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l
10-10-27
s E C R E T
CENTRAL I N T E L L I G E N C E
AGENCY
OFFICE
OF NATIOHAL ESTIMATES
26
February
1968
~ E l W R A 1 I D U M
FOR TUE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The OI;.tlook in
Vietnam
1. This Il.emorandum d o ~ s not seek to eJ...1l1ore
a l l
aspects
of
the si tuat ion
in Vietnam
or
i t s probable
development
over
a
long term.
I t
i s
addressed only to the specific question
put to us i . e . , whether developments
in
Vietnam are apt to
involve
a
continuation
of ccmbat into
the indefinite
future
nt
a level comparable or
higher
than current levels or whether t
is
more
probable
that ei ther
the
VC
or the
GVN wil l
be
unabJ.e
to sustain such
a
level beyond
a
f e ~ months.
2. The current
phase
of combat
{ill have
a
cr i t ica l
bearing on
the further course of the
-W"ar and
may even
prove to
be
decisive. \ole cannot
be
sure hO'.; long th is phase wil l l as t ,
but t
seems
l ike ly tha t
by ea.rly
SUlmler
the
ilmnediste
resul ts
and
the
longer
term implice.tions wil l be fai r ly
clear
to Hanoi
Saigon and Ilashillgaton.
At
present the key
questions concern:
JECLASS fIED _ .
Authority \.. ,L\ t. -
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(1) the capabilities of the Communist forces to sustain their
current challenge, and wnether they can continue tne fighting
thereafter,
and
(2) the
capabilities of
the
South
V i e t r ~ e s e
political
and military establishment to cope
with the
tasks
imposed
by the
prescnt Communist offensive.
Communist Plans and Prospects
3.
Hanoi s aims in
the present
offensive phase
are:
to
register significant milttary
successes
against US and
especially
ARVN
forces, and to inf l ict such heav J losses,
physical
destruction and
disorganization on
the GVN as
to
produce
a to tal
situation
favore.ble to a
negotiated settlement
on Communist
terms.
The Communists
are not
likely to have
e
r igid
timetable, but
they
probnbly
hope to achieve decisive
resul ts during the course of the summer. The high
i ~ p o r t a n c e
which Hanoi
nOvl
attaches to forcing the
issue is
evident from
the risks and
costs
or. the
enterprise.
4.
The
to l l
on C o ~ u n 1 s t
forces has
been considerable,
even i r reportcd co.ouo.ltics
nrc
grel.tly inflat .:
. :
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infiltration
of both
nell
\ ~ i t s replacements
from the North
is continuing.
A
strenuous, las t
minute
recruitment effort
was
made prior to the Tet attacks.
A
significant
part
of the
guerri l la
and
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a ~ C R E T
push fa l ls short they i lill wish to be able to
sustain
a
protracted struggle. Hence they
will
probably not exercise
their capabilities in such a profligate ~ r as to deny
themzelves
the posaibility
of
continuing
the
~ t r u g g l c
should
the present phase
fa i l to produce a decisive result .
rNNjARVll Prospects
7. The will and
capability
of the GVl and i t s armed forces
r ~ ~ a i n the
keys to the eventual outcome.
8. In
the llUlin, the ARVlI hnll o.cquittc l i t se l f
fairly
.Tcll
since
30
January, though
the
record
is
uneven.
~ o r a l e
has held
up on the whole, and
we
~ w of no unit
defections.
HOWever
the ARVN is shoHing
signs
of
fatigue
and in many areas
t
has nOlr
lapsed
into a
static defensivc
pOllture. Security
in the
country-
side has been
sharply
reduced. A long and costly effort would
have
to
be undertaken
to
regain
the
pre-Tet
position.
t
is
highly unlikely that the ARVll will be
in::pircd
enough
or
stroncr
enough to
make such an
effort
-- certainly not in
the
near future.
9. The rNN
also
performed adequately in the immedtate
emergency,
particularly
in the Saigon area. There nou appears
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. C
Il=-E::.'l'
of popular anxieties over
the future
course of the
wnr and
US
at t i tudes toward a polit ical settlement. 'yet, h(.I1.fCver, there
arc no signs of a crisis of confidence \1ithin the goverrucent.
12. I f
major military reverses occur, the poli t ical and
military
apparatus
could degenerate into
general
ineffectualness.
I f
on
the
other hand
US
and
ARVN
regain
the in i t ia t ive
and
infl ict some
conspicuous
setbacks
on
the C o m m u n i s t ~
and
the
general offensive appears to be contained, then the GV N ,ight
manifest ne\; energy and
confidence
and dra\{ nel; support
to
i tself .
On balance,
we
judge
that
the
chances
are
no
bet ter
tban
even that the
GVN/ARVN
will emerge from the
present phase
without being s t i l l further weakened.
Alternative
OUtcomes
of
Present Phase
13.
believe that
the
Communists
'Till custain
a
high
level
of military
act ivi ty
for
a t
least
the
next
two
or
three
months.
I t
is difficult to forecast the
situation which
wil l then
obtain,
given the
number of unknowable factors which
will figure. OUr
best estimate is as
follows:
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S.,:e=C-R-l t-T
a. The leas t
likelY
outcome of
the
present
phase
i3
tha t the Communist side will expend i t s r.eGources to s ~ c h
an extent as to be
incapable t l ~ r e e f t c r
of preventinG
oteady
advances by the US/GVlI
b Also
unlikely
though considerably less
so
is th t
the
GIN/ARVN
wil l
be
so cri ical.ly weakened tha t
t
can play
no
further significant part in
the
military
and
polit ical .
prosecution
of
the struggle
c.
l-Iore likcJ.y
thun e i hcr
of the above
1s th t
the
present push
wil l
be generally
contained
but with severe
losses to both the
VN
and Communist forces and
th t
a
period wil l se t in
d u : r i n ~
which neither will be capable
of
register ing decisive gains.
FOR THE BOARD
OF
NATlmtoU ESTTI1 ATES:
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S
E:
S 'R- E=T
ABBOT
SlflTII
Chairman