dynamics of intervention in failed states in the post cold war era

Dynamics of Intervention in

Failed States in the Post-Cold

War Era

Policy Study nr. 1 / 2015

Andreea Rdulescu

Dynamics of Intervention in Failed States in the Post-Cold War Era Policy Study nr 1/2015 www.newsint.ro

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Abstract

The post-Cold War international system has been extremely uneven in terms of

emerging geopolitical structures. This new world order has directly affected analysts and

policy makers in terms of how to act and interpret the challenges of contemporary global

developments. This research thesis is addressing these issues based on three conceptual

tenets: dangers posed by failed states, intervention and the concept of interdependence. At

the core of this work is the United States decision to militarily intervene in failed states.

These types of structures are assumed to challenge the global relationship of economic

interdependence due to their drastic political, economic and social changes. The inquiry

follows a qualitative research design with a focus on two case studies: Somalia and

Afghanistan. This investigation proposes an in-depth analysis regarding the causal

mechanism between interdependence and military intervention in these failed states based

on two main assumptions. The first hypothesis is built on intervention as being a measure

for preventing disruptions in the regional stability of failed states in terms of economic

interdependence. The findings showed that Somalias geostrategic location could have spill-

over effects for the U.S. allies in the Horn of Africa, Saudi Arabia or Yemen. The instability in

Somalia endangers the issue of maritime security and the access to energy resources in the

Persian Gulf, as well as the protection of naval trade routes in the region. Afghanistan is a

country in Central Asia which was used as a trade passage, historically. The country also

shares oil resources with other Central Asian republics. The region can be regarded as a

complex network of economic ties and in the U.S. vision the free flow of such resources is

primordial for the enlargement of the liberal zone of peace and the mutual gain of benefits.

Indirectly, the U.S. intervention could be interpreted in a sense that Afghanistan became a

portal of instability which was threatening American values and national interest

understood through economic interdependence. The second hypothesis attempts to

explore the degree of vulnerability experienced by the U.S. in relation to state failure. While

Somalia did not present any immediate danger that might have increased the U.S.

vulnerability, the terrorist organizations based in Afghanistan which plotted the attack from

September 11, 2001 represented solid proof for this assumption. The results are oriented

towards understanding the regional interests of economic interdependence which the U.S.

might have had in the light of the interventions that they have conducted. Overall, the

analysis is valid insofar one recognizes that a holistic viewpoint is needed to understand the

rise of failed states and their regional effects which in turn might trigger world leaders such

as the U.S. to adjust their national interests accordingly.


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Table of Contents List of Tables ........................................................................................................................................... 3

I. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 4

II. Research Question Development ................................................................................................... 6

III. Literature review The major explanations for U.S.-led intervention ....................................... 8

A. International Security and the Danger of Failed States .............................................................. 8

B. Geopolitical interests of the superpower ................................................................................. 11

C. Interdependence ....................................................................................................................... 14

D. Gaps in the Literature Review ................................................................................................... 16

IV. Theoretical Concepts ................................................................................................................ 20

A. Intervention .............................................................................................................................. 20

B. Interdependence ....................................................................................................................... 25

C. The state as a Structural concept and the emergence of Failed States ................................... 30

1. The State ............................................................................................................................... 30

2. Failed States .......................................................................................................................... 33

V. Hypotheses Development ............................................................................................................. 36

VI. Research Design ........................................................................................................................ 41

A. Historical Overview of Somalia and Afghanistan ...................................................................... 42

B. Observations for State Failure .................................................................................................. 45

1. Political Shocks ...................................................................................................................... 46

2. Economic Shocks ................................................................................................................... 53

3. Political Goods ...................................................................................................................... 57

4. Level of Violence ................................................................................................................... 61

C. Observations regarding the two key dyadic relationships: US Somalia, US Afghanistan ... 66

1. Geopolitical Factors .............................................................................................................. 66

2. Intervention .......................................................................................................................... 67

3. Economic Interdependence .................................................................................................. 71

VII. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 76

A. Results ....................................................................................................................................... 76

B. Limitations................................................................................................................................. 84

C. Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................................. 85

References ............................................................................................................................................ 87


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List of Tables

Aggregate Indicator for the Rule of Law Somalia (1996-2012)

Aggregate Indicator for the Rule of Law Afghanistan (1996-2012)

GDP in billions of US dollars Somalia (1989-1990)

FDI in US dollars Somalia (1989-1993)

GDP in billions of US dollars Afghanistan (1996-2001)

FDI in US dollars Afghanistan (1996-2001)

Literacy Rate for Somali Male and Female Population 15+ years

Ethnic Wars Somalia (1989-1993)

Ethnic Wars Afghanistan (1996 2001)

Failed States Index Somalia (2005-2007)

Failed States Index Afghanistan (2005-2007)


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I. Introduction

The American nation has continuously evolved into a strong, consolidated state

projecting its ideals and values worldwide. Sometimes, over the course of history, in order

to assure their position as a world power, the United States have used the instrument of

intervention for several reasons. First, they wanted to prevent potential challengers from

other continents to attack them. Second, they wanted to keep balances of power

especially in Europe and Asia. Third, they formulated strategic interests in terms of building

political and economic bases in order to ensure the vital connecting routes to other

regions (Graber, 1978: 485).

During the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the United States

mostly intervened only in the states with geographical proximity. One reason was the

expansionist policy dominating the United States vision and examples of such were Florida,

Texas and Mexico (Viotti, 2010: 139-140). Hence, they increased their economic and military

capabilities. Such an example was represented by the construction of the Panama Canal

which was a vital naval route with access to both the East and West coasts. Thus, the United

States justified their right to restore order in countries where political unrest might have

endangered the region surrounding the canal. However, interventions in more distanced

places was more limited and calculated. For instance, there were situations when the

United States simply refused recognition of various dictatorial or military regimes in Latin

America in the hope that it would block them from progressing in a positive way in the

conduct of economic and foreign policies (Graber, 1978: 487-488).


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The U.S. full military involvement in both World Wars was made under the flag

liberal ideals. Therefore, the League of Nations and later, the United Nations Charter

brought about the concept of collective security through which the United States along with

other countries would reserve the right to protect the perceived common threats to the

world peace and thus, make the world safe for democracy (Viotti, 2010: 141-142).

However, when the concept of collective security failed to be employed due to the plethora

of divergent interests and differences in policy making, the U.S. claimed and continued to

exercise the right of unilateral intervention (Graber, 1978: 489). Some examples of such

interventions are Korea (1950-1953), Lebanon (1958), Cuba (1962), Vietnam (1965-1975) or

Laos and Cambodia (1971) (Viotti, 2010: 142).

The Cold War era has been characterized by the arms race between the East and the

West. The period was based on an ideological battle with the U.S. foreign policy aiming at

containing the spread of the communist regime.

This research thesis focuses on the concept of military intervention in the period

preceding the fall of the Soviet Union, where the U.S. emerged as a global leader advocating

for the spread of democratic values, liberal economy, respect for human rights and the rule

of law. The research on dynamics of intervention found in previous work and proposed for

further analysis in this thesis is considering the nature of international security, the

geostrategic interests of a leading power such as the U.S., and the concept of

interdependence as a potential cause for intervention. In this respect, the puzzle emerges as

it was identified a crucial difference between the explicit causes for intervention in such

failed states (i.e. humanitarian relief, terrorist threats) and the implicit causes which need a


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more in-depth research, in order to understand the processes of decision-making through

different perspectives. In this sense, there have been identified several gaps in the literature

to date and they are followed by an exploration of the theoretical foundation applied to a

small-N case study research design in order to test the validity of the proposed causal

mechanism between economic interdependence and military interventions.

The subsequent chapters are dedicated to the exploration of the theoretical

approaches through a qualitative analysis of two case studies and their historical overview,

state failure observations and dyadic relevance stemming from the hypotheses

development.

II. Research Question Development

Along the history of the United States there were many situations where

intervention was employed and each time frame has been explained as having certain well

defined interests and conditions for the conduct of such actions. The literature covering the

time span from 1990s onwards is considered to require continuous research for explaining

the causes of United States military interventions. It is of value to understand what lies

behind the U.S. foreign policies in undertaking the burden of stabilizing an entire

international system. The costs, the benefits, the risks, the realist and idealist issues

prevailing in the academic circles as topics of debate are going to be projected at a smaller

scale in what comes to represent the research question of this thesis:

What are the causes of U.S. led military intervention in failed states in the post-Cold War

era?


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The research question has been built around several key concepts which have been

strongly debated in the field of political science and international relations. The pillars of

this analysis are the theoretical approach on intervention, the state as a legitimate structure

in the international system, the failed states and the dangers posed by them, and the

modern interdependence theory. Each intervention that took place had a rational reasoning

found in different primary source documents, articles, books on foreign policy analysis and

others.

This research question aspires to bring an extensive understanding for such decision-

making processes beyond the evident reasoning displayed to the public. The goal is to look

at the holistic image of how is intervention defined in the post-Cold War era, what the

target states are and whether there are any linkages between these two elements which

cannot be observed prima facie. The parsimonious path to determining the causality of this

action has introduced the modern interdependence theory, while the entire analysis of the

thesis is focusing on finding explanatory variables from this precise angle. Thus, the holistic

perspective will encompass the framework of regional stability threatened by the turmoil in

these so-called failed states. Moreover, this approach will try to find connections with the

other two theoretical concepts. The following chapters are developing a gradual analysis

starting with the literature review, theory, and an in-depth, qualitative research design. The

thesis will conclude with a critical interpretation of the findings in accordance with all the

elements proposed in the research question and the hypotheses development.


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III. Literature review The major explanations for U.S.-led

intervention

A. International Security and the Danger of Failed States

The world after the fall of communism has changed substantially. The dimension of

national and international security took more complex forms. In a broad sense, the

literature to date has characterized state failure as being a situation of political, economic

and social chaos where citizens are denied basic public goods (Krasner & Pascual, 2005).

Several studies identify the main threats which are seen to jeopardize the international

security: spill-over wars, massive migrations, transnational organized crime, proliferation,

resource curses, diseases, terrorism (Newman, 2009; Patrick 2007).

Another reiteration of the same point is made by Michael Ignatieff who maintains

that the regions comprised of poor, failing states are seen as bad neighbourhoods which

are propagating the internal violence to neighbouring countries and they are creating a

widening tear in the system of state order, analogous to the tear in the global ozone layer

(Ignatieff in Mills & Brunner, 2002: 233-234).

In the post-Cold War era, the United States have acknowledged the danger of failed

states on two levels. One was multilateral through the United Nations, European Union,

NATO, non-governmental organizations and their allies. A second one was unilateral and it

has been mentioned in the 1998 National Security Strategy for a New Century where there


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is a direct reference to the notion of failed states. These are being perceived as centres of

unlawful governance, where violent conflict is the norm and where citizens of such entities

will migrate, will engage in civil wars and will spread the current state of affairs to

neighbouring countries, ultimately affecting U.S. interests and citizens (The White House,

1998:7).

Krasner and Pascual emphasize that failed states cannot take advantage of the

global economybecause they lack strong, capable institutions (2005). In the same way,

developed countries cannot gain the benefits from the economic linkages with such states,

due to the fact that they are so instable that they need institutions to form markets, fiscal

and monetary policies in order to make the country productive (Krasner & Pascual, 2005).

One of the factors that assured the international security is the global economic

interdependence. In this context, the instability of failed states threatens to disrupt it.

In explaining the conditions for the United States military intervention, there are

studies which adopted different positions.

First, Huth assumed that the willingness to intervene in the affairs of another state

must lead to favourable outcomes both domestic and foreign and that domestic policy

makers are rational actors who analyse the stakes of possible interventions in the light of

protecting the international security of their state (1998). These stakes are measured in

military costs and international security benefits (Huth, 1998: 747). Thus, the study

showed that if a target state does not have military capabilities for defending itself against a

challenger, then a major power will intervene. However, Huth emphasized on the fact that


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there is an assessment being made with regards to the existing threats posed by challenger

states (1998: 748).

Second, Fordham brought forward the argument of technological development of

the 20th century which pushed the United States to readjust their interests since their

security was threatened (2008). In other words, from a geopolitical perspective the United

States were not safe anymore and this led to their involvement in World War I which ended

their isolationist policy (Fordham, 2008).

Third, Snow has depicted the danger of failed states in a comprehensive manner. He

has distinguished between the First Tier represented by the developed countries, where

polities are homogeneous economically, socially and politically and there is the Second

Tier which combines a plethora of states from political democracies (India) to communist

states (China, North Korea), autocracies and failed states (Somalia, Haiti). The latter type lies

outside the globalizing economy and is associated with violence and instability (Snow,

2004). The term globalizing economy can be understood through the lens of liberal

institutionalism where free trade and negotiations towards lowering trade tariffs represent

the norm such institutions are the World Trade Organization, the EU, NAFTA and others.

Snow is making an insightful argument by maintaining that countries which have not joined

the so-called globalizing economy have done so by circumstance or by choice (2004: 312).

Haiti, for example, is seen as being a failed state which has little to offer in terms of

economy. Another example is Afghanistan under the Taliban rule which is considered to

have shut out from the global economy intentionally. To state it parsimoniously, the post-

Cold War era has widened the gap between the richer and the poorer countries, and a great


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majority of the latter could not keep up with the developmental change. Thus, Snow makes

the assumption that these low-developed countries which experience internal turmoil

represent a security issue for the United States simply because they are functioning

against the prevailing systemic order (2004).

The threats presented by failed states open the debate on whether intervention

should be considered an option, and whether justifying such a policy instrument should

frame the moral imperative of protecting human rights in these structures or should go

beyond by being assessed as attacks to the international security (Ignatieff in Mills and

Brunner, 2002).

B. Geopolitical interests of the superpower

The geopolitical explanation of American military intervention is framed by the

realist theory of international relations. It is important to include an opposing view to the

multilateralism and liberal institutionalism characterized in the previous section, as the topic

of this research thesis cannot be assigned from the beginning to a single school of thought.

The realist paradigm is based on an anarchic international system, where states are

the main actors and rational calculations are the tools which frame their vital interests. In

addition, any state interactions will be a zero-sum game and the use of force will always be

an option. Realism is also characterized by the respect of a states sovereignty (Wohlforth in

Smith et. al., 2012).

The realist theory has served well as an explanatory tool during the Cold War when

the United States had a clear-definition of their vital interests containing the Soviet


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expansion. In this respect there are studies relating the geopolitical interests for foreign

intervention with the rise of the United States as a superpower starting with the Cold War

era.

To start with, Huth has tested interventions by major powers in international crisis

between 1918 and 1988 and he found that, to a certain extent, the military coalitions and

strategic value of a target state can be explanatory factors (Huth, 1998).

Next, there have been made another series of assumptions when it came to the

United States and the use of force. First, If American vital interests are not threatened, for

instance, then American use of force should not be contemplated. Second, the use of force

will still be an option if the interest is less-than-vital and instead, national security is

threatened (Snow, 2004: 167). Such vital interests were clearly identified during the Cold

War through the Communist expansion which was threatening to engulf U.S. allies.

Moreover, the possible use of nuclear weapons was also a direct threat to the American

military security. After the fall of Communism, Snow maintained that the assessment of

interests and security threats has gained a psychological dimension of what makes one feel

secure and thus, makes the analysis of United States intervention more complex (Snow,

2004: 168).

Moreover, the issue of sovereignty has received favourable support from the United

States over the time. They actively promoted the respect for the internal and external affairs

of the state as being the supreme authority (Snow, 2006: 46). However, this paradigm has

been criticized during the Cold- War as well as afterwards by opponents who described

sporadic interventions of the United States as contradicting the concept of sovereignty (see


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economic boycott on Cuba in 1960). Snow has framed this contradiction under the term

ambivalence (Snow, 2004: 46). In other words, there has not been attained a balance

between what constitute the vital interests of the superpower, the breach of other states

sovereignty and the image of a self-help system.

Comparing the Cold War period with the one after 1989, it could be safely assumed

that the latter did not clear the air since the new international system, where the United

States was considered to be a superpower, did not fit the parameters laid by the realist

paradigm. Thus, the United States has been considered to continue a foreign policy

characterized by ambivalence also in the post-Cold War period. The classic realist paradigm

infers that military force will always be an option in a world of anarchy. The literature to

date extends this vision by showing how traditional perspectives of sovereignty, security

and interests have radically changed. Snow maintains how the concept of security has

broadened including more complex forms, namely that of individual security in order to

justify new dimensions of intervention such as human rights violations (see Somalia, Bosnia,

Kosovo during the 1990s) (Snow, 2004). This, in turn, became a reiteration of the United

States ambivalence.

Robert D. Kaplan has depicted a rather grim and purely geopolitical image of the

world where major powers would acknowledge the need to take a stance in these

situations. He described Africa as being underdeveloped and in his article from 1994 he

argues that the future of this region, in particular, will shift from central governments to

the rise of tribal and regional domains (Kaplan, 1994: 48). He explained the case of Ivory

Coast by maintaining that after the President had passed away, the country remained in


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shatters due to a weak party network, lack of foreign investment, small army, therefore no

force to maintain the order; and a large foreign, non-Ivorian population. Kaplan predicted

an anarchic implosion of criminal violence. Today, the Ivory Coast is a centre of instability

especially since the neighbouring countries such as Sierra Leone are not performing much

better. It is indeed the threat of regional collapse which is of greater concern, rather than

the one of national collapse. In the light of the threats posed by regional collapse Kaplan

believes that foreign policies targeting failed states will be done by need rather than by

design (Kaplan, 1994: 72).

C. Interdependence

The literature is exploring the concept of interdependence in various ways. As an

overview, the notion of interdependence has been understood in different ways across

several studies. Some have argued to have positive consequences. Keohane and Nye have

proposed a positive but broad approach on the meaning of mutual dependence

characterized by sensitivity in terms of how fast a state responds to the changes taking

place in the system and by vulnerability in terms of how a state adjusts to such changes

occurring in the system (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 7-11). However, the adjustments to these

changes are considered to be made through cooperation. Others have argued to be linked

to negative consequences if one of the parties involved in the process of interdependence

defects (McMillan, 1997: 34).

Nye Jr. explained how the United States is leading the international system in a

world of change. He emphasized on how security has undertaken other dimensions that


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cover the economic well-being of citizens. Also, he emphasizes on how the new power

game has changed in terms of linkages of interdependence between more complex and

simultaneous issues such as security, trade or finance and where the degree of vulnerability

has increased spectacularly (Nye Jr., 1991: 180). It can be considered that the United States

degree of vulnerability has increased as their ability to control the international economic

developments is not as pervasive as it was during the Cold War.

Nye Jr. proposed an alternative characterization of how the United States is adapting

to the new environment. In this sense, he explained how the United States has more co-

optive power understood as a method of influencing other states in forming preferences

for their national interests similar to the American ones and implementing foreign policies

accordingly (Nye Jr., 1991: 191). Nye Jr. concluded on a positive note that despite the post-

Cold War uprisings in weak states cooperation will remain the preferred norm due to the

fact that military interventions will be too expensive (Nye Jr., 1991)

Another more focused study has been made on the U.S. intervention in Third World

Internal Wars between 1945 and 1989. Given that the time span of the study is

concentrated on the Cold-War period, the findings of the research are showing that material

and economic interests do not cause U.S. intervention (Yoon, 1997). One limitation of this

study is that it only reflects the Cold-War era and not beyond.

Gartzke et. al. made a study which advocated for the positive consequences of the

economic interdependence maintaining that states would not engage in military conflict if

opportunity costs are higher than the use of force. In addition, the research showed that

liberal dyads are more prone to cooperation when it came to the break-down of economic


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ties. The authors also found that political shocks that may damage the economic

interdependence would still use peaceful options to resolve matters (Gartzke, et.al., 2001).

In the light of these findings it is worth mentioning two studies which found that

economic linkages could be causes for state conflict. Fordham conducted a study on the

economic interests, security and American Intervention covering the period of the 20th

century. His findings showed that the longer was a relationship of economic

interdependence between allied dyads, the more likely it was for the United States to

intervene on behalf of their trading partners. Unfortunately, the study did not cover the

post-Cold War era (Fordham, 2008). Barbieri controlled for salience and symmetry of

dependence over a time span between 1870 and 1938. She discovered that extension of

economic ties did not ensure peace and cooperation. In this sense, the study showed that

the more asymmetrical the trade, the more likely a conflict will take place (Barbieri, 1996).

Despite these findings, the study is limited due to its short time span. Other scholars have

also criticized it since the cases chosen are not relevant and a greater number covering a

longer period of time should be considered.

D. Gaps in the Literature Review

There have been identified certain limitations in the literature covering the issues

discussed in the previous sections. For coherence purposes, the enunciation of the limits

posed by the studies considered above will be treated in the order they appear in the

literature review.


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Studies regarding international security issues and causes for American intervention

are limited to the 20th century less the post-Cold War era. Another limitation is that since

the 1990s the notion of failed states is a new and deeply debatable concept having no

agreed upon definition. However, there is a consensus in the literature over the difficulties

of the powerful states in addressing the threats and challenges posed by state failure to the

international security. Therefore, the aspect of whether interventions of major powers such

as the United States in failed states are preventing the disruption of economic

interdependence and thus protecting the international security requires further research.

The literature covering the realist paradigm fails to explain some aspects when it is

put in relation to the research question at hand. The contemporary era has moved past the

traditional military conquest with the countries that may pose a threat to the national

security of the United States not possessing actual capabilities of attacking them. In other

words, countries such as Somalia, Haiti or Afghanistan which are considered to be failed do

not possess the means or the geostrategic interest to attack the United States in a

traditional manner. Second, the wars conducted today are asymmetrical and although such

a discussion is beyond the scope of this research thesis, it is worth mentioning that the

realist view is not providing a comprehensive explanation when it comes to terrorist threats

and the conduct of war on terror. Finally, the post-Cold War era makes it difficult to actually

define the vital interests of a state, and thus actions of intervention in these times become a

puzzle of interest-threat mismatch that requires further research (Snow, 2004: 174).

The study conducted by Gartzke et. al. has several drawbacks (2001). First, the cases

are comprised of only contiguous states and major powers and they cover the Cold War


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period. Second, the study takes into account revisionist states as opposed to liberal ones.

Revisionism during the World War II and later during the Cold War was understood as states

which had polities opposed to the prevailing order represented by democracies. In this

sense, the context of revisionist states is marked by ideological competition and by the

threat or use of force employed by such a country to make gains which would balance the

loss of another one (Evans & Newnham, 1998). However, the goal of this research thesis is

to incorporate the concept of failed states seen as an internal institutional collapse which

makes a country unable to maintain economic relations with a major power in this case

the United States. In this context, it is worth assuming that cooperation with failed states is

severely hurdled due to the fact that external actors have a difficulty in distinguishing the

factions which are reliable enough to regain control of the country and stabilize its

institutions. Presumably, such an action would end the turmoil and pave the path to

economic progress.

Finally, there are several aspects which remain unclear and which are still debated in

the literature. One of them is the United States role in the post-Cold War era and thus,

what makes them the global economic watchdog. Another one is represented by the

changed international system with the United States not having an ideological challenger

anymore. Thus, formulating foreign policies and justifying interventions has been difficult

for both policy makers and for the academic sphere to understand and analyse them. A

reiterated example would be the communist threat which was perceived as being a

condition for employing intervention in weaker states. In the last decades, the United States

have considered the deployment of military forces a solution of last resort which would be


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undertaken only if the vital security interests of the state are threatened (Graber, 1978:

495).

Along the history of the United States there were many situations where

intervention was employed and each time frame has been framed by the literature in

clearer parameters. Therefore, this research thesis aims at finding the causes for American

military intervention starting with the post-Cold War era when the world suffered a few

visible systemic changes such as the emergence of the so-called failed states. The

perspective this thesis is focuses on these key transformations which represent a challenge

for both the policy makers and the academic experts.


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IV. Theoretical Concepts

A. Intervention

Intervention is a deeply disputed concept in the academic sphere, especially due to the

fact that it is very theoretical and very difficult to quantify. The dynamics of this policy

instrument have been explained in the literature in terms of measuring the legitimacy of a

given action or presenting scientific arguments which would lead to an improved usage of

such a policy (Rosenau, 1969: 150).

Rosenau identified two characteristics of intervention. One is that it is employed against

the regular or expected conduct of a state and especially in the light of the non-intervention

doctrine. Second, the purpose of intervention is to produce a change in the authority of a

target state. Furthermore, Rosenau presents three dimensions of this theoretical concept:

moral, legal and strategic (1969: 151-155).

First, the moral dimension distinguishes the means by which intervention is employed.

Rosenau has emphasized the fact that this dimension is rather misleading when explaining

the causes of this concept since what deems moral for one person, is immoral for another

one. In other words, the morality of intervention is subjective.

Second, the legal standpoint argued by Rosenau is that intervention occurs when the

affairs of one state are altered against its will by the actions of another which implicitly

breaches the concept of sovereignty an aspect invoked by the realist school as being a

trigger for conflict (1969: 153-154). Therefore, the legal dimension is presented as being a


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coercive act imposed on another state, regardless of the form - military, economic or

diplomatic.

On the one hand, the international law theory has refined the conditions under which

intervention can take place. Therefore, states must comply with certain rules regarding

other similar entities. A state cannot interfere in the internal structure of another country

and it cannot pressure the main institutions of that other state or to interfere in the

relations between foreign government authorities and their own nationals (Cassese, 2005:

53). Moreover, states are not allowed to organize, instigate or support the activities of their

organization on the territory of a foreign state.

On the other hand, the principle of non-intervention has received equal attention. To

start with, one state cannot implement the use or threat of force on another entity freely

and without justification. Second, the existence of intergovernmental organizations has

been strongly limiting the actual use of force. Third, the expansion of human rights

conventions has been working in the benefit of non-intervention. It could be uphold that the

principle of non-intervention has been an extension of the traditional concepts of

sovereignty and a modern development in a cooperative direction (Cassese, 2005: 55).

Nonetheless, these international law provisions have created a heated debate on the

thresholds for intervention, regardless of its form. In a critical manner, Cassese explains that

intervention tends to produce political destabilization; instigating, fomenting and financing

unrest in a foreign country (Cassese, 2005: 55). Thus, international law stipulates certain

exceptions from the rule such as the decision of a stronger state to offer financial aid to a

weaker. This act, for example, is not considered to be an infringement of the non-


22

intervention principle as long as it does not coerce the receiving state to be in the

subordination of the former in terms of sovereign rights and foreign policy interests

(Cassese, 2005: 55).

Another related concept is known as forcible intervention (Cassese, 2005: 297). In this

case, interference is conducted in the internal or external affairs of a state by the use or

threat of force, to do something () in the interest of the intervening State (Cassese, 2005:

297). Examples of such interventions are known as naval blockades or embargoes, but they

are conducted under the flag of self-defence, or with the pretence of a state to protect its

own citizens. There is also the case for reprisals where a state reserves the right to intervene

in a foreign state on the premise that the latter committed unlawful acts. Overall, if a state

is violating international law it can either be excluded from a convention or treaty, or it may

be held responsible through the use of force (Cassese, 2005:299).

Another issue would be the extent to which states are allowed to use military force in

foreign territories, with the motivation of preserving the respect for human rights across

borders. In theory, Chapter VII on Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of

the Peace, and Acts of Aggression of the United Nations Charter contains provisions of

interference only through Security Council Resolutions (Charter of the United Nations).

Rosenau has finally argued for the basis of a strategic dimension of intervention which

tends to be leaning towards the delicate matter of national interest formulation. In this

sense, intervention is swiftly manipulated for justification when it comes to issues of vital

interests or security threats, since it has been difficult to assess the definitions of the latter.

Therefore, normative approaches of what constitutes to be a vital interest for one country


23

can be considered the opposite for another one and these subjective imperatives tend to

hurdle the scientific process of testing the hypotheses involving the concept of intervention.

Nonetheless, Rosenau concluded that using the national interest as a cause for intervention

is ambiguous and it needs further empirical measurements (Rosenau, 1969:157-158).

Lastly, the theoretical discussion on intervention deserves a reference to the newer

concept found in international law - responsibility to protect (R2P). There are two basic

principles. One is that the sovereignty of a state gives the responsibility to that entity to

protect and secure its citizens within its borders. The other principle is based on whether a

state is suffering from civil war, insurgency or state failure, and if the state is unable or

unwilling to counter this situation, then international law allows the principle of R2P to be

practiced despite the concept of non-intervention (ICISS, 2001).

R2P takes three dimensions. First, there is the responsibility to prevent people from

being afflicted by internal conflict. Second, the responsibility to react is practiced through

economic sanctions or military intervention. Third, the responsibility to rebuild is based on

offering recovery, reconciliation and reconstruction in cases of military intervention (ICISS,

2001).

In essence, the debate around both the concept of intervention and responsibility to

protect stems from the fact that the former is implemented by powerful states in the light

of perceived transnational threats and its just cause is interpreted in a rather volatile

manner. For example, any kind of intervention under the R2P principle should fulfil the just

cause threshold and the precautionary principles in order to justify military intervention.

In practice, the analysis of various cases such as Rwanda, Kosovo or Somalia have been


24

subject to debate as they did not uniformly fit to the concept of R2P or just intervention and

they more than often breached the sovereignty principle and worsened the situation by not

being able to follow all the protection stages stated under R2P.

A distinctive perspective of intervention has been observed through changes that took

place in the world system. There are two types of systemic changes which have been

identified as affecting the interactions between states. One is represented by the political

advocates for liberal democracy and freedom of trade, goods, people, technology and ideas

which grouped under the so-called notion of interdependence. This in turn opened a more

subtle, complex and sophisticated approach towards intervention (Evans and Newnham,

1998:278-281). The second type is represented by the intergovernmental organizations

which provided an international setting for states to suggest, propose for voting and adopt

interventionist policies (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 280).

The concept of intervention continues to be actively debated in the literature. The

effects of this debate are sometimes costly, since it cannot provide a justifiable and

commonly agreed roadmap for situations when intervention should be employed. This

section reviews the concept from different angles. The diverging perspectives on the use of

this policy instrument emphasize the fact that there is no common agreement which

justifies or dismantles intervention. Therefore, questions addressing the causes for

implementing such an action in the post-Cold War era, especially in failed states are valid

and somewhat quintessential in order to understand the forces governing the international

system in contemporary times.


25

B. Interdependence

The world after the Cold War has ceased to be based on ideological rivalry and political

competition. The liberal view emerged as promoting the image of an inside looking out

order where domestic legitimacy of institutions would propagate to other states and the so-

called liberal zone of peace will enlarge making war less likely (Burchill and Linklater, 2013:

59). At the same time, there have been positions which claimed that liberal states will not

engage in conflict with other structures alike or not even with non-liberal states with the

exception of legitimate self-defence (or in the defence of their legitimate allies), or

intervention in severe cases to protect human rights (Burchill and Linklater, 2013: 63).

Nonetheless, the challenge arises from the fact that intervention should not be limited to

humanitarian or self-defence explanations. This research aims to look beyond these over-

emphasized and generalized claims which are prevailing in official declarations and in the

literature and address in more depth the causes for intervention in the so-called failed

states.

Burchill and Linklater provide a useful image of how the spread of economy would give

states a new platform for negotiation. They argue that interdependence would replace

national competition and defuse unilateral acts of aggression and reciprocal retaliation

(2013: 66). For the purpose of incorporating this concept into a grand theoretical approach,

interdependence will be seen through the lens of liberal institutionalism.

Modern interdependence theory is associated with the concept of free trade and non-

tariff barriers. One example is represented by the economic integration of the European


26

Union which historically, provided an alternative to solving disputes between major powers

such as France and Germany. The idea behind this theory is that such a common framework

would bring more benefits to both parties involved rather than being a zero-sum game as it

is depicted in the realist view. The basis of this argument stems from the neo-liberal

assumption of absolute gains - what will gain me the most? (Burchill and Linklater, 2013:

67).

Modern interdependence theory also suggests that states cannot unilaterally control the

world developments while regimes known as sets of principles, norms, rules and decision

making procedures inhibit the behaviour of states. Thus, institutions and regimes provide a

setting for cooperation and stability, since parties involved in the process of

interdependence know what to expect from each other (Burchill and Linklater, 2013: 67).

In essence, the theory of interdependence suggests that states cannot afford to live in a

world characterized by autarky. The benefits of interdependence have been acknowledged

in the past decades and it is assumed that states would not attempt to endanger the

conditions of economic interdependence, because they are conscious about the penalties

which would bring over them. Although the theory assumes states are rational actors

functioning in an anarchic system, it is mainly based on the idea that international

institutions are preferred to foster cooperation and thus diminishing the effect of anarchy.

Keohane and Nye further developed the concept of interdependence by explaining that

seeking self-interest can also take other forms such as through membership in international

institutions. There is a rigorous view maintaining that conforming to the conduct and

demand of these global organizations reduces the effects of the self-help system and


27

replaces it with a higher degree of compliance and cooperation (Burchill and Linklater,

2013:67). They have also proposed a broader understanding on the notion of

interdependence during the 1970s. As a generality, officials consider that policies at the

domestic level should be adjusted to the world system of interdependence. As an analytic

concept, interdependence is considered to be a mutual dependence between two parties.

One important aspect is that this dependence is affected by external factors such as flows of

money, goods, services, people and communication (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 8).

Moreover, interdependence is inspired by the realist view, being presented as a cost-

benefit calculation. However, the benefits of such a relationship are difficult to quantify,

since the degree of uncertainty a priori is high and the effects are observed over long rather

than short-term periods. In the light of these characteristics, Keohane and Nye developed

two approaches sensitivity and vulnerability. They explain how a change of one party

which is engaged in the relationship of interdependence is more or less compelling the

other party to adjust accordingly depending on the change. The sensitivity approach

illustrates how influential are the effects of changes of one party affecting the other party

(Keohane and Nye, 2001: 10-16). For instance, if one assumes that state A is in a relationship

of economic interdependence with state B. State A suffers an economic break-down and

cannot deliver on commitments towards state B. State B depended on certain goods

imported from state A which now make them impossible to acquire. Such a situation reveals

the fact that state B is severely affected by the changes in state A.

The vulnerability approach measures the costs of adjusting to the change produced in

the relationship of interdependence. Therefore, states measure the alternatives they have


28

at hand and then make the decision most favourable to them. One limitation of this second

step is that even though policies are adjusted to changes, the effects can be observed in the

long-run as mentioned earlier. Keohane and Nye give the example of social vulnerabilities

where policies can be put into action faster. For parsimonious reasons, the examples of

state A and state B will be considered again. If state A suffers from a case of famine, and

there is a group protesting in state B for offering aid to the respective state in need, there

can be adopted and implemented a policy of sending food in that part of the world. In other

words, vulnerability is explained in the sense of how deeply are those changes affecting a

state that it is forcing it adjust to the new situation (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 10-16).

In an overall perspective these two approaches have been considered to function in

situations of asymmetrical interdependence where one state is less vulnerable than the

other and therefore it has more leverage in the bargaining game.

Ultimately, Keohane and Nye have tried to build an ideal concept known as complex

interdependence (2001: 20) characterized by multiple channels of communication

(interstate level, transgovernmental where states are the main actors, and transnational

through banks and corporations), an absence of hierarchy and cooperation prevailing over

the use of military force (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 21).

There is a key aspect of this concept which Burchill and Linklater have mentioned rather

concisely. They maintained how over time, and precisely because of cooperation the

possibility of conflict cannot be disregarded (Burchill and Linklater, 2013: 69).

Nonetheless, both Burchill and Linklater and Keohane and Nye make an interesting point

relevant for this research thesis by not dismissing the realist view that conflict is not an


29

option, especially in the case of economic interdependence. They all claim the fact that this

concept has been often manipulated over the history. Burchill and Linklater sustained that

over the time, the United States have been in the position of a growing superpower and

have more or less controlled the developments and norms of interdependence (2013: 69).

Furthermore, Keohane and Nye have offered two aspects which follow the claim that

conflict is still an option:

drastic social and political change could cause force again to become an important direct

instrument of policy, and even when elites interests are complementary, a country that uses

military force to protect another may have significant influence over the other country

(Keohane and Nye, 2001: 24).

Some examples are represented by the United States threat for intervention in the

beginning of the Cold War where this action prevented the countries in question

(Guatemala 1954; Dominican Republic 1965) to experience drastic regime changes which

were not in the interest of the United States (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 24-25).

On the one hand, it is a subtle agreement that under conditions of complex

interdependence, countries would not resort to force since costs and effects are rather

uncertain. However, when military power is employed, it means that vital interests or

national security are threatened and thus, the respective conditions would fall under the

realist paradigm. On the other hand, this research thesis would test whether the drastic

political changes in failing states, alters the relationship of interdependence they have with

other states in this case the United States and leads for the latter to adjust to such a

change in terms of resorting to force and thus, intervening in those states.


30

The reality of the post-Cold war has showed that failed states suffered such drastic

changes, and in this case they have become even more distanced from becoming members

of international institutions. Although such a membership would constrain their autonomy,

there is a realistic chance it would stabilize them and bent them towards cooperation, which

ultimately would offer them the benefits of interdependence.

In the end, theorizing economic interdependence is a useful tool for the

operationalization of the variables proposed by this research thesis. The manner in which

the concept is explained in the literature emphasizes the puzzle of the research question. In

other words, it is fair to assume that state failure is a threat to the system of economic

interdependence and it may cause a change to which countries such as the United States

have to adjust. How the United States decides to adjust in this situation is accentuated by

the use of military intervention. The theory is leaning towards the myriad of benefits and

the viability of cooperation earned through economic interdependence, but it does not rule

out conflict and intervention. Thus, this research thesis is offered a window of opportunity

to contemplate on whether the international system seeking the enlargement of the liberal

zone of peace, as portrayed in the literature, still has to overcome a new set of complex

problems which are unknown to decision-makers or experts. Failed states could be seen as

drastic changes challenging the order of the post-Cold War world and the protection of

economic interdependence might be a cause for military intervention.

C. The state as a Structural concept and the emergence of Failed States

1. The State


31

The discussion on the notion of failed states requires the introduction of the theoretical

pillar of what constitutes a state in the first place.

The international law provisions suggest that the people living within a given territory

must be bound to a central structure that exercises effective control over them (Cassese,

2005: 73). This central structure must enjoy independency from other external ones.

Another element is the territory which should not be under the influence, control or mere

interference of another sovereign State. The authorities which have acquired the territory

must also require effective possession and control over a territory (Cassese, 2005: 73).

Ultimately, a state must have a territory with well-defined boundaries, a population, a

government, and it should engage in the sphere of international diplomacy with other

entities (John, 2010).

Nonetheless, the debate on the structure of the state has received more foundational

definition starting from the claim that it has control over the developments happening

within well-defined boundaries.

Niccolo Machiavelli maintained how a ruler could conquer a territory by force and hold

on to it. Although this is a realist interpretation of the state, it provides a useful insight for

analysing the structural value of the state. Machiavelli goes on by explaining how the more

unified a territory, the more secure is its entity as a state. The ruler must foresee the risks

that might appear and must take pre-emptive measures to combat them. In other words, a

ruler must have a strategy when conquering a territory by force, due to the fact that

winning over a piece of land does not mean one could not lose it. The conqueror should win

over men of a territory and destroy those who oppose him. In fact, it is the proportional


32

relationship between the ruler and the ruled that keeps a state from falling into chaos.

There is a personal and institutional premise for state control. First, the dominated men

must both love and fear their prince (Machiavelli, 1999:35). The ruler must make himself

feared by the men he is dominating, but at the same time his behaviour must reflect

generosity and courage. Moreover, a ruler should not be hated by his citizens, especially in

hid endeavours of keeping them satisfied. Therefore, such an internal unified and strong

state considers external threats just another stepping stone to overcome. Second, the

military capabilities must be created from within the territory and be secured enough to

fight against external enemies. Furthermore, the matter of establishing power securely is

resolved through both personal charisma and institutional structures (Machiavelli, 1999:

35). The latter can be reiterated through the following: Good arms follow good laws

(Machiavelli, 1999:40). Finally, it is worth quoting the basic premises for building a state -

good laws, sound defence, reliable allies and inspiring leadership (1999:77).

In the twentieth century, Max Weber continued the debate on the concept of

statehood. In Politics as a Vocation Weber maintained that politics can be associated with

leadership and implicitly, with the concept of state. In other words, the leadership that

Weber refers to is based on a human community that has the monopoly of the legitimate

use of physical force (Weber, 1946: 78) In essence, the structure of a state is most of the

times determined by higher classes of men dominating the ones inferior to them. In this

sense, violence is considered to be legitimate (Weber, 1946). According to Weber,

domination is understood through the prism of authority. A group of people relate to the

authority governing them through the idea of obedience. This is made either through


33

custom, by affectual ties, by a purely material complex of interests, or by ideal

(wertrationale) motives (Weber, 1978: 212).

Weber developed three types of authority or legitimate domination. First, there is the

legal authority comprised of rules which people perceive as binding and thus, they obey this

type of authority. An alternate, but yet logical motive is that men fear the consequences of

not obeying these rules and at the same time, they expect to receive rewards for respecting

this legal authority. Second, the traditional authority is based on personal loyalty which

results from common upbringing (Weber, 1978: 227). This type of legitimate domination is

based on owed obedience to the leading master. Third, the charismatic authority is

accepted by men as they genuinely believe in the prowess and virtue of personal trust of

the leader (Weber, 1978: 216).

In sum, the modern state is associated with domination exerted within defined

boundaries as it is considered that such a structure can employ violence under legitimate

pretences. Weber explains that power is supported and achieved through violence, while

the evolution of the state has seen a shift towards distribution of power in order to further

legitimize the states actions. As such, the state is an organization for domination and

ultimately, gaining power requires a degree of education and a strong belief for the

interests of the power holders (Weber, 1946).

2. Failed States

A large part of the research on failed states had its starting point in one article published

by G.B. Helman and S. R. Ratner in Foreign Policy. They describe the emergence of a new


34

political form known as the failed nation-state in the post-Cold War era (Helman & Ratner,

1992). They explain how countries such as Haiti, Sudan or Somalia are struggling with civil

strife, government breakdown, and economic privation which leads to violence and

anarchy (Helman & Ratner, 1992). Consequently, such states were seen to be having spill-

over effects to neighbouring countries through refugee flows, political instability, and

random warfare (Helman & Ratner, 1992). The authors make the assumption that other,

more developed states tend to help for the fear that these problems might get out of

control by spreading to neighbouring nations. Countries from regions such as Africa, Asia or

Central America rank on top of the indexes measuring state failure. One explanation is the

period of decolonization when it was considered that such states will best achieve

independency without the interference of foreign powers. Nonetheless, the bipolar

international system during the Cold War encouraged the U.S. and the Soviet Union to seek

allies and thus, keeping the level of interference in developing and lower developed

countries mostly in the African and Asian region. This fact kept such entities dependent on

developed countries. In effect such actions proved to be counter-productive to their own

development, and in some cases it drove them into chaos (Helman & Ratner, 1992).

Rotberg has a rather Weberian approach where for a state to naturally function it must

provide political goods to its citizens in terms of security, border control, managing

domestic threats, and enabling citizens to solve their issues within the borders of the

territory without resorting to violence. A state fails if its internal authorities cannot

accomplish these requirements. Rotberg provides an understanding of what is in reality a

failed state through different arguments. First, the state is not able or willing to perform

the fundamental jobs of the nation-state and it implicitly finds itself on the road to failure


35

(Rotberg, 2003: 6). In this sense, the institutions are faulty, the education and health care

system are chaotic and absenteeism rises, literacy rates fall, diseases grow and spread;

and poverty increases. Second, the ruler or the ruling faction only enjoys the positive

outcomes because they benefit from the misery of the citizens through increasing

corruption rates and constant food shortages (Rotberg, 2003: 7-8). Third, the ultimate

phase of state failure is the loss of legitimacy when citizens revolt as their living standards

decrease, while the rulers become wealthier (Rotberg, 2002: 87-88). Thus, violence

becomes the norm as it is perceived to be a fair measure against the government (Rotberg,

2003: 9).

Krasner is defining failed states along similar lines as Rotberg and Helman and Ratner.

Therefore, he adds that states with a poor infrastructure, rising crime rates, declining GDP,

different currencies on the same territory, with armies that instigate to violence and which

are not controlled by the government, all represent entities where failure is very likely to be

achieved (Krasner, 2004).

This last theoretical section could be considered the last stop in the cycle of conceptual

explanation presented by this thesis. Naturally, one cannot describe what is understood

through a failed state without presenting the bases of a state. Moreover, state failure has

also been empirically measured, and although not all indexes follow the same parameters,

there is a common thread for detecting whether a state is failed or not. Failed states are the

main units of analysis. Consequently, this research thesis addresses the importance of

contemporary concerns posed by such states.


36

V. Hypotheses Development

The use of the United States military form of intervention in the post-Cold War

period stays at the core of this research thesis. Therefore, it is important to focus on the

practice of this particular policy instrument. On the basis of Rosenaus argument, the

operationalization of this variable should be assessed through the actual movement of one

states troops into another one. Such an approach would improve the theoretical debate as

it simplifies the complexity of intervention. In this sense, there would be a dissemination of

the cases and the concept would be explored in a more insightful manner (Rosenau, 1969).

The concept of failed states is the second element of focus in the research question.

In this sense, U.S. military intervention will be accounted for cases of failed states in the

post-Cold War period. In practice, this policy instrument was used in a selective manner and

it is safe to assume that the United States used a rational process of taking such action

based on intelligence analysis, evaluation of interests and alternatives. Undoubtedly, testing

hypotheses of concepts such as military intervention and failed states are not only abstract,

but also deeply debated in the literature to date.

This research will propose several premises regarding the causality of the United

States military intervention in failed states. To begin with, it is important to clarify the

variables of the research. The independent variable will be the economic interdependence

which is considered to be a cause for U.S. military intervention in failed states as a

dependent variable.


37


38

Dependent Variable: U.S. led Military Intervention

Independent Variable: Economic Interdependence

As a generality, there is a compelling argument for the causality proposed above:

Although liberals and democrats have often succumbed to the temptation to intervene to bring

civilization, metropolitan standards of law and order, and democratic government to foreign

peoples who have expressed no demand for them, these interventions find no justifications in a

conception of equal respect for individuals. (Doyle in Smith et. al., 2012).

This enunciation rejects the idea that interventions have been made for

humanitarian purposes and emphasizes the scope of this research thesis that is looking at

other layers of explanation which go beyond this reasoning at prima facie.

Taking into account the theoretical explanation for the concept of interdependence,

it is important to mention the subtle agreement existing in literature that under conditions

of complex interdependence, countries would not resort to force since costs and effects are

rather uncertain. In turn, when military power is employed, it means that vital interests or

national security are threatened and thus, the respective conditions could be explained

better through the realist paradigm. Nonetheless, this research thesis is testing whether the

drastic political changes in various states mentioned by Keohane and Nye and presented in

the Theory Sectionleading them on the path of failure, alters the relationship of

interdependence they have with other states in this case the United States. In such a


39

situation, a general assumption would be that the United States adjust to such a change in

terms of resorting to force and thus, intervening in those states.

The reality of the post-Cold war showed that failed states suffered such drastic

changes, and they became even more distanced from becoming members of international

economic institutions. Although such a membership would constrain their autonomy, it is

assumed it would give them an incentive for internal stabilization and consequently, would

bend them towards cooperation.

Drawing on the main attributes of the modern interdependence theory proposed by

Keohane and Nye the United States will be considered as being State A and the Failed State

where military intervention occurred as State B. There will be presented some general

assumptions of this research thesis before resuming to the main hypotheses.

The United States need to be able to cooperate with failed states. Due to the fact

that these failed states are characterized by internal chaos, it is difficult for the United

States to find factions in those countries prone to dialogue. Furthermore, the fact that failed

states are outside the globalized economy and thus, outside of the global influence

propagated by the United States, adds to their list of perceived national security threats.

Considering all other viable alternatives, the United States had chosen to militarily intervene

in some states. The use of this policy instrument was due because state failure represented

a change perceived as having expensive effects on the economic interdependence

controlled by America. Such an intervention could be assumed to have been conducted on

the premise that it would bring order into chaos before the system of economic


40

interdependence is altered and later integrate these states into the global economy,

implicitly contributing to their development.

In the light of these ideas, there have been developed the following hypotheses:

H1. H1. If one of the national security interests of State A is defined as protecting its

relations of economic interdependence, then it is likely that military intervention will take

place in State B in order to prevent disruptions in the regional stability which may negatively

affect State As relation of economic interdependence with State B and/or its neighbours.

H2. The longer is State B left into chaos, the greater will State As vulnerability be and thus,

it will trigger military intervention as a direct reaction to States B failure.


41

VI. Research Design

The analysis of this research thesis will focus on two case studies. These have the

goal to confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses proposed in the previous section. In this

respect, the primary units of analysis will be comprised of two states as unitary actors.

Objectively, the choice follows the theoretical guideline proposed in the previous chapters.

The two states must fulfill two conditions. First, they should be considered failed at the time

of the intervention. Second, the intervention is identified in the theoretical structure of this

thesis as being military. In this sense, there must be proof of actual movement of troops in

the failed states in question.

Therefore, the two major units of analysis for testing the proposed hypotheses are

represented by U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992-1994 and by the U.S. intervention in

Afghanistan in 2001-present. The analysis aims at finding whether it is a causal relationship

between the concept economic interdependence and military intervention.

Somalia and Afghanistan represent two interesting choices for the operationalization

of the variables in this thesis. There are two perspectives for this choice: one which

considers the regional geopolitical framework and a technical one. First, the regions where

these states are located show evidence for U.S. strategic interests. Somalia is the Horn of

Africa a zone of political and economic turmoil, and Afghanistan is in Central Asia and used

to represent a passage way for trade routes with other parts of the world, being also a

resourceful country. The second perspective is based on a technical approach. Both cases


42

represent a small-N study and it makes the analysis parsimonious. The ultimate goal is to

explore in-depth the causal mechanism between economic interdependence and military

intervention in failed states.

The research design will follow three observational parameters. First, it will be

presented a historical overview of the states discussed. Evidence showed that this aspect

plays an important factor for explaining state failure and economic interdependence.

Second, observations for state failure will be assessed accounting for a time span of five

years (plus/minus three years according to available data) prior to the actual intervention.

The four main aspects covering this section are political shocks, economic shocks, public

goods and the level of violence. The last part will cover observations based on the dyadic

relationship between U.S. and Somalia and U.S. and Afghanistan. The three perspectives

analyzed are the concept of geopolitics (natural resources, strategic position), the process of

military intervention, and interdependence assumed to benefit all parties.

A. Historical Overview of Somalia and Afghanistan

Somalia was under Siad Barres dictatorship from 1969 until 1991. He gained power of

the territory in a bloodless coup, after the assassination of Abdi Rashid Ali Shermanke the

only president elected by the Somali citizens. Barres regime started to fall apart when

opposition movements rose against his leadership. These movements increased in intensity,

ultimately, forcing Barre to give up power (BBC, 2013).

Historically, the Somali society has always been divided. The population is known to be

nomadic and organized in clans all over the territory. This structural separatist framework


43

brought along different languages, social hierarchies, and cultures. During the colonial

times, the leadership tried to impose a centralized government. However, only during the

1960s Mogadishu became Somalias capital and there were created central institutions such

as the parliament. In addition, the adoption of a constitution during the same time period

allowed for political freedom and competition. This also permitted the appearance of an

endless number of parties. When Siad Barre took over, the constitution and all its provisions

were prohibited and the political organization followed a one party system namely - the

Somali Revolutionary Party (Clarke, 1992: 12). Also, the new regime was influenced by an

Islamist and socialist vision (Ahmed and Green, 1999: 117).

The power apparatus in Somalia has always been extremely decentralized; pastoralism

and farming being the predominant economic activities and people identifying themselves

with the clans they were part of. Comparatively, both colonial leaders and Siad Barre gravely

misunderstood the Somali society. Moreover, Somalia did not share a common national

identity. Therefore, the outcome which followed the fall of Barres regime was not

surprising. Anarchy characterized by ethnic conflict became the status quo in Somalia. In

other words, the imposition of centralized institutions accelerated the incidence of internal

conflicts. Moreover, when local leaders took over, they did not know how to employ the

concept of rule of law, equality or basic democratic values which theoretically aimed at

ensuring the populations with a decent standard of living to say the least. Instead, they

made use of their power to increase their personal well-being, instead of projecting it onto

the society as a whole (Coyne and Leeson, 2010: 4-5). In addition, despots such as Barre

showed contempt towards his own citizens through widespread repression, arbitrary


44

arrest, torture and murder. He became one of the most extravagant human rights

violators (Clarke, 1992: 12).

More importantly, Somalia has never had friendly relations with neighbouring nations.

During Barres regime, it engaged in a war with Ethiopia with the purpose of reuniting the

territories lived by the Somali population under the same flag. This is an eloquent example

of Barre disregarding Somalias societal organization of clanships. In essence, these actions

brought Somalia one step closer to failure (Clarke, 1992:12).

Afghanistan has been characterized by a similar societal structure as Somalia. Due to its

tribal nature, Afghanistan has constantly experienced difficulties in establishing a central

government and when it did, it was due to invasions rather than an internal local decision-

making. During the 1970s, the economy was poor, but autarkic. From 1979 until 1989, the

country lost its economic and political structures as a result of the Soviet Invasion (U.S.

Army of Military History, 2006). The post-Cold War era worsened Afghanistans situation.

Although the Soviet Union withdrew its troops, the country stopped receiving funds from

both the Russians and the U.S. The state succumbed into a dreadful civil war between

different ethnical factions. Some of these are worth mentioning such as Uzbeks, Tajikis or

Pasthuns (Library of Congress Country Studies, 1997). In contrast to the limited basic needs

such as fuel or food, Afghanistans stockpiles of armament were incredible (Library Of

Congress Country Studies, 1997). The remaining officials in the government were struggling

to pay off the opposition factions in order not to attack Kabul and to keep safe public goods

such as roads or towns (Library Of Congress Country Studies, 1997).


45

Consequently, Afghanista

dynamics of intervention in failed states in the post cold war era

Documents