battle swarm

8/9/2019 Battle Swarm

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BATTLESWARM A NEW FORM OF WARFARE

In todays world, the main threat to many states, includingspecifically the US, no longer comes from other states.

Instead, it comes from small groups and other organisations

which are not states. Either we make the necessary

changes and face them today, or what is commonly

known as the modern world will lose all sense of security

and will dwell in perpetual fear.

- Martin Van Creveld

Introduction

Since the advent of warfare the main effort to win the war has been to put

maximum combat power at the decisive point of the battlefield. In the

information age with rapid advancements in Information Technology (IT) this has

become all the more relevant since the forms of warfare are undergoing

phenomenal changes. While the conventional warfare is not a thing of the past, the

asymmetric form of warfare, the Low Intensity Conflict Operations, Peace

Operations, Small Scale Contingencies are also becoming important.

In the business world IT has triggered changes in organization from hierarchical tonetworked forms of organization. The middle layers of management are flattened.

There is considerable discussion in informed circles in Armed Forces all over the

world about how the networked forms of organization, doctrine and strategy could

be adopted to meet the changing requirements of information revolution and

warfare among the entire spectrum of conflict.

The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the increasing

lethality of cluster and Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) make it imperative that

future ground forces remain dispersed as much as possible. This has lead todiscussions on concepts such as dispersed operations, networking and greater

autonomy for small units. One important part of this doctrinal discussion relates to

the feasibility and utility of Swarm tactics which would have such small,

distributed units and maneuverable fires converge rapidly on particular targets.


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Two researchers form American Think Tank, Rand Corporation have been

consistently proposing that the information revolution favours the rise of network

based organizations and the swarming will be the major mode of conflict in the

future. They propose that the US Armys Air Land Battle doctrine may need to

evolve to a doctrine based on swarming. Their swarming proposal named Battle

Swarm is still not completely formulated but does suggest that smaller and more

maneuverable tactical units be deployed in dispersed networks and trained to use

swarming as an operational concept. 1,2

Historical Examples.

Examples of swarming can be found throughout military history from the

numerous horse-archer battles in ancient times to the urban street skirmishes in

Mogadishu,Somalia in 1993. Swarming has been employed at the tactical and operational

levels, both defensively and offensively in cities, deserts, jungles and oceans, by

conventional and unconventional forces. Some examples of historical swarming

cases are given in figure 1. 3

Battle Terrain Swarmer

Mission

:

Defenceor

Offensiv

e ?

Swarmer

Descripition

Non

Swarmer

Descriptio

n

Uniqueness

of Example

Mongols vs

Eastern

Europeans

Battle of

Liegnitz, 1241

Steppe,

Plains

Offensiv

e

Light and

Heavy

Cavalry

Heavy

Cavalry

and

Infantry

Tactical and

Operational

Swarming

Napoleonic

Corps vsAustrians.

Ulm

Campaign180

5

Woods,

Mountains, Steppe

Both The tactical

unit wascombined

arms (masket

infantry,

cavalry,

horse

artillery) : the

Combined

Arms(masket

infantry,

cavalry,

horse

artillery)

Operational

SwarmingCombined

with

Conventiona

l tactics.


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operational

unit was the

semi

autonomous

corpsGerman U

Boats vs

British

Convoys,

1939-1945

Naval Offensiv

e

Woolfpacks

of U-Boats

Convoys

of

merchant

ships

guarded by

destroyer

teams

Naval

example

Somalia vs

US

Commandos,Mogadishu,

Oct 3-4 1993

Urban Both Tribal Militia

(Light

Infantry)

Light

Infantry,

Lightvehicles,

helicopter

gunships

Peace

Making

Operation

Fig 1 : Historical Swarming Cases

Increasing battlefield dispersion is a natural historical trend, caused by increasing

lethality of weapons. Fig 2 shows the Battlefield Dispersion from Antiquity to the

Present.

Area

Occupied

By

Deployed

Forces

1,00,000

strong

Antiquity Napoleonic

Wars

World

War I

World

War II

1973

Arab

-Israel

War

Gulf

War

Square Km 1 20.12 248 2,750 4,000 2,13,000

Front (Km) 6.67 8.05 14 48 57 400Depth (KM) 0.15 2.50 17 57 70 533

Men Per Sq

Km

1,00,000 4790 404 36 25 2.34

Sq Meter

Per Man

10 200 2,475 27,500 40,000 4,26,400


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Fig 2 : Battlefield Dispersion

The Mongols, The Ultimate Swarmers. The Mongols are the ultimate examples

of swarming because they swarmed at both tactical and operational levels. In the

early thirteenth century, Genghis Khan defeated all his neighbours. Eventually

Mongol conquests stretched from Korea to Germany, the largest continuous land

empire ever. They combined the mobility of the horse with the rapid long range

fire of their horn bows to create an imposing ability to swarm either fire or forces.

To this capability they added a very decentralized organizational structure that

gave great leeway to local commanders. They also feigned retreats, often luring

their opponents into loosening their battle formations while in pursuit only to

turn and Swarm upon them at an appropriate time. Finally, their arrow riders

assured the swift flows of important information , allowing an overall commander

to have a very clear idea of just what his widely distributed swarming forces wereup to. No wonder, both Generals Patton and Rommel admired and studied the

principles employed by Subotai, the military commander of the Mongol invasion

of Europe in 1240. 4

Naval Swarming. The German use of U-boat Wolf pack tactics during the

battle of Atlantic (1939-1945) is a naval example of swarming. Packs of five or

more U-boats would converge on a convey of transport ships and their destroyer

escorts, independently attacking from multiple directions. Radio communications

allowed the Germans to perfect the tactics of the Wolfpack. U-boats ordered to the

area of reported sighting would spread out on a scouting line across the expected

convoy route. The first boat to sight the convoy would begin shadowing over the

edge of the horizon by day, closing at dusk. The U-boat command located at

France would then direct all adjacent boats (within hundreds of miles) to

rendezvous with the shadowing U-boat. Once assembled near the convoy, U-boat

woolf packs performed to attack simultaneously from multiple directions at night.

Each U-boat CO attacked at best he could without attempting to co-ordinate

his movements with those of any other boats. During the attack, no senior officer

was in tactical command.

Battle of Britain. Defensive swarming tactics was used by British Fighter

Command to play a decisive role in the Battle of Britain. The concept of operation

was simple. Radar would be used to provide warning of the size and direction of a

German attack, then word would go out to widely dispersed air bases, from which

the defenders would swarm to the attack. Over a period of months, this swarming

defense decisively defeated the German Luftwaffe. The British focused on


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information flows as the key to swarming and pioneered both modern electronic

warfare and some aspects of Information Warfare in their efforts to counter

German air attacks.

As far the use of airpower for tactical offensive swarming during World War II, the

best example is provided by the Japanese Kamikaze attacks on US Navy vessels,

where American casualties from Kamikaze attacks came close to those incurred in

ground fighting. Kamikaze tactics consisted of simultaneously descending upon an

enemy ship or ships from multiple directions, overloading the defense of the target

vessel.

Korean War. After World War II, the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army

(PLAs) intervention in the Korean War late in 1950 also featured a great deal of

swarming. UN Forces found themselves, again and again, surrounded by North

Korean and Chinese Forces that packetized themselves and infiltrated wellbeyond any recognized front then attacked from all directions. It is a matter of

conjecture whether the Chinese used swarming during India-China War of 1962.

Infiltration, envelopment and multidirectional attacks are all part of swarming

technique.

Swarming in Peace Operations Black Hawk is Down. On the night of October

3, 1993, an assault force of 75 US Rangers and 40 Delta Force commandos fast

roped from 17 helicopters onto a gathering of Habr Gidr clan leaders in the heart of

Mogadishu, Somalia. The targets were two top lieutenants of warlord Mohamed

Farrah Iideed. The plan was to secure any hostages and transport them 3 miles

back to the base on a convoy of 12 vehicles. What was supposed to be a hostage

snatch mission turned into an 18 hour firefight over two Black Hawk helicopter

crash sites. Eighteen Americans were killed in the fighting . The lightly armed

Somali tribesmen were fighting the Americans by using Rocket-Propelled Grenade

(RPG), fires against the helicopters, ambushes and large number of Somali

National Army (SNA) militiamen to swarm the Americans with sheer numbers.

The decisive factors that led to a swarmer victory appear to be elusiveness (based

on concealment) and superior knowledge of the terrain.

DOCTRINE OF SWARMING.

The Information Revolution is altering the ways people fight across the spectrum

of conflict. It is doing so mainly by improving the power and performance of small

units and by favouring the rise of network forms of organization, doctrine and


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strategy while making life difficult for large, traditional hierarchical forms.

Swarming is already

emerging as an appropriate doctrine for networked forces to wage information age

conflict. Robust connectivity allows for the creation of a multitude of small units

of maneuver, networked in such a fashion that, although they might be widely

distributed, they can still come together at will and repeatedly, to deal resounding

blows to their adversaries. The technical tools to support swarming already exist.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, JSTARS, Satellites, Precision Guided Munitions and

very advanced and secure communications have already proved their mettle in

conflicts from Gulf War to Kosovo and now the Afghan War. Against a

conventional adversary on a traditional battlefield the swarming of directed fires

should have devastating effects. Against an elusive opponent trying to fight in an

irregular fashion the coordinated swarming of networked forces should enable

them to defeat the enemy in detail. However, even a networked Swarm force will

have a hard time dealing with guerilla forces enjoying the support of a populacethat can sustain, hide and nurture them. We can see examples of swarming by non

military action like International Campaigns to Ban Landmines (ICBL). It grew

into an effective global political movement bringing the Nobel Peace Prize by

using the Internet to assemble and coordinate a complex network of supporting

NGOs and governments. 5

The new kinds of small military units called pods that can operate in clusters

can be developed. These units should be dispersed to mitigate the risks posed by

hostile fire. Possessing both mobility and situational knowledge, they will be able

to strike, swarming from all directions, either with fire or in force.

It is clear that swarming cannot be affected in the absence of a fully integrated

surveillance and communication system. The command, control, communications,

computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (c4isr) system may

Generate so much information that it will be necessary to come up with new ways

to segregate the often time-urgent need of the operational unit from the higher

commanders need to retain the big picture view of what in going on. The office

of the secretary of defense (osd) and us army deputy chief of staff for operationsand plans (dcsops) have conducted wargames that explore swarming operational

concepts. Their view of swarming is that maneuver forces allow enemy forces to

advance fairly unaware until they are attacked from all directions simultaneously.


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The swarm concept is built on the principles of complexity theory. It assumes that

own forces have to operate autonomously and adaptively accordingly to the overall

mission. The concept relies on a highly complex, artificial intelligence (ai)

assisted, theater wide c4isr architecture to coordinate fire support, information and

logistics. Swarm tactical maneuver units use precise, organic fire, information

operations and indirect strikes to cause enemy loss of cohesion and destruction.

Swarming friendly units operate among enemy units, striking exposed flanks

And critical command and control (c2), combat support (cs) and combat service

support(css) nodes in such a way that the enemy must constantly try to multiple

new threats emerging from constantly changing axis. Massing of fire occurs

more often than massing of forces. Since the doctrine of swarming is still in

conceptual stage its effect on command and organization, logistics, communication

and technology and tactics are speculated below.

Command and organization. A typical infantry division includes three infantry

brigades, one artillery brigade, one armoured regiment and other combat arms units

like recce and support battalion, engineer regiment, signal regiment, air defence

and electronic warfare elements, and services units like asc, eme, ordnance,

medical, provost, postal etc. All of these units provide critical functions. Finding

an alternative way to provide this support for a swarm unit would be critical to

success in the battlefield.

Organization and command are directly related. The complexity of the command

problem grows with the number of units, the power and range of their weapons, the

speed at which they move and the space over which they operate. A military that

wants to conduct swarming, either of fire or in force, will have to habituate itself to

the devolution of great deal of command and control authority to a large number of

small maneuver units. These units will be widely dispersed throughout the

battlefield and will likely represent all the various sea, air and ground services

putting a premium on inter service co-ordination for purpose of both sharing

information and combining in joint task groups.

Martin libicki of national defense university, usa, an acknowledged expert on

information warfare has discussed in details about the challenge of changing the

military from the large and the few to the small and many. 6


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Since the large and few military formations are around for centuries and have

functioned reasonably well with the exception of guerilla and other irregular wars

there would be lot of resistance for radical organization change. 7 The small and

the many organizations would create nightmares for support services functions.

For examples, where do mobile surgical units setup their organization? Loss of

more soldiers is a real risk. Would moving to a military of the many and the

small jeopardize or compromise this multipurpose way of war? The real issue is

whether heaviness is a virtue in itself or can it be replaced or compensated for by

swarm of supporting fire from air and naval assets. In the age of acute sensing

capabilities the tremendous accuracy of Precision Guided Munitions (PGM)

suggests that large military formations and the logistics on which they depend are

becoming increasingly vulnerable.

Swarming would never work with the hierarchical command structure because an

extremely flat organization would place too much of demand on the overallcommander. Achieving superior situational awareness may tempt higher level

commanders to exercise more control over tactical commanders on the scene an

urge that should be resisted. There is a natural tension between the decentralised

system ofauftragstaktikand the very centralized command possibilities of the all-

encompassing c4i system. The small unit leaders have to assume high initiative and

responsibility. Junior leaders should be capable of much higher levels of command

and responsibility. It would require high quality personnel both at officer and pbor

level. Even today due to hard life in army, growing gap between civilian and

military pay and declining interest in matters military amongst quality youth, the

problem of human resources do not get the attention it deserves.

Logistics. The most difficult task would be to provide logistics support to the

swarming force in a widely distributed battlefield in which friendly and enemy

forces are intermingled. The demands on logistics differ sharply from the

prevailing practice which have always emphasized the provision of mass

munitions, transport and manpower. For swarming these goods and services will

have to be delivered not to fixed locations but to an ever shifting set of small forces

almost all constantly on the move. It would require new thinking about means ofdistribution, the smaller size of swarm may mean that the amount of supplies that

have to be delivered will be much lower.

The us army is using the concept of focused logistics by using information

technology (it) and provide supplies such as food, fuel, equipment and


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ammunition. In the past, inventories have been large because units hoarded

supplies just in case the items they ordered either took too long to arrive or never

showed up. Rather than just in case focused logistics seeks to respond to real

time battlefield demand and move in the direction of a just-in-time philosophy.

Some of the measures to overcome this critical problem are :-

(a) Spread the burden. Networked units can co-ordinate their supply

needs, using situational awareness to transfer and share between units.

(b) Use common parts and systems.

(c) Use precise aerial resupply when possible, including unmanned

delivery systems such as gps - guided parafoils.

(d) Use prepositioned supply depots.

(e) Create combat service support units that operate with particular

clusters of swarm units.

(f) Alternate ways to treat and evacuate casualties such as telemedicine

needs to be perfected.

TECHNOLOGY AND COMMUNICATIONS.

The technological requirements for a concept like battleswarm to succeed are

onerous. Serious advances are required in the management of information. Speed

of processing information has to be improved. How to use the information has to

be

Learnt, sifting of important information from the non essential and who will know

what at which stage of the battle would be the key. The robustness of

communications to pods and clusters has to be ensured against any kind ofdisruption. The flow of information may be disrupted by the following means :-

* From classic Electronic Warfare jamming to more sophisticated

Computer Network Attacks.


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* Air burst of nuclear weapon at high altitude by generating Electro

Magnetic Pulse (EMP).

* High Power Microwave Weapons (HPMW).

* Aerial bombardment.

* Radio frequency bombs and grenades.

* Corruption of data and exploitation by enemy.

Information Warfare will be the key to all such future military operations.

COMMUNICATIONS. 8 the communication system for such a dispersed

network of pods and clusters will have to be a mobile mesh communicationnetwork with high data throughput and survivability. The defense advanced

research project agency (darpa) is already developing mobile wireless

communication system for widely dispersed tactical units. The equipment will be

capable of supporting a tactical internet based on dismounted soldier and mounted

vehicle nodes without having to rely on a fixed ground infrastructure. The most

promising part of the system would be a mobile mesh network of communications

nodes that are able to buffer, store and route packets of information. Such a system

would be capable of non line of sight transmission - a critical requirement of urban

warfare. The military must develop such systems themselves or fund commercial

enterprises because the market is unlikely to produce a mobile wireless system

with the necessary anti jamming, security, and data rate standards on its own.

Commercial communications systems such as digital cellular systems are designed

to achieve optimal spectral efficiency (bits per second per hertz) which is usually

incompatible with good security characteristics such as low probability of

detection.

Fire Support.9 Sophisticated ISR and target acquisition capabilities will be

essential for detecting and tracking enemy ground formations. Swarm units will

need to rely on multiple layers of ground, airborne and space based sensors and a

robust Tactical Internet. The key to effective fires on all battlefields will be

accurate and dependable target location. Rapidly responsive indirect precision

fires delivered by rockets, missiles, naval gunfire or air must be available. Mostly

swarming operation will be a joint operation. Swarm units should possess both

organic stand off precision munitions and a capability to call for indirect fire


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assets. Indirect munitions will need to be GPS guided and capable of in-flight

corrective maneuvering. A mobile light force would need a mix of direct and

indirect fires. We should not expect small teams to get along without significant

organic fire power specially if weather is cloudy or the terrain masks the

movement of ground forces.

TACTICS.

Swarming can be defined as Systematic pulsing of force and/or fire by dispersed,

internetted units, so as to strike the adversary from all directions simultaneously.10

Swarming can be conceptually broken into four stages : locate, converge, attack

and disperse. Swarm networks must be able to come together rapidly and

stealthily on a target, then redisperse and be able to recombine for a new pulse.

The phenomenon of swarm effect is greater than the sum of its parts.

Operational Concept of Swarm. 11 The friendly units operate as a very

demassed, porous force. The effects of friendly ground forces are supported and

enhanced by long range precision strikes that are called in on designated targets by

individual sub units. The salient effect of the swarm is its synergy - the

combination of direct fire and engagement by highly mobile, relatively light force

and devastating fires from long range precision strike and Information Warfare

assets called in by the ground units.

Early in the operations the primary activity of ground forces is surveillance and

target acquisition. Critical operational and tactical intelligence is gathered for

friendly long range precision strike assets. Friendly maneuver units begin to

engulf the enemy force. Over a relatively short period of time (less than a week)

the enemy force is so severely attrited by the 360 degree, three dimensional

operations of the Swarm that its operational plan is utterly defeated. The effect of

the whole demassed friendly Swarm force is, notionally, significantly greater than

the sum of its numerous company sized parts.

The action of individual sub units making up the Swarms are tightly coordinated.,

but this coordination does not come from above. Co-ordination between theindividual units is governed by the units themselves, extensively but laterally and

essentially ad hoc as necessary to exploit opportunities that develop on the fast

paced battlefield.

It is not clear that a widely dispersed swarm operation will always by itself be

enough to defeat a larger, more conventionally organized enemy force, even


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granted the Swarms significant advantage in tactical and organizational agility.

The Swarm operation may have to be supplemented or followed by more

conventional actions and/or additional forces or assets. As the enemy would be so

unhinged by the initial Swarming operations that the latter operations can be

executed with much greater certainty, and rapidity and probably far fewer

casualties.

The swarming concept demands a need for unit cohesion well beyond what is there

today. Unit have to be trained and remain together populated by individuals who

know intuitively how the other member of the unit fight, their strengths and

weaknesses etc. There is a need of soldiers and leaders who excel as independent ,

adaptive thinkers who can take mission- type orders and interpret them on the fly

to exploit opportunities as they arise.

Tactical Concepts of Swarm. The employment of small, fast, lethal groundcombat units enables the friendly forces to use maneuver to effect fires with great

agility. Friendly maneuver units sortie to critical points individually, execute

their own assigned mission, then disengage, re-supply and move to the next

mission. These pulsed sorties are repeated by multiple, independently operating

friendly units to produce a constant rain of deadly blows at precisely chosen

vulnerable points. Friendly units Swarm not only at enemys flanks and rear but

also among and between enemy force elements, enabled by superior awareness and

Information Warfare to continually operate and intermittently mass. The ultimate

effect is complete loss of psychological and physical cohesion of the enemy.

Enemy is rendered incapable of coalescing to present a strong front or mount a co-

ordinated counter attack.

Demassing friendly maneuver units enhances force protection i.e. relying on

numerous small units in a sortie mode reduces the need for dedicated assets for

force protection at the unit level as the small size, mobility and short engagement

times of each unit are themselves protective measures. However, air and missile

defence should be integrated into tactical operations at the lowest echelon possible.

As friendly units cycle in and out of combat resting, replenishing and

reconstituting in transient havens at unit- specific intervals outside enemy reach - itmay not be necessary to maintain operational reserve resources, though individual

units can constitute temporary pools of uncommitted forces. Air force assets

would not provide Close Air Support (CAS), friendly maneuver units would

provide their own CAS with organic aviation and fires. Navy forces provide

theater missile defence and long range precision strikes.


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Some Critical Issues

In the future war, war will not be waged by armies but by groups

whom today we call terrorists, guerillas, bandits and robbers,

but who will undoubtedly hit on more formal titles to describe

themselves.

- Martin Van Creveld 12

Low Intensity Conflict Operation (LICO).It is most likely that swarming will

feature in LICO in near future. It is a natural doctrine for networked organizations

to apply. Swarming is also attractive because with the ease with which those who

apply it can shift from offense to defence, and vice versa. The Chechan bands of

fighters that defeated the Russian Army in the 1994-96 war used swarming both

offensively and defensively and were highly effective at both. 13

Various terrorists are proving adept at networking and in some cases swarming.

For example Hizbollah uses a swarming approach to deal with Israeli Commando

raids in Southern Lebanon. This approach is based over a general instruction to

Hizbollahs widely distributed units to converge on any intruders in any given

area.

No central leadership is required and Israeli Commandos themselves not

swarming, but trying to engage in Precision Strikes on specific, limited targets-

have found themselves more than once facing swarming attacks from which they

escape but only with serious loss. The inability of the Israeli military to deal with

these Hizbollah swarms may even have contributed to Israels recent unilateral

withdrawal from southern Lebanon. In counter insurgency operation the Swarm

units are likely to be more effective than hierarchical division based units. Swarm

units deployed as a network is more likely to find and finish elusive terrorists. It

takes elusiveness to counter elusiveness.

For intelligence gathering the space and air assets such as Unmanned Aerial

Vehicles (UAV) , Satellite, high altitude aircraft and aircrafts like JointSurveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) will still be limited in

their ability to detect small ground forces in difficult terrain such as mountain,

heavy forests, cities and jungle and in inclement weather. A Swarm force can

physically cover a geographic area and is likely to pick up battlefield intelligence.

A network of swarm units dispersed over an area can perform all types of counter

insurgency operation and constantly gather human intelligence. Swarm units on


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ground are natural sensors for detecting low signature terrorist outfits. Once a

terrorist group is detected all adjacent swarm units can seal off the area and take

appropriate action.

Terrorism.14

In a perverse way the black Tuesday 11 Sep attack in which four civil aircrafts

were converted into cruise missiles homed on to their targets by using RMA

technologies may be considered horrifyingly successful models of swarming.

Information age terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda might pursue a war paradigm,

developing capabilities to strike multiple targets from multiple directions in

swarming campaigns. These terrorists used Internet E-Mail and Websites for their

communication, sometimes relying on encryption and steganogra phy for security.

Special Report : Al-Queda, Janes Intelligence Review, august 2001, pp42-51provides an extensive analysis of al-Qaedas organizational structure, history and

activities. The analysis view al-Qaeda as a kind of conglomerates with both

formal vertical and informal horizontal elements, making it a partial hybrid of

hierarchical and network forms of organization.

Command, Control, Communications and IT. Increase in speed and reduction

in the cost of communications, increases in bandwidth, vastly expanded

connectivity and the integration of communications and computing technologies

allow the establishment of networks is the following critical ways :-

* Reduced transmission time enabled dispersed organizations to

communicate and coordinate their tasks.

* Significant reduction in cost of communications allows information

intensive organizational designs such as networks to become viable.

* Substantially increased the scope and complexity of the information

that can be shared.

Counter terrorism policy makers should keep the following in mind which

formulating strategies to counter terrorism :-

* Monitor change in the use of IT by terrorist groups, differentiating

between organizational and offensive capabilities.


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* Target information flows.

* Deter IT-based offensive IO through better infrastructure protection.

* Beat networked terrorists at their own game. It takes network to fight

networks.

Peace Operation. Peace operations demand flexibility. Swarm units will make

up a flatter, more flexible organization than the division based army of today.

Swarm units are more modular and they can be reconfigured more easily than

conventional units. The structure of the typical Army division based task force

today is not well suited for peace operations, which emphasize policing, building,

transporting and facilitating rather than combat arms function.

The US intervention in Haiti during the 1990s featured a good bit of Swarming ofthe peaceful variety with relatively small numbers of American forces blanketing

the potential trouble spots throughout the country with their deterring presence.

Another benefit of this kind of deployment is closer, better relation with

humanitarian agencies and NGOs, so very important in todays global village

scenario. A swarming forces smaller size should also generate less local

resentment, making coordination with NGOs easier while the pods and clusters

will still have considerable punch at hand or on call.

Limitation of Swarming. As with any tactic or strategy Swarming will not

work against all types of opponents in all situations. Deliberate swarming attacks

against fixed, defensive positions may not succeed when the defender has had time

to fortify those positions and place extensive minefields. Swarm units with little

logistics support may not have the capability to clear and detect minefields quickly.

Recent Developments.

With the concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) gaining ground

experiments are being made in advanced western countries specially USA as to

how the information technology advantage and the Information edge can befurther exploited by all the services. Some of the advanced conceptual initiatives

are as under :-

(a) US Army After Next (AAN). Encouraged by Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC) of US Army. It empowers light forces to be able to

take on much heavier (armoured) opposition .


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(b) Hunter Warrior. US Marine Corps is working on Hunter Warrior/

Sea Dragon advanced war fighting experiments. They share AANs

technical and organizational advances but add to the objective of giving such

a force an offensive punch.

(c) Force XXI (USA).The US Army is trying to integrate the

technological advancements in its army. However, no major organizational

changes have been envisaged.

(d) Fleet Battle Experiment Bravo (US Navy). Existing technology

with new organizations are being experimented.

(e) Air Expeditionary Force (USAF). US Air Force has pioneered a

concept of Air Expeditionary Force that pulls all the elements together undera Composite Wing in which fighters and bombers and other aircraft types

may be closely joined, specifically tailored to the needs of a particular

theater or mission.

(f) Urban Swarm (US Marine Corps). In this concept very small units

known as Infestation teams get to operate in a highly decentralized but

extensively internetted fashion.

Some of the new doctrinal thinking in informed circles are as under :-

(a) Convergent Assault . Relies heavily on helicopter for tactical

mobility for simultaneous and omni directional attack on heavier adversary

forces.

(b) Nodal Warfare. Based on striking at key enemy pressure points

specially Command Control nodes. A network like concept where

swarming can be both nodal and nodeless.

(c) Network Centric Warfare (NCW). 15 The concept of Network

Centric Warfare is gaining ground in US Navy circles after the publication

of seminal article on NCW by Vice Admiral Cebrowski. It allows for a

great deal of connectivity and lot of decentralization of decision making

authority. It views the battlefield as networks with grids of sensors, shooters


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and information overlaid. Swarming may well be a natural fit to Network

Centric Warfare.

(d) System of Systems. 16 Admiral William A Owens used the term

system of systems from three technology areas Sensors, C4I and Precision

Guided Munitions (PGM) : These will interact synergistically on future

battlefields.

Battleswarm in Kashmir Valley - An Indian Hypothesis.17

The concept of swarming can be successfully adopted in lico scenario. Most of the

technological tools of swarming already exists today. These are :-

(a) Computers.

(b) UAVs.

(c) PGMs.

(d) Satellites.

(e) Rashtriya Rifles (RR) Troops.

For the successful operation to take place following actions would have to betaken :-

(a) Intelligence Building. Using Information Operations as part of the

larger canvas of Information Warfare, the RR Sector Headquarters (HQ) as

also the higher headquarters and PMF/CPO HQ would be on one grid about

all background details of the terrorist acts, habits, strengths, weaknesses,

gang details and so on. Voice prints and Direction Finding (DF) equipment

as also code breaking capability would expose his movements and to an

extent his plans. However, human intelligence (Humint) in this operation

would be extremely important. The movement would be tracked accurately

on radio and by UAV data downlinked in real time. This information would

be available upto sector HQ level. Thereafter, sharing of information would

be restricted strictly on need to know basis.


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(b) Plan. The attack plan would be based on specific hard intelligence

and will involve not more than two composite RR companies, with one RR

company being actually involved and one as reserve with suitable PMF/CPO

accretions. The plan will involve deception IW operations.

The leadership skills will be paramount in troop selection, routing,

placement of cordon not around a 600 house village but a small portion of

the mohalla where the gang is hiding. An air of quiet confidence would

prevail in all ranks due to minute to minute situational awareness generated

by secure, portable communications backed by at least a 50% chance of

success. Senior leaders up the line will exercise the restraint expected from

them in decentralized command and interfere only when necessary.

(c) Execution. Well armed, well protected with Commercially Off The

Shelf (COTS) procured light protection gear, troops communicating with thelatest communication equipment using GPS would Swarm the isolated

locality and strikes simultaneously from all directions. Collateral damage

would be minimal. Human rights are not violated, Barkha Datts and Praful

Bidwais get going since situational awareness has kept everyone up the line

informed. Any casualty would be evacuated within 10 minutes of injury by

Air Force Helicopters with night flying capability. The SSP, part of the joint

operations would confirm the identity of the militant.

CONCLUSION

Is swarming a realistic possibility as the next war fighting doctrine? Will it replace

Maneuvers warfare and air land battle doctrine ? Will friction and fog of war

allow swarming to succeed ? A radical departure from existing doctrine would

require many issues like tactics, logistics, command and organization to be worked

out, rigorous research, gaming, simulation followed by unit level exercises are

required to be conducted before a prototype of swarm force can be arrived at. We

cannot entirely discard the mass and depth of firepower afforded by the more

traditional doctrines of warfare. However, we must clearly continue to move

forward in exploring information warfare as an integral part of our strategy,

operational art and tactical execution.


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, in Authers Camp : Preparing for

Conflict in The Information Age, Santa Monica, ca : Rand, MR-800-OSD/RC,

1997.

2. The rise of network based organization is discussed in Arquilla and

Ronfeldt, the Advent of Netwar, Santa Monica, ca, Rand, MR-789-OSD, 1996.

3. Sean J A Edwards, Swarming on the Battlefield : Past, Present and Future,

Santa Monica, ca : Rand, 2000, p11.

4. Chambers, James, The Devils Horsemen, The Mongol Invasion of Europe,

New York : Atheneum, 1979, p66.

5. At Santa Fe Institute and Center for Naval Analysts Efforts have been made

to model and simulate the behavior of various kinds of swarm systems. See

materials at www.swarm.org and www.cna.org/isaac.

6. Libicki Martin, The Mesh and The Net : Speculations on Armed conflict in a

time of free silicon, Washington DC : National Defense University press, 1994.

7. Col PK Mallick, Management of change in Armed Forces, yet unpublished

article.

8. Philip M Feldman, Emerging Commercial Mobile Wireless Technology and

Standards ; Suitable for the Army ? Santa Monica, ca: Rand, MR-960-a-1998.

9. Matsumara, John, Randall Steeb, Thomas Herbert, Scot Eisenhard, John

Gordon, Mark Lees and Gail Halverson, the Army After Next : Exploring New

concepts and technologies for the light battle force, santa monica; rand,1999.

10. John Arquilla and David Randall, Swarming, The Future of Conflict,

National Defense Research Institute, Rand, MR-1100-osd.
http://www.swarm.org/http://www.cna.org/isaachttp://www.cna.org/isaachttp://www.swarm.org/


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11. How we fight manual : a dominating maneuver doctrinal essay RMA

experimentation workshop 4, The Strategic Assessment Center, available in

Internet.

12. Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation Of War, New York : The Free

Press, 1991.

13. Arquilla John, and Theodore Karasik, Chechnya : A Glimpse of Future

Conflict ? Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol 22, No 3, Jul-Sep 1999.

14. Michele Zanini and Sean Ja Edwards, The Networking of Terror in the

Information Age, Rand Research paper countering the new terrorism.

15. Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and John Garstka, Network Centric

Warfare, proceedings of the united state naval institute, vol 124, no 1, jan 1998, pp

28-35.

16. Admiral William A Owens , the Emerging System of Systems, Military

Review, May- Jun 1995, pp 15-19.

17. Brig RS MEHTA, VSM, thesis submitted to the national defence collagenew delhi (41st course) on the emerging RMA and Strategic Option for India and

discussion between the author and BRIG RS MEHTA, VSM.

Published in Trishul, October 2002 issue.

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