Download - Understanding Sructural Realism_Saed Kakei
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Understanding structural realism
By: Saed Kakei,
Ph.D. Student (No1144759),
Theories of Conflict and Conflict Resolution I (CARD 7040-DL2)
Professor Dustin Berna, Ph.D.
Nova Southeastern University
Department of Conflict Analysis & Resolution – PhD Program
March 16, 2012
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Understanding structural realism
Introduction
Fundamentally, Structural Realism–also known as Neorealism, argues that the struggle for power
in international politics is the main key to survival. However, unlike classical realists, structural
realists take some ethical considerations into their power-politics maintaining that rather than
connecting the quest for power to human nature, “it is the structure or architecture of the
international system that forces states to pursue power” (Mearsheimer in Dunne et al., 2010, p.
78). In other words, the struggle for power and international conflict are attributed to the “lack of
an overarching authority above states and the distribution of power in the international system”
(Dunne and Schmidt in Kaufman et al., 2005, p. 169). This causes us to ask a few questions such
as: what is the theoretical construction of structural realism? What are the assumptions of this
theory? What are the variations of structural realism and how do they differ from each other?
And finally, what do the critics say about this theory? To answer these and other related
questions, I will follow a descriptive analytical method to demonstrate the nature of this diverse
and multifaceted school of thought and explain the major ideas of its most prominent pioneers.
Theoretical construction of structural realism
Structural realism derives from classical realism except that instead of human nature, its
focus is mainly on the international politics with greater emphasis put on the struggle for power.
According to Dunne and Schmidt, the key idea in J. J. Rousseau’s book of “The State of War,”
stipulates that “it is not human nature, but the anarchical system which fosters fear, jealousy,
suspicion, and insecurity (2005, p. 166).
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Redefining Hans J. Morgenthau’s Balance of Power theory, Kenneth N. Waltz takes the
key thoughts of the classical realism into his “Theory of International Politics.” Like classical
realists, Waltz asserts that anarchy is the nature of international politics which leads states to
embrace the common sense of “self-help” in pursuit of their vital security needed for survival. In
contrast to classical realism, Waltz argues that while states remain the main actors playing
essential roles in the international system, greater reflection must be given to the non-states
actors through a level of analysis or structure-agency debate. He sees the international system as
a structure whereby the state with individuals below the level of the state act as unitary agency
for the state. Moreover, unlike classical realists, Waltz advocates bipolarity by stating that “the
great powers of a bipolar world are more self-sufficient, and interdependence loosens between
them” (Waltz in Kaufman et al., 2004, p. 327).
When applying his abstract theory to foreign policy, especially security issues, Waltz
argues that nuclear proliferation would increase global stability. In other words, the greater the
numbers of nuclear powers would result in a lesser international aggression. With this very
reason, Waltz demonstrated why his notion was not viable at least for the policy professionals in
the U.S. government.
John J. Mearsheimer is probably the most ardent of the structural realists to criticize and
oppose Waltz’s concept of nuclear proliferation, among other things. Branding him as a
“Defensive Realist” Mearsheimer explains that Waltz, and alike, “maintain that it is unwise for
states to try to maximize their share of world power, because the system will punish them if they
attempt to gain too much power. The pursuit of hegemony, they argue, is especially foolhardy”
(2010, p. 78). Instead, Mearsheimer proposes his own theory of “Offensive Realism” which
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discloses that states in the anarchical system are inherently aggressive and that there is no status
quo or satisfied states with the amount of power in their possessions. However, critics of
Mearsheimer’s aggressive build-up of power, known as modern realists, argue that aggressive
status will create a security dilemma since the maximization of power by any one state will
perpetuate greater power competition (2005, p. 176).
1. The ontological aspect
During the Cold War era, the world has seen an increasing number of new actors playing
significant roles in the international system. These new actors were and still are made of
international governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and transnational non-
governmental organization which, collectively and without evaluating what impact they may
have, play a role in the international system that is impossible to ignore. As such, a process is
needed to construct a systemic theory with which the defects of the classical realism, among
other theories, could be remedied (Waltz, 1979, p. 1). Additionally, benefiting from the three
levels of analysis used by social scientists to explain state behaviour and the causes of war,
Waltz perceives that the struggle for power and the interaction between these actors, including
the state actors, require a new theory with independent variables which he termed as “Theory of
International Politics” (2005, p. 169). Ontologically, we understand therefore that structural
realism not only keeps the main principles of traditional realism regarding the states as essential
actors, but also adds to them the new international non-state actors as necessities which are
foolhardy be ignored in any analysis.
2. The epistemological aspect:
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Structural realism attempts to effectively respond to the wide criticism which classical
realism has received for not been able to understand and absorb the true nature of international
politics. On the one hand, while affirms anarchy to be the ordering principle of international
relations because of the lack a single authority, structural realists explain however that national
interest and the quest for power must not be exaggerated. In so doing, structural realists are
trying to connect their theories to the other fields of social sciences so that their gained
knowledge could contribute to the needed comprehensive picture of the study of international
politics, on the other hand.
3. The methodological aspect
In 1954, his now classic book titled “Man, the State, and War,” Waltz states that after
studying the realist literature, he discovered that scholars came up with a different interpretation
for state behaviour and the causes of War because they were using various levels of analyses. He
adds that some of them had focused on the “Man” and others had focused on “the State.” Yet,
only a few were pointing to the importance of analysing the system. Accordingly, he wrote his
book as a necessity to contain all those trends. In the book, Waltz argues that the best possible
way to analyse international politics is to use a systemic methodology. He adds that instead of
focussing on the state level which will not be sufficient to predict the outcome of the overall
system; and, instead of focussing on human behaviour which will not provide sufficient analysis,
he reached the conclusion that the true causes of war is the international system itself due to its
chaotic structure. Therefore, metaphysical debates should be replaced by a systematic theory
which “remedies the defects of present theories” such as Morgenthau’s Balance of Power theory
(1979, p. 8).
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In chapter five of his 1979 book titled “Theory of International Politics” and under the
rubric of “Political Structures,” Waltz, like most social scientists who apply systemic theories to
their work, isolates structure from the rest of the other sub-systemic variables such as
individuals, institutions, agencies within a state. He does that rigorously believing that the
domestic political structure is the most important factor in the development of international
relations.
In chapter eight titled “Structural Causes and Military Effects” of the same book, Waltz
focuses on the relationships between the “cause” (independent variable) and the “effect”
(dependent variable). In so doing, he challenges the conventional wisdom regarding the
dimensions of distributions of power. Waltz, methodologically, argues that a bipolar system with
two great powers is more stable and peaceful than a multipolar system with three or more great
powers for at least three reasons. First, a multipolar system increases instability and prone to
miscalculation. Second, multipolar systems suffer from “buck-passing.” In other words, when
the risk-seeking allies fail to honour their commitments, the possibility of quickly containing
revisionist states greatly decreases. Third, multipolar systems are more dangerous because
reluctant allies are dragged into a conflict they would otherwise like to avoid. Additionally, tight
alliances would leave all members subject to the sudden desires of the most powerful and or
radical member which may rapidly increase the spread of ignited war (1979, pp. 161-193).
The most important assumptions of structural realism
1. The main international actors interact in an anarchic system. This means that there is no
central international government to enforce rules and regulations or protect the interests
of the larger international community.
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2. Because the structure of the international system is a major determinant of actor
behaviour, states therefore are self-interest oriented. The anarchic competitive system
pushes states to favour self-help over cooperative behaviour.
3. States are rational actors, selecting strategies to maximize benefits and minimize losses.
4. States see all other states as potential enemies and threats to their national security. This
distrust and fear creates a security dilemma, and this motivates the policies of most states.
5. The most critical challenge presented by anarchy is survival (Mearsheimer in Dunne et
al., 2010, p. 79-80).
For structural realists, threats are a variable function of power asymmetries. If a state has
more power than another state, then the feelings of facing risks are legitimate because nothing in
the anarchical system prevents states from using their power against each other to resolve a
conflict. Waltz acknowledges that although power is a complex combination of economic, social,
and geopolitical factors, it can simply be used to rank states by their capacities (1979, p. 131).
This acceptance implies that the distribution of power, and consequently power asymmetries, are
distinctive attributes of the system.
Waltz's systemic theory treats system stability and therefore state identity as symmetric.
In fact, Waltz claims that when it comes to security, all states behave in similar manner because
their leaders reside in an anarchic system in which they value survival, estimate power in the
same way, and they balance against threats according to their similar sensitivities toward power
asymmetries (1979, p. 127). Waltz also argues that competition will remove states that are
resistant to socialization because the latter, in the long run, will force all leaders to share the
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same core values and beliefs. When revisionist states emerge at random intervals to alter the
balance of power, they will either be eliminated from the system or held in check (1979, p. 127).
Variations of structural realism
Although Waltz is accused of being an academic eccentric, he has led about two dozen
younger academic specialists in international relations and security studies. His academic
students have developed their own theories relating to such topics as the dynamics of multipolar
systems, offensive versus defensive theories, supplementary unit-level variables, and stable
versus unstable deterrence factors. Rather than providing an exhaustive analysis of these
variations of structural realism, I will very briefly underline only three of their most important
here.
A. Defensive vs. offensive theory: while Waltz argues that anarchy leads to the logic of self-
help in which states seek to maximize their security, Mearsheimer disputes this claim
stating that the anarchical self-help system compels states to maximize their relative
power position. Waltz reasons his argument providing that “because power is a possibly
useful means, sensible statesmen try to have an appropriate amount of it.” He adds that
“in crucial situations, however, the ultimate concern of states in not for power but for
security” (1979, p. 80). In his theory of ‘offensive realism’, Mearsheimer calls Waltz’s
above argument as ‘defensive realism’ stating that “offensive realism parts company with
defensive realism over the question of how much power states want” (2010, p. 21). He
argues that since all states have some offensive power, there is a considerable level of
uncertainty associated with their intentions. Therefore, no one should believe in satisfied
or status quo states; rather all states have to search persistently to gain power at the
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expense of other states. In other words, peace could be achieved by accumulating power
more than any other states.
B. Neoclassical realism: with the end of cold war, realist scholars such as Randall
Schweller, Fareed Zakaria, and Gideon Rose decided to move beyond the rigid
assumptions of structural realism arguing that the systemic theory of international politics
provided by structural realism is incomplete. It needs to be augmented with better
accounts of unit-level variables such as how power is perceived by state leaders and their
respective societies and how state-society relationships motivated by the exercised
leadership (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005, p. 170).
C. Rational choice realists: while these thinkers accept the basic assumptions of structural
realism, they are advocating the use of advance social science methodologies such as
game theory in order to examine realist hypotheses. Also, this rational choice group claim
that since anarchy does not prevent strong patterns of cooperation from occurring under
certain conditions, therefore, international institutions matter. By that, the problem of
relative gains means that they use less of instrumental force than neo-liberals contend. In
other words, rational choice realists share some common values with the neo-liberals.
Criticisms of structural realism
Despite structural realism’s ability to articulate the realist theory in new directions, it is
not surprising that it has attracted a great deal of criticism. In fact, some post-cold war era
scholars argue that structural realism has still not only failed to produce accurate explanations of
international politics, but also failed to provide a theoretically complete explanation of war.
Again, without providing detail discussions, I will summarize only the main critiques facing
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structural realism in two categories: critiques made by other realists, and critiques made by non-
realists.
Realists’ critiques structural realism
First, classical realists such as John G. Ruggie (1983) criticized Waltz arguing that
structural realism assumes an unchanging structure and an eternal regularity of behaviour in
international politics, adding that this assumption goes back to Morgenthau. For Ruggie, Waltz’s
systemic theory obfuscates real the structural differences between the modern industrialized
period and the medieval feudal period (1983, Pp. 273-276). More significantly, it uncovers the
main lacuna in structural realism - the lack of a theory of change.
First, Rational choice realists argue that Waltz restricts his definition of structure (i.e., the
distribution of power per say) as the most important systemic variable. Theoretically, this
definition is problematic. Because, if any variable gets utilized in the distribution of power, then
such a variable could be a systemic variable.
Second, neoclassical realists argue that Waltz’s structural realism refuses to recognize
state level tests. According to Waltz, his Theory of International Politics "explains why states
similarly placed behave similarly despite their internal differences. The explanation of states'
behaviour is found at the international, and not at the national level" (Waltz, 1996, 54).
Neoclassical realists are contesting this asserting that the state-level behaviour, in fact, accounts
for the systemic level patterns that Waltz expects them to observe.
Third, offensive realists, especially Mearsheimer, argue that contrary to Waltz’s claim,
“multipolarity is less war-prone” and that “the more great powers there are in the system, the
better prospects for peace” (2010, p. 86). Mearsheimer provides two reasons for this: First,
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deterrence of the revisionist states is much easier in multipolarity. Second, the amount of
hostility in a multipolar system is much less than that of bipolarity because states pay less
attention to each other in a multipolar system.
Forth, structural realist theory does not predict the distribution of power in the
international system. Rather, it predicts the behaviour of states and the stability of the system
given a particular distribution of power.
Non-realists’ critiques structural realism
One of the major early criticism of structural realism that has been of lasting note came
from Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye in their 1977 book entitled “Power and
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition.” Both of these liberalist scholars feel that the
“realist assumptions define an ideal type of world politics” and if they were challenged
simultaneously, a world could be imagined “in which actors other than states participate directly
in world politics, in which a clear hierarchy of issues does not exist, and in which force in an
ineffective instrument of policy” (In Kaufman et al., 2005, p. 511).
Another early criticism came from Richard K. Ashley, a post-structuralist, who in his
1984 article titled “The Poverty of Neorealism” brands structural realism as a ‘structuralism’ that
treats “the given order as the natural order” and blasts neorealism for its “economism and
scientism” (1984, p. 228).
Liberalists such as Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis argue that attempting to be
parsimonious, Waltz has produced a theory too incomplete to account for the complexities of the
international system. They look at factors other than anarchy and the distribution of power to
explain international behaviour. In particular, they see the need to examine the role of internal
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politics (1993, p. 4). This leads us to point out some major problems with Waltz's systemic
theory and the way in which he conceptualizes the level of analysis problems in general terms
leaving out the interaction factor which is considered to be the most important factor in
international politics. For those who are not realists or those who have taken a conflict resolution
approach, not all interstate relationships are the same nor do states need to be dominated by a
power-politics relationship. The structure of the international system does not appear to be
dominated by the logic of anarchy which, according to realists, compels great powers to play
power politics, behave in a self-help manner, and seek hegemony.
Aspects of structural realism that I contend with include how the international system is
described as well as the behavior of the hegemon. With the end of cold-war and the advent of
globalization, the current international structure can be said flourishing with multilateral
organizations and rapidly spreading of liberal ideas and values. However, structural realists have
yet to provide convincing account for how these change the structure of the international system
and in particular, how this affects structural realist theory.
Conclusion
Structural realism has been an extremely influential theory in international relations,
particularly in the United States. Since the publication of Waltz’s “Theory of International
Politics” in 1979, structural realism, invigorating debates revitalized the realist paradigm, just as
the intensification of the Cold War under President Ronald Reagan in the early 1980’s created a
receptive audience for a new “scientific” version of realism.
Although Waltz’s work carries a systemic focus, it has shown to have both strengths and
weaknesses—its particular strength lies in pointing out and explaining important continuities in
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world politics. However, it cannot be considered part of the rational choice revolution in political
science. Consequently, variations of realism with emphasis on structural constraints and strategic
action made Waltz’ theory appealing to those thinking about structural models of international
politics. Still, there are important unresolved issues within the realist theory of international
politics. Among the most important of these are whether states are security or power maximizers,
and whether this makes a difference for their behavior toward one another. As this paper
provided, structural realism has several problems, and it has certainly not yet reached acceptable
answers.
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