electoral systems and the formation of democratic party systems: bolivia, ecuador, and peru

Electoral Systems and the Formation of Democratic Party Systems:

Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru

by

Miguel Centellas

Department of Political Science3303 Friedmann Hall

Western Michigan UniversityKalamazoo, MI 49008

[email protected]

This paper compares the evolution of party systems in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Since democratization, these three party systems have taken di-vergent turns. The relationship between electoral and party systems is im-portant and complex, especially in newly democratic systems. If represen-tative democracy requires political parties, then the ability of new electoral systems to strengthen party systems is crucial for democratic consolida-tion. This paper argues that political development in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru since democratization can be explained by contrasting their different electoral systems.

Prepared for delivery at the 60th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Asso-ciation, Chicago, 25-27 April 2002.

Miguel CENTELLAS 1

Electoral Systems and the Formation of Democratic Party Systems

1. Introduction

It is difficult to imagine modern representative democracy without political par-

ties and party systems. Political parties link elites to voters, organize and articulate public

political discourse, help make representative accountable, and help prepare government

teams. Party systems are the more than merely the sum of political parties in a given

country, they also include the way that political parties interact with each other and with

the larger political system.

Political party systems are not doing well in Latin America. Traditional parties are

losing ground across the region. Popular attitudes towards political parties (and politi-

cians) measured in surveys are very negative. In part, this is an international crisis of po-

litical parties and politicians and the rise of populism (Manz and Zuazo 1998). The crisis

of political party systems in Peru and Venezuela, however, went beyond widespread de-

cline in trust of politicians and contributed to regimes that fit O’Donnell’s (1994) defini-

tion of delegative democracy.

One set of explanations for differences among party systems is institutional. Since

Duverger (1954), we have been more aware about the relationship between electoral sys-

tems and party systems. Electoral systems—the set of electoral laws—have important

consequences for the development of party systems. Electoral systems can punish larger

parties and help increase the number of parties. Conversely, electoral systems can rein-

force stable, moderated inter-party competition and help strengthen democracy.

This paper explores the relationship between electoral systems and party systems

in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. In the last two decades, stable party system has only been

the norm in Bolivia. If electoral systems account for differences in political parties, we

may strengthen democracy by “constitutionally engineering” better electoral systems.

Since electoral systems essentially provide incentive structures for voter and (especially)

political elites, finding electoral systems that encourage moderated, democratic politics is

an essential task for all who seek to promote democratic consolidation.

Miguel CENTELLAS 2

2. Theory

Most of the comparative democratization literature adopts Dahl’s (1971) defini-

tion of democracy (or polyarchy) as a political system involving three dimensions: com-

petition, participation, and civil and political liberties. This definition of democracy fo-

cuses primarily on the institutions of electoral democracy and is largely an extension of

Schumpeter’s description of democracy as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at

political decisions by means of competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (1943, 269).

Minimalist definitions of democracy are sometimes described as elitist or procedural def-

initions because they focus on formal electoral democracy and on the role of political

elites. Nevertheless, such minimalist conceptions of democracy are practical for compara-

tive studies of democracy since “they deliberately focus on the smallest number of at-

tributes that are still seen as producing a viable standard for democracy” (Collier and

Levitsky 1997, 433).

Linz and Stepan (1996) consider democracy consolidated when it has become

“the only game in town.” Their commonly used definition focuses on five arenas: civil

society, political society, the rule of law, a usable state bureaucracy, and economic soci-

ety. For them, consolidation also requires certain behavioral attitudinal, and constitutional

conditions: behaviorally, no actors try to (violently) overthrow the democratic regime; at-

titudinally, there is broad public support for democratic procedures and institutions; con-

stitutionally, all actors are subject to and accept the resolution of conflicts using demo-

cratic institutions. Essentially, democracy is consolidated if it meets the requirements for

democracy as well as those necessary for its long-term sustainability. At its core, demo-

cratic consolidation refers to expectations that democracy will survive, that it is immune

to reversal (Schedler 1998).

Recent scholars have also emphasized other elements essential to representative

democracy. These include civilian control over the military (Karl 1990), the rule of law

(O’Donnell 1996), and a vibrant civil society (Putnam 1993). The focus on these new ar-

eas of study, however, primarily extends from procedural or minimalist definitions of

democracy. Though often seen as necessary conditions for democracy —and especially

for democratic consolidation— such things as the rule of law or a vibrant civil society are

essentially external to the democratic process itself. It is unclear whether the practice of

Miguel CENTELLAS 3

democracy leads to the rule of law over time, or whether the rule of law is a necessary

precondition for democracy.

This paper focuses on the competitive dimension of democracy. Although partici-

pation and civil and political liberties are important, inter-elite competition is at the heart

of representative democracy. Electoral systems and party systems play a key role in

democratic competition. Thus, this paper focuses on the relationship between electoral

systems and party systems in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru.

2.1. Electoral Systems

Elections are an essential feature of modern representative democracy. In truth,

“the democratic process is indeed encapsulated in elections and electing” (Sartori 1987,

86). Of course, we must avoid the electoralist fallacy—while elections are a necessary

condition for democracy, they are not a sufficient condition. Nevertheless, free and fair

elections allow citizens to choose between competing political elites and different policy

options. Electoral systems make voting possible by stipulating, among other things, the

number and types of offices contested, how votes are cast, and the counting rules used to

determine winners and losers. Essentially, democracy becomes the only game in town

when all actors agree to use competitive elections as the mechanism to decide who wields

power in the polity.

The procedural model of democracy relies on elections to make popular self-gov-

ernment possible in large political systems. While citizens of large, modern polities are

no longer able to directly decide political issues, they can freely select their own repre-

sentatives. Through competitive elections, citizens are able to influence public policy, ar-

ticulate their interests, and hold government officials accountable (Manin 1997). Al-

though democracies may also use referenda, ballot initiatives, or other electoral mecha-

nisms, this study focuses on national-level elections for the executive and legislature.

The kind of electoral system reflects elementary foundations of the political sys-

tem. Different counting rules aim to build a different type of majority or popular consen-

sus. While single-member district systems are often meant to build elective majorities,

proportional representation (PR) systems are usually designed to increase minority repre-

sentation. By dictating how votes are translated into seats, different electoral systems af-

Miguel CENTELLAS 4

fect citizen and elite behavior by providing different strategic choices.

This paper looks at three features of electoral systems: 1) the effective district

magnitude, 2) whether legislative and presidential elections are concurrent, and 3)

whether the president is elected by congressional majority formula. The effective district

magnitude (usually the average district magnitude) affects the proportionality of the elec-

toral system and, thus, the number of parties. Concurrent legislative elections more

closely link presidential and legislative elections, often providing executives with larger

legislative constituents and reducing the number of parties. Finally, congressional elec-

tion of the president has, in Bolivia, parliamentarized the political system by tightly link-

ing executive and legislative politics.

2.2. Party Systems

Because an institutionalized party system is indispensable for democracy, signifi-

cant attention should be given to the development of stable party systems in new democ-

racies (Lipset 2000). A party system is institutionalized if parties are more than tempo-

rary or personal vehicles. Institutionalized parties are linked to, and legitimately repre-

sent, important social groups and constituencies; they should coincide with the significant

social cleavages and retain relatively stable bases of electoral support. Party systems also

give voters intellectual shortcuts; voters should be able to identify basic policy tendencies

of political parties or, at the very least, who their core leaders are and what they stand for.

If parties are not institutionalized, if they are merely empty labels used haphazardly dur-

ing elections, then voters are essentially voting randomly and without clearly articulated

policy preferences.

Though electoral systems influence the party system’s character, political parties

and party systems also have independent social and historical roots. Lipset and Rokkan

(1967) argued that Western European party systems froze in the 1920s before the full im-

pact of electoral democracy. Because party systems in large part reflect and articulate a

society’s cleavages, the underlying social structure also influences the number and type

of political parties in the party system. These historical legacies were especially felt in

new democracies. Political parties were common in Latin America, even in countries

Miguel CENTELLAS 5

with little or no history of democracy and democratic elections. The ability of these par-

ties to learn to play the electoral game proved crucial.

This paper looks at democratic party systems, party systems that are able to sup-

port stable democracy. Though in theory all party system (even single-party systems) can

coexist with democratic politics, this paper emphasizes the special importance of moder-

ated multipartism. A party system that has a moderate number of parties (no more than

five effective parties) is expected to be more stable and capable of promoting democratic

politics than either a hegemonic or dominant party system (where one party clearly domi-

nates) or a fragmented party system (Sartori 1976).

Beyond the number of parties in the system, a “democratic” party system suggests

two other characteristics. In a democracy, political parties should be competitive, that is,

they should give voters real alternatives. A relative balance between the party (or parties)

in government and those in the opposition enables for checks on the abuse of power and

competitive, democratic politics. Secondly, political parties should represent core con-

stituencies (whether these follow ideological or other cleavages). The more parties repre-

sent core sectors of the voting public, the more stable votes for parties and party systems

should be.

3. Case Selection

The three Central Andean republics were early third wave democratizers. Never-

theless, their political trajectories have been dramatically different. While Bolivia’s

democracy has been stable and uninterrupted for two decades, democracy has not been

stable in Ecuador or Peru. Peru’s experiment with democracy ended abruptly in 1992 af-

ter President Alberto Fujimori’s military-backed autogolpe (self-coup) disbanded the leg-

islature, purged the judiciary, and suspended the constitution. Ecuadorian democracy has

also had a troubled road. Since 1979, the forced removal of two presidents from office,

the brief kidnapping of another by the military, and several military interventions in poli-

tics have kept the future of Ecuador’s democracy uncertain.

Comparing such different outcomes along the dependent variable (party system

stability) is possible because the three cases are substantially similar. The United Nations

Development Program classifies all three Central Andean republics as developing coun-

Miguel CENTELLAS 6

tries. They rank the lowest in South America (along with Paraguay) along socioeconomic

indicators such as annual per capita GDP, the human development index, life expectancy,

and adult literacy rates. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru also share a similar sociopolitical An-

dean cultures. All three have a majority indigenous population that has been historically

excluded from national cultural, political, and economic life. All three also share similar

obstacles to democracy: no previous history of democracy and a history of authoritarian

rule.

Several scholars argue that the democratic shortcomings in Ecuador and Peru are

related to the developments of their party systems. Like Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru had a

history of organized political parties with long historical trajectories. By the end of the

1990s, however, only in Bolivia did traditional parties retain any stable level of popular

support. Traditional parties in Ecuador and Peru, meanwhile, have been marginalized

even as the national party system have become more fragmented and personalized. In

contrast, Bolivia’s party system appears to have stabilized around a moderate number of

political parties.

The limited literature on Bolivia’s democratization highlights a new Bolivian ex-

ceptionalism. In a cross-national study of Latin American democracies, Jones (1995)

finds a significant relationship between the dummy variable for Bolivia and presidential

legislative majorities (which, Jones argues, support stable presidential democracy).

Conaghan and Malloy (1994) point out that of the three Central Andean countries, only

Bolivia successfully implemented neoliberal economic reforms (in the 1980s). They sug-

gest that the success or failure of neoliberal reforms helps explain the different political

trajectories of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. It is possible, however, that the success or fail-

ure of economic reforms —which require political decisions— may just as easily be a

consequence of institutional design.

3.1. Bolivia

Bolivia experienced a difficult and prolonged democratic transition. By 1982, the

military had exhausted its willingness and ability to repress demands for democracy and

allowed Hernán Siles Zuazo, plurality winner of the 1979 and 1980 elections, to assume

the presidency at the head of his Democratic Popular Union (UDP) coalition. In the midst

Miguel CENTELLAS 7

of a growing economic crisis, Siles Zuazo stepped down one year ahead of schedule in

favor of new elections in 1985.

The 1985 election marked a collapse of Bolivia’s leftist parties, with most votes

split between the center-right Democratic National Action (ADN) of former dictator

Hugo Bánzer and the centrist National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) headed by Vic-

tor Paz Estenssoro, though neither candidate won a majority. Under Bolivia’s electoral

system, presidential candidates must win by a majority. If not candidate wins a majority,

the legislature meets in a joint session to elect the president from among the front-run-

ners. The MNR was able to gather a congressional majority for its candidate. Two

months later, however, Paz Estenssoro entered a political alliance with Bánzer, securing

himself a legislative supermajority.

The pattern of congressional election of the president and inter-party political

pacts has continued. Since 1985, no president has been elected directly; parliament has

elected the president in each election, making the building of a majority governing coali-

tions unavoidable. These coalitions have held together surprisingly well, making Bolivian

governments since 1985 true coalition governments.

A stable pattern of bi-polar alliances has developed since 1989. In 1989, Bánzer

ordered his ADN to support the third-place Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)

candidate, Jaime Paz Zamorra. The unexpected move came after MNR decided to cam-

paign for the presidency even though Paz Estenssoro had agreed to support Bánzer’s can-

didacy. Since 1989, ADN and MIR have supported each other nationally against the

MNR in a bi-polar competitive system. Other political parties have tended to play king-

maker roles, though some parties have consistently sided with one or another of the major

parties.

In a region not know for democratic stability, Bolivia’s democratic stability is re-

markable. Elections have gone unhindered for two decades; a democratically elected

civilian government was able to substantive economic reforms; presidents have relied on

legislative coalitions. The normalization of politics around consensual practices and mod-

erated elite bargaining point to the possibility that Bolivian democracy was consolidated

by the late 1980s (Mayorga 1992).

One explanation for Bolivia’s democratic stability is its system of “parliamenta-

Miguel CENTELLAS 8

rized presidentialism” (Mayorga 1992; 1997). The system is characterized by: 1) fused–

ballot PR electoral system; 2) congressional election of the executive; and 3) informal

coalition rules that provide presidents with legislative majorities. The electoral system is

the key to parliamentarized presidentialism. The fused ballot is, essentially, a parliamen-

tary ballot; it closely binds presidents to the legislature and eliminates the problem of

dual legitimacy plaguing many presidential systems (Linz 1994). The 1994 constitutional

reforms did not essentially modify Bolivia’s political system.1

3.2. Ecuador

Despite a relatively smooth transition to democracy, Ecuador’s democratic experi-

ence has been troubled. Since 1979, nine civilian governments have struggled to govern

in the midst of nagging economic problems and a highly fragmented political system. The

last two elected presidents have been forced out of office. Abdalá Bucaram was removed

by congress for “mental incapacity” in 1997 after accusations of massive corruption.

Jamil Muhuad was overthrown in a military-backed popular uprising January 2000 and

replaced by his vice president, Gustavo Naboa.

The military’s important role was clearly seen in the recent coup. Ecuador’s mili-

tary negotiated its withdrawal from power, winning several important concessions. The

military prevented Assad Bucaram, the popular Concentration of Popular Forces (CFP)

leader, from campaigning for the presidency in 1979. Nevertheless, Assad Bucaram

maintained tight control over his party and antagonized the presidency of his nephew-in-

law, Jaime Roldós. Since 1979, Ecuador’s military has intervened in politics as the poder

moderador. Resentment over policies pursued by president León Febres Cordero led to a

rebellion in Quito’s air base in March 1986 and the president’s brief kidnapping by para-

troopers January 1987. After Abdalá Bucaram was removed from office, the military re-

solved a succession struggle by supporting the succession of Fabián Alarcón, head of the

legislature, over vice president Rosalia Arteaga.

1 Under the reforms, parliament is now limited to selecting from among the top two (rather than three) presidential candidates. This reform may have actually helped streamline the process. The intro-duction of a multi-member proportional (MMP) electoral system also did not significantly change Bo-livia’s political system. Although MMP allows for direct election of half of the lower house in single-member districts, the system is still essentially a PR system since the other half of the seats are appor -tioned in compensatory fashion.

Miguel CENTELLAS 9

An important element in Ecuador’s political system is the highly fragmented and

uninstituionalized party system. Ecuador’s political parties are primarily personalist vehi-

cles; political alliances are dominated more by personal and familial ties, rather than ide-

ological or programmatic considerations. The two most important parties in 1979, the

populist CFP and the Marxist Democratic Left (ID), have steadily declined in support,

with CFP splitting into different personalist factions. Clashes between the executive and

legislature are pronounced, even when presidents have a majority coalition. Executives

also tended to lose legislative support after midterm elections and due to frequent cambio

de camisetas as legislators often switched party loyalties back and forth while in office.

3.3. Peru

Peru’s democratic transition was also relatively smooth. The military held elec-

tions in 1978 for a constituent assembly, which drafted a new constitution approved in

1979. After the installation of democracy in 1980, the military returned to its barracks.

Peru’s two major parties, the center-right Popular Action (AP) and popular-center Ameri-

can Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), had long historical traditions. The inability

of Peru’s first two presidents to deal with the growing economic crisis, as well as two

guerrilla insurgencies, weakened the two major parties. By 1990 Peru’s party system had

collapsed, reverting to personalist politics, and allowing the election of Alberto Fujimori,

a political unknown.

The 1990 election marked a dramatic decline in electoral support for both AP and

APRA. It also marked a return of Peru’s traditional right with the candidacy of author

Mario Vargas Llosa, another independent outsider. Fuijimori won the second-round elec-

tion to become Peru’s third democratically elected president. Elected without a congres-

sional majority, Fujimori was antagonized by a legislature still dominated by AP and

APRA.

Fujimori’s April 1992 coup ended Peruvian democracy. At best, the Fujimori-pe-

riod Peru fit O’Donnell’s (1994) description of a delegative democracy. Though interna-

tional pressure led to elections later that year of a constituent assembly, Fujimori’s sup-

porters dominated the assembly. It drafted a new constitution that altered Peru’s political

landscape, significantly enhancing executive powers. The 1995 and 2000 elections main-

Miguel CENTELLAS 10

tained a democratic façade, though they were marked by large numbers of blank and null

votes and accusations of fraud. The sudden collapse of Fujimori’s regime in 2001 led to

the election of Alejandro Toledo, arguably the winner of the 2000 election.

4. Hypotheses

The crisis of democracy in both Peru and Ecuador coincide with crises in their re-

spective party systems. Meanwhile, Bolivia’s democratic stability has coincided with a

relatively stable and institutionalized party system. Differences in institutional design

may explain the different outcomes among the three cases. More specifically, this paper

looks at the role of electoral system in shaping each country’s party system. Three hy-

potheses follow from the electoral rules highlighted above.

Hypothesis 1: A smaller effective district magnitude is associated with a sta-ble political party system.

Hypothesis 2: Legislative election of the executive is associated with a stable political party system.

Hypothesis 3: Concurrent executive and legislative elections are associated with stable political party systems.

5. Data and Method

This paper relies on election data and descriptions of each country’s electoral sys-

tem gathered from a variety of sources. In order to make the data comparable, this paper

uses legislative election results. For Bolivia 1980-1997, legislative data are for the House

of Deputies. Data for Ecuador 1979-1998 come from the unicameral National Congress.

Peru 1980-1990 data are for the Chamber of Deputies; 1992-2001 data are for the uni-

cameral National Congress. Data for the 1978 Peruvian constituent assembly is not used

because it was not an election that also produced a government. Data from the 1980 Boli -

vian general election is used, however, since that election was used to constitute the

1982-1985 government.2 Analysis includes each country legislative election year for a to-

tal of 20 observations.3

2 The 1980 Bolivian election and the 1982–85 UDP government are considered a single observa-tion.

3 The 2000 Peruvian legislative election is not included in this analysis.

Miguel CENTELLAS 11

This paper also uses presidential election data. For comparability, election results

from presidential elections are used. For Ecuador and Peru, first-round electoral results

are used. Though Bolivia’s fused ballot makes presidential and legislative election results

synonymous, the results are comparable to compare votes for major parties and the effec-

tive number of presidential candidates. Analysis includes each country presidential elec-

tion year for a total of sixteen observations.4

5.1. Party System Measures

The degree of multipartism was calculated using the formula for the effective

number of parties developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). The effective number of

parties is calculated from legislative seat shares from the lower chamber (Bolivia, Peru

1980-90) or the unicameral legislature (Ecuador, Peru 1992-2001). Although calculating

the effective number of parties using seat shares does count a smaller number of parties

than using vote shares would, it produces values more easily comparable across cases.5 In

some cases, the number of parties was calculated using two corrective mechanisms. In

cases where some legislative seats were lumped into “Other” or “Independent” cate-

gories, an estimation procedure proposed by Taagepera (1997) was used. For Peru 1992

and 1995 Fujimori’s party group (Cambio 90) held more than fifty percent of the legisla-

ture. In those cases, the corrective procedure outlined by Taagepera (1999) was used.

A look at Table 5.1.1 shows that the effective number of parties has been most

stable in Bolivia than in Ecuador or Peru (see especially the standard deviation from the

mean). Remarkably, even though Bolivia’s electoral system clearly links presidential and

legislative votes for all elections, the effective number of parties for both presidential and

legislative elections were close for all elections in all countries. The significant exception

was the smaller mean effective number of parties for presidential elections in Peru when

compared to legislative elections. Most of this variation, however, comes from the elec-

tions under Fujimori, where opposition candidates did slightly better in legislative elec-

4 This analysis includes the 2000 Peruvian elections.5 Because of differences in electoral systems, calculating the effective number of parties using vote

shares is problematic. Ecuador provides two difficulties: Its two-tiered unicameral legislature makes it difficult to calculate the number of parties using vote shares (one tier is elected nationally, the other from provincial districts). The provincial legislative districts vary in size from district magnitudes of one, two, or more seats, with electoral formulas varying accordingly.

Miguel CENTELLAS 12

tions than in the presidential contests.

Table 5.1.1. Average, lowest, and highest effective number of political parties since the first year of democratic rule.

Mean Lowest HighestStandard Deviation

Legislative

Bolivia 4.4 3.9 5.5 0.54Ecuador 5.7 4.2 7.8 1.11Peru 3.2 1.8 5.9 0.76

PresidentialBolivia 4.9 4.4 5.0 0.54Ecuador 5.3 4.1 7.6 1.20Peru 2.5 1.2 3.7 0.97

The degree of party system stability was calculated by adding the vote share for

each country’s most significant political parties from the first election after democratiza-

tion. For Bolivia, the two major parties considered were MNR and ADN.6 For Ecuador,

the two major parties used were ID and CFP. For Peru, the two major parties were APRA

and AP. If the party system remains stable, the additive vote share for the two major par-

ties should remain fairly constant. A look at Table 4.1.2 shows that only Bolivia’s party

system has remained stable when measured as the vote share for the two major parties.

Although stability of votes for major parties and degree of multipartism are re-

lated, they still reflect different dimensions of the party system. As legislative multipar-

tism increases, of course, the vote share for major parties tends to decrease as well. But

the level of multipartism can hide important information. The effective number of parties

can remain relatively constant while electoral support for the major parties declines (if

traditional parties are being replaced by new parties). In this case the number of parties

6 Although the most important party in the 1978-1980 elections was Democratic Popular Union (UDP), it was essentially a mega-coalition of leftist parties. The next two important parties in all three elections were MNR and ADN. Calculating measures using UDP would reduce the share of votes for major parties in Bolivia and bring its mean to levels comparable with Ecuador and Peru. A third major Bolivian party, Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), was a member of the UDP alliance, how-ever, and continues to do well in national and local elections. Calculating the vote share for major parties using MIR and either MNR or ADN produces a slightly reduced mean, but still significantly larger than the mean for Ecuador or Peru.

Miguel CENTELLAS 13

remains essentially the same, but the system is not stable. Similarly, the rate of decline in

vote share for major parties and in effective number of parties may happen at different

rates. In Peru, for example, the number of parties remained relatively low (and declined

substantially after 1992) even as the vote share for the major parties dropped consider-

ably.

Table 5.1.2. Average, lowest, and highest vote share (as percent) for two major parties since the first year of democratic rule.

Mean Lowest HighestStandard Deviation

Legislative


PresidentialBolivia 48.0 36.9 63.2 9.7Ecuador 22.6 0.0 42.2 16.1Peru 29.7 1.8 72.6 25.2

Table 5.1.2 also highlights the stability of Bolivia’s political party system when

compared to Ecuador and Peru. Bolivia’s two major parties, MNR and ADN, earned a

relatively consistent number of votes. In contrast, the virtual collapse of the two major

parties in Peru and Ecuador is stark. Only Peru’s APRA seems to be making a comeback

(it won 25.8 percent of the valid vote in the 2001 presidential election); no other major

party in Ecuador or Peru is doing well at the close of the 1990s.

The degree of political competition was measured using the index of competitive-

ness developed by Altman and Pérez-Liñán (1999). Using weighted means for the gov-

ernment and opposition, political competition is measured along a scale from zero (when

either the government or the opposition controls the legislature) to one (when the govern-

ment and opposition are balanced).

Table 5.1.3 shows Bolivia’s political stability even while its levels of competition

have remained relatively high. While Peru was the least competitive, Ecuador was also

relatively stable, suggesting that the level of competitiveness in a political system can be

Miguel CENTELLAS 14

distinguished from the vitality of its party system. Nevertheless, a caveat is in order: By

using a weighted average of government and opposition parties, the measure for competi-

tion obscures the degree to which competition is due to fragmented multipartism. Al-

though Ecuadorian presidents have often enjoyed very limited legislative support, the op-

position is splintered. Thus, the Altman and Pérez-Liñán measures for “typical” govern-

ment and opposition parties are similar, producing high competition values.

Table 5.1.3. Average, lowest, and highest level of political competition since the first year of democratic rule.

Mean Lowest Highest Deviation


5.2. Electoral System Measures

The effective district magnitude was calculated following Taagepera and Shugart

(1989) and Jones (1995). With two exceptions, the average district magnitude is used. For

Ecuador’s two-tiered electoral system the effective district magnitude was calculated us-

ing the geometric mean of the magnitude of each tier. Bolivia 1989 also required a cor-

rection for the electoral quota system (essentially a threshold) used that election.

The use of concurrent election and majoritarian congressional presidential elec-

tion formula were measured using dummy variables. For majoritarian congressional for-

mula, Bolivia is coded “1” while Ecuador and Peru are coded “0” for every election year.

Bolivia and Peru both use concurrent electoral systems and are coded “1” (along with

Ecuador 1979 and 1998 because of changes from and back to a concurrent electoral sys-

tem) while Ecuador is coded “0” for 1984-1996.

5.3. Control Variables

This study includes two additional control variables for Peru. The first control

variable is a dummy variable for guerrilla war. Peru is coded as “1” (presence of guerrilla

war) for 1980-1995 and “0” (absence of guerrilla war) for subsequent years. Bolivia and

Ecuador are coded as “0” for all years. Since the decline of Peru’s party system is

Miguel CENTELLAS 15

sharpest, we must consider whether it was a product of the guerrilla war waged by Shin-

ning Path and the urban Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA).

The second dummy variable is also used to account for Fujimori’s autogolpe. Al-

though elections where still held in Peru during the Fujimori years, few would call them

free elections. A dummy variable for Fujimori is necessary to control for the dramatically

poor showing by Peru’s traditional parties during those years. Peru is coded as “1” (after

Fujimori’s autogolpe) for 1992-2000 and “0” (before the autogolpe) for 1980-1990; Peru

is also coded as “0” for the 2001 election which took place after Fujimori fell from power

and fled into exile. Bolivia and Ecuador are coded as “0” for all years.

6. Analysis

A simple comparative analysis combining the method of agreement and method

of difference suggests that Bolivia’s stable party system was the product of congressional

election of the president (see Table 6.1). The role of concurrent elections is less clear;

Peru also used concurrent elections but did not have a stable party system. Of course, the

role of concurrent elections may have been undermined by the presence of guerrilla war

and Fujimori’s role. For this comparison, Ecuador was considered as using non-concur-

rent elections since this was the pattern for all but two of its elections (the first election

and the most recent election).

Table 6.1. Comparative matrix for Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru.

Stable Party System

Congress Elects Presi-

dent

Concurrent Election

FujimoriGuerrilla

War

Bolivia Yes Yes Yes No No

Ecuador No No No No No

Peru No No Yes Yes Yes

A statistical test of each of the five independent variables (electoral system vari-

ables and Peru control variables) allows for more vigorous tests of the hypotheses. Using

legislative election data, each of the three dependent variables was tested against all five

Miguel CENTELLAS 16

variables in multivariate analysis (see Table 6.2 and Table 6.3).

Table 6.2. Ordinary least squares estimates of determinants of political party systems in legislative elections.

Dependent Variables

Independent VariablesEffective Number

of Legislative Parties

Votes for Major Parties

Competition

Concurrent Election -1.247** 30.119* -0.072**

Congressional election of the president

-0.325* 1.146 0.102**

Effective magnitude -0.004* -0.178 * 0.000

Guerrilla war -0.916** 5.349 -0.039*

Fujimori -1.640** -28.700 ** -0.243**

Constant 6.026** 19.559** 0.874**

R-square 0.6596 0.8192 0.5493

Number of observations 20 20 20

Regression with robust standard errors clustered by country. * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01

Concurrent elections had the most profound impact on legislative elections, fol-

lowed by congressional election of the president. When controlling for all other variables,

concurrent elections reduced the number of political parties by just more than one full

party (1.247) and increase the vote share for major parties by more than 30 percent. Inter-

estingly, however, they also tended to reduce competition slightly. Congressional election

of the president had no significant effect on votes for the major parties. It did signifi-

cantly reduce the number of parties by about one third of party and increase the level of

competition by just over ten percent. Though statistically significant, the effective dis-

trict magnitude seemed to have little effect on party systems.

Interestingly, the impact of Peru’s guerrilla war was not very strong. The guerrilla

war did reduce the effective number of parties by about a full party while slightly de-

creasing competition. But the impact of the Fujimori dummy variable was much more

Miguel CENTELLAS 17

profound and statistically significant for all three dependent variables. Fujimori reduced

the number of parties by more than one and a half, reduced the votes for major parties by

just under 30 percent, and decreased competition by almost 25 percent. Still, Fujimori’s

rise to power signaled the collapse of Peru’s new democracy and may have been a prod-

uct of the collapse of the party system (especially of APRA and AP) before the 1990

elections.

Table 6.3. Ordinary least squares estimates of determinants of political party systems in presidential elections.

Dependent Variables

Independent VariablesEffective Number of Presidential Parties

Votes for Major Parties (Presidential)

Concurrent Election -1.8 4.429

Congressional election of the president

0.833 20.324**

Guerrilla war -1.1 16.775**

Fujimori -2.167* -33.983**

Constant 5.867 24.867

R-square 0.7967 0.5474

Number of observations 16 16

Regression with robust standard errors clustered by country. * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01

Table 6.3 shows the results of similar analysis for the presidential elections. Here,

the most important electoral variable was for congressional election of the president,

which significantly affected the percentage of votes for major parties (increasing votes by

more than 20 percent). Neither concurrent election nor congressional election of the pres-

ident significantly affected the effective number of presidential parties.

As expected, the Fujimori variable decreased the number of presidential parties

(as a factor of his hegemonizing the valid votes) and dramatically decreased the votes for

major parties (reducing it by more than 33 percent). Interestingly, the guerrilla war

seemed to have no negative impact on the party system. It only significantly affected the

Miguel CENTELLAS 18

percentage of votes for major parties, in the opposite direction, by increasing votes by

just over 16 percent.

7. Conclusion

If stable, institutionalized party systems are essential for democracy, then efforts

to strengthen the role of political parties and party systems are necessary. A strong case

can be made for Bolivia’s system of congressional election of the president, especially

when coupled with concurrent election (or better yet, a fused ballot) as a way to produce

stable, moderated multiparty systems. In contrast to the second-round runoff election (as

used in Ecuador and Peru), congressional election of the president is associated with a

stable and competitive party system with a moderate number of parties. It is important to

note that district magnitude (which is a function of the electoral system’s proportionality)

had only limited impact on the nature of party systems. Much more significant were two

macro-institutions—whether elections were concurrent or not and whether congress

elected the president or not. It is possible that instituting similar reforms in new democra-

cies that are facing difficulties (such as Ecuador and Peru) may help strengthen not only

political parties and party systems, but also democratic stability.

Miguel CENTELLAS 19

References

Altman, David and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. 1999. “Mas allá de la poliarquía: Una aproximación a la calidad de las democracias.” Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política 11: 83-105.

Collier, D. and S. Levitsky. 1997. “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,” World Politics 49 (2): 430-51.

Conaghan, C. and J. Malloy. 1994. Dahl. R. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University

Press.Duverger, M. 1954. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern

State, trans. B. and R. North. London: Wiley.Jones, M. 1995. Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies. Notre

Dame: Notre Dame University Press.Karl, T. L. 1990. “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Poli-

tics 23 (1): 1-21.Laakso, M. and R. Taagepera. 1979. “Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Ap-

plications to Western Europe,” Comparative Political Studies 12 (1): 3-27.Linz, J. 1994. “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?” in

J. Linz and A. Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy, 3-87. Balti-more: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Linz, J. and A. Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Bal-timore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, S. M. 2000. “The Indispensability of Political Parties,” Journal of Democracy 11 (1): 48-55.

Lipset, S. M. and S. Rokkan. 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: Free Press.

Manin, B. 1997. The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Manz, T. and M. Zuazo, eds. 1998. Partidos políticos y representación en América Latina. Caracas: Nueva Sociedad.

Mayorga, R. 1992.————. 1997. Journal of DemocracyO’Donnell, G. 1994. “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5 (1): 55-69.————. 1996. “Illusions About Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 7 (4): 151-68.Putnam, R. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton:

Princeton University Press.Sartori, G. 1987. The Theory of Democracy Revisited, 2 vols. Chatham: Chatham House.————. 1997. Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures,

Incentives, and Outcomes. New York: New York University Press.————. 1976. Parties and Party Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Schedler, A. 1998. “What is Democratic Consolidation?” Journal of Democracy 9 (2):

91-107.Schumpeter, J. 1943. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper and

Row.Taagepera, R. 1997. “Effective Number of Parties for Incomplete Data,” Electoral Stud-

Miguel CENTELLAS 20

ies 16 (2): 145-51.————. 1999. “Supplementing the Effective Number of Parties,” Electoral Studies 18

(4): 497-504.Taagepera, R. and M. Shugart. 1989. Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of

Electoral Systems. New Haven: Yale University Press. UNDP. 2002. Human Development Report (online at: http://www.undp.org/hdro).