‘‘Feelings as the Motor of Perception’’? The EssentialRole of Interest for Intentionality
Maren Wehrle
� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014
Abstract Husserl seldom refers to feelings, and when he does, he mainly focuses
on their axiological character, which corresponds to a specific kind of value
apprehension (Melle 2012). This paper aims to discuss the role of feelings in
Husserl from a different angle. For this purpose it makes a detour through Husserl’s
early account of attention. In a text from 1898 on attention the aspect of interest,
which is said to have a basis in feeling, plays an essential role. Although Husserl
argues here that every specific interest is dependent on an objectifying act of per-
ception, he at the same time states that every act of perception necessarily has to be
accompanied by an interest of some sort. In the latter sense, the genuine motiva-
tional force and necessity of this feeling aspect, namely interest, is emphasized. This
ambiguity – or even contradiction – shall be the point of departure for the following
considerations. The paper argues that it is possible to interpret the role of feelings in
intentionality in a different way, namely not as an effect of current perception but as
a cause of further perceptions. This tendency is first indicated in the text from 1898
and elaborated further in Husserl’s genetic approach in Experience and Judgment.
In Experience and Judgment Husserl develops a broader notion of interest, defining
it as a general perceptual drive. This general drive (as a general interest in per-
ceiving) – so the paper will argue – expresses itself in concrete perception as a
specific preference: it discloses or makes manifest what is relevant for an individual
subject at a given time.
M. Wehrle (&)
Husserl Archives Leuven, Department of Philosophy, Centre for Phenomenological Research,
KU Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, 3000 Leuven, Belgium
e-mail: [email protected]
123
Husserl Stud
DOI 10.1007/s10743-014-9159-8
1 Introduction
In his manuscript on ‘‘attention as interest’’ from 1898,1 Husserl introduces the notion
of interest as an essential part of every act of explicit or ‘‘focused’’ intentionality, i.e.,
attention. Whereas the act of singling out an object ‘‘for me’’ (i.e., spezielle Meinung,
Sonderwahrnehmung) from the circumspection of a general objective context (i.e.,
Auffassung/Wahrnehmung) is deemed to be the formal condition for attention, there
has to be a concrete interest involved to describe the full blown phenomenon of
attention, an interest that is caused by or refers to an intended object. This interest
cannot be reduced to a theoretical interest (as Carl Stumpf does), but has to be
understood primarily as a perceptional one (Hua 38, p. 103). At the same time,
interest refers to the act of attending itself, in that it is described by Husserl – here
using the words of Stumpf – as a pleasure in the very act of noticing (Lust am
Bemerken) (Hua 38, p. 108). Intentionality is thus not only an epistemic process of
intending and fulfillment, but in its concreteness it is also an expression of tension and
resolution of a perceiving subject.2 Although the explicit aim of an intentional act is a
clear and adequate perception of an object, to actually achieve this aim one also needs
a certain involvement in the act of perception, which can be described in terms of a
felt intensity. What Husserl tries to describe here can be called the emotional side of
cognition (Melle 2012, p. 58). Events or objects do not appear to us in a neutral way;
they are of interest to us. That means that a certain feeling is linked to each perception
of an ‘‘interesting’’ object or part of an object. In turn this feeling, be it good or bad,
increases the intensity of the involved interest, which then influences further processes
of noticing. In this context, Husserl states that ‘‘feelings appear to be the actual motors
and sources of interest’’3 and thus of every specific kind of intentionality (attention).
Could one argue from the descriptions above that feelings play the role of a
motor for perception (and action) in general? But in what sense then does Husserl
refer here to feelings? Apparently not in the sense of a proper intentional feeling,
like joy, that presupposes an objectifying act (Wahrnehmung/Vorstellung). But it
also seems to be different from a pure sensual feeling, which is caused by the
perceived object. Concerning these questions, the above-quoted text is relevant in
two ways: first, one can see here an early form of a drive-dynamical understanding
of cognitive processes (Melle 2012, p. 58). Although Husserl abandons this
approach in the Logical Investigations (1900-01), it can be interpreted as a precursor
1 This text (,,Abhandlung uber Aufmerksamkeit als Interesse’’) is part of Husserl’s lectures on attention,
which he held in 1904/05 in Gottingen. Cf. Hua 38, pp. 63-123: Uber Aufmerksamkeit, spezielle
Meinung.
2 With the differentiation between formal and concrete levels of phenomenological analysis I refer to
A. Steinbock, who argues that while Husserl in earlier texts used to differentiate between deeper (earlier)
and higher (later) levels of foundation – time-consciousness is in this sense regarded as earlier in
comparison to association – from the 1920s onward he no longer speaks of a foundational hierarchy but of
formal and concrete conditions of constitution. Time-consciousness as a formal criterion of constitution
thus has to abstract from the content of experience. For the constitution of a concrete object one needs
association. See Steinbock (1995, 2002).
3 ,,[…] so erscheinen Gefuhle als die eigentlichen Motoren und Quellen des Interesses’’ (Hua 38,
pp. 108-109).
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of his genetic phenomenology, where he describes passive or egoless forms of
intentionality like operative (bodily) intentionality or drive-intentionality. Second,
this text on attention nicely exemplifies a general ambivalence in Husserl’s thought
between a static and a dynamic approach, which also characterizes later attempts to
describe the nature and function of feelings and feeling-acts in the context of a
phenomenological critique of axiological reason. Conceptually, Husserl tries to
stick with his schema of sensual content and mental apprehension (Auffassung und
Inhalt) and its hierarchy between objectifying and non-objectifying acts. But
descriptively the dynamic of the phenomena exceeds the static conceptual frame
and thus betrays its own limits (see Melle 2012).
In the A-Manuscripts, for example, Husserl defines feelings and feeling-acts as
second order phenomena (non-objectifying acts) that conceptually presuppose a
primary act of objectification (perception).4 Before something can give rise to a
sensual or more elaborated feeling, this something first has to be apprehended,
perceived.5 Object-related perception is thus supposed to be the presupposition of
sensual as well as proper feelings, as argued in Husserl’s hierarchical order of the
foundation of act categories. Husserl tried to apply the same act-hierarchy to the
description of ‘‘attention as interest’’ from 1898: Without perception, i.e.,
objectifying acts like apprehension and specific intentionality (spezielle Meinung),
he states, there cannot be any form of interest or feelings involved. Feelings in this
sense are therefore understood as a mere effect founded in object perception. But
nonetheless, when one reads Husserl’s descriptions of interest, one suspects that
something more is at stake here: interest and its feeling sources not only function as
an extra boost of intentionality and cognition, but can be understood also as a cause,
in that they motivate concrete processes of perception and action.
One can find hints for such an interpretation in the descriptions provided by this
early text on attention. These descriptions clearly show that there must always be a
selective differentiation at work in perception: the perceiving subject ‘‘prefers’’ one
object or certain parts of an object over others and so structures the field of
perception according to focus and horizon, foreground and background of
consciousness. This preferring operates in terms of an explicit selection; for
example, when someone is visually searching for something specific like a lost key,
which then comes to be perceptually singled out as an object from its background.
But as later Husserlian texts and also current empirical research on attention shows,
this preference can also operate in a completely passive, automatic way, which is
neither thematic nor willed by the perceiving subject. In both cases certain interests
are in play, whether they operate in an implicit or explicit manner. But these
4 For further critical analysis of Husserl’s concept of objectifying and non-objectifying acts, see Melle
(1990).
5 The same holds true for the axiological role of feelings, as value-apprehension and value-judgments.
Value-perception also presupposes a neutral perception, the presentation of an object as object. In a
parallel or even simultaneous manner this perception is accompanied by a sensual feeling, caused by the
object. Sensual feelings then give rise to value-apprehensions and value judgments, which lead to proper
feelings like joy, disgust or happiness as their effects. Proper feelings like joy or disgust are thus founded
in value-apprehensive consciousness (,,im werterfassenden Bewusstsein‘‘ Husserl, Ms. A VI 12 II/132a).
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interests and their feeling basis indeed go beyond an actual encounter with an
object.
In Experience and Judgment Husserl tries to integrate the notion of interest into a
more genetic perspective, although not in the habitual sense described above.
Interest is here presented as a general perceptional drive or a kind of universal
drive-feeling. In this regard perception and cognition not only have an emotional
side, but rather have to be emotionally structured from the beginning: to initiate the
process of perceiving and to keep it going, a certain kind of striving towards the
world and objects is needed. Striving, in turn, would imply feelings of deficit or
curiosity that establish a tension between actual intentions and the potential
fulfillment of these intentions in ongoing perception. I will argue that this general
striving inherent in perception manifests itself in concrete perception in terms of
specific interests of the experiencing subject (be they implicit or explicit, bodily or
personal). This individual style of experiencing is to be considered as the typical
way a subject relates to the world (see Merleau-Ponty 1963), which in turn is an
emotional relating towards the world.6
This personalized and emotional form of ‘‘being in’’ or ‘‘towards the world’’
defines the threshold and saliency criteria for stimuli and things in our surrounding
environment that are able to affect us at a given time. In this sense, it provides the
genetic impetus for any further objectifying process. Rather than understanding
feelings as secondary phenomena, as presupposing objectifying acts, one could in
this sense argue the other way around: already in sensation and receptive perception,
an implicit valuing, a structuring of the experiential field, takes place in the form of
passive differentiations and preferences within the field of perception. Feeling, as a
general striving and expression of concrete preferences (habits), can thus be
interpreted as a concrete motivational necessity for every object constitution, that is,
for full-blown object perception. Although proper intentional feelings are founded in
objectifying consciousness in a static-conceptual or abstract sense, feelings
(understood as intentional striving or habitual profile) can also count as founding
in a genetic or concrete sense, as described above.7 While in the first case
objectifying acts are essentially or conceptually necessary for proper intentional
feelings and further acts of valuing, in the second case feelings are a concrete or
even existential8 necessity for object perception. They motivate or even allow for a
6 Jan Slaby (2008) would define this as affective intentionality.
7 For a similar differentiation between abstract and concrete foundational orders, see Steinbock (2002,
p. 250). Steinbock describes the static foundation as a formal way of founding that goes from simple to
complex states of consciousness, while the concrete genetic foundational order is dealing with the
complex interrelations of the genetic layers. Steinbock argues that Husserl, in his later works, no longer
differentiates between lower or more fundamental stages of constitution and less fundamental stages, but
instead speaks of formal and concrete constitution. Time consciousness is thus no longer more
fundamental but considered only as abstract or formal necessity for genetic constitution, while for a
concrete constitution the synthesis of association is needed (Hua 11, p. 128; Steinbock 2002, p. 246.).
8 For an analogous argument, see Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, which
he turns on its head in saying that existence includes the I-think and not vice versa (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
p. 403). In the same way as the movement and situatedness of existing comes first, one could argue that
feeling or drives are more fundamental than higher forms of cognition like objectifying acts. Descartes
argued instead from an epistemological point of view: only in and through thinking do we know that we
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(selective) sensitivity towards (certain) outer stimuli, which then affect us and
motivate a further turning towards these stimuli, which can lead to a fully developed
object perception (objectifying acts).
In the first section of this paper, I will analyze the relation between intentionality
and feelings in the context of explicit perceptual intentionality – that is, focused,
attentive perception. According to Husserl’s definition, attention is comprised of
and defined by a formal component, i.e., the structure of intentionality, and a
qualitative component, interest. Interest as the ‘‘emotional’’ aspect of attention
seems in this context to serve the common cognitive ‘‘goal’’ of intentionality: the
clear and distinct perception of things. In this sense, it motivates and stabilizes the
progress of ongoing perception. In the second section, I turn to the relation between
operative intentionality and feelings. In Experience and Judgment Husserl
differentiates between a narrow and a broad notion of interest and includes passive
or bodily forms of interest. Interest in the broad sense is characterized as expression
of a general perceptual drive and, therefore, as a necessary motivational condition
for all higher forms of intentionality. The third and concluding section describes the
different interplays between feeling-based subjective dispositions such as moods,
interests or habitualized feelings, which motivate and shape lifeworldly experience.
Based on the findings of section one and two it aims to present a different view of
foundation, where feeling dispositions form a primary layer founding higher
processes of objectivation and intentionality. In this sense, habitual feelings can
indeed be interpreted as a psychological motor of concrete perception. The overall
thesis I present here is that intentionality understood from a concrete perspective
must always be an affective-intentionality (Slaby 2008). The way we emotionally
relate to the world influences how and if we experience things in a given time and
place.9
2 Explicit Intentionality and Feelings: Thematic Intention (Meinung)and Interest
The expression that feelings might function as a ‘‘motor’’ for perception comes from
Husserl’s lecture on perception and attention from 1904/05, as quoted above. This
statement does not refer to a mere receptive perception, but rather to the cognitive
acts which might determine a concrete perceptual object more closely. These acts
are realized in a process of intention and fulfillment and can be interpreted as
Footnote 8 continued
exist. In Husserl one can see both tendencies – an epistemological or static approach, which has to start
with what is given, and a genetic approach, which goes back to pre-predicative and objective levels of
consciousness. In the latter, egoless activities like passive syntheses presuppose the I-perceive or I-think.
These genetic ideas can be also interpreted in an existential (Merleau-Ponty), developmental-psycholo-
gical or even evolutionary way (see Thompson 2007).
9 In radical cases this may also influence the operation of the passive syntheses such as time-
consciousness and association, as can be seen in psychopathologies. In research on patients with mood
disorders and schizophrenia, for example, it was shown that the structure of time consciousness is
deranged and fragmented (Gallagher 2005, Fuchs 2007, Bovet and Parnas 1993).
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preliminary forms of theoretical knowledge. In this context, the feeling aspect of
intentionality – here expressed as an interest, which has to accompany every kind of
attention – serves a striving for knowledge: ‘‘It is the motor of my desire for
knowledge, it leads me to a closer examination of the object, to occupy myself with
new perceptions, which bring new parts of the same object to actual perception.’’10
What is the role played by interest, then, in the context of attention? Why does
Husserl insist (against Carl Stumpf) that interest is not merely theoretical but is
rooted in feeling?
In the 1904/05 lectures, Husserl defines attention primarily as a specific form of
intentionality, namely spezielle Meinung, which I would translate as thematic or
special perceptional intentionality. In contrast to the underlying intentionality of
Auffassung, with its primary objectifying function, this thematic intentionality is
characterized as a ‘‘distinguishing (selective) force in reference to a perceived
object’’, which in the ‘‘multiplicity of all present objects favors certain objects over
others’’ (Hua 38, p. 86). Through this preferential treatment, perceivable items with
an objective structure turn into explicitly and distinctly perceived objects.11 But this
thematic intentionality, with its highlighting and further objectifying function,
represents only the formal aspect of attention. To describe a full event of attention
one also has to add an aspect of feeling, expressed here as interest, that has to
correspond to every act of perceptual intentionality. This aspect may be described
by criteria of attention with respect to motivation and content.12
Parallel to, though distinct from, the process of intention and fulfillment,
evidence and clarity, Husserl characterizes the so-called interest as a rhythm of
tension and release and an intensity which is generated through this tension. Interest
is thus no theoretical phenomenon but more a Gemutsphanomen. This qualitative
emotional aspect has to accompany every formal aspect of Meinung (thematic
intentionality) and provide it with a certain quality or intensity. The purely selective
singling out of an item knows no gradation – an object is either explicitly singled
out or not: ‘‘Often we do speak of a burning interest, but to speak of a burning
intention makes no sense.’’13 With ‘‘interest’’ Husserl seems to refer to the fact that
intentional acts are not neutral but involve a certain motivation and intensity that
helps us to take notice. Husserl characterizes this in the words of Stumpf as a
10 ,,Es ist ein Motor fur mein Begehren nach Erkenntnis, es veranlasst mich zur naheren
Inbetrachtnahme des Gegenstandes, zur Beschaftigung neuer Wahrnehmung, die neue Teilseiten
desselben zur eigentlichen Wahrnehmung bringen.‘‘ (Hua 38, p. 118).
11 Cf. (Hua 38, p. 86): ,,Aufmerksamkeit [ist] etwas Auszeichnendes in Beziehung auf einen
wahrgenommenen Gegenstand, [es ist] ihre Eigenheit, unter der jeweiligen Mannigfaltigkeit prasenter
Objekte gewissen einen Vorzug zu erteilen, wodurch sie aus wahrnehmbaren zu fur sich wahrgenomme-
nen Objekten werden.‘‘
12 B. Begout (2007) makes a similar distinction, but in relation to other passages on attention (e.g., Hua
24, pp. 249-252 and Hua 26, pp. 18-22). Begout differentiates here between a structural aspect
(intentionality) and a thematical aspect (interest) of attention. Even though there are no systematic
analyses of perception and attention in the texts discussed by Begout – in contrast to the lectures on
perception and attention, which he unfortunately does not take into account – his differentiation holds
also true for this later edited text.
13 ,,[V]on einem brennenden Interesse sprechen wir oft genug, von einer brennenden Meinung zu reden,
gibt keinen Sinn‘‘ (Hua 38, p. 118).
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‘‘delight in noticing’’ (Lust am Bemerken; Hua 38, pp. 110, 118). Against Stumpf,
however, he emphasizes that this delight is not to be described as a theoretical
interest in an object but has its ‘‘main sources in feelings’’ (Hua 38, p. 108).
Husserl starts his description of interest by comparing it to similar acts like a
wish, expectation or desire (Hua 38, p. 104). In this sense, interest is different from
perceptional or thetic acts: the structure of intentions and fulfillment is not related to
the identification of the intended object through the intentions. The fulfillment of a
wish, desire, or will is thus not characterized as an intuition but more as a relaxation
of tension, a satisfaction. Interest, in contrast to other intentions, is thus connected
with a feeling of lack that leads to a tension that wants to be satisfied in further
perceptions. Although interest mostly appears as one of these acts (e.g., expectation,
wishing, willing) or as a component thereof, it has to be differentiated from them
descriptively, since it represents a necessary condition of these acts. There can be
intentionality without an involved expectation or wish, but there can be no
(thematic) intentionality without any form of interest, even if it is only a fleeting and
minimal intensity (Hua 38, p. 106).
So on the one side, Husserl tries to integrate interest into the same hierarchical schema
of foundation that he provided in the Logical Investigations. Interest that is expressed in
acts like wishing and desiring has to be founded by acts of perception or belief
(Vorstellungsakte). In contrast to the mere formal aspect of thematic intentionality, the
respective interest (expressed as wish, desire or will) is described in terms of intensity.
But this satisfaction presupposes in turn an intuition, an objectifying act: the wished or
willed object has to be first presented or given, to then be able to cause a satisfaction. In
terms of phenomenological descriptions, the function of the formal aspect of thematic
intentionality proves to be prior in relation to the role played by interest. For interest to be
effective, it logically presupposes the possibility of a representation of an item ‘‘for
itself’’ (Hua 38, p. 118). The formal structure of this specific (thematic) intentionality
ensures that something can be the object of attention at all, while interest only relates to
the how, the quality or intensity, of the current perception.
On the other side, Husserl emphasizes the emotional dimension of our cognitive
nature and argues for feelings as the motor of interest, the motor of further noticing
and therefore of intuitive fulfillment. In this sense feelings, as interest, act as a
general motor for the operation of perceptual processes and at the same time as a
stabilizer for specific intentions, which demand lasting concentration on a thing over
a long time period.14 In this context Husserl highlights the fact that our mental
nature (geistige Natur) has two sides, an intellectual and an emotional side. Both
sides manifest themselves in acts that alternate, replace or permeate each other.15
The same hold true for concrete acts of attention; only in theoretical description is it
possible to make a strict functional separation of thematic intentionality (Meinung,
Wahrnehmung) from interest. In lifeworldly experience these two aspects go ‘‘hand
14 In psychology this form of attention is called ‘‘vigilance’’. Cf. Goldhammer and Moosbrugger (2006,
pp. 16-33; here p. 24).
15 ,,Unsere geistige Natur hat zwei Seiten, eine intellektuelle und eine emotionelle, die in mannigfach
wechselnden, bald einander ablosenden, bald einander durchdringenden Akten sich außert.‘‘ (Hua 38,
p. 163)
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in hand’’ (Hua 38, p. 119) and are similarly constitutive of the phenomenon of
attention.16 Both establish a practical unity by combining that which ‘‘appears
together in experience [erfahrungsmaßig gemeinsam auftritt]’’ (Hua 38, p. 119).
In concrete experience the more familiar descriptive hierarchy does not seem so
clear anymore. Which comes first, the intellectual or the emotional aspect of the
mental? Or are they interchangeable? In the same sense as the two souls of
intentionality – the mental and the emotional – permeate or penetrate each other, it
seems that feeling here means both something that can be caused by an object and
then turn into a specific interest, and an essential emotional aspect of intentionality,
here defined as a general interest, that always accompanies a feeling, be it negative
or positive. Interest could in this sense be conceived as a striving towards the further
examination of an object, a general drive (feeling) that in its concrete manifestation
accompanies a specific feeling. Concrete perception without an interest is thus not
conceivable, since for Husserl ‘‘motives for preferences’’ always have to be in place
(cf. Hua 38, p. 108). Still, the purpose that Husserl gives for supplementing
intentionality with an emotional aspect is quite clear: it is supposed to support the
process of noticing and therefore the clear and distinct perception of things (cf. Hua
38, pp. 110, 118). But what is new here is that Husserl ascribes a genetic dynamic as
well as an aspect of urge or desire (Lust) to intentionality, which points towards the
later-developed concept of drive-intentionality.17
How then can we come to understand the relation between interest and feelings?
Husserl seems to talk about feeling in this context in quite a naıve way. He does not
differentiate explicitly between different senses in which he refers to feelings. In
some contexts it seems that the feelings he talks about cause a specific interest
(mediated by the perception of an object) and in others he seems to refer to a general
form of interest that is in play in every intentionality. Does this general interest then
only tag along with changing feelings, or is it even to be considered itself a sort of
drive-feeling? Unfortunately Husserl does not further elaborate on the different
notions of feelings in use here and leaves us in uncertainty. On the one hand,
Husserl argues that interest is accompanied by a feeling – regardless of whether this
is delight or any other sort of feeling like fear or disgust – that increases the intensity
16 Husserl speaks in this context of a reciprocal influence or an operating circle (Wirkkreis). Cf. Hua 38,
p. 119.
17 But this has consequences for the ideal aim of perception, namely the distinct and clear givenness of
an object, i.e., adequate perception. This is because interest does not reach its peak when the intended
objective moments are fulfilled or ‘‘saturated’’ (gesattigt, Hua 38, p. 107) as in cognitive intentionality,
but rather reaches its peak when something is absent or the experiencing subject is literally ‘‘missing’’
something. Interest is thus drawn especially to new and potential upcoming things, and this is why interest
wanes before well-known objects, for example after an ‘‘all-sided and exhaustive inspection’’ (Hua 38,
p. 108): ‘‘When the contexts of perception are passed through several times and every detail is familiar to
us, we lose interest in the perceived thing, it becomes boring.’’ (Hua 38, p. 108: ,,Sind die
Wahrnehmungszusammenhange ofters durchlaufen und uns jede Einzelheit vertraut geworden, so verliert
die Sache an Interesse, sie wird langweilig’’). Interest is indeed a force that facilitates noticing and thus
supports a better perception, but at the same time it opposes itself to this teleological alignment, because
the all-too-familiar weakens interest and in this sense makes room for new impressions. The adequate
givenness of things as a general ideal of phenomenology turns, in this practical sense, into a relative
optimum, which defines itself in relation to current actions and interests of the experiencing subject (cf.
also Hua 39, p. 204; Hua 11, pp. 23f).
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of the interest involved (cf. Hua 38, p. 107). According to this description, feelings
seem to be attached or interwoven with the process of interest and thus perception.
But on the other hand Husserl defines feelings in the same paragraph as the actual
sources of interest. In this sense the expression ‘‘to have an interest in something’’
receives a meaning that goes far beyond its actual definition, as Husserl points out
(Hua 38, p. 108).
So it seems that we have to differentiate between a narrow and a broad
conception of interest in the text. In the narrow sense, interest is caused by a
perceived object and accompanied by a sensory feeling (caused by the same object).
In the broad sense, interest is a motivating function within perception and thus a
necessary component of every intentionality. Interest in the broad sense (as general
function and dynamical process of tension and relaxation) is then always followed
by a drive-feeling, i.e., pleasure. In concrete perception this general delight in
noticing can be ‘‘taken over’’ or even ‘‘eliminated’’ by a ‘‘‘stronger’ feeling’’ that is
tied to the perceived thing (Hua 38, p. 107). So in the broad sense, interest seems to
be tied to feelings in an even more direct and dynamic way. It is the rhythm of
tension and release in a temporally continuous act of interest that causes delight or
pleasure, i.e., that is experienced as delightful.18 But interest is not itself to be
identified with pleasure or delight. Although both are interwoven and cannot be
separated in the process of perception, Husserl insists that pleasure, as a kind of
drive-feeling, is only secondarily attached to the dynamical act of interest (Hua 38,
p. 107). While interest as a functional term is more fundamental than the felt
dimension that accompanies it, interest – both in the narrow and broad sense – in
turn presupposes for Husserl the objectifying function of perception.
In what sense, then, does Husserl speak of interest as a motor of perception? Husserl
admits that although interest presupposes an object as presented for itself (fur-sich-
Vorgestelltes), which entails the objectifying function that provides such a singled out
object, one could also argue that the interest which causes the very same process
(singling out) in the first place is prior (Hua 38, p. 118). In the second sense we refer,
according to Husserl, to the psychological (concrete) achievements of interest, i.e., its
status as a motor of (further) perceptions, while in the first sense interest is described as a
current and static state of attention, i.e., the interest that is attention. This static interest
presupposes an objectifying act that separates an object from its mere surroundings to
bring it into focus. In the second sense, we refer to interest as something that makes us
notice or pay attention and thus motivates the specific singling out of an object or part of
an object in ongoing perception (Hua 38, p. 118). Only in this dynamic and concrete
sense can we call interest a motor for further perceptions.
Yet should there not always be a concrete interest or a general existential interest
to motivate something as the distinguished act of attention, i.e., focused perception?
In reducing the phenomenon of attention to the current state of concentration or
being busy with something (Hua 38, p. 118), Husserl leaves out the dynamic and
18 ,,[D]elight in the rhythmic processes of interest, which is characterized likewise through processes of
tension and release […], a delight in (the progress of) attending.’’ (‘‘Lust an dem Rhythmus des sich
spannenden und zugleich losenden Interesses […], eine Lust (an dem Fortgang) des Aufmerkens.’’ Hua
38, p. 108).
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habitual dimension of attention and perception. He does, however, emphasize the
importance of the inherent dynamism in perception, the tension and relaxation in the
very act of noticing. This dynamical aspect not only accompanies feelings but seems
to be itself the expression of a feeling of lack or even the desire to perceive. Indeed,
these interests and their feeling-bases go beyond an actual encounter with an object.
3 The Genetic Notion of Interest
Approaches to such a genetic-motivational extension of the notions of interest and
feeling can be found, for example, in Experience and Judgment. Here, one can find
an extension of the concept of intentionality. It is an extension in the sense that
intentionality now also includes passive and receptive forms of orientation towards
the world, which Husserl calls ‘‘tendencies of the ego’’. Similar descriptions of such
a differentiated model of intentionality, which is comprised of passive (tendencies)
and active dimensions, can already be found in earlier manuscripts from the time of
the Logical Investigations. These manuscripts deal with the different structures and
various forms of intentionality (intellectual, feeling and willing acts) and can be
interpreted as Husserl’s attempt to develop a phenomenological psychology.19
In Experience and Judgment similar ideas become explicitly connected to the
genetic concept of the ego as embodied and personal. One can even find indications
to support a dynamic stage-model of intentionality,20 where intellectual intention-
ality is always embedded and grounded in passive forms of intentionality. Husserl
here describes different stages of receptivity and perception, ranging from a sphere
of passive pregivenness and mere tendencies of the ego to an active and explicit
engagement of the ego. In this genetic theory, the foundation for every other sphere
of intentionality (not only perceptive intentionality but also the realm of feelings)
lies in an ‘‘original passivity’’. Here we see a shift towards a more dynamic
description of perception that also tries to grasp its passive dimensions. Instead of
being an objectifying act, the precondition for higher acts of feeling and perception
is now defined as the ‘‘pregivenness’’ of one’s objective surroundings and
environment. This ‘‘field of pregivenness’’ is thereby not neutral but already a
field of prominences characterized by qualitative differences, such that one thing
will ‘‘excite us’’ while other parts of the field will not. Affection has thus a genetic
or concrete priority over more elaborated forms of intentionality. The given
19 See the ongoing edition of the three volumes on the structures of consciousness (Studien zur Struktur
des Bewusstseins), edited by U. Melle and T. Vongehr at the Husserl Archives Leuven.
20 One could define this dynamic model of intentionality as a ‘‘stage-model’’ in the sense that it can be
compared to developmental stages. The ‘‘primary’’ passive stages of temporality, drive-intentionality, and
perception in this sense could be characteristic for early developmental stages in humans or the way
certain vertebrates relate to their environment. More explicit and thematic forms of intentionality like
thinking and judging are then special kinds of developed human intentionality. Since lower and higher
stages of intentionality are interwoven with each other in the daily life and behavior of adult human
beings, the different stages do not act separately but always in relation with the other forms of
intentionality. The perceptual intentionality of an adult is thus always influenced and informed by more
intellectual forms of intentionality (and habitual forms of knowledge and memory) and therefore cannot
be compared with the perception of animals or children.
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(the objective surroundings) must first exert some allure on the ego. But, at the same
time, there has to be a ‘‘tendency to give way’’ (Husserl 1973, p. 78) from the
subjective side of the ego. Affection is therefore to be seen as the lowest level of
activity of the ego, which is based on the passive syntheses of association and
internal-time consciousness.
In Experience and Judgment the notion of interest is therefore seen as the actual
and practical expression of the ‘‘tendency of the ego in experience’’ (Husserl 1973,
p. 81). What Husserl especially emphasizes is the character of striving involved
here, which points to the motivational function of interest. This striving is described
not only as the motor of further perceptions but also as a motor for the ‘‘doings’’
(1973, p. 85) of the subject (i.e., its actions). It leads to practical, kinaesthetic,
‘‘realizations’’ of noematic horizons of the perceived object (1973, p. 84). Interest
understood as a practical tendency or striving of the ego not only relates to a
specific, thematic intentional object, but also contributes to the constitution of an
intentional object itself, in that it is continuously uncovering and realizing horizons
of the given, and hence motivating new perceptions and actions. Interest here
appears to be an integral part of intentionality, which integrates concepts of bodily
movement and the horizons of perception.
Here Husserl explicitly differentiates between a narrow and a broad concept of
interest. While the narrow concept of interest is quite similar to Carl Stumpf’s
notion of theoretic interest, as a thematic interest one has for an object or subject-
matter over a course of time – for example, during a scientific study – the broad
notion of interest is described by Husserl more as a general perceptional drive. For
Husserl, the narrow notion of interest refers to acts in which I am thematically
turned toward an object, i.e., ‘‘perceiving it, perhaps, and then examining it
thoroughly’’, while the broader notion of interest refers to ‘‘every act of turning-
towards of the ego, whether transitory or continuous, every act of the ego’s being
with (inter-esse)’’ (Husserl 1973, p. 86). Beyond Husserl, I would interpret this in a
more Merleau-Pontian way. Interest expresses itself in a narrower sense in acts of
concentration on specific topics as well as in a broader sense of being-with and
toward the world, i.e., in every form of subjective (bodily and ego-like) engagement
with the world.
This general interest (perceptional striving) then manifests or expresses itself as
concrete forms of interest (of an individual subject) on different levels of activities.
In these concrete forms, interests are either caused from the bottom up, by sensuous
stimuli or objects, or from the top down by habitual interests that precede and go
beyond the current acts of perception.
As described above, affectivity has to be considered as the lowest level of
activity. The next higher level of activity would then be a striving towards a
kinaesthetic realization (cf. Husserl 1973, p. 84), which could be defined as a bodily
form of interest. The interest in an object that has been awakened by affection leads
then to practical possibilities to see that object in different appearances. This bodily
realization of interest can take the form of a will to knowledge in higher stages of
intentionality, such as in intellectual acts like thinking. A specific bodily turning
towards, however, must be characterized as an active process that does not
necessarily include the involvement of an ego and thus can take place without a
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thematic consciousness of an object. Husserl distinguishes in this sense between an
active process or doing that includes an ego, the ‘‘I do,’’ and active processes which
happen without a thematic consciousness, a ‘‘doing that precedes the turning-
towards’’ (Husserl 1973, p. 85).21 According to this genetic hierarchy, one could
define bodily interest as a doing that precedes the explicit turning-towards of the
ego, in that it is merely a bodily-kinaesthetic turning-towards.
Even if Husserl’s argumentation is not clear about the sense in which one can
speak of a bodily stage of turning-towards, one can still argue with and beyond
Husserl for such an active but not (yet) ego-like intentionality of the bodily self
(Legrand 2006), which is implicit and operative in nature. Although this operative
form of intentionality does not involve an ego in the strong sense as Husserl
understood it, it can still be regarded as a turning-towards of the subject and thus as a
consciousness to some degree.22 A purely bodily-kinaesthetic turning-towards can be
described as a ‘‘passive’’ ‘‘running through’’ (Durchlaufen) of kinaestethic move-
ments and apprehensions—for example the direction of eye movements (cf. Husserl
1973, pp. 83f.). Although these courses of movements operate rather automatically,
one could still say that there is some bodily involvement at play, in terms of an
implicit reaction to an outer stimulus which bears some relevance to former bodily
experiences (body memory). If these operative movements become objects of a
thematic intentionality, they turn from movements that just accompany other explicit
actions into ‘‘my movements’’. Such a thematic turning-towards with the participation
of the ego is explicitly conscious, but nonetheless it cannot be the case that it is totally
arbitrary. For there are cases where one is attentively turned toward an object and still
moves one’s eyes involuntarily due to the attraction of something else.
What is new here is that Husserl recognizes that the theme of intentionality
cannot be equated with the current perceptual focus of attention. The act of attention
itself, beginning with a turning toward as the ‘‘starting point of the realization of the
act’’ (Husserl 1973, p. 80), then proceeds – motivated by the interest – ‘‘beyond the
given and its momentary mode of givenness and tends toward a progressive ultra’’
(Husserl 1973, p. 82), toward its noematic horizon (cf. also Gurwitsch 1929, 1964).
Because theme and focus are not one and the same, the notion of interest has to be
extended, otherwise the changes and dynamics of perception and attention could not
be described. It can happen, for instance, that a sudden affection in the form of a
disturbing noise temporarily becomes the object of the turning-towards of the ego,
but the scientific study with which one was occupied before still remains the overall
theme. At the same time, it can be that the noise changes the course of interests and
21 This kind of operative intentionality in Husserl is also analysed and emphasized by Lotz (2002,
p. 25).
22 Therefore it is not adequate to describe all movements and bodily processes as zombie-like behavior
or complete unconsciousness, which is stated in most approaches in the analytical debate on
consciousness and attention (Koch and Crick 2001, Frith and Rees 2007). If we argue for a ‘‘stage-
model’’ of intentionality, these operative forms of intentionality could also be characteristic of the way
children relate to the world before they acquire higher intellectual capacities such as speech, and it could
also be characteristic of certain ‘‘higher’’ animals. Infants as well as children experience their
environment and themselves in a certain way; therefore consciousness, in a phenomenological definition,
should be ascribed to both of them.
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turns into the actual theme of attention. In this context Husserl must also
differentiate between different levels of interest as levels of turning towards the
world and/or objects. Not only can we relate to the world in different ways, but we
can distinguish different grades of activity or passivity in this turning towards.
These activities lead to objectivations and objective givenness, which in turn
provide and enrich the field of the pregivenness (original passivity) and motivate
further activities. Closely intertwined with this idea of different levels of activity or
engagement is the concept of horizon. In this sense not only the noematic aspect of
horizons are of importance – i.e., the inner and outer horizon of the perceived object
– but also the noetic aspects, i.e., the foreground and background experiences and
their subjective (habitual) motivations.
Prior to the selection of foreground and background by the engagement of the
ego, there must be a tendency in place that precedes the ego, ‘‘the tendency as
stimulus’’ (Husserl 1973, p. 78). This stimulus first has to ‘‘attract’’ the ego to
change its engagement from the background to the foreground of subjective
experience. But why is one stimulus or one pre-objective unity more prominent than
others? I would argue that this is because of a habitual dimension of interest
influencing every subjective experience that selectively structures the field of
pregivenness into more and less relevant parts. This subjective-habitual profile can
also be described in terms of a noetic horizon, which guides perception in a passive
and implicit way and structures the field of perception for a subject into foreground
and background. While the noematic horizon refers to the structure of the objective
field of a current perception (inner and outer horizon of a perceived object), the
noetic horizon motivates further perceiving, it makes us perceive in that it
determines our sensitivity towards certain stimuli or situations.
It is in this sense that one could argue that before a specific ‘‘tending-towards’’
and its further ‘‘realization’’ (Husserl 1973, p. 80) can take place, there has to be a
general ‘‘tendency to give way’’, a special or individual sensitivity and alertness of
the subject towards the environment.23 Interest can thus not only be understood as
something that is caused by an affection or proper object perception (and thus with
the sensual feeling that goes along with it), but could also be interpreted as
something that was already there before a concrete affection took place. If one is
interested in the question why we are affected or awakened by certain stimuli and
not by others, one has to consider the notion of interest in an habitual way, as
something that makes us take notice and even on a deeper level makes us sensitive
and open for special environmental factors. Only then could one explain the specific
or typical structure of a field of pregivenness and givenness (noematic horizon) and
get a hint as to why some parts have a special affective force for that same subject
(or a group of subjects), while others do not.
23 Lotz is heading in a similar direction when he argues that there need not always be an affection to
awake the ego. Already on the side of the ego there has to be a certain specified directedness towards the
perceptional field. According to Lotz, every consciousness has a certain attitude toward the things that
affect it. Contrary to Lotz, I would not go so far as to argue that the directedness (Gerichtetheit) or
determination of the subject must already be considered a form of value attitude (Werthaltung) (cf. Lotz
2002, p. 26).
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The individual sensitivity or even selectivity of a subject refers to a noetic
horizon, which is comprised of ‘‘innate’’24 dispositions, long term habitualities and
interests, former perceptions and actions, as well as current desires and implicit and
explicit operating interests. Thus affection, as the first level of attention, is neither
totally caused by subjective conditions (noetic horizon), nor by objective
characteristics of the environment (noematic horizon), but must rather be
understood as an interaction between the subject and the given environment, which
generates a mutual situation of perception. In this sense, it is hardly possible to
define the actual point of crossover between a passive affection and an active
turning-towards of the ego. One can describe it only gradually as ranging from a
passive affection due to a saliency caused by the given – for example a loud noise –
over the current subjective state of being affected, to an explicit allocation and
turning-towards of the ego.
In what ways then are feelings involved in these processes and Husserl’s dynamic
notion of interest? Husserl says that there is a field of pregivenness on the one side,
which not only includes what is sensually given but also involves a feeling that comes
with it, while on the other side there are different levels of activity and objective
orientations, not only in perception but also in evaluation and pleasure: ‘‘there is an
original passivity not only of sensuous givens, of ‘sense data,’ but also of feeling and,
in contrast to this passivity, there is an active, objectivating orientation, not only in
perception but also in evaluation and in pleasure’’ (Husserl 1973, p. 71). Furthermore
Husserl states that the turning towards of the subject can be described or evaluated in
terms of intensity, and intensity is in turn provided by the interwoven feelings. A
foreground experience is thus characterized as having a greater feeling intensity than a
background experience, in that the ego here actually ‘‘lives ‘in’ the experience’’
(Husserl 1973, p. 81) and is actively occupied with its intentional object.
Again Husserl is not clear about the status of the feelings he is describing. It
seems again as though that, in the current state of engagement (as attention or less
explicit activity), feelings – and thus the perceived objects that in turn lead to these
specific feelings – cause interests. Although feelings do not presuppose perception
(as objectifying act) or a given object, they still seem to depend on what Husserl
now calls the ‘‘tendency as stimulus’’ that causes a sensory feeling, affection,
intensity and thus motivates further act-realization. In the sense of a static
understanding of perception – i.e., only in relation to the current act of perception –
feelings are accompanying or are caused by sensual perception. In the sense of a
dynamic understanding of perception (as action, or here as ‘‘doing’’), a general
drive-feeling seems to be the motor of every form of intentionality. This general
24 One has to be careful with the use of the term ‘‘innate.’’ Recent studies in developmental psychology
and genetics point out that this static category of innateness still involves a development, one that either
takes place in the relation of the respective organism to its environment (the womb) before being born, or
can be seen as a long-term development beyond the limits of one generation. If this article focuses on the
genetic-practical aspects, i.e., bodily aspects, of affects and feelings, that does not mean that these aspects
are seen to be innate as, for example, Johnstone presents them in his article on the bodily roots of emotion
(Johnstone 2012, pp. 179-200). In discussing the passive and bodily nature of feeling and perception, this
article rather wants to point out that the relativity and historicity of these affects and feelings are
inscribed, developed and stabilized in and through the body.
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existential or transcendental drive then expresses itself in concrete perception in
specific subjective aims and needs or habitual interests prior to and beyond the
current act of perception and its objects. This concrete emotional-perceptional
profile (noetic horizon) is thus what makes us perceive or be sensitive toward certain
sense-data in ongoing perception.
In this way we could also understand feeling in the sense of a general drive-
feeling that motivates every form of a turning-toward. In the concrete sense, this
perceptional striving would express itself in concrete interests, caused by current
perception (bottom-up/noematic horizon) or by a subject’s typical interest profile
(top-down/noetic horizon). This habitual dimension of interest could then also be
considered as a form ‘‘emotionally colored’’ turning towards, or in terms of feelings
that go beyond the current state of perception (habitualized feelings).
4 Habitual Feelings as a Psychological Motor of Concrete Perception
As shown above, the concept of interest can neither be reduced to the actual
operating interest in perception nor to the intellectual state of consciousness, where
the content or the mere existence of such an interest is explicitly present to the
perceiving subject. Beyond Husserl’s considerations on the role of interest in
relation to current perceptual events, it must be added that every intentional act not
only needs an accompanying interest, but moreover, the intentional act – or better
the subject of intention – needs to have an habitual horizon of interests which
motivates such acts in the first place. In the latter case, interest as a factor of
motivational reason (Rang 1973, p. 127) precedes every actual act of attention and
even every passive event of affection. Hence one has to differentiate between a
currently operating interest and the habitual interest, which implicitly influences the
openness of affection, attention and changes of attention ‘‘a priori’’.
Experience leaves not only permanent traces like habits or bodily skills, but also
temporary after-effects in the form of a certain general mood (Stimmung), which can
influence further perceptions. In the A-manuscripts Husserl speaks in this case of a
‘‘rosy light’’ which permeates all further perceptions. The rosy light may be caused,
for instance, by a beautiful experience with a loved one. This puts the experiencing
subject in a residual positive mood which is then automatically transferred to his/her
environment and the things in it: ‘‘For instance I take a book into my hand and gaze
around into the room: Everything has gained worth and attraction from her [former]
presence;’’ or in another passage, ‘‘How beautiful the world is! The whole world is
illuminated and receives light from the beloved’’ (Ms. A VI 12 II/134b).
If we stick to the logical-theoretical explanation that Husserl offers, one would
have to argue that the mood only influences the how, i.e., the valuing of the
perceived objects, and therefore presupposes an apprehension, an objectifying act.
Yet let us try to switch our perspective away from different act-classifications
toward a view that encompasses the whole of the experiencing subject. From such a
dynamic perspective one can argue that the mood or the habitual interest profile also
influences what, in a given moment, is able to affect me, i.e., what is able to ‘‘wake’’
me because of its standing out from the background of my (former) experience.
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What wakes me may thus stand out from the background because it is similar or
opposed to the former experience of the subject. This is what Husserl describes as
the passive synthesis of association, which follows the criteria of similarity and
contrast. This passive standing-out from a background is not yet a proper object but
generates a pre-objective unity, which is the foundation of any further objectifying
acts or achievements of consciousness. The mood is in this sense not only able to
influence the constitution of an object but can also influence the habitual and bodily
profile of interests, which integrate former sensations, experiences, and their
associated feelings of the subject. This profile not only influences each and every
future perception but is also concurrently constituted and changed by this very
experience itself.
Although Husserl himself does not mention such an habitual dimension of
interests explicitly – neither in his early text about attention nor in Experience and
Judgment – his descriptions of moods and steadier feelings like love can indicate
such a motivational dimension. Actual feelings (caused by an object or stimulus)
can turn into moods and thus not only motivate the current interests in an intentional
act but also help to turn these interests into habits that guide further perceptions. In
contrast to moods, which Husserl understands as after-effects of a current experience
of value – like the perception of a loved one that bathes all subsequent experiences
in a rosy light – we could also talk of something like a habitualized feeling (one that
leads to habitual interests). To love someone, for example, cannot be reduced to an
actual value-perception of a lovable object but must be characterized as an attitude
or habitualized feeling. Habitual feelings would then manifest themselves in a more
sustainable way than an elusive mood, which goes together with a typical style of
perceiving. Thus this love will not only influence further perceptions of the loved
one, but also the perceptional style of a subject in general, in that we focus or even
only come to notice things because we associate them with, or they remind us of, the
loved one. We then see the world with the eyes of the loved one; this love becomes
part of our habitual style of perception and thus motivates specific object
perceptions and actions. The noetic horizon, which we defined above as the sum of
current and habitual motivational factors of an individual subject, must also
therefore be considered an affective horizon.
In this sense it would go along with an intentionality that can be characterized as
affective intentionality, as proposed by Jan Slaby. With his notion of affective
intentionality, Slaby wants to point out that intentionality ‘‘is in the most central
cases not a cold, detached, purely cognitive affair, but is rather constitutively
feelings-involving’’ (Slaby 2008, p. 429). Intentionality understood in a broad sense
as world-directedness and world enclosing must therefore include emotional
aspects, because this turning towards a world is never detached from current desires
or habitual interests and feelings. Concrete experience then must be considered as
emotional experience: ‘‘Emotional experience discloses or makes manifest what is
currently of relevance to us’’ (Slaby 2008, p. 443). It is thus the emotional side of
cognition and experience which personalizes intentionality, in that it reveals to us
‘‘not only what is significant’’, but also informs us (implicitly) about the position/
condition of ourselves in relation to what we experience: ‘‘how things are going for
us, how things stand with regard to our well-being’’ (Slaby 2008, p. 438).
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Illustrations and examples of how an affective horizon influences experience and
motivates further intentions can be found in Husserl’s descriptions of the interrelation
between personal interests and perception. Everyone has in this sense a certain frame
of personal interests and accompanying habitual feelings that forms our typical
experiential horizon. One popular example of this – at least in Husserl – is the so-called
‘‘vocational interest’’ (Berufsinteresse), the way in which our experience is guided by
our profession. The affective horizon of a vocational interest broadens throughout
one’s vocational life. New criteria of relevance are added or substituted for old ones
and can then bring forth other forms of affective arousals. What is now relevant for the
current vocational interest owes its ‘‘power of arousal (Weckungskraft) to the currently
vocationally engaged ego and its motives’’ (Hua 39, p. 594).
At the same time, it is also possible that sudden changes in the course of attention
may occur due to an awakening caused by factors in the environment which are not
directly relevant for the vocational interest. Even this kind of bottom-up affection,
which is supposed to be externally caused, necessarily stands in relation to a
habitual context of experience and interests. The job interest now loses its
actuality and is displaced by another interest when a ‘‘perceptional givenness’’
(Wahrnehmungsgegebenheit) breaks into the ongoing experience with a ‘‘great
affective power’’ (Hua 39, p. 594). This affective power should not be interpreted as
a mere characteristic of the object or the given, however, as it derives its power in
turn from another interest. Husserl describes this interrelation of bottom-up
affection (or salience) and top-down interests by the following example. One of
Husserl’s children catches his attention with great affective power while he is
deeply concentrated on his research work. His attention then changes and a new
personal sphere of interests, another experiential horizon, takes over:
‘‘It [the great affective power] wakes me as someone who is not only a
professional, but also for example a father. But before the moment of
awakening my fatherly interest was not actual. Therefore the child did not
have the affective power to catch my attention at the time I saw her entering
the room, and it therefore did not have the power to motivate fatherly actions
by then. My fatherly interest now becomes activated.’’25
In addition to such a change of thematic attention, there are cases where both lines
of interest stay active or awake in different forms of attention and with different
levels of intensity. In these cases of divided attention, the explicit and thematic
intentionality is focused on the research work while, at the same time, a bodily-
sensual readiness or practical interest is operating, in that one has one’s body
implicitly turned towards the sleeping child and has one’s ears directed towards it.
As we have seen in the examples and descriptions above, the currently active
stages of interest are characterized through their ‘‘flexible horizons of relevance’’
(bewegliche Relevanzhorizonte, Hua 39, p. 596). A subjective, i.e., bodily-sensory
or personal, experience without any form of operating interest is thus not
25 ,,Sie weckt mich als der ich nicht nur Berufsmensch, sondern zum Beispiel Vater bin. Aber mein
vaterliches Interesse war nicht aktuell, von ihm ging daher nicht die Kraft der Affektion aus, die mich
beim Anblick des eintretenden Kindes alsbald aufmerken lasst und mich zu vaterlicher Betatigung
motiviert. Mein vaterliches Interesse wird nun allererst aktiviert.’’ (Hua 39, p. 594)
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conceivable. Subjective experience is selective in nature, and this is practically
expressed by a certain preference profile. This profile is not totally deterministic or
static but flexible and constantly changing, in that interests compete and change
according to current environmental demands. Specific interests thus develop and
also change within experience, in the interaction between subjects with other
subjects and the world. Despite their flexibility and mutability, a typical core or
style that is recognizable, even by other subjects, remains. Furthermore, the
affective horizon has an integrating function in that it integrates every future
experience into the life and experiential history of an individual bodily subject. In
this sense every subject (group of subjects, culture etc.) has a typical way of turning
towards the world or engaging in it, comparable with typical ways of addressing and
tackling things, be it in a skeptical, curious, joyful, pessimistic etc. manner.
This habitual profile can be said to have its source in feelings insofar as it is the
concrete manifestation of acquired habitual interests and feelings. In a general
transcendental or even existential sense one could argue that intentionality itself,
according to its structure of intending and fulfillment and its tendency to go beyond the
actual given, can be characterized as essentially including a (drive)-feeling dimension.
In concrete perception this general drive will then be taken over by specific feelings
that are caused by current experiences and then turn into a mood or habitual feeling
state that guides further perception. Perception and intentionality in general are thus
not neutral or detached cognitive processes but can be characterized as an affective
way of relating to the world (Slaby 2008) that includes general drives, as well as bodily
and personal feelings. To have interest in something thus always refers to a subject’s
emotional involvement with her lifeworld and goes along with changing degrees of
intensity that vary according to the amount of engagement and invested feelings.
What we prefer or what is of relevance for us is therefore closely tied to what we call
‘‘feelings’’. In this sense feelings seem not only to be an effect that we expect to have
when we experience this or that as caused by and object; they can also be interpreted in
an habitual sense as what motivates or structures what we come to see and how we see
it. Feelings understood in this sense are conceptually not dependent on the perception
of a specific object but instead seem to represent a concrete motivational force of
perception. Here a typical style of ‘‘emotionalized’’ perception selects what actually
can affect an individual subject and therefore what she perceives. Feeling, understood
as a general emotional drive that manifests itself in concrete feeling profiles, can thus
be defined as the concrete (or psychological) motivational necessity of every
individual perception; or, in transcendental-phenomenological terms, it is not a formal
but a concrete genetic condition of every (new) object constitution.
As Husserl argues in his late texts on the lifeworld, one cannot talk about a total
absence of interest but only of different levels of relevance and intensity: ‘‘In the
state of being awake (as a correlate of sleep) there can be no absolute lack of
interest, and even what we call ‘operating without interest’ is still a phenomenon of
relevance, one of the lowest level of relevance.’’26 From a subjective-practical
26 ,,Es gibt in der Wachheit (als Korrelat des Schlafes) uberhaupt keine absolute Interessenlosigkeit, und
was das ‘interesselos verlaufend heißt, ist selbst ein Relevanzphanomen niederster Stufe‘‘. (Hua 39,
p. 596)
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phenomenological viewpoint, the experiencing subject is therefore always embed-
ded in an affective horizon. The perceived and experienced lifeworld displays itself
not as something objective but as a subjective and moreover an intersubjective
phenomenon of relevance. ‘‘What is correlatively experienced has the character of a
calling, something that exerts an allure on the I […], but this call dies away if it is
not tackling the current interests of the I.’’27 The experienced world is therefore a
world of interests from the start. Everything that is perceived is perceived in relation
to a certain interest, even though this operating interest can have a low level of
relevance. The lifeworld is a world of interests, both subjective and intersubjective:
‘‘The world that is there for me, appearing as itself, originally, and in its first stage
as field of perception, is there for me as a world of interests [Interessenwelt], and the
way the world appears to me is the way in which I am interested in this world.’’28
And so we can now add: the world not only appears to us in the light of our interest;
it is only disclosed to us because we are emotionally engaged in it.
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