ecb policy during the crisis: “food for thoughts” for monetary policy research
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ECB policy during the crisis: “food for thoughts” for monetary policy research. Lucrezia Reichlin London Business School Based on joint work with D. Giannone (ULB), M. Lenza (ECB) and H. Pill (ECB). The CEPR/ESI 14th Annual Conference on - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
ECB policy during the crisis: “food for thoughts” for monetary policy research
Lucrezia ReichlinLondon Business School
Based on joint work with D. Giannone (ULB), M. Lenza (ECB) and H. Pill (ECB)
The CEPR/ESI 14th Annual Conference on ‘How Has Our View of Central Banking Changed with the Recent Financial Crisis?’
Central Bank of Turkey, 28-29 October 2010
Outline
1. The crisis: symptoms and policy response2. Has and how ECB policy worked?3. Some key Issues4. Is there any lesson to learn?
Outline
1. The crisis: symptoms and policy response2. Has and how ECB policy worked?3. Some key issues4. Is there any lesson to learn?
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Euro money market rates and spreads lhs: percent per annum; rhs: basis points
3-month repo ratesecured, lhs
3-month EURIBORunsecured, lhs
spreadrhs
turmoil
Bear Stearns
Lehman
Source: Bloomberg
Symptoms Euro money market rates and spreads lhs: percent per annum; rhs: basis points
Preliminaries
• Failure of Lehman increased perceived counterparty risk.• Adverse selection led to a freezing of the interbank money
market : heterogeneity, ‘red-lining’ of some banks in interbank market
• Banks are unable to refinance positions and maintain flow of loans to the private sector.
• Governments take various actions:– Fiscal stimulus– Support for financial sector (re-capitalisation, guarantees
for bank bonds, etc.)
Diagnosis
Monetary policy response
Standard monetary policy response : lower interest rates
Non standard measures:• Aim at restoring market functioning …• In the money market, replace interbank transactions with
transactions across the central bank balance sheet (i.e. act as an ‘intermediary-of-last-resort’);
• Improve the availability of bank funding, facilitating securitization and improve functioning of covered bond market …
monetary policy and financial stability policies go hand in hand
Monetary Policy Response: non-standard measures
• Various measures which expanded central bank intermediation …
– Liquidity transformation – accept broad range of collateral in fixed rate / full allotment operations;
– Maturity transformation – lengthen maturity of operations out to 1 year (absorbing at the (overnight) deposit facility);
– Facilitate payments – conduct operations with a large set of counterparties;
– Manage information issues – Eurosystem operations are anonymous, no stigma attached.
Key elements: fixed rate tenders with full allotment (FRFA) in monetary
policy operations
Non standard policies led to expansion of ECB balance sheet after Lehman
-- Asset side: expand scope of repo operations -- Liability side: allow increasing recourse to
deposit facilitiesWhile the ECB has not adopted the rhetoric of “quantitative
easing”, it has expanded it balance sheet, increasing reserves on the liabilities side of its balance sheet against (largely) conventional assets (repos) on the asset side
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Eurosystem balance sheet EUR billions
9 August Lehman
Source: ECB
Comparison of central bank balance sheet sizepercent of GDP, June of each year
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The effect was a decrease in spreads: secured-unsecured rates lhs: percent per annum; rhs: basis points
3-month repo ratesecured, lhs
3-month EURIBORunsecured, lhs
spreadrhs
turmoil
Bear Stearns
Lehman
Source: Bloomberg
Excess Liquidity
• As a result of excess liquidity: the overnight money market interest rate (EONIA) moved systematically away from the policy rate (Main Refinancing Operation rate) and fell towards the rate on the deposit facility.
(ECB chose to reabsorb this excess liquidity by having banks with excess cash make recourse to the (remunerated) deposit facility)
• Money market rates at all maturities adjusted downward
Page 13
Impact on overnight interest rate: wedge between policy rate and eonia percent per annum
With FRFA, excess liquidity conditions emerged in the overnight money market, and the EONIA dropped systematically to the deposit facility rate
Source: ECB
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EONIA
MRO rate
rate on deposit facility
marginal lending rate
Emergence of money market
tensions
Failure of Lehman Bros.
Outline
1. The crisis: symptoms and policy response2. Has and how ECB policy worked?3. Some key Issues4. Is there any lesson to learn?
Has it worked? Exercise 1
Lenza, Pill and Reichlin, Economic Policy 2010
• Characterize the effect of the introduction of non-standard measures in terms of its impact on a variety of money market spreads:– Narrowing of the spread between secured and unsecured term rates;– Reduction of market overnight rate relative to the “policy” MRO rate;– Flattening of the money market yield curve through 1-year LTRO.
• Characterize the (partial) macroeconomic impact of non-standard measures as the difference between two counter-factual exercises (conditional forecasts) constructed using a model of the euro area economy, based on different interest rate assumptions
The model
• Developed and evaluated by Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin (2009): establishes and documents ‘stylised facts’ about monetary dynamics in the euro area.
• The model is a Bayesian vector autoregressive model (B-VAR), estimated over the sample period January 1991 to August 2008 using monthly data.
• The model consists of 32 macroeconomic variables:• Macro variables – economic activity (IP); prices (HICP); unemployment;
etc.• Monetary and credit variables – monetary aggregates; sectoral credit
by use / maturity; and• Money market rates and bond yields …
• We avoid the “curse of dimensionality” by using Bayesian shrinkage techniques (see De Mol, Giannone and Reichlin, 2008, Banbura, Giannone and Reichlin, 2010, Giannone, Lenza and Primiceri, 2010 for setting of priors)
Policy scenario (P) with non-standard measures– Euribor 3 and 12 month rates as observed between November 2008
and August 2009– Simulation → EA(L)(Xt…T│ X0…t-1; P)
No Policy scenario (NP) without non-standard measures– Euribor 3m = MRO + [Spread Euribor 3m/MRO 10/2008 level +
[Spread MRO/EONIA from 11/08 to 08/09]– Euribor 12m = MRO + [Spread Euribor 12m/MRO(10/08)] + Flattening
of the yield curve due to non-standard policy– Simulation → EA(L)(Xt…T│ X0…t-1; NP)
Effect of non-standard measuresImpactns = EA(L)(Xt…T│ X0…t-1; P) - EA(L)(Xt…T│ X0…t-1; NP)
Of course, this all assumes model is stable (we come back to that) …
Exercise 1
The macro effects of non-standard measures:
scenariosEuribor Three months
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Policy No Policy
The macro effects of non-standard measures:
scenariosEuribor Twelve months
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Exercise 1 - Resultsimpact of non-standard measures (EA(L)(Xt…T│ X0…t-1; P) - EA(L)(Xt…T│ X0…t-1; NP), percentage points on annual growth rates (excl. unemployment)
Source: Lenza et al, 2010
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Exercise 1 - Resultsimpact of non-standard measures (EA(L)(Xt…T│ X0…t-1; P) - EA(L)(Xt…T│ X0…t-1; NP), percentage points on annual growth rates
Source: Lenza et al, 2010
Loans to non-financial corporationsLoans for house purchase
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Comments on exercise 1
• Not surprisingly effects on real economy consistent with what we know about the effect of monetary policy shocks (Lenza, Giannone and Reichlin, 2009)
• Strong effect on M1 suggests that M1 multiplier did not collapse (see next slides): overnight market preserved with ECB replacing the market (intermediary of last resort)
StocksUS $ billion
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Source: Rasche (1987)
Money multiplierdefined as M1 / currency
M1 multiplier - Now versus ThenThe thirties
StocksEUR billion
Source: ECB BSI data
Money multiplierdefined as Mx / monetary base
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Exercise 2 Same model as exercise 1Giannone , Lenza and Reichlin, 2009• Compare actual path of macroeconomic variables with those of
model forecasts conditional on the observed path of economic activity (as captured in the evolution of the IP series);
• Addresses question: Have the non-standard measures prevented a “breakdown” / disruption to the pre-crisis regularities seen in the data (and, by implication, the behaviour of the economy)?
• Conditional forecasts start in Jan. 1999 (but the model is estimated using sample to August 2008 – now updated to 2010) …
Exercise 2 – Loans to NFC stable - “business as usual”annual growth rates, sa; 87% confidence interval
Source: Lenza et al, 2010; Giannone et al, 2010
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Observed annual growth rates
Exercise 2 – M1 stable - “business as usual”annual growth rates, sa; 87% confidence interval
Source: Lenza et al, 2010; Giannone et al, 2010
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Observed annual growth rates
Exercise 2 – 3-month-euribor stable - “business as usual”
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for house purchase for consumption
Source: Lenza et al, 2010; Giannone et al, 2010
Exercise 2 – some heterogeneity in loansannual growth rates, sa; 68% confidence interval
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Comments on exercise 2
1. Loans to corporate, 3-month euribor and M1 remarkably stable [same message as exercise 1 – this is ``indication’’ that ECB policy worked to some extent]
2. The euribor path is evidence of stability of ECB policy rule
3. Some heterogeneity on loans behaviour
Remarks on the exercise
It is a counterfactual exercise: no clean interpretation in terms of causality
But if you are willing to assume that no large financial shock materialized from 1992 to 2007, this is sort of a natural experiment: we are conditioning on past correlations (no financial crisis) and business conditions observed during the crisis
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What does this say?
• ECB has achieved some results without massive QE and no recourse to zero bound
• Has done so by manipulating spreads and using more than an instrument in a situation of pervasive frictions
• The stated ECB objective has been the preservation of the transmission mechanism – non standard monetary policies have acted as complements to lowering interest rates
• Emphasis on the fact that EA is bank based financial system
Bank versus market centered financial systems percent of total debt financing of corporate sector
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loans debt sec loans debt sec
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Outline
1. The crisis: symptoms and policy response2. Has and how ECB policy worked?3. Some key Issues4. Is there any lesson to learn?
A. The corridor and liquidity policy: has the ECB done the right thing ?
The ECB has used two instruments, policy rate and deposit rate
Why introducing a costly wedge between the money market rate and the “policy rate”?
• this reflects the existence of excess liquidity in aggregate (which drives EONIA towards DF rate) and the desire of the CB not "penalise" banks making recourse to the (perfectly elastic) supply of liquidity at the MRO with FRFA
The right thing to do during normal times
• If itRR = it
P and RR >> md(normal) (the demand by banks for CB liquidity to settle net interbank positions), then arbitrage at the margin will ensure that it
D = itRR (= it
P)
• This is the case in a “well-functioning” money market
• In other words, sufficiently high remunerated RRs can satiate the banks demand for CB liquidity at zero cost to the banks (Friedman rule)
Frozen money market
• Say the money market “freezes”• (In extremis,) banks have to settle all gross
positions in CB money• By implication md(exceptional) >> md(normal) • … and it is possible that md(exceptional) > RR
Frozen money market
• In that case:– with unchanged supply of CB liquidity
itD >> it
RR (= itP )
– with increased / elastic supply of CB liquidity (to re-establish satiation) ms(exceptional) ≥ md(exceptional) > RR
itD < it
RR (= itP)
falls to zero or to rate on deposit facility in a corridor system
Problem 1
• Situation just described mimics the Bagehot rule -- lend freely against good collateral at a penalty rate.
• But is the collateral really "good" and is the penalty sufficiently large to create an incentive to correct underlying structural problems?
• That is what the problem of "dependence" from CB liquidity is about.
• Collateral quality is also a policy variable
Problem 2
• The idea of using the corridor is motivated by banks’ heterogeneity
• Evidence ......
• But if it is the value of the instrument that matters and not the value of the institution, better to use the collateral to discriminate
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Failure of Lehman Bros.15 September 2008
Volume alloted inMain refinancing operation
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The existence of excess liquidity in aggregate (as reflected in recourse to DF) co-exists with individual bank demand for liquidity at MRO, which points to (severe) segmentation given the difference in rates (width of the corridor).
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Failure of Lehman Bros.15 September 2008
Dispersion of individual bank contributions to EURIBOR average mean absolute deviation from fixing, basis points
Problem 3: liquidity and monetary policy
1. Eonia lower than policy rate implies that effective stance is more accommodative than what revealed by MRO
2. Difficult to separate between liquidity and monetary policy objectives [recent: eg euribor/eonia are creeping up now – what is the macroeconomic effect?]
Communication challenge
B. Banks’ funding – some puzzling facts
• In the crisis collapse of saving deposit beyond what explained by business cycle conditions
• This reflects the ``unusually’’ steep yield curve(M3 and yield curve not stable unlike euribor and
M1)• This must have implications for banks’ funding
Source: Lenza et al, 2010; Giannone et al, 2010
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Exercise 2 – Results annual growth rates, sa; 68% confidence interval2006-08 surge of M3 and its collapse in the crisis is not ``business as usual’’ (difference with M1)
Page 47
This is explained by saving deposits (M2-M1 component of M3)
(M3-M1) versus slope of yield curve: stable relation
M3 - M1annual growth rate,
percent, lhs
10yr – 2yrpercentage points,
rhs
Actual (solid line) and Counterfactual (dashed line) interest rates: 3-month and 10-year interest rate
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Comments
• This is different issue of transmission mechanism – long term interest rate stickiness not well understood
• This has implications for banks’ funding over the cycle
• More research needs to be done here
Outline
1. The crisis: symptoms and policy response2. Has and how ECB policy worked?3. Some key Issues4. Is there any lesson to learn?
Wrapping up
• We have seen an experiment of monetary policy in presence of financial frictions
• Main friction is in interbank market• If frictions more than one interest rate matters• CB has more than one interest as tool – therefore can cope
with some financial stability issues but not all• When main friction in money market and financial system is
banked based QE ECB style makes sense and some evidence that it has worked
• However, beyond the short run, need to understand incentives in presence of banks’ heterogeneity and bank funding strategies in relation to term spread behaviour
Extra slides
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Long term
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Normalization and recent tensions