A New Approach To The Middle East Conflict: The AnalyticHierarchy Process
THOMAS L. SAATYa* and H.J. ZOFFERaaUniversity of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USAbBusiness Administration, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
ABSTRACT
In most long-lasting conflicts, each party’s grievances increase while the concessions they are willing to make decline innumber, quality, and perceived value. Both parties lose sight of what they are willing to settle for, generally exaggerate theirown needs, and minimize the needs of the other side over time. But, it is precisely the matter of trading that needs to be mademore concrete and of higher priority for both sides, if a meaningful resolution is to be found. Without a formal way of tradingoff the concessions and packages of concessions, both sides are likely to suspect that they are getting the short end of thebargain. After the parties have agreed to a trade, very specific binding language about the terms of the agreement, clearimplementation policies and outside guarantors are needed. The worth of the concessions traded, as perceived by both thegiver and receiver, needs to be accurately determined and recorded. All of these require going beyond verbal descriptionsof the concessions to more broadly include their economic, social, geographic, humanitarian, and historical worth. It iscritical that all of these need to be translated into priorities derived in terms of the different values and beliefs of the parties.Priorities are universal and include the diversity of measures in terms of which economic, social, and other values aremeasured. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) provides a way to perform such an assessment with the participation ofnegotiators for the parties. It is a positive approach that makes it possible to reason and express feelings and judgements withnumerical intensities to derive priorities. It has been used productively in the past to deal with the conflicts in South Africaand Northern Ireland and with other controversies throughout the world. With the assistance of panels of Israeli participantsand Palestinian participants brought together in 2009 and 2010, AHP was applied for the first time to the Palestinian–Israeliconflict. The process makes it clear that moderation in different degrees by both sides is essential to arrive at acceptableagreements on concessions proposed and agreed upon by both sides. AHP makes it possible to evaluate moderate andextreme viewpoints and determine their effect on the trading of concessions. The results obtained encourage us to advocateits use in the negotiation process. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
KEY WORDS: Conflict resolution; Middle East Israeli–Palestinian conflict; pairwise comparisons; Analytic HierarchyProcess; concession trade-off
INTRODUCTION
We present an alternative process to address theIsraeli–Palestinian conflict. It does so in two ways thatare different from past efforts. The first is by formallystructuring the conflict, and the second is the manner inwhich discussions are conducted and conclusions drawn.
The approach will help create a solution to the con-flict and provide negotiators with a unique pathway toconsider the thorny issues and corresponding conces-sions underlying the deliberations, together with theirimplementation. Among the prior contentious issues
addressed by this process and encouraged by govern-ments and major participants in the conflicts werethe difficult confrontations in South Africa and inNorthern Ireland. The outcomes of this process addedvaluable dimension to the discussions and resolutionsof those problems.
The Middle East conflict is a prolonged and inter-minable struggle between parties deeply committedto unyielding positions related to identity, religion,and territory. Understanding the Israeli–Palestinianconflict necessitates the understanding and recognitionthat both parties believe there is a theological bondbetween their people and the land. In addition, allthree major religions recognize Jerusalem as symbolicof their belief in a one god idea.
The severity of this conflict has intensified in ourlifetime because international events have catapulted
*Correspondence to: University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh,PA, USAE-mail: [email protected]
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Received 13 December 2011Accepted 06 February 2012
JOURNAL OF MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION ANALYSISJ. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)Published online in Wiley Online Library(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/mcda.1470
the Middle East into a crucial position in the world’ssearch for peace. Claims are made by these peoplesof their right to have a state that ensures their groupidentity. The problem is greatly compounded by greatpower rivalries, weapon sales, interference by neigh-bouring countries, economic and social discrepancies,and the threat of nuclear retaliation. Although it ispossible that the global framework might accelerate asolution, in fact, it complicates the solution becauseof the apparent insolvability of the issues. Hence, asolution continues to elude the global community.
Some of the world’s best negotiators, diplomats,and able leaders have grappled with the resolution ofthis conflict. However, despite their best efforts, thecurrent condition continues to torment all the parties.Since the inception of the Analytic Hierarchy Process(AHP) and its generalization to dependence andfeedback, the Analytic Network Process, authors haveconducted numerous case studies (e.g. [1], [3], [4])that suggest the method as an alternative approach toconflict resolution that will lay bare the structure ofthe problem and allow reasoned judgement to prevail.
Nonetheless, when one deals with conflict, espe-cially conflict of a prolonged duration, reason rarelyprevails. In fact, with respect to the conflict betweenthe Palestinians and the Israelis, positions havebecome entrenched and each party not only seeks tosatisfy its own needs but also does not mind increasingthe costs of concessions made by the other party. Thistype of conflict is defined as retributive [2] because ofits prolonged negative emotional content. Retributiveresponses differ from the usual cooperative conflictsin which the parties work for a win–win outcome, bytheir partly malevolent intentions, whereby the partiesdo not care about the losses of the other side.
In most long-lasting conflicts, each party’s grie-vances increase while the concessions they are willingto make decline in number, quality, and perceivedvalue. Both parties lose sight of what they are willingto settle for, generally exaggerate their own needs, andminimize the needs of the other side over time. The con-cessions worth trading versus the concessions the otherparty is willing to trade become more indefinite and lessconcise. But, it is precisely the matter of trading thatneeds to be made more concrete and of higher priorityfor both sides, if a meaningful resolution is to be found.
Without a formal way of trading off the conces-sions and packages of concessions, both sides arelikely to suspect that they are getting the short end ofthe bargain. After the parties have agreed to a trade,very specific binding language about the terms of theagreement, clear implementation policies, and outsideguarantors are needed. The worth of the concessions
traded, as perceived by both the giver and receiver,needs to be accurately determined and recorded. Allof these require going beyond verbal descriptionsof the concessions to more broadly include theireconomic, social, geographic, humanitarian, andhistorical worth. It is critical that all of these need tobe translated into priorities derived in terms of the dif-ferent values and beliefs of the parties. Priorities areuniversal and include the diversity of measures interms of which economic, social, and other valuesare measured. The AHP provides a way to performsuch an assessment with the participation of negotia-tors for the parties. It is a positive approach that makesit possible to reason and express feelings and judge-ments with numerical intensities to derive priorities.
With the assistance of the panel of Israeli participantsand Palestinian participants, AHP has now been appliedfor the first time with the input of representatives of bothsides who were knowledgeable and informed about theissues associated with the Palestinian–Israeli conflict.They obviously did not represent the full spectrum ofpolitical ideas and notions. The process makes it clearthat moderation in different degrees by both sides isessential to arrive at acceptable agreements on conces-sions proposed and agreed upon by both sides. Theresults obtained encourage us to advocate its use in thisnegotiation process.
We need to begin by emphasizing that the outcomeof our effort is the beginning of an elaborate undertakingto produce a viable solution to the Israeli–Palestinianconflict. It is simply a novel framework for dialogue.A differentiation from other approaches is its potentialto minimize the influence on the outcome of much ofthe intense emotions that have usually accompaniedsuch discussions. The framework forces the negotia-tors to approach the issues using a quantitativelyoriented set of judgements to compare and trade offvarious issues, benefits, costs, and concessions in away in which each individual item is separated fromthe influences of other passionately charged items.We acknowledge that in an emotionally chargedconflict such as this, there will inevitably remain aresidual emotionality and feelings that cannot beignored and inevitably affect the judgements. Thisdoes not affect the viability of the process becausethe numerical representation of the judgements allowsfor such variability up to a limit that can be measured.It essentially allows one to decompose the probleminto smaller components that can be dealt with moreeasily. Although judgements may vary according tothe perceived power of the parties, the essential natureof the process is not compromised, unless participantsare influenced to change their judgements.
T. L. SAATY AND H. J. ZOFFER
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
2. DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVEAPPROACH
Onemight ask:Why is it that somany distinguished poli-ticians and negotiators have failed to reach consensusafter 60 years of trying? Here are some possible reasons:
1. They had no way to measure the importance andvalue of intangible factors that can dominate theprocess.
2. They had no overall unifying structure to organizeand prioritize issues and concessions.
3. They had no mechanism to trade off concessionsby measuring their worth.
4. They had no way to capture each party’s percep-tion of the other side’s benefits and costs.
5. They had no way to provide confidence for theother party that the opposing party is not gainingmore than they are.
6. They had no way to avoid the effect of intenseemotions and innuendoes that negatively affectthe negotiation process.
7. They had no way to test the sensitivity and stabilityof the solution to changes in their judgements withrespect to the importance of the factors that deter-mined the best outcome.
It is not a coincidence that the AHP addresses eachof these reasons in a comprehensive and deliberateway, thus eliminating many of the obstructions formoving forward to identify an equitable solution.
3. THE PROCESS
The AHP is about breaking a problem down and thenaggregating the solutions of all the subproblems into aconclusion. It facilitates decision making by organizingperceptions, feelings, judgements, and memories intoa framework that exhibits the forces that influence a deci-sion. In the simple and most common case, the forces arearranged from the more general and less controllable tothe more specific and controllable. The AHP is basedon the innate human ability to make sound judgementsabout small problems and also about large problemswhen a structure like a hierarchy can be built to representthe influences involved. It has been applied in a variety ofdecisions and planning projects in nearly 40 countries.
Briefly, we see decision-making as a process thatinvolves the following steps:
1. Structure a problem with a model that shows theproblem’s key elements and their relationships.
2. Elicit judgements that reflect knowledge, feelings,or emotions of the primary parties, as well as allother parties that have influence on the outcome.
3. Represent those judgements with meaningfulnumbers.
4. Use these numbers to calculate the priorities of theelements of the hierarchy.
5. Synthesize these results to determine an overalloutcome.
6. Analyse sensitivity to changes in judgement.
The retributive conflict resolution approach presentedhere takes into consideration the benefits to A from con-cessions by B and the costs to A of the return conces-sions A makes, as well as A’s perception of the benefitsto B from the concessions Amakes, and also A’s percep-tion of the costs to B of the concessions B makes. Asimilar analysis is made for B. Findings from thisexercise suggest that the development of ‘bundles’ ofconcessions may minimize the difference in ratios ofgains and losses between the two parties that a negotiatorcan use as a tool to move the resolution process forward.
The expressed objectives of the studywere as follows:
• To identify the issues, major and minor, and toexamine the relative significance or priority of theissues currently inhibiting solution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
• To share knowledge and insights about the currentIsraeli–Palestinian situation from differing pointsof view.
• To construct a comprehensive model of the situation.• To explore the benefits and costs of alternativecourses of action.
The traditional approach involving diplomacy andface-to-face negotiations has led to an inconclusive out-come, partially attributable to attitudes coloured bystrong emotions on both sides. Our approach attemptsto address the impact of negative attitudes by focusingthe participants on making judgements that measurethe intensity of their perceptions about the influences thateach of the issues brings to bear upon the final outcome.
In this study, we consider each party’s list of issues,which, if addressed by the other party by makingconcessions, would provide sufficient benefit to thatside towards meeting their goal. They, in turn, wouldbe willing to make concessions to the other side tobalance those concessions with an equivalent trade-off. We refer to these issues as criteria. The processconsists of taking a set of concessions from one sideand measuring them against these criteria in terms of
A NEW APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
actual or perceived benefits to the other side. Actualbenefits (or costs) are defined as judgements by oneparty about the relative importance of the concessionsthey receive (or give). Perceived benefits (or costs)are defined as putting oneself in the shoes of the otherside to estimate the benefits (or costs), even though thatside may have a totally different opinion about whatthe concessions received or offered are worth.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows.In the next section, we define the problem in generalterms. Subsequently, we outline the structure of thedecision in the form of multiple hierarchies. This effectis evaluated by the parties according to their value sys-tems, both actual and perceived. The outcomes of thisanalysis are priorities used to assess ratios of gainsand losses by both sides that make it possible to deter-mine those concessions for which each party’s gainsexceed its losses and these gains to losses are not unac-ceptably large for either party in comparison with theother party. Then, we examine and identify ratios thatare nearly equal for the two sides from the concessionsmade and pose questions about the viability of suchbundles of concessions that are traded off. Finally,we suggest a way for moving the process to the nextlevel through better definition of the issues and conces-sions as well as through recognition of potential imple-mentation policies and other relevant changes.
4. IMPLEMENTING THE PROCESS
In the opening day of the 3-daymeeting, the panel brain-stormed the issues and structured the problem, definedthe parties at interest, and developed a series of conces-sions that each party might offer to the other.
The process was not without conflict and negotiationof its own. At times, the panel made judgements with-out agreement on exact definitions. There was nearlyalways unanimous agreement on the nature of the con-flict, with much debate about the underlying concerns.These concerns differed according to which constituentgroup was putting them forward. For example, amongthe Palestinian key constituents are Palestinian refu-gees, Hamas followers, Fatah followers, Palestinianswho still live in Israel, and Diaspora Palestinians.Among the Israeli constituents are the ultra right ortho-dox community, Israelis living in settlements in theWest Bank, those associated with the Likud movement,those associated with the Labor Party, and those moreactively seeking peace as a primary objective, withoutdwelling on the details of the difficulties to achieve it.
Since the beginning of the conflict, different consti-tuents have proposed many different approaches. These
approaches inevitably influenced the panel’s perceptionof the concessions to be made by either side. In fact,one participant suggested that it would be difficult ‘tothink outside the box’. He thought that the group wasso influenced by previous thinking that they wouldhave difficulty in conceptualizing ‘creative’ alternativesthat had not been proposed previously.
The panel defined the goal as an attempt to under-stand what forces and influences or combinationsthereof would tend towards a consensus peace accordfor the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Toaccomplish this goal, the panel of nine individuals wasassembled to represent a cross section of thinking onboth sides. Its members had present or prior experi-ence in academia, government, and in business. How-ever, it was recognized that the panel did not representa complete cross-sample of opinions. The sample ofpanel participants was not sufficiently large to includeall points of view, nor was it intended to be so becauseof limitations of time and resources, nor did it containparticipants in actual Israeli–Palestinian negotiations.
This initiative only sought to test the AHP metho-dology on a problem that had previously evadedresolution. The size of the panel was thought to besufficient to account for the different populations.However, it was agreed that the work is exploratoryin nature and intended to demonstrate how the methodcan be used over a short period to arrive at a processthat moves the negotiation process forward.
As mentioned earlier, at no point in the developmentand evaluation of the problem was the process easy. Infact, even the ‘purpose’was not easily agreed upon, andat several points in the 3 days over which the meetingstook place, the panel readdressed what the undertakingwas intended to accomplish. It looked at the purpose ofthe project from various perspectives in the hope offinding one that appeared more promising than othersthat have been tried. The panel brainstormed all theissues they could think of that had to be consideredin the framework. They are listed in Table I as theywere identified by the participants and later organizedinto categories, with no attempt to eliminate possibleduplications. Listing the issues made it easier to iden-tify the concessions and to structure the problem.Taking time to structure the problem in as comprehen-sive a fashion as may be feasible is a crucial first stepbefore attempting to prioritize the relative importanceof its constituent parts that have causal influence onthe concessions and actions to be taken. Needless tosay, the structure that emerged in the early discussiondepended on the parties, their knowledge, experience,and conditioning. In a strict sense, it was a politicalrather than a scientific structure. In such a situation, it
T. L. SAATY AND H. J. ZOFFER
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
was not possible to provide a cultural analysis of theparties’ narrative and framing of the issues.
The exercise in discussing specific issues sometimesseemed to generate incompatible perceptions of whatcan and would be achievable in peace negotiations.For example, all the Israelis present were adamant that
a one state solution is impossible to contemplate,whereas Palestinians all agreed that a solution that doesnot grant refugees their internationally recognized rightsto return is also impossible to contemplate. But we doknow that historically adamant positions have changedwhen circumstances change. For proper application
Table I. List of outstanding issues organized by category
Geographic and Demographic Issues Political Issues Behavioural Issues
Access of Palestinians to availablenatural resources
Accountability and reasonability ofHamas in the Gaza Strip
Bad faith negotiations
Archaeological issues Agreement on one-state solution CompromiseGolan heights Agreement on two-state solution Confidence building measuresHow to address the Palestinian diaspora AIPAC (American Israel Political
Action Committee)Corruption
How to re-settle Palestinian refugees American politicians Deception and manufacturing of historyImmigration Citizenship rights of Palestinian
community in IsraelEqual treatment of all parties
Palestinian access to the Mediterranean Sea Colonialism Ethnic cleansingPalestinian problem of split land massbetween Gaza and the West Bank
Condemnation of violence as atool of negotiation
Harassment
Population Control Human rightsProblems for Israel in living in anocean of Arab countries
Denunciation of irrelevantUnited Nations resolutions
Human shields
Right of Palestinians to return totheir homes in Israel
European acceptance of responsibilityfor the Holocaust and settlement ofIsraelis in Israel
Intermarriage
Rights of Palestinians toIsraeli-controlled land
Funding of terrorism Learning to forgive without forgetting
Status of Israeli settlements Historical legitimacy of ownershipof land in the area
Love
Water How to deal with charges of apartheid Mutual recognition of rights of each partyEconomic and Business Issues International relationships NonviolenceCompensation for victims of terrorism Islamic state Psychological barriersCompensation to Palestinians for loss of land Jewish refugee issues Psychological damageDealing with property confiscation issues Mutual compensation RacismEconomic choices Problems associated with Hamas Recognition of the HolocaustHow to re-settle Palestinian refugees Residency rights Recognition of the Nakba conditionRestitution Role of the Druze in negotiations Religious fundamentalismEducation Issues Sovereignty Representation of women in the negotiationsEducation Status of Israel RespectIncitement in the educational school system Status of Jerusalem Subjugation and humiliationIndoctrination Status of Palestinian authority Suicide bombersIndustrial parks Status of Ramallah TrustLack of creativity and problem solving Syrian accommodation for settlement
of Palestinian refugeesMilitary Issues
Language training Social Issues Arms smugglingStolen culture Basic human needs DisarmamentSecurity Issues Religious and Ideological Issues House demolitionBombing of Israeli children Armageddon InvasionGilad Shalit (release of prisoners) Christian Zionism (evangelists) Missile buildingSafe passage Holy places Nuclear responsibilitySafety and security Jewish Zionism War crimesTerrorism Palestinian Christians Legal IssuesThe Wall Religious prophecy International Law
Prisoners
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of the AHP methodology, it is important to include inthe structure all factors, including those that some par-ticipants feel are so crucial to their preconceived andpredetermined positions, that any concession on thoseissues seems inconceivable.
In order to develop the necessary measurements forprioritization, we need to calculate the gains and lossesfor each concession from each of the parties. The paneldeveloped a total of eight hierarchies involving benefitsand costs and perceived benefits and costs: four hierar-chies for the Israeli group and four hierarchies for thePalestinian group. The exercise in which the 106 issueswere identified through the process of brainstormingserved as a stimulus to the thinking of the participantsto deal with the structuring process. Each of the eighthierarchies involves a goal, for example Israel’s Bene-fits from Palestinian Concessions, and a set of criteriathat are a subset of the issues relevant to that goal. Theyare called criteria in terms of which all the possible con-cessions that were identified were evaluated by scoringthem one at a time. The criteria that were developed forthese eight models were chosen by each of the Israeliand Palestinian participants, respectively. Because ofthe volume of issues, we found it necessary in develop-ing the hierarchies to select as criteria a subset of themost crucial issues. The overall goal of each of thecorresponding criteria in the four hierarchies involvedthe apparent equalization of the ratio of the gains tothe losses by each side. Concessions by each partyare listed in Table II. We list the concessions thatthe participants identified as possible responses to theissues given in Table I. We have classified theseconcessions into four categories for each side.
The following concessions comprise the bottomlevels of the hierarchies given in Figures 1 and 2 inthe Appendix. The first level of these hierarchies arethe criteria used to determine the contribution of theconcessions to the benefits, costs, perceived benefitsand perceived costs of both parties. The priorities ofthese criteria are given in Table III (see [5]). These prio-rities are also listed at the top of Tables IV and V.
The panels attempted to accomplish much in a veryshort period. To facilitate the process and reach someconclusions, we rated each concession under eachcriterion using the words and corresponding scale
values in Table VI as to how strongly it contributedto that criterion that represents the goal it serves. Theresult of this rating is given in Tables IV and V.
For example, in Table IV(a), Israeli’s concessionswere rated using only the highest priority criteria. Twocriteria with negligible priorities, one in column 4 andone in column 6 had zero rating priorities for the conces-sions. These were ignored, ensuring that at least 70% ofthe priorities from the criteria were accounted for in theratings model. Similarly, we did the same thing in theother tables. Table IV(a,b,c,d) presents the results forIsraeli benefits from Palestinian concessions, Israeliperception of Palestinian costs for making these conces-sions to Israel, Israeli costs of their own concessionsand finally, Israeli perception of Palestinian gains fromIsraeli concessions, respectively. Similarly, Table V(a,b,c,d) presents the results of the Palestinian ratings model.
Thus, given two parties A and B, for every conces-sion of party A, there are associated with it costs, andperceived gains to party B, as well as gains to party Band perceived costs to party A.
5. THE RETRIBUTIVE FUNCTION
Given the entrenchment of both sides, a negotiatorhas an opportunity in an appropriate setting to callattention to the gap between the perceived benefitsand costs of the concessions made by both sides andto help each party to reach a conclusion through theintroduction of ‘bargaining chips’. In the negotiationsetting, if A and B are participants, then A considersa particular concession not only with respect tothe incremental benefit (cost) to A but also the cost(benefit) to B in providing (receiving) the concession.The greater the perceived cost of each concession toB, the greater the value of that concession is to A.
Hence, A’s gain from a given concession from Bmay be described as the product of A’s benefits andB’s costs (as perceived by A). We have the followingratios for the two parties A and B:
(according to A’s perceptions)
A’s ratio:
Gain to A from B’s ConcessionA’s Perception of B’s Gain from A’s Concession
¼P
A’s benefits� B’s costs from B’s ConcessionPB’s perceived benefits� A’s costs from A’s Concession
T. L. SAATY AND H. J. ZOFFER
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
whereP
is the sum over all the benefits obtainedby A in the numerator and by B in the denomina-tor. Hence, given A’s ratio, A’s gain is a productof both the utility benefit received and the costto B in providing that benefit as described inthe numerator of the equation. The total gain toA is diminished by the product of the cost to Ain concessions given to B and the perception ofthe benefit received by B for A’s concessions inthe denominator. A’s benefits and costs are readilymeasured by A; however, the costs and gains to B
are not readily available to A and are thereforeestimated as perceived by A. A expects to havea gain ratio greater than one that suggests thatthe gains to A are greater than the perceived ben-efits to B. Likewise, B expects to have a gain ratiogreater than 1. For equality in ‘trade’ to be achieved,the two parties should be nearly equal in value, whichsuggests that the two gain as much as the perceivedbenefits to and costs of concessions to the other. B’sutility is given by the function (See equation afterTable V (d)):
Table II. Palestinian and Israeli concessions
Concessions
Palestinian concessionsI. Compromise on sovereignty1 Accept two-state solution2 Accept a two-state solution that includes a non-contiguous area—Gaza3 Acknowledge Israel’s existence as a Jewish state4 Acknowledge Israel’s existence as an Independent state5 Make compromises on the status of JerusalemII. Compromise on right of return1 Agree to compromise on the demand of the right of return2 Lobby Arab states to allow both Israelis and Palestinians to have the right to return to their land of origin3 Seek assistance for a legitimate settlement of refugeesIII. Cooperate economically with Israel1 Drop opposition to trade and normal relations with Israel2 Share all natural resources with Israel3 Work cooperatively and in active engagement with IsraelIV. Change attitude towards Israel1 Denounce Iranian pursuit of nuclear arms and support Israel’s efforts to remove the threat2 Refrain from and work against any anti-Israel sentiments in Palestinian schools3 Denounce and rein-in violenceIsraeli concessionsI. Compromise on sovereignty1 Abandon the idea of a Jewish state2 Accept a two-state solution3 Comply with all applicable United Nations resolutions4 Allow the sharing of all natural resources between Palestinians and Israelis5 Allow all parties to have equal access to and control of religious sites and holy places6 Share Jerusalem as both a religious and political centre for all partiesII. Modify settlement activity1 Turnover settlements of Jewish settlers on land claimed by the Palestinians with or without compensationIII. Cooperate to improve human rights treatment1 Comply with human rights2 Implement Palestinian refugee rights3 Encourage equal opportunity for Palestinians to achieve equal economic prosperity4 Allow the right to have an education that is non-biased and equally shares historic backgroundsIV. Remove access barriers1 Permit Palestinian freedom of movement2 Remove the Wall and other barriers to Palestinian movement
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Table III. Priorities of criteria
Israeli Criteria
Isra
elis
Ben
efits
fro
m P
ales
tinia
n C
once
ssio
ns
Isra
elis
Per
cept
ion
of P
ales
tinia
n C
osts
Isra
elis
Cos
ts f
rom
The
ir O
wn
Con
cess
ions
Isra
elis
Per
cept
ion
of P
ales
tinia
n G
ains
fro
m I
srae
lis C
once
ssio
ns
BenefitsControl Jerusalem & Holy Places 0.245
Refugee Compensation & Settlement 0.251
Increasing Security 0.193
Permanent Borders 0.000
Controlling & Rationing of Water 0.162
Human Rights 0.022
Settlements in Palestinian Territory 0.127
Perceived Palestinian CostsLose Argument of Refugees 0.048
Victim Status 0.301
Revolutionary cause as unifying factor 0.308
Infrastructure 0.039
Cost 0.268
Accountability & Responsibility 0.035
CostsEconomic 0.026
Political 0.07
Religious 0.002
Psychologica1 0.119
Security 0.274
International Image 0.014
Demographic 0.191
Administration 0.021
Civil Disorder 0.185
Social 0.095
Unification of Jewish People 0.003
Perceived Palestinian BenefitsInternational Recognition 0.002
Member Nations 0.017
Recognized Borders 0.131
Peace 0.014
Independence 0.119
Economic Trade 0.013
Law and Order 0.085
Pride 0.619
Priorities
Palestinian Criteria
Pale
stin
ian
Ben
efits
fro
m I
srae
lis
Con
cess
ions
Pale
stin
ian
Perc
eptio
n of
Isr
aelis
C
osts
Pale
stin
ian
Cos
ts f
rom
The
ir O
wn
Con
cess
ions
Pal
estin
ian
Perc
eptio
n of
Isr
aeli
Gai
ns f
rom
Pal
estin
ian
Con
cess
ions
BenefitsHuman Rights 0.091
Permanent Borders 0.029
Sovereign Palestinian State 0.13
Vacating of Israelis from Settlement
0.167
Freedom of Movement 0.000
Shared Water and OtherResources
0.239
Shared Control of Jerusalem & Holy Places
0.025
Resolution of Refugee Problem 0.288
Security 0.017
Two-Way Compensation 0.015
Perceived Israeli CostsEnding of Superiority 0.207
Change of Zionist Narrative 0.037
Property Restitution and Compensation
0.234
Settlement Evacuation 0.351
Social Restructuring 0.086
Unity Based on Having a Common Identity
0.084
CostsPolitical 0.131
Economic 0.035
Land/Sea Control 0.279
Psychological 0.034
Religious 0.004
Social 0.032
Quality of Life 0.084
International Image 0.044
Social Harmony 0.019
Not Challenging Israel 0.017
Property Rights 0.318
Perceived Israeli BenefitsPeace of Mind 0.167
Reduce Fear of Living 0.041
Retention of Israeli Immigration 0.016
Leveraging Resources 0.098
Acceptance of Israel within Islamic World
0.034
Acceptance of Israelis 0.037
Social Harmony 0.015
Sharing of Religious Festivals 0.021
Ending of Apartheid 0.130
Enhanced Economic Deve1opment
0.172
Trade with Region 0.270
Priorities
T. L. SAATY AND H. J. ZOFFER
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
Table IV. Israelis’ concession ratings relative to criteria
(a) Israelis’ Benefits from Palestinians’ Concessions*
(b) Israelis’ Perceptions of Palestinians’ Costs*
*Note: In these tables, the ideal column is obtained from the column of totals by dividing every value by the largest value. The ideal mode is used to measure concessions one at a time
Priorities 0.24
5
0.25
1
0.19
3
0.00
0
0.16
2
0.02
2
0.12
7
Criteria Concessions C
ontr
ol
Jeru
sale
m &
H
oly
Plac
e
Ref
ugee
C
ompe
nsat
ion
& S
ettle
men
t
Incr
easi
ng
Secu
rity
Perm
anen
t B
orde
rs
Con
trol
ling
&
Rat
ioni
ng o
f W
ater
Hum
an R
ight
s
Set
tlem
ents
in
Pale
stin
ian
Ter
rito
ry
Tot
al
Idea
ls
Accept Two-State Solution Very Low Excellent Excellent - Negligible - Medium 0.680 0.736
Acceptance of Non-Contiguous State Negligible Excellent Excellent - Negligible - Negligible 0.605 0.655
Acknowledge Israel's Existence as a Jewish State Excellent Excellent Excellent - Very High - Medium 0.924 1.000
Acknowledge Israel's Existence as an Independent State Medium High High - Very High - Medium 0.762 0.824
Agree to Compromise to Demand of Right of No Return High Excellent Excellent - Excellent - Very High 0.917 0.992
Declare Against Iranian Nuclear Development - - - - - - - 0.000 0.000
Drop Opposition to Trade & Normal Relations w/ Israel Negligible Very Low Very Low - Negligible - High 0.402 0.435
Incitement of Anti-Israeli Sentiment in Schools Excellent Excellent Excellent - Negligible - Very High 0.853 0.923
Lobby Arab States to Allow Israelis Right to Return - - - - - - - 0.000 0.000
Make Compromise on the Status of Jerusalem Excellent Low Excellent - - - Medium 0.653 0.707
Denounce & Reign in Violence Excellent Very Low Excellent - High - Excellent 0.795 0.860
Seek Assistance for a Legitimate Settlement of Refugees Negligible Excellent Excellent - - - Negligible 0.556 0.602
Sharing of Natural Resources Negligible Very Low Medium - Negligible - High 0.459 0.497
Work Cooperatively w/ Israel Negligible Very High Excellent - Very High - Negligible 0.677 0.732
Priorities 0.04
8
0.30
1
0.30
8
0.03
9
0.26
8
0.03
5
Criteria Concessions
Los
e A
rgum
ent
of R
efug
ees
Vic
tim S
tatu
s
Rev
olut
iona
ry
Cau
se a
s U
nify
ing
Fact
or
Infr
astr
uctu
re
Cos
t
Acc
ount
abili
ty
&
Res
pons
ibili
ty
Tot
al
Idea
ls
Accept Two-State Solution - Negligible Excellent - Excellent - 0.667 0.967
Acceptance of Non-Contiguous State - Excellent Excellent - Negligible - 0.690 1.000
Acknowledge Israel's Existence as a Jewish State - Negligible High - Negligible - 0.418 0.605
Acknowledge Israel's Existence as an Independent State - Negligible Excellent - Negligible - 0.479 0.695
Agree to Compromise to Demand of Right of No Return - Excellent Excellent - Negligible - 0.690 1.000
Declare Against Iranian Nuclear Development - - - - - - 0.000 0.000
Drop Opposition to Trade & Normal Relations w/ Israel - High High - Negligible - 0.568 0.823
Incitement of Anti-Israeli Sentiment in Schools - Excellent Excellent - Negligible - 0.690 1.000
Lobby Arab States to Allow Israelis Right to Return - - - - - - 0.000 0.000
Make Compromise on the Status of Jerusalem - Negligible High - Negligible - 0.418 0.605
Denounce & Reign in Violence - Excellent High - Negligible - 0.628 0.911
Seek Assistance for a Legitimate Settlement of Refugees - Low Excellent - Negligible - 0.539 0.782
Sharing of Natural Resources - Medium High - Medium - 0.645 0.935
Work Cooperatively w/ Israel - Negligible High - Negligible - 0.418 0.605
A NEW APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
Table IV. Continued(c) Israelis ’ Costs from Their Own Concessions*
(d) Israelis’ Perceptions of Palestinians’ Gains*
*Note: In these tables, the ideal column is obtained from the column of totals by dividing every value by the largest value.
Priorities 0.02
6
0.07
0
0.00
2
0.11
9
0.27
4
0.01
4
0.19
1
0.02
1
0.18
5
0.09
5
0.00
3
Criteria Concessions
Eco
nom
ic
Polit
ical
Rel
igio
us
Psyc
holo
gica
l
Secu
rity
Inte
rnat
iona
l Im
age
Dem
ogra
phic
Adm
inis
trat
ion
Civ
il D
isor
der
Soci
al
Uni
fica
tion
of
Jew
ish
Peop
le
Tota
l
Idea
ls
Abandon the Idea of Jewish State - - - Excellent Excellent - Excellent - Excellent - - 0.769 1.000
Accept Two-State Solution - - - Medium Negligible - Negligible - High - - 0.371 0.482
Comply with UN Resolutions - - - Excellent Excellent - Excellent - Excellent - - 0.769 1.000
Human Rights - - - Negligible Negligible - Negligible - Negligible - - 0.231 0.300
Implementation of Refugee Rights - - - Excellent Excellent - Excellent - Excellent - - 0.769 1.000
Palestinian Freedom of Movement - - - Excellent Excellent - Excellent - Excellent - - 0.769 1.000
Removal of Wall and Other Barriers - - - Excellent Excellent - Negligible - Excellent - - 0.635 0.826
Right to Economic - - - Negligible Negligible - Negligible - Negligible - - 0.231 0.300
Right to Education - - - Negligible Negligible - Negligible - Negligible - - 0.231 0.300
Shared Administration of Resources - - - Medium Low - Negligible - Medium - - 0.407 0.529
Shared Control of Holy Places - - - Negligible Negligible - Negligible - Excellent - - 0.360 0.468
Shared Jerusalem - - - Excellent High - Negligible - Excellent - - 0.580 0.755
Turnover Settlements w/wo Compensation - - - Excellent Negligible - Negligible - Excellent - - 0.444 0.577
Priorities 0.00
2
0.01
7
0.13
1
0.01
4
0.11
9
0.01
3
0.08
5
0.61
9Criteria
Concessions
Inte
rnat
iona
l R
ecog
nitio
n
Mem
ber
Nat
ions
Rec
ogni
zed
Bor
ders
Peac
e
Inde
pend
ence
Eco
nom
ic T
rade
Law
and
Ord
er
Prid
e
Tota
l
Idea
ls
Abandon the Idea of Jewish State - - Excellent - Excellent - - Excellent 0.869 1.000
Accept Two-State Solution - - Negligible - Excellent - - Very High 0.715 0.823
Comply with UN Resolutions - - Excellent - Excellent - - Excellent 0.869 1.000
Human Rights - - Negligible - Negligible - - Negligible 0.261 0.300
Implementation of Refugee Rights - - Negligible - Excellent - - Excellent 0.777 0.894
Palestinian Freedom of Movement - - Excellent - Excellent - - Excellent 0.869 1.000
Removal of Wall and Other Barriers - - Negligible - High - - Excellent 0.753 0.867
Right to Economic - - Negligible - Negligible - - Negligible 0.261 0.300
Right to Education - - Negligible - Negligible - - Negligible 0.261 0.300
Shared Administration of Resources - - Negligible - High - - Medium 0.568 0.653
Shared Control of Holy Places - - Negligible - High - - Excellent 0.753 0.867
Shared Jerusalem - - Excellent - Excellent - - Excellent 0.869 1.000
Turnover Settlements w/wo Compensation - - Excellent - Excellent - - Excellent 0.869 1.000
T. L. SAATY AND H. J. ZOFFER
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
Table V. Palestinian concession ratings relative to criteria
(a) Palestinians’ Benefits from Israelis’ Concessions*
(b) Palestinians’ Perceptions of Israelis’ Costs*
*Note: In these tables, the ideal column is obtained from the column of totals by dividing every value by the largest value.
Priorities 0.09
1
0.02
9
0.13
0
0.16
7
0.00
0
0.23
9
0.02
5
0.28
8
0.01
7
0.01
5
Criteria Concessions
Hum
an R
ight
s
Perm
anen
t B
orde
rs
Sove
reig
n Pa
lest
inia
n St
ate
Vac
atin
g of
Is
rael
fro
m
Settl
emen
ts
Free
dom
of
Mov
emen
t
Shar
ed W
ater
&
Oth
er
Res
ourc
es
Shar
ed
Con
trol
of
Jeru
sale
m
Res
olut
ion
of
Ref
ugee
Pr
oble
m
Secu
rity
Two-
Way
C
ompe
nsat
ion
Tota
l
Idea
ls
Abandon the Idea of Jewish State Excellent - Medium Medium - Low - Excellent - - 0.705 0.801
Accept Two-State Solution Medium - Very High Excellent - Very High - Very Low - - 0.677 0.769
Comply with UN Resolutions Very High - Excellent Excellent - Very High - Excellent - - 0.881 1.000
Human Rights Excellent - High Very High - High - Excellent - - 0.823 0.935
Implementation of Refugee Rights Excellent - Excellent Medium - High - Excellent - - 0.816 0.926
Palestinian Freedom of Movement Very High - Excellent Excellent - Medium - Low - - 0.689 0.782
Removal of Wall and Other Barriers Excellent - Excellent High - Very High - Medium - - 0.770 0.874
Right to Economic Development Very High - Excellent High - Very High - Low - - 0.703 0.799
Right to Education Very High - Excellent Medium - Medium - Low - - 0.639 0.726
Shared Administration of Resources Very High - Very High Medium - Excellent - Low - - 0.698 0.792
Shared Control of Holy Places Medium - High Very High - Medium - Very Low - - 0.600 0.681
Shared Jerusalem Medium - High Very High - Medium - Medium - - 0.686 0.779
Turnover Settlements w/wo Compensation High - Very High Excellent - High - Medium - - 0.748 0.850
Priorities 0.20
7
0.03
7
0.23
4
0.35
1
0.08
6
0.08
4
Criteria Concessions
End
ing
of
Supe
rior
ity
Cha
nge
of
Zio
nist
Nar
rativ
e
Prop
erty
R
estit
utio
n
Settl
emen
t E
vacu
atio
n
Soci
al
Res
truc
turi
ng
Uni
ty B
ased
on
Shar
ed I
dent
ity
Tota
l
Idea
ls
Abandon the Idea of Jewish State Excellent - Excellent Medium - - 0.688 0.951
Accept Two-State Solution High - Medium High - - 0.611 0.845
Comply with UN Resolutions Excellent - Medium Excellent - - 0.723 1.000
Human Rights Excellent - Very High Medium - - 0.664 0.919
Implementation of Refugee Rights Very High - Very High Very High - - 0.714 0.988
Palestinian Freedom of Movement Very High - Low Medium - - 0.550 0.761
Removal of Wall and Other Barriers High - High Medium - - 0.599 0.829
Right to Economic Development High - Medium Medium - - 0.576 0.797
Right to Education Very Low - Low Low - - 0.376 0.520
Shared Administration of Resources Very High - High High - - 0.655 0.907
Shared Control of Holy Places Medium - Medium Very High - - 0.625 0.865
Shared Jerusalem Medium - Medium Very High - - 0.625 0.865
Turnover Settlements w/wo Compensation Very High - Very High Very High - - 0.714 0.988
A NEW APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
(according to B’s perceptions)
B’s ratio:
Table V. Continued
(c) Palestinians’ Costs from Their Own Concessions*
(d) Palestinians’ Perceptions of Israelis’ Gains*
*Note: In these tables, the ideal column is obtained from the column of totals by dividing every value by the largest value.
Priorities 0.13
1
0.03
5
0.27
9
0.03
4
0.00
4
0.03
2
0.08
4
0.04
4
0.01
9
0.01
7
0.31
8
0.00
0
0.00
0
0.00
0
0.00
0
0.00
0
0.00
0
0.00
0
Concessions
Polit
ical
Eco
nom
ic
Lan
d / S
ea C
ontr
ol
Psyc
holo
gica
l
Rel
igio
us
Soci
al
Qua
lity
of L
ife
Inte
rnat
iona
l Im
age
Soci
al H
arm
ony
Not
Cha
lleng
ing
Isra
el
Prop
erty
Rig
hts
Publ
ic S
tand
ing
Acc
ess
to R
esou
rces
Acc
ess
to F
amily
Tie
s
Inte
rnat
iona
l Sta
ndin
g
Iden
tity
Mor
al
Div
isio
n
Tot
al
Idea
ls
Accept Two-State Solution Very High - Very High - - - High - - - Very High - - - - - - - 0.723 0.921
Acceptance of Non-Contiguous State Excellent - Excellent - - - Excellent - - - Very High - - - - - - - 0.781 0.995
Acknowledge Israel's Existence as a Jewish State High - High - - - Medium - - - High - - - - - - - 0.642 0.818
Acknowledge Israel's Existence as an Independent State Excellent - Very High - - - Very High - - - Excellent - - - - - - - 0.777 0.989
Agree to Compromise to Demand of Right of Return Excellent - Very High - - - Excellent - - - Excellent - - - - - - - 0.785 1.000
Declare Against Iranian Nuclear Development Medium - Negligible - - - Very Low - - - Negligible - - - - - - - 0.305 0.388
Drop Opposition to Trade & Normal Relations w/ Israel Very High - Medium - - - Low - - - Medium - - - - - - - 0.578 0.737
Incitement of Anti-Israeli Sentiment in Schools Very Low - Negligible - - - Very Low - - - Negligible - - - - - - - 0.265 0.338
Lobby Arab States to Allow Israelis Right to Return Very Low - Very Low - - - Medium - - - Low - - - - - - - 0.382 0.487
Make Compromise on the Status of Jerusalem Very High - Medium - - - Very High - - - Excellent - - - - - - - 0.708 0.901
Denounce & Reign in Violence Excellent - Very Low - - - Low - - - Negligible - - - - - - - 0.381 0.485
Seek Assistance for a Legitimate Settlement of Refugees Medium - Medium - - - Medium - - - Excellent - - - - - - - 0.664 0.847
Sharing of Natural Resources Medium - Very High - - - Very High - - - High - - - - - - - 0.673 0.858
Work Cooperatively w/ Israel High - Low - - - Medium - - - Medium - - - - - - - 0.526 0.671
Priorities 0.16
7
0.04
1
0.01
6
0.09
8
0.03
4
0.03
7
0.01
5
0.02
1
0.13
0
0.17
2
0.27
0
Criteria
Criteria Concessions
Peac
e of
Min
d
Red
uce
Fear
of
Liv
ing
Ret
entio
n of
Isr
aeli
Inm
igra
tion
Lev
erag
ing
Res
ourc
es
Acc
epta
nce
of w
Is
lam
ic W
orld
Acc
epta
nce
of
Isra
elis
Soci
al H
arm
ony
Shar
ing
of R
elio
us
Fest
ival
s
End
ing
of
Apa
rthe
id
Enh
ance
d E
cono
mic
D
evel
opm
ent
Tra
de w
/in R
egio
n
Tot
al
Idea
ls
Accept Two-State Solution Very High - - - - - - - Very Low Medium Medium 0.511 0.807
Acceptance of Non-Contiguous State Very High - - - - - - - Very Low Low Negligible 0.369 0.582
Acknowledge Israel's Existence as a Jewish State Very High - - - - - - - Medium Medium High 0.577 0.911
Acknowledge Israel's Existence as an Independent State Excellent - - - - - - - Negligible Very Low Negligible 0.356 0.561
Agree to Compromise to Demand of Right of Return Excellent - - - - - - - Low Negligible Very Low 0.391 0.618
Declare Against Iranian Nuclear Development Very High - - - - - - - Negligible Negligible Very Low 0.349 0.550
Drop Opposition to Trade & Normal Relations w/ Israel Medium - - - - - - - Very High Medium Very High 0.597 0.942
Incitement of Anti-Israeli Sentiment in School Very Low - - - - - - - High Negligible Negligible 0.303 0.479
Lobby Arab States to Allow Israelis Right to Return Negligible - - - - - - - Low High Very High 0.495 0.782
Make Compromise on the Status of Jerusalem High - - - - - - - Medium Very High High 0.595 0.939
Denounce & Reign in Violence Very High - - - - - - - Excellent High High 0.634 1.000
Seek Assistance for a Legitimate Settlement of Refugees Very High - - - - - - - Very Low Low Medium 0.477 0.753
Sharing of Natural Resources Very High - - - - - - - High Medium Medium 0.563 0.889
Work Cooperatively w/ Israel High - - - - - - - High High High 0.591 0.933
Gain to B from A’s ConcessionB’s Perception of A’s Gain from B’s Concession
¼P
B’s benefits � A’s costs from A’s ConcessionPA’s perceived benefits� B’s costs from B’s Concession
T. L. SAATY AND H. J. ZOFFER
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
The measure of equality between the parties in thetrade of concessions may be calculated as the ratio ofthe two ratios:A’s ratio/B’s ratio = retributive gain (loss)to A.
Where the retributive gain is the amount that Abenefits from making B ‘pay’, a loss is accounted forby the amount that A ‘lost’ in the negotiation process.Under no circumstance would we expect A to agree toconcessions when there is a perceived loss when A hasdominance over B. In the case where A has domi-nance over B, the best that B can do is to minimizethe disparity in gains.
The ratios for the Israelis and the Palestinians basedon the benefits and costs and perceived benefits andcosts are given in Tables VII and VIII. When a ratiowas less than 1, the ratio was made equal to zero tosignify that a trade-off was not acceptable. These ratiosare used to make trade-offs among concessions accord-ing to two criteria: (1) both parties should get as muchas possible from the concession(s) and (2) the gainsfrom the concession(s) for both parties should be asclose as possible. The first criterion is the objectivefunction of a MaxMin problem, whereas the secondcriterion is imposed as a constraint.
To decide how to match the concessions of one partywith the concessions from another party, we need to firstcreate all possible concession bundles for both parties.A concession bundle is a set of individual concessions.The parties can then trade concession bundles. Theproblem is that there are many possible concession bun-dles even when the parties in conflict have a moderatelysmall number of possible concessions. For example, ifone party had 13 concessions and another had 14 con-cessions, there are 8191 and 16 383 possible concessionbundles, respectively. Because we need to match abundle of one party with all other possible bundles ofthe other party to determine which concession bundleis more advantageous, we need to solve 7563 matchingproblems for one party and 14 787 problems for theother party.Were we to do it all at once, then the problemwould be even more difficult to solve because the
problem would involve 8191� 16383=134217728variables. A possible solution is to divide the conces-sions into groups such as short, medium, and long-term sets and then form the bundles.
Let CA and CB be the set of concession bundles oftwo parties A and B in a conflict. Let ci(k) be the ithconcession bundle of party k. Let p(i,A|j,B) be theratio gain from the ith concession bundle of partyA when party B offers the jth concession. Letq(j,B|i,A) be the ratio gain from the jth concessionbundle of party B when party A offers the ith conces-sion. Let xij be a binary variable where xij= 1 if theith concession bundle of A is matched with the jthconcession bundle of B.
Concession bundles from one party can be pairedwith concessions bundles of the other party.Thus, the total gain of party A is given byP
i2CA
Pj2CB
p i;Að jj;BÞxij and the total gain of partyB is given by
Pi2CA
Pj2CB
q j;Bð ji;AÞxij . To balanceboth gains and provide both parties with the maximumgain, we solve a MaxMin problem, i.e. a maximizationmodel whose objective function is an arbitrary vari-able x0 such that
Pi2CA
Pj2CB
p i;Að jj;BÞxij≥x0 andPi2CA
Pj2CB
q j;Bð ji;AÞxij≥x0 . If all the concessionsare matched, then
Pi2CA
xij ¼ 1 andP
j2CBxij ¼ 1. If
only a subset of SA ⊂CA is matched with CB, thenPj2CB
xij ¼ 1, for i2 SA andP
i2CAxij≤1. If only a
subset SA ⊂CA is matched with a subset SB ⊂CB, thenPj2CB
xij≤1 for i2 SA andP
i2CAxij≤1 for j2 SB.
Thus, the more general problem is given by:
Max x0such that;P
i2CA
Pj2CB
p i;Að jj;BÞxij≥x0X
i2CA
X
j2CB
q j;Bð ji;AÞxij≥x0
X
i2CA
X
j2CB
p i;Að jj;BÞxij �X
i2CA
X
j2CB
q j;Bð ji;AÞxij�����
�����≤e
X
j2CB
xij≤1; i 2 SAX
j2CB
xij ¼ 0; i=2SAX
i2CA
xij≤1; j 2 SBX
i2CA
xij ¼ 0; j=2SBxij ¼ 0; 1; i 2 CA and j 2 CB
Table VI. Ratings scale for concession evaluation
Ratings scale
Excellent 1.0Very high 0.9High 0.8Medium 0.7Low 0.5Very low 0.4Negligible 0.3
Max x0such that;P
i2CA
Pj2CB
p i;Að jj;BÞxij≥x0X
i2CA
X
j2CB
q j;Bð ji;AÞxij≥x0
X
i2CA
X
j2CB
p i;Að jj;BÞxij �X
i2CA
X
j2CB
q j;Bð ji;AÞxij�����
�����≤e
X
j2CB
xij≤1; i 2 SAX
j2CB
xij ¼ 0; i=2SAX
i2CA
xij≤1; j 2 SBX
i2CA
xij ¼ 0; j=2SBxij ¼ 0; 1; i 2 CA and j 2 CB
A NEW APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
6. DISCUSSION: THE GAIN-TO-LOSS RATIOSOF CONCESSIONS MADE BY BOTH SIDESNEED TO BE CLOSE TO ONE ANOTHER
One of the key takeaways that all participants in theexercise appreciated was that they learned moreabout the other party. One of the primary challengesto the approach turned out to be the same item that
created a greater depth in understanding: a lack ofcommon definitions. A lack of common definitionschallenged the participants to actively engage in dee-per understanding of each other. For future exercisesof this sort though, we suggest that one of the firststeps to pursue is to define terms and language. Forinstance, one of the concessions that is offered is todirect more effort to ‘Human Rights’. How the
Table VIII. Palestinians’ ratios
Palestinians' Ratios
Acc
ept T
wo-
Stat
e So
lutio
n
Acc
epta
nce
of N
on-
Con
tiguo
us S
tate
Ack
now
ledg
e Is
rael
's
Exi
sten
ce a
s a
Jew
ish
Stat
e
Ack
now
ledg
e Is
rael
's
Exi
sten
ce a
s an
Ind
epen
dent
St
ate
Agr
ee to
Com
prom
ise
to th
e D
eman
d of
the
Rig
ht o
f N
o R
etur
n
Dec
lare
Aga
inst
Ira
nian
N
ucle
ar D
evel
opm
ent
Dro
p O
ppos
ition
to T
rade
&
Nor
mal
Rel
atio
ns w
/ Isr
ael
Inci
tem
ent o
f A
nti-
Isra
eli
Sent
imen
t in
Scho
ol
Lob
by A
rab
Stat
es to
Allo
w
Isra
elis
to H
ave
the
Rig
ht to
R
etur
n
Mak
e C
ompr
omis
e on
the
Stat
us o
f Je
rusa
lem
Den
ounc
e &
Rei
gn in
V
iole
nce
Seek
Ass
ista
nce
for
a L
egiti
mat
e Se
ttlem
ent o
f R
efug
ees
Shar
ing
of N
atur
al R
esou
rces
Wor
k C
oope
rativ
ely
w/ I
srae
l
Abandon the Idea of a Jewish State 1.025 1.315 1.023 1.373 1.234 3.566 1.097 4.706 2.002 0.000 1.572 1.196 0.000 1.219
Accept Two-State Solution 0.000 1.121 0.000 1.171 1.052 3.041 0.000 4.013 1.707 0.000 1.340 1.020 0.000 1.039
Comply with UN Resolutions 1.345 1.726 1.342 1.802 1.619 4.680 1.440 6.176 2.627 1.181 2.062 1.569 1.311 1.599
Human Rights 1.156 1.483 1.153 1.548 1.391 4.020 1.237 5.305 2.257 1.015 1.772 1.348 1.126 1.374
Implementation of Refugee Rights 1.231 1.579 1.228 1.648 1.481 4.281 1.317 5.650 2.403 1.081 1.887 1.436 1.199 1.463
Palestinian Freedom of Movement 0.000 1.027 0.000 1.072 0.000 2.785 0.000 3.676 1.564 0.000 1.228 0.000 0.000 0.000
Removal of Wall & Other Barriers 0.000 1.251 0.000 1.306 1.174 3.393 1.044 4.478 1.905 0.000 1.496 1.138 0.000 1.160
Right to Economic Development 0.000 1.098 0.000 1.147 1.030 2.979 0.000 3.931 1.672 0.000 1.313 0.000 0.000 1.018
Right to Education 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.766 0.000 2.330 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Shared Administration of Resources 0.000 1.239 0.000 1.294 1.163 3.361 1.034 4.435 1.887 0.000 1.481 1.127 0.000 1.149
Shared Control of Holy Places 0.000 1.017 0.000 1.061 0.000 2.757 0.000 3.638 1.548 0.000 1.215 0.000 0.000 0.000
Shared Jerusalem 0.000 1.163 0.000 1.214 1.091 3.154 0.000 4.162 1.770 0.000 1.390 1.058 0.000 1.078
Turnover Settlement w / wo Compensation 1.129 1.448 1.126 1.512 1.359 3.928 1.209 5.183 2.205 0.000 1.731 1.317 1.100 1.342
Table VII. Israelis’ ratios
Israelis' Ratios
Acc
ept T
wo-
Stat
e So
lutio
n
Acc
epta
nce
of N
on-
Con
tiguo
us S
tate
Ack
now
ledg
e Is
rael
's
Exi
sten
ce a
s a
Jew
ish
Stat
e
Ack
now
ledg
e Is
rael
's
Exi
sten
ce a
s an
In
depe
nden
t Sta
te
Agr
ee to
Com
prom
ise
to th
e D
eman
d of
the
Rig
ht o
f N
o R
etur
n
Dec
lare
Aga
inst
Ir
ania
n N
ucle
ar
Dev
elop
men
t
Dro
p O
ppos
ition
to
Tra
de &
Nor
mal
R
elat
ions
w/ I
srae
l
Inci
tem
ent o
f A
nti-
Isra
eli S
entim
ent i
n Sc
hool
Lob
by A
rab
Stat
es to
A
llow
Isr
aelis
to H
ave
the
Rig
ht to
Ret
urn
Mak
e C
ompr
omis
e on
th
e St
atus
of
Jeru
sale
m
Den
ounc
e &
Rei
gn in
V
iole
nce
Seek
Ass
ista
nce
for
a L
egiti
mat
e Se
ttlem
ent
of R
efug
ees
Shar
ing
of N
atur
al
Res
ourc
es
Wor
k C
oope
rativ
ely
w/ I
srae
l
Abandon the Idea of a Jewish State 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Accept Two-State Solution 1.792 1.649 1.525 1.442 2.499 0.000 0.000 2.324 0.000 1.077 1.974 1.186 1.172 1.116
Comply with UN Resolutions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Human Rights 7.906 7.273 6.724 6.361 11.022 0.000 3.975 10.251 0.000 4.751 8.706 5.230 5.167 4.923
Implementation of Refugee Rights 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.109 0.000 0.000 1.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Palestinian Freedom of Movement 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Removal of Wall & Other Barriers 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.385 0.000 0.000 1.288 0.000 0.000 1.094 0.000 0.000 0.000
Right to Economic Development 7.906 7.273 6.724 6.361 11.022 0.000 3.975 10.251 0.000 4.751 8.706 5.230 5.167 4.923
Right to Education 7.906 7.273 6.724 6.361 11.022 0.000 3.975 10.251 0.000 4.751 8.706 5.230 5.167 4.923
Shared Administration of Resources 2.057 1.892 1.750 1.655 2.868 0.000 1.034 2.667 0.000 1.236 2.265 1.361 1.344 1.281
Shared Control of Holy Places 1.753 1.613 1.491 1.410 2.444 0.000 0.000 2.273 0.000 1.054 1.931 1.160 1.146 1.092
Shared Jerusalem 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.314 0.000 0.000 1.222 0.000 0.000 1.038 0.000 0.000 0.000
Turnover Settlement w / wo Compensation 1.234 1.135 1.049 0.000 1.720 0.000 0.000 1.599 0.000 0.000 1.358 0.000 0.000 0.000
T. L. SAATY AND H. J. ZOFFER
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
parties define ‘human rights’, however, differsgreatly. Even though philosophically there shouldbe an easily determined common definition for‘human rights’, the reality is that the parties took dif-ferent positions on this issue.
The judgement and prioritization process for theconcessions was implemented for each party withoutknowledge of the other party.
The object is to make the ratios of the two partiesclose. Each party can by itself estimate the gain-to-loss ratio of its opponent and determine if his gain-to-loss ratio is much greater than the other party’sgain-to-loss ratio. That also makes the negotiationsmore difficult. The original model sought a solutionthat matched the best one-to-one concession. How-ever, given that the best solution was a stand-off, wefound that one had to consider trading off bundles ofconcessions. The role of the mediator is extremelyimportant in this setting. There are two ways that themediator can help to alter the outcome of ratios. Recallthat both the numerator and the denominator of theratio includes perceptions of the other; in the numeratoris what one party perceives the cost of concessions areto the adversary, whereas the denominator includeswhat one party perceives the other party’s benefits tobe. It is interesting to note that in a retributive conflict,one party perceives the costs to the adversary as abenefit to itself and conversely the gain to the adversaryas a loss to itself. The mediator has a real opportunity tobridge gaps, given the measured difference between thetwo parties and their varying perceptions, interpreta-tions, and respect for ‘international’ law.
Our results underline the differences between theIsraelis and the Palestinians. In particular, the findingshighlight the value of the Israelis’ concessions asmeasured by the Palestinians when compared with thePalestinians’ concessions as measured by the Israelisthrough the large differences in ratios. Given this dispar-ity, there is great opportunity by one party to take aleadership role in the resolution process. Moreover,there is an even greater opportunity for a mediator tohelp bridge the gap in the gain-to-loss ratios. By educat-ing both parties on the true costs and benefits to theadversary, the perceptions are brought more in line withreality and the score differences are minimized. It ispossible that external influences or pressures might benecessary to rationalize the difference in the gain-to-lossratios in order to recognize the discrepancies.
7. EQUALIZING CONCESSION TRADE-OFFS
Mistrust and the inclination to act retributively preventpeople from making all their concessions at once. Todetermine the fairest and maximum gain to both par-ties from concessions being traded off, we computedgain–loss ratios for each pair of concessions, one foreach party. These gain–loss ratios represent the gain toone party from the concession made by the other partydivided by that party’s loss from the concession it made.The gain to one party’s concession is obtained as thebenefits accrued from the other party’s concession mul-tiplied by the perceived costs to the party making theconcession. The loss to one party’s concession is
Table IX. Matching concessions with corresponding gain–loss ratios
Israeli's Concessions Gain/LossRatio
Palestinian's Concessions Gain/LossRatio
• Shared Administration ofResources
1.03 • Drop Opposition to Trade & NormalRelations w/Israel
1.03
• Comply with UN Resolutions 7.27 • Acceptance of Non-Contiguous State 7.27
• Right to Economic Development • Incitement of Anti-Israeli Sentiment inSchool
• Shared Control of Holy Places 2.77 • Acknowledge Israel’s Existence as anIndependent State
2.77
• Turnover Settlement w/withoutCompensation
• Denounce and Reign in Violence
• Accept Two-State Solution 1.08 • Make Compromise on the Status ofJerusalem
1.08
• Shared Jerusalem • Work Cooperatively w/Israel
• Implementation of RefugeeRights
5.17 • Declare Against Iranian NuclearDevelopment
5.17
• Palestinian Freedom ofMovement
• Lobby Arab States to Allow Israelis toHave the Right to Return
• Right to Education • Sharing of Natural Resources
• Human RightsRemoval of Wall and OtherBarriers
7.900.00
• Accept Two-State Solution 1.16
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Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
obtained as the costs of the concession it made multi-plied by the perceived benefits to the other party.To make the trade-offs, we considered only pairs ofconcessions with gain–loss ratios for both partiesgreater than one. This means that either side would bereluctant to trade off a concession in return for anotherfrom which its gain is less than its loss.
The trade-off process started by attempting to trade-off single concessions with two objectives in mind:closeness of the gain-to-loss ratios and maximizationof the ratio. If there were no single concessions thatcould be traded that satisfied both criteria to ensurefairness, then groups of concessions were consideredfor trade-off to satisfy the same requirements. As aresult of this process, we obtained Table IX.
The concessions in Table IX, numbered as inTable II, are traded off while maximizing the gain-to-loss ratio for each side and minimizing the differencebetween these ratios to within 1% from each otherexcept for the very last concessions that can only betraded if the 1% constraint is relaxed. All the conces-sions have been traded off except for the ones relatedto the resettlement of refugees (concession 1 for theIsraelis from Table II) and the acceptance of Israelby the Palestinians as a secure, independent, anddemocratic Jewish state (concessions 3, 6, and 8 forthe Palestinians from Table II). These concessionswill need to be addressed as the process is continued.
The outcome shows that with the exception of thetwo concessions mentioned earlier, all the otherconcessions can be traded off either singly or in groupsagainst other concessions without violating the con-strains previously established, namely that the gain–lossratios be not too large and as close to one another as pos-sible. One might question the advantage of trading offall of the concession identified to date without addres-sing the two major issues mentioned earlier. Prior nego-tiations have been hampered by the chaos or confusioncaused by trying to address all of the issues at the sametime. What this process permits is eliminating eithertemporarily or permanently any discussion that wouldimpede attention to the two major matters that seemthe most acrimonious and potentially irreconcilable.Another reason to take care of the tradable issues firstis to give the parties experience in interactingsuccessfully with one another, thus engendering a spiritof trust that could be very helpful when the finalfew but crucially important issues are considered.
Note, for example that the Israeli concession,‘Shared Administration of Resources’ trades offagainst the Palestinian concession ‘Drop Oppositionto Trade and Normal Relations with Israel’ with aresulting gain–loss ratio for both sides of about 1.03.
Similarly, the remaining concessions are traded offagainst those of the other side in groups of two andthree. The final two Israeli concessions in Table VIdo not trade off against the last Palestinian concession.
It should be noted that the solution to the refugeeproblem includes removing the three concessions 3,6, and 8, all of which relate to this issue. However,only the single Israeli concession 1 needs to beremoved from the present deliberations. Trade-offsof these concessions would require focusing theAHP process only on these matters with the possibleparticipation of influential outside parties.
8. PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION—SOMESKEPTICAL OBSERVATIONS
‘The problems we have today cannot be solved bythinking the way we thought when we created them’,said Albert Einstein.
It is possible that either side would be reluctant toaccept the outcome of the trade-off of bundles ofconcessions. Optimally, these bundles of concessionswhen compared both maximize the gain–loss ratio foreach side and also seek equality of this ratio for bothsides. However, even though the solution may be opti-mal, there may still be retributive concerns that theother side may be getting more or that they may haveforgotten some important concessions they want or theydo not trust their judgements or cannot completelydivest the emotions generated over a long period.
It may be that the Israelis and Palestinians havelived with this conflict for so long that they do notthink an acceptable resolution is possible. Peoplewho have experienced pain for a long time haveexpectations about what would make them feel better,and a rational solution would not necessarily satisfythose feelings. We all have a tendency to believe inthe mystical, that the hand of God must be allowedto do its work, and miracles do happen. But does thathand act without action by the parties?
Given the length of time that this controversy hasendured, is there a possibility that the parties at riskwould reject an outcome that has embedded long-standing biases and emotions into a solution thatconsiders all conceivable factors and which producesa recommended outcome that gives both parties anapproximately equivalent set of benefits and costs.The answer may be yes. So of what value has thisprocess been? Should such reluctance be observed, thiswill in no way invalidate the efficacy of this approach.
The approach opens up an avenue of new thinking.Even if people reject the first effort, it may only need
T. L. SAATY AND H. J. ZOFFER
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
to be modified a bit to make it acceptable, or in anycase, people may reject the unknown, but they livewith it long enough for it to become an accepted andnatural way of thinking. People may be less likely toreject a second or a third revised effort.
Although it would be appealing for the parties toimplement the recommended solution, it may not be pos-sible do so without the influence or even coercion of out-side parties, such as the United Nations, the UnitedStates, the European Union, and Russia. Some of theconcessions cannot be implemented without supervision.
9. CONCLUSIONS
Our objective has been to see if the AHP, a newapproach to group decision making, could be used pro-ductively to move forward the 60-year-old debateabout solving the perplexing Middle East problem. Itwas not our intention to use the process to discover aspecific solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.The AHP provided us with a new way to pursue thedialogue in a context that uses a quantitatively orientedapproach to attach numerical priorities to the issues inwhat has been an emotionally charged conflict. Ourpurpose has been to introduce a process that, were itto be used by the actual negotiators, might offer somenew ways of moving forward on the heretoforeintractable positions adopted by the parties.
One may ask how can a process like this add mean-ing to the plethora of proposed solutions that haveeither fallen on deaf ears more than 60 years or beendestroyed because of the impossibility of implementa-tion? It is important to state the idea that the AHP is asupplement and not a replacement for face-to-facenegotiations. Whenever the process has broken downin the past, there has been no next step to take. Anumber of entities have stepped forward to try to jumpstart the stalled negotiation. The United States has beenthe foremost player in this remediation effort. Theyhave tried to determine what would be a fair outcome,but to date, there has been no real way to measurewhich initiative would constitute a fair and equitablepackage because the issues are so varied, complex,interrelated, and affected by extreme emotions. AHPprovides an alternative approach by helping the partiesto either think outside the box by themselves or engagein exercises that force this creative behaviour. In itssimplest terms, AHP would require the actual negotia-tor to make judgements in a novel way. The outcomeof their judgements could provide an outsider like theUnited States with some confidence that an AHP-typesolution would yield an outcome that is as fair to each
side as is possible with current technology. A thirdparty could then encourage the parties to consider sucha solution with increased confidence that the approachallows, for example, the United States to act in a neutralposition with some confidence that as fair a solution aspossible is being promoted.
It is important to note that the participants in ourmeetings were knowledgeable, informed, thoughtfulIsraelis and Palestinians, who might be able torecommend to actual negotiators ideas and ways tosolve this long-simmering problem. They wereengaged in a simulation—a process to find out ifthese participants had been, indeed, the actual nego-tiators, would they have been able to stay with thenegotiations and to reach some productive outcome.Whether these participants were representative oftheir respective constituencies is irrelevant becausethe results of their deliberations were never expectedto produce a solution to the problem but merely totest an approach. The outcomes of the deliberationssuggested a number of important benefits if theapproach were actually used by real-life negotiators.
We have attempted to find out how the processwould work: would it provide a modicum of an objec-tive basis to trade off the concessions and help to drainthe emotions, so far as was possible, out of discussionsof contentious issues? It was carried out by rating theissues to prioritize them and then rate the concessionswith respect to each issue. We established priorities byassigning quantitative values, which would encouragenegotiators to deal with the importance of one issue ascompared with another issue. By identifying conces-sions that each party could potentially make and ratingthem as to how they addressed each of the identifiedissues, we reached an outcome whereby certainactions could be seen to be more productive thanothers. This is achieved either by bundling conces-sions on one side to address issues raised by the otherside or identifying issues that cannot be traded off byamassing concessions from one party, mainly becausesome of the issues are so fundamental to the negotia-tions that no number of concessions could balancetheir importance. Although some of these conclusionsmay be apparent to the concerned observer, the pro-cess provides affirmation of the conclusions.
Although the casual observer might suggest criti-cally that the conclusions and outcomes of the studywere totally dependent on what the positions of theparticipants on the negotiating team were, we believethat this is indeed an accurate conclusion but does notin any way invalidate the study. The outcomes dependon the judgements made, and the judgements dependon the opinions of the negotiators. It is self-evident that
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who does the negotiating will directly affect the out-come. We are less concerned with coming to any par-ticular solution than we are with demonstrating howthe AHP represents an approach that captures realitywithout the burden of excessive emotion. Ultimately,solutions that emerge from the process will dependon the positions and attitudes of the negotiators. Tothe extent that the negotiators represent positions thatencompass varying proportions of the constituenciesthey represent, the solution will either be arrived atwithin a reasonable time, or after extended lengthy dis-cussions, possibly never arriving at a solution. Ourrecommendations noted below include our responseto this phenomenon.
It is important to understand that the process hastwo major components, the first being the identificationof issues, concessions, benefits, and costs to each sideand a second that concerns implementation policies.This simulation covered only the first stage of theprocess. So what was the outcome? We believe therewere eight important conclusions that we could draw.
They are as follows:
1. The exercise validated that our process made it possi-ble to consider the potential concessions each sidemightmake and to consider the trade-offs of such con-cessions, either individually or in bundles. The partici-pants learned how to trade off such concessions toserve the interests of both parties. They identified 27concessions, 14 from one side and 13 from the other.We do not have any reason to believe that thisincluded every possible concession that might bemade. Because the AHP process requires that every-thing possible be considered for inclusion in the struc-ture: the issues and their concessions, with benefitsand costs, it is recommended that every effort bemadeto include the full range of issues and concessions. Inour simulation, we may well have overlooked one ormore of these issues and concessions, and thus, ourstructure may be incomplete. That in no waydiminishes the effectiveness of our simulation. How-ever, before beginning to work with combinations ofconcessions to trade them off, the structure can betrimmed down to include only what are now knownto be the major elements.
2. The outcome in many cases reinforced the con-ventional wisdom of the participants as to whatthe concrete objectives of each side are and whatpositions either side is willing to modify withconcessions from the other side or is not willingto modify regardless of the other side’s conces-sions. But it was now possible to measure the gains
and losses related to various concessions as identi-fied by the party that would be providing theconcessions, as well as their judgement as to whatthe benefits and costs were to the other party inproviding their concessions. Obviously, the opinionof one side about the costs and benefits to theother side of specific concessions sometimes variedwidely from the other side’s opinion as to the costsand benefits to them of the concessions they mightpossibly make. These differences in perception arerevealing, and they often led to differences in gain-to-loss ratios as perceived by each party.
3. The AHP process made it possible for the partici-pants to consider a wide variety of potential trade-offs, either individually or in bundles. By attachingquantitative values to the comparisons, a great dealof the emotionality of the discussion was defused. Itbecame clear that at least, in the case of these speci-fic participants, certain issues appeared not to betradable or that the participants did not know howto trade them. For example, the Israeli need to havea Jewish state and the Palestinian need to have asatisfactory solution to the resettlement of refugeesappeared to be issues that could not be easily com-promised, if at all. One might surmise that solutionsto such issues might require the involvement of out-side parties and that solutions not totally acceptableto either side might have to be imposed. By com-paring costs and benefits of concessions as viewedby either party and establishing hierarchies that per-mitted comparisons of the issues and concessions,some equivalence of pain or cost and of benefit,either by individual comparisons or in bundles,might suggest a reasonably objective statement ofwhat a ‘fair’ or equally painful or equally beneficialoutcome might be. Neither side might feel such asolution would be a ‘win’ for them, an objectiveeach side would prefer to achieve. Theymight be con-vinced, perhaps only by outside parties, that a solutionthat would bring peace could only be achieved if eachparty recognized through a process such as the AHPor otherwise, that trading off a similarly beneficialand painful (as objectively measured) set of solutionsis the only way to achieve peace. A further advantagewould be that outside parties, such as the UnitedStates or the European Union or the United Nations,etc. could pressure the parties to settle, using solutionscarefully balanced to favour neither side and exactingcompromises from both sides that these outside par-ties could feel reasonably comfortable that theirimpact was objectively measured.
4. Participants were willing to talk about sensitiveissues as part of the concession discussion without
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feeling threatened by the other party. Althoughthe participants occasionally engaged in heateddiscussions, in general, an order of civility wasengendered. The participants were concerned withlooking at issues at a micro level rather than a macrolevel, with comparisons of priorities, establishmentof hierarchies, and weighting of judgements con-sidered on an issue-by-issue and concession-by-concession basis. This did not necessarily changethe emotionality that each side felt, but by separat-ing the issues and the concessions, participants wereencouraged to consider the relative importance ofone issue and the effect upon it of one or many con-cessions. It is obviously an oversimplification tosuggest that by breaking the problem into smallpieces and then working to measure judgementsmathematically, that participants were so engagedin collating relevant tasks that their emotionalitylargely disappeared. To continue the analogy, parti-cipants had cut the puzzle into a jigsaw of tinypieces where the total picture was not discernibleas they decided which piece fit into which otherpiece. But when the pieces were put back together,the puzzle might look somewhat different. The com-plete puzzle from this experiment has not yet beenput together for a variety of reasons, but when itis, it is fairly certain that it will offer a somewhatdifferent path for proceeding than has been the casethus far. The main reason the puzzle remains inpieces is that we have not yet focused on the secondstage of the process where implementation strategieswill be defined and there are still some parts of theinitial process such as defining the issues and theconcessions in more definitive terms that need tobe carried out again and reconsidered based on ourexperience so far.
5. A major outcome of the process thus far is that theparties have identified 106 issues and numerousconcessions as being relevant to their deliberations.We have arbitrarily grouped these issues andconcessions into major categories. The richness ofthe issues in each category as well as the groupingof the concessions has helped to define the issuesand concessions more exactly. This approach pro-vided a structure where participants have decom-posed the problem rather than sought immediatesolutions. What the parameters of the problemwere was one question addressed. What actionsthe parties could potentially take to address theseissues was a second question answered. In eachsession, we spent only 3 days for the entire processin this effort, so we cannot suggest that every pos-sible concession and issue was identified. But we
do believe that some issues are multifaceted andwhat was suggested as a separate issue may turnout to be a part, large or small, of another issue.A major outcome was that by examining the issuesin contention and the concessions that mightaddress one or many of those issues, the impor-tance of the issues and concessions in terms ofgains and losses as perceived by each party wererepresented by mathematical judgements andquantified.
6. A crucial finding is the need to identify and developimplementation policies for all the concessions.For example, there was much discussion about apossible compromise by the Palestinians on theirdemand for the right of return of those Palestiniansoriginally living in what is now part of Israel. Butwithout an implementation policy or a set ofoptions, if there is more than one possibility, thenthe mere statement of offering such a concessionis ineffective without finding offsetting compro-mises and policies that would probably be difficultto implement. The process we engaged in has gen-erally identified the issues where implementationpolicies are necessary. In some of these cases, con-cessions cannot be provided by the actions of theparty alone offering the concession. There need tobe other parties involved and willing to play a part,so that the concession is truly on the table and atrade can be achieved. The question of how couldthis concession be achieved must be answeredbefore the concession becomes viable. We still needto examine each concession and determine by parti-cipant involvement just what will be required andby whom to make that concession a real possibility.
7. An important outcome of this effort was to identifywhat the parties meant by the use of certain terms.For example, we now know that using the words‘human rights’ that came up time and time againin the discussions is not easily defined. It meansone thing to the Palestinians and something else tothe Israelis. How human rights are identified, dis-played, defined, executed, and implemented needsto be discussed in some detail. Participants cannotmake effective judgements about such terms whenthey are being mathematically compared with otherterms, if the sides have different definitions of theterms. The limitations of time made it impossibleto engage in the complex discussions that wouldhave been required to address this matter. Anotherexample is what is exactly meant by the ‘sharing ofJerusalem’. It is again important to emphasize thatthis problem in no way interfered with the basicquestion we posed, which was how could the
A NEW APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT
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Israeli–Palestinian question be fitted into the AHPstructure and would the process be amenable tousing the AHP approach. We did not expect a solu-tion to emerge, but as the process is furtheremployed and the next stage of discussions occurand perhaps later as the participants in the studyare actual negotiators, the outcomes will perhapsyield some promising avenues for negotiation notyet in play.
8. The experiment we conducted convinced us that areasonably timed conclusion to the conflict wouldbe substantially enhanced if the negotiators repre-sented the viewpoint of some predetermined propor-tion of their respective constituencies. Recognizingthat a suggestion of some non-inclusiveness in thediscussion in the interest of expediency is not onlycontroversial but likely to elicit all sorts of oppro-brium, there is one other way to achieve the sameresult. It is complex and may produce similar out-cries, but at least, it is an alternative. If we coulddetermine, by survey or otherwise, what theproportion in each society was of far right, far left,and centre positions, we could use the AHP(which would weigh the judgements based onthe proportion of that society that the negotiatorrepresented) so that intractable positions are mini-mized, understanding that someone would need todeal with the anger from those whose judgementswere considered less crucial to a final solutionbecause they represented a smaller proportion oftheir respective populations.
A major stumbling block in the negotiationsattempted to date results from the determined effortto address all of the issues in a single format, in oneplace, in a comprehensive manner. Results of ourexperiment suggest that it would be far more feasibleto address a few of the issues and concessions at a time.
During these discussions, the Palestinian represen-tatives indicated that they felt strong anger becauseof their perception that Israel has not taken moreresponsibility in helping to solve the Palestinianrefugee problem. The Israeli representatives, on thecontrary, expressed their sense of anger because thePalestinians failed to participate in helping the Israelisto obtain the level of security that is essential to movethe process forward from the Israeli position.
In summary, these meetings yielded positive butpreliminary results that are clearly inconclusive andincomplete. Nothing that has occurred invalidates theefficacy of the AHP as a novel and comprehensiveapproach to solve this problem. It needs to be carriedto its ultimate conclusion including addressing the
definition and implementation concerns, using actualnegotiators to release the power of the process.
Although the foregoing general outcomes representimportant progress, the capacity of this process to yielduseful conclusions that would move the dialogue for-ward depends on using the results to identify specificsteps that could constitute a new start to the discussions.We also need to examine what remains to be carriedout. Clearly, the approach taken seems to work wellto address the problem. But as the effort continued,it became clearer as to what needs to be carried outin the next round of discussions.
We need to identify those terms where definitionsare crucial and work out agreed upon statements ofexactly what those words or terms meant in order topermit judgements and comparisons that are moreaccurate. We also need to identify which areas ofconcessions need implementation policies developedto make them viable and to examine as many optionsas possible in considering the implementation.
In summary, our participants identified more than100 issues of small and large import, which wereviewed as necessary to address if the Palestinian–Israeli conflict is to be resolved. In the few daysavailable to them, they identified a significant num-ber of concessions both sides could offer, if theywere willing to do so, which would address most ofthese issues. To the extent not all issues wereaddressed by possible concessions, it was eitherbecause the issues were trivial and not worthy of speci-fic concessions or time or imagination did not permitthe identification of appropriate concessions to addressthose particular issues.
The panel was able to trade off all but two majorissues (a secure, independent democratic Jewish staterecognized by the Palestinians and a solution to theresettlement of refugees). These two issues wouldneed to be considered in a separate application ofAHP to find the difficult concessions necessary totrade-off concessions that would meet our restrictionsand still address those two issues directly. Thatprocess remains to be addressed.
To date, the official negotiations have not produceda viable solution. Our research suggests that by orga-nizing the concerns in a more effective way, identifyingconcessions that would address the issues identified,assuming both sides see an advantage in a peacefulresolution quickly, measuring both tangible and intan-gible factors, draining the emotions out of the discus-sions to the extent possible, and decomposing theissues into manageable segments, all of which is possi-ble using AHP, a chance of resolution is enhanced.What have the parties got to lose?
T. L. SAATY AND H. J. ZOFFER
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
GOAL: ISRAELI BENEFITS FROM PALESTINIAN CONCESSIONS
Benefits Criteria Evaluation
Control
Jerusalem &
Holy Places
Refugee
Compensation on
Settlement
Question
Settlements in
Palestinian
Territory
Increasing
Security
Permanent
Borders
Controlling &
Rationing
Water & Other
Resources
Human
Rights
Palestinian Concessions
Accept Two State Solution Agree to compromise on the demand of the right of return Work cooperatively and in
active engagement w/Israel
Accept a two state solution which
includes a noncontiguous area - Gaza Denounce Iranian pursuit of
nuclear arms & support Israel's
efforts to remove the threat
Seek assistance for a legitimate settlement of refugees Acknowledge Israel's existence as a
Jewish state
Refrain from & work against
any anti-Israel sentiments in Palestinian schools
Make compromise on the status of
Jerusalem Drop opposition to trade and normal relations with Israel
Acknowledge Israel's existence as an
Independent State Share all natural resources w/Israel Denounce & rein in violence
GOAL: ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS OF PALESTINIAN COSTS FROM PALESTINIAN CONCESSIONS
Costs
Lose Argument of Refugees Infrastructure
Lose Victim Status Monetary Cost
Lose Revolutionary Cause as Unifying Factor Accountability & Responsibility (Internal & External)
Palestinian Concessions
Accept Two-State Solution Agree to compromise on the demand
of the right of return
Work cooperatively and in
active engagement w/Israel
Accept a Two-State Solution
which includes a
noncontiguous area - Gaza
Lobby Arab states to allow both Israelis and
Palestinians to have the right to return to their land
of origin
Denounce Iranian pursuit of
nuclear arms and support
Israel's efforts to remove the
threat Acknowledge Israel's
existence as a Jewish State
Seek assistance for a legitimate settlement of
refugees
Refrain from and work against
any anti-Israel sentiments in
Palestinian schools
Acknowledge Israel's
existence as an Independent
State
Drop opposition to trade and normal
relations w/Israel
Make compromise on the
status of Jerusalem Share all natural resources w/Israel Denounce and rein-in violence
Figure 1. Hierarchies of Israeli benefits and costs.
APPENDIX
A NEW APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
GOAL: ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS OF PALESTINIAN GAINS FROM ISRAELI CONCESSIONS
Gains
International Recognized Borders Independence Law & Order
Member of Nations Peace Economic Trade Pride
Israeli Concessions
Abandon the idea of a
Jewish State
Share Jerusalem as both a religious
& political center w/all parties
Encourage equal opportunity for
Palestinians to achieve equal
economic prosperity
Accept a two-state
noitulos
Turnover settlements of Jewish
settlers on land claimed by the
Palestinians, with or without compensation
Allow the right to have an
education that is non-biased and
equally shares historic
backgrounds
Comply w/all applicable
United Nations
resolutions
Allow the sharing of all
natural resources between
Palestinians and Israelis Comply w/human rights Permit Palestinian freedom of
movement
Allow all parties to have
equal access to and
control of religious sites
and holy places
Implement Palestinian refugee
rights
Remove the wall and other
barriers to Palestinian movement
GOAL: ISRAELI COSTS FROM OWN CONCESSIONS
Israeli Cost Criteria Evaluation
Economic International
Image Political Religious Psychological Security Demographic
Administration (Law &
Order) Civil Disorder (War) Social Unification of Jewish People
Israeli Concessions
Abandon the idea of a
Jewish State
Share Jerusalem as both a religious & political
center w/all parties
Encourage equal opportunity for Palestinians to achieve
equal economic prosperity
Accept a two-state
solution
Allow the right to have an education that is non-biased
and equally shares historic backgrounds Comply w/all applicable
United Nations
resolutions
Turnover settlements of Jewish settlers on land
claimed by the Palestinians, with or without
compensation Allow the sharing of all
natural resources
between Palestinians &
Israelis Permit Palestinian freedom of movement
Allow all parties to have
equal access to and
control of religious sites
and holy places
Comply w/human rights
Remove the wall & other barriers to Palestinian
movement Implement Palestinian refugee rights
Figure 1. Continued
T. L. SAATY AND H. J. ZOFFER
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
GOAL: PALESTINIAN BENEFITS FROM ISRAELI CONCESSIONS
Benefits Criteria Evaluation
Human
Rights
Permanent
Borders
Sovereign
Palestinian
State
Vacating of
Israelis from
Settlements in
Palestinian
Territory
Shared Control of Jerusalem & Holy Places
Freedom
of
Movement
Shared Water
& Other
Resources
Resolution of
the Refugee
Problem Two-Way
Compensation Security
Israeli Concessions
Abandon the idea of a Jewish
State Share Jerusalem as both a
religious & political center
w/all parties
Encourage equal opportunity for Palestinians to achieve equal
economic prosperity Accept a two-state solution
Comply w/all applicable
United Nations resolutions
Turnover settlements of
Jewish settlers on land
claimed by the Palestinians
with or without compensation
Allow the right to have an education that is non-biased &
equally shares historic backgrounds
Allow the sharing of all natural
resources between Palestinians
& Israelis
Permit Palestinian freedom of movement Comply w/human rights
Allow all parties to have equal
access to and control of
religious sites & holy places
Remove the Wall & other barriers to Palestinian movement Implement Palestinian
refugee rights
GOAL: PALESTINIAN PERCEPTIONS OF ISRAELI COSTS FROM ISRAELI CONCESSIONS
Costs
Ending Superiority (Attitude & Practical) Settlement Evacuation
Change of Zionist Narrative Social Restructuring
Property Restitution & Compensation Unity Based on Common Identity
Israeli Concessions
etatShsiweJafoaediehtnodnabA Share Jerusalem
as both a
religious &
political center
w/all parties
Encourage equal opportunity
for Palestinians to achieve
equal economic prosperity Accept a two-state solution
Comply w/all applicable United Nations resolutions Turnover
settlements of
Jewish settlers
on land claimed
by Palestinians
w/or without
compensation
Allow the right to have an
education that is non-biased
& equally shares historic
backgrounds
Allow the sharing of all natural resources between Palestinians & Israelis
Comply
w/human rights
Permit Palestinian freedom
of movement
Allow all parties to have equal access to and control of religious sites and holy
places
Implement
Palestinian
refugee rights
Remove the Wall & other
barriers to Palestinian
movement
Figure 2. Hierarchies of Palestinian benefits and costs.
A NEW APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
GOAL: PALESTINIAN COSTS FROM OWN CONCESSIONS
Palestinian Costs from Their Own Concessions
Political Psychological Quality of Life Challenging Israel Access to Resources Identity
Economic Religious International Image Property Rights Access to Family Ties Moral
Land/Sea Control Social Social Harmony Public Standing International Standing Division
Palestinian Concessions
Accept Two-State Solution Agree to compromise on the demand of the right
of return
Work cooperatively & in active
engagement w/Israel Accept a Two-State Solution which
includes a noncontiguous area - Gaza Lobby Arab states to allow both Israelis &
Palestinians to have the right to return to their
land of origin
Denounce Iranian pursuit of nuclear
arms & support Israel's efforts to remove
the threat Acknowledge Israel's existence as a
Jewish State
Seek assistance for a legitimate settlement of
refugees Acknowledge Israel's existence as an
Independent State Refrain from and work against any anti-
Israel sentiments in Palestinian schools Drop opposition to trade & normal relations
w/Israel
Make compromise on the status of
Jerusalem Share all natural resources w/Israel Denounce & rein-in violence
GOAL: PALESTINIAN PERCEPTIONS OF ISRAELI GAINS FROM PALESTINIAN CONCESSIONS
Benefits
Peace of
Mind
(Security,
Defense,
Hostility)
Retention of Israeli
Immigration
Acceptance of Israel with
Islamic World Social Harmony
Reduce Fear of Living
Leveraging Resources Acceptance of Israelis Sharing of Religious Festivals
Ending of
Apartheid of
Israel
Sharing of Religious Festivals Trade within a Region
Palestinian Concessions
Accept Two-State Solution Agree to compromise on the
demand of the right of return Work cooperatively & in active engagement w/Israel
Accept a Two-State
Solution which includes a
noncontiguous area - Gaza Lobby Arab states to allow both
Israelis & Palestinians to have
the right to return to their land of
origin
Denounce Iranian pursuit of nuclear arms & support
Israel's efforts to remove the threat
Acknowledge Israel's
existence as a Jewish State
Seek assistance for a legitimate
settlement of refugees Refrain from and work against any anti-Israel sentiments
in Palestinian schools
Acknowledge Israel's
existence as an
Independent State
Drop opposition to trade &
normal relations w/Israel
Make compromise on the
status of Jerusalem Share all natural resources w/Israel
Denounce & rein-in violence
Figure 2. Continued
T. L. SAATY AND H. J. ZOFFER
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda
REFERENCES
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2. Saaty TL, Alexander JM. 1986. Conflict resolution. InPartII: Negotiating Conflicts—The Count of Monte CristoSyndrome: Retributive Conflicts. Praeger: New York.
3. Saaty TL, Vargas LG. 2006.Decision Making with the Ana-lytic Network Process: Economic, Political, Social and Tech-nological Applications with Benefits, Opportunities, Costs
and Risks. Frederick S. Hillier (eds). Springer’s InternationalSeries Operations Research and Management Science.
4. Saaty, TL, Zoffer HJ. (2011). Negotiating the Israeli-Palestinian controversy from a new perspective. Interna-tional Journal of Information Technology and DecisionMaking 10(1): 5–64.
5. Zoffer, HJ, Bahurmoz, A, Hamid MK, Minutolo M,Saaty TL. 2008. Synthesis of complex criteria decisionmaking: a case towards a consensus agreement for aMiddle East conflict resolution. Group Decision andNegotiation 17(5): 363–385.
A NEW APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda