ego strength-frustration tendencies (es-ft): toward a model of predicting militant martyrdom

The psychology of martyrdom is a growing area of interest in today’s world. The need for

viable means of confronting, addressing, and ultimately preventing the development of

cultures of martyrdom is increasingly drawing the attention of world governments. The

following six-part article series, entitled Ego Strength-Frustration Tendencies (ES-FT):

Toward a model of predicting militant martyrdom by examining the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict,” reviews relevant literature on the topic of martyrdom. Four typologies of mar-

tyrdom are defined, with militant martyrdom (i.e., suicide attacks) serving as the focus of

the article series. The author reviews different perspectives of the etiology of militant

martyrdom, reviews the literature, and concludes that frustration-aggression theory and

the effects of systemic psychological victimization best explain this phenomenon. The

author further proposes an ego strength-frustration tendencies (ES-FT) model for predict-

ing the tendency toward related social roles based on the interaction of ego strength and

frustration. The article series concludes with a discussion of the advantages, disadvan-

tages, and implications of ES-FT. A complete reference list is provided at the conclusion

of the series.

EGO STRENGTH-FRUSTRATION TENDENCIES (ES-FT): TOWARD A MODEL

OF PREDICTING MILITANT MARTYRDOM BY EXAMINING THE ISRAELI-

PALESTINIAN CONFLICT (Article One)

DEFINING MARTYRDOM TYPOLOGIES

On September 11, 2001, the homeland of the United States of America came

under attack by Islamic terrorists. While publicly disavowed by most Middle Eastern

leaders, many of the populace celebrated the attacks and viewed the Islamic hijackers as

martyrs giving their lives in the name of Allah. Since that time, there have been a series of

suicide attacks by militant martyrs throughout the world. In post-U.S. invasion Iraq,

suicide bombings have come to be a daily occurrence. Likewise, this trend has been seen

in Afghanistan. Suicide attacks in England, Spain, Indonesia, Northern Africa, and

Chechnya in recent years have caused additional alarm. The issue of the causes of militant

martyrdom is a complex topic that requires considerable reflection and contemplation.

The field of psychology is primed to take the forefront in contributing to this area

of study. Psychology is the study of human behavior. Certainly, terrorism, of all kinds, is

by definition human behavior. If there is to be some understanding of such acts, we must

first understand the conditions that lead to a culture of militant martyrdom. This

understanding is essential to the field of clinical psychology as Western Society looks for

an explanation and means to combat the psychological complexities contributing to and

resulting from a culture of martyrdom.

Several theories have been proposed to explain this complex phenomenon. One of

1

the first to gain substantial following is frustration-aggression theory and it has been one

of the leading explanations for terrorism for several decades. While frustration-aggres-

sion theory, or some variation, continues to be at the forefront of this field of study, it is

this author’s position that it does not provide a complete explanation for this behavior. It

does not account for why some groups experiencing frustration engage in militant martyr-

dom and others do not. Specifically, in the Palestinian Territories, frustration-aggression

does not fully explain the culture of militant martyrdom that has existed since the 1990s.

After all, frustration certainly existed prior to this. Furthermore, frustration theory leaves

unanswered questions when the topic of terrorism as specified to suicide bombings and it

does not fully explain the extraordinary lengths that militant martyrs go to in an effort to

destroy other lives, and does not provide a complete explanation for how a culture of mil-

itant martyrdom develops. There should be no argument that there must be different psy-

chological processes at work when comparing those who engage in violently devastating

actions from a distance and those that willingly “sacrifice” their own lives for a cause that

they will not see to fruition. Frustration-aggression theory may provide an adequate ex-

planation for the former, but it alone is an inadequate explanation for the latter. After all,

why would the potential militant martyr not simply impose his or her devastation from a

distance? Why would he or she seek out or accept such an assignment in the first place?

This article series seeks to answer these questions. In summary, what role does psycho-

logical trauma play in promoting a culture of militant martyrdom in Palestinian males in

the Territories?

This article series will take an in depth look at this problem of militant martyrdom

and its etiology. The purpose of this study is to contribute to the growing body of knowl-

2

edge concerning this ever increasingly important concern and provide a more complete

theoretical explanation for how a culture of militant martyrdom has developed in the

Palestinian Territories. This article series will attempt to complete the complex model of

militant martyrdom, specifically in the Palestinian Territories, of which frustration-ag-

gression theory is a significant but insufficient explanatory factor. The author proposes

that frustration, combined with systematic psychological traumatization, promotes the

culture of militant martyrdom currently seen among Palestinian males.

The implications of arriving at a more complete understanding of the psy-

chological etiology of militant martyrdom are significant. In their efforts to combat this

ideology, the actions taken by some nations may contrarily contribute to the sustaining,

or even spreading, of the martyrdom culture. To wage war on an ideology that is dubi-

ously understood, at best, may do more harm than good. A greater understanding has the

potential to save human life and decrease human suffering throughout the world. The de-

velopment of an explanatory theory that is non-politically-biased and comprehensive will

go far in subduing the overt and covert hostilities that give way to cultures of militant

martyrdom. Such a theory should stand up to scholarly scrutiny and have practical appli-

cations. It will open new ways of conceptualizing the potential martyr’s worldview and

self-image. Better treatment options available to mental health providers should become

more apparent, as a result. Additionally, such a theory would allow the impacted groups

insight into their dilemma and provide a means, through psychosocial interventions, to re-

solve it. The result should be a population that has more pro-social methods of dealing

with the demands of their environment. In order to accomplish this, the author reviews

existing literature on the frustration-aggression theory, psychological programming, the

3

impact of psychological abuse, psychosocial rewards of self-sacrifice, Islamic teachings,

and the self-report of motives found in interviews and other documents left behind by

successful and failed (now-incarcerated) martyrs.

In order to accomplish its goal, this article must establish a working definition of

martyrdom compiled from available literature. Then, discuss the historical significance of

martyrdom in Islam. Finally, an examination of the link between Islamic martyrdom and

terrorism is accomplished.

Definitions of Martyrdom

Webster's New World Dictionary provides the following entry for the term martyr:

"martyr (mart'er) n. [[< Or martyr, a witness]] lone who chooses to suffer or die for one's

faith or principles 2 one who suffers misery for a long time -vt. to kill or persecute for a

belief-- mar'trdom n. (1990, p. 362)." Further, most, if not all religions have similar or

related definitions as they pertain to their belief system. Cunningham (2002), Professor of

Theology at the University of Notre Dame, offers the following statement based on the

writings of Thomas Schubeck and Pope John Paul II:

The criteria for contemporary martyrdom might be summed up by applying three criteria: (1) someone must have been murdered or died as a result of mistreatment; (2) the persecutor had to have been motivated by hatred of the faith or hatred of the practice of some virtues essential to it; (3) the martyrs had to have acted with that awareness that their conduct might cost their lives. (p. 378)

In less exclusive terms, but no less a Western concept, Richmond (2003) describes

a martyr as someone who dies under the persecution of those "who have too much to lose

by listening to the truth [of the principles of peace]" (para. 18). He further qualifies a

martyr as refusing to hate their persecutors while maintaining a hope that one day the

4

persecutor will repent their actions.

Categories of Martyrdom

However, a modified and more comprehensive definition of the word martyr is

proposed by this author as a result of reviewing available literature from various fields on

the subject (Coney, 2003; Cunningham, 2002; Jensen, Burkholder, & Hammerback,

2003; Vigne, 2004). This author argues that there are two main categories of martyrs,

each with sub-categories. The first category of martyrdom proposed by this author is

passive martyrdom. This category consists of individuals or groups that have been killed

because of standing for a cause or belief system. Within this classification are two sub-

types. This author refers to the first as the cognizant-martyr. This type of person openly

and often publicly expresses what he believes, regardless of endangering his life (e.g.,

political assassination). Notable figures include Martin Luther King Jr., Mahatma Gandhi,

and Maximilian Kolbe (Cunningham, 2002). The second sub-type of passive martyr is the

accidental-martyr, a term coined by Lacy Smith (Jensen et al., 2003). In this situation, the

individual does not intend to be a martyr and actually has no belief that there is any

danger. Such a person may be killed accidentally, but because of her beliefs or activism in

a particular arena is elevated by like-minded individuals usually by means of rhetorical

actions as a symbol of that particular cause (e.g., a striking labor union worker who is

accidentally run over by a passing vehicle while picketing).

Opposite of passive martyrdom is what this author has termed active martyrdom,

in which the individual martyred actively sacrifices his life under his own efforts to call

attention to an important issue or to obtain a particular religious, political, social, or other

5

ideological goal. It also has two sub-types: self-sacrificial and militant. The self-

sacrificial-martyr takes his own life, usually in a public way, or places himself in a

position in which he knows his life will be taken as a means of protest, to fulfill a

purpose, or as a call to attention to an issue as in Japanese hara-kiri (Jensen, et al., 2003;

Vigne, 2004). The militant martyr takes her own life, with the intention of killing or

harming others around her or destroying property or some other asset. One of the most

common forms of this martyrdom type is suicide bombings (Coney, 2003). Throughout

this article series, the terms militant martyr and terrorist may be used interchangeably as

the presumption is that both attempt to infuse fear in others as a means of accomplishing

some goal.

The following is a table illustrating the categories and sub-types of martyrs:

Table 1

Martyrdom Typologies

Passive Active

Accidentala Militant

Cognizant Self-sacrificial

a “Accidental martyr” taken from "Martyrs for a just

cause: The eulogies of Cesar Chavez." by R. J.

Jensen, T. R. Burkholder, and J. C. Hammerback,

Pall 2003, Western Journal of Communication,

67(4), p. 335-356.

6

This article is authored by Jerry D. Smith Jr., Psy.D., a Clinical Psychologist with the Federal Bureau of

Prisons, an agency within the U.S. Department of Justice. The views endorsed in this article are those of

Dr. Smith and do not necessary reflect the views of the U.S. Department of Justice or the Federal Bureau

of Prisons.

7



PALESTINIAN CONFLICT (Article Two)

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MARTYRDOM

Islamic Militant Martyrdom

Martyrdom is by no means a new concept. In Arabic-Islamic society, the idea of

terrorism, or the intentional instillation of fear in the masses, using militant-martyrs

appeared in the 11th century in the form of a Shi'i Islam sect known as the Nizari Isma'ilis,

or Assassins (Campbell, 2004; Hudson, 1999; Kermani, 2002; Kjeilen, 2003). The

Assassins would perform public political murders with nothing more than a dagger so

that the act would be well known. In most cases, his target’s bodyguards would

immediately kill the Assassin. According to Kjeilen (2003), the Assassins were

instrumental in turning terrorism into an Islamic religious duty.

According to Hashhash (2006), “martyrdom is an everyday event that continues

to perpetuate itself in Palestine and its representation is a frequent visual motif in

Palestinian art, media, and life.” Still, martyrs have been heralded in every religion and

every corner of the earth, not just Palestine. However, in recent times, militant

martyrdom has almost become synonymous with radical Islam, if not Islam in general, in

the minds of some Westerners. After all, Muslim society has endorsed associated tactics.

For example, the Shi'ite martyrdom zeitgeist resulted in Iranian soldiers rushing forward

into Iraqi mine fields during the Iran-Iraq War (Kermani, 2002). Further, many who were

killed or injured were children and teenagers. This same culture of martyrdom opened the

8

door in 1983 for a member of Hezbollah to commit a suicide bombing for the first time in

Lebanon (Kermani, 2002).

Haifaa Jawad, an Islamic studies lecturer at Birmingham University, relays the

story to Gibson, Chu, and Hasnain (2001) of young Britons turned potential-martyrs in

jihad against the West because of belonging to a generation of Muslims who feel

unaccepted by Western society. Furthermore, young Muslims turn towards religion as a

way to gain some sense of identity (Shameen, 2002). Returning to Palestinian militant

martyrs, Timmerman (2002, para. 13) relates the story of two 11-year-old middle-class

girls interviewed on television: "they explained that their goal was not to become doctors

or teachers, but to achieve a proper death through martyrdom for Allah." In 1993-94,

with no escape plans or guidance, young Palestinians embarked on suicide campaigns

aimed at Israelis, using weapons such as knives and axes. Further, Laqueur (2004)

exclaims that in Arab countries, terrorists arise in places where there is a high

concentration of radical preachers. Given this history, it is a common mistake to associate

most suicide bombings and attacks with Islamic fundamentalists.

Non-Islamic Militant Martyrdom

In actuality, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a secular Marxist-Leninist

group consisting largely of anti-religion Hindis, in their fight for liberation in Sri Lanka,

are the world leaders in suicide attacks (Hudson, 1999; Kermani, 2002; Ness, 2005).

While it is not certain that Christians actively participated in suicide bombings in the

Middle East, the Syrian Nationalist Party, consisting of an especially high percentage of

Arab Christians, carried out the first suicide bombing against Israel in the early eighties

(Kermani, 2002). Thus, a review of recent history reveals that the Laqueur’s (2004)

9

argument of militant martyrdom as the result of fundamentalist Islam does not hold up.

Further, after conducting his research on Palestinian attacks during the Second Intifada,

Moghadam (2003) concludes that it is not likely that “a profound religious belief alone”

will generate a willingness to engage in suicide attacks. Following this sentiment,

Hamilton-Hart (2005) points out that “the closure of options to pursue goals politically,

repression, and human rights abuses lead to adoption of extreme solutions.” Such

extreme measures can be observed in the actions of Japanese Kamikazes pilots in World

War II and the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War. This alone, however, does not

necessarily lead one to acts of militant martyrdom.

Theories of Martyrdom

Frustration Aggression Theory

There are several theories regarding how terrorism actually evolves. The first

formal theory as outlined by Hudson (1999), in his intelligence report for the CIA, is the

frustration-aggression theory. Frustration-aggression theory, one of the first and enduring

theories of terrorism, has been at the forefront of thinking in this area since the 1940s

(Halebsky, 1974; Ross, 1994). This theory states that living organisms react aggressively

because of frustration (Miller, 1941). It is based on the relative deprivation hypothesis

that purports that aggressive actions are the result of a disparity between what the

individual expects to receive from his environment and what the environment actually

provides. Miller’s initial theory asserted that aggression was the natural consequence of

any frustration (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939). However, even

according to Miller, the originator of this theory, frustration-aggression theory does not

10

provide a full explanation for human aggression, much less suicide attacks. Lange (1971)

summed up Miller’s 1941 revision of his theory stating that while “frustration was no

longer explicitly a sufficient cause for aggression…frustration is still a necessary factor in

aggression.” This conclusion seems more accurate when one considers that some

individuals from presumably similar frustrating environments engage in militant

martyrdom and others do not. Still, additional research shows that murder, at least, is

positively associated with frustration (Palmer, 1960).

Narcissistic Rage Theory

A second theory given by Hudson (1999) is the narcissistic rage theory. This

theory arises out of narcissism-aggression theory. Narcissistic rage theory suggests that

unchecked narcissism leads to violent behavior with little regard for pain caused to

others. As pointed out by Hudson, this theory does not seem to apply to those who take

their own life or willingly sacrifice their life for a cause. In fact, this seems the

antithesis of such actions. Further, additional research suggests that most militant

martyrs are not sadistic individuals who delight in violence for violence’s sake or

possess more aggressive tendencies than anyone else possesses (Soibelman, 2004).

Psychopathology Theory

Some researchers have hypothesized that militant martyrs are experiencing

psychosis. Salib (2003) suggests that suicide attackers are experiencing shared

delusions. Rosenberger (2003) describes militant martyrs as having paranoid delusions.

While these informal assessments certainly cannot be ruled out completely, they

require making rather large leaps in logic and excluding more thorough explanations.

Volkan (2002), on the other hand, describes potential martyrs as having disturbed egos

11

or personal identities. These disturbances are likely the result of erratic or

psychologically detrimental upbringings.

Social Problems Theory

In line with this idea, many researchers have hypothesized that social problems are

the root cause of a martyrdom culture (Elnur, 2003; Hammond, 1998; Hill, 2002; Shaffer,

1975; Von Hippel, 2002). A synthesis of many of these suggested problems include low

socioeconomic status, inadequate education, unemployment, environmental degradation,

resource scarcity, rapid urbanization, corrupt governments, and lack of access to weapon

building technology.

Societal and Social Factors of Martyrdom

Socioeconomic Status as a Factor

There are particular societal factors that may be conducive to the development of

a culture of militant martyrdom. Some point to findings that those from lower

socioeconomic classes and the uneducated are more likely to fit within this culture (De

Silva, Hobbs, & Hanks, 2001; Shameen, 2002). Other evidence argues against this

(Coney, 2003; Hudson, 1999; Krueger & Meleckova, 2002; Kushner, 1996; Laqueur,

2004; Taylor, 1988). Coney (2003) provides additional confirmation, indicating that, in

fact, suicide attackers are more likely to come from higher-class levels than from

impoverished families. Krueger and Meleckova (2002) conclude their extensive study

stating, “The evidence we have assembled and reviewed suggests that there are little

direct connections between poverty, education, and participation in or support for

terrorism.” Their findings confirm the conclusions drawn from similar studies on the

12

issue (Hudson, 1999; Kushner, 1996; Laqueur, 2004; Taylor, 1988). A 2001 Palestinian

Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) poll of 1,357 18-year-old or older

Palestinians yielded somewhat different results (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002). Results

from the PCPSR poll showed a negative correlation between unemployment and support

for armed attacks. That is to say, there was less support for armed conflict among the

unemployed than there was among college students, merchants, and professionals.

Taking all of these findings into consideration, it can be concluded that if there is, in fact,

a correlation between poverty and support for militant martyrdom within the Palestinian

Territories, it is a negative correlation. Based on this, an alternative explanation for a

culture of militant martyrdom must be sought.

War as a Non-Factor

Some may suggest that a culture of martyrdom arises from societies being at war.

Human history appears laden with wars in which there are examples of militant

martyrdom at play. However, whether formal wars have been waged, with or without the

systematic use of militant martyrs, seems beside the point. After all, most terrorist groups

claim that their actions are “acts of war” regardless of whether there has been an official

declaration or they have the support of there purported constituents. As such, the issue of

war becomes irrelevant and the potential martyr’s claim can better be explained as acting

out in frustration than a politico-social conflict between two opposing states or groups.




of Prisons.13



PALESTINIAN CONFLICT (Article Three)

DID SOMEONE SAY MIND CONTROL?: HOW THE TERRORIST MIND IS

MOLDED

Control Practices

According to Hudson (1999), terrorist groups, including those that endorse

militant martyrdom, have similarities with religious cults:

They require total commitment by members; they often prohibit relations with outsiders, although this may not be the case with ethnic or separatist terrorist groups whose members are well integrated into the community; they regulate and sometimes ban sexual relations; they impose conformity; they seek cohesiveness through interdependence and mutual trust; and they attempt to brainwash individual members with their particular ideology. (p. 35)

Leaders of terrorist organizations, secular and religious alike, much like those of

religious cults, are typically charismatic, enigmatic, authoritarian figures, possibly with

psychosis and/or a clinically paranoid personality disorder (Hamilton-Hart, 2005; Lester

et al, 2004; Lester, et al, 2004). These figures exhibit strong influential abilities.

Walsh (2001) outlines the trade techniques used by many cults to control their

members. One technique Walsh discusses is milieu control in which communications to

and from the outside world are controlled by the group leader. Mystical manipulation,

another tool used by cult leaders, involves the leader using "extensive personal

manipulation" to elicit desired behaviors, including dependency (p. 122). Indeed, some

research suggests that suicide attackers are often chosen because of the ease in which

they submit to religious indoctrination (Coney, 2003). Prime candidates reportedly 15

consist of immature and troubled youth with few social connections and an absence of

meaning in life (Crenshaw, 1988; Laqueur, 1987; Lester, et al, 2004; Stern, 2003). Plous

and Zimbardo (2004) further claim that groups attempt to screen out those that do not

prove susceptible to the propaganda and manipulation of the group leaders. Demand for

purity, another control technique, divides the world into good and evil as defined by the

group itself. In this vain, Islamic teachings seek to instill at a very early age the

unquestioning obedience to Allah and the calls for purity by religious authority (Post,

2005). A somewhat related technique is the dispensing of existence, in which a line is

drawn determining who has a right to live and who does not (Post, 2005; Walsh, 2001).

Additional techniques include the sacred science where members are taught that deeper

understanding comes from extensive training and unquestioning of group doctrine and

loading the language where new meanings of terminology are established to suit the

goals of the group (Walsh, 2001). An example of loading the language can be seen in the

modification of the Islamic word jihad by the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the

Jews and Crusaders (Knapp, 2003). Another example is the substitution of “martyrdom”

for “suicide” (Post, 2005).

Group Think, Wish Fulfillment, and Deception

Other factors contributing to a culture of martyrdom that may or may not be

similar to cults are conformity, wish fulfillment, and deception (Hudson, 1999; Tomar,

2003). Conformity involves the changing of personal beliefs to agree with the group. The

role of ritual and ceremony is key to this attempt to influence and control. Hafez (2006)

writes:

Ritual and ceremony are not simply by-products of violent conflict, but constitutive aspects of it. Ritual and ceremony are cultural performances, symbolic

16

behaviors, or proscribed procedures that are dramatic, socially standardized, and repetitive. Their aim is to communicate and declare identity, arouse emotions, deepen commitments, and inculcate the values of collective ethos. (p. 169)

A consequence of this is groupthink. Groupthink can lead to "illusions of invulnerability

leading to excessive optimism and excessive risk taking, presumptions of the group's

morality, one-dimensional perceptions of the enemy as evil, and intolerance of challenges

by a group member to shared key beliefs" (Hudson, 1999, p. 35). Wish fulfillment refers

to the human tendency to want to believe in things that are seen as beneficial (Tomar,

2003). Tomar offers the example of an individual growing up in an area ravaged by

violence. She argues that such individuals, as a result of wish fulfillment, are likely to

believe in stories of a paradise awaiting them should they become martyrs. Hafez (2006)

echoes a similar characterization of how terror group leaders are able to use religious

texts, traditions, and public rituals to sell militant martyrdom acts as “opportunities for

unparalleled heroism, religious devotion, and personal redemption.” Additional research

provides support for these claims (Berko & Erez, 2005; Hafez, 2004; Hassan, 2003;

Israeli, 2002; Merari, 2004; Oliver & Steinberg, 2005). Post (2005) notes that

conclusions drawn from psychological autopsies of 93 Palestinian militant martyrs

indicate that

[The attacks] were for the most carried out by young men between the ages of 17 and 22, [who were] unmarried, uneducated, and unemployed. They were unformed youth, who, when they volunteered or were recruited, were told by the recruiters that their life prospects were bleak, that they could do something significant with their lives, that they would be enrolled in the hall of martyrs, and that their parents would be proud of them and would gain financial rewards. From the moment they entered the safe house, they were never alone: someone slept in the same room with them the night before the action to ensure that they did not backslide, and they were physically escorted to the pizza parlor, disco, or shopping mall to carry out their act of suicide terrorism. (p. 630)

Finally, the use of cultic tactics by charismatic leaders to control followers, with 17

its use of intentional manipulation, deception, isolation, propaganda tools, etc. can be

equated to psychological abuse by placing unrealistic demands on the individual to serve

the motives of the group or group leader, at the personal and psychological expense of the

individual (Atran, 2006).

Effects of the Media

The impact of the media in influencing behavior cannot be ignored. Pfefferbaum

et al. (2003, 2004) confirm the potential psychological consequences of exposure to

media reports of traumatic events. They note that repeated exposure to media reports can

result in posttraumatic stress and peri-traumatic symptoms. If repeated media exposure

can impact one’s emotional state, can it not also be used to influence behavior? Dermody

and Scullion (2003), in a study of awareness of election advertising campaigns in Britain,

concluded that advertising is noticed by young people and processed psychologically.

However, they were unable to conclude what role, if any, this awareness of advertising

campaigns had on getting young people to respond. On the other hand, Baines and

Worcester (2005), in their study on changing public opinion regarding the 2003 US

invasion of Iraq, concluded that:

Contrary to the commonly held notion that politicians follow public opinion, this study has shown how a UK Prime Minister managed to persuade, through various rhetorical devices and a complicit media, an initially skeptical electorate that a war with Iraq, in conjunction with the USA, was in the country’s best interests. (p.16)

Ignoring the obvious political subtext included in this statement, there is useful

information here regarding the abilities of leaders to influence others in a particular

direction, using the means at hand. One such rhetorical device referred to was that of

repetition of certain messages in communications (Baines & Worcester, 2005).

18

McGoldrick (2005) echoed this point referring to the Bush Administration, stating the

Administration excels at using pre-arranged positioning and word repetition to drive

home its message. Additional evidence of the persuasive powers of repeated intentional

propaganda can be found in the outcome of the Palestinian Authority’s 2001 martyrdom

propaganda campaign as discussed below (Timmerman, 2002).

Priming and Framing Effects

Further evidence of the ability to influence behavior can be found by looking at

priming and framing. Priming is the ability to cue or bring forward certain topics in the

minds of individuals or groups (Druckman, Jacobs, & Ostermeier, 2004). There is ample

research to support the use of priming in political arenas (Druckman, 2004; Druckman, et

al., 2004; Li and Brewer, 2004). Druckman, et al., further demonstrates that group leaders

tailor their priming strategies to correspond with public opinion and the opportunities

offered by current political conditions. The result is a somewhat circular or reciprocal

influence, but an influence nonetheless.

Framing effects, likewise, play a significant role in influencing attitudes and

behavior. Framing is the conceptualization or characterization of an idea, event, person,

etc., in a way that influences another’s opinion about it (Bar-Tal, 2005). Bar-Tal describes

the role of the media and framing by Israeli leaders in the decline in support for peace

initiatives with Palestine. Boettcher (2004) demonstrates from a prospect theory

orientation how framing can lead to preference and choice reversal in international

relations. Kanner (2004), in his application of prospect theory, makes the case that

through the use of framing, a weaker negotiator can still achieve a desirable outcome,

attesting to its power of influence. Jerit (2004) argues that group leaders (especially those

19

associated with martyrdom groups) have strong incentive to frame messages in ways that

evoke fear, anxiety, and anger because it allows them to motivate their base while also

converting the uncommitted. Gross and D'Ambrosio (2004), in their study on framing

emotional responses, conclude that framing does indeed affect emotional responses, but

asserted that the extent to which emotions are influenced depends on the person’s original

predisposition. This author argues that systemic psychological victimization accounts for

this original predisposition. In an interesting study, Cohen-Hattab (2004) shows that even

tourism can be framed to make political statements, wage wars, and influence the

populace as, he argues, was the case in pre-Israel Palestine where Jewish political-

propaganda led to the creation of the state of Israel. The ability of framing effects to

influence behavior is undeniable and is a powerful tool used by militant martyrdom

groups.

The argument may be made that those who engage in acts of militant martyrdom

need little convincing or persuasion to follow through with their intentions. As if in

anticipation to this argument, Hafez (2006) asks why martyrdom groups are so diligent

and work so painstakingly to establish and maintain a culture of martyrdom if there is not

a need to persuade the broader public of the utility of militant martyrdom. The evidence

overwhelmingly suggests that such groups go to great lengths to instill, support, and

maintain a culture of militant martyrdom. The combination of the aforementioned factors

with the psychological abuse perpetrated on Palestinians, as will be discussed below,

makes the conditions ripe for cult-like/terrorist groups. These groups fill their

membership by seeking out those who have been victimized, offering a means of recourse

for the victimization, and inflicting their own form of victimization by manipulation and

20

other abusive tactics, as outline above. This combined impact creates a culture of militant

martyrdom that was previously non-existent in the Palestinian Territories (Hafez, 2006).

Here one finds the explanation for why a culture of martyrdom did not exist within

Palestine prior to 1989 when the first suicide attack was carried out.




of Prisons. Dr. Smith is the author of the Psychology Student Discourse (PsychoStud.com) website.

21

http://www.psychostud.com/



PALESTINIAN CONFLICT (Article Four)

THE ROLE OF ABUSE IN THE CONVERSION TO MILITANT MARTYRDOM

Neglect, Misogyny, and Borderline Personality

There is some speculation that the culture of militant martyrdom may stem from

the abuse of children at an early age. Militant martyrdom has been described as a result of

children being reared in authoritarian fundamentalist familial systems (Kaganovskiy,

2003). Kaganovskiy ultimately explains the phenomenon of terrorism (in this case

militant martyrdom) by a lack of empathy by the terrorist. This lack of empathy has been

developed in childhood as a result of oppression, impoverishment, and suffering.

However, he argues that these conditions are second to repeated abuse and

neglect as a child in the development, or rather non-development of empathy.

Furthermore, Kaganovskiy suggests, women in these societies are the major perpetrators

of the non-development of empathy in children. He suggests that because of the

misogynistic environment and brutalization at the hands of males, women lose their

ability to empathize. Therefore, women are not capable of teaching their children,

particularly male children, empathy and actually become abusive towards their young.

(DeMause, 2002; Janowitz, 2006; Kaganovskiy, 2003) Lachkar (2002) added that suicide

attackers have developed a borderline personality disorder that developed because of

neglectful and abusive child-rearing practices, frustrating dependency needs and viewing

individual desires as weakness. She adds that young boys experience anger and

22

resentment as a result. This may cause them to identify with charismatic leaders, adopt

misogynistic and oppression ideologies, and disassociate with anything perceived as

womanly, including participating in child-rearing practices (Berko & Erez, 2005;

DeMause, 2002; Lachkar, 2002; Steiner, 1974). Thus, the cycle is perpetuated. Bardis

(1973) additionally notes that physical violence is most commonly found those with

lower social status and lower levels of education. As previously pointed out, there

appears to be little positive correlation between poverty and support for terrorist acts

(Krueger & Maleckova, 2002). However, this may provide some rationale for the support

that is found among low SES Palestinians.

Marketing Martyrdom to Children

De Silva, et al., (2001) conducted a study of nineteen children in Sri Lanka

between the ages of 10 and 17 conscripted into armed combat. Of the 19, 18 volunteered

for service. Nine joined in the hopes of being a freedom fighter or martyr. Five joined out

of hatred for the enemy. De Silva, et. al. (2001) indicate, "Children become easy targets

for recruitment because of their idealist minds. They are easily influenced by

propaganda" (p. 126).They declare the conscription of children of any age to be an

intolerable form of child abuse. A brief discussion of Erikson’s (1968) theory of

developmental psychology may shed some insight. According to Erikson, adolescents

use ideology to protect their developing, but still unstable identities. They search to find

ideas and beliefs outside of themselves that are clearly defined and unwavering. This

makes them vulnerable to uncompromising belief systems. Further, denial of something

concrete to believe in may add to the child experience of frustration (Soibelman, 2004).

However psychologically abusive the marketing of war to children and the

23

conscription of children may be, it has not been limited to Sri Lanka. In May 2001, the

Palestinian Authority aired the first in what has become a series of martyrdom

propaganda. A five-minute music video aimed at recruiting children to become suicide

attackers has been directly linked to bombings (Timmerman, 2002). According to

Timmerman, the definitive connection came in the form of farewell letters left behind in

which children quoted lines from the video. In the 12 years between the first suicide

attack in 1989 and the beginning of the Palestinian Authority martyrdom propaganda

campaign, approximately 21 suicide attacks were carried out (Yom & Saleh, 2004). In

the subsequent 3 years after the initiation of the campaign, over 110 acts of militant

martyrdom were perpetrated (Yom & Saleh, 2004).

From Sympathizer to Martyr

Militant martyrs do not simply start as terrorists. There appears to be a process for

involving oneself with terrorist organizations. Hudson (1999) illustrates one path in

which an individual moves from sympathizer to passive supporter to group member after

violent encounters with authority figures. A conglomerate of research notes systemic

problems with in the Palestinian Territories of negative primary and secondary

experiences with the Israeli military and security forces. These experiences reportedly

included having a loved one killed or beaten, mandatory searches and seizure of property,

annexation and occupying of traditional land, and innumerable additional persistent acts

of Palestinian perceived humiliation, oppression, and injustice. (Soibelman, 2004)

Moral Disengagement

One question that must be asked involves how militant martyrs deal

psychologically with the human devastation they commit. Hudson (1999) describes four

24

techniques of moral disengagement originated by Albert Bandura in 1990. The first

technique involves the use of moral justification. Here, terrorists see themselves as

warriors against injustice and oppression. A second technique involves the displacement

of responsibilities onto group leaders. Third, there is a minimization of the actual

suffering of the victims. Finally, terrorists dehumanize their victims by using name-

calling, labeling, and other rhetoric. Hafez (2006) notes that the aforementioned use of

ritual and ceremony serves the additional purpose of suppressing and converting moral

constraints from harming others, into ethical imperatives to do harm. Further, the carrying

out of the suicide attack provides an anticipated release from the dissonance that

undoubtedly results. According to Soibelman (2004), this dissonance “might lend itself to

justification or constructions that the individual had no choice, and that their enemy bears

ultimate responsibility for violence” (p. 182). As can be seen, the process of moral

disengagement involves several necessary psychological steps to allow the potential

martyr to carry out his mission.

Martyrdom Incentives

Terrorists may receive a variety of social, economic, religious, and

psychological rewards for their actions. Social rewards include the elevation of social

status of the martyr and his family after his death (Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003;

Post, 2005). This is particularly relevant to the Arab culture that places great emphasis

on honor (Berko & Erez, 2005).

Other incentives to engage in acts of militant martyrdom include potential

economic rewards. Post, et al. (2003), wrote, after interviewing twenty-one Islamic

25

terrorists, “Families of terrorists who were wounded, killed, or captured enjoyed a great

deal of economic [and material] aid and attention. And that strengthened popular

support for the attacks.”

Islamic religious rewards promoted by supporters of militant martyrdom

include forgiveness of the martyr’s sins and the ability to intercede on behalf of seventy

family members during judgment (Soibelman, 2004). Islamic Jihadists following

Osama bin Laden have been promised a place in paradise (Knapp, 2003). Additional

rewards include the fulfillment of sexual desires and fantasies in heaven (Soibelman,

2004). Some have even suggested that the act of blowing one’s self up, as with male

suicide bombers, is the symbolic acting-out of the sexual explosion, or ejaculation, at

the time of orgasm (Baruch, 2003; Juergensmeyer, 2000).

Finally, the psychological rewards of suicide attacks can result in high

motivation to carry out such acts. Acts of militant martyrdom can be seen by the

perpetrator as giving meaning to one’s life, symbolically connecting the individual with

wide-held cultural myths. In such a way, the acts of the martyr are romanticized and

linked to the salvation of the group. (Soibelman, 2004) Additionally, by engaging in

militant martyrdom, the martyr is able to demand a sense of individuality and identity

that he is otherwise unable to obtain (Moghadam, 2003). Moghadam’s conclusion

supports Kaplan’s 1981 assertion that terrorism stems from a poor sense of self-worth.

Israeli (1997), likewise, supports this assessment. Post (2005) writes, “Armed action

provided a sense of control or power for Palestinians in a society that had stripped them

of it” (p. 623). Some researchers argue that Palestinian militant martyrs experience

hopelessness and anger (Kushner, 1996; Salib, 2003). Given the conditions of their

26

environment and the psychological traumatization this has likely caused on many, this

is not a difficult assessment to make. For those who have known nothing but sorrow,

oppression, and violence their entire life, "death holds no terror ... death and torture

being the ultimate means by which they assert their power" (Kermani, 2002, para. 56).

It is their transcendence, their statement of being. This idea is reinforced by what Bar

(2004,) calls “a mentality of bello ergo sum (I fight, therefore I exist)” (p.30).

Alternatively, to apply that to the militant martyr, I choose to die, therefore I must

exist.

When considering the rationale for why Palestinians might choose a path of

martyrdom, three themes become apparent (Hafez, 2006; Janowitz, 2006; Raja; 2005).

First, there is religious obligation. Whether the call for martyrdom is a religious duty

demanded in the Koran, is beside the point. As discussed elsewhere in this series,

martyrdom-groups have persuasive methods for instilling such an understanding into

their members and recruits. The second theme is to establish and secure a personal

identity and legacy. There is redemption, transcendence, and glory to be had by

accepting a path of martyrdom. Finally, there is a persistent theme of wanting to leave

the abuses and tribulations associated with their current life for the promised bliss of

the afterlife. Additionally, they seek to improve the social and economic conditions of

those family members they leave behind.

Suicide and Martyrdom

A commonly under-researched area concerning militant martyrs appears to be

the actual risks for traditional suicide (Lester, et al, 2004). However, some research has

27

been done. Israeli (1997) claims that potential martyrs do not possess any risk factors

for traditional suicide. Merari (2004) cites the absence of typical risk factors, such as

affective disorders, alcohol and drug abuse, childhood loss, or recent stress, as proof

that militant martyrs are not suicidal in the traditional sense. These claims made by

Israeli and Merari are highly questionable given that neither author’s assertion seems to

be supported by thorough psychological autopsies or psychological interviews. Further,

this seems to conflict with conclusions that can be drawn from Post’s 2005 study using

93 psychological autopsies of Palestinian martyrs, that cite specific life events that are

typically associated with increased risk for suicide. A number of additional authors cite

similar risk factors for suicide, such as the occurrences of losing loved-ones, both as a

child and young adult, and its synergistic effect, as contributing to the potential

martyr’s decision to act (Berko & Erez, 2005; Lester, et al, 2004).

Multiple occurrences of divorce and the prohibiting free-choice marriages are

cited as direct causes of volunteering for suicide attacks (Berko & Erez, 2005). Other

affective risk factors experienced by potential martyrs include feelings of being

hopeless about the future, despair, guilt, shame, humiliation, etc. (Berko & Erez, 2005;

Kusher, 1996; Lester, et al, 2004; Salib, 2003). Stein (2003) points to the social

contagion, or copycat phenomenon, as another risk factor. If Lachkar’s (2002)

hypothesis about militant martyrs having borderline personality disorder as a result of

abusive upbringings holds weight, then conventional suicidal ideation and intention

becomes even more likely and of enormous concern. Despite contrary arguments, risk

factors for suicide, especially a history of abuse, cannot be ignored when considering

militant martyrs.

28





29




PALESTINIAN CONFLICT (Article Five5)

EGO STRENGTH-FRUSTRATION TENDENCIES (ES-FT) MODEL OF PREDICT-

ING SOCIAL ASSOCIATIONS

While a number of theories have been proposed to explain the existence of mili-

tant martyrdom cultures, one stands out. Frustration-aggression theory answers in part the

question of how and why a culture of martyrdom has developed in the Palestinian Terri-

tories among males. However, it does not provide a complete explanation as pointed out

above. The author has gone to great lengths to try a fill in the missing holes. Specifically,

the author has demonstrated through a review of the literature that there exists a cultural

or systemic problem of psychological abuse inflicted on the populace beginning at a very

young age. This abuse has been inflicted in numerous ways, all with the same effect. It is

this author’s contention that a frustrating environment, one in which the socioeconomic

and religious expectations of the populace are not met, combined with systemic psycho-

logical traumatization, resulting from oppression, humiliation, child abuse, misogyny,

abusive social influence and control techniques, etc., sufficiently promote a culture of

militant martyrdom. Further, an individual’s potential for choosing a path of martyrdom

can be assessed by looking at the interaction of frustration and the extent to which the in-

dividual has been impacted by psychological victimization, that is to say, their ego

strength. To help illustrate this framework, the author has developed the following table:

30

Table 2

Ego Strength-Frustration Tendencies (ES-FT)

Frustrating Environment Non-Frustrating Envi-

ronment

Negative Ego

Strength

Militant martyr

Self-sacrificial martyr

Martyrdom-group leader

Socially isolated

Withdrawn

Depressed

Positive Ego

Strength

Political Activist

Militant group leader

Militant group member

Socially integrated

Acculturated

For the purpose of this conceptualization, the operational definition of ego

strength, constructed by the author, is the extent to which an individual’s sense of self has

been impacted by psychological victimization. While it is acknowledged that this can be

described as being on a continuum, from completely positive effects to completely nega-

tive effects and infinite possibilities in between, it is assumed that one responds to victim-

ization in a generally negative (i.e., experiencing trauma or psychological damage) or

positive (i.e., experiencing resiliency or psychological hardiness) manner. As such, one

whose sense of self has been negatively impacted by abuse, and demonstrates poor self-

worth, lack of or fractured self-identity, little hope for self-determination, and/or a de-

funct sense of life-purpose, is said to exhibit negative ego strength. Conversely, one

whose sense of self remains intact or is bolstered by victimization, demonstrating re-

siliency, with a “bounce-back” attitude, high self-esteem, strong sense of self, and/or high

31

expectation of having control over his future, is said to exhibit positive ego strength.

Based on this framework, an individual from a frustrating environment who demonstrates

negative ego strength will have a tendency toward martyrdom as illustrated in Table 2.

An individual from a non-frustrating environment who demonstrates negative ego

strength will be socially isolated, either through self-isolation or through exclusion by his

peer group, and will likely be chronically sad, hopeless, and anguished. On the other

hand, someone who is from a frustrating environment but exhibits positive ego strength

has a tendency toward political activism, either by legal (e.g., active membership in

peaceful civil rights groups) or illegal means (e.g., active membership in terrorist groups).

Further, the fortunate individual who finds himself in a non-frustrating environment and

exhibits positive ego strength will demonstrate good social skills and healthy relation-

ships and will easily fit in and manage the demands and constraints of new environments

that meet the person’s expectations.





32




PALESTINIAN CONFLICT (Article Six)

IMPLICATIONS OF THE EGO STRENGTH-FRUSTRATION TENDENCIES

MODEL

While this article series is primarily concerned with explaining militant

martyrdom among Palestinian males, it must be noted and was previously alluded to,

that harsh conditions existed years prior to the first incident of militant martyrdom. As

stated previously, the Palestinian Authority’s martyrdom campaign has explanatory

power here. The ES-FT model explains it in the following manner. Palestinians, prior

to the martyrdom campaign, where in a positive ego strength state. ES-FT’s suggestion

that Palestinians, while exhibiting positive ego strength state in a frustrating

environment, would have a tendency toward militancy, but not militant martyrdom.

Support for this can be found in the relative lack of martyrdom acts throughout their

history prior to the mass martyrdom campaign initiated in 2001, and the subsequent

significant rise in attacks. Drawing on the psychoanalytic concept of projection, this

author hypothesizes that Palestinians where able to maintain a strong sense of self by

projecting their internal and external frustrations onto their oppressors, the Israelis.

However, with the launch of the martyrdom campaign, Palestinians were being told

that their lives were worthless unless they engaged in militant martyrdom. Previously,

their lives had worth if they fought and lived to fight another day. This created a state

33

of emotional dissonance and a psychological re-awakening to inter-group frustrations

and abuses. This re-awakening has resulted in a reassessment of their self-identity, self-

worth, and self-determination and caused a move toward the negative pole of the

positive-negative ego strength continuum. However, the motives for engaging in

militant martyrdom may certainly be different for the individual than for the group, as a

whole, that promotes it.

Winkates (2006) confirms that there is a distinction of motivation between the

militant martyr, himself, and the sponsoring group. He suggests that national interests,

in which case suicide bombings might be seen simply as a means to an end, motivate

the sponsoring organization. Additionally, he describes the martyr as being spurred on

by a combination of psychological, religious, and social motives. Further, the reviewed

literature does indeed point directly to psychological distress, including an inhibited

sense of self, as a major contributor to the development of militant martyrs. More

importantly, it points to psychological victimization by both the Israelis and the

Palestinian directly as the source of this distress and subsequent culture of martyrdom.

While the frustration-aggression theory serves as a plausible explanation for

militant martyrdom at the societal level, it does not account for the individual.

Contrarily, the toll that systemic psychological victimization takes on the individual

does serve as an explanation for the individual’s motivation. The proposed ego

strength-frustration tendencies (ES-FT) model brings these two arenas together by

offering a novel way of framing the on-going Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This new

model acknowledges the interaction between internal psychological factors of the

individual and environmental shortcomings and predicts the likely consequences for

34

the individual. Other models seemingly ignore the plight of the individual for that of

the society.

ES-FT holds both sides of the conflict responsible, while suggesting specific

areas for each side to address. It does this by highlighting where the Palestinians and

Israelis are falling short in resolving the contributing environmental conditions (e.g.,

misogynistic practices on the part of the Palestinians and ongoing humiliation of

Palestinians on the part of the Israelis). The strength of this model lies in its synergistic

view of the social and psychological conditions existing in the Territories. While most

prevailing theories have focused on the social, religious, or economic conditions,

psychological explanations have been given little weight. Although the psychology of

martyrdom has not been totally ignored, when compared to the “bigger concerns” of

economics, religion, and education there has been relatively little synthesis of the

psychological issues into “big picture” models. This is where the ES-FT model sets

itself apart.

Clinical Implications

In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, such a theory allows both parties a means of

reassessing their current actions, current motivations, desired outcomes, and

opportunities for collaboration. From a mental health standpoint, this theory warrants

the provider with an outline, similar to current treatments for abused persons, for

working with individuals belonging to a martyrdom culture. Prior models failed to

provide this kind of guidance, leaving mental health professionals without a viable,

practical, and consistent means of conceptualizing these individuals. This meant that

adequate treatment options were difficult, if not impossible, to construct. ES-FT helps

35

replace the image of a murderous, abhorrent perpetrator of mass atrocities with that of a

human being, with human needs and human frailties. With this picture in mind, the

provider can focus on the causes of the potential martyr’s frustration and distress,

without getting lost in his repugnant actions.

The ES-FT framework proposed by this author offers several advantages over

frustration-aggression theory alone. First, it allows for a more complete understanding of

the psychological impact of the conditions within the Palestinian Territories that have

given rise to militant martyrdom. With this new understanding, mental health

professionals can devise treatments at the individual and group level to help resolve some

of the psychological ailments faced after enduring systemic victimization. A second

advantage is that, while frustration-aggression theory implies the need to address the

issue at a societal level, ES-FT opens the door for treating individuals. This is of

particular importance because of the difficulty of developing large-scale treatments.

Further, if the frustration is caused by an external group, such as a nation believing it is

acting in its own best interest, it may prove more effective to focus on individuals than

attempting to convince the frustrator to act contrary to their self-interest.

Research has shown that educating traditionally uneducated populations,

including those in authoritarian environments, leads to more abstract, flexible, and

independent thinking (Burdman, 2003). This could prove useful in counteracting the

indoctrination of a culture of active martyrdom. Further, systematic psychological de-

conditioning programs could be used to counteract the obvious conditioning of

individuals from oppressive, frustrating environments.

Taking the Palestinian conflict as an example, recent research indicates that 73

36

percent of 6 to 11-year olds suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD

(Burdman, 2003). This is a staggering statistic and has profound implications. According

to Burdman, "traumatic experiences lead to increased neuroticism, high risk-taking

behavior and low self-esteem which ... could be a contributing factor to self-destructive

behaviors, including suicide missions" (p. 114). The violence must be stopped and

treatment on an individual and societal level must begin. Mental health providers must

take an active role in the developing of appropriate treatment programs.

Finally, all nations must be willing to evaluate their own policies and interactions

around the world. They must be willing to ascertain what role they are playing or have

played that has led to a cultivation of a culture of militant martyrdom in various places

across the world. They must remember the history of the world to promote tolerance and

peace in the present and future. ES-FT can help facilitate this change by altering the

mainstream conceptualizations of what is happening in Palestine, which may be

generalizing abilities, and offering clinical treatment and prevention recommendations.

Limitations and Implications for Future Research

The ES-FT model is not without its problems. Primarily, there has been research

that points toward the use of militant martyrdom as a rational means-to-a-end tool rather

than the acting out of psychological distress (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006). Although the

point can be argued, this potential criticism of ES-FT makes some sense when consider-

ing a societal explanation for a culture of militant martyrdom. However, this model is de-

signed to consider the individuals that make up that culture.

The issue of martyrdom is a complicated one and its implications can be

extremely troubling. The most profound and devastating implications of martyrdom can

37

be found in militant martyrdom. Such implications will prove and have already proven

difficult to address, as they know no geopolitical, cultural, religious, or socio-economical

boundaries as indicated by the September 11 attacks on the United States and the long

line of preceding and following suicide killings around the world.

To effectively eliminate these activities will take exceptional effort, time, and de-

programming. The ES-FT model may not be sufficient in identifying the many factors

that impact the development of martyrdom cultures. However, it provides a new way of

approaching the subject. Whatever the costs, the cycle of violence must be broken.

Society must find a means other than violence to bring about lasting change. Issues of

poverty and lack of education must be addressed. In particular, fundamentalist

environments that are oppressive must learn tolerance and allow for dissention. As

Burdman (2003), citing a Palestinian psychiatrist, writes regarding the participation of

Palestinian children in the 1988 intifada in the Palestinian-Israeli disputed areas,

Children were rebelling not only against the 'invading Israeli army,' but also by displacing onto the Israelis their unacceptable expression of anger at adverse circumstances of their lives (the behavior of angry exhausted fathers, teachers who were strict disciplinarians, and in Gaza, an Islamic culture whose traditions and divine rules demand absolute compliance). In effect, it may be that they were rebelling against all forms of imposed authority, including that of family and teacher, but displacing their buried anger onto socially legitimate foci, namely the occupying force. (p. 109)

This is of extreme importance to countries who find themselves the focus of martyrdom-

groups as it provides for a deeper understanding of the attackers' motivation.

An exploration of the psychosocial conditions among wealthy, better-educated

Palestinians is an area for additional research. According to Moghadam (2003), many

martyrs come from wealthy families. It will be interesting to see how the ego strength-

frustration tendencies model applies to this demographic. An initial hypothesis is that 38

they experience similar, albeit different, levels of frustration and psychological

victimization. Based on this assumption, ES-FT predicts there will be a tendency toward

militant martyrdom for this demographic as well.

Also of interest is the ES-FT model’s utility in explaining militant martyrdom in

other areas of the world. If, use of the ES-FT model proves fruitful in this effort, it will

allow many of the same benefits it brings to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Finally,

future research should look at this model’s ability to accurately describe and predict the

development of whole cultures of militant martyrdom. The ability to predict such a

development will provide an invaluable avenue for preventive interventions.





39


REFERENCES

Atran, S. (2006). The moral logic and growth of suicide terrorism. The Washington Quarterly, 29(2), 127-147.

Baines, P., & Worcester, R. M. (2005). When the British 'Tommy' went to war, public opinion followed. Journal of Public Affairs, 5(1), 4-19.

Bar, S. (2004). The religious sources of Islamic terrorism. Policy Review, 27-37.

Bar-Tal, D. (2005). The influence of events and (mis)information on Israeli-Jewish pub-lic opinion: The case of the Camp David Summit and the second intifada. Pales-tine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture, 11(3/4), 112-124.

Bardis, P. (1973, Spring). Violence: Theory and qualification. Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 1, 121-146.

Baruch, E. (2003).Psychoanalysis and terrorism: The need for a global “talking cure.” Psychoanalytic Psychology, 20(4), 698-700.

Berko, A. & Erez, E. (2005). “Ordinary people” and “death work”: Palestinian suicide bombers as victimizers and victims. Violence and Victims, 20(6), 603-623.

Boettcher, W.A., III. (2004). The prospects for prospect theory: An empirical evaluation of international relations applications of framing and loss aversion. Political Psy-chology, 25(3), 331-362.

Burdman, D. (2003, Spring). Education, Indoctrination, and Incitement: Palestinian Children on Their Way to Martyrdom. Terrorism and Political Violence, 15(1), 96-123.

Campbell, A. (2004). Prologue. In The assassins of Alamut (1). Retrieved January 21, 2004, from http://www.acampbel1.org.uk/

Cohen-Hattab, K. (2004). Zionism, tourism, and the battle for Palestine: Tourism as a po-litical-propaganda tool. Israel Studies, 9(1), 61-85.

Coney, J. (2003). Martyrdom 2. In Religion, psychology, and violence. Retrieved January 19, 2004, from http://clam.rutgers.edu/~jerryk/ReligionAnd Psychology/Martyrdom2.htm

Crenshaw, M. (1988). The subjective reality of the terrorist: Ideological and psychologi-cal factors in terrorism. In: R.O. Slater & M. Stohl (Eds.), Current Perspective on International Terrorism. London: Macmillan Press.

40

http://www.acampbel1.org./

Cunningham, L.S. (2002). On contemporary Martyrs: Some recent literature. Theological Studies, 63,374-381.

DeMause, L. (2002). The childhood origins of terrorism. Journal of Psychohistory, 29, 340-348.

Dermody, J., & Scullion, R. (2003). Facing the future: Young people's awareness of the 2001 British general election advertising campaigns. Journal of Public Affairs, 3(2), 152-165.

De Silva, H., Hobbs, C., & Hanks, H. (2001). Conscription of children in armed conflict--a form of child abuse. A study of 19 former child soldiers. Child Abuse Review, 10, 125-134.

Dollard, J., Doob, L., Miller, N., Mowrer, O., & Sear, R. (1939). Frustration and aggres-sion. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Druckman, J.N. (2004). Priming the vote: Campaign effects in a U.S. Senate election. Political Psychology, 25(4), 577-594.

Druckman, J.N., Jacobs, L.R., & Ostermeier, E. (2004). Candidate strategies to prime is-sues and image. The Journal of Politics, 66(4), 1180-1202.

Elnur, I. (2003). 11 September and the widening North-South gap: Root causes of terrorism in the global order. Arab Studies Quarterly, 25(1&2), 57-70.

Erikson, E.H. (1968). Identity: Youth and crisis. New York: W.W. Norton.

Gibson, H., Chu, J., & Hasnain, G. (2001, November 12). Traitors or martyrs. Time Europe, 158(20), 36-37. Retrieved January 13, 2004, from Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection Database.

Gross, K., & D'Ambrosio, L. (2004). Framing emotional response. Political Psychology, 25(1), 1-29.

Hafez, M.M. (2004, October). Manufacturing human bombs: Strategy, culture, and conflict in the making of Palestinian suicide terrorism. Paper presented at the National Institute of Justice conference, Washington, DC.

Hafez, M.M. (2006). Rationality, culture, and structure in the making of suicide bombers: A preliminary theoretical synthesis and illustrative case study. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29, 165-185.

41

Halebsky, S. (1974, Spring). New perspectives on political radicalism. Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 2, 113-124.

Hamilton-Hart, N. (2005). Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Expert analysis, myopia, and fantasy. The Pacific Review, 18(3), 303-325.

Hammond, A. (1998). Terrorism’s roots. Christian Science Monitor, 90(220), 11.

Hashhash, M.A. (2006). On the visual representation of martyrdom in Palestine. Third Text, 20(3/4), 391-403.

Hassan, R. (2003). Suicide bombing driven more by politics than religious zeal. YaleGlobal Online. Retrieved July 7, 2007 from http://yaleglobal.yale.edu.

Hill, P. (2002, October 20). Studies say elites spurred to terror. The Washington Times.

Hudson, R.A. (1999). The sociology and psychology of terrorism: Who becomes a terrorist and why? Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

Israeli, R. (1997). Islamikaze and their significance. Terrorism and Political Violence, 9(3), 96-121.

Israeli, R. (2002). A manual of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 14(4), 23-40.

Janowitz, N. (2006). Lusting for death: Unconscious fantasies in an ancient Jewish martyrdom text. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 23(4), 644-653.

Jensen, R.J., Burkholder, T. R., & Hammerback, J. C. (2003, Fall). Martyrs for a just cause: The eulogies of Cesar Chavez. Western Journal of Communication, 67(4), 335-356.

Jerit, J. (2004). Survival of the fittest: Rhetoric during the course of an election cam-paign. Political Psychology, 25(4), 563-575.

Juergensmeyer, M. (2000). Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kaganovskiy, J. (2003). From child to terrorist. In Religion, psychology, and violence. Retrieved January 19, 2004, from http://clam.rutgers.edul~jerryk/ReligionAndPsychology/FromChildtoTerrorist.htm

42

Kanner, M.D. (2004). Framing and the role of the second actor: An application of prospect theory to bargaining. Political Psychology, 25(2), 213-239.

Kaplan, A. (1981). The psychodynamics of terrorism. In Y. Alexander & J. Gleason (Eds.), Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism, 35-50. New York: Pergamon.

Kermani, N. (2002, February 21). Roots of terror: Suicide, martyrdom, self-redemption and Islam. openDemocracy. Retrieved January 20, 2004, from http://www.opendemocracy.net

Kjeilen, T. (2003, October 7). Assassins. In Encyclopaedia of the Orient. Retrieved January 21, 2004, from http://lexicorient.comlcgi-bin/eo-direct.pl?assassins.htm

Knapp, M.G. (2003, Spring). The concept and practice of jihad in Islam. Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, pp. 82-94.

Krueger, A.B. & Maleckova, J. (2002, June 24). Does poverty cause terrorism? The eco-nomics and the education of suicide bombers. The New Republic, 27-33.

Kruglanski, A.W. & Fishman, S. (2006). The psychology of terrorism: “Syndrome” ver-sus “tool” perspectives. Terrorism and Political Violence, 18(2), 193-215.

Kushner, H.W. (1996). Suicide bombers. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 19, 329-337.

Lachkar, J. (2002). The psychological make-up of a suicide bomber. Journal of Psy-chohistory, 20, 349-367.

Lange, F. (1971). Frustration – aggression. A reconsideration. European Journal of So-cial Psychology, 1(1), 59-84.

Laqueur, W. (1987). The Age of Terrorism. Boston, Little, Brown.

Laqueur, W. (2004). The terrorism to come. Policy Review, 49-64.

Lester, D., Yang, B., & Lindsay, M. (2004). Suicide bombers: Are psychological profiles possible? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 27, 283-295.

Li, Q., & Brewer, M. B. (2004). What does it mean to be an American? Patriotism, na-tionalism, and American identity after 9/11. Political Psychology, 25(5), 727-739.

McGoldrick, P. (2005, May). Repetitive messages. Broadcast Engineering, 47(5), 106-106.

43

http://lexicorient.comlcgi-bin/eo-direct.

Merari, A. (2004, October). Suicide terrorism in the context of the Israeli Palestinian con-flict. Paper presented at the Suicide Terrorism Research Conference, National In-stitute of Justice, Washington, DC.

Miller, N.E. (1941). The frustration-aggression hypothesis. Psychology Review, 48(4), 337-342.

Moghadam, A. (2003). Palestinian suicide terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and organizational aspects. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26(2).

Ness, C. (2005). In the name of the cause: Women’s work in secular and religious terror-ism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28, 353-373.

Oliver, A.M. & Steinberg, P.F. (2005). The Road to Martyr’s Square: A Journey Into the World of the Suicide Bomber. New York: Oxford University Press.

Palmer, S. (1960). Frustration, aggression, and murder. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 60(3), 430-432.

Pfefferbaum, B., Pfefferbaum, R.L., Gurwitch, R.H., Doughty, D.E., Pynoos, R. S., Foy, D. W., Brandt, E.N., & Reddy, C. (2004). Teacher's psychological reactions & weeks after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. American Journal of Orthopsychi-atry, 74(3), 263-271.

Pfefferbaum, B., Sconzo, G.M., Flynn, B.W., Kearns, L.J., Doughty, D.E., Gurwitch, R.H., Nixon, S.J., & Nawaz, S. (2003). Case finding and mental health services for children in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing. The Journal of Be-havioral Health Services & Research, 30(2), 215-227.

Plous, S.L. & Zimbardo, P.G. (2004, September 10). How social science can reduce terrorism. The Chronicle of Higher Education: The Chronicle Review, 51, B9.

Post, J.M. (2005). When hatred is bred in the bone: Psycho-cultural foundations of contemporary terrorism. Political Psychology, 26(4), 615-636.

Post, J., Sprinzak, E., & Denny, L. (2003). The terrorists in their own words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists. Terrorism and Political Violence, 15(1), 171-184.

Raja, M.A. (2005, Fall). Death as a form of becoming: The Muslim imagery of death and necropolitics. Digest of Middle East Studies, 11-26.

Richmond, R.L. (2003). The psychology of terrorism. Retrieved February 20, 2004, from http://www.guidetopsychology.com/terrorism.htm

44

http://www.guidetopsychology.com/terrorism.htm

Rosenberger, J. (2003). Discerning the behavior of the suicide bomber. Journal of Reli-gion & Health, 42, 13-20.

Ross, J.I. (1994). Psychological causes of oppositional political terrorism: Toward an in-tegration of findings. International Journal of Group Tensions, 24(2), 157-185.

Salib, E. (2003). Suicide Terrorism. British Journal of Psychiatry, 182, 475-476.

Shaffer, B.D. (1975). Violence as a product of imposed order. University of Miami Law Review, 29(4), 732-763.

Shameen, A. (2002, May 6). Secrets of the mosque. Time Europe, 159(18), 42-44. Retrieved January 13, 2004, from Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection Database.

Soibelman, M. (2004). Palestinian Suicide Bombers. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 1, 175-190.

Stein, R. (2003). Evil as love and as liberation. In Moss, D. (Ed.), Hating in the First Person Plural. New York: Other Press, 281-310.

Steiner, C. (1974). Scripts People Live. New York: Grove.

Stern, J. (2003). Terror in the name of God: Why religious militants kill. New York: Harper Perennial.

Taylor, M. (1988). The Terrorist. New York: Brassey’s Defense Publishers.

Timmerman, K. R. (2002, December 24). Prime-time hate from Arafat TV. Insight on the News, 19(1), 35-37. Retrieved January 21, 2004, from Regional Business News Database.

Tomar, H. (2003). Martyrdom 1. In Religion, psychology, and violence. Retrieved January 19, 2004, from http://clam.rutgers.edu/~jerryk/ReligionAndPsychology/Martyrdoml.htm.

Vigne, J. (2004, January). The desire for martyrdom--pathology or saintliness? In Indian Wisdom, Modern Psychology and Christianity (4). Retrieved January 19, 2004, from http://membres.lycos.fr/jacquesvigne/english/b1p2ch4.html.

Volkan, V. (2002). September 11 and societal regression. Group Analysis, 35, 456-483.

Von Hippel, K. (2002). The roots of terrorism: Probing the myths. The Political Quarterly, Supplement 1, 73, 25-39.

Walsh, Y. (2001). Deconstructing 'brainwashing' within cults as an aid to counseling 45

psychologists. Counseling Psychology Quarterly, 14(2), 119-128.

Webster's New World Dictionary. (1990). New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc.

Winkates, J. (2006). Suicide terrorism: Martyrdom for organizational objectives. Journal of Third World Studies, 23(1), 87-115.

Yom, S. & Saleh, B. (2004, November) Palestinian suicide bombers: A statistical analysis. Economists for Peace & Security. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from www.epsusa.org.

46

http://www.epsusa.org/

ego strength-frustration tendencies (es-ft): toward a model of predicting militant martyrdom

Documents

psychology of martyrdom

topic of martyrdom

culture of martyrdom

culture of militant

predictors of martyrdom

etiology of militant

causes of militant martyrdom

typologies of martyrdom