e5178 - calabar - portside hazop summary

WSP CEL Limited CEL House, Westwood Way

Westwood Business Park Coventry UK CV4 8HS

Tel +44 (0)24 7686 2000 Fax +44 (0)24 7686 2200

Registered office: WSP House, 70 Chancery Lane, London WC2A IAF | Registered in England No. 3877626 | VAT Reg. No. GB 747 8097 84 ver1 2010

HAZOP REPORT

FOR

CALABAR – PORTSIDE INDUSTRIAL PARK FUEL RETICULATION PROJECT

For

AIKENBECK RESOURCES LIMITED - NIGERIA

Issue No. 1 2 3 4 5

Compiled By Peter Dixon

Approved By

Date 27/03/2012

Ref: E5178 – HAZOP Report Issue: P1 Date: 27th March 2012

CALABAR PORTSIDE HAZOP REPORT 27TH MARCH 2012 AIKENBECK RESOURCES LTD - NIGERIA REF: E5178 / CALABAR PORTSIDE HAZOP SUMMARY Issue P1

CONTENTS Page No

REVISION RECORD 1

SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION 2

SECTION 2 STUDY DATES 2

SECTION 3 STUDY TEAM 2

SECTION 4 DOCUMENTATION 3

SECTION 5 METHODOLOGY 3

SECTION 6 SUMMARY OF HAZOP & KEY ISSUES ARISING 4

ANNEX 1 HAZOP AGENDA

ANNEX 2 HAZOP TEAM MEMBERS LIST

ANNEX 3 HAZOP COPY OF P&ID

ANNEX 4 HAZOP GUIDE WORD KEY SHEET

ANNEX 5 HAZOP RECORD


REVISION RECORD

Issue No.

Description of Revision Page/Paragraph No.

P1 Preliminary first issue for comment


SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION

The Cross River Sate Government (CRSG) is embarking on a Portside Development in the Calabar area of Nigeria for petroleum product receiving and storage. This report details the outcome of a HAZOP Study covering the proposed installation.

Two dolphin berths are to be provided near the bank of the Calabar River to handle tankers of 25,000 DWT (Dead Weight Tonnage). Fuel is to be unloaded (or loaded) by hose connection to pipework which connects the dolphin platforms to a manifold system located in a common systems bunded area. The manifold system will initially allow for three different fuel types to be handled and distributed to seven separate tenant sites for storage. Mixed fuel from manifold flushing will be stored in an Intermix Tank within the common systems area. “Intermix” will then be either dosed back into bulk fuel during transfer or taken off site by road tanker.

The three different fuel types are to be handled initially are gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil. The HAZOP study focussed on the unloading of unleaded gasoline due to its very low flash point (-46°C) and high vapour pressure (boiling range 32 to 225°C), compared to the other two products.

SECTION 2 STUDY DATES

The HAZOP study took place over two days on 19th and 20th March 2012 at the La Cour Hotel, Ikoyi, Lagos. The agenda is included as Annex 1.

SECTION 3 STUDY TEAM

The team members were:

Niyi Oginni Chief Op. Officer Aikenbeck Resources Ltd Unimawho Awafung Proj. Dev’t Manager Aikenbeck Resources Ltd Dr. Okey Onyemelukwe Principal Partner GWC Chris Amgeehi Project Manager GWC Ebola Lawal Civil/Structural Eng. IAA Associates Dr. Ambekeh A Udida Director Cross River State M of L&H Margaret Eslen Director Cross River State M of L&H Manderson Okpo Director Cross River State M of L&H Utan Uye Utan Terminal Manager ECM Terminal Ukemeabasi Udo Comm’l Manager ECM Terminal


John Wilmot Cost Consultant WSP Nigeria Fransisco Doregos Design Manager WSP Nigeria Richard Baard Director WSP Industrial Jock Litterick Principal Associate WSP Consulting Mark Pitout Associate WSP Industrial Clint Lakey Mechanical Eng. WSP Industrial Peter Dixon Proc Eng / Leader WSP CEL A “Team Members” list completed at the meeting is included as Annex 2. Representatives from CAA Associates and the Ministry of Lands and Housing were present for the first day only, during which Section 1 was studied.

SECTION 4 DOCUMENTATION

Copies of all design reports and drawings were available to the meeting. Principal documents referred to during the meeting were:

W702 M-830 Rev. 6 P&ID – Oil Pipeline Reticulation System

W702 M-801 Rev. P2 3D Model – Fuel Reticulation System

W702 M-802 Rev. P1 GA – Fuel Reticulation System c/w Dock

W702 M-802 ??

W702 M-804 Rev. P2 GA – Fuel Reticulation System – Haz. Areas

W702 M-805 Rev. P2 GA – Fuel System, Dock – Hazardous Areas

W702 F-881 Rev. P1 Site Layout – Foam System

510168 C1004 Rev. 1 Site Plan

SECTION 5 METHODOLOGY

The conventional HAZOP technique was used for the study, that is:

• Define the intention for each line or sub-system. • Identify relevant deviations (See Guide Word Sheet Checklist -

Annex 4). • Look for causes of each deviation, assess the consequences and

decide whether action(s) is required.


The HAZOP record follows in Annex 5. The record sheets primarily capture those deviations where action(s) was identified; they are not an exhaustive record of all discussion.

SECTION 6 SUMMARY OF HAZOP & KEY ISSUES ARISING

Due to the large number of attendees and extended discussion of many aspects of the project, the HAZOP could not be completed rigorously for all secondary operations. However, the primary operations of fuel transfer in either direction between ship and shore were considered in detail and significant discussion of the secondary operations occurred in parallel. These were then reviewed at the end of the meeting and the actions identified added to the HAZOP record. A follow-up review of the completed design should therefore be considered.

In addition to recommended actions, the HAZOP record highlights the key safeguards intended to mitigate or prevent the consequences of potential process deviations. It should be ensured that these or equivalent safeguards are included within the completed design documentation, particularly a “Trip and Interlock Schedule” and control system “User Requirement Specification”.

Key issues identified by the HAZOP were as follows:

Gasoline has a boiling point range starting at 32°C. Since ambient temperature in the Calabar region will often exceed this, it will be difficult to maintain a prime on the unloading pumps due to vapour formation. Alternatives such as running the ship’s pumps to provide backing pressure will need to be considered.

The ability of the control system to reliably prevent overfilling of tanks should be carefully considered. All tanks should ideally have duplicate and dissimilar high level detection instruments and more than one trip action is likely to be required to achieve an appropriate safety integrity level (SIL). Consideration should also be given to supplementing the PLC by hard wiring or by an independent programmable safety system for these critical trip actions.

A clear interface protocol should be defined between the common systems control PLC and the tenant control systems to ensure that fuel transfer can only commence when a “permissive” signal has been received by the upstream system, and that the downstream receiving system has the priority to immediately stop a transfer.


The reliability of “Emergency Stops” should be considered in comparison to “Process Stops” acting through the process control PLC.

Strict procedures will be required to control the back-loading of fuel to a ship if there is to be no direct link between ship and shore control systems.

Consideration should be given to the inclusion of actuated, fire safe, isolation valves on bottom outlets from large fuel storage tanks.

Provision will be required to separate spilt fuel from rain water, both on the dolphin jetty and in the common systems bund. To this end, separate covered and contained collection of fuel from drainage or pressure relief will be required so that separation is only required from surface run-off.

The extent of hazardous zone surrounding open sumps which may contain fuel should be reconsidered. This will be aided by the segregation of potentially very warm fuel from pressure relief and drainage.


ANNEX 1 HAZOP AGENDA

M:\PROJECTS\WSP\E5178\1 SAFETY\3 HAZARD STUDY\CALABAR - PORTSIDE - HAZOP MEETING AGENDA.DOC ver1 2010

A G E N D A Date: 19th & 20th March 2012 Time: 09.00 Venue: La Cour Hotel, 3, Cooper Road, Lagos Personnel Present: See separate Attendance Schedule Introduction: This is a 2 day Hazard Study meeting to identify any residual

safety and operability issues within the process design for the Portside Industrial Park, Calabar.

Item Description Responsibility Time

1. Attendee Introductions

All 09.00

2. Introduction to HAZOP Procedure PJD

3. Introduction and Overview of Project

WSP Nigeria

4. HAZOP

PJD

Unloading line flush to Intermediate Tank

Fuel unloading to tenant site

Drains, platform sump and sump transfer

Drains, bund area sump and sump transfer

Tanker loading

Intermix tank transfers / dosing

Flow proving

5. Conclusions and next steps

All

6. Project Meeting All


ANNEX 2 HAZOP TEAM MEMBERS LIST


ANNEX 3 HAZOP COPY OF P&ID


ANNEX 4 HAZOP GUIDE WORD KEY SHEET


ANNEX 5 HAZOP RECORD

Company: Aikenbeck ResourcesFacility: Portside Industrial ParkDwg No: No. W702-M-830 Rev 6Dwg Title: Fuel Reticulation System - PID

SectionFirst Action Number Section Title Description

Section 1 1 Unloading Line Flush To flush each unloading pump in turn for 1 minute each to the Inter-mix Tank. Expected total flush quantity is 12 tonnes. Adequate flushing confirmed by manual sampling.

Section 2 39 Unloading Fuel to Tenant Site To unload fuel from a ship to a tenant site storage tank at a rate of 700 tonnes per hour.

Section 3 66 Loading Fuel to Ship from Tenant Site To load fuel from a tenant site to a ship using tenant's pumps and flow meters at a maximum flow rate of 700 tonnes / hour

Section 4 74 Fuel Dosing and Intermix Loading Dosing of fuel at low rate from the Intermix Tank into the unloading line during transfer to tenant storage, ensuring that overall fuel transfer remains within fuel specification. Also loading of an excess of Intermix to a road tanker.

Section 5 78 Flow Proving Unit Proprietary flow proving unit used to verify the calibration of each product flow meter.

Section 6&7 83 Drains, Sumps and Transfer Drains and pressure relief to the dolphin jetty sump. Transfer to the common services bund sump.Drains and pressure relief to the common services sump. Transfer to the Intermix Tank.

Calabar HAZOP Record - Edited Page 1 of 17 Printed on: 27/03/2012

Company: Aikenbeck ResourcesFacility: Portside Industrial ParkDwg No: No. W702-M-830 Rev 6Dwg Title: Reticulation System - PID

Unloading Line Flush Section name: Section 1Leader / Scribe: PD/PD

Date: 19/03/2012Team: See Report

HAZOP ITEM NUMBER PARAMETER DEVIATION POSSIBLE

CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS ACTION NUMBER ACTION REQUIRED ACTION

BY ANSWERS AND COMMENTS

1 Flow No Flow Manual valve closed

Unloading pump runs dead headed 1

Include low current monitoring of pumps to

detect no flowWSP

2 Manual valve closed


Consider position switches on key manual valves and

include feedback information into control

logic

WSP

3 Manual valve closed


Detailed maintenance procedures required to

ensure correct realignment of manual

valves following maintenance operations

ARL

4 Automatic valve closed

Unloading pump runs dead headed

Limit switches to be provided on both open and closed positions

4Sequence must shut down

in the event of a discrepancy

WSP

5No prime on

unloading pumps

Pump cavitationLow pressure on pump

suction.Low current to pump

See action 1

6 Flow Less Flow Manual valve not fully open Incomplete line flush

Manual valves to have facility to be locked open

or closed5

Consider whether any manual valves should be

locked openWSP

7 Flow Reverse FlowRoute open

but pump not running

Unloading header and ship contaminated by

mixed fuel from Intermix Tank

3 NRVs in line to intermix tank.

Discrepancy detected in control system will close

actuated valves

No further action

8 Flow Where Else

Air and fuel bleed to platform

sump

Ship's pump running against substantially

closed head6 Confirm suitability of ship's

pump to run in this way WSP

9

Air and fuel bleed to platform

sump

Extemely flammable liquid discharged into open

sump

Zone 1 hazardous area covers ship and entire

dolphin platform7

Clear operator procedure required to limit flammable

release to a minimumARL








10 Flow Where Else Unloading hose failure

Significant environmental damage to river 8

Unloading operation to be continuously manned. Procedures required to

achieve prompt shutdown from both terminal and

from ship.

ARL

11 Unloading hose failure

Significant environmental damage to river 9

Confirm that unloading hose system is fully

specified within the piping spec.

WSP

12 Tidal movement Hose overextended

Procedures to determine number of hose sections required for type and size

of ship

No further action

13Intermediate

hose joint leakage

Fuel spill outside of planned contained area 10

Consider extending dolphin platform bund to

capture leakage from intermediate hose

connections

WSP

14Intermediate

hose joint leakage

Fuel spill outside of planned contained area 11

Investigate standard practices for confirming absence of leaks before unloading commences

ARL

15 Flow Where Else

Drain valve left open or relief valve

leakage

Loss of fuel to sumpHigh level switch on sump and automatic pump out

to Intermix TankNo further action

16 Flow Where ElseFlow into header to tenant site

Two actuated isolation valves and ability to

monitor flow in headerNo further action

17 Flow Where Else

Leakage into Intermix Tank

bund and possible fire

Fire fuelled by entire contents of Intermix Tank

(due to bottom entry)12

Actuated isolation valve to be close to tank, to close in event of fire and be fire-

safe design

WSP

18Flow into 2nd

unloading manifold

Cross contamination of headers and possible spill

Only one inlet valve to the Intermix Tank should be

open at any one time13 Add a NRV in each inlet

line to Intermix Tank WSP








19 Pressure More Pressure

Ship's pumps also running

during unloading

Unloading is too fast or line velocity too high 14

Procedures required to ensure ship's pumps not

run at same time as unloading pump

ARL


Blocked flame arrester on

Intermix Tank

Overpressure and rupture of tank 15

Consider whether dual flame arresters with

changeover valve requiredWSP

21 Pressure Less Pressure

Unloading hose air leak causes loss of suction

Unloading pumps cavitateProcedures to maintain

hoses.Spare hoses.

No further action


High vapour pressure of gasolene in

warm ambient temperature causes loss of suction

Unloading pumps cavitate 16

Confirm expected temperature of fuel in ship

and vapour fraction at unloading pumps.

Consider whether ship's pumps can be used to

provide backing pressure

WSP


Power fluctuation

Unloading pumps lose prime 17

Review all possible causes of loss of prime of unloading pumps. Check

pump minimum NPSH

WSP

24 Temperature More Temperature

High ambient temperature or solar gain

Pipe expansion Pipework stress design and expansion loops No further action

25 Level Greater Level

Failure of Intermix tank

level transmitter

Overfilling and overflow of intermix tank 18

Provide secondary high level monitoring to provide

adequate safeguard against tank overfill.

Consider SIL assessment

WSP








26 Composition Extra Component

Accumulation of rainwater in

sumps

Cannot pump out to Intermix Tank 19

System required to separate rain water from fuel drainage or spillage.

Fuel sumps to be protected from rain water

WSP

27 Sequence Step Omitted

Line flush omitted before

transfer to tenant

Out of spec transfer 20

Clear procedures / check lists required to ensure that transfer not started without line flush and

sample check

ARL

28 Sequence Step LongerSample

testing takes too long

Cannot achieve target unloading time of 24 hrs 21

Consider providing on site lab / office facility to

ensure rapid turnround of sample test results

ARL

29 Other Shut down

Rapid closure of valves or stopping of

pumps

Pressure surge damages pipework or pipe supports 22

Speed of system shut-down to be determined during commissioning

ARL

30 Other Power/Service Failure

Local power failure Unable to unload ship 23

Consider feasibility of unloading fuel using ship's

pumps. Would require unloading pump bypass.

WSP

31 Other Maintenance/Spares

Lack of pump spares Delayed unloading

Pump spares requirements listed in

pump specificationNo further action

32 Other FireExtent of

flammable zone

Ignition of vapours from common area sump 24

Confirm whether a Zone 2 area is required

surrounding the Zone 1 sump in the corner of the

bund.

WSP

33 Ignition of fuel spill Fire damage to facility

Fire water storage to supply up to 3 foam monitors for 1 hour

25Investigate back-up water

supply to supplement municipal supply

WSP








34 Other Static/Earthing

Static generation during fuel

transfer

Potential vapour explosionEarth bonding and lightning protection

specifiedNo further action

35 Other Environment

Fuel spills on roads and common

areas

Fuel run-off into stormwater channel 26

Consider additional measures to prevent or

separate fuel spills before they enter the storm water

drain / river

WSP

36 Uncontained fuel spill

Spill finds its way to the river 27

Consider options to contain, mitigate or

recover spill from riverARL

37 Other Commisioning

Stroke times of valves

Valve failure trip occurs before valve has reached

end of stroke28

Stroke times and trip delays to be set during

commissioningARL

38 Alarm and trip settings

Process deviations go undetected 29

Alarms and trips required from all process

parameters to be set during commissioning

ARL

39 Other Regs 30

Check applicable advice from "National Oil Spill

Protection and Mitigation Agency"

WSP

40 What Else Bunkering 31 Consider provision for tanker bunkering. ARL

41 What Else Domestic fresh water 32

Consider provision of domestic fresh water

supply to tankerARL

42 What Else

Damage to existing

NNPC oil pipeline

Storm water hits low level

pipePipe fracture and oil spill 33 Confirm civils provision to

protect pipeline WSP

43 What Else

Interaction with future 2nd tanker

berth

Need to flush unloading line

from 2nd berth

Cross contamination between systems

NRVs shown in each unloading line 34

Ensure that valve VBA 184 is suitable for future addition of an actuator

WSP








44 What Else

Cannot flush branches for

future products 4, 5

and 6

P&ID doesn't work as shown

Contamination 35Unloading header must

pass each product take-off branch in turn

WSP

45 What Else

Cannot simultaneousl

y unload products 4 to 7 from each

berth


Loss of flexibiltiy 36

Unloading header from future 2nd berth must

pass each product take-off branch in turn with

separate connections to each

WSP

46 What Else

Cannot simultaneousl

y unload products 4 to 7 from each

berth


Loss of flexibiltiy 37

For two unloading systems, VBA 185 and

186 need to be actuated and located downstream

of the last product take-off

WSP

47 What Else

Loss of radio communicatio

n between ship and

shore

Radio fault Inadequate monitoring of unloading operations 38

Procedures required to prove a working radio

channel (at agreed frequency) between ship

and shore (common systems and tenant)

before operations commence.

Communication to be confirmed on regular (e.g.

hourly) basis.

WSP



Unloading Fuel to Tenant Site Section name: Section 2Leader / Scribe: PD/PD





1 Flow No Flow See actions 1 to 4 WSP

2 Flow No Flow Valve closed on tenant site Pump dead headed

Flow meter will detect lack of flow.

High pressure detection.39

Sequence to abort if flow rate not achieved or high

pressure detectedWSP

3 Flow Less Flow See action 5 WSP

4 Flow Less Flow

Furthest tenant site at

highest elevation

Protracted unloadingPumps specified to

achieve 700 tonnes/hr to highest destination

No further action

5 Flow More Flow

Pumps sized for furthest

tenant site at highest

elevation

Excessive flow rate to nearest sites at lower

elevation.40

Consider control of transfer rate using flow meter and pump VSD. Ensure that max line

velocity to prevent static generation is not

exceeded

WSP

6 Flow Reverse Flow

Tenant tanks at higher

elevation than ship, possibly with bottom

entry

Potential for reverse flow when transfer route

opened

3 NRVs in line to tenant site.

Discrepancy detected in control system will close

actuated valves

41

Check regulations regarding whether top or bottom entry to tenant

tank is preferred

WSP

7 Flow Sooner FlowTenant site

not ready for transfer

Potential spill or flow to wrong destination 42

A transfer permissive signal is required from the

tenant for each of 3 products. Transfer can

only proceed on receipt of this signal.

WSP

8 43

Permissive signal to be via fibre optic cable

(preferred for reliability) or ethernet radio

WSP

9 Flow Where Else See actions 8 to 11 WSP/ARL








10 Flow Where Else

Another routing valve

is open or passing

Flow of fuel to incorrect destination 44

Interlocks required to allow only one routing

valve to be open at any time

WSP

11 45

Transfer to be stopped if fuel flow detected on another product flow

meter

WSP

12Inlet valve to Intermix Tank

is passing

Loss of fuel to Intermix Tank during transfer.

Discrepancy between fuel unloaded and fuel

received

46

Consider additional physical safeguard or cover by procedures if transfer discrepancy

detected

WSP

13Loss of radio communicatio

n

Confusion between tenant site and common system

operators

Transfer permissive signal has ultimate control of

transfer47

Procedures required to prove a working radio

channel (at agreed frequency) between ship, tenant site and common

systems control room before operations

commence. Communication to be

confirmed on regular (e.g. hourly) basis.

ARL

14 Flow Where Else

Pipe damage due to

proximity of pipe rack to

roadway

Fuel spill due to pipe fracture caused by vehicle

impact48

Provide increased separation between pipe

rack and roadwayWSP

15 49Install physical barriers to

protect pipework from road vehicles

WSP


Closed valve or ship's

pump running

Transfer line pressure higher than normal

Transfer will be stopped if high discharge pressure

detectedNo further action

17 Pressure Less Pressure See actions 16 and 17 WSP/ARL








18 Temperature More Temperature

High ambient temperature or solar gain

50

Pipework stress design and expansion loops to be

included in tranfer pipe design

WSP

19 Level Greater LevelInsufficient ullage in

receiving tank

Transfer has to be aborted before completion,

resulting in delays to unloading

51

Tenant should be required to issue a "Notice of

Readiness" to confirm that they have sufficient ullage capacity in their receiving tank. Failure to comply should incur penalties.

ARL

20Receiving

tank reaches high level

Tank overflow 52

Tenant design guidelines to require multiple level

monitoring and sufficient control system integrity to

ensure that transfer permissive signal is

withdrawn when high level is reached

WSP

21 53

Consider requirement for secondary safety system (independent of process

PLC) to ensure that transfer is stopped if permissive signal is

withdrawn

WSP

22 Level Less Level Ship empty Unloading pumps cavitateLoss of pressure on the pump discharge will stop

transfer pumpsNo further action

23 Composition Different Stream 54

Procedure required to sample from the ship

before unloading and from the unloading line after

line flush

ARL








24 55

Include procedure to flush unloading line, even if there is no change of

grade.

ARL


Loss of power to control

room.PLC control system failure UPS for control system No further action

26

SCADA system failure. Unloading continues, but

operator loses sight of what is happening

Fail Safe emergency stop provided in control room

to stop transfer56 Consider providing back-

up SCADA system WSP

27

Voltage spikes in incoming

power supply

Damage to PLC or SCADA system 57

Consider provision of under and over voltage detection on incoming power supply to initiate

switch to generator supply

WSP

28 Other Shut down

Unloading hose

uncoupled before

draining complete

Fuel spill to dolphin platform or to river

Procedure to close block valve and drain hoses to dolphin platform sump

before uncoupling hoses

58

Consider key interlock system on double block

and bleed to guard against maloperation

WSP

29 Other Fire

Pumping continues after fire detected

Continued fuel flow to fire 59

Consider interlock to stop transfer operations if fire

protection system is operated

WSP

30 60

Confirm whether fire protection from hydrants is required over entire length

of transfer pipelines

WSP

31 Other Access

Tranfer pipeline

traverses rough ground

Cannot inspect entire length of transfer lines 61

Provide suitable level access for routine

inspection of transfer pipelines

WSP








32 What Else 62Review other Section 1 actions applicable fuel

transfer to tenant storageWSP/ARL

33 What Else Low points in transfer lines

Transfer lines cannot be fully drained for maintenance

63

Ensure that transfer lines rise continuously to tenant

sites to permit gravity draining to common area

sump

WSP

34 64 Consider drainability of expansion loops WSP

35No high point

vents on transfer lines

Transfer lines cannot be fully drained or draining is

slow65

Consider requirement for venting of transfer lines within the tenant site to

permit draining

WSP

36 What Else

Future expansion of

facility to more than 7 tenant sites

Layout issues

Each product header can be extended to create 2nd

tier header above the initial 7 take-offs. Remote

I/O cabinets are expandable

No further action



Loading Fuel to Ship from Tenant Site Section name: Section 3Leader / Scribe: PD/PD





1 Flow More Flow Pumping down hill

Static electricity hazard (and high reaction forces

on pipework)66

Consider measures required to ensure that transfer rates do not

exceed permitted maximum

WSP

2 Flow Less FlowTenant

pumps too small for duty

Ship delayed at berth, incurring cost 67

Consider including design criteria for back-loading

within tenant design guidelines

WSP

3 Flow Sooner FlowCommon site not ready for

transfer

Potential spill or flow to wrong destination 68

A transfer permissive signal is required to be

sent to the tenant for each of 3 products. Transfer

can only proceed on receipt of this signal.

WSP

4 69

Permissive signal to be via fibre optic cable

(preferred for reliability) or ethernet radio

WSP

5 70

Common site operator must obtain confirmation

from the ship that they are ready to receive transfer

before issuing the permission signal

ARL

6 Level Greater Level Ship's tank overfilled Fuel spill to river

Confirm that sufficient space is available in ship's

tank and that spare tank(s) is available to

provide excess capacity

71

Established and rigorous procedures are required to

prevent overfill of ship's tanks

ARL

7 Composition Different Stream

Wrong fuel grade for

selected lineCross contamination 72

Tenant should provide sample to confirm that fuel

grade is suitable for the selected loading line

ARL



Loading Fuel to Ship from Tenant Site Section name: Section 3Leader / Scribe: PD/PD






Unable to close actuated valves and stop flow of

fuel downhill to ship

Stand-by generators available 73

Confirm ability to close electrically actuated

valves in the event of power failure.

WSP



Fuel Dosing / Intermix Loading Section name: Section 4Leader / Scribe: PD/PD





1

2 Flow Where ElseSpillage

during road tanker loading

Loss of fuel to river 74A contained tanker loading bay is required, draining to

suitable sumpWSP


Too much dosing

Fuel transferred goes out of specification

Only about 12 tonnes of Intermix are expected per

flush75

Procedures required to ensure that dosing does not exceed acceptable

amount

ARL

4Dosing of

gasoline into kerosene

Kerosene becomes hazardous in use.

(Gasoline dosing not considered acceptable.)

76Procedures required to

ensure that only appropriate dosing is done

ARL


Intermix sold as domestic

fuel

Fire or explosion if used as a domestic fuel 77

Procedures required to ensure that any Intermix

sent off site is appropriately used or redistilled to original

specifications

ARL

6 Other Fire

Road tanker loading not covered by

current Hazardous

Area Classification

Fire during loadingNormal safeguards such as tanker earthing to be

provided78

HAC to be extended to include tanker loading

bay. Remote I/O panels may need to be relocated

WSP

These operations were discussed during the HAZOP study of Sections 1 to 3 and then reviewed at the end of the meeting. There was insufficient time available to complete a full HAZOP procedure. A further review should be considered at the end of detail design.



Flow Proving Unit Section name: Section 5Leader / Scribe: PD/PD





1

2 Flow Where ElseSpill during operation of flow prover

Loss of fuel to riverFlow prover to be located

within the common systems bunded area

No further action

3 Flow Later Flow

Flow prover shown on Berth 1

unloading line only

Unable to check flowmeters or unload from

future Berth 2 if Berth 1 not available

79 Flow prover must usable with either unloading line WSP


Only one transfer tank shown with flow prover

Need to drain flow prover to road tanker or sump / Intermix Tank before use

on different product

80

Consider providing a transfer tank for each

product to enable prover to be drained and refilled with compatible product

WSP

5 Other Maintenance/Spares

Flow prover ball needs to be removed

Mechanical handling injury 81

Ensure sufficient access and mechanical handling aids to assist removal of

ball

WSP

6 What ElseIncorrect

operation of flow prover

Inexperience of operators

Flow meter calibration errors 82

Ensure operators are adequately trained for use

of the flow proverARL

This operation was briefly discussed during the HAZOP study of Sections 1 to 3 and then reviewed at the end of the meeting. There was insufficient time available to complete a full HAZOP procedure of the detailed operation of the proving unit. A further review should be considered at the end of detail design.



Drains, Sumps and Transfer Section name: Section 6 / 7Leader / Scribe: PD/PD





1

2 Flow No FlowDischarge pumps not

primedCannot empty sumps 83 Ensure that sump transfer

pumps are self priming WSP


Accumulation of rainwater in

sumps

Cannot pump out to Intermix Tank See action 19 WSP

4 Composition Contamination

Fuel spill elsewhere on site, outside of proposed

bunds

Fuel washed to river with rain water 84

Design a containment system for all rainwater

run-off from site roads to a single collection / holding point to allow separation

or treatment before discharge to river

WSP

5 Other FireExtent of

flammable zone

Ignition of vapours from common area sump See action 24 WSP

These operations were briefly discussed during the HAZOP study of Sections 1 to 3 and then reviewed at the end of the meeting. There was insufficient time available to complete a full HAZOP procedure for the detailed operation of the sumps. A further review should be considered at the end of detail design.


e5178 - calabar - portside hazop summary

Documents

fibre optic cable

la cour hotel

aikenbeck resources facility

planned contained area

full hazop procedure

common area sump

calabar hazop record

significant environmental damage