cia: vietnam

8/9/2019 CIA: Vietnam

1/7

l

10-10-27

s E C R E T

CENTRAL I N T E L L I G E N C E

AGENCY

OFFICE

OF NATIOHAL ESTIMATES

26

February

1968

~ E l W R A 1 I D U M

FOR TUE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The OI;.tlook in

Vietnam

1. This Il.emorandum d o ~ s not seek to eJ...1l1ore

a l l

aspects

of

the si tuat ion

in Vietnam

or

i t s probable

development

over

a

long term.

I t

i s

addressed only to the specific question

put to us i . e . , whether developments

in

Vietnam are apt to

involve

a

continuation

of ccmbat into

the indefinite

future

nt

a level comparable or

higher

than current levels or whether t

is

more

probable

that ei ther

the

VC

or the

GVN wil l

be

unabJ.e

to sustain such

a

level beyond

a

f e ~ months.

2. The current

phase

of combat

{ill have

a

cr i t ica l

bearing on

the further course of the

-W"ar and

may even

prove to

be

decisive. \ole cannot

be

sure hO'.; long th is phase wil l l as t ,

but t

seems

l ike ly tha t

by ea.rly

SUlmler

the

ilmnediste

resul ts

and

the

longer

term implice.tions wil l be fai r ly

clear

to Hanoi

Saigon and Ilashillgaton.

At

present the key

questions concern:

JECLASS fIED _ .

Authority \.. ,L\ t. -

J -


2/7

(1) the capabilities of the Communist forces to sustain their

current challenge, and wnether they can continue tne fighting

thereafter,

and

(2) the

capabilities of

the

South

V i e t r ~ e s e

political

and military establishment to cope

with the

tasks

imposed

by the

prescnt Communist offensive.

Communist Plans and Prospects

3.

Hanoi s aims in

the present

offensive phase

are:

to

register significant milttary

successes

against US and

especially

ARVN

forces, and to inf l ict such heav J losses,

physical

destruction and

disorganization on

the GVN as

to

produce

a to tal

situation

favore.ble to a

negotiated settlement

on Communist

terms.

The Communists

are not

likely to have

e

r igid

timetable, but

they

probnbly

hope to achieve decisive

resul ts during the course of the summer. The high

i ~ p o r t a n c e

which Hanoi

nOvl

attaches to forcing the

issue is

evident from

the risks and

costs

or. the

enterprise.

4.

The

to l l

on C o ~ u n 1 s t

forces has

been considerable,

even i r reportcd co.ouo.ltics

nrc

grel.tly inflat .:

. :

. .

::.

.

.

,.

. .

r

j .

..

,

"

.

" ...

;

,

,

,

.. -

.'


3/7

(

r

(

(

(

S: E

e R -E-T

infiltration

of both

nell

\ ~ i t s replacements

from the North

is continuing.

A

strenuous, las t

minute

recruitment effort

was

made prior to the Tet attacks.

A

significant

part

of the

guerri l la

and

}


4/7

a ~ C R E T

push fa l ls short they i lill wish to be able to

sustain

a

protracted struggle. Hence they

will

probably not exercise

their capabilities in such a profligate ~ r as to deny

themzelves

the posaibility

of

continuing

the

~ t r u g g l c

should

the present phase

fa i l to produce a decisive result .

rNNjARVll Prospects

7. The will and

capability

of the GVl and i t s armed forces

r ~ ~ a i n the

keys to the eventual outcome.

8. In

the llUlin, the ARVlI hnll o.cquittc l i t se l f

fairly

.Tcll

since

30

January, though

the

record

is

uneven.

~ o r a l e

has held

up on the whole, and

we

~ w of no unit

defections.

HOWever

the ARVN is shoHing

signs

of

fatigue

and in many areas

t

has nOlr

lapsed

into a

static defensivc

pOllture. Security

in the

country-

side has been

sharply

reduced. A long and costly effort would

have

to

be undertaken

to

regain

the

pre-Tet

position.

t

is

highly unlikely that the ARVll will be

in::pircd

enough

or

stroncr

enough to

make such an

effort

-- certainly not in

the

near future.

9. The rNN

also

performed adequately in the immedtate

emergency,

particularly

in the Saigon area. There nou appears

- 4 -


5/7

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-

5

-


6/7

. C

Il=-E::.'l'

of popular anxieties over

the future

course of the

wnr and

US

at t i tudes toward a polit ical settlement. 'yet, h(.I1.fCver, there

arc no signs of a crisis of confidence \1ithin the goverrucent.

12. I f

major military reverses occur, the poli t ical and

military

apparatus

could degenerate into

general

ineffectualness.

I f

on

the

other hand

US

and

ARVN

regain

the in i t ia t ive

and

infl ict some

conspicuous

setbacks

on

the C o m m u n i s t ~

and

the

general offensive appears to be contained, then the GV N ,ight

manifest ne\; energy and

confidence

and dra\{ nel; support

to

i tself .

On balance,

we

judge

that

the

chances

are

no

bet ter

tban

even that the

GVN/ARVN

will emerge from the

present phase

without being s t i l l further weakened.

Alternative

OUtcomes

of

Present Phase

13.

believe that

the

Communists

'Till custain

a

high

level

of military

act ivi ty

for

a t

least

the

next

two

or

three

months.

I t

is difficult to forecast the

situation which

wil l then

obtain,

given the

number of unknowable factors which

will figure. OUr

best estimate is as

follows:

- 6 -


7/7

-

S.,:e=C-R-l t-T

a. The leas t

likelY

outcome of

the

present

phase

i3

tha t the Communist side will expend i t s r.eGources to s ~ c h

an extent as to be

incapable t l ~ r e e f t c r

of preventinG

oteady

advances by the US/GVlI

b Also

unlikely

though considerably less

so

is th t

the

GIN/ARVN

wil l

be

so cri ical.ly weakened tha t

t

can play

no

further significant part in

the

military

and

polit ical .

prosecution

of

the struggle

c.

l-Iore likcJ.y

thun e i hcr

of the above

1s th t

the

present push

wil l

be generally

contained

but with severe

losses to both the

VN

and Communist forces and

th t

a

period wil l se t in

d u : r i n ~

which neither will be capable

of

register ing decisive gains.

FOR THE BOARD

OF

NATlmtoU ESTTI1 ATES:

- 7

S

E:

S 'R- E=T

ABBOT

SlflTII

Chairman

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