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Embezzlement and reimbursement. Discipliningofficials in ‘Abbāsid Baghdad (8th-10th centuries A.D.)Maaike van Berkel aa University of Amsterdam , Amsterdam, The NetherlandsPublished online: 26 Aug 2011.

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Embezzlement and reimbursement. Disciplining officialsin ‘Abbasid Baghdad (8th-10th centuries A.D.)

Maaike van BerkelUniversity of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Extortion of taxpayers, embezzlement of state revenues, and bribery were structuralphenomena in the ‘Abbasid administration of the early 10th century. Despite the frequentrecurrences of these phenomena contemporary authors seem to have labeled them as casesof corruption that had to be dealt with by the state authorities. The caliph had at his disposaltwo more or less formalized institutions through which he could react to official abuse and tryto recover illegally required sums: the maz. alim court (a court of petitions) and administrativeprocedures against dismissed officials. This article explores the functioning and aims of theseinstitutions and will demonstrate their inadequacy in controlling official abuse.

Keywords: corruption, ‘Abbasid Baghdad, bureaucracy, maz. alim courts, discharge procedures

To believe the chroniclers, the majority of the officials ofthe ‘Abbasid caliphate were constantly trying to feather theirown nest at the expense of the state treasury and the ordinarytaxpayer. The many references in the sources make it clearthat bribery, embezzlement, and extortion were structuralphenomena. Many officials, on every step of the hierarchi-cal ladder, seem to have profited from their official positionand to have received extra income from illegal sources. Anoffice in the ‘Abbasid administration was often regarded asa source of financial gain to be exploited for self-interest.Honest and unbribeable officials even amazed their contem-poraries, and they were explicitly mentioned as such in thesources to provide positive examples.1

Muslim scholars have written frequently about the offi-cials’ illegal revenues and particularly about the borderlinebetween allowable gifts (hiba) and illegal bribes (rashwa).2

The general view in the legal works is that an allowablegift is something to which no condition is attached, while

1See, for example, the story on Nas.r b. al-Fath. , the head of the pub-lic treasury, whose affairs were investigated after his death in 926 and whoturned out not to have embezzled any money from the state. ‘Arıb, S. ilatta’rıkh, 111.

2Rashwa was also vocalized as rishwa and rushwa. Most of the theoret-ical discussions on the acceptance of bribes are, however, concerned withjudiciary and not so much with other state officials (Rosenthal, 1964, 140).

Correspondence should be addressed to Maaike van Berkel,University of Amsterdam, Spuistraat 134, 1012 VB, Netherlands.E-mail: m.l.m.vanberkel@uva.nl

a bribe is a gift offered to someone in political authoritywith the aim of obtaining his help or support.3 The scholars’condemnation of bribery is very clear. According to an often-cited statement by the Prophet Muhammad, God’s curse isto rest upon the giver of bribes, the taker of bribes, and thego-between.4

Society’s judgment on corrupt officials seems to havebeen milder. The chronicles and histories for the early 10th

century mention many examples of officials offering giftsto courtiers with the aim of gaining their political support.They describe these practices as facts that were part andparcel of political reality, generally without negative com-ments. Bribery was most probably not the most widespreadand devastating wrongdoing of officials. Unlike bribes, theembezzlement of state funds by officials and their extor-tion of the taxpayers are generally condemned expressly bycontemporary authors. References to this kind of corruptionappear even more frequently in the sources. Viziers who tookactions against them are described with much admiration.5

Notwithstanding these adverse comments, a conviction for

3According to Rosenthal (1964, 143), in the discussion of briberyin legal texts throughout the centuries no chronological development orchange in attitude is displayed.

4For the location of this hadıth, see Wensinck et al. (1936–1988, II,262a). The go-between is only occasionally included (Rosenthal, 1964,135, n.4)

5See, for example, Miskawayh’s description of ‘Alı b. ‘Isa’s crusadeagainst corruption. Miskawayh, Tajarib, I, 27–29.

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the embezzlement of state money was not regarded as animpediment to a future career in the state service.

In its turn the state had developed a way of disci-plining its officials and recovering their illegally acquiredrevenues. This article will discuss the state’s dealing withcorrupt officials. There were two more or less formalizedinstitutions through which the central authorities reacted toofficial abuse and embezzlement by its own officials: themaz. alim court (a court of petitions) and procedures againstdismissed officials. This article deals with both these institu-tions, but will start with a short introduction on the ‘Abbasidbureaucracy.

‘ABBASID BUREAUCRACY

The ‘Abbasids came to power in 750 A.D. They moved thecapital of the caliphate from Damascus to Baghdad and ruledan empire which at its height, at the end of the 8th and begin-ning of the 9th centuries (under caliph Harun al-Rashıd),stretched from present-day Tunisia in the West to the bor-ders of Khurasan in the East. This article will concentrateon a short, but well-documented, period of the ‘Abbasid his-tory: the 25 years of the reign of the 18th ‘Abbasid caliph,al-Muqtadir (908–932 A.D.). During the early 10th centurymost of the empire (from Egypt to Afghanistan) still offi-cially recognized the caliph in Baghdad, but he exerciseddirect control in less than half that area, first and foremostin Baghdad’s hinterland, the Sawad of Iraq. In the middle ofthe 10th century the ‘Abbasids also lost political power in theheart of the empire, although they kept the title of caliph forcenturies to come.

The ‘Abbasid era (8th–10th centuries) saw an enormousextension and bureaucratization of the state administration.By the early 10th century the central administrative apparatusin Baghdad consisted of numerous specialized offices—forexample, an office of land tax (dıwan al-kharaj), an officeof state landholdings (dıwan al-d. iya’), an office of mili-tary affairs (dıwan al-jaysh), an office of court expenses(dıwan al-nafaqat) and a chancery (dıwan al-rasa’il) – eachof which had again numerous subdivision. These officeswere staffed by hundreds of specialized scribes who receivedhighly varied monthly salaries.

One of the most noticeable features of the ‘Abbasidadministration was its extensive use of written documents— especially when compared to the contemporary adminis-trations in early medieval Europe, but also when comparedto the administration of its predecessors, the UmayyadCaliphate. The narrative sources testify to the productionand spread of large numbers and types of written documentsthroughout the empire suggesting a correlation betweenincrease in bureaucratic production and the disseminationof literacy in general. They further refer to the copyingand preservation of documents in designated locations, i.e.,archives. The introduction of paper in the caliphate in the

course of the 8th century played a major role in the dis-semination of written documents. Unfortunately, few of the‘Abbasid documents from the central administration havesurvived in their original form.6

However, records have been preserved from other areasof the caliphate, such as papyri from Egypt and a recentlydiscovered corpus of Arabic documents on parchment fromnortheastern Afghanistan which was written during the reignof the ‘Abbasid caliph al-Mans.ur (r. 754–775 A.D.) (Khan,2007). Documents have also been copied and included asmodels in the administrative literature, manuals, and trea-tises written for and by state scribes laying down thestandards of the administrative practice. The collections ofexemplars of documents served here as concrete examplesof good writing.

The state and its administration were also one of the mainparticipants in the development of a document-based men-tality. Record-keeping and the use of these records as properevidence became important instruments in dealing with con-flicts between the state and taxpayers or in administrativedischarge procedures against dismissed officials, as will bedemonstrated in the following discussion.7

MAZ. ALIM (COURT OF PETITIONS)

The first of the two institutions through which the ‘Abbasidcaliphs controlled their own officials is the maz. alim court.The maz. alim was the personal responsibility of the caliph.In theory all grievances could be brought to the caliph inthis court. However, one of its main functions was to hearand respond to complaints regarding abuses by governmentofficials.

The maz. alim institution also functioned as a court ofappeal, a recourse against the judgments from the regularcourts (the qad. ı courts). Regular and maz. alim courts seem tohave been complementary and interchangeable, but in casesof appeal the maz. alim court could become a concurrent insti-tution. In that case regular judges (singular qad. ı) could beoverruled by the maz. alim court (Tillier, 2009, 59–60).

This article will concentrate on one of the maz. alim’s mainfunctions, as a court where the subjects could file petitions,complaining about the misbehavior of officials and the injus-tice caused by their actions. The maz. alim functioned here asan institution that served discontented subjects. But at thesame time it was an instrument in the hands of the statethrough which it could control and regulate its own officials.

Comparatively speaking few studies exist on the func-tioning of the maz. alim court, especially in its formative

6See, for some surviving documents, the ones on paper and papyrusfrom Samarra (Herzfeld, 1948, 271–274).

7For other examples, see Qudama b. Ja‘far, Kharaj, 53–54; Miskawayh,Tajarib, I, 95, 164–165; al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 33, 165.

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period, the ‘Abbasid era.8 The main reason for this lack ofattention is undoubtedly the relative “poorness” of the sourcematerial in this period. While for the later period we havedocuments and the actual petitions and their responses, from,for example, the Geniza collection, the maz. alim practice forthe ‘Abbasid period must be inferred from scattered and spo-radic fragments in narrative sources. There are no actualdocuments left which were produced for or by the maz. alimcourt for this early period in Iraq.

For this article my main source has been the History ofViziers by Hilal al-S. abi’ (969–1055). The History of Viziersis a book with anecdotes on the lives and deeds of viziers, thehighest state official, who were employed during the reign ofcaliph al-Muqtadir in the early 10th century. The stories onthese historical figures and their political actions were prob-ably meant to inform, entertain, and advise at the same time.

The book was written in the early 11th century, but itis based on contemporary reports. Since in those days thevizier generally acted as the caliph’s deputy in the maz. alimcourt, the History of Viziers contains, compared to othernarrative sources, relatively rich material on the maz. alimpractice. It has 18 references to the maz. alim. Half of thecases (nine out of eighteen) deal with official abuse. Theother half deal with miscellaneous topics such as requests forfinancial support (three out of eighteen), a dispute betweenshopkeepers (one case), a conflict between farmers andtraders on the size of a bridge (one case), and complaintsabout a H. anbalı mosque (one case).9

The references to the maz. alim court in the History ofViziers have some major limitations which should be men-tioned before we look into them in more detail. Firstly,

8For the ‘Abbasid era, see Tillier (2009), Tyan (1938–43). For theEgyptian administrations under the Fat.imids, Ayyubids, and Mamluks, see:Stern (1962, 1964, 1966 ), Nielsen (1985), and Rustow (2010). Tillier’s(2009) article is a very eloquent and valuable analysis of the way in whichthe provincial maz. alim court was a tool for the legitimation of the ‘Abbasiddynasty and an instrument of controlling and disciplining local judges. Hefocuses on the function of the maz. alim as court of appeal. Tyan’s (1938–43)book, although an indispensable guide for the rules and regulations regard-ing the maz. alim court system, lacks a thorough historical survey of thesecourts. Samuel Stern (1962, 1964, 1966) and Jørgen Nielsen (1985), dealtin much more detail with the relation between the theoretical expositionsand the functioning of the maz. alim courts in everyday practice. Stern wrotesome very interesting articles on the petitions of the Fat.imid, Ayyubid, andMamluk period, in which he tested the bureaucratic practice as shown insurviving documents against the procedures prescribed in the administrativemanuals. While Stern was mainly interested in the bureaucratic processes,Nielsen went further. In his Secular Justice in an Islamic State, he also paidattention to the role of this institution in the state administration and itsrelation to other judicial institutions. Both Nielsen and Stern have done pio-neering work for our understanding of the functioning of maz. alim courtsin Egypt from the Fat.imid period onwards. This work is continued byMarina Rustow (2010) who found many more petitions among the Genizadocuments. See also Khan (1990), Richards (1973, 1977).

9Obviously, this is still a first and relatively small sample of cases. Fora more comprehensive study on the functioning of the ‘Abbasid maz. alimcourt, the many scattered references in other narrative sources need to becollected and studied.

they are more or less incomplete reports. Very few of themcontain more than a few lines. One or two are partly docu-mentary — they contain copies of small parts of the decisionon the petition — but most of them are restricted to a descrip-tion of the case or of parts of the procedures. Most of thetime they contain a description of the final verdict, but lackinformation on earlier phases of the process.

Secondly, we have to ask ourselves the question of howrepresentative these cases and, especially, their outcomesare. Why were they worth mentioning in the History ofViziers? Were they exceptional cases or were the routinesessions also recorded. I will come back to the question ofrepresentativeness of these cases later on.

Finally, we should be aware that many conflicts betweensubjects and state officials did not find their way to a maz. alimcourt, but were dealt with elsewhere, in a wide variety ofways. We can think of violence and rebellion, mediation, orsimple neglect. For an analysis of the relative importance ofthe maz. alim court in dealing with official abuse, it will thusbe necessary to identify these other types of settlements aswell.

Having said that, the scattered pieces of information fromthe History of Viziers actually do tell us something aboutthe state’s dealing with corruption. The majority of the casesconcerned with official abuse deal with very complicated fis-cal matters which inform us about the everyday practice oftaxation and tax registration by local and central authorities.Generally, the complaints are about deliberate and illegalabolition of former tax privileges by local tax collectors andprovincial governors. Sometimes they discuss unintentionalmistakes in the assessment of the taxes. Some petitionerscomplain about physical abuse, but most complain about thefalsification of documents by officials for the benefit of theirown purse. The cases offer a window on a motley collec-tion of cunning bureaucratic tricks. Telling, for example, isthe case in which a document cannot be accepted as genuinesince an erasure is discovered in the text. However, later itturns out that the erasure had been inserted maliciously byan official with the precise intention of making the documentlegally inadmissible.10

In order to show the modus operandi of the maz. alimprocedures in the days of caliph al-Muqtadir, one of themore elaborate cases from the History of Viziers will be dis-cussed in more detail. This maz. alim report informs us ofthe way in which the vizier Ibn al-Furat dealt with a peti-tion by an estate holder from the Sawad, the area betweenthe Euphrates and the Tigris, who felt his land had beenovertaxed. Ibn al-Furat was three times vizier for Caliphal-Muqtadir at the beginning of the 10th century.

During the first vizierate of Ibn al-Furat a man from theSawad complained about a revenue officer. He stated that

10Al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 66–67.

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his estate (d. ay‘a) was an administrative grant (qat. ı‘a)11 withlong-standing privileges for tax reduction. He had, how-ever, received an [excessive] assessment over it, since [theassessment] was based on the method of istan.12

Thereupon he went to the maz. alim court to make sure thatthis year too his privileges would be recognized.

He wrote a petition (ruq‘a). And [the vizier Ibn al-Furat]ordered an investigation in the archives (ikhraj al-h. al).13 Thedepartment for the land tax of the Sawad issued a report(kharaj)14 in which it was mentioned that the assessmentwent back to an approved account (jama‘a)15 of the revenueofficer for the previous year. In the report (takhrıj)16 it wasfound that the division of the taxes of the village (baydar,literally, the threshing floor),17 about which he had com-plained, had also been carried out on the basis of the high,istan, assessment.18

In other words, according to the investigation by the landtax department the petitioner was wrong as he had receivedthe same assessment as in the previous year. The report ofthe department for the land tax was sent to the vizier, whoinformed the petitioner. The petitioner persisted, however,in his complaint and maintained that the harvest of the pre-vious year was divided on the basis of the lower assessment.He continued to show up on the days the vizier heard com-plaints in the maz. alim court. He even buttonholed the vizier

11A qat. ı‘a is an administrative grant made in favor of estate-holdersfrom which not the full kharaj, but the lower ‘ushr (tithe) tax was due.Al-Khwarazmı, Mafatih. al-‘ulum, 72.

12Al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 163. Al-Khwarazmı defined istan as muqasama(a fixed percentage or share of the harvest, measured after the crops hadripened). Al-Khwarazmı, Mafatih. al-‘ulum, 72. Here, as in many othersources, the istan method of taxation is put vis-à-vis the qat. ı‘a, a landgrant paying the ‘ushr or tithe. Yet, qat. ı‘a estates also could be assessedaccording to the muqasama method. See, for example, al-S. abi’, Wuzara’,165, 201; Løkkegaard (1950, 87). As Løkkegaard suggested, the meaningof mu‘amalat al-istan can therefore at this place better be translated as amethod of tax assessment levied upon the rural population of estates andstate domains, being at least a higher percentage than the tithe and probablythe full kharaj.

13For translation of the term ikhraj al-h. al as “a research in the archives,”see Løkkegaard (1950, 151). In some cases such research in the records wasextended by the dispatch of an official to the district in question in order toinvestigate the local situation. See al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 165.

14A kharaj is an administrative term for a report or opinion drawn upby the officials of the competent department on the basis of a local and/orarchival investigation on the matter. See al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 66, 163, and166: Løkkegaard (1950, 151).

15For a translation of the term jama‘a as “an account of an ‘amil that hasbeen approved after an audit,” see Al-Khwarazmı, Mafatih. , 70, Løkkegaard(1950, 183).

16The term takhrıj is probably derived from the term kharaj, report oraccount. See above.

17The division of the taxes in case of the muqasama system tookplace on the threshing floor (baydar) after the crops had ripened andbeen collected. Løkkegaard (1950, 181). See also Campopiano (2011,forthcoming).

18Al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 163–164.

in the streets and asked him over and over again to examinehis case.

Finally, the vizier decided to look into the matter himself.He told the petitioner that he needed a document (h. ujja) asevidence against the revenue officer. Unfortunately, the peti-tioner did not have written proof, but he was very persistentin his claims. Then the vizier asked for the approved accountof the revenue officer which was kept in the land tax depart-ment. He examined the account attentively, calculated theamounts levied in the other administrative districts of thearea and compared them with the district of the petitioner.In the end the vizier discovered that the revenue officer hadcheated by erasing numbers in the account. He had erasedthem very thoroughly among the posts of the division of theharvest, but forgot to erase them also among the posts ofthe amounts that had been sent to the capital. Thereupon Ibnal-Furat summoned the petitioner and acquainted him withthe corrupted document. He assured him that his privilegewas indeed valid. After the petitioner has received a writtenapproval of this response (tawqı‘) he thanked the vizier withthe words:

“Which vizier is so devoted to me that he studies the wholeaccount from the beginning to the end and that he exploresthe assessment of the whole district until he discovers theplace of the injustice done against me?”19

So far, the narrative on the vizier Ibn al-Fuat and ananonymous revenue officer from Iraq. What does this nar-rative tell us about the functioning of the maz. alim court,and especially about its role in the state’s disciplining of itsofficials?

First, the procedures applied in the maz. alim court turnout to be much more flexible than the stringent rules appliedin the regular courts (the qad. ı courts). This is corroboratedin the work of later theorists such as al-Mawardı (974–1058) who mentions that maz. alim courts can, unlike the qad. ıcourts, for example: postpone sentence when further inves-tigation is necessary; have the freedom of taking initiativesto conduct inquiries; have more liberty in the admission ofdocumentary evidence; and have greater power to summonwitnesses.20 The liberty regarding documentary evidenceis discussed in particular detail by al-Mawardı. While theregular courts — at least in theory — may accept written evi-dence only when it is supported by testimony, the maz. alimcourt could allow documentary evidence on its own valueand the case from the History of Viziers corroborates this. Ata certain point the vizier even asks the petitioner for writtenevidence (h. ujja). Moreover, this case testifies to the exten-sive use of documents in general in the mazalim court, fromthe written petition (ruq‘a) filed by the estate holder to var-ious types of accounts and the final edict (tawqı‘) released

19Al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 164.20Al-Mawardı, Ah. kam, 105–112. See also Nielsen (1985, 23–26).

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by the vizier. Finally, the case also shows that the maz. alimcourt has the freedom to take initiative to conduct inquiries.

Secondly, the cases from the History of Viziers illus-trate how the maz. alim court functioned as an institutionthrough which the ruler could show his goodness by redress-ing wrong perpetrated by his own officials. This workedeven when he did not appear in person in the court. Whilein the early days of the ‘Abbasid caliphate the caliph wassaid to have supervised the maz. alim in person,21 Caliph al-Muqtadir appeared only very sporadically in the maz. alimcourt, if at all.

At the sessions studied for this article the caliph does notseem to have been present. He preferred acting by deputy,generally the vizier.22 Al-Muqtadir’s most intriguing deputywas the harem stewardess Thumal. Through the intercessionof the caliph’s mother, she became the caliph’s deputy in themaz. alim court of a district of Baghdad, Rus.afa.23

For the maz. alim court viziers and other representativesset specific days. The vizier Ibn al-Furat, for example, heldsessions during his first vizierate on Sundays and duringhis second vizierate on Tuesdays.24 The vizier’s responsi-bility for the maz. alim court did not, however, mean that healways supervised the sessions in person. Often he also actedthrough a representative, for example, one of his personalsecretaries.25 Moreover, viziers and other deputies wereassisted by a team of subordinate officials. These officialsprepared the petitions, conducted the necessary research,took care of the routine work, and presented the vizier withthe complicated matters.26

The virtue of the ruler was further endorsed by his allegedaccessibility for every inhabitant of his empire. The Historyof Viziers reveals hardly any information on the identity ofthe petitioners. Still, the stories suggest that any aggrievedinhabitant of the state could file a complaint in a maz. alimsession held by the vizier and that it was the vizier’s respon-sibility to restore justice. In one of the reports, the vizierIbn al-Furat, exhausted from too much work and unable tohandle with all the petitioners, is said to have exclaimed:

“[. . .] how can we send away the numerous people from ourdoor, who walked up here from distant regions and remotedistricts to explain their complaints [. . .].”27

21See, for example, Sourdel (1959–1960, 641–642). al-Mahdı and al-Hadı took care of the petitions themselves, while Harun al-Rashıd was thefirst to let the work be done by his vizier.

22As an exception to this rule the caliph appointed in 929 ‘Alı b. ‘Isaas person in charge of the maz. alim sessions next to the vizier Ibn Muqla.Sourdel (1959–1960, 452–453, 641).

23‘Arıb, S. ilat ta’rıkh, 67.24Al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 66, 107. For other reference, see al-S. abi’,

Wuzara’, 22; Miskawayh, Tajarib, I, 144.25Ibn Muqla, for example, represented the vizier Ibn al-Furat during the

latter’s first vizierate. Al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 107–108.26See, for example, al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 52.27Al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 107.

Finally, there is one relevant aspect of our question whichthis maz. alim case fails to discuss, and that is the wayin which these discoveries of corruption affected the stateofficial who was involved. What happened to the cunningrevenue officer of our example who had erased numbersfrom the official records to feather his own nest at theexpense of the estate holder, while discrediting his employer,the caliph. We do not hear of his interrogation or punish-ment. Fortunately, a few of the other maz. alim cases againstcorrupt officials do discuss the consequences for the rele-vant officials. We hear of letters of reprimand, for example,or replies to the petitions which were sent by the vizier tolocal administrators.28 In one case the administrator is evenasked to organize a mediator to settle the conflict.29 And inanother case a control team of surveyors is sent to a districtto re-measure the land and recalculate the taxes.30

Yet, the focus of the narratives on the maz. alim court ison the ruler, or his representatives, and his redress of wrong.The disciplining of officials is not the main theme of thesenarratives. All our cases from the History of Viziers have ahappy ending in which the vizier as representative of thecaliph corrects abuses. The examples remind one of thoseHollywood movies where after two hours of abuse and cor-ruption by state or corporate officials, in the end justice pre-vails thanks to one or a few “good officers.” That most of our‘Abbasid cases are versions of the theme “good ruler, wickedservants” seems to indicate that these cases are probably notrepresentative of the outcome of maz. alim cases in general,but that they were used as examples of good governance.

ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGE CASES

The second institution through which the ‘Abbasid state triedto deal with corruption and official abuse are the administra-tive procedures against dismissed officials. Narratives aboutthis institution provide us with much more information onthe consequences of corruption for the officials that wereinvolved in it.

The calling to account of discharged officials for theirspoils of office was a common procedure since Umayyadtimes (late 7th and early 8th centuries) (Løkkegaard, 1950,162). Again the reign of caliph al-Muqtadir is relevantfor studying these procedures, for two reasons. First, thesources for this period are particularly rich concerning thebureaucracy and its employees. Second, this period wascharacterized by numerous changes of power at the top ofthe bureaucracy and therefore discharge procedures figureprominently in the sources.

My main sources are the previously mentioned, History ofViziers and a chronicle called Tajârib al-umam (Experiences

28Al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 337–339, 346.29Al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 337–339, 345.30Al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 346.

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of the Nations) by the 10th-century author Miskawayh.Miskawayh was born in the decade after the death of Caliphal-Muqtadir. His account, at least partly based on sourcescontemporary to al-Muqtadir’s reign, is the most importanthistorical source for the period. Again, we have to ask our-selves how representative the narratives on the dischargeprocedures are. First of all, the narratives concentrate on thedischarge procedures against the highest layers of officials.We hear hardly anything about those lower on the hierarchi-cal ladder. Secondly, both sources intend to provide practicalexamples of proper and bad government for their audiences,the ruling classes. They do not neglect the excrescences ofthis institution, but, rather, tend to present their narratives ina moralistic way.

The administrative discharge procedures are mostlyreferred to by the terms mus. adara and munaz. ara. Since wehave so many descriptions of them, it is possible to analyzetheir procedures and routine.31 They generally developedaccording to a standard scheme (van Berkel, 2010). The firststep was the arrest of the dismissed officials, often consistingof the vizier, his relatives, dependents, and his most impor-tant employees. Very often, his dependents and relatives hadoccupied prominent positions in the bureaucratic apparatus.The arrest was commissioned by the caliph and carried outby the military. After their arrest the vizier and his associateswere placed in the custody of influential courtiers, such asharem stewardesses or chamberlains. Confinement seems tohave been no punitive measure, but a means of coercion tomake sure these discharged officials would disgorge at leastpart of their riches to the state.

Then a wide variety of negotiation methods wereemployed, ranging from peaceful and gentle interroga-tions and mediation processes, in public hearings or privatechambers, to violent confiscations and physical torture.Theoretically, the caliph determined the course of thesecases, deciding who was going to apply which methodof negotiation at which point of the proceedings. In prac-tice, others such as the caliph’s mother, the courtiers, andthe newly appointed heads of the bureaucracy (the new

31Here only the investigations against the highest officials of the centraladministration will be discussed. Also, the provincial officials were, aftertheir discharge, put through a procedure of investigation and confiscation.In order to prevent provincial officials from corruption and extortion as wellas to investigate the political situation in the remoter areas of the empire,the caliph had at his disposal an intelligence service. This espionage net-work was connected to the office of the post (dıwan al-barıd). Moreover,for specific financial surveillance tasks the central authorities sometimesdispatched an ad hoc inspector (mushrif ) to check financial affairs in a cer-tain district. In 287/900, for example, an inspector was sent to the Wasit.district to investigate the estates of the family of the later vizier Ibn al-Furatand in 924 ‘Alı b. ‘Isa was dispatched as mushrif to Egypt and Syria toinvestigate the finances of the tax farmer al-Madhara’ı. ‘Arıb, S. ilat ta’rıkh,46, 99, 105; Miskawayh, Tajarib, I, 24, 25, 141, 146; Qudama b. Ja‘far,Al-Kharaj, 50–52, 77–129; Al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 133–135, 159, 175, 309,319–321.

vizier and his entourage) also influenced the sequence of theinterrogations.32

The dismissed officials were usually first handed over tothe new vizier and his officials. These new administratorshad often successfully engaged in intrigue for their officeby declaring that they would be able to extract enormoussums from their predecessors. Moreover, the administrativestaff was best equipped for the collection of incriminat-ing evidence. To prevent the destruction of valuable proof,papers, accounts, letters, deeds, and possibly duplicate book-keeping were seized immediately after the dismissal.33 Ateam of scribes then studied both the documents and oraltestimonies in search of potential secret assets. Specialistswere needed to investigate the complex paperwork.34

The next step involved the confrontation of the defendantwith the evidence in a hearing. Most cases against high offi-cials were set up in the caliph’s palace. Depending on thestatus of the person heard and the nature of the accusations,those present during the hearings were judges, scribes, mili-tary commanders, courtiers, and jurists.35 A senior official ofthe new administrative staff, the vizier or one of his closestassociates, usually led the interrogations at these meetings.Some of the interrogations took place in public hearings.Others had a more private character and were held in theplace of confinement of the dismissed official or in the pri-vate apartments of the examiner.36 These interrogations werenot exactly known for their display of collegiality. Out ofself-interest the interrogators often submitted falsified doc-uments and bribed witnesses.37 Moreover, also torture wasused by the interrogators.38

Discharge cases were concluded with a (re)paymentarrangement. Since both unjustly acquired fortunes andlegally obtained assets could be confiscated, officials notonly tried to destroy incriminating documents when theirdownfall was near,39 they also sought to protect their pri-vate possessions by depositing money and valuables withrelatives, friends and money dealers or stash it in wellsand hoards.40 The discharged official had to sign for the

32See, for example, Miskawayh, Tajarib, I, 57, 66, 94, 153, 219–220.33On the seizure of the documents of H. amid b. al-‘Abbas, see, for

example, Miskawayh, Tajarib, I, 95 and al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 33.34See, for example, Miskawayh, Tajarib, I, 164–165.35For examples of interrogations where the presence of judges,

courtiers, or senior officials are explicitly mentioned, see Miskawayh,Tajarib, I, 61, 64, 99–100, 114, 133.

36See, for example, Miskawayh, Tajarib, I, 101, 109, 209.37On the submitting of a false witness and a false document in our

case against Ibn al-Furat, see Miskawayh, Tajarib, I, 60–61 and al-S. abi’,Wuzara’, 100–102.

38See, for example, ‘Arıb, S. ilat, 97; Miskawayh, Tajarib, I, 99, 102–103, 110–111, 123; al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 105, 33–48.

39According to Miskawayh, each year H. amid b. al-‘Abbas was in thehabit of throwing his bookkeeping into the Tigris. Miskawayh, Tajarib, I,100.

40Miskawayh, Tajarib, I, 44, 68, 95, 102, 155, 158, 257; al-S. abi’,Wuzara’, 74, 224, 226.

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reimbursement sum and this document was kept, first, inthe vizier’s archive, and later, after the establishment of aspecialized office for bribes and confiscations, in an archiveattached to that office.41 In this way officials could be forcedto actually pay the reimbursement sum they had agreed uponduring the interrogations.

CONCLUSION

This article discussed some of the instruments throughwhich the ‘Abbasid caliph in the early 10th century triedto control his own officials: the maz. alim court and the dis-charge procedures. The many references to grasping officialsdemonstrate that corrupt officialdom was indeed a structuralphenomenon. The discussion in the sources of the state’sdealing with this phenomenon proves that contemporariesindeed identified these cases as official abuse that had tobe controlled by the ruler. Many of the narratives on offi-cial abuse in the History of Viziers by Hilal al-S. abi’, and theExperiences of the Nations by Miskawayh, seem to functionas examples of good and bad governance. Yet, despite theirmoralistic character, they provide us with detailed infor-mation, on, for example, the well-developed protocol androutine of these institutions.

Were these institutions also effective instruments againstcorruption? Did they contribute to controlling and disciplin-ing officials? Did the cases of corruption diminish thanksto these institutions? For the maz. alim court, the informa-tion is too scattered and too biased to analyze its effect onstate abuse in the long run, the maz. alim institution could,indeed, alert the ruler to corrupt officials and practices. Forthe administrative discharge procedures the answer seemsnegative. The main goal of the discharge procedures wasthe mulcting of the both secretly and legally acquired for-tunes of dismissed officials. The discharge procedures weregenerally very effective in one respect. Especially in combi-nation with the use of violence, large sums of money wereindeed recovered from dismissed officials. But, at the sametime, these procedures seem to have had a negative effect onofficial abuse in general. The system of arrest and confisca-tions caused large-scale financial insecurity among officials.In reaction to that it somehow encouraged further corruptionto safeguard livelihoods in bad times. Moreover, after repay-ment of an agreed sum, or sometimes even after the mere

41In 304/917 Ibn al-Furat had established a provisional office for illegalprofits (dıwan al-marafiq). The sources also mention an office for calling toaccount discharged officials (dıwan al-mus. adarın). Miskawayh, Tajarib, I,21, 42, 154–155; al-S. abi’, Wuzara’, 311. Al-Khas.ıbı’s successor, ‘Alı b.‘Isa, disapproved, however, of this innovation by arguing that the head ofthe office for confiscations might be tempted to sell the signed documentsof the discharged officials. The state would then have lost all evidence offorthcoming payments. Miskawayh, Tajarib, I, 155.

guarantee of payment, the convicted official was often rein-stated and acted again in the same manner. The cycle thuskept repeating itself.

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