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THE FRANCE-USA HRO PROJECT
ENHANCING RELIABILITY IN INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
Renaud Vidal
Research Engineer
Centre dEtude et de Recherche en Gestion Aix Marseille (CERGAM)
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Firefighters Organizational Reliability: A Comparative Approach (France-USA)
INTRODUCTION1
Studies of large disaster response organizations are likely to draw the attention of a growing
number of organization science scholars, for at least two reasons.
First, the frequency and impact of catastrophes are increasing for the past 20 years. Global
warming and the growing interdependency between territories are two important contributing factors,
making the pessimistic predictions of researchers such as Turner ( Man Made Disaster , 1978) or
Perrow ( Normal Accidents , 1984) come true. Regarding large wildland fires that are the object of
this study, the vulnerability of a growing number of territories is reaching a critical threshold, due tothe conjunction of three long term trends: global warming, growing wildland-urban interface and an
increase in fuel. The more frequent occurrence of wildland fires seems inexorable. As a result,
improving the reliability of response organizations becomes crucial.
Second, studies of emergency operations are interesting because they shed a special light on
organizing. Crises and catastrophes can be defined as the collapse of meaning, i.e. the irrelevance of
our expectations about the world and about the outcome of our interactions with each event. The
most famous example is probably the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, which shook the theological and
philosophical foundations of the times. However, it is precisely this set of agreed upon premises and
common expectations that allow organizations to act collectively. Emergency responders, who often
face the unexpected, have to deal with an organizational paradox: to act collectively in a decisive
way when the sense of a situation is collapsing. In other words, how can they reconcile stability and
change, adaptation and adaptability (Weick, 1979)? Thus, the study of how response organizations
face the unknown may bring us closer to the nature of organizing.
The central argument of our work is that the successful management of these conflicting
requirements is the main source of high reliability in emergency operations. To explore this idea, we
observed some of the best incident management teams from France and from the U.S. for the past
three years. This paper presents our findings and contribution to incident management. The first
section sets the theoretical framework within which the management of the tension between
1
The authors are grateful to the French and US Firefighters for their generous time and commitment. Any factual orinterpretation error that would remain, despite our best efforts, would we our own.This research was supported by a grant from the program Risk Decision Territory of Frances Ministry of Environment
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opposing demands are conceptualized. The second section offers a brief description of the France-
U.S. High Reliability Organizing (HRO) project, and the third one presents the contrasted results of
French and U.S. Incident Management Teams as well as their interpretation. The final section
discusses how firefighters can enhance reliability in incident management, combining stability and
change, flexibility and robustness, adaptability and adaptation.
I. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS AS THE MANAGEMENT OF THE TENSION
BETWEEN CONTROL AND MINDFULNESS
Our research is based on the following idea: individuals, groups or organizations as a whole are
challenged by a fundamental tension between control and mindfulness, i.e. two types of processes
that are antagonist but whose expressions are necessary. The next section provides a theoretical
background.
1. Control and Mindfulness: two processes necessary to systems persistence
Control and Mindfulness processes can be best described with the paradigm of complex and
adaptable systems, as proposed by William Buckley (1968).
Buckley describes the environment of a system as a set of variables. The variety of this set is defined
by all possible combinations of the values of these variables. In the general case, these combinations
are limited by stable causal, spatial or temporal relationships between some variables. The complete
lack of stability and regularity would result in a chaotic environment, which is excluded by
hypothesis.
A system maps its environment when it acquires features that permit it to discriminate, to act upon
and to respond to it. The persistence of a system, defined as the maintenance of the systems
essential variables within acceptable limits, largely depends on successful mapping.When facing stable environments, organizations tend primarily to preserve their current mapping and
evolve towards an archetype that Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck call an organizational palace:
Designers, and especially management scientists, have long promoted skill specialization, integration, clear
objectives, and unambiguous authority structures. These widely accepted values assert that an organization
should be internally differentiated and yet harmonious, should use explicit communication channels and explicit
decision criteria, and should act decisively and consistently. Such properties could improve the performance of
an organization if it inhabited an unchanging environment. Routine activity programs could replace
unprogrammed strategic analyses and coordinating messages (J. R. Galbraith, 1973; Hedberg, 1975a; Landau,
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1973; Miller and Mintzberg, 1974; Thompson, 1967). Activity programs could be multiplied and pared to their
essential elements, then preserved in capital equipment and standard operating procedures (Gershefski, 1969;
McGuire, 1963; Starbuck and Dutton, 1973; Thompson, 1967). Communications could be abbreviated with
efficient codes, and responsibilities could be sharply delineated (Bennis, 1965; J. R. Galbraith, 1973;
Khandwalla, 1974; Miller and Mintzberg, 1974; Starbuck, 1965; Thompson, 1967). In constant surroundings,one could confidently assemble an intricate, rigid structure combining elegant and refined components: an
organizational palace (Camping on seesaws: Prescriptions for a self-designing organization, 1976, p.44).
We can now define control processes as follows:
Control refers to organizational processes, which preserve the existing mapping. Such processes limit
the increase in internal entropy and tend to optimize the allocation of resources on the basis of the
prevailing mapping premises.
According to Buckley, complex environments are characterized by a high level of variety and by
short-term and local regularities. Although limited, this stability enables the identification of a set of
variables and of causal relationships between these variables, which makes it possible for the system
to explain and predict its interactions with the environment. This modeling is what Buckley
designates by mapping.
Complexity manifests itself by variations in this set of relevant variables and / or relationships. A
new mapping becomes necessary. As a result, a complex adaptive system should be able to detect
these changes and update its mapping. We call this capability mindfulness. In general the higher the
internal variety of an organization, the greater its ability to restructure. This phenomenon is known
by the principle of requisite variety. Ashby (1956) summarized this principle as follows: only
(organizational) variety can deal with (environmental) variety. In other words, a necessary condition
for an organization to detect and adapt to the worlds changes consists in creating and maintaining a
variety of ideas and of response repertoires. This internal variety is sometimes described as a deviation from the prevailing norms of mapping (Buckley, 1968), as equivocal organizational
processes (Weick, 1979), or as conceptual slack (Schulman, 1993).
Mindfulness refers to the processes of re-mapping. Mindfulness makes swift detection of changes in
the environment possible, and contributes to creating novel ad-hoc responses. Mindfulness grows
with internal variety.
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To sum up, the persistence of the systems facing complex environments depends on their
ability to structure, de-structure and re-structure. In other words, a persisting system succeeds
in exhibiting control and mindfulness.
This capability is not given, as these two types of processes are often in conflict.
Control Mindfulness
Definition Control refers to processes preserving
the organizational ability to
discriminate and act upon its current
environment
Mindfulness refers to processes making
swift detection of changes in the
environment possible, and contributing to
creating novel ad-hoc responses.
Consequences Control processes limit the increase in
internal entropy, reduce slack and tend
to optimize the allocation of resources
on the basis of the prevailing mapping
premises.
Mindfulness grows with internal variety
and slack:
- resource slack allowing the testing of new
solutions
- managerial slack, i.e. employees discretion
- conceptual slack, i.e. diversity in analytical
perspective
- behavioral slack as an enlarged response
repertoirePrinciples Learning from past successes vs
Ignoring noise vs
Sensitivity to plans/strategy vs
Deference to hierarchy vs
Commitment to stability vs
Preoccupation with failure
Picking up weak signals
Sensitivity to operations
Deference to expertise
Commitment to resilience
Outcomes Effectiveness of collective action
Stability
Adaptation
Accuracy of situational assessment
Change
Adaptability
Risk Overconfidence in organizational
knowledge, resulting in:
- solving the wrong problem precisely
- group think
Overcautiousness, resulting in:
- Inaction
- Coordination problems
Table 1 : contrasting control and mindfulness processes
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1. Control and Mindfulness: two organizational processes in tension
These two processes are antagonist and/or in competition. First, they are antagonist with regards
to their underlying logics. Control aims to optimize the adaptation of a system to its current
environment, to suppress ambiguity and variability around standard operating procedures, overlap in
responsibilities and organizational roles, and employees autonomy and discretion. In doing so,
control processes reduce organizational variety to its minimal value. Mindfulness brings about
experimentation, uncertainty, equivocality, dispersion of outcomes, risk, discussion, and
improvisation. It increases the pool of alternative ideas and behaviors, some of which will be useful
to adapt to future changes in the environment. Mindfulness, in fine, increases adaptability.
Then, these two processes can be in competition for organizational resources. Time is an example of
such precious resources: mindfulness consumes time that control wants to reduce consumption of or
use in pre-planned programs (March and Simon, 1958).
In general, control processes tend to reduce slackwhen mindfulness processes perform better with
high levels of slack. The latter can pertain to other resources, employees discretion (managerial
slack), ideas (conceptual slack) or behaviors (behavioral slack).
As a result, the organizations persistence implies the expression of two types of processes in
conflict. We will use the terms organizational tension to refer to this conflict. Buckley (1968)
summarizes this tension as follows:
A requisite of socio-cultural systems is the development and maintenance of a significant level of non-
pathological deviance manifest as a pool of alternate ideas and behaviors with respect to the traditional
institutionalized ideologies and role behaviors (p. 495).
Weick (1979) refers to this tension as a dilemma between adaptation and adaptability.
Adaptation exploits current opportunities whereas adaptability exploits future opportunities. This
dilemma is also sometimes described in terms of stability versus flexibility. Flexibility makes
adaptation to changes possible by detecting and inventing novel responses early. Stability is an
economical means to exploit current regularities of the environment. Extreme flexibility undermines
the sense of identity and continuity that contributes to unify organizational members. Too much
stability prevents the organization finding better responses in today or tomorrows environment.
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2. A central issue of emergency operations rarely explored by researchers
This dilemma of adaptation vs. adaptability is a central issue in emergency operations for several
reasons:
First, the context of crises, i.e. the collapse of meaning, in which emergency operations unfold,
makes the creation of mindful processes imperative to make sense of what is going on and what is to
be done.
Then, operations unravel in an urgent manner and require a quick commitment to act. Control
processes enable rapid and effective collective action.Finally, these operations are conducted in risky environments. Coordination errors (lack of control)
or situational awareness errors (lack of mindfulness) can become catastrophic for the people
threatened or for first responders themselves.
The tension that underlies emergency operations and in general any system that wishes to
persist has been identified for a long time by scholars, especially through the angle of
organizational learning (Buckley, 1968; Hedberg et al., 1976; Turner, 1978; Weick, 1979). Control
and mindfulness processes have been thoroughly examined; however, separately. Few studies
Mindfulness
+
Control
Figure 1- Control, Mindfulness and High Reliability
High Reliability
Accuracy/usefulness of
mappings
Effectiveness of
collective action
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have considered the issue of their co-existence. Modes of managing the tension between control
and mindfulness processes have been rarely explored (March, 1991; Levinthal, 2006).
There is, however, a notable exception in the domain of safety: the High Reliability Organization
Project at the University of California Berkeley.
High Reliability Organizations (HRO) theory progressively emerged in the past 20 years from the
analysis of complex organizations facing high-risk environments (NASA, nuclear power plants,
nuclear aircraft carriers, submarines, and firefighters). It highlighted the cognitive processes
making early detection of signals of crises possible as well as resilience capability (Weick et al.,
1999). HROs succeed in creating and in maintaining a dynamic state ofcollective mindfulness, by
heedful interrelating between their members.
In the 1990s a theoretical debate began between the proponents of HRO theory and the
proponents of the normal accident theory (Perrow 1994, Levinson 2002). The latter, developed by
Charles Perrow (1984), states that any organization with tightly coupled components and interactive
complexity (as it is often the case with highly technological systems) is prone to unavoidable major
accidents. Hence it is never possible to obtain absolute reliability. The reason is simple: because of
the complexity of the interactions, an error in one of the tightly coupled components can potentially
propagate quickly to the rest of the system, long before anyone can understand what is going on and
what should be done.
This debate can be reframed in the perspective of the management of the tension between control and
mindfulness. Perrows proponents think that such a tension cannot be managed, because:
Centralization is the only way to become aware and to stop the propagation of errors
within a tightly coupled system. (Reinforcing Control)Interactive complexity can only
be addressed by a highly decentralized organization (Enhancing Mindfulness)
Since an organization cannot be at the same time centralized and decentralized, it is vulnerable. This
line of reasoning can be reframed by stating that mindfulness and control cannot be found within the
same system.In this debate, Perrows opponents think that HROs have developed ways to successfully manage
this tension. It is indeed significant that their work uses terms that reflect this tension; either directly:
ambivalence as the best compromise (Weick, 1979); or indirectly by putting together two words
characterizing the two types of processes: heedful interrelating (Weick and Roberts, 1993),
Collective Mindfulness (Weick et al., 1999), Flexible bureaucracy (Bigley and Roberts,
2001), Managing the Unexpected (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007).
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Our work is in line with this approach. Although it can be stated that the findings of the Berkeley
HRO Project demonstrate that some organizations are able to manage the tension between control
and mindfulness processes, researchers have mainly focused on mindfulness processes (Weick et al.,
1999). We intend to pay attention to the organization as a whole by observing control as well as
mindfulness processes. This stance leads us to put this tension at the core of our research. By
observing the best incident management teams in France and in the U.S., our research aims at:
- Exploring the tension between control and mindfulness processes, i.e. understanding how
these processes interact with each other;
- Identifying successful tension management strategies.
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II. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT IN FRANCE AND IN THE U.S.: THE HRO PROJECT
1. Context and goals
Vulnerability to wildland fires increases with the conjunction of three heavy trends: global
warming, expansion of the wildland-urban interface and fuel growth. This situation makes
large wildland fires more frequent, as recent fire history around the Mediterranean coast and
the western US proved to be the case. The HRO project aims to prepare Incident
Management Teams to deal with complex wildland-urban interface fires. The main idea
consists in applying and developing High Reliability Organizing theories, in comparing two
territories: Southern France and the Western US, in combining several research designs:
initial impregnation, direct observation of incident management teams training and fire
operations, analysis of archival data, experiments on Frances civil protection Virtual Reality-
based (VR) training platform.
2. Project participants
2.1.In France:
- University of Aix-Marseille (CERGAM)- Frances Civil Protection Training School (ECASC)
- Bouches-du-Rhne Fire Department (SDIS 13)
2.2.In the US:
- University of California Berkeley (CCRM)
- National Advanced Fire & Resource Institute (NAFRI)
- National Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center- US Forest Service - Fire and Aviation Management
3. Research design
The design of this research combines and triangulates several approaches. It is divided in four
phases:
3.1.Interrelating within Incident Management Teams
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The identification of organizational culture, of interaction modes among team members as well
as the pre-identification of prevailing control and mindfulness processes, were done through
impregnation (days on the fire line, training of researchers, days spent in fire houses) and
interviews with team members. At the end of this phase, most processes and interaction types were
categorized within the frame of tension management.
The main impregnation stages include:
- Training sessions at ECASC (2 months) and 2006 Fire season in Bouches du Rhne
- The Day Fire (California): September 1 to 7, 2006 with an Incident Management Team
- Workshop at NAFRI/LLC (Tucson, AZ): November 12-14, 2006
- Complex Incident Management Course (Sacramento, CA): February 1 to 8, 2007.
- UC Berkeley research team took the Entry level training of US firefighters: July 18 to 22,2007.
3.2.Direct Observation of fire operations in France and in the U.S.
Direct observation of large incidents made it possible to identify operational tensions and to
understand how they are managed (i.e.: East Zone Complex in the U.S. that totaled over 200 000 ha)
by mixed teams (firefighters and researchers). Each IMT member was audio taped from 7:00 to
22:00 each day and critical moments (briefings, strategy meetings, and planning meetings) were
video taped.
The main fire operations observed includes:
- 2006 fire season in Bouches du Rhne (Saint Zacharie Fire, Bouc Bel Air Fire)
- Day Fire (California): September 1 to 7, 2006
- Zaca Fire (California) : July 8-11, 2007
- Meriweather Fire (Montana) : August, 3-7, 2007- East Zone Complex (Idaho) : August 7-29, 2007
- Slide Fire (California) : October 26-30, 2007
- 2008 fire season in Bouches du Rhne.
3.3.Analysis of archival data and observation of team trainings
This phase includes the review of training manuals, engagement doctrines, after action reports,
national databases, surveys and previous studies (i.e. on safety, megafires, incident
management).
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Main observations include:
- Golden Guardian full scale exercise (San Bernardino, CA): November 6, 2006. Shadowing
the IC during the response to a terrorist attack (unified command: FBI, Fire, Law
Enforcement)
- Complex Incident Management Course (Sacramento, CA): February 1 to 8, 2007
- LLC at NAFRI (Tucson, AZ): October 21-26, 2007. Analysis of lessons learned/training
processes. Participation of 3 French firefighter officers.
- Workshop (San Francisco, CA) on Mega Fires with NIMO team, US FS, Brookings
Institute, UC Berkeley (Karlene Roberts, Renaud Vidal)
- SDIS13 (France): December 11, 2007. Full scale exercise (wildland fire). Participation of 3
US firefighter officers.
- Sequoia/Kings Canyon National Park: January 15-16, 2008. Participation with the LLC
Information Collection Team assignment on the Parks implementation of HRO principles.
- NAFRI (Tucson, AZ): January 25- February 2, 2008. Interviews of 12 US experts in incident
management. Observation of Type 1 Incident Management Team qualification training.
Participation of 12 French firefighter officers (from ECASC and SDIS13)
- Super Bowl (Phoenix, AZ) : February 3, 2008. Visit of the Joint Operation Center.
- SW IMTs (5) pre-season meetings and workshop (Santa Fe, NM): March 25-27, 2008.
3.4.Experiments on VR-based training platform
The three first phases led to the formulation of hypotheses on how incident management teams
can manage operational tensions. This experimental phase aims at testing and refining these
hypotheses. The VR-based simulations involve an elite opportunity belonging to the U.S. National
Incident Management Organization (the Atlanta-based NIMO team) and a French team from SDIS13
(one of the southern France leading fire departments in wildland firefighting). Both teams were put
separately in the exact same operational conditions and performed on three different scenarios. The
experiments were conducted on Frances civil protection VR-based training platform (see chart
below).
The first scenario was designed to observe the first leg of the tension (control processes) by setting a
high rate of spread and low complexity; the second scenario was designed to observe the second leg
(mindfulness process) by including highly equivocal inputs and low rate of spread. The third
scenario included a high rate of spread and equivocal inputs to examine how both legs were handled.
This last scenario tests the organizational ability to express both legs and manage underlying
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conflicts, which constitutes the essence of high reliability. The following chart summarizes the main
characteristics of simulation exercises.
A specific website was dedicated to the simulation exercises:www.hro-fires.com, providing further
details on the experiments. The exercises were broadcast live online and now can be downloaded for
interested researchers.
1.1.Respect of fundamental ethical principles of research
This research and participating researchers have been approved by the Institutional Review board
(IRB) which ensures that fundamental ethic principles pertaining to research studies involving
human beings are respected, as defined by the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (Ethical Principles and Guidelines for theProtection of Human Subjects of Research, 1978): respect for persons, beneficence and justice.
http://www.hro-fires.com/http://www.hro-fires.com/http://www.hro-fires.com/http://www.hro-fires.com/ -
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Scenario S14 hrs
Scenario S24 hrs
Scenario S36 hrs
HRO-relatedobjectives
Performance will dependon the
effectiveness/speed ofcollective action
Performance will dependon the accuracy of the
situation assessment.
Performance will dependon the accuracy of the
situation assessment andeffectiveness ofimplementation.
Dynamics High tempoTight coupling with the
environment (errors will
be catastrophic)
Moderate tempo Loose coupling during
the exercise
(errors are possible
during the exercise, but
errors of assessment are
catastrophic for the next
operational period)
Moderate to high tempoTight coupling
Complexity Linear, classical, stablesituational trend
Changing, complex
situation (slow 180
wind shift)
Complex situation (two
wind shifts, large city
threatened)
Type of incident Initial/Extended attackin WUI
Large Fire in WUI Catastrophic fire in WUI
Type of inputs No surprise Inputs are equivocal,partial, enhancing
complexity
Enhance complexity andrequire immediate
resolutionEvaluationcriteria
Are the objectives givenby the AgencyAdministrator during theinbriefing met?
The plan for the nextoperational periods
Management of currentoperations and plan for thenext operational periods
Evaluationspecifics
Raw data (hectares burnt, destroyed structures, injured personnel ), opinion ofwildland fire experts (observers), hot debriefing of IMTs, analyses by mixedteams (researchers/experts)
Table 2: Experiment scenarios
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Chart 1 : Simulation training Platform
PilotsJournalists
Div sup booth
AgencyAdmin.
Residents
ICP
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III.FIGHTING WILDLAND FIRES IN FRANCE AND IN THE U.S.: TWO
APPROACHES
The comparison of operational modes between incident management teams in France and in theU.S. is based on the observation done during the exploratory phase (direct observations on the fire
line, during trainings, review of after action reports) and the experiment phase. We first present the
main results, and then suggest theoretical interpretations.
1. Results summary
We have chosen to segment the results along four lines: action principles, command
organization, planning and interactions among team members.
Table 3 : U.S.-FR. comparison
FRANCE U.S.
Action principles
Role Organizing chaos Bringing order to chaos
Time horizonMassive attack - action/reaction -short term horizon - improvisation
Anticipation - planning-mid/longterm
Type of obligation Results Process, Process, Process
Attitude with respect to external
stakeholdersConstraint undergone
Constraint managed -
Transparency
Command organization
DispatchOperational staff
In anticipation
Administrative staff
In reaction
CommandmentUnique and centralized
Merged functions: strategy/tactics
Unified and distributed
Separated functions:
strategy/tactics
StructuringTop-down: from the I.C. to
division sups
Bottom-up: from division sups to
the I.C.
Planning
Process Under formalized - centralized Formalized distributed
Type of tacticsIntegrated precise based on the
concept of decisive action
Weakly integrated - underspecified
- guide for coordination based on
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opportunism with regard to
conditions (topography/weather)
Resource engagementImmediate in anticipation - in
excess
Post-analysis: anticipating resting
ratio, safety briefing, cost
Interactions
Radio traffic
Norms
Frequent short structured
Concise and precise
Spaced long discussion
No news is good news
Type of interactions Generic Inter-subjective
1.1.Principles for action
The first question that is systematically raised by trainers to the future US Incident Management
Teams is: Why are you here? What do bring you to the table? And, invariably, the answer
expected by the trainers that will be repeated during the next 10 days is: We bring order to chaos .
This motto is immediately associated to the following injunction, repeated even more often:
Process, Process, Process ! In other words, members of incident management teams define
themselves before anything else as high-level professionals, mastering incident management
processes. As a result, these teams guide their actions and measure their success with respect to the
rigorous application of rules and of standard operating procedures, most of them included in the
Incident Command System (ICS). This does not imply that these teams are insensitive to people or
the land at risk, but it means that the processes through which they make sense of the situation arestructured by the application of processes.
A caricatured example is given by the following observation, made during the final simulation
exercise2
We provide another example, taken from an operational context:
of an incident management team in training. Evaluators gave the instruction to manage an
unfolding incident, a wildland fire) and to hand in the Incident Action Plan (IAP) for the following
operational period, at the end of the simulation exercise. The disrupting inputs the IMT had to
manage included invasive media, violated Temporary Flight Ristricted (TFR) areas of airspace,
evacuation of personnel and the fire threatening labs holding radio-active products that finally endup burning down. What is significant for this study is that the exercise is designed so that it becomes
more important to produce, in accordance with the ICS processes, a complete set of documents (the
IAP) rather than to manage an imminent and major threat (nuclear contamination).
Early July 2007, a fire broke out by Santa Barbara (California,) in the Los Padres National Forest ( Zaca fire ).By the end of August, It had burnt over 120 000 ha, becoming the second largest California fire, for an estimatedcost (rescue operations only) over $117 million. Our research team arrived on scene in the afternoon of July 8, at
2 For instance : Complex Incident Management Course Sacramento, California February 11-18, 2007
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the turning point of the incident. At that time, two events happened simultaneously. On the one hand, ahelicopter tilted over, while taking off (hopefully without injuring anyone), leading to the immediate shuttingdown of the air program. On the other hand, a spot fire crossed a line, threatening the Forests wilderness. Airresources being unavailable, the spot fire could not be put out and ended up firing the entire area.Two observations can be pointed out. First, 10 minutes after the IMT got the information (as the same time asour team) about the spot fire, the planning meeting (scheduled in advance, according to the ICS process)
occurred, detailing the incident action plan for the next operational period, without mentioning the spot fire andits consequences. Second, the rule according that the air program is shut down in case of an accident was neverdiscussed. Maybe only helicopters could have stopped, but not air tankers
Symmetrically to the U.S. IMTs who aim to bring order to chaos, a French officer describes his
job as organizing chaos . The difference is significant. The principle for action of French IMTs
consists in stopping the chaos created by the fire as soon as possible, even if the organization is itself
somewhat chaotic. For the U.S. IMTs, internal order should overcome external chaos.
French operational processes are codified in several documents (national reference guides fortraining and professions, national guide for Air Resources use, national guide for Wildland
Firefighting Operations), but much less detailed than in the American ICS. Not only are the
processes less documented, but unthinkable in the U.S. some firefighters frequently put down the
ayatollahs de la formation , referring to the rigor with which trainers at the Civil Protection
Training School (ECASC) enforce official working processes. Simulation exercises showed that the
French IMTs (among the best in SDIS13) worked sometimes slightly differently from the official
doctrine.These diverging principles for action result in different training programs. All French and U.S.
trainers assess the quality of internal functioning (synergy, information sharing, leadership), the
application of taught processes, foresight, reactions to disrupting inputs, stress management, But
actually, U.S. trainers grade the quality of the Incident Action Plan, while French trainers debrief by
commenting on the number of hectares and/or structures burnt.
To sum up, on the U.S. side, Incident Management Teams consider themselves as high-level
professionals, capable of managing complex situations and make the process obligation a
priority. On the French side, teams are oriented towards an obligation of result to limit the size
and complexity of the situation to handle.
1.2.Organizing command
Without getting into too much detail about French and American command structures, we point
out a crucial difference pertaining to the degree of decentralization of command.
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In the U.S. case, the Agency Administrator sets general objectives to the Incident Commander
(IC). These objectives often revolve around three themes: safety of firefighters and residents,
containing the fire within geographic limits, and minimizing suppression cost. The IC then validates
the translation of these goals into operational objectives and tactics proposed by the operations
section chief. The fire is divided in sectors (called divisions and branches) corresponding to three
types of missions: direct attack, indirect attack, and point protection (structures, businesses,
infrastructures). As a result, within this framework, each division supervisor or branch director
assesses his needs and requires resources to carry out the mission, and then organizes as desired. The
analogy given by an experienced firefighter is your division is your own state, and you are the
governor .
The French approach is quite different. Once in charge, the IC defines the SAOIEC . ThisFrench acronym contains the following elements: Situation, Anticipation of upcoming changes,
Objectives, Idea of maneuver (tactics) to meet the operational objectives, Execution and Command
(who is in charge of what).
SAOIEC is the framework for the entire organization. It is validated by the equivalent of the Agency
Administrator (the Mayor or the Prefect). Members of the Incident Command Post (ICP) are
responsible for carrying out the plan. Division supervisors have a certain degree of autonomy in the
local implementation of the plan, but they are - first and foremost in charge of executing the globaland integrated plan made by the IC. As a result, most decisions are made by the IC: defining or
redefining division limits, missions, allocation of incoming resources; controlling the effectiveness
of ongoing actions; anticipating possible evolutions; making new proposals to the Agency
Administrator; reporting to the hierarchy; conducting recons; and informing local authorities as well
as the media
The French organization is strongly centralized, while the U.S. organization is decentralized.
The simulation exercises provided multiple quantitative measures, including the centrality of
interactions network. The coding of the six exercises (over 200 hours of data) made the construction
of the following interaction networks possible:
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Figure 2-FR interaction network links size is proportional to couplings3
3 Coupling C : 0
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Figure 3- US interaction network links size is proportional to couplings
NB: the definition and measure of couplings between pairs of individual is given later. Measures of centrality take
into account the existence of links between individuals regardless of the weigh.
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The centrality of interaction networks can be assessed by considering the variation of the degree
in centrality among the members of the network (Monge et Contractor, 2003). For instance, if the
degree of centrality is about the same for all members, the network is not centralized. If it is much
higher for a few individuals or one individual, the network is centralized. The degree of centrality is
measured through different possible angles:
- The number of members with which one is communicating with (degree)
- The proximity of a member to the members with which he/she is not directly connected
(proximity)
- The mediation, which measures the tendency of a member to be in communication with any
two individuals of the network.
The measures obtained with the simulation exercises are given below:
Chart 1- Normalized centrality measures4
FR US delta US/FR
Number of actors 20 20 1.0
Interacting pairs 98 80 0.8Network centrality Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev.
Degree 26 17 21 15 0.8 0.88
Higher values COS 58, RENS 47, CPC 47, A/T 47 Air Attack 53, IC 47, OPS 42
Proximity 49 11 46 9 0.9 0.82
Higher values COS 68, A/T 65, RENS 61 Air Attack 68, OPS 63, IC 61
Mediation 6 6 7 12 1.2 - 2
Higher values COS 20, SD 18, A/T 16 Air Attack 45, IC 33, OPS 22
The French IC is always the most central actor of the network in terms of degree, proximity and
mediation to a lesser extent.
The structuring of command when the organization is expanding is also significant. As already
noted, the French IC designs the plan ( SAOIEC ), defines generally three or four branches and
their resources. When the operation expands, each branch is then split up in divisions.
4 Analysis tool: Ucinet for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies -Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G. and Freeman, L.C. 2002.
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In the U.S. dynamics, the fire is initially organized in divisions/groups; as the incident grows, they
are gathered in branches for improved coordination.
The French start with branches that they later separate into divisions and the Americans start with
divisions that they branch when too numerous.
The French dynamics is based on top-down logic, when the US dynamics is bottom-up.
1.3.Planning
The planning process includes the assessment of the situation, the development of objectives, the
selection of the appropriate tactics and resources. The differences between American and French
functioning extend to the planning process. On the French side, the process boils down to the SAOIEC made by the IC. It is centralized and not very formalized. To the contrary, the U.S.
planning process is distributed and extremely codified.
In addition, the outcome of the planning process is different: the French planning is integrated,
global and based on decisive actions. Indeed, the IC bases its tactics on the combined effects of the
actions conducted simultaneously by each division. These actions are defined and related resources
are scaled so as to stop definitively the progress of the fire. Hence the term of decisive actions. In
that sense, the French plans are integrated (forming a coherent whole) and decisive (designed to stopthe fire).
As for the U.S. IMTs, the plan documented in the Incident Action Plan (IAP), is loosely
integrated, under-specified and consists in a guide for situated action.
Each division has its own objective and allocated resources, operating almost independently
from the others. In that sense, the plan is less integrated because not based on decisive actions but on
a set of actions; each of them improves the global situation partially, and not necessarily
simultaneously. This plan is a guide and a resource for action. It provides the big picture of a
complex operation, and the information to build ones own reasoning: general objectives, potentially
dangerous phenomenon, meteorological forecast, fire behavior forecast, assignment of other
divisions, and availability of air resources
1.4.Interactions within the teams
Interactions among the U.S. and French teams are different in formats as well as in contents.
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The format of French interactions is short, frequent and codified, while the format of U.S.
interactions are long, rare and free.
For the French firefighters, communications must be brief and concise in order not to clog the radio
traffic.
Radio messages are codified. For instance, the words that are communicated to the air tanker pilot in order tostart the drops must be drop authorization . Any other sentence (for instance top - drop is not taken intoaccount, the words stop and top could be confused although the orders are opposite).Another example is the strict format of the messages used by the IC to report to his hierarchy/Operations Center:I am at, I am seeing, I am instructing, I am anticipating, I am requestingMany times during real operations or during the simulation exercises, the IC or the Operations Center remindsfirefighters to limit their communications, to avoid obstructing radio channels.
To the contrary, U.S. communication style is rare but longer. It goes as far as having an implicit
norm: no news is good news . This is to be put in the context of the strong autonomy of the
divisions, which are not required to report their status continuously. As a result, when
communication occurs, exchanges happen among individuals who need to catch up with one another
(what is the situation in their division, how they feel about their chance of success, how they will
coordinate). Since communication is rare, its takes the form of a discussion that lasts longer and in
which more data, denser in context, are exchanged.
These qualitative observations have been measured during the simulation exercises. First, we
displayed all interacting pairs along two dimensions: mean duration of interactions versus the
number of interactions (cf. chart 3). It appears that the interactions of the U.S. team are mainly in the
area long duration/low frequency, while the interaction pairs of the French team are mostly in the
area short duration/high frequency.
Chart 2 Number of interactions versus average duration of interactions
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
FR US
Nb of interactions
Duration (s)
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We then refined the analysis by computing the coupling of each pair. The coupling is defined by the
formula: number of interactions/mean duration. An overall coupling at the group level was also
computed. We will comment further in the paper the interpretation of this indicator. The value of
couplings for each simulation (cf. chart below) shows that the French average coupling is twice as
high as the U.S. coupling.
Chart 2- Interaction couplings per simulation exercise
The interactions of the French team are tightly coupled while they are loosely coupled for the U.S.
team.
As far as content is concerned, French interactions are generic while the US interactions are
inter-subjective.
Exchanges between French officers are rather uni-directional and close, and show the salience of
hierarchy. The U.S. exchanges are more bi-directional and open (even when a chief and his
subordinate are interacting).
To sum up, U.S. interactions allow for richer discussions on the developing situation. They
include exchanges on items/hypotheses at the origin of the current representation of the
situation. This makes it easier to reconstruct a more accurate picture, if needed. They unfold
0.49
0.28
0.53
0.27
0.78
0.22
0.58
0.25
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
FR1 US1 FR2 US2 FR3 US3 FR All US All
Couplings
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between two individuals who bring their personal experience. In that sense, there are more
inter-subjective than the French interactions.
French interactions focus on the essential, are based on very codified protocols and common
expectations, allowing rapid coordinated actions. They are poor in contextual cues because
individuals are only asking for the few parameters that are necessary to perform their own
routine. In that sense, French interactions are generic because everyone behaves mainly
according to her/his organizational role.
2. Data interpretation: two management modes of tension between control and mindfulness
2.1.Tight and loose couplings in organizations
In order to interpret results, we found useful to rely on the concept of organizational coupling.
The coupling of two entities A and B refers to the predictability of Bs behavior, given As behavior.
Miller (1978, cited by Weick 1982) suggests that A and B are loosely coupled when A impacts B:
(1)suddenly (versus continuously), for example when reaching a threshold effect;
(2)marginally (versus significantly), for example when there is a buffering effect;
(3)indirectly (versus directly), when there is a mediator between A and B;(4)after a lag (versus immediately).
When two entities remain loosely coupled long enough, this decoupling becomes cognitive and
behavioral, i.e. the mapping of each other's environment tend to decouple. An organization with
different types of couplings between its components will display different systemic characteristics.
Karl Weick (1982) argues that the intensity of couplings induces differences in the degree to which
means are tied to ends, actions are controlled by intentions, solutions are guided by imitation of
ones neighbor, feedback controls search, prior actions determine subsequent acts, past experience
constraints present activity, logic dominates exploration, and wisdom and intelligence affect coping
behavior (p.382).
From a research design perspective, we identified the nature of couplings by correlating two
types of data:
- by identifying whether at least one of Millers five loose coupling characteristics was
present.
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- By analyzing the duration and frequency of interactions: short and frequent
communication points to a tight coupling, long and rare exchanges refer to loose
coupling.
Appendix 4, 5, 6 and 7 provide details on coupling measures: real time couplings per
team and per simulation, characteristics of interaction networks such as density, centrality
and structural constraints.
First, we will locate ongoing couplings in the American and French teams. Then we will
establish the link between the distribution of couplings and the modes of tension management.
2.2. Application to the French and U.S. IMTs
The French IMT is characterized by a tight coupling between entities that display varying
production processes, while the US IMT is characterized by a loose coupling of entities with
highly normalized production processes.
Chart 3- Types of coupling within Incident Management Teams
FRANCE U.S.
Tightly coupled system of
intrinsically varying units
Loosely coupled system of highly
normalized units
Tight CouplingStrong centralization around the IC
Through the link ICP-branches
Culture, codification of process,
professional norms
Loose Coupling
Variation around production
processes
Improvisations
Between the IC and other teammembers
Decentralization Disjoint
incrementalism
As for the French case, the coupling intensity can be seen through frequent and short
interactions. The standardization and codification of oral exchanges, the need for velocity, leads to a
system in which each member receives and transmits the values of predefined parameters, necessary
for the unfolding of routines. The strongest values can be found in the ICP and between the ICP and
the branches (including the air branch).
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Loose couplings exist in the form of:
- Variation around production processes (standard operating procedures);
- A preference for action/reaction modes and resilience, rather than for anticipation.
This is a source a loose coupling between pre-established plans and the actual situation,
but also between actions. We mean that this preference translates frequently into
improvising in the sense that firefighters recombine portions of their action repertoires
into novel ways, in order to meet situational demands.
- Sporadic calls for support/advice from the IC to some officers.
One observes that the IC is at the heart of most interactions, which are loosely coupled.
We detail the following example:
-
-
(*) the FR ICP includes the operator (OP), Action/Transmission (A/T), Logistics chief (M/L), Situationofficer (RENS) and the ICP chief (CPC)
(**) During the simulation exercises, the Branch Directors including the Air Branch Director- had thefollowing couplings with the ICP: 0.3-0.6-0.5-0.5
The triad is comprised of two loose couplings and one tight coupling. In general, the IC
sets the incident objectives and makes the plan through the SAOEIC - upon adiscussion with the ICP (mindfulness processes thus loose coupling) then the ICP
implement the plan by a close and direct supervision of branch directors (control
processes thus tight coupling). The IC can also reassess his plan or change it after a
discussion with a branch director of a division supervisor (bypassing the ICP). The IC
and the branch directors are connected directly through loosely coupled interactions
and indirectly through tightly coupled interactions.
IC
BranchDirector (**)
ICP(*)
Figure 4- Triad - FR IMT
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This type of double connection tight coupling-loose coupling seems to play a fundamental
role in resilience mechanisms of living systems, as some studies tend to prove (McCann,
2000, Glassman, 1973).
As for the U.S. case, the low coupling intensity translates into rare and long interactions. This
comes from the strong autonomy of division supervisors.
Tight coupling is due to:
- A strong codification of working processes;
Examples include the planning process ( planning P ) codified in the Incident
Command System, or the 48 rules of engagement that apply to firefighters on the fire line
(Gleason, 1994).
- Rigorous, specialized, long training sessions;
- Socialization process;
Socialization reinforces common beliefs, norms of behavior or professional values. They
are specific to the organizational role of each team members, but they also emerge for
each incident management team, reflecting the ICs personality.
Strong coupling exists because these common expectations allow each member to quickly make
sense of others behavior and adjust his own behavior accordingly.
Observation: the analysis of couplings distribution for each organization (appendix 5) shows that
loose couplings are distributed uniformly in the US team while they are mainly located around the IC
in the FR team.
When one recalls that loose couplings reflect mindfulness processes and tight couplings manifest
control processes, one can interpret this situation by stating that: in the US team everyone thinks ,
while for the FR team this task is mainly devoted to the IC.
2.3.Interpretation : Two management modes of tension between control and mindfulness
Lets start by observing that tight coupling is the main source of control and loose coupling
is the main source of mindfulness (Weick, 1982, p.388). As a result, we brought to light two ways
of expressing control and mindfulness processes within incident management teams, thus two ways
of expressing control and mindfulness processes.
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The French doctrine (massive attack of starting fires) leads to a specific mapping of the
environment by the organization. This mapping creates common expectations enabling control
processes to unravel. Among these processes, a strong centralization induces rapid, integrated,
coordinated collective action. As it is often the case with strong centralization, local adjustments are
necessary. Tolerated variations around working processes reinforce a capacity for adjustments or
improvisation, characterizing mindfulness processes.
In the U.S. IMT, mindfulness processes are based on the autonomy of entities (divisions,
functional sections) for which local adjustments are continuous and independent mainly as a result of
their specific local situation, and are unconstrained by strong central and integrated orders. Control
processes rely on a high codification of working processes, socialization and training processes prior
to the actual operations. This control enables a minimum coordination of autonomous entities.
3. Each management mode exhibits limitations
Chart 4- Strengths, weaknesses and corrective measures
FRANCE U.S.
Tightly coupled system of
intrinsically varying units
Loosely coupled system of highly
normalized units
Strengths
Reactive re-structuring ability
Integrated vision: awareness of
interdependencies
Local adaptations, integration of
complex constraints
Weaknesses
Limits with respect to operation
complexity or size
Varying quality and consequences
of improvisationsLack of hindsight
Overconfidence in the IC
Distributed cognition inertia
Self-centered organization,
overconfidence in the ICS
Observed corrective measures
Simplification of external
constraints by the IC (FR1)
Normalizing efforts (i.e.: increased
training, Quality approach
implementation (FR2)
HRO program (FR3)
Briefings, planning meetings,
Command and General staff
meetings (US1)
Trigger points, STICC (US2)
Managing stakeholders (US3)
HRO programs (US4)
Lessons Learned Center (US5)
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NIMO teams, central inspection
(US6)
From rules to principles program
(US7)
3.1. Strengths and weaknesses of each tension management mode
Centralization brings along significant advantages: better knowledge of the big picture and of
interdependencies among entities. Moreover, reactivity for remapping and restructuring is enhanced
once the IC decided so.
However, the group relies mainly on one individual who cannot manage large and complex
situations, even if smart and experienced. Also, local adjustments sometimes happen through
improvisation with varying success and consequences (for instance, in the first simulation exercise,
an improvised backfire escaped and worsened the situation). Another weakness was observed during
the exercises: a difficulty to step back and to see an emerging trend. By design, a 180 wind shift
occurred within one hour. The ICP, continuously communicating with the team members on the
ground, kept acknowledging small changes in wind direction, but never realized the significance of
the phenomenon. Finally, overconfidence in the ICs experience (regardless of any kind of deference
to hierarchy) prevented relevant questions to be raised.
The strength of the U.S. configuration relies on continuous local adjustments and its capability
to integrate numerous and complex constraints (logistics, finance, environment, politics ).
Nevertheless, some inertia can be observed. Beyond the size factor (which did not matter during the
simulation exercises, since the American and French teams had the same size), this inertia comes
from a less acute awareness of interdependencies among the components. Also, the high degree of
specialization of each function, associated trainings and socialization processes, leads the
organization to focus on itself: inflation in norms, high focus on internal processes to the detrimentof results
3.2.Corrective measures taken to mitigate the weaknesses
We observed a number of actions designed to correct the negative outcomes of some processes.
Naturally, these actions are not consciously taken to fix the unbalance between control and
mindfulness processes.
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For the French IMT, corrective measures contribute to:
- Influence the environment to simplify the issue at stake (FR1). During the simulation
exercises, the IC regularly tried to influence the environment (i.e. the agency administrator,
gray zones of the exercises ground rules or of the scenario, the media) in order to simplify
the constraints of the situation faced. Not so surprisingly, such attempts echo the limitation of
ones brain to manage interactive complexity.
- Increase the normalization of working processes (FR2). SDIS13 invests heavily in training
and in a quality management approach in order to reduce the variability of its production
processes and to improve the organizations steering tools.
- Engage in HRO training (FR3). Among other things, SDIS13/ECASC has progressively
realized with the HRO project the limitations of the current operational approach. By
engaging the IMTs to enhance the quality of their interactions and to open more sensemaking
spaces, the project addresses the weaknesses of their tightly coupled system.
For the U.S. IMT, corrective measures contribute to:
- Make significant efforts to construct and share a global picture of the situation (US1).
These efforts translate into multiple briefings, to counteract the trend for divergence among
loosely coupled entities and related coordination problems.
- Set boundary conditions (US2).This process appears to be quite important. Setting trigger points, also called Management
Action Points (MAPs), and Situation, Task, Intent, Concerns, and Calibration (STICC)
briefings (especially the item Concerns ) reflect this idea. The goal is to set the main limits
within which the current situation and organizational response are valid. If those limits are
crossed, a change (in sensemaking, in decision making) is necessary. This technique is
particularly useful to counter the organizations inertia.
- Focus stakeholders on specific issues (US3)Stakeholders include the media, elected officials, residents and authorities The IC devotes
an extensive part of his time and energy to stakeholders, dedicating two segments of the
organization ( Public Information and Liaison ) that included over 50 members on
several operations (e.g. Slide Fire, California, November 2007). By being transparent with
respect to stakeholders, by explaining their working processes, IMTs focus the attention of
stakeholders on their professionalism and away from problems of global reactivity.
- Engage in HRO (US4).
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For the last five years, the U.S. Forest Service has engaged in some efforts to increase
awareness of HRO principles, expecting to enhance IMTs responsiveness: Staff Rides,
Tactical Decision Games, and Sand Table Exercises all now include HRO Principles as part
of the discussions. S-520 has also included a 4-hour section on HRO in the 2009 and 2010
classes.
- Constitute and develop a Lessons Learned Center (US5).
Since innovations are local and communication among autonomous entities is scarce, the
Center enables firefighters to share their experience (through after action reports, case studies,
libraries of lessons and effective practices). The LLC also provides an online Team Center
for IMTs and an online Community Center to support communities of practice that together
form a Knowledge Management System for the wildland fire community. The Center has co-
sponsored multiple regional and five national HRO workshops during the last five years. The
Center also co-sponsored an international, inter-industry HRO workshop in early 2010.
- Another emerging FS-wide item is the Key Decision Log developed to collect the logic of
IMT and Agency Administrator decisions creating an institutional memory that can be
analyzed for trends before, during and after the events.
- Create NIMO teams to advise and lead; Chiefs Representatives groups to carry out central
inspections (US6).
Some internal studies from the U.S. Forest Service pointed to a general trend of IMTs to align
their actions with the agency administrators expectations, sometimes to the detriment of the
headquarters instructions (often related to cost control). The creation of NIMO teams (small
size highly experienced teams) to provide expertise, and Forest Service Chiefs
Representitives to perform central inspections during the fires. Both aimed at reinforcing the
coupling between IMTs and headquarters, and in fine the Congress.
Beginning in early 2009, a Continuous Improvement in Decision-Making Program sponsored
by the NIMO teams engaged 30 forests at risk for large fires before, during and after fireseasons, and began to emphasize firefighter and public risk assessment as the primary driver,
with lowered costs becoming an outcome.
- Finally, the U.S. Forest Service (Fire and Aviation Management) started a broader reflection
on moving from rule-based behaviors influenced by strict compliance, to principle-based
behaviors in a doctrinal approach to decision-making. The organization is purposefully
attempting to vector toward becoming a learning organization and a HRO (US7).
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To sum up, the comparison between American and French IMTs highlights two management
strategies with respect to the tension between control and mindfulness processes. Each strategy
carries some strengths and weaknesses that teams try to mitigate. The following section integrates
these observations in theoretical framework.
IV.DISCUSSION
1. Theoretical developments
1.1.Managing the tension between control and mindfulness
In the third section of this paper, we pointed to the source of loose and tight couplings in
American and French IMTs. Then we identified the modes of expression of control and mindfulness
processes, which allowed us to bring to light four tension management strategies: manipulating,
alternating, specializing and diffracting.
Manipulating
This strategy consists in influencing the environment so that the organization can express one of
the two processes only, without suffering the negative consequences of not expressing the other
process. There are control-oriented manipulations or mindfulness-oriented manipulations.
Manipulating for control
In this case, the organization leads external stakeholders to focus on the portions of the
environment that will be well handled by its control processes only. This is exactly what the FrenchIC is trying to do with the agency administrator, residents, and the media to make them accept and
internalize the ICs own constraints. In this stabilized and simplified environment, the weakness of
mindfulness processes is far less important. This is also what the U.S. team does by making the
residents, media focus on the quality of their incident management processes.
Manipulating for mindfulness
This strategy consists of influencing external stakeholders on the portions of the environmentthat will be well handled by its mindfulness processes only. This strategy was observed before and
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during a dangerous and chaotic night when a fuel driven fire crossed a community. The U.S. team
ended up putting one firefighter with each resident. In another domain, Horowitz (1970) shows that
the success of the Israeli Army during the Six-Day War was due to the attack of very autonomous
and loosely coordinated units, which cut the communication lines of the centralized Egyptian Army.
The Israeli Army chose its own battleground (manipulation) and did not suffer from the lack of
control (enabling good coordination) because the war was won quickly.
Alternating
This strategy consists in alternating the expression of each leg of the tension. There is a
gradation in the spontaneity of the alternation:
Alternating by design
This is the prevailing functioning mode of the U.S. teams. Codification of working processes,
extensive training, and socialization by job and by team precedes the actual operations. This
construction of common frames of reference (control processes) is followed by a strong decoupling
of divisions during operations, one of the main sources of mindfulness.
The two dimensions of this tension management strategy are:
- The loose coupling of organizational units. Their interactions lead to make more explicit rationales
for action, viewpoints and premises. They enable to reconstruct collectively the sense of situations
and what to do about them (mindfulness). In another domain, Schulman showed how 12 different
entities were involved in safety issues at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant and had to discuss
and negotiate the upgrading of working protocols (Schulman, 1993). Rochlin pointed out how
managers of power plants solved problems by confronting two distinct underlying logics: empiricism
of operators and the design rationalities of engineers (Rochlin, 1999).
- A strong organizational culture as a source of coordination and control of loosely coupled systems.The role of culture was brought to light by authors such as Weick ( Management of organizational
change among loosely coupled elements , 1982; Organizational Culture as a Source of High
Reliability, 1987) or Spender (Culture and High Reliability Organizations: The Case of Nuclear
Submarines, 1995)
Alternating by plan
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The ICS requires mindfulness moments at pre-set times (e.g. strategy meeting ) during which
the situation is re-assessed and the next incident action plan is drafted, followed by the execution of
the incident action plan.
Alternating dynamically
The setting of trigger points creates more flexible alternation between control and
mindfulness.
The OODA loop 5
used by US Air Force pilots during the Korean War is a declination of this idea
(Boyd, 1987). It requires pilots to observe the situation, orient (i.e. to interpret previous observations
and update the representation of the situation, if necessary), decide, act, observe results, orient (is it
working?), decide, act, etc. This can be seen as a succession of control and mindfulness phases.
Alternating by discretion
The French IC punctually asks for advice (in general to a branch director he trusts, the ICP
chief). After such a discussion, a decision is made and the rest of the organization executes. This
happens randomly, i.e. whenever he feels useful, at his own discretion.
Specializing
The idea is to express simultaneously control and mindfulness processes, but at different
organizational levels.
This is the prevailing mode of tension management for the French Teams. Control is expressed
through the ICP and branches. Mindfulness is located around the IC and within divisions and
manifests itself by their resilience and improvising ability.
Variations around this principle can be observed:
- Designed organizational roles can be the dividing line between control and mindfulnessoriented jobs.
For instance, one of the roles of the U.S. IC is explicitly to pay attention to the teams
dynamics and quality of interactions. Each member follows a routine (control) while the IC
pays attention to how it unfolds (mindfulness). Similarly, American and French rules of
engagement require that one member of the crews on the fire line acts as a lookout and watch
for the fire behavior.
5 OODA : Observe, Orient, Decide, Act.
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- Gauthereau and Hollnagel (2005) analyzed a programmed outage in a Swedish power plant
and suggest a distinction between four levels of processes: targeting, monitoring, regulating,
and tracking. There is a gradation in the degree of anticipation (the highest being the targeting
level) and in the degree of adjustment (the highest being the tracking level). Anticipation is
(in this case) linked to control processes and adjusting ability to mindfulness. With our
vocabulary, the authors have brought to light a strategy of progressive specialization.
- Management by objectives, which is a characteristic of the ICS (Bigley and Roberts, 2001),
provides another example of this principle. Each organizational level is free to work within
the framework of the general objectives negotiated with or determined by the higher
organizational level. The authors describe this scheme as constrained improvisation.
Diffracting
This strategy consists in diffusing the tension between control and mindfulness to the entire
organization. The following three observations (detailed in the earlier sections) illustrate this idea:
- Creating rules about not applying rules,
- Ambivalent norms,
- Creating, training and socializing to norms on mindfulness (HRO approach).
These norms do not transcend the paradox they create, but contribute to make people aware of
the ambivalence of enacted reality, and as a result, make them more mindful and sensitive.
This is a way of increasing the requisite variety of the organization. People who do not blindly
follow prevailing norms and rules will pay attention to more cues and will try more interpretative
schemes to make sense of the situation they face. Such a lead has been developed by Weick through
the concept of wisdom , an individual and collective attitude which consists in simultaneously
trust and doubt knowledge ( the Attitude of wisdom: ambivalence as the optimal compromise ,1998). This attitude aims at avoiding two pitfalls: overconfidence leading to erroneous
interpretations and over cautiousness that paralyzes action. Wisdom internalizes the tension between
control and mindfulness.
We chose to label this strategy diffracting by reference to the physics phenomenon according to
which an electromagnetic wave diffuses in space when meeting an obstacle. The interest of this
comparison is reinforced by the fact that diffraction is related to the wave-particle duality. Indeed,
this strategy tends to diffuse the duality control-mindfulness to the entire organizational space. Toextend the analogy, the interaction between reality and the organization (versus the contact between
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the wave and the obstacle) determines its control and mindfulness behaviors (versus wave or
particle).
To sum up, four families of strategies have been presented: manipulating, alternating,
specializing and diffracting. Each team uses these strategies at varying degrees. Prevailing
strategies structure the teams behavior: alternating for the U.S. teams and specializing for the
French teams.
It can also be assumed that organizations facing specific environments would use manipulating or
diffracting strategies as their prevailing strategies. The following section attempts to sketch the
domain of validity of each strategy.
1.2.Domains of validity of prevailing strategies
Strategies are not successful in all situations. Weaknesses, failures and corrective actions taken by
the U.S. or French IMTs inform about their domains of validity. We found that three characteristics
emerged:
- Manipulability: the extent to which the organization can influence portions of the
environment;
- Variety: the variety of the environment is defined by the number of elements, states of
distinct events in space and time, with different attributes;
- Constraints: the extent to which this variety is constrained, i.e. the extent to which the elements
are linked by stable causal, space or time relationships.
When we focus on the last two dimensions, the management strategies distribute along the following
domains of validity:
- Alternating is relevant in situations where the surroundings of loosely coupled entities arerelatively independent. This decoupling increases internal variety and enables the
organization to manage a high level of variety in the environment. Local adjustments (disjoint
incrementalism) provide adaptation and adaptability;
- Specializing is more appropriate in an environment with a high level of constraints in variety.
Causal relationships between an environments variables require a global grasp and a strongly
coordinated response. If this environments variety is not too high, the organizations control
center can manage it;
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- Diffracting should be the direction towards which an organization with a specializing
strategy, but with increasing interdependencies among the main variables, heads for. It could
also be the direction for an organization with a specializing strategy, but facing such an
increase in the variety of the environment, that the control center cannot manage it anymore.
HRO researchers placed the principle of requisite variety at the heart of their theories (Weick et
al. 1999), stating that an organization should be as complex as the environment it is trying to control.
We found that decomposing variety along 3 dimensions (manipulability, strict variety, constraints)
enable an organization to go further in the prescription of the regulation modes that should prevail as
stability increases.
2. Implications for enhancing reliability in firefighting operations
The first recommendation consists of identifying the main control and mindfulness processes
prevailing in the organization, in order to become aware of the dominant tension management
strategy. Two situations are possible. If this strategy is adapted to the operational context, then the
organization needs to develop actions that can correct the weaknesses of the prevailing mode of
tension management. If this strategy is not adapted to the context anymore, another strategy must be
considered.
Figure 5- Strategies validity domains
Strictvariety
DiffractingAlternating
Specializing
Constraints (interdependencies)
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Also, in every situation, processes that produce simultaneously control and mindfulness should
be encouraged. These three types of recommendations are developed below.
2.1.Encouraging positive relationships between control and mindfulness processes
When a positive relationship between control and mindfulness can be activated, then more
control will induce more mindfulness. Two recommendations seem to apply broadly:
Alternating dynamically
- Alternating dynamically: injecting numerous trigger points
By trigger points, we refer to the description of the boundary conditions (i.e. the conditions
under which the current action is valid and useful). When approaching the limits of the
boundaries, then reassessing the situation is needed. It can be flame length, the fire crossing a
given line, public reaction
By making more of peoples assumptions explicit, the content of interactions will be
improved. These triggers will also increase the occasions for mindful moments of reflection
and dialogue around concerns and possibilities. The points of application are very broad:
from institutionalized briefings (safety briefings, morning briefings ), meetings
(preplanning, planning ) to local interactions among team members. Encouraging the
STICC briefing format, or the Incident Response Pocket Guide (IRPG) briefing format, to
create discussion opportunity around concerns between a firefighter and his subordinate
should be sought as well.
Note that this strategy will increase the amount of talk (and tighten couplings) and will move
toward a situation where people do things because they make sense, not out of compliance
only.
- Alternating dynamically: making assignments more accurate in IAPs to generate discussions
Vague assignments are generally the rule. For instance (in substance): cut as much as you can
along this line. This is often justified by the fact that incident conditions change and localadjustments are always necessary. As a result a detailed plan would be useless and future
plans discredited. However, setting more defined expectations will lead to earlier detection
that the job is not possible given the change in conditions and trigger discussions about
expedient changes. Moreover, since the US FSs strategy is now to engage fires where there
is a higher probability of success, then the rationale for success should translate into clearer
and more precise assignments.
Diffracting
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Diffracting is about creating, training and socializing organizational norms that capture the
tension between control and mindfulness.
- Moving from rules to principles
The problem with too many rules is that people tend to do things not because they make
sense, but to comply with requirements. When they stop reflecting on what they are doing,
they stop being mindful. Moreover, a large set of rules breeds overconfidence in what the
organization knows. Finally, rules reduce the variability of responses which is dangerous
when the variety of situations to deal with is greater.
We suggest creating a small set of key principles that will serve as guidelines for
improvisation to meet unanticipated situations. The application of these principles to local
conditions being discretionary, people should not be left alone with their problems. Such a
move from rules to principles can be successful only if it is applied together with denser and
richer dialogues between group members.
- Flexible norms and training to dual thinking
Flexible norms refer to norms such as the following one, enforced by the Navy: "never break
a rule unless safety will be jeopardized by carrying out the rule (cited by Roberts et al,
1994). This norm basically says that organizational knowledge encoded in rules is
incomplete. It creates a paradoxical injunction (trust/distrust organizational knowledge) that
captures the tension between control and mindfulness. It enhances mindfulness because it
encourages people to use judgment to identify which situation they are exactly facing and
what rules should apply.
As we have already seen, norms such as LCES capture the same tension. It says that people
can trust the ability of the crew to control the situation (by monitoring the fire and providing
safety) but to distrust it as well because the fire is still capable of surprise and a swift retreat
may be necessary. The point here is that people should be trained to recognize and
acknowledge the tension encoded in these norms. When they realize that individuals andgroups are dealing with competing tendencies towards control and mindfulness, they can
more easily detect the push for overconfidence or overcautiousness.
The objective is that people should be confident enough in organizational knowledge to take
actions, but distrust it at the same time because unexpected things can always happen. This
research has attempted to identify general strategies to manage this tension. However, more
dialogue will always be a step in the right direction: it leads group members to share their
expertise about the situation to create a more accurate picture, leaving out overblownconcerns or introducing cues of a changing situation. Moreover, it enables to assemble
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response repertoires into ad-hoc responses. This objective supports The US Forest Service
Doctrine Dialogue (Spring 2010):
Improving fire line communications and fire line decision-making, along with instilling high reliability
organizing into fire organizations, all serve to promote the Learning & Safety Culture. Recent
hallmarks of the Risk Management program include new systems management practices and incident
reporting tools that allow fire fighters to feel confidence and trust in practices that incorporate
transparency and strive to eliminate blaming.
2.2.Developing corrective actions mitigating the vulnerabilities of the prevailing strategy
French case: see the report Fiabiliser la gestion des feux de trs grande ampleur, programme RDT
du MEEDDM
US case
We have seen that the US organizing scheme holds the features of a loosely coupled system.
Loosely coupled systems main weakness lies in its distributed cognition that limits responsiveness
and integration of interdependent constraints. Large complex fires analyses have shown that the best
strategy is to engage fire when success is assured (c.f. presentation by Marc Rounsaville 2009,
Lessons Learned Center). Thus, early detection of these opportunities and organizational
responsiveness are crucial!
At least four strategies tend to increase cognitive coupling and global responsiveness (Weick, 1982):change the presumption of logic, equalization of participation rates, restore variations to constant
variables, and give convincing feedbacks.
Change the presumption of logic.
This means that people interpret others action as necessarily relevant. It is exemplified by the tacit
norm no news is good news. By making people self conscious of their presumptions (through
training) or by introducing strangers/novel logics (US-FR project). Doubting the logic of
unfolding action