end of europe

Hegel and the End of EuropeAuthor(s): Thomas MertensSource: ARSP: Archiv fr Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law andSocial Philosophy, Vol. 89, H. 1 (2003), pp. 38-52Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23681546 .Accessed: 16/02/2015 03:56

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Franz Steiner Verlag is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to ARSP: Archiv frRechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 111.68.103.104 on Mon, 16 Feb 2015 03:56:35 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Thomas Mertens, Nijmegen

Hegel and the End of Europe

Abstract: The issue of Europe's identity often arises in discussions on the nature and future of the European Union. This paper prsents Hegel's conception of Europe and in the mirror of this philosophy, it is suggested, Europe's early 19th Century understanding of its place in the world. When discussing Hegel, particular attention will be glven to the final section of the Philosophy of Right, the often, but unjustly, neglected concluding para graphe concerning "World History". Having outlined the structure of the rational State ear lier in his work Hegel, in this section, emphasises the significance of this state's develop ment. In order to understand this fully, I consider it necessary to examine the way Hegel contrasts Europe and the other continents, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History. I will pay particular attention to the chapter on the "Geographica! Basis of World History." The resuit is a rather clear image of Europe's superiority. Since Europe derives its identity here by emphasising its superiority over other continents and non-Europeans, Hegel's idea of Europe as the 'absolute West' can no longer be upheld.

1. Introduction

The rapid development of what, since the Maastricht Treaty (1992), is called the Euro pean Union has been accompanied by many questions regarding the nature of Eu rope. Within the realm of history and political sciences scholars ask to what extent the dream of a federal Europe constituted the reason for starting the process of integra ting European nation-states after World War II. Within the sphere of constitutional law it is asked whether the mature institutions of the European Union require the formula tion of a European constitution. Some have expressed doubts: the success of such an enterprise, they argue, is dpendent on the emergence of a 'European people'. Since no such European 'Demos' exists yet, the only legitmate units of European intgra tion are its constituent parts, that is, the contracting states.1 The dmocratie deficit within the Union cannot simply be overcome by extending the legislative powers of the European Parliament, since democracy dpends on 'pluralism, internai repre sentativity, freedom and capacity for compromise', in short, on a public sphere. And this is precisely what is lacking at the European level. Consequently the European Union can only exist as a Europe of the nations.2 Others, however, whilst acknowl edging the difficults inherent in establishing a sense of belonging within the Europe an Union argue that the values of autonomy and self-regulation associated with de mocracy can no longer be upheld within the narrow bounds of the European nation states. Within a globalising economy, the cration of regional rgimes like the Euro

German Constitutional Court, Judgment of October 12, 1993, 89 BvertGE 155. An illuminating comment sgiven by J.H.H. Weiler, Demos, Telos, Ethos and the Maastricht Dcision, in: P. Gowan and P. Anderson (ed.), The Question of Europe, New York, London 1997, 265-294 Dieter Grimm, Does Europe Need a Constitution, in: P. Gowan and P. Anderson (ed.), The Ques tion of Europe, 1997, 251


Hegel and the End of Europe 39

pean Union, is necessarily to uphold the demands of democracy.3 Why not see it as a task for Europeans to attempt to bring about an integrated public sphere and a com mon political identity on a Europe-wide basis?4

Within philosophy it is asked whether it is possible to rely on some common past or hritage when trying to establish such a European transnational identity. However, when addressing the question of what constitutes Europe's identity, scholars tend to advance general and broad notions that are of limited use. In particular, they refer to 'partially shared' traditions like Roman law, political democracy, parliamentary institu tions, Judeo-Christian ethics and cultural hritages such as Renaissance humanism, rationalism and empiricism.5 For obvious reasons, however, these traditions and hr itages are of little use when attempting to delineate Europe. Christianity has deep roots in Georgia and Armenia, but in Europe's recent history Muslim Bosnia's capital Sarajevo plays a much more prominent role. Furthermore, these 'partially shared' traditions only encompass Europe's positive aspects, as if it does not have its dark sides too. The Thirty Years War, the slave-trade, colonialism and the Holocaust, to mention only a few examples, define Europe's history as much as Enlightenment and liberal democracy.

Maybe for that reason, Europe has never been a prvalent theme in philosophical literature. It appears that European thinkers have never seriously reflected upon the fact that they lived in the 'headland', Asia's cape.6 They were fascinated by reason and not by the territorial location of the cave they were trying to leave. How then can the issue of Europe's identity be approached? I suggest here that the concept of biography might be helpful: let us have a look at a couple of biographies written about Europe. Of course, we have to take into account that individuis as well as societies tend to 'rationalise' their lives. Biographies, including those devoted to Europe, need to be understood with caution since they often contain a mix of self-justification, ne glect of others and self-complacency.

Europe's oldest biography is the well-known myth according to which Europe is a beautiful Phoenician, i.e. Asian, princess, the daughter of Agenor who originally came from Egypt. Zeus, the suprme among the Greek Gods, feil in love with her. In order to marry her, he transformed himself into a bull, kidnapped her and took her to Crete.7

Thus, Europe originated in Asia and moved westwards by means of a divine destiny that eradicated her from her homeland. As a consquence, Europe now lives in close proximity to the divine world and we Europeans are the grandchildren of this marriage between the daughter of Asia and the suprme God. Because of this origin in Logos, philosophy itself is the European way of being, to be contrasted with non-philosophi cal attitudes 'abroad'. The most profound account of the contrast between these two ways of life can be found in Hegel's understanding of world history, a prominent ex ample of Europe's modem biography.

J. Habermas, Reply to Grimm, in: P. Gowan and P. Anderson (ed.), The Question of Europe, 1997, 261 ; Idem, The European Nation State. Its Achievements and Its Limitations. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship, Ratio Jurist (1996), 135-137

E.g. J.H.H. Weiler, The European Union Belongs to its Citizens: Three Immodest Proposais, Euro

pean LawReview22 (1997), 150-156. A.D. Smith, National Identity and European Unity, in: P. Gowan and P. Anderson (ed.), The Ques tion of Europe, 1997, 334 I borrow this vocabulary from: J. Derrida, The OtherHeading. Refiections on Today's Europe, Indi ana 1992.

Herodote, Histories I, 2; IV, 45


40 Thomas Mertens

2. Cosmopolitanism versus World History

To a certain extent, it is astonishing that Hegel's thinking of Europe is as eurocentric as it is, since he could have benefited from the doubts and hsitations expressed by Rousseau and Kant. Of course, Kant's thinking is also eurocentric to a certain degree. When giving an example of the categohcal imperative that one ought to develop one's own talents Kant contrasts the European active life of self-improvement with the life of South Sea Islanders who, he argues, let their talents rust and devote their lives solely to idleness, procration and enjoyment.8 Similarly, when Kant attempts to give an adquate description of the diffrent nations in his Anthropologie, he describes only European nations and pays no attention to non-European nations. According to Kant, however, this apparent superiority of the Europeans over other human beings does not give them a privileged legal status. When dealing with law and international rela tions, Kant not only focuses on how European states ought to behave towards one another, but also on establishing just relations with non-European nations. Nations, Kant suggests, ought to respect one another's autonomy and right to self-determina tion, this being a categorical demand, irrespective of the degree in which a nation has civilised itself. European nations cannot, therefore, claim any right to vilate the way of life in non-European continents. Furthermore, all human communities, not just the modem European ones, deserve to be respected. Kant explicitly formultes this in the so-called third definitive article for a perpetual peace, which states: "cosmopolitan right should be limited to conditions of universal hospitality".9 The negative formula tion is due to Kant's distinction between 'the right of a guest' and 'the right of a visitor': cosmopolitan right entails the latter but not the former. Thus, on the basis of cosmo politan right every human being has the right not to be treated with hostility when he arrives, either voluntarily or by accident, on the territory of another community. Fur thermore, he also has the right to attempt to enter into peaceful relations with native

inhabitants. Cosmopolitan right does not, however, grant a foreigner the right to stay as long as he wishes. Such permit, according to Kant, would require a particular agree ment between the foreigner and this host community. Foreigners are not entitled to unlimited residency or citizenship. On the contrary, in Kant's view, a community has the right to turn down a foreigner's request to settle and can expel him from its territo ry.10

This cosmopolitan article is famous on account of its criticism on colonialism. The clearest example of violating cosmopolitan right is, according to Kant, the lack of respect which Europeans often show for the life of the native non-European popula tions. Some of the so-called civilised states of the European continent have even, in violation of this article, conquered their territories and enslaved the resident popula tions.1 1 The lgitimation of this violent practice is, Kant argues, built on the erroneous

8 I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Akademie Ausgabe (=AA) Band IV, De Gruyter Berlin 1902, 423

9 I. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, AA VIII, 357 (Transi, in: Reiss, H. (ed.), Kant's Poiiticai Writings, Cambridge 1970, 105); The other two definitive articles aim at republicanism on the national and federalism on the international level respectively.

10 I. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, AA VIII, 358 (Ed. Reiss, 105-6); This right to expel a foreigner does not have unlimited validity; he can only be turned away, if it is done without endangering his life.

Nowadays this restriction is known as the principie of non-refoulement, one of the key principies of

refugee-law; See: Th. Mertens, Cosmopolitanism and Citizenship: Kant against Habermas, Euro

pean Journal of Phiiosophy 4 (1996), 328-347. 11 I. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, AA VIII, 358 (Ed. Reiss, 106)



argument that large parts of the world would remain almost uninhabited without the establishment of colonies and that people living there would lack a rightful condi tion.12 In contrast with this common European practice, Kant strongly dfends the rights of indigenous peoples as first possessors of thelr terrltories, even if they are shepherds and hunters and therefore dpendent on large areas of wasteland.

At first sight there seems to be a great deal of similarity between the approach endorsed by Kant and the one taken by Hegel. Both seem to envisage three levels within the concept of right. In Kant's view, relations between Citizens should be gov emed by a republican constitution, relations between states by federalism and rela tions between states and non-citizens by cosmopolitanism. In this way, ail possible relations between inhabitants of this world corne to be governed by law. Hegel's Phi losophy of Rig h fi 3 also contains three levels of analysis, but, as we will see, they are very diffrent from the Kantian ones. Here we need to be very precise. Reference is not to the three main parts of the work: Abstract Right, Morality and Ethical Life, or to the threefold structure of Ethical Life: Family, Civil Society and State, but rather to the threefold structure within the subdivision of the 'State', wherein most elements of what normally belongs to a legal philosophy can be found. From the headings one gets the impression that Hegel deals with constitutional law first, develops international law next and ends with an exposition of world history. The diffrences between Kant and Hegel would then simply concern the very end of their legal philosophies and could be reduced to the opposition between cosmopolitanism and world history. On this view Hegel would describe a gradually progressive movement, which Starts with the state, develops into international law and finally answers the question of how this ethical construction of state and international law can be institutionalised within world histo ry.14 This impression, however, is false and the diffrences between the two are fun damental.

This becomes self-evident if one takes seriously the fact that it is the chapter on the State, which contains three parts. This suggests that ail three parts are to be seen from the perspective of the State, a view which is confirmed by a literal translation of the headings of the three (sub-)subdivisions. They are not constitutional law, interna tional law and world history but rather as follows:

The State: A. The internal law of the state:

A I: Internai constitution for itself; A ILThe sovereignty against outside;

B: The external law of the state; C: World history.15

I. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, Rechtslehre, 62,15; AA VI, 353, 266 (Transi, in M.J. Gregor (ed.), /. Kant. The Metaphysics ofMoris, Cambridge 1991, 159, 86-7) Rfrencs to Hegel's Phiiosophy of Right (Rph) will be given in brackets in the text. The first

Paragraph or page number will refer to: G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Merke (ed. by E. Molderhauer und K.M. Michel, Frankfurt), Bd. 7, 1968. A second page number

may refer to the English translations: Knox: Hegei's Phiiosophy of Right (transi, with notes by T.M.

Knox), Oxford 1952; Elements: G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Phiiosophy of Right (ed. A. Wood; transi. H.B. Nisbet), Cambridge 1991. In this line: H. Ottman, Die Weltgeschichte, in: G.W.F. Hege/, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (ed. L. Siep), Klassiker Auslegen Band 9, Berlin 1997, 267-286; S. Smith, Hegei's Critique of Liberaiism, University of Chicago Press 1989,163-4, 211-2. Knox translates: The State: A) Constitutional Law: A I) The Constitution, A II) Sovereignty vis--vis

foreign states; B) International Law; C) World History. Wood translates: The State: A) Constitution


42 Thomas Mertens

Wheri analysing Hegel's Philosophy of Right, scholars usually pay most attention to the largest section of the internal law of the State (A I). Here, Hegel discusses key elements of 'his' State, namely monarchical sovereignty, executive and legislative powers. Problems and solutions related to interstate relations are located in the rela tively small sections A II and B. In these parts, Hegel attempts to refute the Kantian

arguments in favour of restricting state sovereignty and establishing enforceable in ternational law. Both parts describe a diffrent aspect: section A II emphasises the

importance of war for ethical communities such as nation states and the bnficiai effects of the possibility of war on the internai organisation of the state. The complete absence of war is therefore considered undesirable. Section B emphasises the im

possibility of overcoming war by means of international law, as this would prsuppos the consent of the participating states and this would only be forthcoming for as long as international law coincided with their interests. Since each individual state is guid ed by its own interests in international relations, the situation of permanent peace is unattainable.16 Translating "B. Das ussere Staatsrecht" into "B. International Law" is therefore misleading, since it suggests that international law restricts state law. He

gel, however, makes clear that international law is not powerful enough to do so. State law, so it is argued in section C, is only restricted by world history. This final section therefore provides us with an important understanding of the significance of the modem state.17 Thus, rather then being a dull appendix, section C dialectically reveis the significance of the whole of the preceding work. In my view, Hegel is

arguing here that the modem constitutional monarchy as outlined in A I is the highest product of world history and that it can be found only in the Germanie18 part of Eu

rope. In order to make this clear, a close examination of the transition from B to C is

needed as some scholars have drawn a rather diffrent conclusion from the fact that Hegel ends his Philosophy of Right with a section on world history. They argue that we are confronted with turmoil of passions, interests, ends, talents and virtues, and of course violence when looking at world history. Within this turmoil, the existence of the ethical whole of the state (as in A I) seems a matter of contingency. By referring to world history, Hegel would thus affirm the finitude of the state reminding his audience that the state belongs to the sphere of 'objective spirit' and not to the ultmate 'abso

al Law: A I) The Internal Constitution, A II) External Sovereignty; B) International Law; C) World

History. For similar attempts see: A. Peperzak, Hegel contra Hegel in His Philosophy of Right: The contra dictions of International Politics, Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (1994), 241-263, esp. 244-6. See: Th. Mertens, Hegel's Homage to Kant's PerpetualPeace. An Analysis of Hegel's Philosophy ofRlght 321-340, The Review of Politics 57 (1995), 665-691. Some Hegel-scholars tend not to believe this. E.g., in his Hegel's Philosophy of Freedom (New Hven, London, 1999, 337) P. Franco writes: "I do not intend to gove a detailed account of this dialectic of world history here, since to do so would take us far beyond the scope of this chapter" (on 'The Rational State', ThM). Translating 'Germanisch' as 'Germanie', instead of as 'German', with S. Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modem State, Cambridge 1972, 228; J. McCarney, Hegel on /ife//j^Routledge Philosophy Guidebook), Routledge 2000,146.1 do not agree with Avineri who includes France, Italy and Spain into 'Germanie'. On the basis of Rph, 358: '... nordischen Prinzip der germanischen Volket, I

agree with McCarney that the opposition here is between 'Germanie' and 'Romanic' and with Walsh's suggestion that 'Germanie' would mean 'Anglo-Saxon protestantism', W.H. Walsh, Princi

pie and Prjudice in Hegel's philosophy of history, in: Z.A. Pelczynski (ed.), HegeTsPoliticalPhilos ophy. Problems and Perspectives, Cambridge 1971, 183, 192.



lute spirit'. 'World history' is the acknowledgement that the spirit does not find a com pletely satisfactory habitat in the external sphere of social and legal institutions but demands a final progressive step into the realm of art, religion and philosophy.19 The Encyc/opeda-ve rs i o n of Hegel's legal philosophy seems to confirm this by ending with an extensive remark on the relationship between state and religion.20 Conse quently, the 'law' that transcends the law of individual states is not international law, but the absolute right of the spirit, which reigns over all the finite spirits in world history as the world's court of justice.21 In contrast to the ultmate 'real' spirit of the world, ail particular forms of worldly life like civil society and the spirits of nations are, according to Hegel, 'ideal', which is 'non-real'. The movement of the spirit is to exhibit this truth.22

In my opinion, however, there is a forceful objection to the above analysis. It can not be denied that the exposition on world history takes place within the general sec tion on the state. Therefore it seems likely that world history aims at adding to the understanding of the state itself. Hegel's remark that world history is not simply a verdict of mere power,23 confirms this. Since reason is the spirit of the world, world history consists of moments in a progressive development as the exposition and actu alisation of the universal spirit.24 So it is suggested that world history (C) indicates the stage of development at which the modem constitutional monarchy (A I) must be located. Consequently, while B gives an international understanding of the state, C adds the world-historical understanding. Like individuis, nations and states have their own particular principies and are preoccupied by their own interests. Ultimately only the spirit of the world, having as its objective the universal ralisation of reason, is able to use those particular principies and interests for its own end. It intgrtes them as instruments and organs for its own development from one stage into higher ones. In comparison with the enormous process of the spirit in its own absolute right, l ments of daily life, like justice and virtue, wrongdoing and violence, guilt and inno cence, have only limited meaning and significance. (Rph, 345)

According to Hegel, this philosophical understanding of human history differs from the two current methods of approaching history, namely the 'original' writing of histo ry, consisting of no more than the description of deeds, events and stages of society, and the 'reflective' writing of history which organises historical facts in accordance with some general, but arbitrary, point of view. A philosophical approach to world history conceives of history as a process of necessity that originates in the spirit itself. In contrast with 'original' history, a philosophical approach accepts that events are organised and, unlike in the 'reflective' history tradition, the organising principie is necessary rather than arbitrary. According to this underlying principie, reason is the sovereign of the world and world history prsents us with a rational process.25 God's

J.N. Findlay, Hegel. A Re-examination, London, New York 1970, 334-5; E. Weil, Hegel et l'tat, Paris 1974, 73; A.W. Wood, Hege/'s Ethical Thought, Cambridge 1990, 219-21 ; A. Peperzak, He

gel contra Hegel in His Philosophy of Right: The contradictions of International Pol i tics, 242-3 G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopdie der philosophischen Wissenschatten, Werke (ed. by E. Molderhauer und K.M. Michel), Bd. 10, Frankfurt 1968, 522

Rph, 340, Hegel here quotes Schiller's poem Resignation. G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopdie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 522; See also: 324 Anm. and Z.

Rph, 342: "... nicht das blosse Gericht seiner Macht,..." Or as the process by which reason is incorporated into reality (Rph, 270 Anm. 419; Elements,

294). G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke (ed. by E. Molderhauer und K.M. Michel), Bd. 12, Frankfurt 1968, 20. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy ofHistory (Transi. J. Sibree), London 1857, 9; I will follow the Sibree-translation.


44 Thomas Mertens

wisdom is not only displayed in plants, animais and isolated occurrences, but also in the whole of the process of history as progress of the consciousness of freedom.26 This is not, however, a continuous development but takes place in several successive stages, each represented by a particular nation within its geographica! and anthropo logical existence. (Rph, 346) Reason's governance of history is not restricted to human actions, but it embraces all the natural and spiritual circumstances in which they are embedded too. As we shall see, Hegel does not mention geographical l ments accidentally here.

Within each successive stage of historical development, particular nations play a key role and at each stage of world history, the spirit is represented by one dominant nation. World history can therefore be presented as a sequence of 'world historical' nations. As soon as a nation becomes the bearer of a particular epoch of the develop ment of the world spirit, this nation has an absolute right; the spirits of other nations are without any claims and do not count. (Rph, 347) Obviously, states do not 'act' in any meaningful sense. Thus, interpreting world history as a sequence of 'world histo rical' nations ieads to the acknowledgement of the importance of the so-called 'world historical' individuis:27 those who, in Hegel's view, act out the substantial moments of the world spirit. These individuis do not, however, know that they are fulfilling the task of the world spirit. Despite following their own particular objectives and interests, however, they bring about successive stages in world history. (Rph, 348) Reason thus manages to use the private passions of such individuis as a means to further the stages of historical development. As a consquence, such individuis ought not to be valued by the ordinary standards of their contemporaries: no man is a hero to his servant, not because the former is no hero, but because the latter is a servant.28 However, the philosophical approach to history does accept that 'world historical' indi viduis have insight into the requirements of their epoch, even if they are unconscious of the way in which such requirements relate to the spirit. Such 'heroes' must there fore be acknowledged as having been the most clear-sighted of their time and their deeds and words the best of their time.29 They express the substantial deeds of the world spirit. Therefore they are, so Hegel writes, 'immediately identical' with it. (Rph, 348)

Of course, a new question now arises: what exactly do such 'spiritual' heroes do to cause history to progress in this way? The answer is given in PhUosophy of Right's key paragraphs 349-350, in which the thesis that reason orchestrtes history is linked with the thesis that progress takes shape in the form of a sequence of world historical realms. In order for a human Community to be part of history and respected by other communities it must, according to Hegel, make the transition from the initial stage of being merely a people, in the form of an extended family, tribe, kinship group or a mass of human beings, to being a state. Without such 'state'-form, a people lacks the objectivity of a universally valid existence for both itself and for others and without such objective legality or firmly established rationality, the independence of such peo ple is merely formal and does not amount to sovereignty. Thus, a Community living in

26 G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 58; G.W.F, Hegel, Lectures on the Phitosophy of History, 16

27 See also: S. Avineri, Hege/'s Theory of the Modern State, 230-234. Critical of Avineri's account: A.W. Wood, Heget's Ethicat Thought, 226-8.

28 G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 48. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Phitosophy of History, 33

29 G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 46. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Phitosophy of History, 32


Hege! and the End of Europe 45

a patriarchal form would not need to be recognised by peoples, which have already attained the form of a State. The study of human history can therefore be restricted to communities that have managed to overcome their initial lawless situation by means of legal dterminations and objective institutions such as marriage and agriculture. Now the answer is given to what heroic, 'world histrica!' individuis do. They have the task of founding the State. Even if their founding acts appear to be violent and unjust, they have an absolute right to act in this way. (Rph, 350)

This 'world historie' preference for the State created by heroes enables Hegel to create a hierarchy of the vast variety of human communities. Thus, civilised nations are to be preferred to barbaran peoples. Amongst barbaran peoples, however, agri culturist societies must be given preference over pastoral people who, in their turn, rightly treat hunters as barbarians. Hegel's Philosophy of Rightas a philosophy of the State also crtes a hierarchy within the class of state-organised societies. The world spirit Orders the historical states according to four principies, starting with the principie of natural immediaey and ending with that of freedom. These four principies corre spond with four 'world historical' realms, namely: The principie of the substantial spirit embodied in the Oriental realm. The principie of subjective knowledge of this substantial spirit within the Greek realm. The principie of the abstract universality within the Roman realm and, finally: The principie of the reconciliation of substantiality and subjectivity within the Germa nie Realm, in which the opposition between objective state-organisations and the subjective quest for truth and freedom has disappeared. (Rph, 353)

These four realms and their process of an ever-growing awareness of truth and freedom must be discussed in some detail in order to determine Europe's status in Hegel's legal philosophy. In this way, the implications of Hegel's preference for the Germanie State become evident. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to fill in some gaps in Hegel's reasoning. Why does Hegel not discuss or even mention hu man societies in Africa, America or Australia, thus suggesting that these continents and their inhabitants do not count from a 'world historical' perspective? Could this be explained by the absence of state-organisations in these rgions of the world? Why did such organisations develop in Asia and Europe only? The key to the answer lies, I think, in Hegel's remark that the successive stages in the development of world history are symbolised by one particular nation both in its anthropological and its ge ographica!existence. (Rph, 346) This remark can only be understood when paying attention to an often-neglected section in Hegel's Lectures ort the Philosophy of His tory.

3. Europe as the 'absolute' West

Although Hegel's so-called "Philosophy of History" is based only on student's notes, the text has attracted considerable attention, due partly to the fact that these lectures, in contrast with many other parts of Hegel's oeuvre, are rather accessible. The intro duction, known as "Reason in History", is even famous.30 Not much attention is nor mally paid, however, to the chapter on "Geographica! Foundation of World History",

30 G.W.F. Hegel, Reason in History: a general Introduction to the PhHosophy of History (transi., with an Introd. by R.S. Hartman), New York 1953. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the PhHosophy of World

History: Introduction; Reason in ///sto/y (trans!. H.B. Nisbet), Cambridge 1975; A general introduc tion s: J. McCarney, Hegel on History.


46 Thomas Mertens

situated between this introduction and the description of the four world-historic realms already mentioned in connection with the Philosophy of Right. However, this chapter is not unimportant as it focuses on the important geographica! and climatic precondi tions of world history. Here too Hegel holds that the world in all its forms and stages consists of an manation of Reason. Therefore, geography necessarily belongs to the development of the spirit and constitutes the 'infrastructure' of political history, so to speak. Reason acting as 'stage manager' to the heroic 'world historical' actors such as the founders of states and first lawgivers like Caesar or Napoleon must be consid ered as having set the geographica! scene too. Because "God's providence governs the world" and "the carrying out of his plan is the history of the world",31 geography is part of that overall plan.32 World history as the appearance of the spirit manifests itself not only in time, but also in space and in the character of the peoples as the offspring of the soil. Such reasoning brings Hegel to his central thesis: whether a people is able to posit itself as a world-historical people dpends on geographica! and climatic con ditions. A people can only play a role in world history if its natural 'infrastructure' is neither too dominant or too bnficiai. No 'world historical' people can be found where it is either too cold or too warm, that is, where nature's power is so strong as to keep people from developing towards free movement. History's theatre is therefore only to be found in the moderate rgions of the world and, more specifically, in the moderate rgions of the Northern Hemisphere. Although the Southern Hemisphere contains moderate rgions as well, it is divided 'into many far ends', while the North ern Hemisphere of the earth prsents itself 'in a continental form'. According to Hegel, there is strong empirical evidence for this: the north contains a larger variety of animal and plant species with common characteristics, whereas in the south species often have individual and distinctive features which contrast sharply with each other.33

Thus, Hegel's conception of geography immediately confronts us with two distinc tions: a distinction between moderate and extreme and a distinction between the two hemispheres. World history has a clear preference for the moderate climate of the North. Hegel adds the further distinction between the 'old' and 'new' parts of the world. Although, geologically, the newly discovered continents of the Americas and Australia are of the same age as the Old World, the 'newer' territories, it is argued, are both physically and psychologically less well developed. This view is supported by 'empir ical evidence': rivers in New-Holland, for instance, have not properly embedded them selves; the people living there are quite small and are less powerful. As a resuit, the indigenous people of northern America are unable to contend with the activity of the European immigrants and are consequently driven backwards to the western territo ries. In southern America, the indigenous people are treated even more harshly and it will, so Hegel writes, take a long time for European immigrants to succeed in teaching them some self-esteem. This is illustrated by an illuminating little example: the Jesuits had to remind the Indians of their matrimonial duties by ringing a bell at midnight.34 Furthermore, Negroes were transported from Africa to America due both to the lazy

G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 25; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Phitosophy of History, 13 See also: "... Die Unterschiede der Weltteile als nicht zufllige, sondern notwendige ...", G.W.F.

Hegel, Enzyklopdie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 393 Z., 58. G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 107; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Phitosophy of History, 84 G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 108; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Phiiosophy of History, 85



nature of the indigenous Americans and to their being far more susceptible to Europe an culture, even though they too live in parts of the world in which it is difficult for the Spirit to develop itself. If America will ever appear in the theatre of world history as the land of the future, this will be due only to the fact of its being Europeanised.35

From a 'world historical' perspective, therefore, the description of the world's ge ography can be restricted to the three continents of the Old World. Within the Old World, Hegel distinguishes between Africa on the one hand and Asia and Europe on the other. Like Australia and the Americas, the part of Africa that lay beneath the Sahara, Africa in the strictest sense, is dominated by the highlands and isolated from the rest of the world. This Africa does not particpate in world history36 and need not be dealt with at length since this 'land of childhood' is enveloped by the dark mantle of Night and lies beyond the day of self-conscious history.37 Not only is Africa's atmosphre humid and its air poisonous for a European but the Negroes fail to develop fully concepts like univer sality, morality or religion. They lack all distinctions and live without any knowledge of a higher being. In the absence of religion they too lack respect for human beings and they thus Ilstrate natural man in his completely wild and untamed State, lacking in any char acteristics which reflect humanity.38 Unsurprisingly, African communities are ruled tyrannically according to Hegel. Since Africans treat each other with brutality, their kings completely despise their subjects. Moral sentiments are non-existent: parents are Willing to seil their children as slaves, and vice versa. Negroes, Hegel argues, do not consider slavery to be wrong. Indeed, when compared to their own absolute forms of slavery, European slavery, as harsh as it may have been, is an improvement and must be considered as a part of ducation. In Hegel's eyes, slavery is "in end of itself" unjust and European policy should aim at abolishing slavery for it is human destiny to be free. In the case of Africa, however, the gradual abolishment of slavery must be considered wiser than its sudden removal.39 One might summarise Hegel's view as follows: Africa is a static, wild, homogeneous and primitive continent lacking in histo ry, development, moris, philosophy and religion.40

In leaving Africa, one enters history's real theatre, found in Asia and Europe, to which the northern parts of Africa, the Nile delta and the Mediterranean coast belong. These two continents, however, are not on an equal footing, for Hegel introduces the further distinction between East and West. Asia is the oriental quarter of the globe where the light of reason arose and therefore history originated, while Europe consti tues the centre and the end of the Old World. Why is Asia the absolute East and

W.H. Walsh, Principie and Prjudice in Hegel's philosophy of history, 184 Africa's two remaining parts: the narrow coastal tracts along the Mediterrenean Sea and river r

gion of the Nile, belong to Europe and Asia respectively. G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 120; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, 95; See also: H. Kimmerle, Hegel und Afrika, in: Idem, Die Dimension des Interkulturellen, Amsterdam Atlanta, 1994, 85-112; also Hegel-Studien28 (1993), 303-325. G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 124 ("keine Achtung"), 122 ("... nichts an das Menschliche Anklingende ..."); G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, 97 G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 129; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, 103; Hegel adds the interesting remark that Negroes consider the Eng lish who have done most for abolishing the slave-trade, as enemies. Empirical findings do not confirm Hegel's prefering European over native slavery. H. Kimmerle, Hegel und Afrika, 86; These remarks do not belong to the periphery of Hegel's writ

ings only. See e.g.: G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopdie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 393 Z., 59-60.


48 Thomas Mertens

Europe the absolute West?41 If we first concntrate on Asia we will, according to Hegel, find that Asia is not homogeneous. Instead, it can be dlvided nto three distinct

rgions. First, the hlghlands, in which people with a nomadic lifestyle are occupied with the rearing of cattle only and where history is still relatively absent. The second part of Asia consists of plains, in which people are occupied with agriculture. Here, the

principie of private property and that of master and servant have developed. Reflec tion started too, since such agricultural communities require stability and demand foresight and solicitude for the future. Typical of Asian agricultural societies, however, is the fact that the element of civilisation supplied by the sea is not integrated. Only Asia's third part knows of such higher forms of reflection since it consists of a mixture of mountains and plains and borders the sea. This rgion is referred to as the Mlddle East and Asia Minor. This part is no longer typically Asian, but becomes orientated towards the Mediterranean Sea, the central point of world history,42 and therefore orientated towards Europe. Although in this remarkable part of Asia all religious and

political principies orignate, these principies do really become developed only in Eu

rope.43 Hegel's geographical journey therefore ends in Europe. Europe is privileged since, unlike Africa and Asia, it does not demnstrate strong

geographical variations and contrasts.44 Instead, Europe's nature is mild, with smooth transitions between mountains, plains and river mouths. Europe consists of three parts too: first, its southern part constituted by Greece and Italy and orientated towards the Mediterranean. For a long period of time world spirit found its habitat here. Its second part consists of France, Germany and England. Caesar opened Europe's 'heart' when he conquered Gaul. From the 'world historical' perspective, Caesar was therefore more successful than Alexander, the predecessor he so admired, because the latter wanted in vain to intgrate the East into Greek life, whilst the former rightly under stood the movement of civilisation from East to West. Finally, the third part of Europe is located in the Northeast rgions of Europe: Roland, Russia and the Slavic coun tries. They arrive late on the scene of historical states, while their existence is con nected with the Asiatic continent.

4. Europe and the four 'world historical' realms

Hegel's explanation of the 'geographical foundation' of world history enables us to understand the sequence of 'world historical' realms in the Philosophy of Right. The final chapter on world history indicates where the modem state must be located, namely at the summit of historical development.45 Furthermore, Hegel claims that this apex can not be superseded. In this sense, we arrive here at the end of history. Some comment is still necessary however.

G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 130; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Phitosophy of History, 104 G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 115; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Phitosophy of History, 92 G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 132; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Phitosophy of History, 106 G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopdie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 393 Z., 58 This is confirmed in: G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopdie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 393 Z., 63: " ... in Europe, the State displays the development and ralisation of freedom by means of rational institutions".



The story Hegel tells is new In terms of its vocabulary, but not in its meaning or Its metaphors. One recognises, for instance, the myth of Europe as told by Herodote as well as the influences of heliotrope.46 The sun rises in the east and sets in the west and civilisation follows. Hegel adds the following reason: light is at first hand 'the simple relation to itself. The effect of the rising of the sun is like the experience of a blind man who, suddenly possessed of sight, looks at the bright glimmering of the dawn ("Morgendmmerung"): "The boundless forgetfulness of his individuality in this pure splendour, is his first feeling, utter astonishment"47 No distinctions, no objects can be perceived. Only later when the sun has risen, the admiration diminishes. From this moment on it is possible to make out the distinction between perceiver and per ceived, as well as the transition from inactive contemplation to activity. By the close of the day man has constructed a house with his own inner sun. When he then contem pltes this, he values the building of his own more highly than the original sun. While he was overwhelmed at first, he now stands in a conscious and free relation to the light. This image symbolises the course of history in its travel from east to west, from the land of the morning to that of the evening. Although the world takes the physical form of a globe, world history does not complete a fll circle: instead, it is the process of disciplining and educating the uncontrolled natural will into obedience to universal ity and freedom.

In Hegel's story also other common ideas can be recognised. First, the od idea of the translatio imperii,A the transition of empires to a more encompassing freedom: the Oriental world only knew and still only knows that one is free, the Greek and the Roman world knew that some are free, but only the Germanie world knows that ail are free. History can be seen to develop from despotism, via democracy and aristocracy to constitutional monarchy as the ultmate achievement of the modern world, in which the substantial idea of freedom had finally won its subjective infinite form. (Rph, 273 Anm.) Second, we find the metaphor of man's individual development from childhood into maturity as a model for the development of mankind as a whole. This was a common image during the age of Enlightenment.49 Here is Hegel's version: humani ty's childhood Starts in the land of the morning, in the Orient. In the oriental realm the world-view is 'inwardly substantial and undivided' without a distinction between the

According to J. Derrida the foundational metaphor of western metaphysics, see: La mythologie blanche, in: Idem, Marges de la Philosophie, Paris 1971,247-324, esp. 299-300. See also: G.W. F.

Hegel, Enzyklopdie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 392 Z. G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 133-4; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, 109 The origins of this idea can be traced back as far as to the Book Daniel in the Bible, with Daniel's

explanation of Nebukadnezar's dream of the four empires. Hieronymus understood these empires later as the empires of Babylon, Persia, Macedonia and Rome respectively, with civilisation starting in the fertile crescent, between the Eufrat and the Tigris, and moving to the west. Remember also that Christ died on the cross of Golgotha with his face to the West. Long into modem times this scheme remained dominant. Opinions only differ as to what should be considered 'head' of civilisa tion. Buffon agreed very much with Hegel: nature in America is not fit to reach to the heights of

Europe's civilisation. Its climate is too wet and cold, its vgtation poorer than that of Europe and the indigenous population physically much shorter. Bishop Berkeley, on the other hand, had high hopes for the new America. He became its prophet by summarizing the heliotropy of his days in a

poem: "Westward the Course of Empire takes its Way; The four first Acts already past; A fifth shall close the Drama with the Day; Time's noblest Offspring is the last". See: J.W. Schulte Nordholt, De

mythe van het Westen, Amsterdam 1992, esp. 108, 99. Kant used this metaphor in his discussion with M. Mendelssohn concerning the question whether mankind is morally progressing during its development. See e.g.: ber den Gemeinspruch, AA VIII, 308-9 (Transi, in: Reiss, H. (ed.), Kant's Political Writings, Cambridge 1970, 88-89).


50 Thomas Mertens

constitution and lgislation on the one hand and religion on the other. The individual has no rights here and disappears altogether. As a resuit of the absence of any inter nal movement, the Oriental State's orientation is outwards and its movement mani fests itself as rage and dvastation. (Rph, 355) Therefore, Oriental states are en gaged in endless conflicts with one other, without any real changes taking place.50 Mankind develops as a child with the Egyptians and the Phoenicians, but only reach es boyhood with the Greeks. The Greek realm no longer excludes subjectivity, but seeks to establish the unity of the finite and the infinite. It is at this point that individual spirituality develops. Thus ethical life, for the first time, is based on the free will of personal individuality, but it does not attain its fulfilment. In Greece, the spirit is not yet able to give itself substantial forms and ethical life is split up into a series of particular national spirits in city-states, and into classes of lords and slaves. (Rph, 356) In this respect, the Greek world is the exact opposite of the Orient. In the latter 'substantial forms' exist without subjective freedom, while in Greece freedom exists in subjectivity and individuality but without the capacity to give itself concrete substantial forms. The Greek period can therefore be summarised as 'beautiful freedom'.51 Adolescence is the next phase in human development and this corresponds with the Roman realm, as characterised by abstract universality embodied in law and organisation. Contrary to the Greek city-state of Athens, the Roman Empire no longer belongs to its individ uis. Instead, it has an abstract existence and in this respect, the Roman Empire seems to duplcate its Oriental predecessors. Mediation between the universality of institutions and the subjectivity of the individuis living therein is, however, only seem ingly absent, because in Rome, unlike in Oriental states, individuis remain to a limit ed extent recognised as such. Thus, in their individual capacity persons have private rights.52 To summarise: in the Orient there are merely institutions without individuali ty; in Greece individuality is emphasised, although without the substantial forms in which it should be embodied; in Rome the substantial forms of the Orient re-emerge, but without fully negating the Greek development: in Roman law a place for individu ality is preserved. The next stage is reached when substantial forms and individuality become reconciled in harmonious unity.

This summit of historie development is constructed upon the ruins of the Roman Empire, which collapsed because of the inner tension between abstract universality and inward subjectivity. The collapse of the Roman Empire is first followed by despot ism and during this period the spirit seeks, for the time being, its refuge into the inner realm of religious spirituality.53 In its struggle to regain Standing in the outside world, Christianity is of dcisive importance and aims at reconciling the spiritual principie and the barbaran world. However, it takes Christianity eight centuries to establish this reconciliation between substance and subjectivity in what becomes known as the 'Germanie realm'. Christianity's major accomplishment in this respect is removing the conflict between the empire of the world or political State, and the religious empire of the Roman-Catholic church. Protestantism's Reformation makes a dcisive step in

50 G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 137; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Phi/osophy ofHistory, 112

51 G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 137; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosoph y of History, 113

52 G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 138; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosoph y of History, 114

53 G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 139; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Phiiosophy of History, 114-5



this respect enabling the spirit to realise Reason within the world itself.54 Thus man kind finally reaches maturity. It now is the principie task of the North, that is, of the Germanie peoples, to bring about the unity of the divine and the human as the telos of human history in perfect maturity. (Rph, 359)

Hegel's analysis of the four realms and the 'spiritual' primacy of the Germanie peoples have, of course, practical consquences. By sketching the historical origin of constitutional monarchy as the rational State Hegel lgitimtes claims made by mod em European states on non-European territories and on non-Germanic European territories. Since world history decrees that there should be states and that the mod em State is an absolute end in itself (Rph, 258),55 a nation ('Volk') without a state, in its initial stages, lacks moral substantiality: it exists, but without valid 'sovereignty'.56 Civilised nation-states have the right to treat nations without a state as barbarians and are allowed to solve their problems by finding solutions in the territories of such na tions. (Rph 351) The main problem in the modem state is the odd combination of poverty and wealth with which modem civil societies are confronted.57 Based on con temporary economic theory, Hegel hoids that early capitalism is characterised by the accumulation of wealth in combination with surplus population and relative poverty. Therefore the modem state's economy is too poor to supply all its Citizens with their basic goods. Here, Hegel anticiptes problems connected with what later became known as the 'social question' or, in Marx' terms, the 'proltariat'. This problem could not, according to Hegel, be solved by additional investments initiated by the state because such a solution would only make the problem worse. Solutions are therefore to be found abroad, either by finding new consumers in other countries, or by coloni sation, or by a combination of the two. It is evident that Hegel considers colonisation as a legitmate strategy. He fails to acknowledge Kant's principie of cosmopolitan right which limits the right of entry. The modem rational society is no longer, according to Hegel, an agricultural society with strong economic and emotional ties with the soil. The basic element of an industrial society is the moving element of the sea. Therefore a nation-state can solve its problems by encouraging the poor strata of its population to emigrate for the newly discovered territories. In those colonies, emigrants find space to settle down and return to the family principie and agriculture. From this point on, it

is suggested, the process of constructing a rational state can start anew. (Rph, 242 248, in combination with 349)58 Hegel here clearly takes the perspective of the expanding European civilisation. For him, indigenous populations cannot legitimately

G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 140-1 ; G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Phitosophy ofHistory, 115-6 Observe the diffrence between Hegel's concept of "Selbstzweck" designating the (rational) State and Kant's use of the human being as "Zweck an sich Selbst", in: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der

Sitten, AA IV, 428.

Rph 349: "Ein Volk ist zunchst noch kein Staat, seine Selbstndigkeit ist nicht Sou

vernitt"; See also Anm.; See also: A.W. Wood, Hege/'s Ethicai Thought, 204. Unfortunately, Hegel's language is descriptive instead of prescriptive, as usual, as if it is just a matter of plain fact that non-statal human communities, in its initial stages, are not being recognized. Hegel's conten

tion, however, that primitive communities need not be respected, is in clear opposition with Kant's

(prescriptive) cosmopolitanism. See e.g.: S. Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State, 147-154; P. Franco, Hegei's Phiiosophy of Freedom, New Hven London 1999, 265-277; R.-P. Horstmann, Hegels Theorie der brgerli chen Gesellschaft, in: G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (ed. L. Siep), Klassi ker Auslegen Band 9, Berlin 1997, 206-210. This explains why Hegel does not mention any 'international problems' when discussing colonisa tion as a solution to the poverty problem. Neither do most of his commentators.


52 Thomas Mertens

Claim to have their way of life respected. Europe is the capital of humanity and if another nation wants to develop a communal life, which deserves respect, it will need to copy the 'Nordic' structures.

It is hardly surprising that some commentators have argued that human history has found its ideological end in Hegel's conception of the rational State.59 Thus, Eu rope's mission would consist in exporting its models of being to the rest of the world. Once this telos is reached, Europe as a specific way of human communal life will find its ending.

5. Conclusion

Hegel's conceptualisation of world history is a way of answering the question of Eu rope's identity. Hegel emphasises Europe's superiority as the embodiment of identity, modernity and rationality.60 This Stry is evidently one-sided and one of exclusion and inclusion, of superiority and inferiority. it has determined the relationship not only between Europe and non-European continents, but also between European nation states in efforts to domnate the continent. Germany's war against Russia during W.W. II is the most recent example in which it was argued that ultimately Europe's fate was at stake.61 As a resuit, many have radically doubted Hegel's story, like Horkheimer and Adorno in their Dialektik der Aufklrung. More recently, Baumann challenged the supposition that the rise of rationality will inevitably lead to morality's triumph over barbarism. Convincingly, Bauman argues that the Holocaust cannot be understood simply as the failure of Europe's process of civilisation, but also as one of its possible consquences.62 If Europe wishes to address the issue of its identity, it should not focus on officiai Hegelian biographies but on alternative stories from non-eurocentric and non-European perspectives. Fortunately, this openness is part of European thought too. The Kantian tradition according to which ail humans and human communities deserve to be respected is the most prominent example in this respect. If Europe wants to escape from the Hegelian sductions and essences, it needs to develop and to reinforce these truly cosmopolitan ways of thinking.

Author's address: Prof. Dr. Th. Mertens, Faculty of Law, University of Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9040, 6500 KK Nijmegen, The Netherlands. E-mail: [email protected]

The well-known, recent example is: F. Fukuyama, The End of History, in: The National /nterest, 1989,3-18. G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopdie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 393 2., 62-3: "Therefore, the

principie of the European spirit is the selfconscious reason, Here reigns this infinite urge to

knowlegde, which is not familiar to the other races." Hegel's concept of Europe is eurocentric. The use of the concept 'race' here does however not make him a racist. The attribution of radical and elemental divisions between human groups cannot be found in Hegel. His thinking is indebted to the eighteenth-century belief of a common human nature: J. McCarney, Hegel on History, 145; W.H. Walsh, Principie and Prjudice in Hegel's philosophy of history, 193. See also: D. Innerarity, Hegels Idee von Europa, Zeitschrift fr philosophische Forschung 46 (1992), 381-394. W.-D. Gudopp, Stalingrad - Heidegger - Marx, Deutsche Zeitschrift fr Philosophie ZA (1983), 672-687 Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, Polity Cambridge 1989


Article Contentsp. [38]p. 39p. 40p. 41p. 42p. 43p. 44p. 45p. 46p. 47p. 48p. 49p. 50p. 51p. 52

Issue Table of ContentsARSP: Archiv fr Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Vol. 89, H. 1 (2003), pp. 1-158Front Matterberlegungen zu Gustav Radbruchs Verleugnungsformel: Ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Rechtsbegriff [pp. 1-16]Moderne Zugnge zur praktischen Philosophie des Aristoteles: Politisch, metaphysisch oder rhetorisch? [pp. 17-37]Hegel and the End of Europe [pp. 38-52]Materiale Wertethik und Strafrechtsdogmatik: Zum Einflu der Lehren Max Schelers und Nicolai Hartmanns auf die deutsche Strafrechtswissenschaft [pp. 53-74]Ethisierung des ffentlichen Diskurses und Verstaatlichung der Ethik [pp. 75-86]Reine Rechtslehre. Oder: Rechtswissenschaft als Normwissenschaft: Zum Geltungsproblem der Rechtsstze im Rechtspositivismus Hans Kelsens [pp. 87-102]IVR-Informationen und Mitteilungen [pp. 103-114]LiteraturLiteraturberichtRechtsphilosophie und politische Theorie [pp. 115-121]

RezensionsabhandlungThe Liberalism of Freedom in the History of Moral Philosophy [pp. 122-132]

RezensionenReview: untitled [pp. 133-135]Review: untitled [pp. 136-140]Review: untitled [pp. 140-142]Review: untitled [pp. 142-144]Review: untitled [pp. 144-149]Review: untitled [pp. 149-154]Review: untitled [pp. 154-157]

Back Matter

end of europe

Documents

philosophy of history

european union

philosophy of right

european constitution

european people

european demos

jstor terms

federal europe