieswithlongesttenureinthe
EEC->EUsystemwouldbetheonesthatmorefullyembeddedtheECHRregimeintotheir
domesticlegalsystem.Ifourhypothesisisborneout,westillwillnotknowifrule-of-lawculture
perseistheprimarycausalvariable,duetoitsco-variancewithlengthofEUtenure.Still,wewill
haveunearthedsomeinitialsupportfortheruleoflawthesis.
Inordertotestthishypothesis,wedividedourcasesintothreecategories,asfollows:
(1)CoreEUmemberstates--France,Germany,andtheNetherlands.Thesestateshavealong
rule-of-lawtradition,albeitonepunctuatedinthecaseofGermany(anditsfellowcoremember
Italy)bytheirFascist/Naziperiodsandalengthyexperiencewithsupranationallegal/political
institutions.(2)StatesthatbecameEUmembersinthe1980s--Portugal,Greece,andSpain.
Thesestatesexperienceddecades-longdiscontinuitiesintheruleoflawandmissedthe
formativeperiodofearlyEuropeanCommunitymembership.(3) MembersoftheCouncilof
EuropefromoutsideWesternEurope(i.e.statesoftheformerSovietbloc)Romania.Whenthey
joinedtheCouncilofEuropeintheearly1990s,thesecountrieshadenduredfiftyyearsof
totalitarianpoliticalabusesandanabysmalrecordofrule-of-lawperformance.Romaniajoined
theCouncilofEuropein1993,ratifiedtheConventioninJune1994,submitteditsapplicationfor
EUmembershipinJune1995,andbeganEUaccessionnegotiationsonFebruary15,2000.
WeinitiallyhadalsoincludedinourstudyanexampleofaformerSovietRepublic(as
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distinguishedfromSovietblocmember),Moldova(BanandGoldstein2002).Itssoviet-style
institutionshavebeenlargelypreservedsinceindependence(1991),eventhoughitjoinedthe
CouncilofEuropein1995andratifiedtheConventionin1997.Furtherreflectioncausedusto
eliminatealloftheformerSovietrepublicsfromthescopeofourstudy,althoughourhypothesis
shouldapplytotheotherSovietbloc(asdistinguishedfromSovietUnion)countriesthatarein
theCouncilofEuropeandtotheBalticRepublics.Thereasonwesegregatedthecasesinthis
wayisourperceptionthattheECtHRforatimewasapparentlyapplyingadoublestandardwith
respecttoformerSovietrepublics,mostnotoriouslyRussia:ForalongtimetheCourtaccepted
nocasesthatpresentedclaimsofviolationsofhumanrightsinthesecountries,evidently
attemptingtogivethesefledglingrule-of-lawregimesextratimetoadapttoWesternrule-of-law
standards.BecausethestandardappliedbytheECtHRtosuchcountriesismarkedlyeasierto
attainthanthestandardappliedtothemoreWesternmemberstates,thereisnotyetaviable
waytomeasure"integration"oftheformerintotheECtHRregime.Ineffect,theCourtseemsto
havegrantedthemsomesortofdefactoapprenticeshipperiod.In2000,forinstance,the
ECtHRregistered1,323applicationstohearcases(i.e.,claimsofhumanrightsabuses)against
Russia.Itacceptednonethatyear.ByAugust2002,incontrast,theECtHRhasissuedtwo
condemnationsofRussia.Forcomparisonpurposes,theyear2000figuresforRomaniaare31
outof639casesaccepted;France,80outof870(www.echr.coe.int).Ifourinferencefromthis
dataiscorrect,thenitwouldseemthattheECtHRitselfisoperating,atleastastoitstreatmentof
Russia,ontheveryassumptionwearetestinginthispaper(viz.,thatcountriesaccustomedto
theruleoflawwillmorereadilythanothersacceptthetransnationalauthorityoftheECtHR.).
Havingselectedexamplesfromeachofthesecategories,wethencomparedboththerate
andthethoroughnesswithwhicheachofthemacceptedECHRnormsintotheirownlegal
systemsasconstraintsontheirownsovereignty.Ourexpectationwasthattheacceptanceof
theECHRlegalregimewouldbedeepestandbroadestinthecoreEUstates,withmorerecent
EUstatesandapplicantstatesfollowinginthatorder.
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Thestructureoftheargumenttofollowlooksfirst,inSection2,attheconstitutionalizationof
theECHRregimebyexamining(1)ECHRcompatibilitywithtextsofnationalconstitutionsand(2)
thereceptionoftheECHRregimebyspecializedconstitutionalcourtsinthosecountriesthat
havesuchcourts.(Inthemajorityofthecountriesweexamined,asinglecourtmonopolizesthis
jurisdiction.Exceptionsarenotedbelow.)ThissectionexaminestheprimacyoftheConvention
overdomesticlawbysurveyingthedegreeofcoherencebetweenthetreatystreatmentin
constitutionaltextandinconstitutionalcourtdoctrine.Nationalconstitutionallawisourfirst
measureoftheembeddednessoftheConvention.
Section3thenexaminesimplementationofECtHRdoctrinebytherestofjudiciary(looking
beyondthespecificallyconstitutionalcourts)ineachofthecountriesofourstudy.Insection4,
wefocusonthequestionofimplementationofECtHRdecisionsbythelegislativeandexecutive
branchesofthememberstates.Section5willpresentourconclusions.
2.ConstitutionalStatusoftheECHRRegime
Asaprefacetotheanalysishere,wepointouttwoelementsofEuropeanlegalcontext.
First,theECtHRtreatsnotonlythetextoftheConventionbutalsoitsowndoctrinaloutputas
thelawoftheConvention(Handysidev.UK,ECtHR1976;Modinosv.Cyprus,22April1993;
Dudgeonv.UnitedKingdom, 22Oct.1981;Norrisv.Ireland,26Oct.1988;ShapiroandStone
Sweet2002,2).ThisaspectofECtHRdoctrinemeritsattentionbecausesomenationalcourts
usedtoclaim,andothersstilldo(atconsiderableexpenseintreasureandcredibility)thatthey
were/areboundonlybythetextoftheConventionandbythoseECtHRdecisionsinwhichtheir
countrywasadefendant.InsupportofthisargumenttheycitedthelanguageofArticle53of
the1950Convention(renumberedin1998tobecomeArt.46),whichspecificallymentionsonly
anobligationofpartiestotheConventiontoobeytheECtHRdecisioninanycasetowhich
theyareparties.TheirbehavioropenlyignorestheECtHRscustomofprefacingitsexamination
ofthefactswithasummaryoftheinterpretationitgavetospecificrelevantcasesinprevious
decisions;by1993,theECtHRwaspointedlycondemningdefendant-statesforneglectofprior
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ECtHRcases.Onemustconcludethatcertainlyby1993theECtHRhadexplicitlyrejecteda
narrowinterpretationofArticle53,andexpecteditsprecedentstobehonored.
Second,theConventionandECtHRjurisprudence,ontheonehand,andtheECJ
jurisprudenceonhumanrights,ontheotherhand,aretightlylinkedtoeachother.Earlyon,the
ECJreferredtotheConventionasafundamentalsourceofCommunityrights(Rutiliv.Ministryof
theInterior1975).Morerecently,the(EU)TreatyofAmsterdam(Art.6)andtherecently-
adoptedEUCharterofFundamentalRightsandFreedoms(Art.47),mandateddeferencetothe
ConventionandtotheCourt.Thus,ECJpracticestrengthensnormsandrulesoftheECHR
regime,alreadytermedbycertainscholars,apartoftheculturalself-definitionofEuropean
civilization"(AlstonandWeiler1999,3;Harmsen2000,34).
A.TheCoreStates
I.France
TheFrenchConstitutionof1958doesnotprivilegetheConventionisascomparedtoother
internationallegalinstruments.UnderArticle55,treatiesprevailovernationallaws(butnot
overtheConstitution).TheConseilConstitutionnel(ConstitutionalCouncil)inafamous1975
decisionacknowledgedthisprimacy,inprinciple(Decision74-74of15Jan.1975),butrefused
theretoreviewthecompatibilityofinternationaltreatieswithnationallaw,groundingitsrefusal
onitsclaimthattreatylawiscontingent,asArt.55putsit,subjecttoitsapplicationbythe
otherparty,therebydecliningtoenforcetheConvention(Steiner1997;Coccozza1996,714-
15).InalatercasethatsameyeartheConseilConstitutionnelrefusedspecificallytoreviewa
FrenchstatutelegalizingabortionforthecompatibilitywiththeConvention(Art.2)provision
protectingtherighttolifeofeveryhumanperson.HeretheConseilsaidsimplythatitsjurisdiction
waslimitedtoclashesbetweentheConstitutionandstatutes,thattreatyinterpretationwasnot
partofitspurview,andthejudgesruledthestatuteconstitutional(Cons.Const.,23July1975,
Decis.75-56;Troper2003,42).
WhathappenednextisthatFrancessupremeappellatecourtforordinarylaw,the
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CourdeCassation,pickeduptheball.In1975,shortlyaftertheabortiondecisionthiscourt
startingstrikingdownFrenchlawsthatconflictedwiththetreatylawoftheEuropean
Community.FromthisactionevolvedthedoctrinethatallFrenchcourtshavethedutytostrike
downastatutethatconflictswithtreatylawconvention-basedjudicialreview(Troperibid.).
In1981FrancelegislativelyacceptedtherightofindividualpetitiontotheECtHR,andin1988the
Secretary-GeneraloftheConseilConstitutionnel,BrunoGenevois,admittedthattheConvention
hadconstitutionalvalueinFranceandthereforecouldnotbeconsideredascontingent."
(Genevois1988;Alter2001,158-59).TheConseilConstitutionnelinthelate1980sofficially
acknowledgeditsdutyunderArticle55oftheConstitutiontoenforceinternationallaw
supremacyoverordinarydomesticstatutes,ingeneral(Decis.86-216,3Sept.1986);Decis.88-
1082/1117,21Oct.1988), andeventuallyenforcedtheConventioninparticular(e.g.,pursuant
toFunke,CrmieuxandMiailhe(no.1)v.France,ECtHRJudgmentsof25Feb.1993).These
prominentshiftsbytheConseilConstitutionnelevidentlyhelpedpersuadetheConseildEtat
(Francessupremecourtforadministrativelaw)by1989toabandonitsearlierprominenthostility
toenforcinginternationaltreaties(Nicolo,"ConseildEtat,5July1989[ECTreatyaboveFrench
Law)];ConseildEtat,21Dec.1990,Decis.283-286[ECHRaboveFrenchLaw];Steiner1997,280).
Still,thewillingnessofthesehighFrenchcourtstoconformtoECtHRrulingshasbeenlargely
limitedtocasesinwhichFranceplayedadirectroleasrespondentstate.Inotherwords,these
courtshavenot,asageneralmatter,treatedECtHRprecedentsfromothercountriesascreating
rulesbindingonFrance.
Despitethisincompletenessofjudicialimplementation,itisfairtosaythatbythelate1980s
formalconstitutionaldoctrineinFrancegavetheConventionpriorityoverFrenchstatutelaw,if
notovertheFrenchConstitution.Thiswasnosmallchangeinacountrywithasstrongatradition
ofParliamentarysovereigntyasFrancehad.
II.Germany
InthetextoftheGermanConstitution(Art.59)thestatusoftheConventionislower,inthat
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treatieshavethesamerankasfederalstatutes.Onlygeneralprinciplesofinternationallawand
theGermanConstitutionitselfareaccordedhigherstatusthandomesticstatutes.Nonetheless,
inGermany,theECHRdidcometoprevailoverdomesticstatutesbywayofinterventionfrom
theGermanConstitutionalCourt.In1987,inaccordancewiththeconstitutionalprinciplethat
theinterpretationthatconformstointernationallawmustprevail,thepowerfulGerman
ConstitutionalCourt(BundesverfassungsgerichtorBVerfG)ineffectbroughttheConvention
regimeintoGermanlawbydecidingthattheBVerfGsinterpretationofthoseConventionrights
thatarelistedintheGermanConstitutionmusthaveregardtoboththeConventionandthe
case-lawthatensuestherefrom(Decis.of26March1987);Schlette1996;BVerfGDecis.on
MaastrichtTreaty12Oct.1993.Moreover,theBVerfG(officiallyappointedguarantorofhuman
rightsinGermanybytheConstitution)ruledthatordinaryGermanstatutesmustbeinterpreted
(whereverpossible)asconformingtotheECHR,nomatterwhetherthelegislationwereprioror
subsequenttotheConvention(Voss1997,155-56).TheBVerfGalsocreatedaspecialappeal
foundedontheprincipleofequalprotectionbeforethelaw,whichwastooperatewhenever
theECHRwasapplicableandhadbeendisregardedbyordinarycourts(Frowein1992,122).This
rulingencouragedtheordinarycourtstotakecaretousetheECHRinorderthattheirjudgments
wouldnotbeoverturnedonappeal.Insum,despiteaconstitutionaltextthataccordedno
specialstatustotheCouncilofEuropetreatyortotheConventionassuch,thehigh
constitutionalcourtofGermanyby1987elevatedtheECHRanditrelatedjurisprudenceto
supremacyoverGermanstatutes.
Itbearsattentionthatthisjudicialmovewasroughlycontemporaneousbothwiththe
movementinthesamedirectionbytheFrenchConseilConstitutionnel,andwiththeadoptionof
theSingleEuorpeanActof1987bytheEuropeanCommunity(eliminatingthevetopowerof
eachmemberstateoftheECoverECpolicies).ThepoliticalmoodinWesternEuropeofthe
late1980s(irrespectiveofdifferentlywordedconstitutions)seemstohavepushedboththese
transnationalevolutionsoflegaldoctrine.
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III.TheNetherlands
Ofoursevencountries,theConstitutionoftheNetherlands,mostclearlysubordinates
nationallawtotheECHRregime.Article94oftheDutchConstitutionunequivocallyprovides
thatdomesticregulationsshallnotbeappliedunlesstheyareinconformitywithprovisionsof
treatiesandresolutionsofinternationalinstitutionsoncethelatterhavebeenpublished,
implicitlyincorporatingtheensembleofECtHRcase-lawwithinthiscategoryofresolutions.As
earlyas1980theHogeRaad(DutchSupremeCourt)interpretedArticle94asestablishing(1)
thatboththetextoftheConventionandECtHRinterpretationsofitaresupremeovernotonly
nationallaws,butevenovertheDutchConstitution;and(2)thattheseECHRrulestakedirect
effectinDutchlawi.e.,nopriorDutchlegislativeoradministrativeimplementationisrequired
inordertogivethemtheforceoflaw(judgmentof23Sept.1980).TheHoge Raadalso
bolsteredthestatusoftheConventionbyitsleadershiprole:itproducedthree-fourthsofallthe
DutchjudicialreferralstotheECtHR(Vervaele1992,211-14;KlerkanddeJonge1997).
ThisDutchconstitutionalframeworkrequiresallDutchjudgestorefusetoapplyany
domesticstatutoryprovisionsorprovisionsoftheConstitutionthatconflictwiththeConvention
(orotherinternationaltreaty,eventhoughtheyarenotsupposedtoruleonconflictsbetween
statutesandtheConstitution).Unliketheothercountriesinoursample,theDutchdonothave
aspecialconstitutionalcourtthatmonopolizesthepowerofconstitution-basedjudicialreview.
Constitution-basedjudicialreview(incontrasttointernational-law-basedjudicialreview)is
forbiddenintheDutchConstitution,Art.111(KlerkanddeJonge1997,111-112).
B. NewerEUStates
I.Spain
SpainisaparagonoftheECHRregime,theConventionbeingeffectivelysupremelawon
thebasisofthewidelypresumedintentofthedraftersofthe1978SpanishConstitutiontobind
thenationalprotectionofhumanrightstointernationalinstruments(CavagnaandMonteiro
1992,177).Interestingly,Article10-2,thelegaltextsupportingthisinterpretation,doesnot
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mentionspecificallyeithertheECHRandorECtHRjurisprudence;itreads,Thenormsrelativeto
basicrightsandlibertieswhicharerecognizedbytheConstitutionshallbeinterpretedin
conformitywiththeUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandtheinternationaltreatiesand
agreementsonthosemattersratifiedbySpain.
TheSpanishConstitutionalCourt,however,beginningwithitsfirstcasethatposedtheissue,
in1984,hasconstruedArt.10-2torequireitselfandallotherSpanishcourtstofollowECtHR
caselaw;anyindividualunderthejurisdictionofSpanishcourtsmaytakeaclaimtotheSpanish
ConstitutionalCourtchallengingastatuteasunconstitutionalonthegroundsofconflictwith
ECtHRjurisprudence(ConstitutionalCourt:Judgment114/1984,29Nov.1984;Judgment25Oct.
1993;Judgment259/1994,3Oct.1994;Lembert1999,342,354-55,357).
StrasbourgcaselawtherebyveryquicklybecameaneffectivesourceofSpanish
constitutionallaw.Thisoccurredslightlyinadvanceof,althoughroughlycontemporaneously,
withmovesinthesamedirectionbytheconstitutionalcourtsofFranceandGermany.
II.Portugal
Bycontrast,inPortugal,thereceptionoftheConventionwasuntiltheearlyninetiesmuch
cooler.Foronething,thePortugueseConstitutionspecifiesinitsArticle16.2onlyone
internationaltreatyinharmonywithwhichdomesticstatutesandtheConstitutionmustbe
construed:theUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.Anattemptedconstitutional
amendmenttoaddtheEuropeanConventionfailedin1982,onthepurportedgroundsthatit
mighthavepermittedderogationfromtheconstitutionalstatusoffundamentalrightsby
introducingtheunforeseenrestraintsofECtHRjurisprudence(CavagnaandMonteiro1992,
171-79).
IncontrasttoSpain,thePortugueseConstitutionalCourtforalongtimedidnotactively
promotetheConventionasanormativeframeworkforPortuguesedomesticcourts.Despiteits
soleconstitutionalauthoritytodecideconflictsbetweendomesticlawandtreaties,thiscourt
classifiedbreachesofatreatybyadomesticstatuteasmattersofindirectconstitutionality,
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whichclassificationputthemintothejurisdictionofordinaryPortuguesecourts,whohave
constitution-interpreting(butnotdirecttreaty-interpreting)authority(ibid.,180).Thus,thiscourt
abandonedtheopportunitytodirectlowercourtjudgesinterpretationoftheConvention,even
thoughtheconstitutionaltextconstraineditspowersnomorethantheGermanorSpanish
constitutionsrestrainedtheConstitutionalCourtthere.
UntiltheearlyninetiesPortugueselegalscholarsandjudgesweremaintainingthattheir
countrysConstitutionsurpassedtheConventionintermsoftheprotectionofindividualrights
(Leandro2000).Thelimitationofthisviewpoint,aswiththatoftheirGermancounterpartson
issuesotherthanArticle6.1oftheConvention(seebelow),isthatitconstruestheConventionas
a(textually)fixedsetofrules,whentherealityisthatofacontinuousprocessof(judicial)
interpretationandexpansionofthoserules.Thatis,evenjudgeswhoheedthetextofthe
ConventionareignoringrightsunderthatConventionthathavebeendevelopedbyECtHR
jurisprudence.Theclearestevidenceofproblemswiththeirapproachisthefactthatboth
GermanyandPortugalexperienceyearlycondemnationsinStrasbourg.
Ontheotherhand,therearesignsofchangeinPortugal,withrespecttoarecent
turnaboutbyitsConstitutionalCourt.In2002theConstitutionalCourtissuedalengthyreportto
aconferenceofconstitutionalcourtsinBrussels,inwhichitdocumentedadecadeofitsown
pro-activeleadershipintermsofrevisingPortuguesecaselawtobringitintoconformitywiththe
ECHR.Moreover,thiscourtspecificallynotedthatwhilethetextofthePortugueseConstitution
offersmoredetailedprotectionofhumanrightsthandoesthelanguageoftheConvention,
nonethelesstheinterpretivecaselawoftheECtHRoughttobeusedtofleshoutthemeaningof
thecorrelativerightsprovisionsinthePortugueseConstitution(ConstitutionalCourtofPortugal
2002,35).
III.Greece
The1975republicanConstitutionofGreecegrantedtointernationallawandall
internationalconventionsenteredbyGreeceself-executingeffectandprimacyoverany
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contraryprovisionofthelaw(Article28.1).WhileGreecelacksaspecificallyconstitutional
court,theGreekSupremeAdministrativeCourtruledthattheexpressionanycontraryprovision
ofthelawistobeconstruedasplacingtheECHRabovealldomesticlawexceptthe
Constitution,andthisinterpretationisacceptedintheotherGreekcourts(Judgments4590/1976
and395/1978,citedinPerrakis1996,174).
Controloverthevalidityofdomesticlawshasseveralunusualfeatures,themostimportant
beingthatunderGreeklawtheECHRisembeddedintwosystemsofcontrol.Thefirstisthe
controlforconstitutionality:allGreekjudgesareobligedtoassurethatdomesticlawsconformto
theConstitution;everyjudicialandadministrativecourtisrequiredbytheConstitution(Art.87.2)
torefusetoapplyanylawthatviolatestheConstitution.Thesecondisthecontrolforconformity
withinternationallaw.ThiscontrolempowersallGreekcourtstoverifywhetherdomesticlaws
complywiththeECHRandrefusetoapplyanydomesticlawthatdoesnot.Thissituationis
distinctfromthatoverconstitutionalitybecausejudgesarerequiredtoexplorethisquestiononly
ifapartytothecaseraisestheissue.Thewaythisdualsystemplaysoutinpracticeisthat,unless
apartyhasraisedaquestionofConventionviolation,Greekcourtsdonotrefusetoapplylaws
thatarecontrarytotheECHRsolongasthecourtfindstheminotherrespectsconstitutional
(Bechlivanou1992;Perrakis1996).Thisapproachseverelyconstrainstheeffectivenessofthe
ConventioninGreece.
Apartfromthislimitation,aconsensusforalongtimeprevailedamongGreekcourtsand
legalscholarsthatsincethelistingofhumanrightsintheGreekConstitutionmatchesthatofthe
ECHR,theirrespectisassuredbymeansofcontroloverconstitutionality,althoughonedoesfind
morerecentscholarshipnowassertingthecontrary(Bechlivanou1992,158;Perrakis1996,187).
AsinthecasewithPortugal,itbecomesincreasinglycostlyforGreekcourtstoignorethelawof
ECtHRrulings:TherightofindividualpetitiontotheECtHRgrantedbyGreecein1985is
producingconsiderablepressure;intheyear2000,Greecefiguredhighonthelist(atno.6)of
statescondemnedbytheECtHRforviolationsoftheConvention.
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C.Non-EUExampleEU-applicant,Romania
InRomaniatheformalstatusoftheECHRbenefitsfromgeneroustreatmentinits
Constitutionof1991(Art.11;Art.20.1):theprotectionofthehumanrightslistedinthe
Constitutionistofollowinternationalhumanrightstreaties;shouldaconflictarisebetweensuch
treatyanddomesticlaw(belowtheConstitution),thetreatyprevails(Deleanu2001).The
RomanianConstitutionalCourt(hereafterCC)hasamonopolyoverquestionsof
constitutionality,includingallhumanrightsissues.Ordinarycourtsarethereforerequiredtorefer
theconflictandcomplywithwhatevertheCCdecides.
EvenbeforeStrasbourgfirstdecidedacomplaintfromRomaniain1998,theCCruledas
earlyas1994(judgmentof14Dec.)thattheECHRshouldguidetheinterpretationofthe
Constitutiononhumanrightsquestions.Thisindependentandactivecourtmanagedtoshape
thepracticeofordinarydomesticcourts,anditsdecisions,afterunevenlevelsofcomplianceby
ordinarycourtsintheearly1990s,arenowtreatedasbindingbyallofthem(e.g.,Curteade
ApelBucuresti,s.pen.,judgments311/2000,1235/2000,and2768,26Nov.1999).4
Still,theCourtsinterpretivestanceismarkedbyatension.Ontheonehand,theCC
approachesgapsintheRomanianConstitutionondueprocessasopportunitiestoenlargethe
impactoftheECHR.Thus,ina2000landmarkdecision(CCjudgment146,14July2000),the
ConstitutionalCourtrejectedtheinterpretationoftheexecutivebranchthataruleofcriminal
procedureisconstitutionalsolongasthehumanrightinvokedtochallengeit(here,reasonable
lengthofcriminalproceedings)isnotexplicitlyforbiddenintheConstitution.TheCourtruled
thatifarightisprotectedbytheECHR,sincetheConventionmustbeeffectiveinRomanianlaw,
anydomesticnorminfringingtherightisunconstitutional.
Ontheotherhand,inmatterswherenosuchgapsexist,theCChasbeeninconsistentin
addressingtherelevanceofthetextoftheECHRandofECtHRjurisprudenceinitsdecisions
(Chirita2003).ItsapplicationoftheConventionvaries:Onmanyoccasionsithasdeclared
unconstitutionaladomesticnormonthegroundsofviolationoftheECHR(CCjudgments234,20
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Dec.1999;145,14July2000;112,19Apr.2001;148,8May2001;255,20Sept.2001)andhaseven
donesoonitsowninitiative(CC,judgment199,23Nov.1999);butatothertimesithas(1)failed
toofferanyguidelinesforapplyingconcededlyrelevantECtHRcaselaw(CC,judgments104,11
Apr.2001,and234,20Dec.1999),(2)failedtociteandapplyobviouslyrelevantECtHRcaselaw
despiteitsobligationtodoso(CC,Judgment55,22Mar.2000,neglectinga1999ECtHRcase
againstRomania[Brumarescuv.Romania]despiteadissentcriticizingthereasoningonthis
grounds(3)dismissedacomplainantsreferencetospecificarticlesoftheConventionasunduly
detailed(CCjudgment82,8Mar.2001)and(4)failedtoaddresslitigants'argumentsbasedon
theConventionandcaselaw(CCjudgments11,9Feb.1999;211,1Nov.2000;171,23May
2001).TheseinconsistenciesweakenedtheEuropeanhumanrightsregimeinRomaniainthat
theyexhibitedpatternsofreasoningthatdepartedfromthoseoftheECtHRandreflectedthe
oldunderstandingofsovereignty.Moreover,totheextentthattheCCassumedtheposture
oftheofficialpromoteroftheECHRinRomanianlaw,itslackofconsistencyinupholdingthe
ECHRregimehaspromotedaclimateinwhichordinarycourtshavenotdiligentlybeenreferring
toitcasesthatposeapotentialconflictbetweentheConventionandRomanianlaw.
Asidefromthesecaveats,onecanconcludethatthisconstitutionalcourthasconsiderably
strengthenedtheECHRregimeinRomania,primarilybecauseithasreversedmanylongstanding
practicesthatwereoutoflinewithECtHRrulings.Italsochallengedacomplacentattitudeof
thejudiciarytowardinternationallegalnorms.
D. ConclusionstoSection2
Atleastattheformallevel,thefindingsinthissectionproducemixedresultsforour
hypothesis.InRomania,notyetintheEU,itsConstitutionalCourthasbeenmarkedlyinconsistent
infollowingtheauthorityoftheECHRandofthecaselawoftheECtHR.So,attheextreme,our
thesisinasenseholds.Ontheotherhand,concerningthecontrastweexpectedbetweenthe
earlier,rule-of-law-entrenchedEUmembers(Germany,theNetherlands,France)andthelater
ones--theoneswithrecentlengthyhistoriesofdictatorialrule(Spain,Portugal,andGreece)at
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leastatthelevelofformalconstitutionallaw,wefoundnoteworthyvariationwithineachgroup,
ratherthantheunidirectionalcontrastweexpected.Specifically,France,withitsdecadesof
formalresistancebyitshigh-leveljudiciarytothewordingofitsownConstitution,whichshould
haveindicatedthattheConventionanditscaselawtookpriorityoverdomesticlaw,tookmuch
longertoaccepttheECHRregime(and,intermsoftreatingcaselawasbindingprecedent,
remainssomewhatresistant)ascomparedtoSpain,whichratifiedtheConventiononlyin1979.
Germany,astalwartoftheECsystemdidnotofficiallyamenditsConstitutiontogivepriorityto
ECHRlawanysoonerthantheFrenchshift,butdidmoveviainterpretivechangeatthehandsof
itsConstitutionalCourtjustaroundthetimethattheFrenchCourtmovedinthesamedirection.
Strikingly,despitethedifferenceintimesofenteringtheCouncilofEurope,theSpanish,French,
andGermanConstitutionalCourtmovedroughlycontemporaneouslytogiveECHRlawpriority
overdomesticlaw,andthisjudicialinitiativeoccurredroughlyatthetimeoftheECsSingle
EuropeanActof1987.TheformalconstitutionallawofbothGreeceandPortugaldoesappear
tohavelaggedbehindtheotherECmembersinoursamplewithrespecttoassimilatingthe
ECHRregime.
3.TheRegimeNormsandRulesinSub-ConstitutionalCourts
Inthesesevencountries(andinmuchoftheworld)thedominantpatternisthatauthorityto
engageinconstitutionalreviewofnationalstatutesisreservedtoasinglespecialcourt.The
threeexceptionsamongoursevenweretheNetherlands,whereconstitution-basedjudicial
reviewofactsofthenationallegislatureisforbidden;Portugal,whereallcourtssharethepower
(althoughtreaty-interpretingpoweris,inprinciple,reservedtoasinglehighcourt);andGreece,
whereallcourtssharethepower(andareinprincipleobligedtoexerciseit)butwhichhasa
body,theSpecialHighestCourtofGreece,thatis,amongotherthings,designatedtoresolve
anydisagreementsonthemeaningoftheConstitutionbetweenanytwoofitsthreehigh
appellatecourts.Theseariseonlyrarely(Bechlivanou1992,169).Thisoverallsituationmeansthat
strongleadership,orlackthereof,bytheConstitutionalCourt(wherethereisone)substantially
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influencessuchquestionsaswhethertheECHRistreatedinfactasbinding,andthatiswhywe
devotedasectiontoconstitutionalcourtsandtheirconstitutions.Theapplicationofthe
Conventionbyordinary(inthesenseoftheotherthanspecialconstitutional)courtscannotbe
ignoredeither.Tothedegreethatsuchpracticeprevails,theECHRmorefullyattainsthestatus
ofbindingnorm,whichtheformalconstitutionalsystemsofallsevencountriesinprinciple
establish.Inthenatureofthings,asinglecourtforawholecountrydoesnothavetimetohear
morethanaverytinyfractionofallcasesthatcomealong.Onlyifordinarydomesticcourts
routinelyapplytheECHR,willthesecountriesinfactattaintheobjectivesetforthbytheECtHR:
tosafeguardtheindividualinrealandpracticalways,establishingnotrightsthatare
theoreticalorillusory,butrightsthatarepracticalandeffective(Articovs.ItalyECtHR1980;
AireyvsIrelandECtHR1979).
UnliketheECJ,whichissuesbindinginterpretationsofEurope-levellawinPreliminaryRulings
tomemberstatecourts,theECtHRhasnomechanismallowingittocommunicatedirectlywith
nationalcourtsand,asaconsequence,facesmoredifficultyinconstructingalegalregime.In
theEUcountries,however,theECtHRpresumablybenefitsfromthecreationbytheECJofa
communityoflawatboththedomesticandtransnationallevel.Theconjecturethatthesame
judgeswhohavebeensocializedinthepracticeofreferringdomesticcasesforinterpretation
bytheECJandwhoaregenerallyaccustomedtomakejudgmentsboundedby(EU)
transnationallawnormswouldbemorelikelytotakeguidancefromsupranationalECHRlaw
thantheoneswhohavenot,thuswasoneofthetwofoundationsforourhypothesisthatlength
ofEUmembershipwouldberelatedtostrengthoftheECHRregimewithinacountry.
A.CoreEUCountries
I.France
TheFrenchSupremeCourtforcivilandcriminallaw,theCourdeCassationhasbeenatthe
forefrontofacknowledgingtheforceofECHRlawinFrance,havingrecognizeditslegalforcein
casesasearlyas1975(Respino,decis.3June1975;Glaeser,decis.30June1976;Judgmentof5
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Dec.1978,citedinSteiner1997,281n.58).TheseearlyforaysintoECHRjurisprudence,however,
wereerraticandmarkedbyambivalence(Steiner1997).OncetheConseilConstitutionnel
changeditsstancetowardtheECHR, however,theCourdeCassationfollowedalong
enthusiastically.Between1987and1997thiscourtissuedmorethan700decisionspertainingto
theapplicabilityoftheConventionandECtHRcaselaw(FabreandGouron-Mazel1998),and
alteringitsownjurisprudenceincaseaftercaseafterFrancelostattheECtHR(e.g.,Courde
Cassationdecis.12June1996pursuanttoFoucherv.FranceECtHR18March1997).
Still,therecordoftheCourdeCassationhasbeenuneven.Onecanpointtonumerous
cases,wherethiscourthasfaithfullyappliedECtHRstandardstoalterFrenchlaw.Forexample,it
declaredArt.546oftheFrenchCodeofCriminalProcedureincompatiblewithECHRArt.6on
theequalityofthepartiesbeforethecourt(Judgment21May1997).Also,thiscourtissueda
rulingtobringFrenchpracticeintoconformitywithECtHRdecisionsonthestandardsof
interrogationsforcriminalproceedings(Judgment26March1998).Butinseveralcaseswhich
aresensitivetothecreationofEuropeanrule-of-lawstandardssuchastherighttodefense
counselandtherighttofileforappeal,theCourdeCassationhasmountedwhatJean-Pierre
Marguenaud(2001)termedarebellionagainsttheECtHR,byrefusingtoconsiderexplicitcase
lawoutlinedbytheECtHRinjudgmentsissuedagainsttheFrenchstateitself.In Poitrimolv.
France(23Nov.1993),Guerinv.France(29July1998)andOmarv.France(29July1998)the
ECtHRcondemnedtheFrenchjudicialruleaccordingtowhichapersonresistingarrestmaynot
fileforappealandberepresentedbyalawyer.TheCourdeCassationrefusedtooverturnthe
rule(Judgmentsof19Jan.1994;15Feb.1994;9Jan.1995;14Nov.1996;18Nov.1997;Gouttes
n.d.).ThiscourtexhibitedsimilarintransigencetowardstheECtHRstandardsofBelletv.France,
(4Dec.1995)initsdecisionsof6Jan.1997,AffaireFondationsaintMarc, "(Gouttesn.d.).
Subsequentlythesamecriminalchamberofthesamecourtyielded,onlytoreversecoursetwo
monthslater,withreferencetothesameArticle6.1,inthewidelytelevised(formerNazi)Papon
case,whentheFrenchjudgesagainignoredtheECHR-relevantPoitrimolcase-law.
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Frenchlowercourtshavetendedsince1988tousetheConventionmoreextensivelythan
before,evenfollowingtheECHRinpreferencetoexplicitFrenchstatutelaw,andcopyingECtHR
reasoningalmostverbatim,althoughoftenwithoutacknowledgingitssource(Margenaud2001,
5-7;Lembert1999,345).Still,theyseemtolimittheirpreferenceforECHRlawtosituationswhere
Frenchlaw(statutoryand/orcaselaw)eitherconfirmsorissilentaboutparticularConvention
provisions(Gouttesn.d.;Lembert1999,349-50).
II.Germany
InGermany,thepracticeofapplyingECtHRjurisprudenceasadirectsourceoflawisrelatively
rarebecauseofthewidespreadbeliefamongGermanjudgesthatthefundamentalrightslisted
intheirFederalConstitutionarewiderinscopethanthosefoundintheConvention(Burkhard
2000;Voss1997,158).Butthisisnotthewholepicture,becausethedetailedguaranteesof
Articles5and6oftheECHRdonotappearintheGermanConstitution.Indeed,despitethis
generalbelief,inanumberofinstancesGermancourts discontinued(well-entrenched)rulesof
pre-trialcriminalproceedingsthatexceededthestandardsofreasonabledetentiontime
(Art.6.1)setbytheECtHR(Frowein1992,126;BGHStV.1992,452-453;BGHRSt.GB46Abs.2
Verfahrenverzogerung3).Ordinarycourts,ontheirown,areapplyinganumberofotherECtHR
standards(e.g.,theArt.6.3ruleonlegalassistancefromPakellivs.Germany,ECtHR,25April
1983)toalterrights-restrictivedomesticstatutes,enforcementpractices,orcaselawthathave
neitherbeenamendedyetbythelegislativepowernorinvalidatedbytheBVerfG(Frowein
1992,126).
III.TheNetherlands
IfGermanordinarycourtsaresophisticatedatapplyingECtHRcase-lawonlywithregardto
Article6.1,6.2,and6.3,theircounterpartsintheNetherlands(whereallthecourtsareordinary
courtsinoursenseoftheword)dosoonasystematicbasiswithregardtoboththeECHRand
ECtHRcaselaw.InthiscountrytheappealscourtofArnhemfirstappliedtheConventionin1978-
79;today,recoursetotheECHRandECtHRjurisprudenceisderigueurforDutchjudges
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(Corstens2000).Thesecourtshavegrownremarkablysophisticatedinmakingjudgmentsbased
ontheConventionandhaveexercisedinterpretiveskillsthatreproducethoseoftheECtHRon
suchdoctrinesasthenationalmarginofappreciation(seeabove)(e.g.,caseof9Jan.1986,
Arrondissementrechtsbank,Zwolle,No.14740/1985,citedinVervaele1992,223.)
Inpart,thissophisticationwithrespecttoECHRlawmustbeattributedtotheDutch
constitutionalprovision(Art.94)thatauthorizesallcourtstoapplyprovisionsoftreatiesor
decisionsofinternationalinstitutions.Wheneverthemeritsofthecasebearonrightsprotected
bytheECHR,thediscussionoftheECHRarticleinpointisstandardprocedure.Onmany
occasions,Dutchlow-levelcourtsorderedahumanrightsprotectionveryshortlyaftertheECtHR
standardsforitwerelaidoutwhetherthedecisiondirectlyconcernedtheNetherlandsas
defendant(asin,e.g.,HogeRaadjudgment2July1990,pursuanttoKostovskiv.the
Netherlands,ECtHR20Nov.1984)orinvolvedachallengetosomeothercountry'spractices.For
instance,theECtHRrulinginAbdulaziz,CabalesandBalkandaliv.UK(28May1985)was
incorporatedintoDutchjurisprudencewithinayear(Vervaele1992:224).
InGermany,theNetherlands,Spainand,toalesserdegreeinFrance,ordinarycourtsnow
factorintotheirjudgmentsstandardsfromECtHRcaselawandhavebecomeremarkably
knowledgeableabouttheECHRregime,capablyapplyingcomplexpatternsofECtHR
reasoning,includingthosewhichdistinguishcaseswhich,althougharguablygermanetothe
caseinhand,differinimportantnuances.
B.NewerEUcountries:Spain,PortugalandGreece
Forthereasonsexplainedinsection2,SpanishordinarycourtsroutinelyusetheECtHRcase
law,whereastheirPortuguesecounterpartsatleastasjudgedbyanalystsintheearly90s
weredoingsoonlyinfrequently(CavagnaandMonteiro1992,179).Therecentlyinvigorated
self-describedleadershipofthePortugueseTribunalConstitucionalnotedabovemaywellbe
triggeringachangeintheordinarycourts(althoughwehavenotyetfoundasecond-party
accountofthelowercourtsreaction).
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UntilGreecerecognizedtherighttoindividualpetitionin1985andlostalonglistofcasesin
Strasbourg,theConventionhadlittleeffectthere(Bechlivanou1992,165-167;Perrakis1996,171).
Foryears,manyordinarycourts'decisionsproducedlawlaterjudgedtobeviolationsofthe
Convention,suchastheinterpretationofArt.6oftheGreekConstitutionasnotprotectingthe
individualagainstcivilimprisonment(SalonikaCourtofAppeal,Judgment7Sept.1990;
ThessolanikiAdministrativeCourtofFirstInstance,Judgment1753/1983,citedbyBechlivanou
1992,164).Insomecases,ordinaryGreekcourtsissuedjudgmentsthatdirectlyviolatedexplicit
standardsfromanECtHRcaseinwhichGreeceitselfhadbeenaplaintiff(e.g.,twodecisions
contrarytoKokkinakisvGreece,25may1993,arecitedinCommitteeofMinistersResolutionDH
97,576of15Dec.1997).Eventoday,ordinaryGreekcourtsoftenrefuseprotectionofa
particularhumanrightguaranteedbytheConventiononthesheergroundsthatthe
Conventionallowsforrestrictions,withoutprovidinganythinglikethekindofjustificationforsuch
restrictionsthatisdemandedbyECtHRjurisprudence,suchastherequisiteexplicationofcriteria
oflegitimacyanddemocraticnecessity(e.g.CreteCourtofAppeal(Efetio),Judgment17
may1987).Mostrecently,aGreekcourt(MisdemeanourCourtofLamia,Judgment5Jan.2000)
defiedaseriesofrepeatedECtHRjudgmentsthattheGreekpracticeinquestionviolatedthe
Convention(Thlimmenosv.Greece,ECtHRdecis.no.34369/1997,6Apr.2000;Kokkinakisv.
Greece,ECtHRR1993).Insum,theGreekjudiciarydoesrelativelylittletoupholdtheECHR
regime.
AswithourdiscussioninSection2,GreeceandPortugalarelaggardsinimplementingthe
ECHRregime,Spaindoesatleastaswellaslong-timeEUmembers,Dutchcourtswereinthe
vanguard,andFranceresiststheECHRregimemorethandoesGermanyorevenSpainaless
longstandingmemberoftheEU.
C.Non-EUcountries--Romania
DespiteECHRratificationin1994,onlyafterthefirstcoupleofECtHRrulingsagainstRomania,
Vasilescuv.Romania22May1998andPetrav.Romania23Sept.1998,didRomaniancourts
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startinnoticeablenumberstoaddresstheECHR.Then,from1999through2002,thebasic
picturewasthataminorityofthejudgesincreasinglyhonoredthelawoftheECHR,whilemost
judgestreateditasjustanotherineffectualinternationaltreaty.Onthepro-ECHRside,for
instance,theSupremeCourt(CurteaSuprema)reversedin2000itspriorjurisprudenceontheuse
oflegalvenuesfortheretrievalofrealestateconfiscatedbythecommunistsaftertheECtHR
adjudgedthislineofprecedentaviolationoftheConvention(Brumarescuv.Romania28
October1999).Also,atleastoneregionalcourtofappealscrafteditspleaofunconstitutionality
attheConstitutionalCourtaroundECtHrcaselaw(e.g.,CurteadeApelBrasov,provisional
judgmentno.515/p/2001).Theseexamples,however,donottypifytheentirejudiciary.
Thedominantpatternsince1999hasbeenthatRomanianlawyersonlysporadicallydeploy
ECHR-basedclaims,duetotheir[accurate]perceptionofwidespreadunresponsivenessbylow-
levelcourtstosucharguments.Indeed,despiteseveralatypicalexamplesonecouldcite,
neithertheSupremenortheintermediatecourtsofappeals,asofthefirsthalfof2003,had
shownanyintenttoincorporatethebodyofECHRlawsystematicallyintoRomanian
jurisprudence.
Mid-year2003,however,seemstobeusheringinanew,moreECHR-friendlyeraforthe
Romanianjudiciary.TheendofJunebroughttwopivotalevents.First,inresponsetoa3June
2003decisionoftheECtHR(Panteav.Romania)thatdeclaredtheRomanianarrestwarrant
systeminconsistentwiththeECHRrequirementofseparationbetweentheexecutiveandjudicial
branches,theRomanianSupremeCourt(on27June2003)releasedajudgearrestedon
corruptioncharges.Indoingso,itdeclaredthatRomanianprosecutorsmustceaseissuingarrest
warrants,despitetheirstatutoryauthorizationtodoso,anddespitethefactthataParliamentary
debatetoamendthisstatutewasinprocessatthetime.Inotherwords,forthefirsttime,the
SupremeCourt(ineffect)declaredvoidaRomanianstatuteonthegroundsofaconflictwith
theECHR(eventhoughtheConstitutionreservesconstitution-basedjudicialreviewtothe
constitutionalcourt).SeverallowercourtsimmediatelyfollowedtheleadoftheSupremeCourt,
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inorderingreleasesofpersonsheldon[newly]improperwarrants.WithinaweekoftheSupreme
Courtaction,theParliamentcompleteditsECHR-stimulatedoverhauloftheCodeofCriminal
Procedure.Thiswholeprocessreceivedenormousmediacoverageandprovokednationwide
publicdiscussion.
Secondly,inearlyJuly,theMinistryofJusticeannouncedthatitplanstosendtoParliament
adraftLawoftheMagistracythatwouldrequirealljudgesandprosecutorstofollowECtHR
jurisprudencein(respectively)theirrulingsandtheirpleadings.Thismoveappearstobeadirect
expressionofthestrongdesireoftheRomanianpoliticalleadershipforEUmembership,pending
in2007andcontingenton,amongotherthings,reformofthejudiciary.Asoffall2003thetop
RomanianlawschoolswillbegintorequirecoverageofECtHRlawinthecurriculum.
D.ConclusionstoSection3 :
AsnotedattheendofSection3.B,thedistinctionweinitiallyhypothesizedbetweenthe
coreEUstatesandthenewerEUmembersdoesnotholdupacrosstheboard.Whilejudgesin
theNetherlandsandGermany,ontheonehand,andPortugalandGreece,ontheotherhand,
indeedformtwodistinctivegroupsalongthepatternweexpected,thecasesofSpainand
Francedonotfitthispattern.Spain,anEUmemberonlysince1986hasmuchmorefully
embeddedtheECHRregimeintoitslawthanhasFrance,afoundingmemberoftheEU.
AsforthethreestateswheretheECHRregimeislesswellentrenchedinjudicialpractice--
Portugal,GreeceandRomaniatheRomanianjudiciaryhasseemedmostweaklycommitted
totheECHRregime,inthesensethatmanyofitsjudgeshavebeenrepeatedlyignoringclearly
relevantECtHRcaselaw.InGreece,whilethereisfrequentjudicialresistancetoor
misapplicationofECtHRlaw,atleasttheECtHRjurisprudencehasbecomeapartoftheactive
vocabularyoftheGreekjudiciary.TheConstitutionalCourtofPortugal,ifonecantrustitsown
report,hastakenlargestridessince1991toentrenchECHRlegaldoctrine(2002).Still,this
movementtookonseriousmomentumonlyadecadeago,whereasECHRlawwasbythenan
oldstoryincountriesliketheNetherlands,Germany,andeven,surprisingly,Spain.
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4.LegislativeandExecutiveBranchImplementationofECtHRdecisions
A.CouncilofEuropeEnforcementRegime
AftertheECtHRhandsdownadecisionagainstasignatorymemberoftheConvention,the
onlyimmediateconcretecompulsionthatthestateconfrontsisitsobligationtopaythejust
satisfactionawardedbytheECtHRtotheapplicant,anobligationstatesfulfillmoreorlesson
time,inlightofthefactthateachcomplainantfunctionsasahighlymotivatedmonitoruntil
thepaymentismade.Havingpaidthecompensatorypenalty,however,thestateisnotthen
utterlyfreetopreserveitsdomesticlegalorderintactandtopersistinthesamehumanrights
violations.
Theobligationtoreformitsstatutesandlegalpractices,implicitinitssigningontothe
Convention,isenforcedthereafterinagentleandgradualistfashionbytheCommitteeof
MinistersoftheCouncilofEurope.ThisCommitteemeetseveryfewmonthsandconsistsofall
theforeignministersofthe(nowforty-six)membercountries.ThisCommitteeofMinisters
receivesareportofeachECtHRjudgmentandrespondstoeachwithaResolutionindicating
thetypeofreformwithinthemembercountrythatisneededtosatisfytheCourtsjudgment
(e.g.,eliminationofaparticularpenalstatute,reformofaparticularpolicepractice,etc.).The
stateisheldaccountableatfuturemeetingsforreportingonwhatprogresshasbeenmadeto
meetthestandardssetforthintheseResolutions.Ineffect,theCommitteeofMinistersactsas
theadministrativearmoftheECHRregimetoimplement,viapublicshaming,therulesimplicitin
thejudgmentoftheECtHR.Shouldthestatedragitsfeetforanunreasonablylongperiodof
time,theCommitteesanctionsitbyadoptinginterimresolutionsthatprovideinformationabout
thelackofprogressinimprovingimplementation(www.coe.int/intro/e-rules-46.htm).
EUorganizations,too,playaroleinthiscomplianceregime.First,EUstatesareindirectly
pressuredtobehave,bothbytheECJ,whichregardsthecaselawoftheECtHRasitsown
minimumhumanrightsstandard,andbypoliticalpressurefromtheeverdeepeningUnion.
Secondly,intheapplicantcountriestheCommissionerforEUenlargementdirectlysupervises
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reform.EachapplicantstateisrequiredtointegratehugeswathsoftheEuropeanlegalorder
structuredin30negotiationchapters,oneofwhichisthatonjusticeanddomesticaffairs,
whichhasarubriconhumanrightsviolations.TheCommissionannuallyreportsonthestateof
thejudiciaryandofhumanrightsandscoldstheapplicantstateifitfailstomakereasonable
andtimelychanges.Thus,theEUintegrationandenlargementprocessesarehighlyintertwined.
Theseinstitutionalforcesengulfthestateinanetworkoftransactionscreatedthebycomplex
interdependenceofEUmembershiporassociatestatus,whichnetworkfurthersthe
entrenchmentoftheECHRinnationalpolicy.
Finally,theECtHRitselfplaysaroleinspeedinglegislativereformbythewayitwordsits
decisions.Ingeneral,theCourtrefrainsfromdirectlystigmatizingadomesticnormasaperse
violationand,therefore,fromprescribingspecificpolicyreforms(Merrills1993,104).Nonetheless,
incertainlandmarkcases,theECtHRtookamoreassertivestanceandnoticeablyadoptedthe
roleofagenda-setter.Inoneinstance,afterhavingconceded,Thestatehasachoiceof
variousmeans,itaddedthataspecificdomesticnormviolatedtheConvention(Marcksvs.
Belgium1979).Thestatecorrectlygraspedthatthisamountedtoastrongrecommendationto
changethatlaw.TheECtHRannouncessuchprescriptivedecisionsforthefulfillmentofpositive
obligationswhenthedomesticorderlacksnormativeprovisionsmeanttosecurerespectforthe
rightsoutlinedintheConvention(X&Yv.Netherlands(1985))orwhenthestatehas
demonstratedneglectfortheprotectionofindividualrights(PlatformArtzefurdasLebenv.
Austria1992;Merrills1993,102-106).
B.Domesticlevellegislativeandexecutiveaction
IftheimpactofECtHRrulingswerelimitedtomonetarydamagestosingleindividualswho
broughtsuit,regimechangewouldbeveryincrementalindeed.Infact,thememberstatesof
theCouncilofEuropetypicallyengageinextensivelegislativeandexecutivebranchreformto
implementECtHRrulings.ToredressandpreventfutureviolationsoftheConvention,legislatures
andexecutiveorgansadoptnewlawsorlegislativeamendments,undertakesystematic
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screeningofdraftlegislation,andsendcircularletterstolawenforcementagenciestobring
theirpracticesintocompliancewiththestandardsofECtHRcase-law.Additionalexecutive
actionhasincludedorderinginclusionoftheConventionandofitscase-lawinthecurriculaof
lawschools,disseminatinginformationconcerningtheCourttothepublicatlarge,
implementingmeasurestoensuretheindependenceandtheprofessionalprestigeofthe
judiciary,and,finally,traininginhumanrightsforsectorsresponsibleforlawenforcement.
Withinthisevolvingtransnationalregime,what,then,arethemechanismspushingtheso-
calledsovereignstatestoadoptlegislativechangeandadministrativereforms?First,the
rationallycalculatingstate,awareofthefinancialconsequencesloominginthepotentialthata
streamoffollow-upcomplaints("repetitiveapplications")maybefiledinStrasbourg,maydecide
thatthecostsofthejustreparationpaymentstobemadewouldoutweighboththematerial
andthenon-materialbenefitsofpreservingthesuccessfullychallengedlegaldomesticnorm.
Secondly,thestatemayabandonitsresistanceandreformthelawafterthepainstakingand
prolongedordealfacedbyitsrepresentatives,obligedtojustifyitsresistancethreeorfourtimes
ayearinlegallanguageunderstoodbytheothermembersoftheCommitteeofMinisters.These
psychicandpoliticalcostsareparticularlyhighforEUapplicantcountries,butevenmember
countriesareawarethatintheextremesituation,anon-complyingcountrycouldgetbooted
outoftheCouncilofEurope.
Ourempiricalexcursus(basedlargelyonsourcesinwww.echr.coe.int)foundamixed
picture:Allthesurveyedstateshavetakensomeextremelypromptcorrectiveactionpursuant
toECtHRdecisionsinanumberofcrucialfieldsofdomesticlaw,andallbutone(Spain!)also
exhibitedinstancesoffootdragging.
Forexample,theNetherlands,widelyperceivedasexemplaryinthedegreeofits
cooperationwiththeECHRregime,inonecase,inanticipationofadecisionoftheECtHR,
correctedachallengedstatutetwoyearsbeforetheStrasbourgCourtruleditaviolation:The
legislaturereformedtherulesonconfinementofthecriminallymentallyilltwoyearsbefore
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Koendjbihariev.theNetherlands(ECtHR1990).YeteventheNetherlandscantakeaslongas
fiveyearsafteranegativeECtHRdecisionforthelegislaturetorespondwithappropriatereform:
Fiveyearselapsed(from1986to1991)beforetheDutchlegislaturechangeditslaborstatutory
regulationssothattheyconformtotheECHRstandardsannouncedinFeldbruggev.the
Netherlands(29May1986).
ThismixedpatternofconductappearstobereplicatedinGermany,France,Portugal,
Greece,andevenRomania.TheRomanianCodeofCivilProcedurewasamendedtoallow
individualsinthefuturetore-opentheiroriginalcasepursuanttoECtHRdecisionsthatsuch
individualshadbeenwronged,inordertoassurefullimplementationofECtHRdecisions.Most
recently,withinweeksofthe3June2003ECtHRdecisiononthearrestwarrantssystem,boththe
legislativeandexecutivebranchesreformedtheCodeofCriminalProceduretoreplace
prosecutorswithjudgesastheissuersofwarrantsforarrests,searches,andwiretaps.Moreover,
theMinistryofJusticeisurgingParliamenttoadoptlegislationthatmandatesadherenceto
ECtHRprecedentbyallprosecutorsandjudges.
Greece,liketheNetherlands,hasproducedsomelegislativereformsinmereanticipationof
anegativeECtHRdecision:Law2298/95of4April1995,reformingpretrialdetention,
anticipatedbyafewmonthsKampanisv.Greeceof13July1995.InotherinstancesGreece
implementedreformswithinayearortwooftheECtHRholding;e.g.,inresponsetoHoly
Monasteriesv.Greece,judgment9Dec.1994,theGreekParliamentadoptedLaw2413/96to
protecttherightsofmonasteries.
PortugaldiligentlyredesigneditsentirejudicialsystempursuanttoECtHRdecisionsSilvia
Pontesv.Portugal(1994),GamaCidraisv.Portugal(1994)andLoboMachadov.Portugal(1996)
(COEPressService2000).
Spainactuallyoverhauledstatutorycodesonthreeseparateoccasionsinanticipationof
anadverseECtHRrulingonthem.TheCodeofCriminalProcedureandtheCriminalCodewere
amended(withrespecttotheactionsofarmedbandsandterrorists)inMayof1988,intheearly
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stagesoftheCaseofBarbera,MessegueandJabardo,judgment6Dec.1988.Similarlyanact
of28Dec.1988re-organizedthejudicialsystem,inanticipationoftheECtHRdecisioninUnion
AlimentariaSandersSAv.Spain, judgmentof7July1989.Spainalsoadoptedalawon9June
1988reformingitsConstitutionalCourtproceduresinanticipationoftheECtHRsRuiz-Mateosv.
Spain,judgment23June1993.
FrancereformedstatutesinresponsetotheECtHRinaslittleasayearstime.Thefirst
StrasbourgdecisionagainstFrenchlawwasKruslinandHuvigv.FranceECtHR24April1990.The
FrenchlegislaturepromptlycompliedbypassingActno.91-646of10July1991(effective1
Oct.1991)ontelecommunicationssecrecy.Onatleastoneoccasionitamendedlegislation
evenbeforetheCourthandeddownadecision:Francealtereditscriminalprocedurelawin
January1993,topreventbreachesoftheprincipleofthepresumptionofinnocenceandallow
forrectifyingmeasures,wellinadvanceofAllenetdeRibemontv.France,ECtHR10Feb.1995.
TheFrenchParliament,facedwiththeerraticbehaviorofitsCourdeCassationandin
deferencetotheECtHR,eventuallyintervenedtoabrogatearticle588ofLeCodede
ProcedurePenale(regardingthepre-triallengthofdetentiontime),whichhadsupplieda
numberofcaseslostbyFranceattheECtHR(Steiner1997,293-94).
GermanyamendedtheprovisionsoftheCourtCostsActandoftheCodeofCriminal
ProcedureconcerninginterpretationcostsinitsActof18Aug.1980,inpromptresponsetothe
28Nov.1978ECtHRjudgmentinLuedicke,BelkacemandKov.Germany.
Similarly,onecanalsopointtoinstancesoffootdraggingintheallcountriesinoursample
exceptSpain:(1)Letellierv.France,ECtHR26June1991.Lawreform:30Dec.1996.(2)Ozturkv.
Germany,ECtHR21Feb.1984:Germanychangedthelawonpaymentofinterpreterfeesin
administrativeproceedingson15June1989.(3)AfterVasilescuv.Romania(ECtHR22May1998)
RomaniastillhasnotamendeditsCodeofCriminalProceduretoallowforappealsagainst
certainprosecutorsacts,asisrequiredbytheCommitteeofMinisters.Also,whilethe
prosecutingarmoftheexecutivebranchincooperationwithacommitteeofParliament
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expeditiouslyproduceddraftsforamendingtheCriminalCodewithreferencetothestandards
forfilingcriminallibelinresponsetotheECtHRsDalbanv.Romania,Sept.1999,therelated
legislationpassedindifferingversionsinthetwolegislativechambersandhasyettobe
reconciledintoavalidlaw.(4)IttooktheNetherlandsfiveyears(from1986to1991)tochange
itslaborstatutoryregulationssothattheyconformtothestandardsin Feldbruggev.the
Netherlands(ECtHR29May1986).(5)AsforGreece,threeyearselapsedbeforeitchangedthe
criminalmilitarycode(from1992to1995)toconformtoHadjianastassiouv.Greece(ECtHR16
Dec.1992).FouryearselapsedbeforeitamendedtheConstitution(Art.93.3)withrespectto
criminalproceduresthathadbeencondemnedinGeorgiadisAnastasiosv.Greece,ECtHR29
May1997.(6)AftertheadverseMatos&Silva,&2others,ECtHR19Sept.1996,Portugaldidnot
rectifytheproblemuntilthefinaljudgmentofthePlenaryAssemblyoftheSupreme
AdministrativeCourt,on21Feb.2001.(7)SpainhasbeentakentotheECtHRinseveninstances,
butinonlythreeofthemdidtheCommitteeofMinistersconsiderlegislativereformnecessary.In
eachofthesecasestheSpanishreformpredatedtheECtHRruling.
Insum,thelengthofdelaybetweenECtHRdecisionandreformatthenationallevelhas
occasionallybeenaslongasfiveyears,butcomplianceinthesenseofdomesticreformwithin
lessthantwoyearsofthedecisionappearstobequitecommon.
C.ConclusionstoSectionFour
Thefindingsinthissectionlacktheclearpatternofvariationacrossthethreecategoriesthat
weinitiallypredicted.IntermsofthepaceofrespondingtotheECtHRwithcooperative
legislativeorexecutivebranchalterationsofthestatusquoante,wehavefailedtoconfirmour
hypothesisthatstateswithamorelengthypriorcommitmenttotheruleoflawdomesticallywill
besignificantlymorereceptivetotheruleoflawoftheECtHRregime.Nosuchpattern
appeared.AllofthelaterjoiningcountriestotheEUandevenapplicantcountryRomaniahave
repeatedlydemonstratedanotablewillingnesstoimplementlegislativeandadministrative
reformsattentivetoECtHRdecisionsandtoCommitteeofMinistersResolutionsimplementing
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them.
5.Conclusion
ThispapertestedtheassumptionthattheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightswouldbe
moreeffectiveinlegalsystemsthatbelongtotheliberalcoreofEurope(asoperationalizedby
lengthofmembershipintheEU),anddidsofortworeasons.Thefirstwasthatthesestateshave
long-termcommitmentstolegalsystemsrespectfulofindividualrights,andacorrelation
betweensuchcommitmentandacceptanceoftransnationalregimesisprominently
hypothesizedintheIRliterature.Secondly,itseemedcommon-sensicalthatlong-term
experiencewithonesupranationallegalregime(thatoftheEU)wouldbelinkedtomoreready
acceptanceofrelatedsupranationallegalregimes(specificallythatoftheECHR).We
examinedsevenCouncilofEuropememberstates,threewithlongrule-of-lawtraditions,and
long-timemembersoftheEEC/EC/EU;threewithshakyrecenthistorieswithrespecttotheruleof
law,andmorerecentmembershipintheEC/EU,andone,anapplicantstatetotheEU,which
hasemergedfromdictatorialruleonlywithinthepastfifteenyears.Weexaminedthemwith
respecttoformalconstitutionalprovisions,legaldoctrinefromconstitutionalcourtsastothe
meaningoftheconstitution,judicialpracticeintheothercourts,andpracticeintheexecutive
andlegislativebranches.
ThepaperfoundaconsiderabledegreeofvariationinjudicialreceptionoftheConvention
acrosslegalsystemswithessentiallythesameconstitutionaltextregardingthehierarchyof
internationalvs.domesticnorms(e.g.,FranceandSpain).Moreover,arestrictiveconstitutional
textvis--visinternationaltreatiesdidnotpreventGermanyfromgrantingconstitutionalvalueto
theConventionbyjudicialinterpretation.Also,wefoundthatwhileseniorityintheEUliberal
coremaybeanimportantvariablecertainlyitpredictedaccuratelythattheRomanian
judiciarywouldlagbehindtheothersinourstudy--theseparationlinesbetweenthefirstand
thesecondgroupseemtobeblurredbythequalityofreceptionoftheConventionregimein
SpainandFrance.Byourprediction,ECtHRruleswouldhavebeenbetterreceivedinFrance,
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butthereverseseemedtobeourfinding,certainlyastooveralltreatmentofthecorpusofECHR
lawbytherespectivejudiciaries.Also,despitequitedifferentconstitutionaltextsonthesubject,
anddespitethemuchlaterentryofSpainintotheEUandECHRsystems,theConstitutionalCourt
ofSpain,ofFrance,andofGermany,allassertedthepriorityofECHRlawoverdomesticlaw
withinroughlythesametimeperiod,theperiodaroundtheSingleEuropeanActof1987.
Moreover,wealsofoundsurprisingcontrastsamongbrancheswithinindividualcountries.
Portugal,forinstance,hasajudiciarythatforalongtimewasquiteresistanttoECtHRrulings,but
onanumberofoccasionsreformeditsexecutiveandlegislativepracticeevenbeforethe
ECtHRreachedthepointofissuingarulingagainstit;inotherwords,themerefactofa
registeredapplicationforacomplainttobeheardatStrasbourgwasenoughtoprovokereform
inPortugalonthematterindispute.Similarly,theFrenchParliamentonoccasionproved
considerablymorecooperativethantheFrenchjudiciarytowardECHR-inspiredreform.
Thesefindingsinviteonetolookbeyondthesimplisticdivisionoftheworldintosimplyrights-
respecting/rule-of-lawstatesvs.therest,thuscallingintoquestionthepredictiveutilityofthe
hypothesisweculledfromtheIRliterature.Itturnsoutthatavarietyofothervariablesmaybe
forcefulenoughtotrumptheimpactofarule-of-lawtradition[oritsabsence].Inoursmall
studyinparticular,variablesthatseemedtobeinfluentialincluded(1)strongleadershipbythe
personnelofconstitutionalcourtsinSpainandGermany,andbythelegislatureofSpain,which
displayedthemostpromptrecordofECtHRcomplianceofanyinourstudy;(2)politicaland
judicialleadershipinthedecadeofthe1990sinPortugal;(3)apoliticalcultureinFrancethat
elevatesstatesovereigntytoalmosticonicstatus,therebyslowingFrenchwillingness,especially
withinthejudiciary,tosubordinatetheFrenchstatetotransnationalauthority;(4)theimpactof
thegeneralpoliticalmoodinWesternEurope,atleastaroundthetimeoftheSingleEuropean
Act;and[5]forthecaseofRomania,pressuretoEuropeanizethetrainingofthejudiciaryand
professionalbarfromtheEuropeanCommission,backedbythecarrotofEUmembershipin
2007,whichpressurehasproducedimportantreforms,asofmid-2003.Explorationsofother
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aspectsofpoliticalculturebesidescommitmenttotheruleoflawandliberalrights,andcareful
attentiontosuchmattersaspoliticalleadership,courtleadership,theinfluenceofparticular
NGOs(suchasthenationalbar),andtheoverallmoodoftheelectorate,cannotsensiblybe
neglectedforthesakeofmonocausalexplanations.
WhiletheclaimsintheIRscholarshipoftheimportanceofarule-of-lawcultureforeasing
transitioninsupranationallegalregimesmayhavesomevaliditynotdiscernibleinastudy
coveringsofewcountriesasthiswithinatimespanasshortasfiftyyears,andcountrieswithsuch
asubstantialculturaloverlap,wecouldnotdemonstrateproofofitsconsistentimpactamong
theCouncilofEuropecountriesweexamined.Ineffect,itpredictedcorrectlyasto
constitutionalandjudicialdoctrineforsomeofthesevencountriesweexamined,anderredas
tosome:theDutchandtheGermandorankabovethoseofPortugalandGreeceonECHR
embeddedness,andRomaniabelowtherest.ButSpaintieswiththeNetherlands,insteadof
beingbelowit(outdoingbothGermanyandFrance),andtheFrenchjudiciarymayapproach
thatofPortugalcertainlyitisbelowSpain.Moreover,thepredictionisaflopastolegislative
andexecutivebranchreforminresponsetoECtHRdecisions;allsevencountriesdoreasonably
well,andSpaindoesexceptionallywell,withnoobviousotherdifferencesdiscernible.
NOTES
1.TwooftheparticipantstothedraftingConference,ItalyandGermany(observer),couldhardlyclaimtobemembersofthisselectclubimmediatelyafterthewar,giventheirformerembraceofFascism(Italy1922-1944)andNazism(Germany:1933-1945).However,thedelegationsofthesetwocountrieswereamongthestrongestsupportersthereforenforceabilityofthehumanrightssystem(Moravscik2000).
2.TheEuropeanCommission,theexecutivebranchoftheEU(notoftheCouncilofEurope),contributestotheimplementationoftheECHRregimeintwoways:First,itdisbursessignificantamountsofmoneytoEUapplicantcountriestoenforcedemocracyandtherule
oflaw,mainlybyfundingjudicialreform.Second,theEUCommissionerforenlargementmonitorstheperformanceoftheapplicantstatesinsecuringtheindependenceofthejudiciaryandfightingagainstcorruptionincourts.Essentiallyutilizingthetechniqueofshaming,theCommissionissuescountryreportsannuallyoneachapplicant(www.europa.eu.int).
3.Greece,despiteitssidingwiththeAllies,hadaNationalSocialist(i.e.fascist)dictatorshipfrom1936until1945,acivilwarfrom1946-1949,thenaconstitutionalmonarchywithParliamentaryruleuntil1967,atwhichtimeitunderwentamilitarycoup.Themilitaryjunta
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exercisedadictatorshipfrom1967until1974.TheGreekThirdRepublicreintroducedtheConventionintoGreecein1974(LawNo.53).
4.Despiteanappointmentprocessgearedtoguaranteeingjudicialindependence,observersdostillnotethatRomaniafacesdifficultiesineliminatingcorruptionfromtheranksofits
judges,aswellasotherpublicofficials(Gall2001).Nonetheless,itisnotobvioustousthat
thecorruptionproblemissubstantiallyworsetherethan,forinstance,inlong-timeEUmember,Italy.
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