dynamics india's security and foreign policy: responding ... · south asian domestic milieu...

Dynamics of India's Security and Foreign Policy:

Responding to Challenges of South Asian Domestic Milieu

Nalini Kant Jha*

To stress that security and foreign policy of a country cannot remain unaffected by its domestic environment is to state the obvious. Admittedly, foreign policy capability and security of a state crucially depend upon a healthy and progressive domestic environment. A state plagued with poverty and other indicators of economic backwardness, social conflicts, size, and adverse geographical location, lacking a sense of national pride, and poor leadership can rarely play a significant role in international relations'. At the same time, domestic environment prevailing in neighbouring countries too affects state security and foreign policy in various ways.

77ieairflwr,a Professor of liitenlafioiznl Relnfionsaiid Director ofSorrt1iet-n Asin Stirdies Program at P o n d i c h y Central University, is nirreittly a Visiting Fulbrighf Profrssor at fhe School ofAdvniiced Intmurtiorinl Stirdies of Johns Hopkins University, Wnshingfon DC.

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The Post-Cold War Context The significance of domestic sources of insecurity and challenges to foreign policy all the more increased in the post- Cold War era, as the rise of sub-nationalism and terrorism complicated these challenges for any country in general and Third World countries like India in particular? For, if on the one hand, the end of super-power rivalries, which had complicated regional conflicts in the Third World, contributed to a diminution of these conflicts, the 'decompression' effect of the end of the Cold War, on the other hand, also gave a fillip to linguistic, religious and communal tensions, which were dormant and overlaid with Cold War rivalries and the earlier colonial dominance over the Third World. Their release exacerbated domestic conflicts in developing countries deriving from the plethora of ethno- nationalist, socio-economic and communal-religious reasons. This is clear from the enumeration of major conflicts, published annually by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), since the Cold War abated; it confirms that intra-state conflicts greatly outnumber inter- state conflicts. The SIPRI Yearbook 2000 on Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, for instance, reports that out of 27 major armed conflicts that raged in 25 countries during J999, only two were inter-state conflicts, namely, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and India-Pakistan over Kashmir. The mitigation of rivalries between the two superpowers and the disappearance of block politics thus shifted the focus of conflict from the external to internal sphere and, more certainly, to the Third World.

In addition, if domestic environment means the situation within the jurisdiction of a sovereign state, then it must be submitted that this sovereignty itself stands compromised in many ways after the Cold war. One can easily notice the

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shrinking space of state and sovereignty due to both external and internal factors. External factors include globalisation of economy, emergence of strong regional organisa tions, rise of interdependent issues of terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, human rights, etc., tackling of which need external cooperation. Internal factors, on the other hand, include rise of sub-nationalism, liberalisation of economy, emergence of non-governmental organisations as strong actors, and above all, explosion of knowledge and democratic aspiration due to the revolution in information technology, which, in turn, has led to increasing questioning of traditional authorities including state. The erosion of the authority and sovereignty of state thus reflects, to an extent, an explosion of awareness, aspirations, and identities brought by the technological advancements.

All the consequences of this triple explosion of knowledge, aspirations and identities for South Asia, the most populous region of the world, are of course, not n e g a t i ~ e . ~ This, however, has also created new and intensified prevailing social tensions, which have taken the forms of agitations and protest movements on the one hand, and violent conflicts and organised insurgencies, on the other, along religious, political and ethnic lines. While agitations and protest movements are part of political process and have to be addressed by the governments within the given framework of political and administrative decisions, the insurgencies and violent conflicts threaten to tear the structure of the state apart.

If the globalisation and liberalisation of economy, emergence of interdependent issues such as democracy, human rights, and environment, etc., and revolution in Information Technology (IT) have, strengthened the triple explosion of awareness, aspirations and identities, these transformations

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have also weakened the governing capabilities of weak governments. Consequently, though external or military threats to a nation’s territory have receded and compulsion to seize territory for obtaining resources is no longer the driving force, internal dissent and claims to ‘autonomy and ethnic recognition by sub-national entities have intensified. These claims are forcefully being pushed though armed conflict.

This uniquely affects India and South Asia. India is unique in the region by virtue of sharing a border with each of the SARRC states-ther than the Maldives-while none of the others shared a border with each other till the inclusion of Afghanistan in November 2005. This coincidence is compounded by the presence in each of the states of the region of population segments, which have ethnic and communal linkages with population elements in the other. In other words, Indo-centric nature of South Asia, i.e., India’s predominance in the region in terms of geographical size, strategic location, natural resource, economic and technological advancement, and political stability as well as India’s close geographical, societal and cultural linkages with her neighbours, make domestic turmoil in India’s neighbourhood influence her security environment and foreign policy. Besides, unlike the West, where nation- building took place before state-building, South Asian states are trying to build up political nations after forming state in the post-colonial era. The task of nation-building is therefore still in progress and it is in this sense that that domestic dimensions of security and foreign policy in South Asia assume critical significance. This paper, attempts to briefly examine the implications of domestic milieu prevailing in South Asian states’for security and foreign policy of India.

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Dynamics of India’s Security and Fmeign Policy: ...

Domestic Milieu in South Asia Most of the South Asian states are beset with domestic problems of various kinds, degrees and intensities, having implications across borders. Almost all of them are confronted with the challenging task of not only safeguarding their territorial integrity but also creating stable political structures, which can accommodate a bewildering range of ethnic, linguistic and religious groups. Most of them have a150 inherited unevenly developed social and economic structures. The process of nation-building in South Asia was, since their independence, accompanied by fierce competition for scarce resources, generating uneven political, economic and cultural development among different ethno-linguistic and religious groups. The concentration of economic resources and political power among a privileged few only served to deepen the existing contradictions in all South Asian societies on regional, ethnic and religious lines. Under the circumstances, the task of nation-building was rendered more difficult by increasing quest by the less privileged groups for more equitable participation in the nation- building process on the one hand and the dominant elites’ apathy to the legitimate aspiration of such groups for their share, on the other. Pressures from diverse ethnic, linguistic and religious groups steadily acquired increasing political and economic manifestations. It is thus essentially the political and economic demands of minority groups or deprived sections of the society for political representation and resource allocation, often mobilised on ethnic lines, which lie at the root of growing polarisation in all countries of South Asia. The assertion of ethnic nationalism, basically a function of complex interaction of politico-economic changes in society, haspver the years become more strident with greater incidence of internecine violence between

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communities, religions and ethnic groups: Had there been visionary statesmen at the helm of affairs in these countries, they could have retrieved the situation to a large extent. Unfortunately, inability of ruling elites to mediate conflicts for their narrow and short-term gains has compounded the problem by eroding the legitimacy of political class in these countries.

This has complicated the task of bridging ethnic and sectarian divides within South Asian countries. The task of nation- building has thus been rendered more difficult by the state’s role in managing the complexities of integrating heterogeneous groups in the mainstream of a nation’s policy. The response of state to diverse ethno-national demands has either been vacillating or inadequate. In several cases, misdirected policies of deliberately undermining the ethnic, linguistic and religious identities or minorities in the face of entrenched majoritarin interest/identity have only caused concern to the minorities regarding their own future in the existing political set up. in some cases, short sighted policies of seeking single national identity by assimilation of disparate identities through suppression of cultural pluralism has led to internecine violence between religious communities and ethnic groups with alarming frequency. Not surprisingly, almost all South Asian states are confronted with challenges emanating from diverse ethno-linguistic and religious groups. Sustained and at times militant assertion of ethno-sectarian forces poses a serious challenge to nation- building in these countries. Quest for identity on the basis of religion and ethnic consciousness is sharpening ethnic strife and conflict.

It is relevant to note in this context that ethnicity per say is not a problem for &e security of a state. It becomes a security issue only when it is politicised. In the case of politicisation

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of ethnic groups, which consists of cross-country migrants, security risks are of three types. It may, in the long run, pose a direct threat to the state by initiating ethno-regionalism or creating local political and social tensions in pursuance of their interests. The domination of the migrant ethnic community in particular region may give rise to conflict between local people and outsiders. The local people may resist the economic and political rights of the migrant community. Since these migrants have cross-county ethnic affiliation, it may therefore lead to the involvement of their counterparts across the national boundaries or even a direct confIict between the concerned states. In general the politicisation of ethnic groups may lead to: disruption of socio-economic and political structures; creation of law and order problem and other troubles such as arms and drug trafficking; social and political tensions between migrants and the local people; involvement of politicised ethnicity in local politics; competition between locals and outsiders thereby disrupting the social harmony; and paving a way for the interference of external powers in regional affairs. In the case of South Asia, the situation is quite complex because of ethnic, religious and linguistic overlap between different states of the region?

Not surprisingly, the increasing role of the ethnic diasporas in supporting and funding ethnic wars has assumed critical proportions in South Asia, especially in the case of Sri Lanka’s Tamils and the Kashmiri Muslims. Accordingly, no South Asian domestic conflict is confined internally. Each one of them has external, neighbourhood spill over. Depending on the nature of bilateral relations and the phases of evolving conflicts, support and encouragement have flown to the internal conflicts from the neighbourhood. On the other hand, neighbouring countries too have been adversely

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affected by such conflicts. In addition to external dimensions of ethnic conflicts in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Sri-Lanka, insurgents in India’s northeast, too, have got support from external forces. There are, for instance, reports of arms and money flowing to Bodo, United Liberation Front for Assam (ULFA) and Naga insurgents through private channels from China through Myanmar. On the whole, South Asia is characterised by weak political institutions, internal strife, backwardness, poverty and terrorism, the problem of border management, illegal immigration thus making it an unstable region, which in turn adversely affects economic cooperation in the region.

India: Confronting the Challenges of Separatism, Terrorism and Governance

India though tallest among all South Asian countries in many respects, too, is afflicted by internal conflicts and problems, which have a bearing on its security and foreign policy. Though this country has so far sustained a credible democratic federal framework and managed to defuse pressures from diverse and contending religious/linguistic and cultural groups, it is finding it increasingly difficult to do so. Questions of restructuring union-state relations and demands for greater autonomy for states are gaining salience in the political discourse. Indian federation is getting frayed at the edges as it comes under increasing pressure from diverse quarters. The dawn of coalition era, though not an unwelcome development in itself, has considerably weakened the federal authority and the federal government’s dependence on regional parties having ethnic linkages with neighbouring countries has forced it to countenance, to an extent, ethnic separatism and terrorism6 Growing demands by states for substantive autonomy are making for strains on the existing federal structure. Incipient threats to Indian

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federal polity are increasingly coming to the fore with Kashmir and to an extent the Northeast representing the extreme instance of such threats.’

Ethnic and religious conflicts in India, for instance, not only erode foreign policy capability of the country by sapping its attention and energy in managing these conflicts, but these discords also enable India‘s hostile neighbours to exploit these internal turmoils to the great detriment of its interests. Internal conflicts apar tJ narco-terrorism, crime-poli tics nexus, crisis of governance, and erosion of values leading to all- pervading corruption including corruption in defence purchases and, economic disparity are another internal sources of insecurity in India. In other words, the domestic sources of India’s security concerns include: insurgency; terrorism and religious fundamentalism; communalism and related riots which affect our image outside; caste discrimination that has acquired international dimension especially in the context of the conference of the World Social Forum; child labour; women empowerment, AIDS; the role of the press and intellectuals; growing political and social unrest; fragility of successive weak federal governments; progressive decline of political institutions; growing criminal-political nexus; and worsening law and order situation across the country; corruption; growing regional disparities; and rising expectations of people that the system can hardly cope with; the role of the NGOs that lack required transparency with regard to their sources of funding and have become an important instrument for interfering in a country’ internal affairs; and of course the new paradigm that is sought to be imposed and that has increased external intervention in the name of human rights?

Finally, the image of Iqdia as a soft state has been one of the significant reasons behind several security problems

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confronting the country. On the one hand, the state ignores genuine demands for autonomy and good governance, it surrenders to dictates of terrorists and fundamentalists on other. In spite of having the largest army, it has not been able to manage its borders well. This has partly been because of the inefficiency and partly because of its federal structure?

Pakistan: Road-Blocks to Peace and Cooperation

The domestic environment in Pakistan includes the mindset of the rulers of that country built around two-nation theory;I0 military rules and the weak democracy; Islamic fundamentalism and the terrorist infrastructures; and of course, the centrality of Kashmir in their relationship with India. There has been a perception of Pakistan as a failed state and hence the danger of nuclear proliferation. Traditional sectarian and ethnic conflicts apart, the present Pakistani military ruler Pervez Musharraf's strategic decision to align with the West to dismantle its own creation in Afghanistan has generated extremist backlash against the government in Pakistan. As preoccupation of Pakistani rulers with the politics of sustenance and survival at home, and fragile economy of Pakistan have often influenced that country's policy towards India, General Musharraf too '

cannot be expected to tailor his India policy disregarding his compulsions of political survival.

This is evident from his unwillingness or inability to dismantle terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan, which was created in the period when the US was financing resistance to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan in the 198Os, and that infrastructure was later diverted towards India, especially, Jammu & Kashmir after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan andof course after the collapse of Soviet Union.

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There is this whole mind set that has developed in Pakistan around the Kashmir issue, very carefully and studiously nurtured by the Pakistani regimes so as not to allow the reconciliation between India and Pakistan.

It is, of course, heartening to note that of late General Musharraf has been talking in a different tone. He has now reciprocated India’s peace initiative and expressed willingness to solve the border dispute between the two counties not by changing the borders on the basis of religion but by making the borders irrelevant through cross-border travel and trade. The expression of this view, manifested in a joint India-Pakistan statement issued during General Musharraf‘s New Delhi visit in April 2005, has however evoked an unusually hostile reaction in Pakistan, in part because of the perception that Islamabad has conceded too much. When changing the country’s external borders has been an article of faith for decades in Pakistan, the General’s call for the border to be made irrelevant understandably caused consternation among many in Pakistan. He has also come under fire for suggesting, while in New Delhi, that the separatist leaders were marginal to the bilateral dialogue process.

Even liberal elements in Pakistan are finding it hard to deal with his declaration that Kashmir cannot be resolved on the basis of religion and that borders have to be made irrelevant for the ultimate solution. While the peace elements have no quarrel with the General’s quest for peace with India, their main worry is over what are increasingly seen as ’unilateral,’ though much needed corrections, in Pakistan’s India policy. They are concerned over the sustainability of such a policy without involvement of various stakeholders, nurtured by the establishment for decades.”

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Those elements within Pakistan, who have so far been brought up on the staple of “Kashmir batzega Pakistan” (Kashmir will become Pakistan), are feeling restless as the establishment unveils elements of its new approach to India. As a result, there is a growing feeling that the military establishment is in a great hurry to buy peace with India under external pressures. A meeting of the Kashmir representatives chaired by President Musharraf before his India visit in April, best illustrates this point. Most of the Kashmiri representatives at the meetirig wanted to know why an impression has been allowed to gain ground that Pakistan was in haste and why ’unilateral’ concession were being made to New Delhi. A defensive Musharraf merely appealed to them to have trust in him.I2 This clearly shows the dangers ahead in India and Pakistan’s march on the road to peace.

As regards India, its interest lies in encouraging of modernist forces in Pakistani society. It is in this sense that New Delhi’s recent decision to allow Gen. Musharraf to play host to the Hurriyat leaders in Islamabad and other cities of Pakistan for a whole fortnight, needs to be commended. This is likely to help the General to fend off domestic critics whose cries of ”sell-out” help none. New Delhi’s decision to allow the Hurriyat to visit Pakistan is thus a major and dramatic confidence-building measure. It is low in risk and high in symbolism and will allow General Pervez Musharraf to tell Pakistani public that India too is prepared to display new thinking on Kashmir. The fact that the predecessor government in New Delhi led by the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) had initiated the current peace process between India and Pakistan and the Leader of the Opposition in India, L K Advani, has extended strong support to this peace process during his recent tour to Pakistan reflect domestic consensus

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within India about beginning a new chapter in India-Pakistan relations. Though Advani invited the ire of his own Party and its associates, known as the Sarzgli Pmivnr, an average Indian’s longing for peace with Pakistan did not allow New Delhi to go on brinkmanship after bomb attack by the terrorists during the eve of the Deepavali this year (2005). This should help the General to allay apprehensions in this regard within his own country. New Delhi’s prompt offer of help to victims of earthquake in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir too showed India’s eagerness to change the contours of its ties with Pakistan. While General Musharraf was hesitant to accept Indian help, his domestic concerns are understandable.

Nepal: The King’s Follies Amidst Maoist Rebellion

The domestic environment of Nepal in characterised by a poor democratic base; Maoist insurgency; lack of development and low per capita income. This Himalayan state is also plagued with the problems of infiltration; a number of mosques and Mndnrsns have come up there; and there is a thriving smuggling business. Nepal is passing through a turbulent phase in its history marked by continuously expanding influence of the Maoists, political uncertainties and growing international interests. As to the domestic crisis in Nepal, suffice it to say here that on the one hand, the Maoists have been successful in gradually pushing their agenda through violence and intimidation; on the other hard, concentration of power in the hands of King Gyanendra, and the disarray among the political leadership have aggravated the domestic turmoil in Nepal.I3

In fact, the King has been more interested in exploiting the situation in his favour than showing prudence and

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statesmanship in dealing with the Maoists rebels. First he dissolved Nepal's parliament on 22 May, 2002, and then dismissed the Sher Bhadur Deuba government in October that year accusing him of being incompetent in running the government. While street rallies and protests organised by main opposition parties forced him to repeatedly change his nominated prime ministers, the inability of these parties to come out with a consensus candidate for the post of prime minister during the interim period strengthened his p~sition. '~ He used the inability of the Deuba government (which was reinstalled in June 2004) to tame the Maoists to once again dismiss it and impose emergency in February this year. Though the King announced the lifting of emergency in Nepal on 29* April 2005, i.e., soon after his meeting with the Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, in Jakarta, he hasnot yet withdrawn the draconian executive orders suspending fundamental rights. The King is governing the country directly and incarcerated political leaders continue to languish in jails. He is doing all these in the name of controlling the Maoists, but this has enabled them to gain more legitimacy and strength, as the authoritarian measures of the King have turned the ire of political parties against the King rather than the Ma~ists. '~

Needless to add, India that shares a 1,5000-km-long border, which is open and porous, as well as close social ties with Nepal, cannot remain unaffected by domestic turbulence in Nepal. This is especially true in the context of Nepal's Maoist rebels, who have an anti-India bias. The document adopted at the third plenum of the CPN (M) central committee in March 1995 had declared that the armed struggle was specifically against "Indian imperialism." It also voiced opposition to the recruitment of Gurkha soldiers in the Indian army. It is alleged'that the Maoists are being trained by the



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ex-Gurkhas of the Indian army. Further, the Maoists demand the abrogation of India-Nepal Treaty of 1950 and the Mahakali Treaty.

Moreover, the Maoists, masquerading under various names such the People War Group (PWG) and Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), are very active in Indian states such as Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Sikkim and Assam. The other side of the coin is that the Nepali Maoists, as and when under pressure from the army, try to escape to adjacent Indian territories and seek sanctuary in the hideouts.16 The arrests of top Maoists leaders last year (2004) in Silliguri and Patna clearly indicated their links with Indian militants. As the Director General of Police of Sikkim, T. N. Tensing, observed that they are aware with the likelihood of a spillover of Maoists from Nepal into border states like Sikkim and West Bengal. This forced these states to sound an alert to check infiltration of these rebels into the Indian territory.” By establishing its linkages within India, the Maoists in combination with the PWG and MCC are thus in a position tq pose security threat to at least four Indian mainland states.

The Maoist insurgents in Nepal have also forced some Indian companies to move out of Nepal. A host of top Indian firms led by Dabur. and ITC temporarily shut down operations in Nepal after Maoist rebels bombed a luxury hotel in August 2004 raising fear about safety of conducting business in the Himalayan kingdom. The attack came on the eve of a deadline set by the rebels to shut down 10 companies including Nepal’s oldest Indian luxury hotel, accusing them of adopting unfair labour practices, which these companies denied.I8

The socio-political turmoil in Nepal has thus a spill over effect . -

in India. The anti-India sentiments of the Maoist rebels, the

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unbridled use of India-Nepal border by the Maoists for shelter, training, supplies and arms smuggling, and their deepening linkages with the Indian left-wing extremist and Northeast extremist groups pose serious security threat to India. Further, there is apprehension that Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), active in border areas, could forge links with the Maoists to destabilise the region.

Not surprisingly, India has been extending both moral and material support to Nepalese authorities in their fight against the Maoist menace. With political turbulence rocking Nepal and political parties decaying, India, under the NDA rule, saw a clear interest in preserving the institution of monarchy as a stabilising force in the restive Himalayan state. India’s then minister for external affairs and defence, Jaswant Singh, therefore, visited Nepal in August 2001 to establish personal rapport with the new King, Gyanendra. Besides, India extended diplomatic support to declaration of emergency in Nepal in November 2001 and condemned violence by the Maoists.lg Soon after the collapse of the ceasefire in Nepal in November 2001, the then prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, had talked to his Nepalese counterpart, Deuba, and assured India‘s full support and cooperation to Nepal at all levels in meeting the challenges posed by the Maoists. New Delhi declared, including the Indian, Maoist groups as terrorists and increased action against them. India supplied helicopters that the Nepali security forces required immediately in meeting the challenges. The border areas were kept on ”high alert” to check the movements of the Maoists. Their possible hideouts in the border districts and towns were searched, and some of the Maoist activists, who were undergoing treatment, were handed over to the Nepali police.

When the then. Nepalese prime minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba, visited India in March 2002, New Delhi offered him

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help to face the ongoing insurgency in Nepal. But at the same time it clearly expressed its desire to see him address its concerns about misuse of Nepalese territory and hospitality by some forces inimical to India’s national interest. The Nepalese leader reportedly showed his sensitivity to India’s concerns about the Himalayan kingdom’s vulnerability to penetration by some anti-India forces. Both the countries decided to intensify their efforts and cooperation to combat terrorism and cross-border crimes including sharing intelligence and information regarding the terrorists‘ movements.20 The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in India thus showed no hesitation in endorsing the steps taken by the Nepalese government to contain the Maoists.

The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, which came in to power in India in May 2004 continued with policy of the previous government. The Joint Statement issued at the end of the visit of the Nepalese Prime Minister, Sher Bhadur Deuba, to India in September 2004, for instance, reiterated determination of the countries in combating terrorism and further intensifying cooperation in curbing the activities of the extremists and terrorists. In response to India’s expression of concern over the increasing anti-India activities of Pakistan‘s IS1 and the Dawood Ibrahim gang in Nepal, Deuba assured India of Nepal’s determination not to allow any anti-India activities in Nepal. This prompted New Delhi to agree on gth September for upgrading its security assistance to Nepal, including a fresh consignment of military hardware, training to Royal Nepalese Army and intelligence sharing between the two countries?’ This made the Nepalese Maoists to launched a scathing attack against India. In a press statement posted in their party website (www.cpnm.org), the CPN (M) Chairman, Prachand, said that Indian

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"expansionism" backed by US imperialism was directly impinging on the "people's war" launched by the Maoists in Nepal.

The Indian government had to face the dilemma when the King imposed emergency in Nepal in February this year. Since this step invited the ire of the Maoists as well as all democratic political parties in Nepal, the present regime in New Delhi rightly suspended military aid to Nepal. This was in consonance with India's long cherished tradition of opposing autocratic rule in India's neighbourhood. At the same time, this policy enabled India not only to align with democratic parties and intelligentsia in Nepal, but also avoided needlessly alienating the Maoists. As the UPA government rightly realised that Maoists cannot be tamed by military action alone, it did not hesitate to abandon its half-century old policy of bilateralism in its dealing with Nepal and built a common front with the US, UK and European Union to bring additional pressure to bear on the King to restore democracy and allow the political leaders to resume negotiations with Maoists?*

Within three months of this bold move to use its leverage in Nepal to make the King see reason, the UPA government, however, made a U-turn in its Nepal policy. Not only Prime ,

Minister, Manmohan Singh, met King Gyanendra in Jakarta in April 2005, he even promised to expedite the delivery of arms suspended at the time of royal coup. But what India got in return? As stated earlier, though the King announced lifting of emergency, he did not annul draconian executive orders suspending fundamental rights. Worse, the two countries learned about the U-turn in India's policy only from the King, who chose to make public Manmohan's assurances to him during the+ Jakarta meeting. It took the Government of India 17 days to confirm something that the Nepalese

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monarch had already announced. While constraints of time and space prohibit us from going into reasons for this volt face in India’s Nepal policy, suffice to point here is that this dangerous flip flop is a betrayal of the Nepalese political parties’ struggl for the restoration of democracy.23

India’s ill-advised decision to resume supply of arms to Nepal has provided a shot in the arms for the King. Spurred on by New Deli’s benediction, the Nepalese security forces are likely to go all out to find bloody ’military solution’ to the Maoists question, and intimidate democratic opponents and critics into the bargain. India’ decision to go back to playing ball with King Gyanendra could increase disarray in the democratic camp. This is why the Kind was so eager to go public about the Indian U-turn immediately after his Jakarta meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The arms matter less to him than the legitimacy India has bestowed on him and his not-so-secret a project to turn the clock back to the bad old days of the Pnnchaynf system.

Despite the direct threat to India by the Maoist insurgents of Nepal, a military intervention by New Deli is not a real option. India would gain little by getting embroiled in a prolonged anti-guerrilla operation in a neighbouring country. India must not forget the lessons learnt from its ill- advised policy of dispatching the Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Sri Lanka in 1987 for bringing peace and protecting the Tamil minority, which invited the ire of both the Singhalese as well as the Tamil groups in Sri Lanka leading to the assassination of former Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi by Tamil extremists. In any case, the Nepalese, fiercely proud of their own military traditions, would not like Indian troops on their soil. The manner in which the Palace that controls the army in Nepal, reacted to suggestions of Indian military help to beat the blockade by Maoists in

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August 2004,25 is a useful pointer to which way the wind blows on this question. Any move to go against this would only give added voice to the anti-Indian constituency in Nepal. Under the circumstance, India can only insist that Nepal gets its act together in resolving the insurgency as quickly as possible. Since the Maoist insurgency has real economic and social roots and this problem cannot be solved only by use of force, New Delhi must employ all of its diplomatic skills to persuade the King to make up with the political parties and jointly deal with the Maoist menace. Nepal's fractious political parties too must show more unity of purpose than they have done so far. It is heartening to note that political parties and the Maoists are gradually coming towards a common platform for restoration of democracy in Nepal.

Bhutan: Setting an Ideal Precedent Another Himalayan State, Bhutan, too is facing domestic problems in the form of ethnic democratic movement launched by the Bhutanese people of Nepalese origin. In 1990, these Bhutanese dissidents launched a movement against the royal government of Nepal. A large number of these people went to Nepal where they stayed in refugee camps. Some of them came to India. Rongthong Kunley Dorji is such a Bhutanese dissident. He claims to be the Chairman of five party United Front for Democracy in Bhutan. Since the Bhutanese King regards these dissidents as great security threat to his country, the Bhutanese government requested India to extradite him to face criminal charges in Bhutan for his alleged financial irregularities. New Delhi arrested him in 1997 under the extradition act, but due to pressures from the human right groups, he was released on baiLZ6 Apart from creating the dilemma of protecting a friendly country



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vs. honouring human rights, the resurgence of the Nepalese ethnic groups in Bhutan, demanding a greater Nepal, has also posed a challenge to Indian diplomacy.

Another important issue in the domestic environment of Bhutan having a bearing on India is the presence of insurgents from India’s northeast, who take shelter there. Fortunately for India, the Bhutanese King has shown extremely positive attitude towards Indian interest. The Bhutanese King actively acted to expel anti-India insurgents operating in Bhutan, and thus showed the way to promote cooperative security in the region.

In the case of energy too, Bhutan is setting a wonderful example, which may be emulated by countries like Nepal. Nepalese fears concerning exploitation of Nepal by India in the event of Nepal’s engagement with Water Resources Corporation of India because of India’s bigger capacity have thoroughly been disproved by the manner in which India is co-operating with Bhutan. Bhutan has been able to derive enormous benefit from its cooperation with India. After the latest Hydro-Electric Project Conference, Bhutan has achieved the highest per-capita income in South Asia, eleven to twelve hundred dollars per month. This is phenomenal and Bhutan’s policy of cooperating with India in the field of water resources has undoubtedly contributed to this impressive growth.

Bangladesh: The Menace of Islamic Fundamentalism

Like Bhutan, India’s another next-door neighbour, Bangladesh, too turned into a sanctuary for Indian insurgents in the northeast. Unlike, Bhutan, however, it never took any step to expel these rebels operating from Bangladesh soil against India. Dhaka even refused to acknowledge that any

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such problem exits. Besides, illegal immigration from Bangladesh into India too is a matter of grave concern for this country, as it is changing the demographic profile of several border districts of Indian provinces of Bihar, West Bengal, Assam, etc. India must therefore consider amending its laws concerning verifying the status of immigrants, as the present Indian law obliges the government to prove the illegality of immigration into India and thereby encourages illegal immigration into this country.

Moreover, the Bangladeshi elite uses anti-India feelings to sustain their support base at home. They have to demonstrate that they are not pro-India when in the opposition, and when they acquire power again, they have to project themselves as anti-India.2i It creates a difficult situation for India. The management of India-Bangladesh relations is really a big challenge for the makers of India's foreign policy.

Besides, India is alarmed at the free run fundamentalists have in Bangladesh and especially the growing activities of the Pakistan's ISI;2R the insurgents operating against India in Assam and other parts of the northeast receiving millions of dollars of arms and safe haven from Bangladesh; the political opponents of the ruling regime in Dhaka being killed; and the fact that government-to-government business has become farcical. India's pulling out of the SAARC meet scheduled in February 2005 was not only directed against the proclamation of emergency in Nepal but also intended to send a signal to Dhaka to set its house in order. New Dechi feels that this message has gone loud and clear to

But what is not clear is whether the Bangladesh government will act in a meaningful way, especially on the serial killings of opposition leaders. Said an official in New Delhi, "Bangladesh is not willing to engage with us. If Dhaka does

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Dyilaniics of India’s Securiiy and Foteign Policy: ...

not accept there is a problem, then how do you even begin talking about it?’” In fact, Dhaka denies the presence of terrorist training camps in its territory; it denies existence of even a single illegal immigrant from Bangladesh into India (India estimates number over 10 million); and it denies a rise in fundamentalism in the country even though the newspapers there have been extensively reporting the phenomenon. What is inore, Dhaka denies India transit rights, and it is opposed to setting right trade imbalances through a more spirited trade policy that includes sale of gas to India.

This is surprising in view of the fact that India and Bangladesh really have no fundamental difference, except a mental block to co-operate more with India. This also goes into the field of economic co-operation. They use trade deficit with India to negate economic cooperation between the two countries instead of bridging this gulf with exporting those commodities like natural gas to India, which is abundant in Bangladesh. Dhaka cannot sell gas to New Delhi because hardliners in Dhaka are against India-Bangladesh cooperation. And, yet, they complain about their trade deficit with India.

’ New Delhi must therefore give up,its traditional policy of maintaining strong links only with the Awami League, which led the struggle for liberation of Bangladesh. Instead, it must engage in sustained dialogue with moderates of all significant political formations in Bangladesh, as the ouster from power of the Awami League has invariably denied India influence in the Bangladesh government, as the situation currently obtains.

Sri Lanka: Grim Prospects of Peace In the southern part of h u t h Asia, the present phase in India-

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Sri Lanka relations can, of course, be termed as the friendliest era in relations between the two countries, despite problems faced by the leaders in Sri Lanka and killing of its visionary foreign minister, Lakshman Kadhigmar. Colombo has been able understand the long-term benefits accruing from its economic relationship with India. With all the differences between former president Kumarathunga and the prime minister of Sri Lanka, Sri Lankans are capable of taking rational long-term decisions, which are beneficial for both Sri Lanka and India. They are very keen to economically integrate Sri Lanka with India and steps have been taken in that direction and the two countries are going to enter into a comprehensive economic partnership agreement. The new President, Mahendra Rajakapse is following the positive policy towards India initiated by his predecessor.

Internal milieu of Sri Lanka, however, is still a source of worry for Colombo as well as New Delhi. Though the sub- nationalist movement in Sri Lanka has had an indigenous character, which was not influenced by the Tamil Nadu factor in any substantive manner, Tndia cannot afford to be a bystander in violent ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. For the ethnic linkage between Indian and Sri Lankan Tamils obliges this country to ensure the safety, security and dignity of Sri, Lankan Tamils. At the same time, India’s interest lies in the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka, as the disintegration of Sri Lanka is bound to encourage numerous separatist movements within India?’

India must also take note of the past record of Tigers, which shows that if they were able to create the Tamil Eelmu, there would be no honoured place for the Tamil-speaking Muslims and Indian Tamils. The eastern Tamils would be treated as second-class citizens. For all those who consider that multiple

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Dynamics of India’s Security and Foreigti Policy: ...

identities can and should co-exist in a plural state, the goal of a separate Tamil state is a reactionary concept.

New Delhi, therefore, can not remain a silent spectator to growing military muscle of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which has flouted the spirit of the peace process with total impunity to strengthen its ability to wage war against Colombo. India can not forget that it was the LTTE, which masterminded and executed the killing of former prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, after the pulling out of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka. Also, Triconamale is strategically important for India and the Indian Oil Corporation has invested in Triconamale in the Indian oil sector. So, what happens in the northeast part of Sri Lanka and whatever happens by way of progressive peace process is again directly linked to both the security and foreign policy interests of India.

Needless to add, India cannot escape the responsibility of being the guarantor of peace and stability in Sri Lanka. If the things go out of hand in Sri Lanka, one cannot visualise a situation where India will not be compelled to be more active then it is at present in terms of dealing with the situation. The new Sri Lankan President, Rajakapase, has offered solution to Sri Lanka’s ethnic problem only within the framework of a unitary Sri Lanka and the LTTE continues to reject a federal solution short of an independent Tamil Eelanz.

Summing Up To sum up, South Asia is emerging as a new epicenter of both the global trade and paradoxically and unfortunately of gIobal terrorism and internal conflicts as well. While countries on India’s periphery are wrecked by terrorism,

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insurgencies and separatist movements and therefore, are inherently unstable, India too is not free from serious domestic troubles.

Much of the regional instabilities in South Asia have emerged from lack of democratic governance leading to severe mal- governance. India perhaps remains, paradoxically so, the only “thriving democracy’’ within the region. Some of its neighbours such as Bangladesh are democracies only in name. The lack of good governance has led to severe resource scarcities leading to acute environmental degradation and underdevelopment in several parts of South Asia. Underdevelopment and related security issues have therefore led to mass displacement and migration of people within the region and beyond. Lack of secure borders, has placed India at the receiving end of refugees and economic migrants, which has not only put an acute strain on India’s existing infrastructure, but has also forced it to shape its foreign and defence policy accordingly.

The inability of most South Asian countries, including India, in many respects to evolve into viable nation-states has also serious implications for India’s security and foreign policy. In Pakistan, for example, the emphasis is on Islamic identity, which influences Islamabad’s disposition towards South Asia and.has led to a debate within Pakistan whether to project itself as a South Asian or Middle Eastern state. In this context, Pakistan, one of the pivotal states in the region, has unfortunately been unable to articulate a strong sense of South Asian identity and has therefore been perhaps the most reluctant member of the region.

The task of nation building has been further complicated by the emergence of newer and contesting identities within the region. In India, for example, newer regional identities are emerging. The urge to build a national identity distinctive

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from an Indian identity that overwhelms the region, partly owing to historical legacies, has also led to sort of a love- hate relationship between India and its immediate neighbours.

As regards Pakistan, the military remains the prominent institution. A paradigmatic shift in Pakistani policy towards India has not been witnessed in the past half-a-century, even under democratic governments. This therefore, underscores the fact that the challenge to India’s foreign policy makers lies not in whether there should be a military or democratic government in Pakistan, but whether Pakistan is a strong or a weak state. A careful thought on this question reveals that a strong Pakistan would be in the interest of India, as a confident Pakistan would be more forthcoming in improving ties with India.

Besides, New Delhi must downplay the prominence of Indo- Pak relations in its foreign policy concerns. While discussing internal dynamics in South Asia, Indo-Nepalese relations for instance, cannot be viewed merely as an outcome of Indo- Pak tensions. Indian foreign policy makers, therefore have to reconfigure India‘s security concerns and foreign policy in such a way that smaller states figure as importantly as Pakistan. One way to do is to move both India and Pakistan away from territorial security and arms build-up against each other and to redefine the parameters of security issues in play between the two countries. There is a need to emphasise that national security does not depend merely on military strength and readiness. This also involves social cohesion through more people-to-people contacts and increased trade and diplomatic support.

Finally, since countries of the region are grappling with intense ethnic and religious tensions, they must embark on

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a careful path of social accommodation and good governance. India's success as a modern, powerful, secular and democratic state would inspire its neighbours move in similar direction and thereby check the growth of fundamentalism, militarism and authoritarianism, and promote the formation of a cooperative, peaceful and law governed order in the region.

Endnotes 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Nalini Kant Jha, Dotiiestic ltnperntives in Itidin's Foreigti Policy (New Delhi: South Asia Publishers, 2002).

Other expression used to describe the post- Cold War era include 'a world transformed', 'turbulence in world politics', 'end of history', 'end of geography', 'back to the future', 'clash of civilisations', and so on. See, for instance, R. Tucker, S . Hoffman, K. Keller and W. McNeil, Foreign Afnirs (New York), vol. 69, no, 4, 1990; James N. Rosenau, Ttrbiilence in World Politics (Princeton, 1990); Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History", The Nntiotinl Interest, vol. 16, Summer 1989; Takshinouguchi, "Dialectics of World Order: A View from Pacific Area", in Hans-Henrik Holm and George Sorenson, eds., Whose World Order: Urieveti Globalisntioii nnd the Eiid of Cold Wnr (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995); John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", Inter?intional Seciirity, vol. 15, nos. 1-3, 1990; and Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisation", Foreigti Afnirs, Summer 1993, and September-October 1993.

For an analysis of the positive implications of this triple explosion for South Asia, see Nalini Kant Jha, ed., Sorith Asin in 21st Centiiry: Indin, Her Neighboiirs, arid Grent Powers (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 2003), pp. 2-3.

Nancy Jetly, Regiotinl Seciirity iii Soiifli Asin: The Etlztzo-Secfarinti Dinieiisioits (New Delhi: Lancers Books, 1999), pp. v-vi.

Ramakant and B. C. Upreti, "Inter-State Migration, Ethnic- Politics and Security in the Himalayas," in ibid. pp. 480-81.

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6. For an analysis of the impact of the coalition government on India’s foreign policy; see Nalini Kant Jha, “Coalition Governments and India’s Foreign Policy,” in Mahendra Pratap Singh, at al, eds., Coalition Politics in lndin: Problems nnd Prospects (New Delhi: Manohar, 2004), pp295-325.

7. For an analysis of the roots of the Kashmir problem and the possible way out, Nalini Kant Jha, ”Kashmir: Need for a Balanced Peace Initiative”,JoiininZ ofpence Stirdies (New Delhi), vol. 7, no.6, November-December 2000, pp. 37-91. For a discussion on the separatist movements in the Punjab, Kashmir and the Northeast, see, Nancy Jetly; ”India: The Domestic Dimensions of Security”, in Bary Buzan, Gowher Rizvi, at. al; eds; Soirth Asinn Seciirity mid the Grent Powers (London, 1986); M. J. Akbar; Knshtnir: Behiiid the Vole (New Delhi, 1991), and his, The Siege Within, New Delhi, 1996); Samir Das, ”National Security and Ethnic Conflicts in India: A View from the North-East” in Arun Kumar Banerji, ed., Soictli Asinri Secirrity lssires Domesticand Exteriinl Soiirces of Thrent to Security (Calcutta: Minerva Associates, 1998), pp.102-18; and Nalini Kant Jha, “External Challenges to Indian Nationhood”, Third Concept (New Delhi), vol.1, no.4, June 1987, pp.18-20; and his “From CTBT Obsession to Basic Strategies” Trisliiil (Willington), vol. 12, no.2, Spring 2000, pp. 65- 73.

8. For elaboration of this point, see Nalini Kant Jha, ”India’s Security Concerns in a Turbulent World,’’ in Nalini Kant Jha, at a1 eds., lndin in a Tirrbiilent World: Perspectives on Foreigii nnd Seciirity Policies (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 2003), pp.31-32. Also his, Domestic lmpertrtiues iri hidin’s Foreign Policy, n. I, chapters-I1 & VI1; and his, ltitemnl Crisis mid lndirn Gandhi‘s Foreigii Policy (Patna: Janki Prakashan, 1985)) pp.137-54.

For an overview of the working of Indian political system since independence, see Nalini Kant Jha, ”Realising the Constitutional Vision: Road Blocks and Road Ahead,” lndiniz Joirrnnl of Political Science (Meerut), vo1.66, no.1 January-March 2005, pp.9-28; and his, ”Indian Democracy: Hope and Reality”, Indian Joicrnal of Politics (Aligarh), vo1.32, nos.3-4, July- December 1998, pp.153- 71.

9.

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10. One of the most significant roots of conflict behveen India and Pakistan has been Pakistan's emergence on the basis of two-nation theory based on religion and India's continuing refusal to accept religion as a basis of nationhood. For an elaboration of this point, see Nalini Kant Jha, "Cultural and Philosophical Roots of India's Foreign Policy," Itifermtionnl Studies (New Delhi), vol. 26, nol, January-March 1989, pp 45-67.

11. B. Murlidhar Reddy's dispatch from Islamabad, "Musharraf's India's Policy," The Hitzdzr (Madras), 23 May 2005.

12. %id.

13, See, for details, Nalini Kant Jha, "Domestic Turmoil in Nepal: Implications for Nepalese and Indian Security," Joiiriznl of Pence Stirdies (New Delhi), vol. 10, no.2, April-June 2003, pp.2- 18; and his, "Domestic Conflict in Nepal: Origin, Challenges and Prospects," Asin A i a z i ~ l , 2003 (New Delhi: Shipra, 2003), pp.197-209. See also, Khalid Mahmud, "Maoist Insurgency in Nepal," RegioiznI Sfzrdies (Islamabad), v01.21, no.1, Winter 2002-03, p.5; Krishna P. Khanal, "Post-11 September Developments in Nepal: Implications for Curbing the Maoist Insurgency," in Dipankar Banerjee, et al., eds., South Asim atid the Wnr on Terrorisnz (New Delhi: India Research Centre, 2003), pp.25-37; Smruti S. Pattanaik, "Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Examining Socio-Economic Grievances and Political .Implications," Sfrntegic Atznlysis (New Delhi), vo1.26, no.], January-March 2002, ppI19-20; Sangeeta Thapliyal, "Maoists in Nepal," The Hindrr (Madras), 18 December 2001; Chitra K. Tewari, "Nepal: Maoist Insurgency," Soriflr Asin Motzitor, no.31, March I, 200 I, www .csis.org/saprog; Deepak Thapa, "Day of the Maoist," Hittinl South Asirr (Kathmandu), vo1.14, no.5, may 2001; and Sanjay K. Jha, "Nepal: Quest for Elusive Peace," Strnfegic Annlysis (New Delhi), vo1.28, no.3, July- September 21004, p.455.

14. Hitzdzistntz Times (Patna), 4 June, 2004; and ibid (Bhopal), 18 October, 2004.




15. Prem Shankar Jha, “Follies of the Kingdom,” Orrflook (New Delhi), vol. 45, no.9,7 March 2005, p.40.

16. According to Rohan Gunaratne the Indian organisations with whom the Maoists have links include: ULF A, Nortbem Bihar Liberation Front, Bhartiya Communist Youth League, Bharat Ekta Samaj, All “Nepal Youth Association (Chennai Committee) of India, etc. See his, Nepal’s Insurgents Balance Politics and Violence,“ Jane‘s liztelligence Review, October 2001, p.33.

17. Marcus Dam’s dispatch from Kolkotta, “India, Nepal Begin Operations against Maoist Rebels,” The Hindu, 21 August, 2004; and ”Nepal to Seek Help of Indian States,” ibid., 24 August, 2004.

18. “Top Indian Firms Move out of Nepal, ” Times of lndia (Lucknow), 19 August 2004.

19. Jha, ”India’s Security Concerns in a Turbulent World,” n. 8, p.31-32. .

20. Editorial, “Cross Border Bonhomie with Nepal,” The Hindti, 20 March 2002.

21. Anil Kumar Singh, “lndo-Nepalese Relations and India’s Security,” Sozith As ia Politics (New Delhi), vo1.3, no.7; November 2004; p,7.

22. Prem Shankar Jha, “Follies of the Kingdom,” Ozitlook (New Delhi), vol. 45, no.9,7 March 2005, p.40.

23. For details concerning causes of volt face in its Nepal policy by the UPA government, see Satish Chandra, ”India‘s Nepal Policy: Dangerous Flip Flop,” The Hindu, 10 May 2005; Siddharth Varadrajan, “A Policy in Search of a Rationale,” The Hindti, ibid., 14 May 2005; and V. Sudarshan, “When it Reigns, It Pours,” Outlook, vol. 45,no.l8,15 May 2005.

24. “India and Nepal’s Insurgency,” The Hindu, 8 September, 2004.

25. Kapileshawar Labh, ”Relations with the Himalayan

69 at Australian National University on June 5, 2016iqq.sagepub.comDownloaded from


Nalini Xantjha

Kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan," in Nalini Kant Jha, ed., Mia's Foreign Policy in a Changing World (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 200), p.170.

26. See Nalini Kant Jha "India and Bangladesh: The Track Back to Normalcy" in ibid, pp. 182-84.

27. During his visit to Dhaka in July 2005, though this author found existence of secular atmosphere in Dhaka in general and Dhaka University campus in particular, a prominent faculty member of Dhaka University belonging to the Hindu minority community informed him that Islamic fundamentalist are operating in a very subtle manner and they have already captured other campuses such as Rajshahi University.

28. Several scholars of International Relations at Dhaka University, however, felt that India's sudden cancellation of the SAARC summit in February 2005 amounted to an insult of Bangladesh peoples, which worsened their perception about India. Author's interaction with Prof Amena Akthar Mohsin and Prof. Emtiaz Ahmed at the Department of International Relations at University of Dhaka on 19th July 2005

29. V. Sudarshan, "South Asia: With Neighbours like These," Oirtlook, vol. 45, no.7,21 February 2005. p. 24.

30. For an elaboration of this point, see Nalini Kant Jha, "Opposition to Indo-Sri Lanka Accord: Failure to Understand a Complex Reality," Third Concept (New Delhi), v01.2, no.1, March 1988,pp19-21,31. Also see, S. Balaji, "Tamil Militancy in Sri Lanka: Implications for India's Security," in Nalini Kant

' Jha, ed., 11.26, pp.202-14. - ..

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