Early Yogācāra and Its Relationship with the Madhyamaka SchoolAuthor(s): Richard KingSource: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Oct., 1994), pp. 659-683Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399757 .Accessed: 03/03/2011 03:32

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EARLY YOGACARA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP

WITH THE MADHYAMAKA SCHOOL

1. Introduction D. T. Suzuki noted as early as 1928 that

Most Buddhist scholars are often too ready to make a sharp distinction between the Madhyamika and the Yogacara, taking the one as exclusively advocating the theory of emptiness (sunyata) while the other is bent single- mindedly on an idealistic interpretation of the universe. They thus further assume that the idea of emptiness is not at all traceable in the Yogacara and that idealism is absent in the Madhyamika. This is not exact as a historical fact.1

As the second important philosophical school to develop in Indian

Mahayana Buddhism, the Yogacara school seems to have developed the distinctive features of its philosophy from a comprehensive analysis of meditative experience (hence the name 'Yogacara'-the "practice of

yoga"). In discussing the philosophical perspective of the Asanga- Vasubandhu school of thought, preference will be given to the doctrinally neutral term 'Yogacara' in opposition to the epithets 'Vijnaptimatrata' and 'Vijnanavada', which are frequently used to designate this school. This reflects the wider denotation of 'Yogacara' and its relative indepen- dence from certain specific theoretical positions. This is particularly im-

portant when dealing with the early stages of a school's philosophical development. It should be noted, however, that the term 'Vijnaptima- trata' (Cognitive-Representation-Only) is preferable to 'Vijnanavada' (the doctrine that "consciousness [alone] exists"), when referring to the litera- ture of the early Yogacara, since the former term (unlike Vijnanavada) is at least used by Maitreyanatha, Asanga, and Vasubandhu. In fact, since the early Yogacarins did not accept the ultimate reality of subjective consciousness (vijinana), the term 'Vijnanavada' is particularly inaccurate. This epithet, nevertheless, may be applicable to the later doctrinal posi- tion of the Dharmapalan lineage of the Yogacara, which, according to Yoshifumi Ueda, upheld the view that the external world was merely a transformation of an ultimately real subjective consciousness (vijinana- parinama).2 As we shall see, however, even the term 'Vijnaptimatrata' may prove inappropriate as a final designation of the Asariga- Vasubandhu school of thought.

The wide scope of the term 'Yogacara' is clear from the fact that it was originally used in India as a general term for the "practice of yoga" (yoga-acara). Thus, the colophon to the Four Hundred Verses (Catuhsa- taka) of the Madhyamika Aryadeva describes the text as 'bodhisattva-

yogacara.' The term seems to have derived its later doctrinal and scholas- tic specificity from the title of Asaiga's major work, the voluminous

Richard King

Lecturer in Indian Religion and Philosophy at the University of Stirling

Philosophy East & West Volume 44, Number 4 October 1994 659-683

? 1994

by University of Hawaii Press

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Stages in the Path of Yoga (Yogacarabhumi). This work, however, far from

being a sectarian exposition of Yogacara ideas, is a large-scale compen- dium of the stages of the Buddhist path, of which only a small part is devoted to the specific interests of the Yogacara school. This is a feature of much of Asanga's literary output, the other great example being his Compendium of the Mahayaina (Mahayanasamgraha). Although the works of Asanga and Vasubandhu do show a marked development of ideas in the delineation and analysis of the yogic path when compared to their Madhyamika predecessors, this should not necessarily be seen as characteristic of an antithetical attitude toward the earlier exposition of

Mahayana philosophy. The specific attribution of the terms 'Yogacara', 'Vijnaptimatrata', or 'Vijnanavada' to the thought of Asanga and Vasu- bandhu should always be used with extreme caution, lest one read back the scholastic controversies of later times into the early stages of

'Yogacara' thought. It is often stated that the first evidence of Yogacara ideas can be

found in the Samdhinirmocana-sutra. This text is of great historical inter-

est, not only because it is a 'crystallization' of a particularly early phase in the development of the Yogacara (in chapters four and eight), but also because of its description of the 'three turnings of the wheel of Dharma' (dharma-cakra). Thus, the suitra declares that

By the first Turning of the Wheel of Doctrine, [Buddha] taught the doctrine of the aryasatya and on its basis the astivada of the Abhidharma has been

developed. This astivada was negated by the Prajnaparamita and there has been established the sunyavada of the Mahayana. The amalgamation of both asti and sunyavada is now done in the Samdhinirmocana, and it is the last and the highest turning of the Wheel of Doctrine.... The ultimate doctrine of the Mahayana is, no doubt, taught in the Prajnafparamita, but its way of exposition is 'with an esoteric meaning', or 'with a hidden intention'.3

Philosophy East & West

The Samdhinirmocana-sutra, then, does not see itself in terms of the establishment of a rival school to the "sunyavadins"; rather it sees itself as the text which 'explicates' the true meaning of emptiness. Thus, VII.3 declares that the sutra's purpose is to establish the doctrine of the

three-own-beings (trisvabhava) in terms of their lack of own-nature (nihsvabhavata).4 This was understood to be a development from rather than a reaction to the philosophy of emptiness propounded in the

Prajniaparamita. The Samdhinirmocana-sutra is also the first Mahayana text to utilize

the notion of a consciousness made up of all the seeds of past karmic fruition (sarvabTjakavijniana). This seed-consciousness soon became one of the distinctive features of the Yogacara school as the concept of

alayavijfnana, the 'store' or 'repository-consciousness' underlying the

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individual's experience of samsara.5 In the literature of the various Abhidharma schools there was already an exhaustive analysis of the five sense-consciousnesses and the mental consciousness (manoviinana) that

provide an awareness of sense objects (visaya). This was a development of the scheme of the eighteen dhatu outlined innumerable times in the Sutta-Pitaka. Thus, we find Asanga arguing that "the alayavijnana is mentioned in the Vehicle of the Hearers (sravaka-yana) through various

synonyms (paryaya)."6 Thus, as far as Asarga was concerned, the seed- consciousness is little more than the application of a nomenclature to an idea already existent in Buddhism from its inception. Asanga maintains that it is not recognized as the store-consciousness in the sravaka-yana because "it is a subtle cognizable (suksmajneya)."7 Asanga's statement is

particularly interesting since it suggests an inclusivist attitude toward the

sravaka-yana. Bearing this in mind, one suspects that Asanga's attitude to the Madhyamaka school is likely to be even more conciliatory. Reading back later Madhyamaka-Yogacara polemics into the works of Asanga is

only likely to misrepresent the continuity between the two scholastic traditions at this early stage in their interaction.

The comprehensive explication of the notion of 'emptiness', as found in the philosophical literature (sastra) of the Madhyamaka school, provides a doctrinal key to unlock the abstruse meanings of the Prajnaparamita sutras. As a Mahayana school, the Yogacara developed as a response to the insights of those same sutras. Under such circumstances, it would have been difficult indeed to have ignored the centrality of the notion of

sunyata to these texts. In fact, the idea that the early classical Yogacara of Asanga and Vasubandhu found any difficulty whatsoever in embracing the basic insights of the Madhyamaka school disregards both the histori- cal and textual evidence, which, on the contrary, displays a spirit of

underlying continuity and acceptance. Both the Madhyamaka and the Yogacara schools accept the validity

of the notions of prat?tyasamutpada, pudgala-nairatmya, and dharma-

nairatmya, the four arya-satyas, the bodhisattva ideal, and sunyata, among many others. With such a level of doctrinal unanimity, the two schools can hardly be said to be in great conflict with one another.

Admittedly both Asarga and Vasubandhu criticize those (Madhyamikas?) who "adhere to non-existence" (nastikas, vainasikas),8 but this is only in their attempts to delineate the true nature of emptiness as the Middle Path between extremes. Nevertheless, one must accept that there appears to have been a significant development in the hermeneutics of the

emptiness doctrine in the Yogacara school. This, as I shall argue in section III of this essay, stems from a fear that the traditional Madhyamaka exposition was in danger of advocating (or at least appearing to advocate) the extreme position of 'nihilism' (ucchedavada). Richard King

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II. The Yogacara Reformulation of the Middle Path One of the most important features of the Yogacara 'reformulation'

of the Middle Path is a marked movement away from the 'negativistic' interpretation of emptiness found in the Madhyamaka school. For Asanga there are two types of extreme and erroneous view:

(1) that one which clings to affirming (samaropata) the existence of what are nonexistent individual characteristics, having essential nature only through verbal designation (prajnapti) for a given thing ... and also (2) that one which, with respect to a given thing (vastu), denies (apavadamano) the foundation for the sign of verbal designation, which exists in an ultimate sense (para- marthasadbhutam) owing to its inexpressible essence (nirabhilapyatmaka- taya) saying "absolutely everything is nonexistent" (sarvena sarvam nastTti).9

Thus, for Asanga, a universal denial (sarva-vainasika) of the "bare given thing" (vastu-matra) is a view which strays from the Buddhist path (Dharma-vinaya).10

Neither reality (tattva) nor [its] designation (prajniapti) would be known when the bare given-thing of form (rupa) and so forth, is denied. Both these views are inappropriate.11

An important point to note is that Asarga here explicitly criticizes the view that denies that there exists a "bare given-thing" (vastu-matra) as the basis for the rupa-skandha.12 Indeed, the Yogacara school seems to have accepted the traditional Sarvastivada division of dharmas into five

categories: mind (citta), mental concomitants (caitasika), form (rupa), compounded factors independent of the mind (citta-viprayukta- samskara-dharmas), and the uncompounded factors (asamskrta).13 This seems to be at variance with the "naive idealism" usually attributed to

Yogacara thought. It should be made clear from the outset then that the

Yogacara school is far more complex in its understanding of the nature of experience than is usually acknowledged.

It must be realized, however, that the abhidharmic taxonomy of the

Yogacara school (usually said to consist of one hundred specific dharmic

types) is only provisional. Such conceptual categories are existent only in a purely conventional and nominal sense (prajnapti-sat). In his Abhidhar-

masamuccaya, for instance, Asanga criticizes the idea that matter (rupa) is a substantial and independent existent.14 Thus,

It is said that a mass of matter (rupasamudaya) is composed of atoms. Here the atom should be understood to be without a physical body (nihsarTra). The atom is determined in the final analysis by the intellect (buddhi), in view of the abandonment of the notion of an aggregate (pindasamjna), and in view of the penetration into the relativity15 of matter as a substance

Philosophy East & West (dravyaparini.pattipravesa).

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This argument was extended further by Asarga's brother Vasubandhu in his Vimsatika16 with an attack upon the realist notion of matter (rupa) as a substance existing independently of the experiencing subject. Whether this is a case of idealism depends to a large extent upon one's under-

standing of the term. Certainly, much of Asanga's work presupposes a distinction between material and immaterial, and external and internal.

Indeed, in the Abhidharmasamuccaya,17 Asarga describes the grasping subject of perceptions (grahaka) as the material sense-organ (rupTndriya), the mind (citta), and the mental factors (caitasika). The inclusion of a gross sense-faculty in the analysis of the subject is hardly what one would

expect from an idealistic analysis. Again, in the same work,18 Asanga makes a distinction between internal and external sensations (adhyatma / bahirdha vedana). Internal sensation is "that which is produced from one's own body (kaya)," while its external counterpart is "that produced by an external body."19 However, in Mahayanasarmgraha 1.22, the notion of an external seed (bahya) is said to be purely conventional (samvrta) while that of an internal seed (adhyatmika) is said to be ultimate

(paramarthika).20 Whether Asarnga is an idealist or not, internal or subjec- tive states (adhyatmika) are given more validity than those based upon external (bahya) stimuli.

Attempts to delineate the thoughts of one school of Indian thought from another in a rigid and clear fashion are, however, fraught with

difficulty. In the sixth century C.E., subsequent to the classical formulations of Nagarjuna, Asanga, and Vasubandhu, academic controversy did occur between the Madhyamaka and Yogacara schools of Mahayana Bud- dhism, but, as Stefan Anacker has noted,

these are really the disagreements of sixth-century followers of Nagarjuna and Vasubandhu. They belong to a time when Buddhism had become an aca- demic subject at places such as the University of Nalanda. They may have disagreed because they were academics fighting for posts and recognition.21

Much of this controversy surrounded the status of the paratantra- svabhava in the Yogacara school. The main figures in this debate were Bhavaviveka, Dharmapala and Sthiramati.22 From the Madhyamaka point of view, those Yogacara texts that asserted the 'existence' of the

paratantra-svabhava were guilty of reification, thus straying into the extreme of eternalism (sasvata-vada). It remains a moot point as to what the Yogacara school actually meant by terms such as 'paratantrastita'. Does the term imply the independent existence (svatantrika) of a realm of mutual dependency (paratantra), or is it a descriptive (but non-ontologi- cal) term referring to the interdependent nature of existence? On the former interpretation, the Yogacarin does indeed seem to be guilty of

reifying the dependency realm itself. On the other hand, the term may simply be an alternative to the Madhyamaka conception of pratTtyasa- Richard King

663

mutpada. One suspects that the ambiguity of the phrase is a reflection of the ambivalence of the Yogacara school itself. Different answers may be given by different members of the school.

It is interesting in this respect to note that various modern scholars have drawn attention to the fact that Dharmapala has given a peculiarly 'idealistic' tone to the Yogacara message, and that to this extent he has

strayed from the original import of Vasubandhu's ideas.23 Thus Janice Willis (1979) notes:

Assessments which claim to characterize the whole of Yogacara thought as

being uniformly "idealistic" take little notice of the fact that historically-and according to the texts themselves-there existed at least two varying streams of Yogacara thought, viz., (1) what may be called an "original" thread pro- pounded by Maitreya, Asanga, Vasubandhu, and Sthiramati; and (2) a "later" thread, which found expression notably through such doctors as Dharmapala and Hsuan-tsang. Both "streams" were introduced into China-the earlier by Paramartha and the later by Hsuan-tsang-and afterwards transmitted also to Japan. Moreover, while there is clear evidence that the later stream of

thought, as expounded by Dharmapala and others is "idealistic" in character, the same cannot and should not be assumed for the earlier "thread," though, in fact, this has generally been the case.24

It was this "idealistic" tendency that was the primary focus of Bhava- viveka's attack upon the 'Vijnanavadins'. Many contemporary scholars have cast doubt upon the interpretation of the Asarga-Vasubandhu phase of Yogacara as a form of idealism.25 Needless to say, it would be rather presumptuous to assume that the differences between Bhavavi- veka and Dharmapala in the sixth century C.E. represent irreconcilable differences between the classical Madhyamaka and Yogacara positions as represented by Nagarjuna on the one hand and Asanga and Vasu- bandhu on the other. In the eighth and ninth centuries of the Common Era we do in fact find a successful synthesis of Madhyamaka and

Yogacara ideas in the work of Jnanagarbha and Santaraksita. One should

note, however, that the two positions are accepted on an unequal footing (Madhyamaka being the ultimate truth). This might be taken to suggest that the two schools are to some degree incommensurable. Yet again the

possibility remains that later developments and interpretations of the two schools differ from the early formulations of the "founding fathers" of each school. Let us turn, therefore, to the early Yogacara conception of

sunyata in order to discern if it is appreciably different from its earlier

Madhyamika counterpart.

III. Search for a Substratum-Redefining Sunyata in the Yogacara The classical Yogacara explication of emptiness is found at the very

Philosophy East & West beginning of the Madhyantavibhaga:

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There exists the imagination of the unreal, there is no duality, but there is emptiness, even in this there is that.26

Vasubandhu explains in his commentary that the imagination of the unreal (abhuta-parikalpa) is the discrimination between the duality of grasped and grasper. Emptiness is explained as "the imagination of the unreal that is lacking in the form of being graspable or grasper." Thus, for the Yogacarin, sunyata is primarily the emptiness of grasper (i.e., subject) and grasped (i.e., object) (grahaka-grahya). Since our entire range of

experiences is characterized by a dichotomy between subject and object (with the possible exception of some higher states of samadhi), this amounts to a universal application of 'emptiness' (sunyata). However, the

Yogacarin stresses that the range of 'fictive' perceptions that does occur, although not corresponding to an independently existing world of sub-

jects and objects, nevertheless does occur. This particular emphasis in the use of the notion of emptiness is a specific feature of the Yogacara explanation of the term, since even in emptiness there is an 'existent' (viz. the abhutaparikalpa), which nevertheless persists as such.

In this respect it might be argued that the Yogacara explication of sunyata is more in line with the commonsense usage of 'empty'. Garma Chang states:

It is believed that sunya was originally derived from the root svi, "to swell," and sunya implies "relating to the swollen." As the proverb says "A swollen head is an empty head," so something which looks swollen or inflated outside is usually hollow or empty inside. Sunyata suggests therefore that although things in the phenomenal world appear to be real and substantial outside, they are actually tenuous and empty within.27

It is interesting, however, to note that prima facie there is nothing in this brief description of emptiness that would greatly trouble a Madhya- mika Buddhist. One could argue that in defining emptiness in this way, the Yogacarins are actually 'tidying up' the earlier work of the Madhya- maka school. This view is not an unattractive one, and one suspects that throughout its long and varied history many Buddhists have understood the Yogacara analysis as such. It is also a view that appears to be gaining increasing support from modern Western scholarship.28

However, the rather knotty problem of the status of the emptied 'entity' is one that has caused some controversy in Mahayana scholastic circles. The Yogacarins continually maintained that that there was some- thing actually given in experience, namely a nonobjective (and hence illusory?) perception, while the Madhyamikas responded by denying that 'existence' could be predicated of such an imaginary 'entity'. Whether this amounts to little more than a quibble over the appropriate use of linguistic conventions is a moot point that perhaps needs further consideration. Richard King

665

For the Yogacarin the interdependent flow of dharmas is such that

they are empty in the same way that a container is said to be empty. There is no wine in an empty glass, but there is nevertheless still a glass. There may be no substantiality to our perceptions but they are neverthe- less still there.29 Kochumottom's translation of Vasubandhu's commen-

tary on Madhyanta-Vibhaga 1.1 draws our attention to what might be called the 'container' conception of emptiness:

Thus, when something is absent [in a receptacle], then one, seeing that [receptacle] as devoid of that thing, perceives that [receptacle] as it is, and recognises that [receptacle], which is left over, as it is, namely as something truly existing there.30 (My parentheses)

Again, if we examine Asanga's explication of sunyata, we find a similar

understanding of its appropriateness:

Emptiness is logical when one thing is devoid of another because of that [other's] absence and because of the presence of the empty thing itself.31

Asanga continues,

Wherever and in whatever place something is not, one rightly observes that [place] to be void of that [thing]. Moreover, whatever remains in that place one knows (prajanati) as it really is, that "here there is an existent." This is said to be engagement with emptiness as it really is and without way- wardness.... Without that wayward view, he neither affirms nor denies the

given thing.... Not otherwise would he rid himself of the object of conscious- ness (alambana) and dwell with equanimity.32

All other interpretations are described by Asanga as "emptiness wrongly grasped" (durgrhJta sunyatety). (Interestingly this is the same term that Nagarjuna uses in his Madhyamaka-karika when criticizing those who take sunyata to be a view.)33 Thus, for Asanga the designation 'empty' (sunya) is only predicable of an existent thing, since "emptiness is only logical if something exists."34 Again we find Madhyanta-vibhaga 1.13 declaring that

The nonexistence of duality is indeed the existence of nonexistence; this is the definition of emptiness. It is neither existence, nor nonexistence, neither different nor identical.35

The 'existence of nonexistence' turns out to be the specific definition of sunyata found throughout the early Yogacara literature. In the Abhid-

harmasamuccaya, Asanga states that emptiness is "the non-existence of the self, and the existence of the no-self."36 In fact, within this text Asanga espouses a conception of the Middle Path based upon the Mahayana notion of the other-dependent nature (paratantra //pratityasamutpanna)

Philosophy East & West of all dharmas:

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The real meaning of pratTtyasamutpada is the fact that there is no creator (nihkartrkartha), the fact of causality (sahetukartha), the fact that there is no

being (nihsatvartha), the fact of dependence (paratantrartha), the fact that there is no mover (nirlhartha), the fact of impermanence (anityartha), the fact that all is momentary (ksanikartha), the fact that there is an uninterrupted continuity of cause and effect (hetuphalaprabhandhanupacchedartha), the fact that there is a conformity between cause and effect (anurupahetupha- lartha), the fact of the variety of causes and effects (vicitrahetuphalartha), and the fact of the regularity of cause and effect (pratiniyatahetuphalartha).

Moreover, dependent origination is momentary, but one can also find

stability within it. Dependent origination consists of nonmoving conditions, but these conditions are also functional (samarthapratyaya); dependent origi- nation does not admit of a being (nihsatva), but it can also be understood in terms of a being. Dependent origination does not admit of a creator, but there is an uninterrupted flow of actions and their results. It does not arise from itself, nor from another, nor from both. It is produced neither from its own action nor from the action of another, nor is it without cause (ahetu).37

Pratityasamutpada is to be understood in terms of a realm of causally efficient but existentially dependent (paratantra) occurrences (dharmas). For an explanation of the causal process in terms of the paratantra- laksana, we need look no further than Asanga's own Mahayanasamgraha.

If the dependent nature is representation-only (vijniaptimatra), the support of the manifestation of objects (arthabhasasraya), why is it dependent and why is it so called? Because it arises from its own trace-seeds (vasana-bTja), it is dependent upon conditions. Because, after its birth, it is incapable of sub- sisting by itself for a single instant, it is called 'the dependent'.38

In this work we see a new gloss put upon the traditional Madhyamaka explanation of the dependently arisen as that which arises dependent upon trace-seeds (vasana-bNja). Nevertheless, there is still a characteristi-

cally Madhyamaka refusal to use the dualistic language of 'existence' and 'nonexistence'. No dharma has an independent self, being dependent (paratantra) upon all other dharmas for its existence. Thus, a dharma "exists" only insofar as it participates in the causal network of interdepen- dent dharmas. As the Abhidharma had pointed out, no dharma has

independent existence, since it occurs as the result of a long and complex chain of interdependent factors (dharmas), which themselves are pro- duced in dependence upon other conditions. Thus, a dharma is 'empty of itself but not of another'. Dharmas, then, are in one sense existent (bhava), but not in the everyday sense of being a definable and indepen- dent "entity" or "object."

Dharmas are not existent (bhava) in the everyday sense of the term, since they are not distinguishable and separate 'entities'; they have no

independent self in their constructed nature (parikalpita). Nevertheless, dharmas are not totally nonexistent (abhava), either, since they are by Richard King

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Philosophy East & West

definition (svalaksana) factors (dharmas) of experience; that is, they are

cognizables. Nevertheless, dharmas are not as they appear to unen-

lightened minds. They are not 'objects' in that they do not possess the existential substantiality required in order to be "existent" (viz. that they are persistent and independent "entities" distinguishable from one an- other and definable in terms of a name or designation, prajnapti). Thus, we find in the Yogacara, as in the Madhyamaka school, a pointed refusal to become involved in an ontological debate.

It is interesting that this type of analysis is something of a bridge- building exercise between what might be seen as an undue emphasis upon negative language (via negativa) in the exposition of emptiness by (some?) Madhyamikas on the one hand, and the overarching realism (via

positiva) of the Abhidharma schools on the other hand. As such the

Yogacara movement can be seen as a "re-forming" of the Middle Path. This is not to say that such a reformation is necessarily out of step with the understanding of sunyataas systematized in the sastras of Nagarjuna (who is clearly neither a nihilist nor a realist in the accepted senses of the

terms), but merely that, in its emphasis upon the 'given' of meditative and so-called 'normative' perception, the Yogacara aim is to establish the

appropriate parameters of linguistic usage and a rigorous logic for the establishment of the Mahayana position on experientially verifiable

grounds. Another predominant feature of the early Yogacara exposition of the

Middle Path is the explanation of the selflessness of dharmas (dharma-

nairatmya) in terms of an "ineffable intrinsic nature" (nirabhilapya svab- havata). All of these technical phrases are attempts to establish a concise definition of emptiness that would clearly distinguish it from an extreme and nihilistic interpretation. It is here that we encounter the major prob- lem in explicating sunyata, one which I believe was an important factor in the early Yogacara attempts to reexplain this fundamental Mahayana concept.

The nihilistic interpretation of emptiness is the view that if all is

empty then it does not really exist. Avoiding this conclusion without at the same time reifying what one declares to be empty of intrinsic nature (svabhava) has proved to be the major preoccupation of

Madhyamika scholasts. The problem, however, may prove to be insur- mountable within the realms of conventional language. The nihilistic

interpretation of emptiness can only be avoided by emphasizing the redeemed (or "deobjectified") status of the 'given' (vastu) in perception. It is clear that such an endeavor is bound to lead the careless thinker toward the opposing extreme of eternalism. The Mahayana 'Middle Path' is indeed a thin tightrope on which to balance. Let us consider this

problem more fully in an attempt to clarify the relationship between the

Madhyamaka and the early Yogacara.

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IV. The Problem of Nihilism (Ucchedavada) in the Madhyamaka As we have seen, the early formulations of 'classical Yogacara', as

found in the works of Asanga and Vasubandhu, place a specific emphasis upon what might be called 'the container conception of emptiness'. This is the declaration that for x to be empty, x must exist in some form or other. This is a clear attempt to secure the Mahayana conception of

sunyata firmly on the rails of the Middle Path, and resist the entrapments of an encroaching nihilism. Such a tendency is also found in the renewed efforts to establish some form of quasi-substantial basis to the ap- pearance of the world. Thus, Mahayana-sa.mgraha 11.2 says that the

paratantra-laksana is 'the locus for the manifestation (abhasasraya) of nonexistent (asat) and illusory objects (bhranta-artha)'. Alayavijnana is described as the 'locus of the knowable ( jneyasraya)'.39

The appeal to a substratum ushers in a movement away from main- stream Indian Madhyamaka, which explained the origination of the world in terms of a dynamic process of fluctuating and interdependently arisen

(pratTtyasamutpanna) dharmas. Both the Abhidharma and Madhyamaka perspectives are based upon the 'deconstruction' of conventionally pos- tulated entities (prajinapti/samvrti-sat) such as tables, chairs, and persons (pudgala) into momentary 'events' (dharma). The Abhidharmic schools

developed a highly complex understanding of the causal process; no

single entity or dharma was the product of a single cause but rather was the end result of a multiplicity of causal factors contributing to its mani- festation on a number of different levels.

Of course, the various schools of Indian Buddhism had widely differ-

ing conceptions of the nature of causality-ranging from the momentari- ness theories of the Sarvastivadins to the denial of 'substance-causality' as found in the Madhyamaka. All the schools, however, were unanimous in focusing upon the notion of dependent co-origination (pratftyasa- mutpada) as the central conception for explaining the phenomenon of

change. The fact that all dharmas arise interdependently was subse-

quently turned on its head by the Madhyamaka school, which declared that dependent origination was no origination at all (anutpada). This is because a conditioned and evanescent 'entity' could not be said to exist, since (from a Madhyamaka perspective at least) 'to exist' means to exist

absolutely. Thus, if there is no entity that originates, then the concept of

origination itself becomes devoid of meaning. Nevertheless, all schools

agreed upon the centrality of pratTtyasamutpada even if they did not

agree upon its precise implications. The importance of the dependent co-origination scheme lies in the fact that it does not require the exis- tence of some ultimate support, over and above that which arises inter-

dependently, to account for that origination itself. The appeal to a substratum shows a dissatisfaction in the early

Yogacara literature with the efficacy of the Madhyamaka explanation of Richard King

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Philosophy East & West

the origination of the world. The problem, of course, was brought about

by the Madhyamaka's insistence that dependent origination is no origina- tion at all (pratTtyasamutpada = anutpada). What the Madhyamaka means by this, of course, is not to deny the origination of entities, which remains within the scope of conventional existence (samvrti-sat), but

merely to point out the inappropriateness of such conceptions as origina- tion (utpada) of inherently existing entities on an ultimate level (para- martha). In fact, for the Madhyamaka school the conventional arising and cessation of entities is only possible because they are essentially empty. "For emptiness everything goes, for nonemptiness nothing is possible."40

However, if x is empty and thus ultimately does not inherently exist, then surely it cannot exist conventionally either. This, put rather sim-

plistically, is the import of the Yogacara attack upon the "universal

emptiness" of (at least) some Madhyamikas. To be fair to the Madhya- maka, such criticism is largely irrelevant and misrepresents the school's basic position. Emptiness is not a declaration of universal nonexistence or nihilism, but is rather a further explication of the doctrine of dependent co-origination. A denial of the emptiness of entities makes it impossible to assign any change to their intrinsic natures (svabhava); it is only if

something is empty that it can originate, subsist, decay, and cease to exist. But, as the Madhyamika is quick to point out, the origination of an

empty entity is not what we would normally consider origination at all! It is interesting to note, then, that the only way in which the

Madhyamika can make his critic understand the meaning of emptiness is to lay stress upon the fact that in the debate over change ("Becoming") vs. entity ("Being"), the Madhyamika comes down firmly on the side of the givenness of change and impermanence, and consequently 'desub- stantializes' (or deconstructs) the notion of a 'nonempty entity'.41 This is not to deny the givenness of the entity (i.e., its 'experiential facticity'), but rather to deny its reality as an inherently existing entity. In other words, it is a denial of the 'entityness' of that entity. The entity remains as such

(tathata, that is, as an empty entity), devoid (sunya) of its 'own intrinsic nature' (svabhava).

The attempt to differentiate the Madhyamaka conception of sunyata from nihilism is liable to mislead insofar as it comes dangerously close to

reifying the empty entity by making such statements as "the entity remains as such." This statement is necessary, however, for the Madhya- mika to make the point that his is not a blanket denial of everything. Thus, in attempting to differentiate emptiness (sunyata) from nihilism (uccheda- vada), one is inevitably forced to refer to that entity, having already denied its own self-existence, by declaring that it is empty. The very explication of emptiness in conventional language, therefore, leads to

apparent contradiction (whether the Madhyamaka position does in fact lead to paradox is a moot point since some Buddhist schools, notably the

670

Tibetan dGe lugs pa, suggest logical resolutions of such problems via the doctrine of the two levels of truth). The very act of referring to an entity necessitates its self-identity or self-referentiality; that is to say, in order to refer to the entity that has just been declared to be empty, one must refer to it as an 'it' (as an 'entity'), and as such one is immediately guilty of reification. Self-identity being denied, one cannot help but refer to the

emptied entity in an attempt to explain the nature of its emptiness. Necessarily this involves an implicit affirmation of that (empty) entity's self-identity. The problem appears insurmountable and reflects why the best answer from the Madhyamaka perspective is often said to be the

profound silence that 'roars like a lion'. The problem with any attempts to explain the internal dynamics of

the emptiness doctrine is that they become embroiled in problems of

ineffability and the limitations of language. This has led to three common

misinterpretations of the Madhyamaka position. Firstly there is the view that Madhyamaka doctrine is little more than self-contradictory non- sense. Secondly, one might argue that it is a form of unabated nihilism, or thirdly that it is the reification of an ultimate entity (i.e., a form of absolutism). That such misinterpretations occur is inevitable for as long as one fails to grasp the point of the Madhyamaka explanation-namely, that an entity 'exists' only insofar as it is empty of its own essence (nihsvabhava).

The self-contradictoriness of 'unyata is a frequent criticism of the

Madhyamaka school that is upheld, in the main, by the various non- Buddhist schools of philosophy. Sankara's attitude to the Madhyamaka school seems to have amounted to no more than a contemptuous dismissal.42 The second interpretation of the Madhyamaka position, that it is a form of nihilism, is a frequent cry of later Yogacarins (e.g., Dharmapala).43 The reification of an ultimate entity ('Emptiness' with a

capital 'E') is the mark of the absolutistic interpretation of Madhyamaka.44 All three interpretations miss the point of the Madhyamaka enterprise, which is not surprising since, to a large extent, to grasp fully the

Madhyamaka conception of emptiness is tantamount to a conversion to its own position, since the concept is fundamental to the basic para- digmatic orientation of the school. Dharmas arise interdependently; that is to say, they have no independent basis-no substantiality. However, they are not completely nonexistent. Because of the Madhyamaka's radically "deconstructive" nature, one cannot accept its arguments un- less one accepts that it has reduced all opposing arguments to absurdity!

The Madhyamaka position is likely to seem peculiarly at odds with itself for as long as the Madhyamaka's central premise is not accepted- that premise being that the emptiness of own-being (sunyata-svabhava) is neither a denial of the object (being just a denial of its own-being) nor an assertion of its existence (existence presupposing own-being). Richard King

671

Nagarjuna makes it clear on many occasions that the terms 'emptiness' (sunyataD and 'dependent co-origination' (pratTtyasamutpada) while hav-

ing the same meaning (ekartha), strike a middle path between all dog- mas.45 As such they are designations or pointers (prajnfapti), and as the

Mahayana saying suggests, 'the finger that points at the moon is not the moon!'

Emptiness was proclaimed by the Conquerors as the relinquishing of all views, but those for whom there is a view of 'emptiness' are declared to be incurable.46

This view is supported by Nagarjuna's pupil Aryadeva, who argues in Catuhsataka XVI.25 that

No criticism can be leveled against someone who does not hold a thesis, be it [about] existence, non-existence, or [both] existence and non-existence, even if [you try] for a long time.47

V. Soteriology as the Focus of the Dispute between the Schools Buddhism has always been primarily interested in the attainment of

salvation and freedom from suffering, and one of the main problems of the post-Madhyamika thinkers was that of explaining and arguing for the existence of suffering given that everything was empty (sunya). It would

appear from the ideas and arguments of the developing Yogacara school that the Madhyamaka understanding of emptiness was seen by some to subvert the possibility of suffering. Nagarjuna argues that it is only be- cause things are empty that change, impermanence, and suffering can occur. Consequently, without emptiness not only could the world of

change never have occurred but there could also have been no way out of it.48 Change can only occur because dharmas are not absolute.

Having not dependently arisen, how will there be suffering? It has been said that suffering is impermanent. Thus, it is not self-existent.49

However, it would appear that many Yogacarins believed that an

unqualified and universal declaration of emptiness subverted the reality of suffering in samsara and so was in danger of subverting the very basis of the Buddhist tradition, namely the Four Noble Truths. This concern

clearly predates the Yogacara and is expressed by Nagarjuna himself at the beginning of the chapter on the Four Noble Truths in his

Madhyamaka-karika. Nagarjuna's response, however, does not appear to have been sufficient for the early Yogacarins, since a concerted effort is made to further distinguish emptiness from the extreme of nihilism.

According to the Yogacara formulation of the Middle Path, dharmas are empty of the prapanica-based constructions (parikalpita) of discursive

thought, but are not empty insofar as they do exist in some form. The

Philosophy East & West Madhyamaka of course did not deny that dharmas exist in some form; it

672

merely rejected their true or ultimate status as inherently existing entities. For the Yogacarin the perception itself really existed, though devoid of the reificatory notions of grasper and grasped (subject and object). What, then, was the status of these perceptions? The Yogacara response was to

say that they were like dreams and illusions. But how could something be said to exist and yet also be an illusion? The problem here is that these

Mahayana schools are involved in a debate which, even on their own

premises, is in the realm of strict ineffability. Conventional language just cannot do the work required of it because of the inevitable tendency for the unenlightened listener to reify its referents. As we have seen, it is

possible to argue that the Yogacara definition of emptiness as "the existence of nonexistence" is merely an example of 'word-play' in an

attempt to clarify the Madhyamaka conception of emptiness. While it seems possible that some Yogacarins understood the definition in this

manner, it is also possible that the 'search for a substratum' evident within many Yogacara texts is strongly suggestive of a shift in paradigm.

The search for a substratum to explain the origination of the world of duhkha was felt to be both unnecessary and fallacious by the

Madhyamikas. For Nagarjuna all such attempts to find a ground of exis- tence lead to absolutism in that they postulate a permanent (and thus absolute) entity. In this way the author of the Madhyamaka-karika steered clear of all explanations of the world based upon an ontological distinction between appearance and reality. The reason for this is that such endeavors are dangerously close to subverting the Middle Path in their acceptance of some form of absolute reality supporting and tran-

scending phenomenal (that is 'dharmic') manifestation. For Nagarjuna such a conception of the world process contradicts the fundamental

principle of dharma-nairatmya. 'Appearance' or manifestation is only possible because all dharmas are empty of an intrinsic nature. If there was

any dharma that possessed such an essence (svabhava), then it could never be subject to change or dissolution. Clearly such a conclusion was

unacceptable to Nagarjuna. Thus, one should relinquish all belief in

inherently existing entities. However, outside the Madhyamaka school this explanation seems

either to have been misunderstood (hence the frequent cries of 'uccheda- vada') or, at best, was felt to be inadequate. The movement toward a more substrative model of reality can be seen in new ways of formulating the meaning of emptiness in the literature of the early Yogacara school. For instance, in commenting on the Madhyanta-vibhaga's statement that defilements are adventitious (klesasya agantukatvatah, 1.23), Vasubandhu makes the following points: "[The purity of emptiness is established] by shaking off the adventitious defilements. However, this is not a change in own-nature."50 Emptiness, then, is "neither defiled nor pure by its very nature."51 What is one to make of the reference to the 'nature of empti- Richard King

673

ness'? Is the phrase to be understood in the traditional Madhyamaka sense to mean that the inherent nature of things is their lack of an inherent nature, or is there a postulation of some form of svabhava here that would not be consonant with the Madhyamaka tradition? Further- more, one can also find references in the work of Asanga to the "ineffable inherent-nature" (nirabhilapya svabhavata) of dharmas. Thus we find

Asanga arguing in the Bodhisattva-bhumi that the Buddhas and bodhisattvas

[H]aving penetrated the non-self of dharmas (dharma-nairatmya), and having realized, because of that pure understanding, the inexpressible nature (nir- abhilapya svabhavata) of all dharmas, know the sameness (sama) of the essential nature of verbal designation (prajnaptivada) and the nondiscursive knowledge (nirvikalpajnieya). That is the supreme Suchness (tathata).52

The movement away from an emphasis upon the lack-of-essential- nature (nihsvabhavata) of dharmas to their 'ineffable-essential-nature'

may be interpreted as a subtle introduction of 'essentialism' (svabhavata- vada) into the Mahayana tradition at a time when the 'nihilism' of the

Madhyamaka position may have been seen to be too 'extreme' and

uncompromisingly negative in its exposition.

VI. Doctrinal Ambivalence in the Early Yogacara The remarkable fact about the early formulations of classical

Yogacara, as established in the texts of Asanga and Vasubandhu, is their hermeneutical 'open-endedness'. It is possible to understand these works as attempts to express and reformulate the Madhyamaka message. Alter-

natively, they may be seen as reactions to the 'nihilism' of the Madhya- maka school. In the former case the ineffable own-nature (nirabhilapya svabhavata) of dharmas is an attempt to explain that their emptiness transcends the categories of 'being' (bhava) and 'nonbeing' (abhava). As such, their 'own-nature' (svabhava) is merely their common quality of

'lacking an own-nature' (nihsvabhavata). However, ineffability may also refer to the fact that there is some positive sense in which own-nature (svabhava) can be found in dharmas. In this case we have a quasi- substantialist position, dharmas being real in some ultimate sense if not in any linguistically expressible sense. If the latter were the correct inter-

pretation, then we would have pinpointed a clear difference of opinion between Asanga and Vasubandhu on the one hand and the Madhyami- kas on the other. Whatever the allegiance of the earliest Yogacarins as the school developed, it did eventually develop its own distinctive under-

standing of emptiness pace Madhyamaka. The appeal to a substratum is a clear example of the Yogacara attempt to distinguish the Mahayana

Philosophy East & West idea of emptiness from a nihilistic interpretation.

674

In the light of the problem of explicating the notion of emptiness, we are now in a position to reevaluate the import of the Yogacara's particular formulation of the doctrine. The attempt to qualify the emptiness of an

entity as allowing for the pure given-ness (vastumatra) of that entity clearly constitutes an attempt by the early Yogacarins to differentiate

emptiness from nihilism. The question of the relationship between the

Madhyamaka and the early classical formulations of Asanga and Vasu-

bandhu, however, remains a moot point. It could be argued that Asanrga conceived of emptiness along broadly Madhyamaka lines, and that his own formulations of the doctrine are merely developing the Madhya- maka position by emphasizing what I have called the "experiential facticity" of objects (i.e., the "given-ness" of experience). This provides a

characteristically Yogacara emphasis on experience without necessitat-

ing a break with the Madhyamaka tradition on this issue.

Attempts to differentiate emptiness from nihilism, however, inevita-

bly lead to the assertion of the reality of the emptied thing and as such can lead to the reification of that empty entity. The extent to which

Asanga took his own formulation of sunyata to be fundamentally differ- ent from those of his predecessors largely depends on the extent to which he takes his own use of language seriously. Thus, on the one hand, Asarnga may be defending Madhyamaka from a nihilistic interpretation by attempting to distinguish it from a blanket denial of everything, while on the other hand he may have been attacking the Madhyamikas for their encroaching nihilism. If the latter is in fact the case, then Asanga took his own statements concerning the given-ness of the entity at face

value, and from the Madhyamaka point of view was indeed guilty of reification. From this it would be clear that there is a different conception of emptiness at work in the treatises of the early Yogacarins. Both

interpretations of Asanga's position are possible. Determining which of these is correct may prove particularly problematic since the very paradoxicality of explaining emptiness in (reifying) language points to its

inexpressibility. Any defense of emptiness against the charge of nihilism is always

likely to result in the possibility of reification insofar as reference to the given-ness of the entity is taken literally, that is, not purged of its

ontological implications. This is an unfortunate consequence of the prob- lems inherent in the self-referential nature of language. Thus, on the one hand Asanga may be rescuing the Madhyamaka position from fallacious nihilistic interpretations, or alternatively he may be criticizing the Mad-

hyamaka school. This hermeneutical problem is complex, and any resolu- tion of it would necessitate not only an examination of Asanga's own

conception of emptiness, but also a consideration of his attitudes toward his Madhyamaka predecessors. Examining the latter proves particularly Richard King

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difficult since Asanga wrote in an era before Madhyamaka-Yogacara polemics arose, and his position vis-a-vis that question is thus not alto-

gether clear. The question of Asanga's relationship to the Madhyamaka school is far from easily settled.

If the early Yogacara movement was formulated as a reaction to rather than a reform of mainstream Madhyamaka, Asanga and his suc- cessors have some difficulties in overcoming the Madhyamaka critique of their position. For how can the other-dependent (paratantra) realm be said to 'exist' in some form without risking ontological attribution? As

Nagarjuna argues, if there is no independent "self" there can be no "other" to be dependent upon since "other nature" (parabhava) is the "self-nature" (svabhava) of an 'other' (MKXV.3). Bhavaviveka picks up on this argument in his disputations with the vijnanavadins, pointing to the

absurdity of asserting that an illusion exists (vijniapti // bhranti-matra).53 Paul Williams puts the point very succinctly when he notes that

The vijinanavada difficulty stems from reference to an entity at the same time as maintaining its ineffability, and reflects a failure to transcend the Madhya- maka progression from conditional occurrence to nihsvabhavata and thence to no occurrence at all. Nevertheless, the fact that the Madhyamaka position seems paradoxical cannot be doubted, the interesting point being that for the

Madhyamaka the vijnanavada position was paradoxical and vice versa. Mu- tual incomprehensibiliy and paradoxically due to shifting structural presuppo- sitions was common to Indian philosophy.54

One suspects that the developing Yogacara school felt uneasy about the Madhyamaka equation of pratTtyasamutpada with anutpada. Never-

theless, in the early Yogacara literature one can even find references to the renunciation of vijnfaptimatrata, usually taken to be the definitive

concept of the Yogacara school. In the Mahayanasamgraha, for instance,

Asanga explicitly states that representation-only (vijnfapti-matra) is to be relinquished once one has transcended dichotomizing-consciousness (vijnana) and the duality of subject and object.

Thus, upon investigating the 'mental chatter' (manojalpa) which appears as an object, the bodhisattva enters the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhava). Upon entering representation-only (vijnaptimatra), he enters the dependent nature. How then does he enter the perfected nature (parinispanna- svabhava)? He enters it upon rejecting altogether the notion of

representation-only (vijnaptimatrasa.mjiia). Thus, for the bodhisattva who has

destroyed the notion of an object (arthasamjnia), the mental chatter resulting from the impression of the heard Dharma does not have the capability to arise with the appearance of an object and, consequently, does not arise

anymore as representation-only. When the bodhisattva resides in the "name-

Philosophy East & West without concept" with regard to all objects (sarvarthesunirvikalpakanama),

676

when he resides through yogic perception (pratyak.ayogena) in the dharmad- hatu, then he possesses nirvikalpajinana, in which the objective-support (alambana) and the supported-consciousness are totally identified. It is then that the bodhisattva has entered the perfected nature.55

This supramundane (lokottara) knowledge corresponds to the final

stage of enlightenment outlined by Asanga and Vasubandhu where even the notion of representation (vijnfapti) is relinquished. For how can you talk of representation in the absence of an object that is being repre- sented? Thus, Vasubandhu declares in Trisvabhava-nirdesa 36 that

Through the perception that there is mind-only (citta-matra), there arises the

nonperception of knowable things. Through the nonperception of knowable

things, there arises the nonperception of mind also.56

Taken at face value, these statements suggest that there remains considerable room for debate as to the precise relationship between the doctrinal positions of the early Yogacara and the Madhyamaka schools. It is also not clear that the early Yogacara philosophy is straightforwardly "idealistic" since there appears to be the acknowledgment at times that at the highest levels of attainment both citta and vijinapti-matra are to be transcended. One suspects that the early Yogacara of Asanga and Vasubandhu, as laid down in such texts as the Bodhisattva-bhumi and the Trisvabhavanirdesa, represents a philosophical school in transition.57

NOTES

1 - Suzuki 1928, p. 255. Quoted in Willis 1979, p. 21, and Harris 1991, p. 68.

2 - Ueda 1967, pp. 155-165.

3 - Samdhinirmocana-sutra VII.30. See Lamotte 1935, pp. 85 ff.

4 - Ibid., pp. 67, 193.

5 - Asanga evidently thought that the alayavijnana was so important that he devoted the introduotory section of his Mahayanasamgraha to an examination of its meaning.

6 - Mahayanasa.mgraha 1.11.

7 -Ibid., 1.10.

8 - For example, see Willis' translation of the Tattvartha chapter of the

Stages of the Bodhisattva Path (Bodhisattva-bhuimi), in Willis 1979, pp. 106, 109, etc. Richard King

677

9 - Willis' translation, ibid., p. 106.

10 - See ibid., p. 106, and Wogihara's (1930-1936) edition of the Bodhi-

sattvabhumi, p. 45.

11 - Willis 1979, p. 109, and Wogihara 1930-1936, pp. 45-46.

12 - Willis 1979, p. 21.

13 - Compare this with the statement made by Yasomitra in his Abhid-

harmakosabhasyavyakhya 1.16: upalabdhivastumatragrahanam /

vedanadayastucaitasa visesagrahanarupah / "[The six conscious- nesses (vijinana)] apprehend, grasping only the given-thing. How-

ever, it is the mental concomitants of sensation that, grasping, specify the form (rupa)." Williams (1980), p. 15, says that "the distinc- tion between vijnana- and samjinaskandhas largely marks the dif- ference between apprehending a composite thing and becoming consciously aware of the state of affairs marked by that thing." Compare this also to the nineteenth-century British idealism of Francis H. Bradley, where reality is experience or pure apprehension (before the intervention of concepts).

14 - Rahula 1971, p. 66.

15 - 'A-parinispatti, literally 'not-absolute' or 'not-fulfilled'. Rahula trans- lates it as 'non-realite'.

16 - Thus, Vimsatika, vv. 11-14, criticizes 'atomic realism' on the

grounds that the idea that the sense objects that one apprehends are made up of atoms is not demonstrable on purely experiential (i.e., phenomenological) grounds. Simply speaking, it contradicts the

given-ness of perception. The concept of a unique and indivisible atom (paramanu) is also rejected, as such an entity would have no facets with which to connect to other atoms. Thus v. 12 states that "One atom simultaneously conjoined with six other atoms must have six facets. Yet, if they are said to occupy the same space, [being the smallest occupier of space possible], then their aggregate would be no more than a single atom" (satkena yugapadyogatparaman- ohsada.msata, sannam samanadesatvat pindah syad anumatrakah).

17 - Rahula 1971, p. 32.

18 - Ibid., p. 118.

19 - Interestingly, Asanga also makes room for a third category of sensa-

tion, that which is both internal and external. This latter sensation is

produced by the interaction of the external sense-spheres (bahyaya- tana), which are the support of the sense-organs (indriyadhisthana), and the 'spheres of internal form' (adhyatmikani rupmny ayatanani),

Philosophy East & West which constitute the 'internal body' (adhyatmakaya).

678

20 - Lamotte 1938, vol. 2, pp. 39-40.

21 - Anacker 1984, p. 3.

22 - See Kajiyama 1969, pp. 193-203. See also Hirabayashi and leda 1977, pp. 341-360, and leda 1980.

23 - See Ueda 1967, pp. 155-165, for a brief but definitive examination of the differences between Paramartha and Dharmapala in their

exegesis of Vasubandhu's works. See also Walpole Rahula 1972, pp. 324-330.

24 - Willis 1979, p. 21.

25 - See for instance, Wayman 1965, passim; Rahula 1972, pp. 82-85; Nagao 1979, p. 39 (or Nagao 1991, p 198); Willis 1979, pp. 20-36; Kochumottum 1982, pp. 197-234; and Harris 1991, pp. 152-175.

26 - Madhyanta-Vibhaga 1.1: abhuta-parikalpo 'stidvayam tatra na

vidyate, sunyata vidyatetu-atra tasyam-apisa vidyate.

27 - Chang 1971, p. 60.

28 - For instance, Rahula 1972, passim; Willis 1979, pp. 13-36; Anacker 1984; Nagao 1979, pp. 29-43, reprinted in Nagao 1991, pp. 189-199; and Harris 1991, pp. 63-83, 102-179.

29 - For an interesting discussion of this, see Nagao 1978, pp. 66-82, recently reprinted in Nagao 1991, pp. 51-60.

30 - Kochumottom 1982, p. 236.

31 - yena hi sunyam tada-sad-bhavat yac-ca sunyapm tad sad-bhavac

chunyata yujyeta (trans. in Willis 1979, p. 114; see also Wogihara 1930-1936, p. 47).

32 - Willis 1979, pp. 117, 121; Wogihara 1930-1936, pp. 47, 49.

33 - Madhyamaka-karika 24.11.

34 - tad sad-bhavac chun yata yujyeta. See Wogihara 1930-1936, p. 47.

35 - Madhyanta-vibhaga 1.13: dvaya-abhavohi-abhavasya bhavah sun-

yasya laksanam na bhavo na-api ca-abhavahnaprthaktva-eka- laksanam. See also Madhyanta-Vibhaga 1.2: na suinyam napi casunyarm tasmat sarvam vidhiyate, sattvad asattvat sattvac ca

madhyama pratipac ca sa, "Neither empty nor nonempty, so is

everything described; that indeed is the Middle Path, for there is existence as well as nonexistence, and again existence."

36 - Rahula 1971, p. 65.

37 - Note that my translation is dependent upon the French translation of W. Rahula (1971), I. chap. 1, sec. 2, p. 44. Richard King

679

38 - Mahayanasamgraha 11.15.1. See Lamotte 1938, vol 2, p. 107.

39 - Ibid., p. 89.

40 - Vigrahavyavartan, v. 70.

41 - The Madhyamaka position is grounded in the Buddhist conception of the world as impermanent (anitya) and lacking an abiding self (anatman). Thus we find Nagarjuna, in Madhyamaka-karika XXI. 4, suggesting the following axiom: "For impermanence is never absent in entities."

42 - See Ingalls 1954, pp. 291-306; Biderman 1978, 405-413; Whaling 1979, pp. 1-42.

43 - See Hirabayashi and leda 1977, pp. 341-360.

44 - The foremost example of the absolutistic interpretation of Madhya- maka is the work of T.R.V. Murti. Candrakirti notes in Prasannapada 247-248 that the person who reifies emptiness is like the person responding to the merchant who has nothing to sell with the words "all right let me buy some of that nothing!" Nevertheless, the

majority of critics attacked the Madhyamaka for its apparent nihil- ism. The absolutistic interpretation of Madhyamaka was not preva- lent in traditional Indian sources, absolutism generally being seen as a feature of the Brahmanical / Upanisadic heritage and not the Buddhist.

45 - See, for instance, Vigrahavyavartan, v. 71.

46 - Madhyamaka-karika 13.8: sunyata sarvadrs.tmamr prokta nihsara nam jinaih, yesam tu sunyatadrstis tan asadhyan babhasire.

47 - sad asat sadasac ceti yasya pakso na vidyate, upalambhas cirenapi tasya vaktur na sakyate (trans. in Lang 1986, pp. 150-151).

48 - See Madhyamaka-karika 24:18-28.

49- Ibid., 24.21: aprat?tyasamutpannam kuto duhkham bhavisyati, ani-

tyam uktam duhkham hi tat svabhavye ne vidyate.

50 - Madhyanta-vibhaga-bhasya 1.17.

51 - Madhyanta-vibhaga-bhasya 1.23.

52 - Trans. in Willis 1979, p. 79.

53 - Madhyamakahrdaya-karika chap. 5; PrajinapradTpa chap. 25. Can- drakTrti also attacks the views of the citta-matra. He does, how-

ever, clearly grasp the fact that the Yogacara position is not a naive form of subjective idealism. In Madhyamakavatara VI.45, he points out that for the Yogacara school, if the object is absent, so, too, is

Philosophy East & West the subject. However, the view which equates the dream and wak-

680

ing states is criticized by CandrakTrti in Madhyamakavatara VI.48- 53. Again in Madhyamakarvatara V1.65, the author asks "if the

cognition of 'blue' is mental and not sensory, why is it that a blind man cannot see blue?" CandrakTrti also clearly distinguishes the

Madhyamaka conception of 'samvrti' from the Yogacara notion of

'paratantra' (see Madhyamakavatara VI.80-81).

54 - Williams 1980, p. 12.

55 - Mahayanasamgraha 111.9. See Lamotte 1938, vol. 2, pp. 164-165 [1 43a1 6].

56 - Trisvabhava-nirdesa, v. 36: citta-matropalambhena jneyarthanupa- lambhata, jneyarthanupalambhena syac cittanupalambhata. See al- so Trirnika, v. 29, Madhyantavibhaga 1.6 and the bhasya upon it. One might wish to argue that such statements are to be understood in a specifically yogic context only and so should not be taken to refer to the Yogacara's own distinctive doctrinal position. However, in discussing such movements as this, it is difficult to draw a hard and fast line between the theoretical and the practical. This is reflected in the fact that the Yogacara derives some of the evidence to support its own philosophical perspective from meditative experi- ences. See, for instance, the reference to yogic perception in

Mahayanasamgraha 111.9, quoted above.

57 - Perhaps a distinction can be made between those texts written by Asanga for the Mahayana in general, e.g. the voluminous Yogacara- bhumi (containing the Bodhisattva-bhumi), and the Mahayanasam- graha, and those texts written specifically for a Yogacara audience.

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