envi hw 1 orig cases

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HOMEWORK 1

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SB LAW JOURNAL MARCH 2010

SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATIONAL RESOURCES: CHANGE OF CONCEPT OR PERCEPTION BEDA LAWJOURNAL

SEC. 16 ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of

nature.

MINORS OPOSA V. DENR JULY 30 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO

and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERT A NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA,

CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA

FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGFRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA.

CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V.PASIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her

parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL

and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPARADO,

CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA.

MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their paren

ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING,

minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed

ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed

ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all

surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL and

IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH,

STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT,

BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents

FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., Petitioners, v.

THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, Respondents.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND

HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY, CONSTRUED.The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal rightthe right to a balanced

and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nations constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.

Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides: "SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people t

a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." This right unites with the right to health which is

provided for in the preceding section of the same article: "SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people

and instill health consciousness among them." While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration o

Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political

rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-

preservation and self-perpetuationaptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said topredate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are

assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the

well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by

the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the

first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but

also for those to comegenerations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balance

and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

2. ID.; ID.; TIMBER LICENSES; NATURE THEREOF; NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE MAY NOT BE INVOKED; CASE AT BAR.

all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due

process clause of the Constitution. In Tan v. Director of Forestry, (125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983]) This Court held: ". . . A timber license is


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an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A

timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly

withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.A license is merely a permit or privilege t o do what

otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom

it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 16 8). Thus, this Court

held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People v. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.

7576) . . ." We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary: (190 SCRA 673 684

[1990])." . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization an

disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a

privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concessi

area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when nationa

interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 o

Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]." Since

timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall b

passed." In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an

executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as ye

be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot

still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have on

been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthf

ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corp., (110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]) this Cou

stated: "The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to

reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional

guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of publichealth, safety, moral and general welfare." The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia v. New York, (291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L.

ed. 940 947-949) quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. v. Auditor General, (22 SCRA 135, 146- 147 [1968]) to wit:" Under

our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The

general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for

government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to

work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest." In court, the non

impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. (Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corp.,

supra; Phil. American Life Insurance Co. v. Auditor General, supra; Alalyan v. NLRC, 24 scra 172 [1968]; Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope

Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1974]; Kabiling v. National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987]).

3. ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; NO LONGER IMPAIRED BY THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE; RATIONALE. It must,

nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power

or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies

involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretio

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Commenting on this

provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says: "The first part o

the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The

second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden

territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government. As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and

particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to

declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the

meaning of grave abuse of discretion, which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the

judiciary." In Daza v. Singson, (180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also Coseteng v. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales v.

Macaraig, 191 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 [1991]) Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking f

this Court, noted: "In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even

if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under th

expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the

Constitution clearly provides: . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

4. REMEDIAL LAW; PLEADINGS; CAUSE OF ACTION, DEFINED; CASE AT BAR. the right of the petitioners (and all those

they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENRs duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and

functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that

right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners

maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and

healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. A cause of action is

defined as: ". . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal

right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right." (Marao


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Sugar Central Co. v. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community Investment and Finance Corp. v. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere v.

vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseas v. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462 [1967]; Virata v. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680 [1991]; Madron

v. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].

5. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION, AS A GROUND; RULE; CASE AT BAR. It is settled in this

jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to th

court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermor

the truth or falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be

resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in

the complaint? In Militante v. Edrosolano, this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and

circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest

correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If

that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute." After a careful examination of the petitioners

complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the subheading

CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may

thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for.

FELICIANO,J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; LOCUS STANDI, CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. The Court explicitly states that petitioners hav

the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of

petitioners claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. Iunderstand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintif

must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in this"class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future it appears to me that everyone who may be

expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus

standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries right of action in the field of environmental protection, as

against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of

activity involved. Whether such a beneficiaries right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to

act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"

is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO "A BALANCE AND

HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY" ; INTERPRETATION.The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "on

specific fundamental legal rightthe right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to

balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental i

character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. Iis in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and

healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubric appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention

and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and

raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and

inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or

slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and

other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements

pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987

Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the

constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Sections 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right t

health"). As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constit utional

statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing

and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those

implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

3. ID.; RIGHT TO HEALTH; SHOULD SPECIFICALLY EXIST IN OUR CORPUS OF LAW.Justice Feliciano suggestion is simp

that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of

generality than Article II (15) of the Constitutionthat is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public

respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the

Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law,

considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the tri

court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismis

4. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF ACTION; LEGAL RIGHTS, AS ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS;

STANDARDS.the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a


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constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or

disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively

in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter. The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violatio

of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial

power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads: "Section 1 . . . Judicial power includes the

duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determin

whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the Government." When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the righ

to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy

making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical

competence and experience and professional qualifications. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then th

policy making departmentsthe legislative and executive departmentsmust be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and

promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR.,J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramaticallyassociate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issu

of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arres

the unabated hemorrhage of the countrys vital life-support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."cralaw virtua1aw library

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Tria

Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly

represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI)

a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the

protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary

of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable

Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpay ers class

suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and

enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the countrys virgin tropical rainforests." The same was filed for themselves and otherswho are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before th

Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is praye

for that judgment be rendered:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements." cralaw virtua1aw

library

and granting the plaintiffs." . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million

(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna

may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of

indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in ord

to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the countrys land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty -four per cent (54%

for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and

disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water

shortages resulting from the drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)

salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the

island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural

productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size

the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the countrys unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the


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disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipinos indigenous cultures, (f) t he siltation of

rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource

productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds

which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the flooding of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the

absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for th

purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the e arths capacit

to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global

warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."cralaw virtua1aw library

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued deforestation are so capable of unquestionable

demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to

present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the

countrys land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) othe countrys land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass

of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that defendants predecessors have granted timber license agreements (TLAs) to various corporations to cut

the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex A.

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays

and holidays includedthe Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the

plaintiff minors generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental

damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and

irreparable injury to plaintiffsespecially plaintiff minors and their successorswho may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this

rare and unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of

plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its

capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendants office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served up on defendan

a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex B.

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLAs, to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudic e of

plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLAs is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff

minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous

cultures which the Philippines has been abundantly blessed with.


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19. Defendants refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLAs is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Phil ippine

Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable ha rmony

with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well -being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977).

20. Furthermore, defendants continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLAs is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the

State to

a. effect a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth and make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic).

(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b.protect the nations marine wealth. (Section 2, ibid);

c.conserve and promote the nations cultural heritage and resources (sic). (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);

d.protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

(Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendants act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural lawand violative of plaintiffs right to self-

preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the

countrys vital life-support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth." 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds,

namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which

properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners

maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a

justiciable question as it involves the defendants abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the

defendants claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the

respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited

the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescin

and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, th

parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning

their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order

(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16,

Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational

genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of mans inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law.

Petitioners likewise rely on the respondents correlative obligation, per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, the safeguard the peoples right to a

healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretarys alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreement

(TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitutions non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not

apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clau


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HOMEWORK 1

it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the

respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations

concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens

patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of

whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or

legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners recourse is not to file an action in court, but to lobby befor

Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law

Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same

can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the

agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled wi thout the

requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. Th

original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is

indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the

Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them

before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of a

concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are

present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations

yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations

file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational

responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the

"rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter

alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, wa ters, fisheries

wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible

to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm

and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of th eir right to a

sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the

generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments

adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judges challenged ord er for having

been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order read as

follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

"After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believ

that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are

seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the

Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail t

state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public

policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred princ iple of Separation of Powers of the thre

(3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the

plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processin

renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to impairment of contracts abhored (s ic) by

the fundamental law." 11


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HOMEWORK 1

We do not agree with the trial courts conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specifi c legal right

involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on

unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal rightthe right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in

our nations constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution

explicitly provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and

harmony of nature."cralaw virtua1aw library

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." cralaw

virtua1aw library

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under th

Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right

belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuationaptly and

fittingly stressed by the petitionersthe advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a

matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of

humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that

unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, therebyhighlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance th

second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come

generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the

debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between

Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"MR. VILLACORTA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same

and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance." 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the countrys forests. Without such

forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversibly disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions

of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the countrys natural resources, 13 then Pres ident Corazo

C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment

and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper

use of the countrys environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in

reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be

provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future

generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management,

renewal, and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and

enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and

use of the countrys natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also th e policy of the sta

to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization; development

and conservation of our natural resources."cralaw virtua1aw library

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15 specifically in Section 1

thereof which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph


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HOMEWORK 1

"SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy.(1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development

as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, lan d, waters,

fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance an

protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilizat ion of suc

natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost implications

relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources."cralaw virtua1aw library

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the

environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes

particular reference to the fact of the agencys being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 2. Mandate.(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation o

the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control and supervise th

exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the countrys natural resources."cralaw virtua1aw library

Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and

have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to th

"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D.

No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop,

maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to

fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an

environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each

generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to

the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENRs duty und

its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advanc

the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cau

of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their

right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the

plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right." 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the

question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should

be considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically

admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in

accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante v. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should

"exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action]

lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or

recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute." cralaw virtua1aw

library

After a careful examination of the petitioners complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegati ons, as well a

the specific averments under the subheading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of

their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofa

as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are

indispensable parties.


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HOMEWORK 1

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the

executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vi

a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is n

longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative

actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states

that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and

enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."cralaw virtua1aw library

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Cour

says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as

conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review wha

was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the

decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave

abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of grave abuse of discretion, which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or

contract according to the disposition of the judiciary."cralaw virtua1aw library

In Daza v. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to

assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded

jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution

clearly provides: . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution

The court a quo declared that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the

plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processin

renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to impairment of contracts abhored (s ic) bythe fundamental law." 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the

respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he

would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber

license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and

conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by

the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which

provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession

permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right

protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan v. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that publi

welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, whic

can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authorit y, federal,

state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested

right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable righ ts, neither is it

property or property rights (People v. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576) . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library


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HOMEWORK 1

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

". . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and

disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a

privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concessi

area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when nationa

interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 o

Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]." cralaw

virtua1aw library

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive

issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be

invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot sti

be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have only

been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthf

ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 28 this Court

stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to

reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional

guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public

health, safety, moral and general welfare."cralaw virtua1aw library

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia v. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. v. Auditor

General, 30 to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally m atters of private and not of public

concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are

absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of

contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common int erest."

In court, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the

respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no

contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter

right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of

18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as

defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason,JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., took no part; related to one of the parties.

Puno,J., took no part in the deliberations.

Vitug,J., took no part; I was not yet with the Court when the case was deliberated upon.

Separate Opinions


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HOMEWORK 1

FELICIANO,J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J . in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most

important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence

profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of a

the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to

be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and maintenance of this suit (Decision,

pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit . I understand locus stand

to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of

"class" here involvedmembership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future it

appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to

take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries right of action in the

field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities

operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such a beneficiaries right of action may be found under any and all

circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown

("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an

appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right the right to abalanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is

"fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very

great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to

fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list o

particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubric appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic

fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland

and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open lan

streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destructio

of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of

ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3,

Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated

June 1977all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II,

Sections 16 ("the rightto a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection o

more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to

an extremely wide range of topics:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water


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HOMEWORK 1

(vii) mineral resources.

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or

provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce.

Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation

and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine

Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of

implementation of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional st atements above

noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially

enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are

too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a right cast in language of a

significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitutionthat is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to a

imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed

for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our

corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code,

and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a

motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rathethan a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or

disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively

in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge considerationwhere a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved,

petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VII

of the Constitution which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and

enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with

remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is

respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast are

of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional

qualifications. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislativ

and executive departmentsmust be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and t

implement them before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr.,J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLAs petitioners demand

public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners entitlement to the

relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of

their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is

that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factua

nexus between petitioners specific legal right and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent adminis trative agenc

They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which

exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certioraribecause the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of

extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Courts decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer

examination.


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HOMEWORK 1

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, , VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTECORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION AND OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORAT

COUNSEL,.

ELLOSILLO,J.:

TheFilipino First Policyenshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the nationa

economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,[1] is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the

shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provisio

is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form pa

of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the

Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the

issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, is to provide management

expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of

the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel

Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad

a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more

than the bid of petitioner.

Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state -

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC -

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest

Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation

System Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel x x x x

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS x x x x

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER -

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate

Counsel) are obtained.[3]

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitione

in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.[4] In a

subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty -three Million Pesos

(P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhadx x x x[5] which respondent GSISrefused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51%

of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition

and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and

consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the CourtEn Bancafter it was referred to it by the First Division. The case was

then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.


15/28

HOMEWORK 1

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been

identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage

and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and

power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national

patrimony.[6] Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel

which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a par

of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of

the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.[7]

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the

national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate

that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that

have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.[8]

Respondents except. They maintain that:First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle

and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said provision to opera

there must be existing laws to lay down conditions under which business may be done.[9]

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimonywhich only refers to

lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or

timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second

paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the

hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimon

of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a

personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.

Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since

what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building

stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of th

shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had

lost in the bidding.

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Biddercannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided tha

these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share , is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the

privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarde

the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be

awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion

in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a

positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no

clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme,imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and

paramount law of the nation.[10] It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments

their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conceptio

in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be

determined and all public authority administered.[11] Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any

norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private

persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramou

and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.


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HOMEWORK 1

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact law

and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the

governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.[12] A provision which lays down a general

principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itse

and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which

the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and exten

of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and

construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.[13]

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become i

effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the

function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided th

a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-

executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the

power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.[14] This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing vie

is, as it has always been, that -

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary i

clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature

discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. Thes

envi hw 1 orig cases

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