dr. mpho g. molomo & dr. gloria somolekae -...

Sustainable ElectoralDemocracy in Botswana

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Dr. Mpho G. Molomo &Dr. Gloria Somolekae

Executive summary

The purpose of this paper is to outline the major developments in Botswana'sdemocratic and electoral systems. The paper argues that there have been anumber of positive developments that include the establishment of anindependent electoral commission, lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18years and the introduction of an absentee ballot system.

The paper also highlights some of the major weaknesses that Botswana'sdemocracy has had for a number of years. These include a weak andfragmented opposition, a weak civil society entirely dependent on donorfunding, a small private press, distortions due to the winner-takes-all electoralsystem, and the lack of an effective and well-coordinated national civic andvoter education.

Botswana's democratic system has also become much more participatory andinclusive as evidenced by the increase of women in parliament and in seniorgovernment positions. For the first time in the history of Botswana's electionssix women stood for parliamentary seats and they all won. The President usedhis powers and nominated an additional two. While this still falls short of the30 percent quota required under the Southern African DevelopmentCommunity (SADC) Protocol and the Beijing Platform, it is nevertheless anotable development.

Despite widening of the franchise to include youth of the ages of 18 years,youth participation in the 1999 elections was far from satisfactory. Not onlydid a negligible number register for the elections, but their turn out was alsopoor. Equally important is the fact that political parties in general did notfield any significant number of youth candidates. Youth Wings of politicalparties face a great challenge ahead of them.

With the increasing clout of the private media, government has found itselfmore under the spotlight, and constantly held accountable for a number of itsactions. Prior to the 1994 elections a number of corruption scandals allegedlyimplicating senior government officials were uncovered by the private press.

International IDEA Conference -Towards Sustainable DemocraticInstitutions in Southern Africa

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There have also been setbacks to the democratic system of the country,particularly the breakup of the major opposition, the BNF. The opposition hasso far failed to present itself as a coherent and united front that can provide analternative government. This is primarily due to the problems of factionalismand internal splits within opposition parties, the lack of institutionalization,lack of financial and other resources, and the winner-take-all electoral systemwhich tends to favour the incumbent BDP as it distort electoral outcomes.

Notwithstanding the limitations outlined, there is evidence that democracy inBotswana has increasingly become institutionalized. The free and fairelections held every five years, unwavering respect for the rule of law, theindependence of the judiciary and respect for human rights all serve toindicate the extent to which democracy in Botswana has taken root.

However, more can still be done to improve the system. For example, thefairness of the electoral process can be enhanced through the establishment ofan Independent Broadcasting Authority, and the provision of state funding forpolitical parties. A change of the electoral system can also go a long way tostrengthen democracy. Occasionally the media and some international bodiescarry disturbing reports about human rights violations in Botswana. The mostoutstanding cases come from the Prisons Department. In order to furtherconsolidate Botswana's democracy, these reports need to be closely followedup, scrutinized and publicly discussed and appropriate remedies taken.


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1.0 Introduction

The 1990s will always be remembered as a period during which Southern Africa underwentsignificant political transformation. The end of one party rule in countries like Malawi,Tanzania, Zambia and the end of minority rule in South Africa and Namibia have all markedthe ushering in of a new era, an era of hope and renewal. Although the war in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo and the continuing civil strive in Angola have begun to cause a lot ofanxiety in the region, there is still a mood of hope for a better political future.

This paper looks at the way electoral and democratic systems in Botswana have beensustained over the years. It focuses on five major issues, namely electoral management, therole of election observers in enhancing democracy, civic and voter education, political partycompetition, gender and politics and concludes by mapping a way forward in consolidatingdemocratic practices.

2.0 The political context of Botswana’s democratic development

Throughout the period referred to above, Botswana remained unique in Sub-Saharan Africa.When many countries abolished the west-minister model of democracy, either opting for one-party regimes (such as Tanzania and Zambia), Botswana maintained her multi-partydemocratic system. Since independence the country has held elections every five years as theconstitution demands, the country has never had political prisoners, and the human rightsrecord has remained relatively clean.

However, this democracy has had a number of weaknesses worth mentioning. These are asfollows:

(a) A Weak and Fragmented Opposition

First, one political party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has dominatedparliament.


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Table 11: PARTY SUPPORT 1965 – 1999

Party 1965 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999

BDP 28 24 27 29 28 31 31 33BNF - 3 2 2 5 3 13 6BPP 3 3 2 1 1 0 0 -BIP/IFP 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 -BCP - - - - - - - 1BAM - - - - - - 0 0

______________________________________________Total no. of Seats 31 31 32 32 34 34 40 40

% of Popular Vote

BDP 80 68 77 75 68 65 55 54BNF - 14 12 13 20 27 37 25BPP 14 12 6 8 7 4 4 -BIP/IFP 5 6 4 4 3 2 4 -BCP - - - - - - - 11BAM - - - - - - - 5Other 1 0 1 0 2 2 0 0Rejected - - - - - - - 5

_______________________________________________Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

% of Seats

BDP 90 77 84 91 82 91 67 83BNF - 10 7 6 15 9 33 15BPP 10 10 7 3 3 0 0 -BIP/IFP 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 -BCP - - - - - - - 2BAM - - - - - - - 0

_______________________________________________Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Table 1 shows that until 1994, only one political party, the Botswana DemocraticParty (BDP) has dominated parliament. The opposition’s representation in parliamenthas been nominal. This is in part because opposition parties in Botswana have had ahistory of splits and internal fights. To further compound their weaknesses, they havefailed to present clear alternative policies to those of the ruling party.


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The major opposition, Botswana National Front (BNF) split in 1998 due to thisinfighting. The majority of its parliamentarians (i.e. 11 out of 13) together with 68councillors formed the new Botswana Congress Party (BCP) in 1998. Partly as aresult of this split, the BNF obtained half of the seats it had won in 1994. Its politicaltroubles have continued even after the 1999 elections.

We wish to add though, that internal fights are not exclusive to opposition parties.The ruling BDP has had problems of factionalism for years now. The majordifference between the ruling party and the opposition however, is the capacity tocontain factional fights and to ensure that at the end of the day there is internal partycohesion.

(b) A Weak Civil Society

Besides a weak opposition, another significant feature of Botswana’s democracy hasbeen a weak civil society. According to Holm, Molutsi and Somolekae (1994:14)civil society in Botswana is weak in relation to the state. Civil society is primarilyconcerned with “promoting interests of members and not so much with theirrelationship with the state.” Compounding this problem has been the state’s tendencyto initiate the formation of civil society organizations. As a result of this corporatestrategy, Molutsi (1995) has rightly concluded that “through the corporate strategy,the state has appropriately defined the role and functions of each organization andcircumscribed these such that it becomes easy to label and isolate others as political… the effect of this strategy was that the state systematically denied itself a chance tohear the voice of the people.”

In addition to the corporate strategy and the tendency to isolate those civil societygroups seeking to influence policy, the state has also had the tendency to emasculatesome sections of civil society labeling them “agents of foreign interests.”

(c) Emerging Private Media

Until the mid-1980s, government media, both radio and the daily newspaper, DailyNews was the only media of disseminating information. Both Radio Botswana andthe Daily News are state controlled. It was only with the emergence of the privatepress, e.g., The Botswana Guardian, the now defunct Examiner, Mmegi (TheReporter), The Botswana Gazette and The Midweek Sun that alternative views tothose of government started to be heard. The impact of this small private press hasoccasionally been felt even in government. Examples include the Botswana HousingCorporation scandal, The Mogoditshane land issue, the National Development Bankloans scandals involving senior ministers, etc. All these issues and others werecovered much more extensively by the private press and not the government


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controlled media. Thus, increasingly, the private press is enhancing transparency andaccountability.

(d) The Electoral Process

Admirable as Botswana's democracy may be, it has limitations that are embedded inits electoral system. Reynolds and Reilly (1997:7) authoritatively argue that electoralsystems are perhaps the most manipulative instrument of determining the outcomes ofelections. Botswana operates the 'first-past-the-post' electoral system sometimesknown as the 'winner-take-all' based on the single member constituency system.Under this system only one candidate makes it to the National Assembly. Over theyears, opposition parties have tried to find advantage in this electoral system but endup marginalised after every election.

The winner-take-all electoral system benefits established parties that enjoy theadvantage of incumbency and the fact of being politically tested. Therefore, instead ofdeepening democracy it leads to the political marginalisation of significantproportions of the population. The fact of the matter is that it reduces politics to azero-sum game in which democracy is nothing more than to the ordering of numbers.Marking a real travesty of democracy, this electoral system returns members ofparliament based on a simple majority thus producing a predominant system whoseresult is that smaller parties loose out in the race for political power.

Needless to say that this system has served the country since independence, and, in alarge measure, accounts for the country's political stability, it is far from democratic.In an attempt to project an alternative electoral system, this paper argues that forelectoral democracy to be meaningful, it has to be based on a broad consensus of theelectorate whose votes count equally. The outcomes of elections must be based on anational consensus that is reflected in the composition of the national legislators.

(e) Limited Civic and Voter Education

Despite being one of the oldest democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa, voters inBotswana are yet to be educated about their civic rights and responsibilities as well astheir political rights. In numerous studies undertaken by the Democracy ResearchProject (DRP), for example, voters displayed alarming levels of political ignorance.In the March 1999 DRP poll only 14 percent of voters knew about the IndependentElectoral Commission (IEC) and what its responsibilities are. Worst still, only 30percent of the voters surveyed on polling day knew something about the recentlydeclared state of emergency.


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Until recently, voter education initiatives have been limited and sporadic. OnlyEmang Basadi and the recently established IEC have undertaken sustained votereducation campaigns. While Emang Basadi is entirely dependent on donor funding,the IEC is yet to establish a voter education unit that will design, implement,coordinate and monitor its voter education programmes.

3.0 Electoral management issues

For many years, the administration of elections in Botswana was the responsibility of theOffice of the President. The returning officer was the Permanent Secretary to the President.Following numerous complaints from opposition parties about the unfairness of such a set up,and subsequent consultations between government and opposition parties, some modestchanges were introduced. An office of the Supervisor of Elections was created and locatedoutside the Office of the President but the lines of authority and reporting remained the same.

Opposition parties complaints reached a pick in 1989 when they threatened to boycott theelections. What seemed to compound matters was that the then Supervisor of Elections Mr.Nathaniel Mmono, was a known card carrying BDP member who had even contested primaryelections for the Lobatse-Barolong constituency in 1984. The same complaints and threatscontinued even in the 1994 elections. As a result of continued complaints from the opposition,the then President Sir Ketumile Masire announced some major electoral reforms in 1995.These included the establishment of an independent electoral commission, lowering thevoting age from 21 to 18 years, and the introduction of an absentee ballot system.

This presidential announcement was followed by a National Referendum in 1997 on electoralreforms. To mark its independence, members of the commission were selected after a lengthyand transparent process. First, there was an advertisement in the media for any interestedmembers of the public to apply for positions in the Commission. Then an all-party forum didthe selection.

The mandate for the IEC is to conduct free and fair elections. Its first test was the 1999elections. As preparations for the 1999 elections gathered momentum, public concerns aboutthe effectiveness of the IEC and its readiness to conduct them were raised. The private pressdiscussed a number of issues indicative of a lack of effectiveness by the IEC (e.g., TheBotswana Guardian – July 2 1999) and questioned the accuracy of the voters’ roll citing thecase of a BCP candidate whose particulars had been mixed up.

Compounding this problem was the declaration of the state of emergency by the President Mr.Festus Mogae in order to restore the franchise to 67 000 voters who had registered during theJuly 1999 Supplementary Registration exercise. Although the press later reported that theChairman of the IEC had distanced the Commission from the blunder that necessitated the


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state of emergency (see the Midweek Sun, October 6, 1999), the IEC had found itself underthe spotlight due to that situation.

Questions are still being asked about its autonomy because of the following:

(a) it reports to the Office of the President instead of Parliament directly;

(b) it has virtually inherited all staff of the former Supervisor of Elections and for quite along time after its formation, the only additional member of staff was the Secretary tothe Commission. Just before the elections, the IEC advertised some 20 positions forofficers who will be responsible for registration of voters in all the 40 constituencies.However, current suggestions that such officers will be located in the DistrictCommissioner’s Officer’s office have further cast doubt on the independence of theIEC from government; and

(c) The IEC does not have complete independence over the administration of its funds. Ithas to follow the same procedures as government departments. The same applies tothe procurement of transport.

4.0 The role of observers in enhancing democracy

Although Botswana’s democracy is one of the oldest in the African continent, it has not beenof interest to international observer groups. This is not to be surprising, because as Otlhogile(1994:294) has observed, “not all elections are observed. The international community iscommitted to circumstances; for instance, where there has been an absence of power sharing,or where there have been autocratic or despotic rulers, or the country has gone throughturbulent periods in its history, or perhaps accompanied by human rights violations.” None ofthese has been applicable to Botswana.

Until discovery of the unopened ballot box of the Tshiamo Primary School polling stationalleged irregularities in Botswana elections were always dismissed as unfounded. Theopposition claimed that the discovery of this unopened ballot box was testimony to thecheating that they have always complained about. Although not much was made of thisincident internationally, it had at least registered a point that the opposition had made foryears.

Following this incident, in 1989, the DRP observed the elections in Botswana. Even then, theobservation was limited in that; it was restricted to the southern part of the country. TheCatholic Commission for Peace and Justice (CCPJ) and the DRP of the University ofBotswana observed the 1989, 1994 and 1999 elections.


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The following groups: the CCPJ, DRP, Botswana Centre for Human Rights and the SouthernAfrican Electoral Commissioners Forum observed the latest election. All these groupsdeclared the 1999 election free and fair. However, the DRP provided a number of suggestionsthat it felt could help enhance the effectiveness of the electoral process (Somolekae: 1999).

The critical question that this section sought to answer was whether and how electionobservation had enhanced Botswana’s electoral process. Here we wish to reiterate our earlierpoint that due to the peace and tranquil that has existed in the country for a number of yearsand the fact that elections have always been successful, Botswana elections have not attracteda lot of attention, even from the international press. However, the fact that authorities havemaintained their commitment to transparency, and welcomed both domestic and internationalobservers has no doubt further strengthened the governments' position that it has nothing tohide.

We are of the view however, that Botswana’s democracy can still benefit from electionobservation. Currently, only one organization, the DRP does propose and publicly articulatesfrom time to time, an agenda of how Botswana’s democracy can be strengthened.International observers can also help by providing their own perspectives on what theybelieve can be done to strengthen the democratic process.

5.0 Political parties as formal vehicles of political competition

A defining characteristic of Botswana’s political system is that of a predominant party system.Nevertheless, political parties in Botswana are committed to open political competition and achange of government through the ballot box. However, the institutionalization of Botswana'spolitical competition has not been tested because no turn over of government has taken place.

There are a number of factors that hamper the effectiveness of political parties as agents ofchange and political mobilization. These are:

(a) Factionalism and Party Splits

Factionalism has been a factor in Botswana politics since the nationalist struggle. Thefirst major split was that of the Botswana Peoples Party (BPP) in 1964. Amidstcontroversy surrounding that split, there are two major views explaining it. Asdiscussed in Mokopakgosi and Molomo (forthcoming, 2000), on the one hand, it wasdue to the alleged ideological differences between Motsamai Mpho and PhilipMatante, and the other hand, due the alleged misappropriation of funds from foreigndonors.


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The BNF, which was formed in 1965 to try and reconcile the factions in BPP, wasitself a subject of faction fights starting in the mid-1980s. Instead of building a profileas leader of the opposition, it was beset by factional fights and splits. Following the1989 BNF Congress in Francistown, where delegates were told that the BNF was nota party but a front, the southern region led by Leach Tlhomelang broke away from theparty citing its loss of political direction, and formed the Freedom Party. That splitcost the BNF the Kanye and Ngwaketse South constituencies during the 1989election. Factionalism was to occupy the BNF leadership for the entire duration of the1990s.2

Perhaps the most dramatic of all these splits was the one of 1998 that led to theformation of the BCP. This split was a result of ideological differences as well asstruggles for political succession. During the 1997 Congress held at Ledumang inGaborone, the BNF was split into two factions; the old guard who believed in thesocialist policies entailed in Pamphlet No. 1 and the parliamentary caucus group thatbelieved in the social democratic programme. At that congress, with the exception ofKoma who retained the presidency of the party, all the members of the old guard lostthe elections for positions in the Central Committee. Then a group of the old guarddrawing support and sympathy of the party leader, which called itself the 'concernedgroup' threatened to take legal action and challenged the conduct of the elections.After several unsuccessful attempts to mediate the conflict, things went from bad toworse. At a Special Congress held in April 1998 in Palapye, amidst tensions offactional debates an open fight between the groups broke out leaving several peopleinjured and property damaged. Instead of rising above squabbles and projecting aspirit of reconciliation, Koma who openly identified with the concerned group, toldmembers of the party’s Central Committee to form their own party if they did notwant him as leader.

In further display of hardened positions, despite attempts to mediate on the conflict byreligious groups, the party remained clearly paralyzed between the ParliamentaryCaucus Group and the Concerned Group. Arising from these hardened positions, inJuly 1998 11 Members of Parliament and 68 councilors resigned from the BNF toform the BCP. As a result, the BNF's membership in parliament was reduced from 13to 2, and they, therefore, lost their position as the official opposition to the BCP.

However, Koma regained his status as leader of the opposition after the BNF scoredhigher than other opposition parties after the 1999 elections. More than any othersplit, this one cost the BNF dearly. After the 1994 election, the BNF, which had won13 of the 40 parliamentary seats representing 38 percent of the popular vote, hademerged as a clear alternative to the BDP. In the wake of factionalism and splits, theBNF, and indeed all opposition parties remained weak and paralyzed.


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The rest of the opposition parties have remained regionally based, small andinconsequential. The BPP is a party for the North East and Francistown, the BIP/IFPhas remained localized in Kanye and Maun, while the Botswana Progressive Union(BPU) has only existed in Nkange. The small parties such as Bosele, which wasformed in 1997, have not made their presence felt anywhere.

Despite the opposition’s failure to form a united front, there is overwhelmingevidence that this situation disadvantages opposition parties. According to Table 2below, the opposition stood a good chance to win five more constituencies in both the1994 and 1999 elections. The Table shows that the combined poll of the oppositionin some of the constituencies it lost was greater than that of the BDP.

The BDP has had its fair share of factionalism. Factional fights as far back as 1992polarized it. These factions expressed themselves into two camps, popularly known asthe Kwelagobe and Merafhe factions. Unlike in the BNF, the factions in the BDPwere not motivated by ideological factors, but mainly by struggles for politicalsuccession, and, a desire by each faction to maintain a hegemonic position in theparty.

The height of BDP factionalism came in 1992 following the publication of the Reportof the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Problems in Mogoditshane andOther Peri-Urban Villages, which implicated Peter Mmusi and Daniel Kwelagobe inwrong doing. Mmusi and Kwelagobe held high positions in both government andparty; as Vice President and Minister of Local Government and lands and partychairman, and Minister of Agriculture and Secretary General of the party,respectively. The report reflected Mmusi and Kwelagobe as having entered into illicitland deals in Mogoditshane. Notwithstanding the fact that the report was eventuallynullified because its submissions were made in camera rather than in public, theimage of the two men, who had to resign their positions in cabinet and party, wasbadly tainted. There was nevertheless a strong feeling among the Kwelagobe Campthat factionalism was the reason why the two were badly reflected in the report. TheBDP entered the 1994 elections deeply polarized by factional fights. They are said tohave suffered a severe backlash due to these factions in those elections.

In further testimony of factionalism, during the 1997 Congress in Gaborone the BDPfailed to democratically elect a Central Committee due to hardened political positions.The Merafhe faction threatened to boycott the elections because PonatshegoKedikilwe of the Kwelagobe faction had allegedly reneged on an earlier agreementthat he would not challenge Festus Mogae to the position of chairman of the party. Inwhat will remain a serious indictment to the party, the former President Sir KetumileMasire, working behind the scenes brokered an agreement that fixed the elections ofthe Central Committee in order to avert a major split of the party.


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TABLE 23: SELECT CONSTITUENCIES WHERE COMBINED POLL OF OPPOSITIONWAS GREATER THAN THAT OF BDP

PARTY PERFORMANCE IN 1994

Constituencies

BDP BNF BPP IFP BPU UDF TotalOpp.Vote

Maun-Chobe 4804 2912 175 3142 6229

North East 4901 296 4638 4935

Sebina Gweta 3488 1149 1392 3541

Ngwaketse West 4024 3622 91 427 4140

FrancistownEast

2873 2568 2010 4578

Nkange 3694 465 3016 3481

PARTY PERFORMANCE IN 1999

ConstituenciesBDP BNF BCP BAM MELS Total

Opp.Vote

Kgatleng West 4569 3616 1676 5292

Kgatleng East 2968 2138 2333 4471

Ngwaketse West 4615 4602 428 5033

FrancistownWest

4018 1604 1623 1142 6014

GaboroneCentral

2868 1874 983 293 13 3063

It was in the wake of these factions that the BDP engaged a consultant, LawrenceSchlemmer, to study the problems in the BDP and what the party needed to do toimprove it chances of winning the 1999 election. The Schlemmer Report (1997:13)identified factionalism as one of the factors that affected the BDP poll in 1994. Thereport then recommended that the party should bring into its fold a person of'sufficient dynamism' who was 'untainted' by factional fights. The report furtherrecommended the retirement of the old guard of the party and an injection of newblood, especially youth and women. The appointment of Lieutenant Ian KhamaSeretse Khama, the eldest son of the first President, Sir Seretse Khama, as Vice-President and Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration was


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testimony to the seriousness accorded to the solution of factionalism. FormerPresident Sir Ketumile Masire and other founder members of the party retired fromactive politics giving way to youth and women, many of who have made it intocabinet.

A reinvigorated BDP entered the 1999 election a relatively united party. This wasattested to by the fact that the 1999 Congress proceeded without factional fights.However, unity within the BDP remains fragile given the prominence that LieutenantKhama enjoys above long serving party stalwarts. Recently, the BDP youth wingpublicly condemned President Mogae's decision to grant Khama a one-year sabbaticalleave.

(b) Unity of Opposition Parties

As explained earlier in this paper, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) won everyelection by a landslide since the independence elections in 1965. It has since emergedthat the only way in which opposition parties can dislodge the BDP from power isthrough a united opposition. It is the only way of avoiding a split of the oppositionvotes.

The idea of a united opposition was first conceived in 1991. Drawing inspiration fromthe BNF, the BPP and the BPU, the People Progressive Front (PPF) envisaged amerger of the three opposition parties into a united front. However, PPF did not livebeyond the level of an idea, it collapsed because its proponents did not agree on itsmodus operandi. Nevertheless, the germ if an idea was born.

In place of the PPF a new body known as the United Democratic Front (UDF) wasformed in 1994. For its part, as discussed in Molomo (2000:82), the UDF envisagedthe creation of an umbrella organization or a front through which various politicalparties and civil organizations, while retaining their individual identities, wouldcoalesce into a united opposition. However, the UDF as a body that was formed bybreakaway factions from the BNF (discussed under the section on factionalism andparty splits), lacked credibility and internal cohesion, and did not articulate anyagenda beyond unseating the BDP. As a consequence, UDF never made a differencein the 1994 elections.

The latest attempt towards unity was mooted in 1999. This time the unity movementwas conceived under the auspices of the Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM). Justlike its predecessor, the alliance partners were to maintain their independent identitiesand only pull their resources together to counter the overbearing influence of theruling BDP. Suffering a similar fate as attempts made before it, BAM did not win thesupport of all political parties. Although the BNF initially bought into the coalition, itwithdrew because, they, together with other coalition partners were not prepared to


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make the necessary concessions which are implied in coalition building. In the end,the parties that contested the 1999 elections under the fold of BAM were UnitedAction Party (UAP), Botswana Peoples Party (BPP) and Independence FreedomParty (IFP). However, due to the fact that the major opposition parties such as BNFand BCP were not its members, BAM only served to split the opposition vote. It didnot only fail to gain a seat in parliament but only polled about 5 percent of thepopular vote.

(c) Institutionalization

The late 1980s, specifically, marked a turning point in the history and growth of theBNF. This had been the only party whose share of the popular vote was increasingwhile that of the BDP was declining. A number key people who had left theirrespective political parties such as the former Mayor of Gaborone Mr. B. Bagwasiand the former Member of Parliament for Kanye Mr. Leach Tlhomelang, Mr. W.Seboni, former Assistant Minister of Finance and Development Planning defected tothe BNF. As the party grew, there was a feeling amongst the veteran members thatnew members who allegedly also initiated an ideological move towards the centerwere slowly hijacking it.

Part of this growth came with new initiatives to ensure that the party isinstitutionalized, and had offices and procedures for doing things includingprocedures on how candidates had to be chosen. Previously, the party leader and hisclose advisors handpicked leadership within the party. With increased competition forleadership positions, there was pressure to have systems in place; and to ensure thatthey are adhered to even if the results would go against the wishes of the leadership.As discussed in Molomo (2000:79), Johnson Motshwarakgole, a party stalwart andtrade unionist, expressed the personification of the party as Koma (Party ke Koma).Had there been clear institutional procedures, respected by all, many of the problemsthat besieged the BNF since the late 1980s would have been properly managed.

(c) Party Funding

Effective political competition requires visibility and contact with the electorate. Thiscan be achieved if funds for running campaigns, advertising and securing transportfor all constituencies are available. However, not many political parties in Botswanaare able to do this. The only party that appears to have sustained visibility evenoutside election years is the ruling party. It has received generous donations fromundisclosed sources, particularly in the 1999 election year. On being criticized by theopposition parties for receiving money from secret donors, and therefore engaging inunfair competition, the ruling party pointed out that the BNF had also receivedassistance from undisclosed sources in 1994. BDP also added that the opposition wasfree to fundraise from whichever sources they chose.


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The law in Botswana covers a very narrow aspect of campaign financing because itdeals mainly with disclosure of election expenses by candidates and not politicalparties. Candidates are compelled by law to disclose any expenses incurredimmediately after the writ of elections has been issued. We may wish to add that oncethe writ is issued, elections have to be held within 60 days. So expenses incurredbefore this period are not regulated. As Dingake (1999) has concluded, regulationwould be important in order to level the political playing field.

6.0 Women’s participation in politics

The Beijing Platform for Action states that “without the active participation of women and theincorporation of women’s perspectives in all levels of decision-making, the goals of equality,development and peace cannot be achieved.”

One of the weaknesses of Botswana’s democracy has been the under-representation of womenat virtually all levels of decision-making, both in the political sphere and even in thegovernment bureaucracy. For a number of years, this situation was not even questioned in thecountry, particularly because according to Setswana tradition, “women cannot or should notlead.” This situation was increasingly questioned following several developments, bothlocally and internationally. These developments were as follows:

(a) The Formation of Emang Basadi

Following the amendment of the Citizenship Act in 1982, a group of Batswanawomen met to decide how to challenge this Act which denied Batswana womenmarried to foreign men the right under the law to pass on citizenship to their children.The women felt that the Act denied them their democratic rights. They formed anorganization called Emang Basadi that has since become a leading organization interms of advocating for women’s rights.

(b) The Dow Case

Emang Basadi tried since its formation in 1986 to lobby government to amend theCitizenship Act and to enact a gender-neutral piece of legislation. When these effortsdid not seem to bear fruit, a Motswana woman, Unity Dow, (married to an Americancitizen) took government to court on grounds that the Citizenship Act denied herenjoyment of human rights and that such discrimination violated the country’sconstitution. Dow won the case but the state appealed and still lost.


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(c) The Beijing Conference

• The Beijing Conference, just like the others before it (e.g., the NairobiConference of 1985), and other regional initiatives such as the SADCDeclaration on Gender and Development have also played a major role ofbringing into focus the issues of gender, equality and development in theagendas of many governments. The Government of Botswana is a signatoryto both the Beijing Declaration and the SADC Declaration on Gender andDevelopment. These international initiatives have also helped local women’sorganizations, namely Emang Basadi and its collaborating partners thatneeded a boost in questioning Botswana’s democracy and its effectivenessparticularly in promoting participation by all, and ensuring equality.

The results of the 1999 elections have shown that all the different interventions from NGOsand the entire civil society concerning women’s empowerment, are starting to bear fruit.Actually, these results started to become evident following the 1994 elections. After thatelection, only two women won elections, but the President used the provision for specialnomination in the constitution to bring in two more women. Still, that was not substantial,given the fact that parliament has 40 members. However, the women’s movement welcomedthe gesture as it was seen as an important step in strengthening Botswana’s democracy, andcontinued to lobby for more gender equality.

The number of women in parliament following the 1999 elections is eight. Six of thesecontested elections and they all won. The President later nominated two. In addition, for thefirst time since the country’s independence, there are four women in Cabinet. Two morewomen have been appointed Permanent Secretaries. However, despite these gains, it is stillevident that the challenges of achieving gender equality in Botswana politics are still great.Increasingly, it has been realised that if more women were to be visible in politics, politicalparties would have to device strategies that will ensure that they are represented even withinparty structures, and to ensure that they go through the primary elections stage. Women’swings of political parties would have to play a central role of ensuring that such changesoccur at party level.

7.0 Minorities and youth

One of the issues that have occasionally dominated political debate in Botswana is the issueof minorities, particularly the Basarwa. Human Rights groups such Ditshwanelo (BotswanaHuman Rights Center) and the Botswana Christian Council have complained about allegedviolations of human rights of Basarwa. In particular, the issue of land rights and the relocationof the Basarwa from the Central Kgalagadi Game Reserve have been repeatedly cited.


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The major mouth piece of the Basarwa (i.e. the First People of the Kgalagadi Organization,has joined forces with the international NGOs to bring this issue to the attention of theinternational community. They have been somewhat successful because two years ago, theEuropean Union even sent a fact finding mission to Botswana to study the nature of theproblem.

However, government has not gone back on its earlier decision to relocate the Basarwa. Infact, the issue has not even dominated national debate. Until the issue is brought into thenational agenda, it will remain peripheral.

The electoral reforms introduced in 1998, were largely expected to strengthen democracy. Inparticular the lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18 years was expected to give the youth avoice in the political system. However, the problem of youth voter apathy in the 1999 electiondid not make this possible.

Compounding this problem was the failure of the party primary election system to produceyouth candidates. The entrenched cultural stereotypes against youth leadership, and the failureof youth wings to articulate a clear and coherent agenda for youth political empowerment didnot help the situation. We believe that unless the different political parties in this countryprioritize this issue, and tackle it head on, youth will remain marginalized from holdingpolitical office.

8.0 Botswana’s democracy – which way forward?

The picture that emerges from this paper concerning the development and sustainability ofBotswana's democracy is a somewhat contradictory one. It is contradictory in the sense thatthere have been real positive developments that have the potential of promoting thesustainability of the democratic system, but there have also been negative developments thatmay have the potential of undermining the achievements made thus far.

(a) Positive Developments

As we noted in the paper some of these notable positive developments include the following:

(i) Free and fair elections have consistently been held since independence. The countryhas never experienced political violence, and there is evidence that a culture ofpolitical tolerance has taken root.


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(ii) Major electoral reforms have been undertaken. These include the formation of theIndependent Electoral Commission, lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18, and theintroduction of the absentee ballot system.

(iii) There have been concerted efforts by government to respond to the wishes of thetraditionally marginalised groups, particularly women. Discriminatory pieces oflegislation have been amended, there are more women in cabinet today than at anypoint in the country’s history, and Botswana has finally acceded to calls from thewomen’s movement to ratify international conventions outlawing gender baseddiscrimination.

(iv) The private media continues to grow and to be vigilant in its watchdog role. Todaythere are two private radio stations, and about seven newspapers. This obviouslyenhances the dissemination of a variety of ideas and opinions, not just the officialview that is what the state media provides.

Much as the above are commendable and go a long way in enhancing Botswana’sdemocracy, there are still a number of concerns and problems in the following areas:

(b) Shortcomings of Botswana's Democracy

(i) The Electoral System

Despite having introduced significant electoral reforms noted earlierBotswana has continued with an electoral system that distorts electoraloutcomes. The winner takes all electoral system produces a parliament that isdisproportionate to the popular vote.

(ii) Crisis in the Opposition

The crisis takes the following forms; it is the lack of internal unity andcohesion that manifests itself in party splits, a proliferation of small parties,and factionalism. On the other hand, this crisis also manifests itself in thearea of poor management and the failure to build a cohesive force that cantruly provide a voter with a viable choice.

(iii) Uneven Political Playing Field

Elections like any form of competition have to be held in an environmentwhere none of the contesting parties is unfairly disadvantaged. This is animportant aspect in the fairness of an electoral process. However, inBotswana, there are a number of factors that actually contribute to theunfairness of the country’s electoral system. These include the following:


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• Access to Government Media

The state controls both the Daily News and the biggest radio stationin the country, Radio Botswana. The opposition has complained onnumerous occasions about this situation, indicating that they do notget fair and equal coverage like the ruling party. They have evengone to the extent of recommending the introduction of anIndependent Broadcasting Authority.

Government on the other hand has dismissed such concerns asunfounded claiming that all parties get equal and fair coverage.Nevertheless, we do not think this is so. The BDP as an incumbentparty obviously cannot get the same airtime on radio as oppositionparties in a state controlled media.

• Political Party Funding

For as long as political party funding from the state is not provided,the playing field cannot be level. The ruling party is able (being anincumbent party) to attract generous donations from various donorsas it admitted during the 1999 elections. We do not expect potentialsponsors to risk their interests by targeting untested small parties.This effectively means that at election time, BDP has a lot offinancial strength and visibility which others do not have. During the1999 elections, the ruling party put up billboards, bought a fleet ofvehicles and engaged in numerous advertising activities. They hadvisibility, the opposition did not, and we feel the contest was as suchnot fair.

However, the provision of state funding for political parties cannottake away the apparent need for opposition parties to deal with theirinternal problems and lack of institutionalization since theseundermine their viability, and their chances of emerging asalternative governments.

In concluding this paper, we would like to address one pertinent issue, and that is,what is being done in Botswana to strengthen the democratic system? In doing so, welook at government’s efforts and those efforts of civil society.

(c) Contemporary efforts to Strengthen Democracy

(i) Government Efforts


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• Vision 2016

In 1997, the former President Sir, Ketumile Masire set up a TaskForce to facilitate a process of formulating a long-term vision forBotswana. After extensive consultations with people all around thecountry, the committee published all the ideas and issues raised bythe people in a document entitled Long-Term Vision for Botswana:Towards Prosperity for All. Subsequently, an interim Vision Councilwas established to oversee the implementation of the vision.

Among the areas of focus in the Vision is the 'creation of an open,democratic and accountable nation.' What the Vision aims to achieveis to consolidate Botswana’s democracy, and the cultivation of acertain leadership ethic described as follows:

A morally and ethically upright, educated society ... withincreased political tolerance, and legal sanction against thosewho violate the principles of accountability at all levels ofleadership, including the state president (Vision: 1997:11).

The portfolio for the vision rests with the Vice President. This shows theextent to which the Vision is important to the country.

• Parliamentary Offices

After the 1999 elections, a decision was taken to provide all

Parliamentarians in their constituencies with offices in order

to promote consultation with those they represent.

(ii) NGO EFFORTS

The NGOs continue to make their contributions in the following areas:

• They continue to provide a voice from outside government thus

making government accountable.

• They provide civic and voter education, thus enhancing thedemocratic process.

• The media continues to educate, question and raise issues demandinggovernment answers, thus promoting accountability andtransparency.


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However, these efforts have largely relied on donor assistance whose exodus since 1998, hasdeprived the NGO sector of valuable support for its continued survival. If the remainingdonors are to follow SIDA, NORAD and others, then the infant civil society currently existingwill vanish from the political scene; thus the state will remain dominant without acountervailing voice. This will weaken Botswana’s democracy.

9.0 recommendations

Given the above problems and issues, we make the following recommendations which webelieve are necessary for strengthening Botswana’s democracy;

• Reform the electoral system.

• Enhance the operational autonomy of the IEC.

• The state should provide funding for political parties.

• The law should be changed to make it compulsory to disclose all sources of politicalparty funding.

• Continue to strive to achieve greater gender equality in politics.

• Establish an Independent Broadcasting Authority.

• Endeavor to ensure that Vision 2016 is translated into tangible, concreteimplementable programmes for strengthening democracy.

• Donors must provide financial and institutional support to civic groups dealing in thearea of democratization such as Emang Basadi and DRP.


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ENDNOTES

1 . G. Winstanley, The Bechuanaland General election 1965: Ballot Envelopes and VotingCounters, 1965; G. Winstanley, Report to the Minister of Health, Labour and Home Affairson the General Elections 1969 Gaborone: Government Printer (March 1970); P. L Steenkamp,Report to the Minister of State on the General elections, 1974 Gaborone: Government Printer(1974); P. L Steenkamp, Report to the Minister of Public Service and Information on theGeneral Election, 1979, Gaborone Government Printer (1979); Festus G. Mogae, Report tothe Minister of Public Service and Information on the General Election, 1984, Gaborone:Government Printer, (1984); Nathaniel Mmono, Report to the Minister of Presidential Affairsand Public Administration on the General Election, 1989 Gaborone: Government Printer(1989); Nathaniel Mmono, Report to the Minister of Presidential Affairs and PublicAdministration on the General Election, 1994 Gaborone: Government Printer (1994); GabrielSeeletso, Report to the Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration on theGeneral Election, 1999 Gaborone: Government Printer (1999).

2. During the mid-1990s three splinter groups emerged from the BNF. These were theBotswana Workers Front (BWF) formed by Shawn Nthaile, United Socialist Party (USP) ledby Nehemiah Modubule and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) by Mareledi Giddie. ShawnNthaile left the BNF to form the BWF because he felt Batswana of Bakgalagadi origin weremarginalised from top party positions. Manifesting a different problem Modubule whoseparty espoused a socialist ideology felt that the right wing had gained a hegemonic position inthe party. As a mark of political opportunism, Giddie after he lost the primary elections forGaborone Central broke from the BNF to form the SDP, professing the same ideologicalposition as the party he left.

3. Op. cit.


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