france usa hro project 07012010[1]

8/9/2019 France USA HRO Project 07012010[1]

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THE FRANCE-USA HRO PROJECT

ENHANCING RELIABILITY IN INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

Renaud Vidal

Research Engineer

Centre dEtude et de Recherche en Gestion Aix Marseille (CERGAM)


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Firefighters Organizational Reliability: A Comparative Approach (France-USA)

INTRODUCTION1

Studies of large disaster response organizations are likely to draw the attention of a growing

number of organization science scholars, for at least two reasons.

First, the frequency and impact of catastrophes are increasing for the past 20 years. Global

warming and the growing interdependency between territories are two important contributing factors,

making the pessimistic predictions of researchers such as Turner ( Man Made Disaster , 1978) or

Perrow ( Normal Accidents , 1984) come true. Regarding large wildland fires that are the object of

this study, the vulnerability of a growing number of territories is reaching a critical threshold, due tothe conjunction of three long term trends: global warming, growing wildland-urban interface and an

increase in fuel. The more frequent occurrence of wildland fires seems inexorable. As a result,

improving the reliability of response organizations becomes crucial.

Second, studies of emergency operations are interesting because they shed a special light on

organizing. Crises and catastrophes can be defined as the collapse of meaning, i.e. the irrelevance of

our expectations about the world and about the outcome of our interactions with each event. The

most famous example is probably the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, which shook the theological and

philosophical foundations of the times. However, it is precisely this set of agreed upon premises and

common expectations that allow organizations to act collectively. Emergency responders, who often

face the unexpected, have to deal with an organizational paradox: to act collectively in a decisive

way when the sense of a situation is collapsing. In other words, how can they reconcile stability and

change, adaptation and adaptability (Weick, 1979)? Thus, the study of how response organizations

face the unknown may bring us closer to the nature of organizing.

The central argument of our work is that the successful management of these conflicting

requirements is the main source of high reliability in emergency operations. To explore this idea, we

observed some of the best incident management teams from France and from the U.S. for the past

three years. This paper presents our findings and contribution to incident management. The first

section sets the theoretical framework within which the management of the tension between

1

The authors are grateful to the French and US Firefighters for their generous time and commitment. Any factual orinterpretation error that would remain, despite our best efforts, would we our own.This research was supported by a grant from the program Risk Decision Territory of Frances Ministry of Environment


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opposing demands are conceptualized. The second section offers a brief description of the France-

U.S. High Reliability Organizing (HRO) project, and the third one presents the contrasted results of

French and U.S. Incident Management Teams as well as their interpretation. The final section

discusses how firefighters can enhance reliability in incident management, combining stability and

change, flexibility and robustness, adaptability and adaptation.

I. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS AS THE MANAGEMENT OF THE TENSION

BETWEEN CONTROL AND MINDFULNESS

Our research is based on the following idea: individuals, groups or organizations as a whole are

challenged by a fundamental tension between control and mindfulness, i.e. two types of processes

that are antagonist but whose expressions are necessary. The next section provides a theoretical

background.

1. Control and Mindfulness: two processes necessary to systems persistence

Control and Mindfulness processes can be best described with the paradigm of complex and

adaptable systems, as proposed by William Buckley (1968).

Buckley describes the environment of a system as a set of variables. The variety of this set is defined

by all possible combinations of the values of these variables. In the general case, these combinations

are limited by stable causal, spatial or temporal relationships between some variables. The complete

lack of stability and regularity would result in a chaotic environment, which is excluded by

hypothesis.

A system maps its environment when it acquires features that permit it to discriminate, to act upon

and to respond to it. The persistence of a system, defined as the maintenance of the systems

essential variables within acceptable limits, largely depends on successful mapping.When facing stable environments, organizations tend primarily to preserve their current mapping and

evolve towards an archetype that Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck call an organizational palace:

Designers, and especially management scientists, have long promoted skill specialization, integration, clear

objectives, and unambiguous authority structures. These widely accepted values assert that an organization

should be internally differentiated and yet harmonious, should use explicit communication channels and explicit

decision criteria, and should act decisively and consistently. Such properties could improve the performance of

an organization if it inhabited an unchanging environment. Routine activity programs could replace

unprogrammed strategic analyses and coordinating messages (J. R. Galbraith, 1973; Hedberg, 1975a; Landau,


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1973; Miller and Mintzberg, 1974; Thompson, 1967). Activity programs could be multiplied and pared to their

essential elements, then preserved in capital equipment and standard operating procedures (Gershefski, 1969;

McGuire, 1963; Starbuck and Dutton, 1973; Thompson, 1967). Communications could be abbreviated with

efficient codes, and responsibilities could be sharply delineated (Bennis, 1965; J. R. Galbraith, 1973;

Khandwalla, 1974; Miller and Mintzberg, 1974; Starbuck, 1965; Thompson, 1967). In constant surroundings,one could confidently assemble an intricate, rigid structure combining elegant and refined components: an

organizational palace (Camping on seesaws: Prescriptions for a self-designing organization, 1976, p.44).

We can now define control processes as follows:

Control refers to organizational processes, which preserve the existing mapping. Such processes limit

the increase in internal entropy and tend to optimize the allocation of resources on the basis of the

prevailing mapping premises.

According to Buckley, complex environments are characterized by a high level of variety and by

short-term and local regularities. Although limited, this stability enables the identification of a set of

variables and of causal relationships between these variables, which makes it possible for the system

to explain and predict its interactions with the environment. This modeling is what Buckley

designates by mapping.

Complexity manifests itself by variations in this set of relevant variables and / or relationships. A

new mapping becomes necessary. As a result, a complex adaptive system should be able to detect

these changes and update its mapping. We call this capability mindfulness. In general the higher the

internal variety of an organization, the greater its ability to restructure. This phenomenon is known

by the principle of requisite variety. Ashby (1956) summarized this principle as follows: only

(organizational) variety can deal with (environmental) variety. In other words, a necessary condition

for an organization to detect and adapt to the worlds changes consists in creating and maintaining a

variety of ideas and of response repertoires. This internal variety is sometimes described as a deviation from the prevailing norms of mapping (Buckley, 1968), as equivocal organizational

processes (Weick, 1979), or as conceptual slack (Schulman, 1993).

Mindfulness refers to the processes of re-mapping. Mindfulness makes swift detection of changes in

the environment possible, and contributes to creating novel ad-hoc responses. Mindfulness grows

with internal variety.


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To sum up, the persistence of the systems facing complex environments depends on their

ability to structure, de-structure and re-structure. In other words, a persisting system succeeds

in exhibiting control and mindfulness.

This capability is not given, as these two types of processes are often in conflict.

Control Mindfulness

Definition Control refers to processes preserving

the organizational ability to

discriminate and act upon its current

environment

Mindfulness refers to processes making

swift detection of changes in the

environment possible, and contributing to

creating novel ad-hoc responses.

Consequences Control processes limit the increase in

internal entropy, reduce slack and tend

to optimize the allocation of resources

on the basis of the prevailing mapping

premises.

Mindfulness grows with internal variety

and slack:

- resource slack allowing the testing of new

solutions

- managerial slack, i.e. employees discretion

- conceptual slack, i.e. diversity in analytical

perspective

- behavioral slack as an enlarged response

repertoirePrinciples Learning from past successes vs

Ignoring noise vs

Sensitivity to plans/strategy vs

Deference to hierarchy vs

Commitment to stability vs

Preoccupation with failure

Picking up weak signals

Sensitivity to operations

Deference to expertise

Commitment to resilience

Outcomes Effectiveness of collective action

Stability

Adaptation

Accuracy of situational assessment

Change

Adaptability

Risk Overconfidence in organizational

knowledge, resulting in:

- solving the wrong problem precisely

- group think

Overcautiousness, resulting in:

- Inaction

- Coordination problems

Table 1 : contrasting control and mindfulness processes


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1. Control and Mindfulness: two organizational processes in tension

These two processes are antagonist and/or in competition. First, they are antagonist with regards

to their underlying logics. Control aims to optimize the adaptation of a system to its current

environment, to suppress ambiguity and variability around standard operating procedures, overlap in

responsibilities and organizational roles, and employees autonomy and discretion. In doing so,

control processes reduce organizational variety to its minimal value. Mindfulness brings about

experimentation, uncertainty, equivocality, dispersion of outcomes, risk, discussion, and

improvisation. It increases the pool of alternative ideas and behaviors, some of which will be useful

to adapt to future changes in the environment. Mindfulness, in fine, increases adaptability.

Then, these two processes can be in competition for organizational resources. Time is an example of

such precious resources: mindfulness consumes time that control wants to reduce consumption of or

use in pre-planned programs (March and Simon, 1958).

In general, control processes tend to reduce slackwhen mindfulness processes perform better with

high levels of slack. The latter can pertain to other resources, employees discretion (managerial

slack), ideas (conceptual slack) or behaviors (behavioral slack).

As a result, the organizations persistence implies the expression of two types of processes in

conflict. We will use the terms organizational tension to refer to this conflict. Buckley (1968)

summarizes this tension as follows:

A requisite of socio-cultural systems is the development and maintenance of a significant level of non-

pathological deviance manifest as a pool of alternate ideas and behaviors with respect to the traditional

institutionalized ideologies and role behaviors (p. 495).

Weick (1979) refers to this tension as a dilemma between adaptation and adaptability.

Adaptation exploits current opportunities whereas adaptability exploits future opportunities. This

dilemma is also sometimes described in terms of stability versus flexibility. Flexibility makes

adaptation to changes possible by detecting and inventing novel responses early. Stability is an

economical means to exploit current regularities of the environment. Extreme flexibility undermines

the sense of identity and continuity that contributes to unify organizational members. Too much

stability prevents the organization finding better responses in today or tomorrows environment.


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2. A central issue of emergency operations rarely explored by researchers

This dilemma of adaptation vs. adaptability is a central issue in emergency operations for several

reasons:

First, the context of crises, i.e. the collapse of meaning, in which emergency operations unfold,

makes the creation of mindful processes imperative to make sense of what is going on and what is to

be done.

Then, operations unravel in an urgent manner and require a quick commitment to act. Control

processes enable rapid and effective collective action.Finally, these operations are conducted in risky environments. Coordination errors (lack of control)

or situational awareness errors (lack of mindfulness) can become catastrophic for the people

threatened or for first responders themselves.

The tension that underlies emergency operations and in general any system that wishes to

persist has been identified for a long time by scholars, especially through the angle of

organizational learning (Buckley, 1968; Hedberg et al., 1976; Turner, 1978; Weick, 1979). Control

and mindfulness processes have been thoroughly examined; however, separately. Few studies

Mindfulness

+

Control

Figure 1- Control, Mindfulness and High Reliability

High Reliability

Accuracy/usefulness of

mappings

Effectiveness of

collective action


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have considered the issue of their co-existence. Modes of managing the tension between control

and mindfulness processes have been rarely explored (March, 1991; Levinthal, 2006).

There is, however, a notable exception in the domain of safety: the High Reliability Organization

Project at the University of California Berkeley.

High Reliability Organizations (HRO) theory progressively emerged in the past 20 years from the

analysis of complex organizations facing high-risk environments (NASA, nuclear power plants,

nuclear aircraft carriers, submarines, and firefighters). It highlighted the cognitive processes

making early detection of signals of crises possible as well as resilience capability (Weick et al.,

1999). HROs succeed in creating and in maintaining a dynamic state ofcollective mindfulness, by

heedful interrelating between their members.

In the 1990s a theoretical debate began between the proponents of HRO theory and the

proponents of the normal accident theory (Perrow 1994, Levinson 2002). The latter, developed by

Charles Perrow (1984), states that any organization with tightly coupled components and interactive

complexity (as it is often the case with highly technological systems) is prone to unavoidable major

accidents. Hence it is never possible to obtain absolute reliability. The reason is simple: because of

the complexity of the interactions, an error in one of the tightly coupled components can potentially

propagate quickly to the rest of the system, long before anyone can understand what is going on and

what should be done.

This debate can be reframed in the perspective of the management of the tension between control and

mindfulness. Perrows proponents think that such a tension cannot be managed, because:

Centralization is the only way to become aware and to stop the propagation of errors

within a tightly coupled system. (Reinforcing Control)Interactive complexity can only

be addressed by a highly decentralized organization (Enhancing Mindfulness)

Since an organization cannot be at the same time centralized and decentralized, it is vulnerable. This

line of reasoning can be reframed by stating that mindfulness and control cannot be found within the

same system.In this debate, Perrows opponents think that HROs have developed ways to successfully manage

this tension. It is indeed significant that their work uses terms that reflect this tension; either directly:

ambivalence as the best compromise (Weick, 1979); or indirectly by putting together two words

characterizing the two types of processes: heedful interrelating (Weick and Roberts, 1993),

Collective Mindfulness (Weick et al., 1999), Flexible bureaucracy (Bigley and Roberts,

2001), Managing the Unexpected (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007).


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Our work is in line with this approach. Although it can be stated that the findings of the Berkeley

HRO Project demonstrate that some organizations are able to manage the tension between control

and mindfulness processes, researchers have mainly focused on mindfulness processes (Weick et al.,

1999). We intend to pay attention to the organization as a whole by observing control as well as

mindfulness processes. This stance leads us to put this tension at the core of our research. By

observing the best incident management teams in France and in the U.S., our research aims at:

- Exploring the tension between control and mindfulness processes, i.e. understanding how

these processes interact with each other;

- Identifying successful tension management strategies.


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II. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT IN FRANCE AND IN THE U.S.: THE HRO PROJECT

1. Context and goals

Vulnerability to wildland fires increases with the conjunction of three heavy trends: global

warming, expansion of the wildland-urban interface and fuel growth. This situation makes

large wildland fires more frequent, as recent fire history around the Mediterranean coast and

the western US proved to be the case. The HRO project aims to prepare Incident

Management Teams to deal with complex wildland-urban interface fires. The main idea

consists in applying and developing High Reliability Organizing theories, in comparing two

territories: Southern France and the Western US, in combining several research designs:

initial impregnation, direct observation of incident management teams training and fire

operations, analysis of archival data, experiments on Frances civil protection Virtual Reality-

based (VR) training platform.

2. Project participants

2.1.In France:

- University of Aix-Marseille (CERGAM)- Frances Civil Protection Training School (ECASC)

- Bouches-du-Rhne Fire Department (SDIS 13)

2.2.In the US:

- University of California Berkeley (CCRM)

- National Advanced Fire & Resource Institute (NAFRI)

- National Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center- US Forest Service - Fire and Aviation Management

3. Research design

The design of this research combines and triangulates several approaches. It is divided in four

phases:

3.1.Interrelating within Incident Management Teams


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The identification of organizational culture, of interaction modes among team members as well

as the pre-identification of prevailing control and mindfulness processes, were done through

impregnation (days on the fire line, training of researchers, days spent in fire houses) and

interviews with team members. At the end of this phase, most processes and interaction types were

categorized within the frame of tension management.

The main impregnation stages include:

- Training sessions at ECASC (2 months) and 2006 Fire season in Bouches du Rhne

- The Day Fire (California): September 1 to 7, 2006 with an Incident Management Team

- Workshop at NAFRI/LLC (Tucson, AZ): November 12-14, 2006

- Complex Incident Management Course (Sacramento, CA): February 1 to 8, 2007.

- UC Berkeley research team took the Entry level training of US firefighters: July 18 to 22,2007.

3.2.Direct Observation of fire operations in France and in the U.S.

Direct observation of large incidents made it possible to identify operational tensions and to

understand how they are managed (i.e.: East Zone Complex in the U.S. that totaled over 200 000 ha)

by mixed teams (firefighters and researchers). Each IMT member was audio taped from 7:00 to

22:00 each day and critical moments (briefings, strategy meetings, and planning meetings) were

video taped.

The main fire operations observed includes:

- 2006 fire season in Bouches du Rhne (Saint Zacharie Fire, Bouc Bel Air Fire)

- Day Fire (California): September 1 to 7, 2006

- Zaca Fire (California) : July 8-11, 2007

- Meriweather Fire (Montana) : August, 3-7, 2007- East Zone Complex (Idaho) : August 7-29, 2007

- Slide Fire (California) : October 26-30, 2007

- 2008 fire season in Bouches du Rhne.

3.3.Analysis of archival data and observation of team trainings

This phase includes the review of training manuals, engagement doctrines, after action reports,

national databases, surveys and previous studies (i.e. on safety, megafires, incident

management).


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Main observations include:

- Golden Guardian full scale exercise (San Bernardino, CA): November 6, 2006. Shadowing

the IC during the response to a terrorist attack (unified command: FBI, Fire, Law

Enforcement)

- Complex Incident Management Course (Sacramento, CA): February 1 to 8, 2007

- LLC at NAFRI (Tucson, AZ): October 21-26, 2007. Analysis of lessons learned/training

processes. Participation of 3 French firefighter officers.

- Workshop (San Francisco, CA) on Mega Fires with NIMO team, US FS, Brookings

Institute, UC Berkeley (Karlene Roberts, Renaud Vidal)

- SDIS13 (France): December 11, 2007. Full scale exercise (wildland fire). Participation of 3

US firefighter officers.

- Sequoia/Kings Canyon National Park: January 15-16, 2008. Participation with the LLC

Information Collection Team assignment on the Parks implementation of HRO principles.

- NAFRI (Tucson, AZ): January 25- February 2, 2008. Interviews of 12 US experts in incident

management. Observation of Type 1 Incident Management Team qualification training.

Participation of 12 French firefighter officers (from ECASC and SDIS13)

- Super Bowl (Phoenix, AZ) : February 3, 2008. Visit of the Joint Operation Center.

- SW IMTs (5) pre-season meetings and workshop (Santa Fe, NM): March 25-27, 2008.

3.4.Experiments on VR-based training platform

The three first phases led to the formulation of hypotheses on how incident management teams

can manage operational tensions. This experimental phase aims at testing and refining these

hypotheses. The VR-based simulations involve an elite opportunity belonging to the U.S. National

Incident Management Organization (the Atlanta-based NIMO team) and a French team from SDIS13

(one of the southern France leading fire departments in wildland firefighting). Both teams were put

separately in the exact same operational conditions and performed on three different scenarios. The

experiments were conducted on Frances civil protection VR-based training platform (see chart

below).

The first scenario was designed to observe the first leg of the tension (control processes) by setting a

high rate of spread and low complexity; the second scenario was designed to observe the second leg

(mindfulness process) by including highly equivocal inputs and low rate of spread. The third

scenario included a high rate of spread and equivocal inputs to examine how both legs were handled.

This last scenario tests the organizational ability to express both legs and manage underlying


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conflicts, which constitutes the essence of high reliability. The following chart summarizes the main

characteristics of simulation exercises.

A specific website was dedicated to the simulation exercises:www.hro-fires.com, providing further

details on the experiments. The exercises were broadcast live online and now can be downloaded for

interested researchers.

1.1.Respect of fundamental ethical principles of research

This research and participating researchers have been approved by the Institutional Review board

(IRB) which ensures that fundamental ethic principles pertaining to research studies involving

human beings are respected, as defined by the National Commission for the Protection of Human

Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (Ethical Principles and Guidelines for theProtection of Human Subjects of Research, 1978): respect for persons, beneficence and justice.
http://www.hro-fires.com/http://www.hro-fires.com/http://www.hro-fires.com/http://www.hro-fires.com/


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Scenario S14 hrs

Scenario S24 hrs

Scenario S36 hrs

HRO-relatedobjectives

Performance will dependon the

effectiveness/speed ofcollective action

Performance will dependon the accuracy of the

situation assessment.

Performance will dependon the accuracy of the

situation assessment andeffectiveness ofimplementation.

Dynamics High tempoTight coupling with the

environment (errors will

be catastrophic)

Moderate tempo Loose coupling during

the exercise

(errors are possible

during the exercise, but

errors of assessment are

catastrophic for the next

operational period)

Moderate to high tempoTight coupling

Complexity Linear, classical, stablesituational trend

Changing, complex

situation (slow 180

wind shift)

Complex situation (two

wind shifts, large city

threatened)

Type of incident Initial/Extended attackin WUI

Large Fire in WUI Catastrophic fire in WUI

Type of inputs No surprise Inputs are equivocal,partial, enhancing

complexity

Enhance complexity andrequire immediate

resolutionEvaluationcriteria

Are the objectives givenby the AgencyAdministrator during theinbriefing met?

The plan for the nextoperational periods

Management of currentoperations and plan for thenext operational periods

Evaluationspecifics

Raw data (hectares burnt, destroyed structures, injured personnel ), opinion ofwildland fire experts (observers), hot debriefing of IMTs, analyses by mixedteams (researchers/experts)

Table 2: Experiment scenarios


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Chart 1 : Simulation training Platform

PilotsJournalists

Div sup booth

AgencyAdmin.

Residents

ICP


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III.FIGHTING WILDLAND FIRES IN FRANCE AND IN THE U.S.: TWO

APPROACHES

The comparison of operational modes between incident management teams in France and in theU.S. is based on the observation done during the exploratory phase (direct observations on the fire

line, during trainings, review of after action reports) and the experiment phase. We first present the

main results, and then suggest theoretical interpretations.

1. Results summary

We have chosen to segment the results along four lines: action principles, command

organization, planning and interactions among team members.

Table 3 : U.S.-FR. comparison

FRANCE U.S.

Action principles

Role Organizing chaos Bringing order to chaos

Time horizonMassive attack - action/reaction -short term horizon - improvisation

Anticipation - planning-mid/longterm

Type of obligation Results Process, Process, Process

Attitude with respect to external

stakeholdersConstraint undergone

Constraint managed -

Transparency

Command organization

DispatchOperational staff

In anticipation

Administrative staff

In reaction

CommandmentUnique and centralized

Merged functions: strategy/tactics

Unified and distributed

Separated functions:

strategy/tactics

StructuringTop-down: from the I.C. to

division sups

Bottom-up: from division sups to

the I.C.

Planning

Process Under formalized - centralized Formalized distributed

Type of tacticsIntegrated precise based on the

concept of decisive action

Weakly integrated - underspecified

- guide for coordination based on


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opportunism with regard to

conditions (topography/weather)

Resource engagementImmediate in anticipation - in

excess

Post-analysis: anticipating resting

ratio, safety briefing, cost

Interactions

Radio traffic

Norms

Frequent short structured

Concise and precise

Spaced long discussion

No news is good news

Type of interactions Generic Inter-subjective

1.1.Principles for action

The first question that is systematically raised by trainers to the future US Incident Management

Teams is: Why are you here? What do bring you to the table? And, invariably, the answer

expected by the trainers that will be repeated during the next 10 days is: We bring order to chaos .

This motto is immediately associated to the following injunction, repeated even more often:

Process, Process, Process ! In other words, members of incident management teams define

themselves before anything else as high-level professionals, mastering incident management

processes. As a result, these teams guide their actions and measure their success with respect to the

rigorous application of rules and of standard operating procedures, most of them included in the

Incident Command System (ICS). This does not imply that these teams are insensitive to people or

the land at risk, but it means that the processes through which they make sense of the situation arestructured by the application of processes.

A caricatured example is given by the following observation, made during the final simulation

exercise2

We provide another example, taken from an operational context:

of an incident management team in training. Evaluators gave the instruction to manage an

unfolding incident, a wildland fire) and to hand in the Incident Action Plan (IAP) for the following

operational period, at the end of the simulation exercise. The disrupting inputs the IMT had to

manage included invasive media, violated Temporary Flight Ristricted (TFR) areas of airspace,

evacuation of personnel and the fire threatening labs holding radio-active products that finally endup burning down. What is significant for this study is that the exercise is designed so that it becomes

more important to produce, in accordance with the ICS processes, a complete set of documents (the

IAP) rather than to manage an imminent and major threat (nuclear contamination).

Early July 2007, a fire broke out by Santa Barbara (California,) in the Los Padres National Forest ( Zaca fire ).By the end of August, It had burnt over 120 000 ha, becoming the second largest California fire, for an estimatedcost (rescue operations only) over $117 million. Our research team arrived on scene in the afternoon of July 8, at

2 For instance : Complex Incident Management Course Sacramento, California February 11-18, 2007


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the turning point of the incident. At that time, two events happened simultaneously. On the one hand, ahelicopter tilted over, while taking off (hopefully without injuring anyone), leading to the immediate shuttingdown of the air program. On the other hand, a spot fire crossed a line, threatening the Forests wilderness. Airresources being unavailable, the spot fire could not be put out and ended up firing the entire area.Two observations can be pointed out. First, 10 minutes after the IMT got the information (as the same time asour team) about the spot fire, the planning meeting (scheduled in advance, according to the ICS process)

occurred, detailing the incident action plan for the next operational period, without mentioning the spot fire andits consequences. Second, the rule according that the air program is shut down in case of an accident was neverdiscussed. Maybe only helicopters could have stopped, but not air tankers

Symmetrically to the U.S. IMTs who aim to bring order to chaos, a French officer describes his

job as organizing chaos . The difference is significant. The principle for action of French IMTs

consists in stopping the chaos created by the fire as soon as possible, even if the organization is itself

somewhat chaotic. For the U.S. IMTs, internal order should overcome external chaos.

French operational processes are codified in several documents (national reference guides fortraining and professions, national guide for Air Resources use, national guide for Wildland

Firefighting Operations), but much less detailed than in the American ICS. Not only are the

processes less documented, but unthinkable in the U.S. some firefighters frequently put down the

ayatollahs de la formation , referring to the rigor with which trainers at the Civil Protection

Training School (ECASC) enforce official working processes. Simulation exercises showed that the

French IMTs (among the best in SDIS13) worked sometimes slightly differently from the official

doctrine.These diverging principles for action result in different training programs. All French and U.S.

trainers assess the quality of internal functioning (synergy, information sharing, leadership), the

application of taught processes, foresight, reactions to disrupting inputs, stress management, But

actually, U.S. trainers grade the quality of the Incident Action Plan, while French trainers debrief by

commenting on the number of hectares and/or structures burnt.

To sum up, on the U.S. side, Incident Management Teams consider themselves as high-level

professionals, capable of managing complex situations and make the process obligation a

priority. On the French side, teams are oriented towards an obligation of result to limit the size

and complexity of the situation to handle.

1.2.Organizing command

Without getting into too much detail about French and American command structures, we point

out a crucial difference pertaining to the degree of decentralization of command.


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In the U.S. case, the Agency Administrator sets general objectives to the Incident Commander

(IC). These objectives often revolve around three themes: safety of firefighters and residents,

containing the fire within geographic limits, and minimizing suppression cost. The IC then validates

the translation of these goals into operational objectives and tactics proposed by the operations

section chief. The fire is divided in sectors (called divisions and branches) corresponding to three

types of missions: direct attack, indirect attack, and point protection (structures, businesses,

infrastructures). As a result, within this framework, each division supervisor or branch director

assesses his needs and requires resources to carry out the mission, and then organizes as desired. The

analogy given by an experienced firefighter is your division is your own state, and you are the

governor .

The French approach is quite different. Once in charge, the IC defines the SAOIEC . ThisFrench acronym contains the following elements: Situation, Anticipation of upcoming changes,

Objectives, Idea of maneuver (tactics) to meet the operational objectives, Execution and Command

(who is in charge of what).

SAOIEC is the framework for the entire organization. It is validated by the equivalent of the Agency

Administrator (the Mayor or the Prefect). Members of the Incident Command Post (ICP) are

responsible for carrying out the plan. Division supervisors have a certain degree of autonomy in the

local implementation of the plan, but they are - first and foremost in charge of executing the globaland integrated plan made by the IC. As a result, most decisions are made by the IC: defining or

redefining division limits, missions, allocation of incoming resources; controlling the effectiveness

of ongoing actions; anticipating possible evolutions; making new proposals to the Agency

Administrator; reporting to the hierarchy; conducting recons; and informing local authorities as well

as the media

The French organization is strongly centralized, while the U.S. organization is decentralized.

The simulation exercises provided multiple quantitative measures, including the centrality of

interactions network. The coding of the six exercises (over 200 hours of data) made the construction

of the following interaction networks possible:


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Figure 2-FR interaction network links size is proportional to couplings3

3 Coupling C : 0


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Figure 3- US interaction network links size is proportional to couplings

NB: the definition and measure of couplings between pairs of individual is given later. Measures of centrality take

into account the existence of links between individuals regardless of the weigh.


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The centrality of interaction networks can be assessed by considering the variation of the degree

in centrality among the members of the network (Monge et Contractor, 2003). For instance, if the

degree of centrality is about the same for all members, the network is not centralized. If it is much

higher for a few individuals or one individual, the network is centralized. The degree of centrality is

measured through different possible angles:

- The number of members with which one is communicating with (degree)

- The proximity of a member to the members with which he/she is not directly connected

(proximity)

- The mediation, which measures the tendency of a member to be in communication with any

two individuals of the network.

The measures obtained with the simulation exercises are given below:

Chart 1- Normalized centrality measures4

FR US delta US/FR

Number of actors 20 20 1.0

Interacting pairs 98 80 0.8Network centrality Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev.

Degree 26 17 21 15 0.8 0.88

Higher values COS 58, RENS 47, CPC 47, A/T 47 Air Attack 53, IC 47, OPS 42

Proximity 49 11 46 9 0.9 0.82

Higher values COS 68, A/T 65, RENS 61 Air Attack 68, OPS 63, IC 61

Mediation 6 6 7 12 1.2 - 2

Higher values COS 20, SD 18, A/T 16 Air Attack 45, IC 33, OPS 22

The French IC is always the most central actor of the network in terms of degree, proximity and

mediation to a lesser extent.

The structuring of command when the organization is expanding is also significant. As already

noted, the French IC designs the plan ( SAOIEC ), defines generally three or four branches and

their resources. When the operation expands, each branch is then split up in divisions.

4 Analysis tool: Ucinet for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies -Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G. and Freeman, L.C. 2002.


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In the U.S. dynamics, the fire is initially organized in divisions/groups; as the incident grows, they

are gathered in branches for improved coordination.

The French start with branches that they later separate into divisions and the Americans start with

divisions that they branch when too numerous.

The French dynamics is based on top-down logic, when the US dynamics is bottom-up.

1.3.Planning

The planning process includes the assessment of the situation, the development of objectives, the

selection of the appropriate tactics and resources. The differences between American and French

functioning extend to the planning process. On the French side, the process boils down to the SAOIEC made by the IC. It is centralized and not very formalized. To the contrary, the U.S.

planning process is distributed and extremely codified.

In addition, the outcome of the planning process is different: the French planning is integrated,

global and based on decisive actions. Indeed, the IC bases its tactics on the combined effects of the

actions conducted simultaneously by each division. These actions are defined and related resources

are scaled so as to stop definitively the progress of the fire. Hence the term of decisive actions. In

that sense, the French plans are integrated (forming a coherent whole) and decisive (designed to stopthe fire).

As for the U.S. IMTs, the plan documented in the Incident Action Plan (IAP), is loosely

integrated, under-specified and consists in a guide for situated action.

Each division has its own objective and allocated resources, operating almost independently

from the others. In that sense, the plan is less integrated because not based on decisive actions but on

a set of actions; each of them improves the global situation partially, and not necessarily

simultaneously. This plan is a guide and a resource for action. It provides the big picture of a

complex operation, and the information to build ones own reasoning: general objectives, potentially

dangerous phenomenon, meteorological forecast, fire behavior forecast, assignment of other

divisions, and availability of air resources

1.4.Interactions within the teams

Interactions among the U.S. and French teams are different in formats as well as in contents.


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The format of French interactions is short, frequent and codified, while the format of U.S.

interactions are long, rare and free.

For the French firefighters, communications must be brief and concise in order not to clog the radio

traffic.

Radio messages are codified. For instance, the words that are communicated to the air tanker pilot in order tostart the drops must be drop authorization . Any other sentence (for instance top - drop is not taken intoaccount, the words stop and top could be confused although the orders are opposite).Another example is the strict format of the messages used by the IC to report to his hierarchy/Operations Center:I am at, I am seeing, I am instructing, I am anticipating, I am requestingMany times during real operations or during the simulation exercises, the IC or the Operations Center remindsfirefighters to limit their communications, to avoid obstructing radio channels.

To the contrary, U.S. communication style is rare but longer. It goes as far as having an implicit

norm: no news is good news . This is to be put in the context of the strong autonomy of the

divisions, which are not required to report their status continuously. As a result, when

communication occurs, exchanges happen among individuals who need to catch up with one another

(what is the situation in their division, how they feel about their chance of success, how they will

coordinate). Since communication is rare, its takes the form of a discussion that lasts longer and in

which more data, denser in context, are exchanged.

These qualitative observations have been measured during the simulation exercises. First, we

displayed all interacting pairs along two dimensions: mean duration of interactions versus the

number of interactions (cf. chart 3). It appears that the interactions of the U.S. team are mainly in the

area long duration/low frequency, while the interaction pairs of the French team are mostly in the

area short duration/high frequency.

Chart 2 Number of interactions versus average duration of interactions

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

0 50 100 150 200 250 300

FR US

Nb of interactions

Duration (s)


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We then refined the analysis by computing the coupling of each pair. The coupling is defined by the

formula: number of interactions/mean duration. An overall coupling at the group level was also

computed. We will comment further in the paper the interpretation of this indicator. The value of

couplings for each simulation (cf. chart below) shows that the French average coupling is twice as

high as the U.S. coupling.

Chart 2- Interaction couplings per simulation exercise

The interactions of the French team are tightly coupled while they are loosely coupled for the U.S.

team.

As far as content is concerned, French interactions are generic while the US interactions are

inter-subjective.

Exchanges between French officers are rather uni-directional and close, and show the salience of

hierarchy. The U.S. exchanges are more bi-directional and open (even when a chief and his

subordinate are interacting).

To sum up, U.S. interactions allow for richer discussions on the developing situation. They

include exchanges on items/hypotheses at the origin of the current representation of the

situation. This makes it easier to reconstruct a more accurate picture, if needed. They unfold

0.49

0.28

0.53

0.27

0.78

0.22

0.58

0.25

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

1.20

1.40

FR1 US1 FR2 US2 FR3 US3 FR All US All

Couplings


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between two individuals who bring their personal experience. In that sense, there are more

inter-subjective than the French interactions.

French interactions focus on the essential, are based on very codified protocols and common

expectations, allowing rapid coordinated actions. They are poor in contextual cues because

individuals are only asking for the few parameters that are necessary to perform their own

routine. In that sense, French interactions are generic because everyone behaves mainly

according to her/his organizational role.

2. Data interpretation: two management modes of tension between control and mindfulness

2.1.Tight and loose couplings in organizations

In order to interpret results, we found useful to rely on the concept of organizational coupling.

The coupling of two entities A and B refers to the predictability of Bs behavior, given As behavior.

Miller (1978, cited by Weick 1982) suggests that A and B are loosely coupled when A impacts B:

(1)suddenly (versus continuously), for example when reaching a threshold effect;

(2)marginally (versus significantly), for example when there is a buffering effect;

(3)indirectly (versus directly), when there is a mediator between A and B;(4)after a lag (versus immediately).

When two entities remain loosely coupled long enough, this decoupling becomes cognitive and

behavioral, i.e. the mapping of each other's environment tend to decouple. An organization with

different types of couplings between its components will display different systemic characteristics.

Karl Weick (1982) argues that the intensity of couplings induces differences in the degree to which

means are tied to ends, actions are controlled by intentions, solutions are guided by imitation of

ones neighbor, feedback controls search, prior actions determine subsequent acts, past experience

constraints present activity, logic dominates exploration, and wisdom and intelligence affect coping

behavior (p.382).

From a research design perspective, we identified the nature of couplings by correlating two

types of data:

- by identifying whether at least one of Millers five loose coupling characteristics was

present.


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- By analyzing the duration and frequency of interactions: short and frequent

communication points to a tight coupling, long and rare exchanges refer to loose

coupling.

Appendix 4, 5, 6 and 7 provide details on coupling measures: real time couplings per

team and per simulation, characteristics of interaction networks such as density, centrality

and structural constraints.

First, we will locate ongoing couplings in the American and French teams. Then we will

establish the link between the distribution of couplings and the modes of tension management.

2.2. Application to the French and U.S. IMTs

The French IMT is characterized by a tight coupling between entities that display varying

production processes, while the US IMT is characterized by a loose coupling of entities with

highly normalized production processes.

Chart 3- Types of coupling within Incident Management Teams

FRANCE U.S.

Tightly coupled system of

intrinsically varying units

Loosely coupled system of highly

normalized units

Tight CouplingStrong centralization around the IC

Through the link ICP-branches

Culture, codification of process,

professional norms

Loose Coupling

Variation around production

processes

Improvisations

Between the IC and other teammembers

Decentralization Disjoint

incrementalism

As for the French case, the coupling intensity can be seen through frequent and short

interactions. The standardization and codification of oral exchanges, the need for velocity, leads to a

system in which each member receives and transmits the values of predefined parameters, necessary

for the unfolding of routines. The strongest values can be found in the ICP and between the ICP and

the branches (including the air branch).


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Loose couplings exist in the form of:

- Variation around production processes (standard operating procedures);

- A preference for action/reaction modes and resilience, rather than for anticipation.

This is a source a loose coupling between pre-established plans and the actual situation,

but also between actions. We mean that this preference translates frequently into

improvising in the sense that firefighters recombine portions of their action repertoires

into novel ways, in order to meet situational demands.

- Sporadic calls for support/advice from the IC to some officers.

One observes that the IC is at the heart of most interactions, which are loosely coupled.

We detail the following example:

-

-

(*) the FR ICP includes the operator (OP), Action/Transmission (A/T), Logistics chief (M/L), Situationofficer (RENS) and the ICP chief (CPC)

(**) During the simulation exercises, the Branch Directors including the Air Branch Director- had thefollowing couplings with the ICP: 0.3-0.6-0.5-0.5

The triad is comprised of two loose couplings and one tight coupling. In general, the IC

sets the incident objectives and makes the plan through the SAOEIC - upon adiscussion with the ICP (mindfulness processes thus loose coupling) then the ICP

implement the plan by a close and direct supervision of branch directors (control

processes thus tight coupling). The IC can also reassess his plan or change it after a

discussion with a branch director of a division supervisor (bypassing the ICP). The IC

and the branch directors are connected directly through loosely coupled interactions

and indirectly through tightly coupled interactions.

IC

BranchDirector (**)

ICP(*)

Figure 4- Triad - FR IMT


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This type of double connection tight coupling-loose coupling seems to play a fundamental

role in resilience mechanisms of living systems, as some studies tend to prove (McCann,

2000, Glassman, 1973).

As for the U.S. case, the low coupling intensity translates into rare and long interactions. This

comes from the strong autonomy of division supervisors.

Tight coupling is due to:

- A strong codification of working processes;

Examples include the planning process ( planning P ) codified in the Incident

Command System, or the 48 rules of engagement that apply to firefighters on the fire line

(Gleason, 1994).

- Rigorous, specialized, long training sessions;

- Socialization process;

Socialization reinforces common beliefs, norms of behavior or professional values. They

are specific to the organizational role of each team members, but they also emerge for

each incident management team, reflecting the ICs personality.

Strong coupling exists because these common expectations allow each member to quickly make

sense of others behavior and adjust his own behavior accordingly.

Observation: the analysis of couplings distribution for each organization (appendix 5) shows that

loose couplings are distributed uniformly in the US team while they are mainly located around the IC

in the FR team.

When one recalls that loose couplings reflect mindfulness processes and tight couplings manifest

control processes, one can interpret this situation by stating that: in the US team everyone thinks ,

while for the FR team this task is mainly devoted to the IC.

2.3.Interpretation : Two management modes of tension between control and mindfulness

Lets start by observing that tight coupling is the main source of control and loose coupling

is the main source of mindfulness (Weick, 1982, p.388). As a result, we brought to light two ways

of expressing control and mindfulness processes within incident management teams, thus two ways

of expressing control and mindfulness processes.


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The French doctrine (massive attack of starting fires) leads to a specific mapping of the

environment by the organization. This mapping creates common expectations enabling control

processes to unravel. Among these processes, a strong centralization induces rapid, integrated,

coordinated collective action. As it is often the case with strong centralization, local adjustments are

necessary. Tolerated variations around working processes reinforce a capacity for adjustments or

improvisation, characterizing mindfulness processes.

In the U.S. IMT, mindfulness processes are based on the autonomy of entities (divisions,

functional sections) for which local adjustments are continuous and independent mainly as a result of

their specific local situation, and are unconstrained by strong central and integrated orders. Control

processes rely on a high codification of working processes, socialization and training processes prior

to the actual operations. This control enables a minimum coordination of autonomous entities.

3. Each management mode exhibits limitations

Chart 4- Strengths, weaknesses and corrective measures

FRANCE U.S.

Tightly coupled system of

intrinsically varying units

Loosely coupled system of highly

normalized units

Strengths

Reactive re-structuring ability

Integrated vision: awareness of

interdependencies

Local adaptations, integration of

complex constraints

Weaknesses

Limits with respect to operation

complexity or size

Varying quality and consequences

of improvisationsLack of hindsight

Overconfidence in the IC

Distributed cognition inertia

Self-centered organization,

overconfidence in the ICS

Observed corrective measures

Simplification of external

constraints by the IC (FR1)

Normalizing efforts (i.e.: increased

training, Quality approach

implementation (FR2)

HRO program (FR3)

Briefings, planning meetings,

Command and General staff

meetings (US1)

Trigger points, STICC (US2)

Managing stakeholders (US3)

HRO programs (US4)

Lessons Learned Center (US5)


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NIMO teams, central inspection

(US6)

From rules to principles program

(US7)

3.1. Strengths and weaknesses of each tension management mode

Centralization brings along significant advantages: better knowledge of the big picture and of

interdependencies among entities. Moreover, reactivity for remapping and restructuring is enhanced

once the IC decided so.

However, the group relies mainly on one individual who cannot manage large and complex

situations, even if smart and experienced. Also, local adjustments sometimes happen through

improvisation with varying success and consequences (for instance, in the first simulation exercise,

an improvised backfire escaped and worsened the situation). Another weakness was observed during

the exercises: a difficulty to step back and to see an emerging trend. By design, a 180 wind shift

occurred within one hour. The ICP, continuously communicating with the team members on the

ground, kept acknowledging small changes in wind direction, but never realized the significance of

the phenomenon. Finally, overconfidence in the ICs experience (regardless of any kind of deference

to hierarchy) prevented relevant questions to be raised.

The strength of the U.S. configuration relies on continuous local adjustments and its capability

to integrate numerous and complex constraints (logistics, finance, environment, politics ).

Nevertheless, some inertia can be observed. Beyond the size factor (which did not matter during the

simulation exercises, since the American and French teams had the same size), this inertia comes

from a less acute awareness of interdependencies among the components. Also, the high degree of

specialization of each function, associated trainings and socialization processes, leads the

organization to focus on itself: inflation in norms, high focus on internal processes to the detrimentof results

3.2.Corrective measures taken to mitigate the weaknesses

We observed a number of actions designed to correct the negative outcomes of some processes.

Naturally, these actions are not consciously taken to fix the unbalance between control and

mindfulness processes.


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For the French IMT, corrective measures contribute to:

- Influence the environment to simplify the issue at stake (FR1). During the simulation

exercises, the IC regularly tried to influence the environment (i.e. the agency administrator,

gray zones of the exercises ground rules or of the scenario, the media) in order to simplify

the constraints of the situation faced. Not so surprisingly, such attempts echo the limitation of

ones brain to manage interactive complexity.

- Increase the normalization of working processes (FR2). SDIS13 invests heavily in training

and in a quality management approach in order to reduce the variability of its production

processes and to improve the organizations steering tools.

- Engage in HRO training (FR3). Among other things, SDIS13/ECASC has progressively

realized with the HRO project the limitations of the current operational approach. By

engaging the IMTs to enhance the quality of their interactions and to open more sensemaking

spaces, the project addresses the weaknesses of their tightly coupled system.

For the U.S. IMT, corrective measures contribute to:

- Make significant efforts to construct and share a global picture of the situation (US1).

These efforts translate into multiple briefings, to counteract the trend for divergence among

loosely coupled entities and related coordination problems.

- Set boundary conditions (US2).This process appears to be quite important. Setting trigger points, also called Management

Action Points (MAPs), and Situation, Task, Intent, Concerns, and Calibration (STICC)

briefings (especially the item Concerns ) reflect this idea. The goal is to set the main limits

within which the current situation and organizational response are valid. If those limits are

crossed, a change (in sensemaking, in decision making) is necessary. This technique is

particularly useful to counter the organizations inertia.

- Focus stakeholders on specific issues (US3)Stakeholders include the media, elected officials, residents and authorities The IC devotes

an extensive part of his time and energy to stakeholders, dedicating two segments of the

organization ( Public Information and Liaison ) that included over 50 members on

several operations (e.g. Slide Fire, California, November 2007). By being transparent with

respect to stakeholders, by explaining their working processes, IMTs focus the attention of

stakeholders on their professionalism and away from problems of global reactivity.

- Engage in HRO (US4).


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For the last five years, the U.S. Forest Service has engaged in some efforts to increase

awareness of HRO principles, expecting to enhance IMTs responsiveness: Staff Rides,

Tactical Decision Games, and Sand Table Exercises all now include HRO Principles as part

of the discussions. S-520 has also included a 4-hour section on HRO in the 2009 and 2010

classes.

- Constitute and develop a Lessons Learned Center (US5).

Since innovations are local and communication among autonomous entities is scarce, the

Center enables firefighters to share their experience (through after action reports, case studies,

libraries of lessons and effective practices). The LLC also provides an online Team Center

for IMTs and an online Community Center to support communities of practice that together

form a Knowledge Management System for the wildland fire community. The Center has co-

sponsored multiple regional and five national HRO workshops during the last five years. The

Center also co-sponsored an international, inter-industry HRO workshop in early 2010.

- Another emerging FS-wide item is the Key Decision Log developed to collect the logic of

IMT and Agency Administrator decisions creating an institutional memory that can be

analyzed for trends before, during and after the events.

- Create NIMO teams to advise and lead; Chiefs Representatives groups to carry out central

inspections (US6).

Some internal studies from the U.S. Forest Service pointed to a general trend of IMTs to align

their actions with the agency administrators expectations, sometimes to the detriment of the

headquarters instructions (often related to cost control). The creation of NIMO teams (small

size highly experienced teams) to provide expertise, and Forest Service Chiefs

Representitives to perform central inspections during the fires. Both aimed at reinforcing the

coupling between IMTs and headquarters, and in fine the Congress.

Beginning in early 2009, a Continuous Improvement in Decision-Making Program sponsored

by the NIMO teams engaged 30 forests at risk for large fires before, during and after fireseasons, and began to emphasize firefighter and public risk assessment as the primary driver,

with lowered costs becoming an outcome.

- Finally, the U.S. Forest Service (Fire and Aviation Management) started a broader reflection

on moving from rule-based behaviors influenced by strict compliance, to principle-based

behaviors in a doctrinal approach to decision-making. The organization is purposefully

attempting to vector toward becoming a learning organization and a HRO (US7).


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To sum up, the comparison between American and French IMTs highlights two management

strategies with respect to the tension between control and mindfulness processes. Each strategy

carries some strengths and weaknesses that teams try to mitigate. The following section integrates

these observations in theoretical framework.

IV.DISCUSSION

1. Theoretical developments

1.1.Managing the tension between control and mindfulness

In the third section of this paper, we pointed to the source of loose and tight couplings in

American and French IMTs. Then we identified the modes of expression of control and mindfulness

processes, which allowed us to bring to light four tension management strategies: manipulating,

alternating, specializing and diffracting.

Manipulating

This strategy consists in influencing the environment so that the organization can express one of

the two processes only, without suffering the negative consequences of not expressing the other

process. There are control-oriented manipulations or mindfulness-oriented manipulations.

Manipulating for control

In this case, the organization leads external stakeholders to focus on the portions of the

environment that will be well handled by its control processes only. This is exactly what the FrenchIC is trying to do with the agency administrator, residents, and the media to make them accept and

internalize the ICs own constraints. In this stabilized and simplified environment, the weakness of

mindfulness processes is far less important. This is also what the U.S. team does by making the

residents, media focus on the quality of their incident management processes.

Manipulating for mindfulness

This strategy consists of influencing external stakeholders on the portions of the environmentthat will be well handled by its mindfulness processes only. This strategy was observed before and


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during a dangerous and chaotic night when a fuel driven fire crossed a community. The U.S. team

ended up putting one firefighter with each resident. In another domain, Horowitz (1970) shows that

the success of the Israeli Army during the Six-Day War was due to the attack of very autonomous

and loosely coordinated units, which cut the communication lines of the centralized Egyptian Army.

The Israeli Army chose its own battleground (manipulation) and did not suffer from the lack of

control (enabling good coordination) because the war was won quickly.

Alternating

This strategy consists in alternating the expression of each leg of the tension. There is a

gradation in the spontaneity of the alternation:

Alternating by design

This is the prevailing functioning mode of the U.S. teams. Codification of working processes,

extensive training, and socialization by job and by team precedes the actual operations. This

construction of common frames of reference (control processes) is followed by a strong decoupling

of divisions during operations, one of the main sources of mindfulness.

The two dimensions of this tension management strategy are:

- The loose coupling of organizational units. Their interactions lead to make more explicit rationales

for action, viewpoints and premises. They enable to reconstruct collectively the sense of situations

and what to do about them (mindfulness). In another domain, Schulman showed how 12 different

entities were involved in safety issues at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant and had to discuss

and negotiate the upgrading of working protocols (Schulman, 1993). Rochlin pointed out how

managers of power plants solved problems by confronting two distinct underlying logics: empiricism

of operators and the design rationalities of engineers (Rochlin, 1999).

- A strong organizational culture as a source of coordination and control of loosely coupled systems.The role of culture was brought to light by authors such as Weick ( Management of organizational

change among loosely coupled elements , 1982; Organizational Culture as a Source of High

Reliability, 1987) or Spender (Culture and High Reliability Organizations: The Case of Nuclear

Submarines, 1995)

Alternating by plan


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The ICS requires mindfulness moments at pre-set times (e.g. strategy meeting ) during which

the situation is re-assessed and the next incident action plan is drafted, followed by the execution of

the incident action plan.

Alternating dynamically

The setting of trigger points creates more flexible alternation between control and

mindfulness.

The OODA loop 5

used by US Air Force pilots during the Korean War is a declination of this idea

(Boyd, 1987). It requires pilots to observe the situation, orient (i.e. to interpret previous observations

and update the representation of the situation, if necessary), decide, act, observe results, orient (is it

working?), decide, act, etc. This can be seen as a succession of control and mindfulness phases.

Alternating by discretion

The French IC punctually asks for advice (in general to a branch director he trusts, the ICP

chief). After such a discussion, a decision is made and the rest of the organization executes. This

happens randomly, i.e. whenever he feels useful, at his own discretion.

Specializing

The idea is to express simultaneously control and mindfulness processes, but at different

organizational levels.

This is the prevailing mode of tension management for the French Teams. Control is expressed

through the ICP and branches. Mindfulness is located around the IC and within divisions and

manifests itself by their resilience and improvising ability.

Variations around this principle can be observed:

- Designed organizational roles can be the dividing line between control and mindfulnessoriented jobs.

For instance, one of the roles of the U.S. IC is explicitly to pay attention to the teams

dynamics and quality of interactions. Each member follows a routine (control) while the IC

pays attention to how it unfolds (mindfulness). Similarly, American and French rules of

engagement require that one member of the crews on the fire line acts as a lookout and watch

for the fire behavior.

5 OODA : Observe, Orient, Decide, Act.


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- Gauthereau and Hollnagel (2005) analyzed a programmed outage in a Swedish power plant

and suggest a distinction between four levels of processes: targeting, monitoring, regulating,

and tracking. There is a gradation in the degree of anticipation (the highest being the targeting

level) and in the degree of adjustment (the highest being the tracking level). Anticipation is

(in this case) linked to control processes and adjusting ability to mindfulness. With our

vocabulary, the authors have brought to light a strategy of progressive specialization.

- Management by objectives, which is a characteristic of the ICS (Bigley and Roberts, 2001),

provides another example of this principle. Each organizational level is free to work within

the framework of the general objectives negotiated with or determined by the higher

organizational level. The authors describe this scheme as constrained improvisation.

Diffracting

This strategy consists in diffusing the tension between control and mindfulness to the entire

organization. The following three observations (detailed in the earlier sections) illustrate this idea:

- Creating rules about not applying rules,

- Ambivalent norms,

- Creating, training and socializing to norms on mindfulness (HRO approach).

These norms do not transcend the paradox they create, but contribute to make people aware of

the ambivalence of enacted reality, and as a result, make them more mindful and sensitive.

This is a way of increasing the requisite variety of the organization. People who do not blindly

follow prevailing norms and rules will pay attention to more cues and will try more interpretative

schemes to make sense of the situation they face. Such a lead has been developed by Weick through

the concept of wisdom , an individual and collective attitude which consists in simultaneously

trust and doubt knowledge ( the Attitude of wisdom: ambivalence as the optimal compromise ,1998). This attitude aims at avoiding two pitfalls: overconfidence leading to erroneous

interpretations and over cautiousness that paralyzes action. Wisdom internalizes the tension between

control and mindfulness.

We chose to label this strategy diffracting by reference to the physics phenomenon according to

which an electromagnetic wave diffuses in space when meeting an obstacle. The interest of this

comparison is reinforced by the fact that diffraction is related to the wave-particle duality. Indeed,

this strategy tends to diffuse the duality control-mindfulness to the entire organizational space. Toextend the analogy, the interaction between reality and the organization (versus the contact between


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the wave and the obstacle) determines its control and mindfulness behaviors (versus wave or

particle).

To sum up, four families of strategies have been presented: manipulating, alternating,

specializing and diffracting. Each team uses these strategies at varying degrees. Prevailing

strategies structure the teams behavior: alternating for the U.S. teams and specializing for the

French teams.

It can also be assumed that organizations facing specific environments would use manipulating or

diffracting strategies as their prevailing strategies. The following section attempts to sketch the

domain of validity of each strategy.

1.2.Domains of validity of prevailing strategies

Strategies are not successful in all situations. Weaknesses, failures and corrective actions taken by

the U.S. or French IMTs inform about their domains of validity. We found that three characteristics

emerged:

- Manipulability: the extent to which the organization can influence portions of the

environment;

- Variety: the variety of the environment is defined by the number of elements, states of

distinct events in space and time, with different attributes;

- Constraints: the extent to which this variety is constrained, i.e. the extent to which the elements

are linked by stable causal, space or time relationships.

When we focus on the last two dimensions, the management strategies distribute along the following

domains of validity:

- Alternating is relevant in situations where the surroundings of loosely coupled entities arerelatively independent. This decoupling increases internal variety and enables the

organization to manage a high level of variety in the environment. Local adjustments (disjoint

incrementalism) provide adaptation and adaptability;

- Specializing is more appropriate in an environment with a high level of constraints in variety.

Causal relationships between an environments variables require a global grasp and a strongly

coordinated response. If this environments variety is not too high, the organizations control

center can manage it;


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- Diffracting should be the direction towards which an organization with a specializing

strategy, but with increasing interdependencies among the main variables, heads for. It could

also be the direction for an organization with a specializing strategy, but facing such an

increase in the variety of the environment, that the control center cannot manage it anymore.

HRO researchers placed the principle of requisite variety at the heart of their theories (Weick et

al. 1999), stating that an organization should be as complex as the environment it is trying to control.

We found that decomposing variety along 3 dimensions (manipulability, strict variety, constraints)

enable an organization to go further in the prescription of the regulation modes that should prevail as

stability increases.

2. Implications for enhancing reliability in firefighting operations

The first recommendation consists of identifying the main control and mindfulness processes

prevailing in the organization, in order to become aware of the dominant tension management

strategy. Two situations are possible. If this strategy is adapted to the operational context, then the

organization needs to develop actions that can correct the weaknesses of the prevailing mode of

tension management. If this strategy is not adapted to the context anymore, another strategy must be

considered.

Figure 5- Strategies validity domains

Strictvariety

DiffractingAlternating

Specializing

Constraints (interdependencies)


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Also, in every situation, processes that produce simultaneously control and mindfulness should

be encouraged. These three types of recommendations are developed below.

2.1.Encouraging positive relationships between control and mindfulness processes

When a positive relationship between control and mindfulness can be activated, then more

control will induce more mindfulness. Two recommendations seem to apply broadly:

Alternating dynamically

- Alternating dynamically: injecting numerous trigger points

By trigger points, we refer to the description of the boundary conditions (i.e. the conditions

under which the current action is valid and useful). When approaching the limits of the

boundaries, then reassessing the situation is needed. It can be flame length, the fire crossing a

given line, public reaction

By making more of peoples assumptions explicit, the content of interactions will be

improved. These triggers will also increase the occasions for mindful moments of reflection

and dialogue around concerns and possibilities. The points of application are very broad:

from institutionalized briefings (safety briefings, morning briefings ), meetings

(preplanning, planning ) to local interactions among team members. Encouraging the

STICC briefing format, or the Incident Response Pocket Guide (IRPG) briefing format, to

create discussion opportunity around concerns between a firefighter and his subordinate

should be sought as well.

Note that this strategy will increase the amount of talk (and tighten couplings) and will move

toward a situation where people do things because they make sense, not out of compliance

only.

- Alternating dynamically: making assignments more accurate in IAPs to generate discussions

Vague assignments are generally the rule. For instance (in substance): cut as much as you can

along this line. This is often justified by the fact that incident conditions change and localadjustments are always necessary. As a result a detailed plan would be useless and future

plans discredited. However, setting more defined expectations will lead to earlier detection

that the job is not possible given the change in conditions and trigger discussions about

expedient changes. Moreover, since the US FSs strategy is now to engage fires where there

is a higher probability of success, then the rationale for success should translate into clearer

and more precise assignments.

Diffracting


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Diffracting is about creating, training and socializing organizational norms that capture the

tension between control and mindfulness.

- Moving from rules to principles

The problem with too many rules is that people tend to do things not because they make

sense, but to comply with requirements. When they stop reflecting on what they are doing,

they stop being mindful. Moreover, a large set of rules breeds overconfidence in what the

organization knows. Finally, rules reduce the variability of responses which is dangerous

when the variety of situations to deal with is greater.

We suggest creating a small set of key principles that will serve as guidelines for

improvisation to meet unanticipated situations. The application of these principles to local

conditions being discretionary, people should not be left alone with their problems. Such a

move from rules to principles can be successful only if it is applied together with denser and

richer dialogues between group members.

- Flexible norms and training to dual thinking

Flexible norms refer to norms such as the following one, enforced by the Navy: "never break

a rule unless safety will be jeopardized by carrying out the rule (cited by Roberts et al,

1994). This norm basically says that organizational knowledge encoded in rules is

incomplete. It creates a paradoxical injunction (trust/distrust organizational knowledge) that

captures the tension between control and mindfulness. It enhances mindfulness because it

encourages people to use judgment to identify which situation they are exactly facing and

what rules should apply.

As we have already seen, norms such as LCES capture the same tension. It says that people

can trust the ability of the crew to control the situation (by monitoring the fire and providing

safety) but to distrust it as well because the fire is still capable of surprise and a swift retreat

may be necessary. The point here is that people should be trained to recognize and

acknowledge the tension encoded in these norms. When they realize that individuals andgroups are dealing with competing tendencies towards control and mindfulness, they can

more easily detect the push for overconfidence or overcautiousness.

The objective is that people should be confident enough in organizational knowledge to take

actions, but distrust it at the same time because unexpected things can always happen. This

research has attempted to identify general strategies to manage this tension. However, more

dialogue will always be a step in the right direction: it leads group members to share their

expertise about the situation to create a more accurate picture, leaving out overblownconcerns or introducing cues of a changing situation. Moreover, it enables to assemble


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response repertoires into ad-hoc responses. This objective supports The US Forest Service

Doctrine Dialogue (Spring 2010):

Improving fire line communications and fire line decision-making, along with instilling high reliability

organizing into fire organizations, all serve to promote the Learning & Safety Culture. Recent

hallmarks of the Risk Management program include new systems management practices and incident

reporting tools that allow fire fighters to feel confidence and trust in practices that incorporate

transparency and strive to eliminate blaming.

2.2.Developing corrective actions mitigating the vulnerabilities of the prevailing strategy

French case: see the report Fiabiliser la gestion des feux de trs grande ampleur, programme RDT

du MEEDDM

US case

We have seen that the US organizing scheme holds the features of a loosely coupled system.

Loosely coupled systems main weakness lies in its distributed cognition that limits responsiveness

and integration of interdependent constraints. Large complex fires analyses have shown that the best

strategy is to engage fire when success is assured (c.f. presentation by Marc Rounsaville 2009,

Lessons Learned Center). Thus, early detection of these opportunities and organizational

responsiveness are crucial!

At least four strategies tend to increase cognitive coupling and global responsiveness (Weick, 1982):change the presumption of logic, equalization of participation rates, restore variations to constant

variables, and give convincing feedbacks.

Change the presumption of logic.

This means that people interpret others action as necessarily relevant. It is exemplified by the tacit

norm no news is good news. By making people self conscious of their presumptions (through

training) or by introducing strangers/novel logics (US-FR project). Doubting the logic of

unfolding action

france usa hro project 07012010[1]

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