Download - Battle Swarm
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
1/20
BATTLESWARM A NEW FORM OF WARFARE
In todays world, the main threat to many states, includingspecifically the US, no longer comes from other states.
Instead, it comes from small groups and other organisations
which are not states. Either we make the necessary
changes and face them today, or what is commonly
known as the modern world will lose all sense of security
and will dwell in perpetual fear.
- Martin Van Creveld
Introduction
Since the advent of warfare the main effort to win the war has been to put
maximum combat power at the decisive point of the battlefield. In the
information age with rapid advancements in Information Technology (IT) this has
become all the more relevant since the forms of warfare are undergoing
phenomenal changes. While the conventional warfare is not a thing of the past, the
asymmetric form of warfare, the Low Intensity Conflict Operations, Peace
Operations, Small Scale Contingencies are also becoming important.
In the business world IT has triggered changes in organization from hierarchical tonetworked forms of organization. The middle layers of management are flattened.
There is considerable discussion in informed circles in Armed Forces all over the
world about how the networked forms of organization, doctrine and strategy could
be adopted to meet the changing requirements of information revolution and
warfare among the entire spectrum of conflict.
The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the increasing
lethality of cluster and Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) make it imperative that
future ground forces remain dispersed as much as possible. This has lead todiscussions on concepts such as dispersed operations, networking and greater
autonomy for small units. One important part of this doctrinal discussion relates to
the feasibility and utility of Swarm tactics which would have such small,
distributed units and maneuverable fires converge rapidly on particular targets.
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
2/20
Two researchers form American Think Tank, Rand Corporation have been
consistently proposing that the information revolution favours the rise of network
based organizations and the swarming will be the major mode of conflict in the
future. They propose that the US Armys Air Land Battle doctrine may need to
evolve to a doctrine based on swarming. Their swarming proposal named Battle
Swarm is still not completely formulated but does suggest that smaller and more
maneuverable tactical units be deployed in dispersed networks and trained to use
swarming as an operational concept. 1,2
Historical Examples.
Examples of swarming can be found throughout military history from the
numerous horse-archer battles in ancient times to the urban street skirmishes in
Mogadishu,Somalia in 1993. Swarming has been employed at the tactical and operational
levels, both defensively and offensively in cities, deserts, jungles and oceans, by
conventional and unconventional forces. Some examples of historical swarming
cases are given in figure 1. 3
Battle Terrain Swarmer
Mission
:
Defenceor
Offensiv
e ?
Swarmer
Descripition
Non
Swarmer
Descriptio
n
Uniqueness
of Example
Mongols vs
Eastern
Europeans
Battle of
Liegnitz, 1241
Steppe,
Plains
Offensiv
e
Light and
Heavy
Cavalry
Heavy
Cavalry
and
Infantry
Tactical and
Operational
Swarming
Napoleonic
Corps vsAustrians.
Ulm
Campaign180
5
Woods,
Mountains, Steppe
Both The tactical
unit wascombined
arms (masket
infantry,
cavalry,
horse
artillery) : the
Combined
Arms(masket
infantry,
cavalry,
horse
artillery)
Operational
SwarmingCombined
with
Conventiona
l tactics.
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
3/20
operational
unit was the
semi
autonomous
corpsGerman U
Boats vs
British
Convoys,
1939-1945
Naval Offensiv
e
Woolfpacks
of U-Boats
Convoys
of
merchant
ships
guarded by
destroyer
teams
Naval
example
Somalia vs
US
Commandos,Mogadishu,
Oct 3-4 1993
Urban Both Tribal Militia
(Light
Infantry)
Light
Infantry,
Lightvehicles,
helicopter
gunships
Peace
Making
Operation
Fig 1 : Historical Swarming Cases
Increasing battlefield dispersion is a natural historical trend, caused by increasing
lethality of weapons. Fig 2 shows the Battlefield Dispersion from Antiquity to the
Present.
Area
Occupied
By
Deployed
Forces
1,00,000
strong
Antiquity Napoleonic
Wars
World
War I
World
War II
1973
Arab
-Israel
War
Gulf
War
Square Km 1 20.12 248 2,750 4,000 2,13,000
Front (Km) 6.67 8.05 14 48 57 400Depth (KM) 0.15 2.50 17 57 70 533
Men Per Sq
Km
1,00,000 4790 404 36 25 2.34
Sq Meter
Per Man
10 200 2,475 27,500 40,000 4,26,400
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
4/20
Fig 2 : Battlefield Dispersion
The Mongols, The Ultimate Swarmers. The Mongols are the ultimate examples
of swarming because they swarmed at both tactical and operational levels. In the
early thirteenth century, Genghis Khan defeated all his neighbours. Eventually
Mongol conquests stretched from Korea to Germany, the largest continuous land
empire ever. They combined the mobility of the horse with the rapid long range
fire of their horn bows to create an imposing ability to swarm either fire or forces.
To this capability they added a very decentralized organizational structure that
gave great leeway to local commanders. They also feigned retreats, often luring
their opponents into loosening their battle formations while in pursuit only to
turn and Swarm upon them at an appropriate time. Finally, their arrow riders
assured the swift flows of important information , allowing an overall commander
to have a very clear idea of just what his widely distributed swarming forces wereup to. No wonder, both Generals Patton and Rommel admired and studied the
principles employed by Subotai, the military commander of the Mongol invasion
of Europe in 1240. 4
Naval Swarming. The German use of U-boat Wolf pack tactics during the
battle of Atlantic (1939-1945) is a naval example of swarming. Packs of five or
more U-boats would converge on a convey of transport ships and their destroyer
escorts, independently attacking from multiple directions. Radio communications
allowed the Germans to perfect the tactics of the Wolfpack. U-boats ordered to the
area of reported sighting would spread out on a scouting line across the expected
convoy route. The first boat to sight the convoy would begin shadowing over the
edge of the horizon by day, closing at dusk. The U-boat command located at
France would then direct all adjacent boats (within hundreds of miles) to
rendezvous with the shadowing U-boat. Once assembled near the convoy, U-boat
woolf packs performed to attack simultaneously from multiple directions at night.
Each U-boat CO attacked at best he could without attempting to co-ordinate
his movements with those of any other boats. During the attack, no senior officer
was in tactical command.
Battle of Britain. Defensive swarming tactics was used by British Fighter
Command to play a decisive role in the Battle of Britain. The concept of operation
was simple. Radar would be used to provide warning of the size and direction of a
German attack, then word would go out to widely dispersed air bases, from which
the defenders would swarm to the attack. Over a period of months, this swarming
defense decisively defeated the German Luftwaffe. The British focused on
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
5/20
information flows as the key to swarming and pioneered both modern electronic
warfare and some aspects of Information Warfare in their efforts to counter
German air attacks.
As far the use of airpower for tactical offensive swarming during World War II, the
best example is provided by the Japanese Kamikaze attacks on US Navy vessels,
where American casualties from Kamikaze attacks came close to those incurred in
ground fighting. Kamikaze tactics consisted of simultaneously descending upon an
enemy ship or ships from multiple directions, overloading the defense of the target
vessel.
Korean War. After World War II, the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army
(PLAs) intervention in the Korean War late in 1950 also featured a great deal of
swarming. UN Forces found themselves, again and again, surrounded by North
Korean and Chinese Forces that packetized themselves and infiltrated wellbeyond any recognized front then attacked from all directions. It is a matter of
conjecture whether the Chinese used swarming during India-China War of 1962.
Infiltration, envelopment and multidirectional attacks are all part of swarming
technique.
Swarming in Peace Operations Black Hawk is Down. On the night of October
3, 1993, an assault force of 75 US Rangers and 40 Delta Force commandos fast
roped from 17 helicopters onto a gathering of Habr Gidr clan leaders in the heart of
Mogadishu, Somalia. The targets were two top lieutenants of warlord Mohamed
Farrah Iideed. The plan was to secure any hostages and transport them 3 miles
back to the base on a convoy of 12 vehicles. What was supposed to be a hostage
snatch mission turned into an 18 hour firefight over two Black Hawk helicopter
crash sites. Eighteen Americans were killed in the fighting . The lightly armed
Somali tribesmen were fighting the Americans by using Rocket-Propelled Grenade
(RPG), fires against the helicopters, ambushes and large number of Somali
National Army (SNA) militiamen to swarm the Americans with sheer numbers.
The decisive factors that led to a swarmer victory appear to be elusiveness (based
on concealment) and superior knowledge of the terrain.
DOCTRINE OF SWARMING.
The Information Revolution is altering the ways people fight across the spectrum
of conflict. It is doing so mainly by improving the power and performance of small
units and by favouring the rise of network forms of organization, doctrine and
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
6/20
strategy while making life difficult for large, traditional hierarchical forms.
Swarming is already
emerging as an appropriate doctrine for networked forces to wage information age
conflict. Robust connectivity allows for the creation of a multitude of small units
of maneuver, networked in such a fashion that, although they might be widely
distributed, they can still come together at will and repeatedly, to deal resounding
blows to their adversaries. The technical tools to support swarming already exist.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, JSTARS, Satellites, Precision Guided Munitions and
very advanced and secure communications have already proved their mettle in
conflicts from Gulf War to Kosovo and now the Afghan War. Against a
conventional adversary on a traditional battlefield the swarming of directed fires
should have devastating effects. Against an elusive opponent trying to fight in an
irregular fashion the coordinated swarming of networked forces should enable
them to defeat the enemy in detail. However, even a networked Swarm force will
have a hard time dealing with guerilla forces enjoying the support of a populacethat can sustain, hide and nurture them. We can see examples of swarming by non
military action like International Campaigns to Ban Landmines (ICBL). It grew
into an effective global political movement bringing the Nobel Peace Prize by
using the Internet to assemble and coordinate a complex network of supporting
NGOs and governments. 5
The new kinds of small military units called pods that can operate in clusters
can be developed. These units should be dispersed to mitigate the risks posed by
hostile fire. Possessing both mobility and situational knowledge, they will be able
to strike, swarming from all directions, either with fire or in force.
It is clear that swarming cannot be affected in the absence of a fully integrated
surveillance and communication system. The command, control, communications,
computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (c4isr) system may
Generate so much information that it will be necessary to come up with new ways
to segregate the often time-urgent need of the operational unit from the higher
commanders need to retain the big picture view of what in going on. The office
of the secretary of defense (osd) and us army deputy chief of staff for operationsand plans (dcsops) have conducted wargames that explore swarming operational
concepts. Their view of swarming is that maneuver forces allow enemy forces to
advance fairly unaware until they are attacked from all directions simultaneously.
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
7/20
The swarm concept is built on the principles of complexity theory. It assumes that
own forces have to operate autonomously and adaptively accordingly to the overall
mission. The concept relies on a highly complex, artificial intelligence (ai)
assisted, theater wide c4isr architecture to coordinate fire support, information and
logistics. Swarm tactical maneuver units use precise, organic fire, information
operations and indirect strikes to cause enemy loss of cohesion and destruction.
Swarming friendly units operate among enemy units, striking exposed flanks
And critical command and control (c2), combat support (cs) and combat service
support(css) nodes in such a way that the enemy must constantly try to multiple
new threats emerging from constantly changing axis. Massing of fire occurs
more often than massing of forces. Since the doctrine of swarming is still in
conceptual stage its effect on command and organization, logistics, communication
and technology and tactics are speculated below.
Command and organization. A typical infantry division includes three infantry
brigades, one artillery brigade, one armoured regiment and other combat arms units
like recce and support battalion, engineer regiment, signal regiment, air defence
and electronic warfare elements, and services units like asc, eme, ordnance,
medical, provost, postal etc. All of these units provide critical functions. Finding
an alternative way to provide this support for a swarm unit would be critical to
success in the battlefield.
Organization and command are directly related. The complexity of the command
problem grows with the number of units, the power and range of their weapons, the
speed at which they move and the space over which they operate. A military that
wants to conduct swarming, either of fire or in force, will have to habituate itself to
the devolution of great deal of command and control authority to a large number of
small maneuver units. These units will be widely dispersed throughout the
battlefield and will likely represent all the various sea, air and ground services
putting a premium on inter service co-ordination for purpose of both sharing
information and combining in joint task groups.
Martin libicki of national defense university, usa, an acknowledged expert on
information warfare has discussed in details about the challenge of changing the
military from the large and the few to the small and many. 6
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
8/20
Since the large and few military formations are around for centuries and have
functioned reasonably well with the exception of guerilla and other irregular wars
there would be lot of resistance for radical organization change. 7 The small and
the many organizations would create nightmares for support services functions.
For examples, where do mobile surgical units setup their organization? Loss of
more soldiers is a real risk. Would moving to a military of the many and the
small jeopardize or compromise this multipurpose way of war? The real issue is
whether heaviness is a virtue in itself or can it be replaced or compensated for by
swarm of supporting fire from air and naval assets. In the age of acute sensing
capabilities the tremendous accuracy of Precision Guided Munitions (PGM)
suggests that large military formations and the logistics on which they depend are
becoming increasingly vulnerable.
Swarming would never work with the hierarchical command structure because an
extremely flat organization would place too much of demand on the overallcommander. Achieving superior situational awareness may tempt higher level
commanders to exercise more control over tactical commanders on the scene an
urge that should be resisted. There is a natural tension between the decentralised
system ofauftragstaktikand the very centralized command possibilities of the all-
encompassing c4i system. The small unit leaders have to assume high initiative and
responsibility. Junior leaders should be capable of much higher levels of command
and responsibility. It would require high quality personnel both at officer and pbor
level. Even today due to hard life in army, growing gap between civilian and
military pay and declining interest in matters military amongst quality youth, the
problem of human resources do not get the attention it deserves.
Logistics. The most difficult task would be to provide logistics support to the
swarming force in a widely distributed battlefield in which friendly and enemy
forces are intermingled. The demands on logistics differ sharply from the
prevailing practice which have always emphasized the provision of mass
munitions, transport and manpower. For swarming these goods and services will
have to be delivered not to fixed locations but to an ever shifting set of small forces
almost all constantly on the move. It would require new thinking about means ofdistribution, the smaller size of swarm may mean that the amount of supplies that
have to be delivered will be much lower.
The us army is using the concept of focused logistics by using information
technology (it) and provide supplies such as food, fuel, equipment and
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
9/20
ammunition. In the past, inventories have been large because units hoarded
supplies just in case the items they ordered either took too long to arrive or never
showed up. Rather than just in case focused logistics seeks to respond to real
time battlefield demand and move in the direction of a just-in-time philosophy.
Some of the measures to overcome this critical problem are :-
(a) Spread the burden. Networked units can co-ordinate their supply
needs, using situational awareness to transfer and share between units.
(b) Use common parts and systems.
(c) Use precise aerial resupply when possible, including unmanned
delivery systems such as gps - guided parafoils.
(d) Use prepositioned supply depots.
(e) Create combat service support units that operate with particular
clusters of swarm units.
(f) Alternate ways to treat and evacuate casualties such as telemedicine
needs to be perfected.
TECHNOLOGY AND COMMUNICATIONS.
The technological requirements for a concept like battleswarm to succeed are
onerous. Serious advances are required in the management of information. Speed
of processing information has to be improved. How to use the information has to
be
Learnt, sifting of important information from the non essential and who will know
what at which stage of the battle would be the key. The robustness of
communications to pods and clusters has to be ensured against any kind ofdisruption. The flow of information may be disrupted by the following means :-
* From classic Electronic Warfare jamming to more sophisticated
Computer Network Attacks.
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
10/20
* Air burst of nuclear weapon at high altitude by generating Electro
Magnetic Pulse (EMP).
* High Power Microwave Weapons (HPMW).
* Aerial bombardment.
* Radio frequency bombs and grenades.
* Corruption of data and exploitation by enemy.
Information Warfare will be the key to all such future military operations.
COMMUNICATIONS. 8 the communication system for such a dispersed
network of pods and clusters will have to be a mobile mesh communicationnetwork with high data throughput and survivability. The defense advanced
research project agency (darpa) is already developing mobile wireless
communication system for widely dispersed tactical units. The equipment will be
capable of supporting a tactical internet based on dismounted soldier and mounted
vehicle nodes without having to rely on a fixed ground infrastructure. The most
promising part of the system would be a mobile mesh network of communications
nodes that are able to buffer, store and route packets of information. Such a system
would be capable of non line of sight transmission - a critical requirement of urban
warfare. The military must develop such systems themselves or fund commercial
enterprises because the market is unlikely to produce a mobile wireless system
with the necessary anti jamming, security, and data rate standards on its own.
Commercial communications systems such as digital cellular systems are designed
to achieve optimal spectral efficiency (bits per second per hertz) which is usually
incompatible with good security characteristics such as low probability of
detection.
Fire Support.9 Sophisticated ISR and target acquisition capabilities will be
essential for detecting and tracking enemy ground formations. Swarm units will
need to rely on multiple layers of ground, airborne and space based sensors and a
robust Tactical Internet. The key to effective fires on all battlefields will be
accurate and dependable target location. Rapidly responsive indirect precision
fires delivered by rockets, missiles, naval gunfire or air must be available. Mostly
swarming operation will be a joint operation. Swarm units should possess both
organic stand off precision munitions and a capability to call for indirect fire
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
11/20
assets. Indirect munitions will need to be GPS guided and capable of in-flight
corrective maneuvering. A mobile light force would need a mix of direct and
indirect fires. We should not expect small teams to get along without significant
organic fire power specially if weather is cloudy or the terrain masks the
movement of ground forces.
TACTICS.
Swarming can be defined as Systematic pulsing of force and/or fire by dispersed,
internetted units, so as to strike the adversary from all directions simultaneously.10
Swarming can be conceptually broken into four stages : locate, converge, attack
and disperse. Swarm networks must be able to come together rapidly and
stealthily on a target, then redisperse and be able to recombine for a new pulse.
The phenomenon of swarm effect is greater than the sum of its parts.
Operational Concept of Swarm. 11 The friendly units operate as a very
demassed, porous force. The effects of friendly ground forces are supported and
enhanced by long range precision strikes that are called in on designated targets by
individual sub units. The salient effect of the swarm is its synergy - the
combination of direct fire and engagement by highly mobile, relatively light force
and devastating fires from long range precision strike and Information Warfare
assets called in by the ground units.
Early in the operations the primary activity of ground forces is surveillance and
target acquisition. Critical operational and tactical intelligence is gathered for
friendly long range precision strike assets. Friendly maneuver units begin to
engulf the enemy force. Over a relatively short period of time (less than a week)
the enemy force is so severely attrited by the 360 degree, three dimensional
operations of the Swarm that its operational plan is utterly defeated. The effect of
the whole demassed friendly Swarm force is, notionally, significantly greater than
the sum of its numerous company sized parts.
The action of individual sub units making up the Swarms are tightly coordinated.,
but this coordination does not come from above. Co-ordination between theindividual units is governed by the units themselves, extensively but laterally and
essentially ad hoc as necessary to exploit opportunities that develop on the fast
paced battlefield.
It is not clear that a widely dispersed swarm operation will always by itself be
enough to defeat a larger, more conventionally organized enemy force, even
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
12/20
granted the Swarms significant advantage in tactical and organizational agility.
The Swarm operation may have to be supplemented or followed by more
conventional actions and/or additional forces or assets. As the enemy would be so
unhinged by the initial Swarming operations that the latter operations can be
executed with much greater certainty, and rapidity and probably far fewer
casualties.
The swarming concept demands a need for unit cohesion well beyond what is there
today. Unit have to be trained and remain together populated by individuals who
know intuitively how the other member of the unit fight, their strengths and
weaknesses etc. There is a need of soldiers and leaders who excel as independent ,
adaptive thinkers who can take mission- type orders and interpret them on the fly
to exploit opportunities as they arise.
Tactical Concepts of Swarm. The employment of small, fast, lethal groundcombat units enables the friendly forces to use maneuver to effect fires with great
agility. Friendly maneuver units sortie to critical points individually, execute
their own assigned mission, then disengage, re-supply and move to the next
mission. These pulsed sorties are repeated by multiple, independently operating
friendly units to produce a constant rain of deadly blows at precisely chosen
vulnerable points. Friendly units Swarm not only at enemys flanks and rear but
also among and between enemy force elements, enabled by superior awareness and
Information Warfare to continually operate and intermittently mass. The ultimate
effect is complete loss of psychological and physical cohesion of the enemy.
Enemy is rendered incapable of coalescing to present a strong front or mount a co-
ordinated counter attack.
Demassing friendly maneuver units enhances force protection i.e. relying on
numerous small units in a sortie mode reduces the need for dedicated assets for
force protection at the unit level as the small size, mobility and short engagement
times of each unit are themselves protective measures. However, air and missile
defence should be integrated into tactical operations at the lowest echelon possible.
As friendly units cycle in and out of combat resting, replenishing and
reconstituting in transient havens at unit- specific intervals outside enemy reach - itmay not be necessary to maintain operational reserve resources, though individual
units can constitute temporary pools of uncommitted forces. Air force assets
would not provide Close Air Support (CAS), friendly maneuver units would
provide their own CAS with organic aviation and fires. Navy forces provide
theater missile defence and long range precision strikes.
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
13/20
Some Critical Issues
In the future war, war will not be waged by armies but by groups
whom today we call terrorists, guerillas, bandits and robbers,
but who will undoubtedly hit on more formal titles to describe
themselves.
- Martin Van Creveld 12
Low Intensity Conflict Operation (LICO).It is most likely that swarming will
feature in LICO in near future. It is a natural doctrine for networked organizations
to apply. Swarming is also attractive because with the ease with which those who
apply it can shift from offense to defence, and vice versa. The Chechan bands of
fighters that defeated the Russian Army in the 1994-96 war used swarming both
offensively and defensively and were highly effective at both. 13
Various terrorists are proving adept at networking and in some cases swarming.
For example Hizbollah uses a swarming approach to deal with Israeli Commando
raids in Southern Lebanon. This approach is based over a general instruction to
Hizbollahs widely distributed units to converge on any intruders in any given
area.
No central leadership is required and Israeli Commandos themselves not
swarming, but trying to engage in Precision Strikes on specific, limited targets-
have found themselves more than once facing swarming attacks from which they
escape but only with serious loss. The inability of the Israeli military to deal with
these Hizbollah swarms may even have contributed to Israels recent unilateral
withdrawal from southern Lebanon. In counter insurgency operation the Swarm
units are likely to be more effective than hierarchical division based units. Swarm
units deployed as a network is more likely to find and finish elusive terrorists. It
takes elusiveness to counter elusiveness.
For intelligence gathering the space and air assets such as Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAV) , Satellite, high altitude aircraft and aircrafts like JointSurveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) will still be limited in
their ability to detect small ground forces in difficult terrain such as mountain,
heavy forests, cities and jungle and in inclement weather. A Swarm force can
physically cover a geographic area and is likely to pick up battlefield intelligence.
A network of swarm units dispersed over an area can perform all types of counter
insurgency operation and constantly gather human intelligence. Swarm units on
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
14/20
ground are natural sensors for detecting low signature terrorist outfits. Once a
terrorist group is detected all adjacent swarm units can seal off the area and take
appropriate action.
Terrorism.14
In a perverse way the black Tuesday 11 Sep attack in which four civil aircrafts
were converted into cruise missiles homed on to their targets by using RMA
technologies may be considered horrifyingly successful models of swarming.
Information age terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda might pursue a war paradigm,
developing capabilities to strike multiple targets from multiple directions in
swarming campaigns. These terrorists used Internet E-Mail and Websites for their
communication, sometimes relying on encryption and steganogra phy for security.
Special Report : Al-Queda, Janes Intelligence Review, august 2001, pp42-51provides an extensive analysis of al-Qaedas organizational structure, history and
activities. The analysis view al-Qaeda as a kind of conglomerates with both
formal vertical and informal horizontal elements, making it a partial hybrid of
hierarchical and network forms of organization.
Command, Control, Communications and IT. Increase in speed and reduction
in the cost of communications, increases in bandwidth, vastly expanded
connectivity and the integration of communications and computing technologies
allow the establishment of networks is the following critical ways :-
* Reduced transmission time enabled dispersed organizations to
communicate and coordinate their tasks.
* Significant reduction in cost of communications allows information
intensive organizational designs such as networks to become viable.
* Substantially increased the scope and complexity of the information
that can be shared.
Counter terrorism policy makers should keep the following in mind which
formulating strategies to counter terrorism :-
* Monitor change in the use of IT by terrorist groups, differentiating
between organizational and offensive capabilities.
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
15/20
* Target information flows.
* Deter IT-based offensive IO through better infrastructure protection.
* Beat networked terrorists at their own game. It takes network to fight
networks.
Peace Operation. Peace operations demand flexibility. Swarm units will make
up a flatter, more flexible organization than the division based army of today.
Swarm units are more modular and they can be reconfigured more easily than
conventional units. The structure of the typical Army division based task force
today is not well suited for peace operations, which emphasize policing, building,
transporting and facilitating rather than combat arms function.
The US intervention in Haiti during the 1990s featured a good bit of Swarming ofthe peaceful variety with relatively small numbers of American forces blanketing
the potential trouble spots throughout the country with their deterring presence.
Another benefit of this kind of deployment is closer, better relation with
humanitarian agencies and NGOs, so very important in todays global village
scenario. A swarming forces smaller size should also generate less local
resentment, making coordination with NGOs easier while the pods and clusters
will still have considerable punch at hand or on call.
Limitation of Swarming. As with any tactic or strategy Swarming will not
work against all types of opponents in all situations. Deliberate swarming attacks
against fixed, defensive positions may not succeed when the defender has had time
to fortify those positions and place extensive minefields. Swarm units with little
logistics support may not have the capability to clear and detect minefields quickly.
Recent Developments.
With the concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) gaining ground
experiments are being made in advanced western countries specially USA as to
how the information technology advantage and the Information edge can befurther exploited by all the services. Some of the advanced conceptual initiatives
are as under :-
(a) US Army After Next (AAN). Encouraged by Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) of US Army. It empowers light forces to be able to
take on much heavier (armoured) opposition .
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
16/20
(b) Hunter Warrior. US Marine Corps is working on Hunter Warrior/
Sea Dragon advanced war fighting experiments. They share AANs
technical and organizational advances but add to the objective of giving such
a force an offensive punch.
(c) Force XXI (USA).The US Army is trying to integrate the
technological advancements in its army. However, no major organizational
changes have been envisaged.
(d) Fleet Battle Experiment Bravo (US Navy). Existing technology
with new organizations are being experimented.
(e) Air Expeditionary Force (USAF). US Air Force has pioneered a
concept of Air Expeditionary Force that pulls all the elements together undera Composite Wing in which fighters and bombers and other aircraft types
may be closely joined, specifically tailored to the needs of a particular
theater or mission.
(f) Urban Swarm (US Marine Corps). In this concept very small units
known as Infestation teams get to operate in a highly decentralized but
extensively internetted fashion.
Some of the new doctrinal thinking in informed circles are as under :-
(a) Convergent Assault . Relies heavily on helicopter for tactical
mobility for simultaneous and omni directional attack on heavier adversary
forces.
(b) Nodal Warfare. Based on striking at key enemy pressure points
specially Command Control nodes. A network like concept where
swarming can be both nodal and nodeless.
(c) Network Centric Warfare (NCW). 15 The concept of Network
Centric Warfare is gaining ground in US Navy circles after the publication
of seminal article on NCW by Vice Admiral Cebrowski. It allows for a
great deal of connectivity and lot of decentralization of decision making
authority. It views the battlefield as networks with grids of sensors, shooters
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
17/20
and information overlaid. Swarming may well be a natural fit to Network
Centric Warfare.
(d) System of Systems. 16 Admiral William A Owens used the term
system of systems from three technology areas Sensors, C4I and Precision
Guided Munitions (PGM) : These will interact synergistically on future
battlefields.
Battleswarm in Kashmir Valley - An Indian Hypothesis.17
The concept of swarming can be successfully adopted in lico scenario. Most of the
technological tools of swarming already exists today. These are :-
(a) Computers.
(b) UAVs.
(c) PGMs.
(d) Satellites.
(e) Rashtriya Rifles (RR) Troops.
For the successful operation to take place following actions would have to betaken :-
(a) Intelligence Building. Using Information Operations as part of the
larger canvas of Information Warfare, the RR Sector Headquarters (HQ) as
also the higher headquarters and PMF/CPO HQ would be on one grid about
all background details of the terrorist acts, habits, strengths, weaknesses,
gang details and so on. Voice prints and Direction Finding (DF) equipment
as also code breaking capability would expose his movements and to an
extent his plans. However, human intelligence (Humint) in this operation
would be extremely important. The movement would be tracked accurately
on radio and by UAV data downlinked in real time. This information would
be available upto sector HQ level. Thereafter, sharing of information would
be restricted strictly on need to know basis.
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
18/20
(b) Plan. The attack plan would be based on specific hard intelligence
and will involve not more than two composite RR companies, with one RR
company being actually involved and one as reserve with suitable PMF/CPO
accretions. The plan will involve deception IW operations.
The leadership skills will be paramount in troop selection, routing,
placement of cordon not around a 600 house village but a small portion of
the mohalla where the gang is hiding. An air of quiet confidence would
prevail in all ranks due to minute to minute situational awareness generated
by secure, portable communications backed by at least a 50% chance of
success. Senior leaders up the line will exercise the restraint expected from
them in decentralized command and interfere only when necessary.
(c) Execution. Well armed, well protected with Commercially Off The
Shelf (COTS) procured light protection gear, troops communicating with thelatest communication equipment using GPS would Swarm the isolated
locality and strikes simultaneously from all directions. Collateral damage
would be minimal. Human rights are not violated, Barkha Datts and Praful
Bidwais get going since situational awareness has kept everyone up the line
informed. Any casualty would be evacuated within 10 minutes of injury by
Air Force Helicopters with night flying capability. The SSP, part of the joint
operations would confirm the identity of the militant.
CONCLUSION
Is swarming a realistic possibility as the next war fighting doctrine? Will it replace
Maneuvers warfare and air land battle doctrine ? Will friction and fog of war
allow swarming to succeed ? A radical departure from existing doctrine would
require many issues like tactics, logistics, command and organization to be worked
out, rigorous research, gaming, simulation followed by unit level exercises are
required to be conducted before a prototype of swarm force can be arrived at. We
cannot entirely discard the mass and depth of firepower afforded by the more
traditional doctrines of warfare. However, we must clearly continue to move
forward in exploring information warfare as an integral part of our strategy,
operational art and tactical execution.
-
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
19/20
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, in Authers Camp : Preparing for
Conflict in The Information Age, Santa Monica, ca : Rand, MR-800-OSD/RC,
1997.
2. The rise of network based organization is discussed in Arquilla and
Ronfeldt, the Advent of Netwar, Santa Monica, ca, Rand, MR-789-OSD, 1996.
3. Sean J A Edwards, Swarming on the Battlefield : Past, Present and Future,
Santa Monica, ca : Rand, 2000, p11.
4. Chambers, James, The Devils Horsemen, The Mongol Invasion of Europe,
New York : Atheneum, 1979, p66.
5. At Santa Fe Institute and Center for Naval Analysts Efforts have been made
to model and simulate the behavior of various kinds of swarm systems. See
materials at www.swarm.org and www.cna.org/isaac.
6. Libicki Martin, The Mesh and The Net : Speculations on Armed conflict in a
time of free silicon, Washington DC : National Defense University press, 1994.
7. Col PK Mallick, Management of change in Armed Forces, yet unpublished
article.
8. Philip M Feldman, Emerging Commercial Mobile Wireless Technology and
Standards ; Suitable for the Army ? Santa Monica, ca: Rand, MR-960-a-1998.
9. Matsumara, John, Randall Steeb, Thomas Herbert, Scot Eisenhard, John
Gordon, Mark Lees and Gail Halverson, the Army After Next : Exploring New
concepts and technologies for the light battle force, santa monica; rand,1999.
10. John Arquilla and David Randall, Swarming, The Future of Conflict,
National Defense Research Institute, Rand, MR-1100-osd.
http://www.swarm.org/http://www.cna.org/isaachttp://www.cna.org/isaachttp://www.swarm.org/ -
8/9/2019 Battle Swarm
20/20
11. How we fight manual : a dominating maneuver doctrinal essay RMA
experimentation workshop 4, The Strategic Assessment Center, available in
Internet.
12. Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation Of War, New York : The Free
Press, 1991.
13. Arquilla John, and Theodore Karasik, Chechnya : A Glimpse of Future
Conflict ? Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol 22, No 3, Jul-Sep 1999.
14. Michele Zanini and Sean Ja Edwards, The Networking of Terror in the
Information Age, Rand Research paper countering the new terrorism.
15. Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and John Garstka, Network Centric
Warfare, proceedings of the united state naval institute, vol 124, no 1, jan 1998, pp
28-35.
16. Admiral William A Owens , the Emerging System of Systems, Military
Review, May- Jun 1995, pp 15-19.
17. Brig RS MEHTA, VSM, thesis submitted to the national defence collagenew delhi (41st course) on the emerging RMA and Strategic Option for India and
discussion between the author and BRIG RS MEHTA, VSM.
Published in Trishul, October 2002 issue.