embedded systems security: virtualization and …...iotarchitecture • iotis • devices using...

embedded systems security: virtualizationand beyond

Kolin Paulhttp://www.cse.iitd.ac.in/~kolin

[email protected]

Department of Computer Science and TechnologyIndian Institute of Technology Delhi

http://www.cse.iitd.ac.in/~kolin

[email protected]

day one

me

• Associate Professor @CSE@IITD

• Research Area• Reconfigurable Computing

• Silicon Compilation• Custom Processor Design

• Embedded Systems• Runtime Systems

• Hardware Security.

http://www.cse.iitd.ac.in/~kolin Embedded Systems Security 3


introduction

• Security and Privacy are key challenges to IoT Growth1

• Security is often a BoltOn



iot architecture

• IoT is• Devices using Internet Protocol to

communicate

• Why the Buzz ...• 32 bit µControllers• Powerful yet low power• Can run the entire Stack

• Hence



so why should we be concerned?

• 20-50 Billion Devices• Unequal Capabilities• Security in the whole• Design time constraint



how real is the threat?

• Smart Grid

Source: Google

• Smart Meter• Physical Attack• Breach of metering databases• Remote connect/disconnect

Notice the significant increase in Attack Surface by becoming Smart




• Smart Grid

Source: Google






• Smart Grid

Source: Google


Notice the significant increase in Attack Surface by becoming Smarthttp://www.cse.iitd.ac.in/~kolin Embedded Systems Security 10



• Connected Vehicles• V2V Communications• Mobile Integration• In car WiFi

• Risks• Install “unauthorized components”• Tamper ECU• Fake ADAS Messages• Leak Driver/owner behavior information• Electronic Attack

• Current Scenario• Very few “(Open) Gates”• ECUs are secured• Similar to a Bank vault





• Connected Vehicles• V2V Communications• Mobile Integration• In car WiFi

• Risks• Install “unauthorized components”• Tamper ECU• Fake ADAS Messages• Leak Driver/owner behavior information• Electronic Attack

• Current Scenario• Very few “(Open) Gates”• ECUs are secured• Similar to a Bank vault

Notice the significant increase in Attack Surface by becoming Smarthttp://www.cse.iitd.ac.in/~kolin Embedded Systems Security 12


challenges and opportunities

• Opportunities• Healthcare• Homes• Smart Cities• (Connected) Vehicles

• Challenges• Potentially insecure code• Unauthenticated Devices• Device EveryWhere Syndrome• Absence of a System Level

Abstraction



the solution space

• Tamper-proofing the hardware• Implementing secure processing domains

• ARM TrustZone• Secure boot• Secure storage



hardware security

• Ensure Code at Boot is “authentic”• Root of Trust• Secure Boot• DPA Resistant• Protect IP



system virtualization

• Complexity of the Stack• Every linux based effort becomes a proprietary stack• Typical OS abstractions are mature

• New emerging requirements, IP issues can be frustrating to implement incurrent stack

• A new OS in market

New Level of Abstraction needed to handle sophisticated electronichardware is the OS

• Have the ability to run any operating system in the hardware



system virtualization

• Complexity of the Stack• Every linux based effort becomes a proprietary stack• Typical OS abstractions are mature

• New emerging requirements, IP issues can be frustrating to implement incurrent stack

• A new OS in marketNew Level of Abstraction needed to handle sophisticated electronichardware is the OS

• Have the ability to run any operating system in the hardware



embedded hypervisor

• System Virtualization• Enables hosting of multiple OS in

the same physical hardware

• Also known as Virtual Machines• Guest Operating systems

• Different from Enterprisehypervisors• Embedded hypervisor is designed

specifically for embedded andmobile systems



applications of virtualization

• Time Sharing used in data centerserver consolidation

• Testing new (versions) of OSarchitectures

• Backward Compatibility

• Environment Sandboxing• Virtual Machine isolation• Robustness depends on the

underlying hypervisor architecture• Enterprise hypervisor flaws have

been exploited



arm trust zone

• Virtual Security Appliances• Isolate the trusted component

from the primary OS

Source:http://www.adac.co.jp/eng/products/multivisor/images/TrustZone.jpg



a solution

• A typical Embedded SystemImplementation using Hypervisors

• Hardware based security fornetworked embedded systems

• Prevent unauthorized networktransactions

• Anti-malware must run in aseparate space



a solution

• A typical Embedded SystemImplementation using Hypervisors • Hardware based security for

networked embedded systems• Prevent unauthorized network

transactions• Anti-malware must run in a

separate space



exploit trust zone

• Available in ARM1176, Cortex-A*• VMware introduced full system virtualization• Hardware security extensions

• Virtualizes a physical core as two virtual cores

• Processor state: set/reset NS (Non-Secure)bit of the SCR (Secure ConfigurationRegister) via CP15 interface

• Trustzone Software Architecture• Key Idea: Separate Execution

Domains• Low Cost Security Framework



system architecture

• System call trap• LKM in Hypervisor “redirects”

syscalls

• Security policy• Policy accesible to secure VM only• Encrypted Flash

• Hardware Policy based Passthru• Can selectively do PCI passthru

• Implementation• Solution implemented using KVM



system architecture


syscalls






using reconfigurable devices

• Reconfigurable Devices• Security policy decryption engine• Processor cache/RAM: No access to secure data• Reduced Overheads

• Driver only for the Decryption Engine

Transmission Rate (µs/Transmission)Without LKM 6217.38 196.170With LKM 5097.63 224.003

Configurable hardware defines the security policies and makes that visibleonly to the security VMJoint work with Anupam Joshi and Vivek Parmar



iot security

• Smart interconnected devicesoperate in swarms

• Nowadays most device attestationscheme assume a single proverdevice and don’t not scale toswarms

• Software integrity verification ofdevice swarms is essential

Source: SEDA: Scalable Embedded Device Attestation N. Asokan et

al

• Offline Phase : Training• Initialize• Registration

• Online Phase : Attest



iot security





al





conclusion

• Architectures must transcend Domains• Need for System Wide Design Patterns• Programming Language Support to ensure Security is a Design

Parameter• Create Testbeds, Simulators, Reference Code Bases and Benchmarks



Thank You



embedded systems security: virtualization and …...iotarchitecture • iotis • devices using...

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