a new approach to the middle east conflict: the analytic hierarchy process

A New Approach To The Middle East Conflict: The AnalyticHierarchy Process

THOMAS L. SAATYa* and H.J. ZOFFERaaUniversity of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USAbBusiness Administration, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA

ABSTRACT

In most long-lasting conflicts, each party’s grievances increase while the concessions they are willing to make decline innumber, quality, and perceived value. Both parties lose sight of what they are willing to settle for, generally exaggerate theirown needs, and minimize the needs of the other side over time. But, it is precisely the matter of trading that needs to be mademore concrete and of higher priority for both sides, if a meaningful resolution is to be found. Without a formal way of tradingoff the concessions and packages of concessions, both sides are likely to suspect that they are getting the short end of thebargain. After the parties have agreed to a trade, very specific binding language about the terms of the agreement, clearimplementation policies and outside guarantors are needed. The worth of the concessions traded, as perceived by both thegiver and receiver, needs to be accurately determined and recorded. All of these require going beyond verbal descriptionsof the concessions to more broadly include their economic, social, geographic, humanitarian, and historical worth. It iscritical that all of these need to be translated into priorities derived in terms of the different values and beliefs of the parties.Priorities are universal and include the diversity of measures in terms of which economic, social, and other values aremeasured. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) provides a way to perform such an assessment with the participation ofnegotiators for the parties. It is a positive approach that makes it possible to reason and express feelings and judgements withnumerical intensities to derive priorities. It has been used productively in the past to deal with the conflicts in South Africaand Northern Ireland and with other controversies throughout the world. With the assistance of panels of Israeli participantsand Palestinian participants brought together in 2009 and 2010, AHP was applied for the first time to the Palestinian–Israeliconflict. The process makes it clear that moderation in different degrees by both sides is essential to arrive at acceptableagreements on concessions proposed and agreed upon by both sides. AHP makes it possible to evaluate moderate andextreme viewpoints and determine their effect on the trading of concessions. The results obtained encourage us to advocateits use in the negotiation process. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

KEY WORDS: Conflict resolution; Middle East Israeli–Palestinian conflict; pairwise comparisons; Analytic HierarchyProcess; concession trade-off

INTRODUCTION

We present an alternative process to address theIsraeli–Palestinian conflict. It does so in two ways thatare different from past efforts. The first is by formallystructuring the conflict, and the second is the manner inwhich discussions are conducted and conclusions drawn.

The approach will help create a solution to the con-flict and provide negotiators with a unique pathway toconsider the thorny issues and corresponding conces-sions underlying the deliberations, together with theirimplementation. Among the prior contentious issues

addressed by this process and encouraged by govern-ments and major participants in the conflicts werethe difficult confrontations in South Africa and inNorthern Ireland. The outcomes of this process addedvaluable dimension to the discussions and resolutionsof those problems.

The Middle East conflict is a prolonged and inter-minable struggle between parties deeply committedto unyielding positions related to identity, religion,and territory. Understanding the Israeli–Palestinianconflict necessitates the understanding and recognitionthat both parties believe there is a theological bondbetween their people and the land. In addition, allthree major religions recognize Jerusalem as symbolicof their belief in a one god idea.

The severity of this conflict has intensified in ourlifetime because international events have catapulted

*Correspondence to: University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh,PA, USAE-mail: [email protected]

Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Received 13 December 2011Accepted 06 February 2012

JOURNAL OF MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION ANALYSISJ. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)Published online in Wiley Online Library(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/mcda.1470

the Middle East into a crucial position in the world’ssearch for peace. Claims are made by these peoplesof their right to have a state that ensures their groupidentity. The problem is greatly compounded by greatpower rivalries, weapon sales, interference by neigh-bouring countries, economic and social discrepancies,and the threat of nuclear retaliation. Although it ispossible that the global framework might accelerate asolution, in fact, it complicates the solution becauseof the apparent insolvability of the issues. Hence, asolution continues to elude the global community.

Some of the world’s best negotiators, diplomats,and able leaders have grappled with the resolution ofthis conflict. However, despite their best efforts, thecurrent condition continues to torment all the parties.Since the inception of the Analytic Hierarchy Process(AHP) and its generalization to dependence andfeedback, the Analytic Network Process, authors haveconducted numerous case studies (e.g. [1], [3], [4])that suggest the method as an alternative approach toconflict resolution that will lay bare the structure ofthe problem and allow reasoned judgement to prevail.

Nonetheless, when one deals with conflict, espe-cially conflict of a prolonged duration, reason rarelyprevails. In fact, with respect to the conflict betweenthe Palestinians and the Israelis, positions havebecome entrenched and each party not only seeks tosatisfy its own needs but also does not mind increasingthe costs of concessions made by the other party. Thistype of conflict is defined as retributive [2] because ofits prolonged negative emotional content. Retributiveresponses differ from the usual cooperative conflictsin which the parties work for a win–win outcome, bytheir partly malevolent intentions, whereby the partiesdo not care about the losses of the other side.

In most long-lasting conflicts, each party’s grie-vances increase while the concessions they are willingto make decline in number, quality, and perceivedvalue. Both parties lose sight of what they are willingto settle for, generally exaggerate their own needs, andminimize the needs of the other side over time. The con-cessions worth trading versus the concessions the otherparty is willing to trade become more indefinite and lessconcise. But, it is precisely the matter of trading thatneeds to be made more concrete and of higher priorityfor both sides, if a meaningful resolution is to be found.

Without a formal way of trading off the conces-sions and packages of concessions, both sides arelikely to suspect that they are getting the short end ofthe bargain. After the parties have agreed to a trade,very specific binding language about the terms of theagreement, clear implementation policies, and outsideguarantors are needed. The worth of the concessions

traded, as perceived by both the giver and receiver,needs to be accurately determined and recorded. Allof these require going beyond verbal descriptionsof the concessions to more broadly include theireconomic, social, geographic, humanitarian, andhistorical worth. It is critical that all of these need tobe translated into priorities derived in terms of the dif-ferent values and beliefs of the parties. Priorities areuniversal and include the diversity of measures interms of which economic, social, and other valuesare measured. The AHP provides a way to performsuch an assessment with the participation of negotia-tors for the parties. It is a positive approach that makesit possible to reason and express feelings and judge-ments with numerical intensities to derive priorities.

With the assistance of the panel of Israeli participantsand Palestinian participants, AHP has now been appliedfor the first time with the input of representatives of bothsides who were knowledgeable and informed about theissues associated with the Palestinian–Israeli conflict.They obviously did not represent the full spectrum ofpolitical ideas and notions. The process makes it clearthat moderation in different degrees by both sides isessential to arrive at acceptable agreements on conces-sions proposed and agreed upon by both sides. Theresults obtained encourage us to advocate its use in thisnegotiation process.

We need to begin by emphasizing that the outcomeof our effort is the beginning of an elaborate undertakingto produce a viable solution to the Israeli–Palestinianconflict. It is simply a novel framework for dialogue.A differentiation from other approaches is its potentialto minimize the influence on the outcome of much ofthe intense emotions that have usually accompaniedsuch discussions. The framework forces the negotia-tors to approach the issues using a quantitativelyoriented set of judgements to compare and trade offvarious issues, benefits, costs, and concessions in away in which each individual item is separated fromthe influences of other passionately charged items.We acknowledge that in an emotionally chargedconflict such as this, there will inevitably remain aresidual emotionality and feelings that cannot beignored and inevitably affect the judgements. Thisdoes not affect the viability of the process becausethe numerical representation of the judgements allowsfor such variability up to a limit that can be measured.It essentially allows one to decompose the probleminto smaller components that can be dealt with moreeasily. Although judgements may vary according tothe perceived power of the parties, the essential natureof the process is not compromised, unless participantsare influenced to change their judgements.

T. L. SAATY AND H. J. ZOFFER

Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. (2012)DOI: 10.1002/mcda

2. DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVEAPPROACH

Onemight ask:Why is it that somany distinguished poli-ticians and negotiators have failed to reach consensusafter 60 years of trying? Here are some possible reasons:

1. They had no way to measure the importance andvalue of intangible factors that can dominate theprocess.

2. They had no overall unifying structure to organizeand prioritize issues and concessions.

3. They had no mechanism to trade off concessionsby measuring their worth.

4. They had no way to capture each party’s percep-tion of the other side’s benefits and costs.

5. They had no way to provide confidence for theother party that the opposing party is not gainingmore than they are.

6. They had no way to avoid the effect of intenseemotions and innuendoes that negatively affectthe negotiation process.

7. They had no way to test the sensitivity and stabilityof the solution to changes in their judgements withrespect to the importance of the factors that deter-mined the best outcome.

It is not a coincidence that the AHP addresses eachof these reasons in a comprehensive and deliberateway, thus eliminating many of the obstructions formoving forward to identify an equitable solution.

3. THE PROCESS

The AHP is about breaking a problem down and thenaggregating the solutions of all the subproblems into aconclusion. It facilitates decision making by organizingperceptions, feelings, judgements, and memories intoa framework that exhibits the forces that influence a deci-sion. In the simple and most common case, the forces arearranged from the more general and less controllable tothe more specific and controllable. The AHP is basedon the innate human ability to make sound judgementsabout small problems and also about large problemswhen a structure like a hierarchy can be built to representthe influences involved. It has been applied in a variety ofdecisions and planning projects in nearly 40 countries.

Briefly, we see decision-making as a process thatinvolves the following steps:

1. Structure a problem with a model that shows theproblem’s key elements and their relationships.

2. Elicit judgements that reflect knowledge, feelings,or emotions of the primary parties, as well as allother parties that have influence on the outcome.

3. Represent those judgements with meaningfulnumbers.

4. Use these numbers to calculate the priorities of theelements of the hierarchy.

5. Synthesize these results to determine an overalloutcome.

6. Analyse sensitivity to changes in judgement.

The retributive conflict resolution approach presentedhere takes into consideration the benefits to A from con-cessions by B and the costs to A of the return conces-sions A makes, as well as A’s perception of the benefitsto B from the concessions Amakes, and also A’s percep-tion of the costs to B of the concessions B makes. Asimilar analysis is made for B. Findings from thisexercise suggest that the development of ‘bundles’ ofconcessions may minimize the difference in ratios ofgains and losses between the two parties that a negotiatorcan use as a tool to move the resolution process forward.

The expressed objectives of the studywere as follows:

• To identify the issues, major and minor, and toexamine the relative significance or priority of theissues currently inhibiting solution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

• To share knowledge and insights about the currentIsraeli–Palestinian situation from differing pointsof view.

• To construct a comprehensive model of the situation.• To explore the benefits and costs of alternativecourses of action.

The traditional approach involving diplomacy andface-to-face negotiations has led to an inconclusive out-come, partially attributable to attitudes coloured bystrong emotions on both sides. Our approach attemptsto address the impact of negative attitudes by focusingthe participants on making judgements that measurethe intensity of their perceptions about the influences thateach of the issues brings to bear upon the final outcome.

In this study, we consider each party’s list of issues,which, if addressed by the other party by makingconcessions, would provide sufficient benefit to thatside towards meeting their goal. They, in turn, wouldbe willing to make concessions to the other side tobalance those concessions with an equivalent trade-off. We refer to these issues as criteria. The processconsists of taking a set of concessions from one sideand measuring them against these criteria in terms of

A NEW APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT


actual or perceived benefits to the other side. Actualbenefits (or costs) are defined as judgements by oneparty about the relative importance of the concessionsthey receive (or give). Perceived benefits (or costs)are defined as putting oneself in the shoes of the otherside to estimate the benefits (or costs), even though thatside may have a totally different opinion about whatthe concessions received or offered are worth.

The remainder of this work is structured as follows.In the next section, we define the problem in generalterms. Subsequently, we outline the structure of thedecision in the form of multiple hierarchies. This effectis evaluated by the parties according to their value sys-tems, both actual and perceived. The outcomes of thisanalysis are priorities used to assess ratios of gainsand losses by both sides that make it possible to deter-mine those concessions for which each party’s gainsexceed its losses and these gains to losses are not unac-ceptably large for either party in comparison with theother party. Then, we examine and identify ratios thatare nearly equal for the two sides from the concessionsmade and pose questions about the viability of suchbundles of concessions that are traded off. Finally,we suggest a way for moving the process to the nextlevel through better definition of the issues and conces-sions as well as through recognition of potential imple-mentation policies and other relevant changes.

4. IMPLEMENTING THE PROCESS

In the opening day of the 3-daymeeting, the panel brain-stormed the issues and structured the problem, definedthe parties at interest, and developed a series of conces-sions that each party might offer to the other.

The process was not without conflict and negotiationof its own. At times, the panel made judgements with-out agreement on exact definitions. There was nearlyalways unanimous agreement on the nature of the con-flict, with much debate about the underlying concerns.These concerns differed according to which constituentgroup was putting them forward. For example, amongthe Palestinian key constituents are Palestinian refu-gees, Hamas followers, Fatah followers, Palestinianswho still live in Israel, and Diaspora Palestinians.Among the Israeli constituents are the ultra right ortho-dox community, Israelis living in settlements in theWest Bank, those associated with the Likud movement,those associated with the Labor Party, and those moreactively seeking peace as a primary objective, withoutdwelling on the details of the difficulties to achieve it.

Since the beginning of the conflict, different consti-tuents have proposed many different approaches. These

approaches inevitably influenced the panel’s perceptionof the concessions to be made by either side. In fact,one participant suggested that it would be difficult ‘tothink outside the box’. He thought that the group wasso influenced by previous thinking that they wouldhave difficulty in conceptualizing ‘creative’ alternativesthat had not been proposed previously.

The panel defined the goal as an attempt to under-stand what forces and influences or combinationsthereof would tend towards a consensus peace accordfor the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Toaccomplish this goal, the panel of nine individuals wasassembled to represent a cross section of thinking onboth sides. Its members had present or prior experi-ence in academia, government, and in business. How-ever, it was recognized that the panel did not representa complete cross-sample of opinions. The sample ofpanel participants was not sufficiently large to includeall points of view, nor was it intended to be so becauseof limitations of time and resources, nor did it containparticipants in actual Israeli–Palestinian negotiations.

This initiative only sought to test the AHP metho-dology on a problem that had previously evadedresolution. The size of the panel was thought to besufficient to account for the different populations.However, it was agreed that the work is exploratoryin nature and intended to demonstrate how the methodcan be used over a short period to arrive at a processthat moves the negotiation process forward.

As mentioned earlier, at no point in the developmentand evaluation of the problem was the process easy. Infact, even the ‘purpose’was not easily agreed upon, andat several points in the 3 days over which the meetingstook place, the panel readdressed what the undertakingwas intended to accomplish. It looked at the purpose ofthe project from various perspectives in the hope offinding one that appeared more promising than othersthat have been tried. The panel brainstormed all theissues they could think of that had to be consideredin the framework. They are listed in Table I as theywere identified by the participants and later organizedinto categories, with no attempt to eliminate possibleduplications. Listing the issues made it easier to iden-tify the concessions and to structure the problem.Taking time to structure the problem in as comprehen-sive a fashion as may be feasible is a crucial first stepbefore attempting to prioritize the relative importanceof its constituent parts that have causal influence onthe concessions and actions to be taken. Needless tosay, the structure that emerged in the early discussiondepended on the parties, their knowledge, experience,and conditioning. In a strict sense, it was a politicalrather than a scientific structure. In such a situation, it



was not possible to provide a cultural analysis of theparties’ narrative and framing of the issues.

The exercise in discussing specific issues sometimesseemed to generate incompatible perceptions of whatcan and would be achievable in peace negotiations.For example, all the Israelis present were adamant that

a one state solution is impossible to contemplate,whereas Palestinians all agreed that a solution that doesnot grant refugees their internationally recognized rightsto return is also impossible to contemplate. But we doknow that historically adamant positions have changedwhen circumstances change. For proper application

Table I. List of outstanding issues organized by category

Geographic and Demographic Issues Political Issues Behavioural Issues

Access of Palestinians to availablenatural resources

Accountability and reasonability ofHamas in the Gaza Strip

Bad faith negotiations

Archaeological issues Agreement on one-state solution CompromiseGolan heights Agreement on two-state solution Confidence building measuresHow to address the Palestinian diaspora AIPAC (American Israel Political

Action Committee)Corruption

How to re-settle Palestinian refugees American politicians Deception and manufacturing of historyImmigration Citizenship rights of Palestinian

community in IsraelEqual treatment of all parties

Palestinian access to the Mediterranean Sea Colonialism Ethnic cleansingPalestinian problem of split land massbetween Gaza and the West Bank

Condemnation of violence as atool of negotiation

Harassment

Population Control Human rightsProblems for Israel in living in anocean of Arab countries

Denunciation of irrelevantUnited Nations resolutions

Human shields

Right of Palestinians to return totheir homes in Israel

European acceptance of responsibilityfor the Holocaust and settlement ofIsraelis in Israel

Intermarriage

Rights of Palestinians toIsraeli-controlled land

Funding of terrorism Learning to forgive without forgetting

Status of Israeli settlements Historical legitimacy of ownershipof land in the area

Love

Water How to deal with charges of apartheid Mutual recognition of rights of each partyEconomic and Business Issues International relationships NonviolenceCompensation for victims of terrorism Islamic state Psychological barriersCompensation to Palestinians for loss of land Jewish refugee issues Psychological damageDealing with property confiscation issues Mutual compensation RacismEconomic choices Problems associated with Hamas Recognition of the HolocaustHow to re-settle Palestinian refugees Residency rights Recognition of the Nakba conditionRestitution Role of the Druze in negotiations Religious fundamentalismEducation Issues Sovereignty Representation of women in the negotiationsEducation Status of Israel RespectIncitement in the educational school system Status of Jerusalem Subjugation and humiliationIndoctrination Status of Palestinian authority Suicide bombersIndustrial parks Status of Ramallah TrustLack of creativity and problem solving Syrian accommodation for settlement

of Palestinian refugeesMilitary Issues

Language training Social Issues Arms smugglingStolen culture Basic human needs DisarmamentSecurity Issues Religious and Ideological Issues House demolitionBombing of Israeli children Armageddon InvasionGilad Shalit (release of prisoners) Christian Zionism (evangelists) Missile buildingSafe passage Holy places Nuclear responsibilitySafety and security Jewish Zionism War crimesTerrorism Palestinian Christians Legal IssuesThe Wall Religious prophecy International Law

Prisoners



of the AHP methodology, it is important to include inthe structure all factors, including those that some par-ticipants feel are so crucial to their preconceived andpredetermined positions, that any concession on thoseissues seems inconceivable.

In order to develop the necessary measurements forprioritization, we need to calculate the gains and lossesfor each concession from each of the parties. The paneldeveloped a total of eight hierarchies involving benefitsand costs and perceived benefits and costs: four hierar-chies for the Israeli group and four hierarchies for thePalestinian group. The exercise in which the 106 issueswere identified through the process of brainstormingserved as a stimulus to the thinking of the participantsto deal with the structuring process. Each of the eighthierarchies involves a goal, for example Israel’s Bene-fits from Palestinian Concessions, and a set of criteriathat are a subset of the issues relevant to that goal. Theyare called criteria in terms of which all the possible con-cessions that were identified were evaluated by scoringthem one at a time. The criteria that were developed forthese eight models were chosen by each of the Israeliand Palestinian participants, respectively. Because ofthe volume of issues, we found it necessary in develop-ing the hierarchies to select as criteria a subset of themost crucial issues. The overall goal of each of thecorresponding criteria in the four hierarchies involvedthe apparent equalization of the ratio of the gains tothe losses by each side. Concessions by each partyare listed in Table II. We list the concessions thatthe participants identified as possible responses to theissues given in Table I. We have classified theseconcessions into four categories for each side.

The following concessions comprise the bottomlevels of the hierarchies given in Figures 1 and 2 inthe Appendix. The first level of these hierarchies arethe criteria used to determine the contribution of theconcessions to the benefits, costs, perceived benefitsand perceived costs of both parties. The priorities ofthese criteria are given in Table III (see [5]). These prio-rities are also listed at the top of Tables IV and V.

The panels attempted to accomplish much in a veryshort period. To facilitate the process and reach someconclusions, we rated each concession under eachcriterion using the words and corresponding scale

values in Table VI as to how strongly it contributedto that criterion that represents the goal it serves. Theresult of this rating is given in Tables IV and V.

For example, in Table IV(a), Israeli’s concessionswere rated using only the highest priority criteria. Twocriteria with negligible priorities, one in column 4 andone in column 6 had zero rating priorities for the conces-sions. These were ignored, ensuring that at least 70% ofthe priorities from the criteria were accounted for in theratings model. Similarly, we did the same thing in theother tables. Table IV(a,b,c,d) presents the results forIsraeli benefits from Palestinian concessions, Israeliperception of Palestinian costs for making these conces-sions to Israel, Israeli costs of their own concessionsand finally, Israeli perception of Palestinian gains fromIsraeli concessions, respectively. Similarly, Table V(a,b,c,d) presents the results of the Palestinian ratings model.

Thus, given two parties A and B, for every conces-sion of party A, there are associated with it costs, andperceived gains to party B, as well as gains to party Band perceived costs to party A.

5. THE RETRIBUTIVE FUNCTION

Given the entrenchment of both sides, a negotiatorhas an opportunity in an appropriate setting to callattention to the gap between the perceived benefitsand costs of the concessions made by both sides andto help each party to reach a conclusion through theintroduction of ‘bargaining chips’. In the negotiationsetting, if A and B are participants, then A considersa particular concession not only with respect tothe incremental benefit (cost) to A but also the cost(benefit) to B in providing (receiving) the concession.The greater the perceived cost of each concession toB, the greater the value of that concession is to A.

Hence, A’s gain from a given concession from Bmay be described as the product of A’s benefits andB’s costs (as perceived by A). We have the followingratios for the two parties A and B:

(according to A’s perceptions)

A’s ratio:

Gain to A from B’s ConcessionA’s Perception of B’s Gain from A’s Concession

¼P

A’s benefits� B’s costs from B’s ConcessionPB’s perceived benefits� A’s costs from A’s Concession



whereP

is the sum over all the benefits obtainedby A in the numerator and by B in the denomina-tor. Hence, given A’s ratio, A’s gain is a productof both the utility benefit received and the costto B in providing that benefit as described inthe numerator of the equation. The total gain toA is diminished by the product of the cost to Ain concessions given to B and the perception ofthe benefit received by B for A’s concessions inthe denominator. A’s benefits and costs are readilymeasured by A; however, the costs and gains to B

are not readily available to A and are thereforeestimated as perceived by A. A expects to havea gain ratio greater than one that suggests thatthe gains to A are greater than the perceived ben-efits to B. Likewise, B expects to have a gain ratiogreater than 1. For equality in ‘trade’ to be achieved,the two parties should be nearly equal in value, whichsuggests that the two gain as much as the perceivedbenefits to and costs of concessions to the other. B’sutility is given by the function (See equation afterTable V (d)):

Table II. Palestinian and Israeli concessions

Concessions

Palestinian concessionsI. Compromise on sovereignty1 Accept two-state solution2 Accept a two-state solution that includes a non-contiguous area—Gaza3 Acknowledge Israel’s existence as a Jewish state4 Acknowledge Israel’s existence as an Independent state5 Make compromises on the status of JerusalemII. Compromise on right of return1 Agree to compromise on the demand of the right of return2 Lobby Arab states to allow both Israelis and Palestinians to have the right to return to their land of origin3 Seek assistance for a legitimate settlement of refugeesIII. Cooperate economically with Israel1 Drop opposition to trade and normal relations with Israel2 Share all natural resources with Israel3 Work cooperatively and in active engagement with IsraelIV. Change attitude towards Israel1 Denounce Iranian pursuit of nuclear arms and support Israel’s efforts to remove the threat2 Refrain from and work against any anti-Israel sentiments in Palestinian schools3 Denounce and rein-in violenceIsraeli concessionsI. Compromise on sovereignty1 Abandon the idea of a Jewish state2 Accept a two-state solution3 Comply with all applicable United Nations resolutions4 Allow the sharing of all natural resources between Palestinians and Israelis5 Allow all parties to have equal access to and control of religious sites and holy places6 Share Jerusalem as both a religious and political centre for all partiesII. Modify settlement activity1 Turnover settlements of Jewish settlers on land claimed by the Palestinians with or without compensationIII. Cooperate to improve human rights treatment1 Comply with human rights2 Implement Palestinian refugee rights3 Encourage equal opportunity for Palestinians to achieve equal economic prosperity4 Allow the right to have an education that is non-biased and equally shares historic backgroundsIV. Remove access barriers1 Permit Palestinian freedom of movement2 Remove the Wall and other barriers to Palestinian movement



Table III. Priorities of criteria

Israeli Criteria

Isra

elis

Ben

efits

fro

m P

ales

tinia

n C

once

ssio

ns

Isra

elis

Per

cept

ion

of P

ales

tinia

n C

osts

Isra

elis

Cos

ts f

rom

The

ir O

wn

Con

cess

ions

Isra

elis

Per

cept

ion

of P

ales

tinia

n G

ains

fro

m I

srae

lis C

once

ssio

ns

BenefitsControl Jerusalem & Holy Places 0.245

Refugee Compensation & Settlement 0.251

Increasing Security 0.193

Permanent Borders 0.000

Controlling & Rationing of Water 0.162

Human Rights 0.022

Settlements in Palestinian Territory 0.127

Perceived Palestinian CostsLose Argument of Refugees 0.048

Victim Status 0.301

Revolutionary cause as unifying factor 0.308

Infrastructure 0.039

Cost 0.268

Accountability & Responsibility 0.035

CostsEconomic 0.026

Political 0.07

Religious 0.002

Psychologica1 0.119

Security 0.274

International Image 0.014

Demographic 0.191

Administration 0.021

Civil Disorder 0.185

Social 0.095

Unification of Jewish People 0.003

Perceived Palestinian BenefitsInternational Recognition 0.002

Member Nations 0.017

Recognized Borders 0.131

Peace 0.014

Independence 0.119

Economic Trade 0.013

Law and Order 0.085

Pride 0.619

Priorities

Palestinian Criteria

Pale

stin

ian

Ben

efits

fro

m I

srae

lis

Con

cess

ions

Pale

stin

ian

Perc

eptio

n of

Isr

aelis

C

osts

Pale

stin

ian

Cos

ts f

rom

The

ir O

wn

Con

cess

ions

Pal

estin

ian

Perc

eptio

n of

Isr

aeli

Gai

ns f

rom

Pal

estin

ian

Con

cess

ions

BenefitsHuman Rights 0.091

Permanent Borders 0.029

Sovereign Palestinian State 0.13

Vacating of Israelis from Settlement

0.167

Freedom of Movement 0.000

Shared Water and OtherResources

0.239

Shared Control of Jerusalem & Holy Places

0.025

Resolution of Refugee Problem 0.288

Security 0.017

Two-Way Compensation 0.015

Perceived Israeli CostsEnding of Superiority 0.207

Change of Zionist Narrative 0.037

Property Restitution and Compensation

0.234

Settlement Evacuation 0.351

Social Restructuring 0.086

Unity Based on Having a Common Identity

0.084

CostsPolitical 0.131

Economic 0.035

Land/Sea Control 0.279

Psychological 0.034

Religious 0.004

Social 0.032

Quality of Life 0.084

International Image 0.044

Social Harmony 0.019

Not Challenging Israel 0.017

Property Rights 0.318

Perceived Israeli BenefitsPeace of Mind 0.167

Reduce Fear of Living 0.041

Retention of Israeli Immigration 0.016

Leveraging Resources 0.098

Acceptance of Israel within Islamic World

0.034

Acceptance of Israelis 0.037

Social Harmony 0.015

Sharing of Religious Festivals 0.021

Ending of Apartheid 0.130

Enhanced Economic Deve1opment

0.172

Trade with Region 0.270

Priorities



Table IV. Israelis’ concession ratings relative to criteria

(a) Israelis’ Benefits from Palestinians’ Concessions*

(b) Israelis’ Perceptions of Palestinians’ Costs*

*Note: In these tables, the ideal column is obtained from the column of totals by dividing every value by the largest value. The ideal mode is used to measure concessions one at a time

Priorities 0.24

5

0.25

1

0.19

3

0.00

0

0.16

2

0.02

2

0.12

7

Criteria Concessions C

ontr

ol

Jeru

sale

m &

H

oly

Plac

e

Ref

ugee

C

ompe

nsat

ion

& S

ettle

men

t

Incr

easi

ng

Secu

rity

Perm

anen

t B

orde

rs

Con

trol

ling

&

Rat

ioni

ng o

f W

ater

Hum

an R

ight

s

Set

tlem

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in

Pale

stin

ian

Ter

rito

ry

Tot

al

Idea

ls

Accept Two-State Solution Very Low Excellent Excellent - Negligible - Medium 0.680 0.736

Acceptance of Non-Contiguous State Negligible Excellent Excellent - Negligible - Negligible 0.605 0.655

Acknowledge Israel's Existence as a Jewish State Excellent Excellent Excellent - Very High - Medium 0.924 1.000

Acknowledge Israel's Existence as an Independent State Medium High High - Very High - Medium 0.762 0.824

Agree to Compromise to Demand of Right of No Return High Excellent Excellent - Excellent - Very High 0.917 0.992

Declare Against Iranian Nuclear Development - - - - - - - 0.000 0.000

Drop Opposition to Trade & Normal Relations w/ Israel Negligible Very Low Very Low - Negligible - High 0.402 0.435

Incitement of Anti-Israeli Sentiment in Schools Excellent Excellent Excellent - Negligible - Very High 0.853 0.923

Lobby Arab States to Allow Israelis Right to Return - - - - - - - 0.000 0.000

Make Compromise on the Status of Jerusalem Excellent Low Excellent - - - Medium 0.653 0.707

Denounce & Reign in Violence Excellent Very Low Excellent - High - Excellent 0.795 0.860

Seek Assistance for a Legitimate Settlement of Refugees Negligible Excellent Excellent - - - Negligible 0.556 0.602

Sharing of Natural Resources Negligible Very Low Medium - Negligible - High 0.459 0.497

Work Cooperatively w/ Israel Negligible Very High Excellent - Very High - Negligible 0.677 0.732

Priorities 0.04

8

0.30

1

0.30

8

0.03

9

0.26

8

0.03

5

Criteria Concessions

Los

e A

rgum

ent

of R

efug

ees

Vic

tim S

tatu

s

Rev

olut

iona

ry

Cau

se a

s U

nify

ing

Fact

or

Infr

astr

uctu

re

Cos

t

Acc

ount

abili

ty

&

Res

pons

ibili

ty

Tot

al

Idea

ls

Accept Two-State Solution - Negligible Excellent - Excellent - 0.667 0.967

Acceptance of Non-Contiguous State - Excellent Excellent - Negligible - 0.690 1.000

Acknowledge Israel's Existence as a Jewish State - Negligible High - Negligible - 0.418 0.605

Acknowledge Israel's Existence as an Independent State - Negligible Excellent - Negligible - 0.479 0.695

Agree to Compromise to Demand of Right of No Return - Excellent Excellent - Negligible - 0.690 1.000

Declare Against Iranian Nuclear Development - - - - - - 0.000 0.000

Drop Opposition to Trade & Normal Relations w/ Israel - High High - Negligible - 0.568 0.823

Incitement of Anti-Israeli Sentiment in Schools - Excellent Excellent - Negligible - 0.690 1.000

Lobby Arab States to Allow Israelis Right to Return - - - - - - 0.000 0.000

Make Compromise on the Status of Jerusalem - Negligible High - Negligible - 0.418 0.605

Denounce & Reign in Violence - Excellent High - Negligible - 0.628 0.911

Seek Assistance for a Legitimate Settlement of Refugees - Low Excellent - Negligible - 0.539 0.782

Sharing of Natural Resources - Medium High - Medium - 0.645 0.935

Work Cooperatively w/ Israel - Negligible High - Negligible - 0.418 0.605



Table IV. Continued(c) Israelis ’ Costs from Their Own Concessions*

(d) Israelis’ Perceptions of Palestinians’ Gains*

*Note: In these tables, the ideal column is obtained from the column of totals by dividing every value by the largest value.

Priorities 0.02

6

0.07

0

0.00

2

0.11

9

0.27

4

0.01

4

0.19

1

0.02

1

0.18

5

0.09

5

0.00

3


Eco

nom

ic

Polit

ical

Rel

igio

us

Psyc

holo

gica

l

Secu

rity

Inte

rnat

iona

l Im

age

Dem

ogra

phic

Adm

inis

trat

ion

Civ

il D

isor

der

Soci

al

Uni

fica

tion

of

Jew

ish

Peop

le

Tota

l

Idea

ls

Abandon the Idea of Jewish State - - - Excellent Excellent - Excellent - Excellent - - 0.769 1.000

Accept Two-State Solution - - - Medium Negligible - Negligible - High - - 0.371 0.482

Comply with UN Resolutions - - - Excellent Excellent - Excellent - Excellent - - 0.769 1.000

Human Rights - - - Negligible Negligible - Negligible - Negligible - - 0.231 0.300

Implementation of Refugee Rights - - - Excellent Excellent - Excellent - Excellent - - 0.769 1.000

Palestinian Freedom of Movement - - - Excellent Excellent - Excellent - Excellent - - 0.769 1.000

Removal of Wall and Other Barriers - - - Excellent Excellent - Negligible - Excellent - - 0.635 0.826

Right to Economic - - - Negligible Negligible - Negligible - Negligible - - 0.231 0.300

Right to Education - - - Negligible Negligible - Negligible - Negligible - - 0.231 0.300

Shared Administration of Resources - - - Medium Low - Negligible - Medium - - 0.407 0.529

Shared Control of Holy Places - - - Negligible Negligible - Negligible - Excellent - - 0.360 0.468

Shared Jerusalem - - - Excellent High - Negligible - Excellent - - 0.580 0.755

Turnover Settlements w/wo Compensation - - - Excellent Negligible - Negligible - Excellent - - 0.444 0.577

Priorities 0.00

2

0.01

7

0.13

1

0.01

4

0.11

9

0.01

3

0.08

5

0.61

9Criteria

Concessions

Inte

rnat

iona

l R

ecog

nitio

n

Mem

ber

Nat

ions

Rec

ogni

zed

Bor

ders

Peac

e

Inde

pend

ence

Eco

nom

ic T

rade

Law

and

Ord

er

Prid

e

Tota

l

Idea

ls

Abandon the Idea of Jewish State - - Excellent - Excellent - - Excellent 0.869 1.000

Accept Two-State Solution - - Negligible - Excellent - - Very High 0.715 0.823

Comply with UN Resolutions - - Excellent - Excellent - - Excellent 0.869 1.000

Human Rights - - Negligible - Negligible - - Negligible 0.261 0.300

Implementation of Refugee Rights - - Negligible - Excellent - - Excellent 0.777 0.894

Palestinian Freedom of Movement - - Excellent - Excellent - - Excellent 0.869 1.000

Removal of Wall and Other Barriers - - Negligible - High - - Excellent 0.753 0.867

Right to Economic - - Negligible - Negligible - - Negligible 0.261 0.300

Right to Education - - Negligible - Negligible - - Negligible 0.261 0.300

Shared Administration of Resources - - Negligible - High - - Medium 0.568 0.653

Shared Control of Holy Places - - Negligible - High - - Excellent 0.753 0.867

Shared Jerusalem - - Excellent - Excellent - - Excellent 0.869 1.000

Turnover Settlements w/wo Compensation - - Excellent - Excellent - - Excellent 0.869 1.000



Table V. Palestinian concession ratings relative to criteria

(a) Palestinians’ Benefits from Israelis’ Concessions*

(b) Palestinians’ Perceptions of Israelis’ Costs*


Priorities 0.09

1

0.02

9

0.13

0

0.16

7

0.00

0

0.23

9

0.02

5

0.28

8

0.01

7

0.01

5


Hum

an R

ight

s

Perm

anen

t B

orde

rs

Sove

reig

n Pa

lest

inia

n St

ate

Vac

atin

g of

Is

rael

fro

m

Settl

emen

ts

Free

dom

of

Mov

emen

t

Shar

ed W

ater

&

Oth

er

Res

ourc

es

Shar

ed

Con

trol

of

Jeru

sale

m

Res

olut

ion

of

Ref

ugee

Pr

oble

m

Secu

rity

Two-

Way

C

ompe

nsat

ion

Tota

l

Idea

ls

Abandon the Idea of Jewish State Excellent - Medium Medium - Low - Excellent - - 0.705 0.801

Accept Two-State Solution Medium - Very High Excellent - Very High - Very Low - - 0.677 0.769

Comply with UN Resolutions Very High - Excellent Excellent - Very High - Excellent - - 0.881 1.000

Human Rights Excellent - High Very High - High - Excellent - - 0.823 0.935

Implementation of Refugee Rights Excellent - Excellent Medium - High - Excellent - - 0.816 0.926

Palestinian Freedom of Movement Very High - Excellent Excellent - Medium - Low - - 0.689 0.782

Removal of Wall and Other Barriers Excellent - Excellent High - Very High - Medium - - 0.770 0.874

Right to Economic Development Very High - Excellent High - Very High - Low - - 0.703 0.799

Right to Education Very High - Excellent Medium - Medium - Low - - 0.639 0.726

Shared Administration of Resources Very High - Very High Medium - Excellent - Low - - 0.698 0.792

Shared Control of Holy Places Medium - High Very High - Medium - Very Low - - 0.600 0.681

Shared Jerusalem Medium - High Very High - Medium - Medium - - 0.686 0.779

Turnover Settlements w/wo Compensation High - Very High Excellent - High - Medium - - 0.748 0.850

Priorities 0.20

7

0.03

7

0.23

4

0.35

1

0.08

6

0.08

4


End

ing

of

Supe

rior

ity

Cha

nge

of

Zio

nist

Nar

rativ

e

Prop

erty

R

estit

utio

n

Settl

emen

t E

vacu

atio

n

Soci

al

Res

truc

turi

ng

Uni

ty B

ased

on

Shar

ed I

dent

ity

Tota

l

Idea

ls

Abandon the Idea of Jewish State Excellent - Excellent Medium - - 0.688 0.951

Accept Two-State Solution High - Medium High - - 0.611 0.845

Comply with UN Resolutions Excellent - Medium Excellent - - 0.723 1.000

Human Rights Excellent - Very High Medium - - 0.664 0.919

Implementation of Refugee Rights Very High - Very High Very High - - 0.714 0.988

Palestinian Freedom of Movement Very High - Low Medium - - 0.550 0.761

Removal of Wall and Other Barriers High - High Medium - - 0.599 0.829

Right to Economic Development High - Medium Medium - - 0.576 0.797

Right to Education Very Low - Low Low - - 0.376 0.520

Shared Administration of Resources Very High - High High - - 0.655 0.907

Shared Control of Holy Places Medium - Medium Very High - - 0.625 0.865

Shared Jerusalem Medium - Medium Very High - - 0.625 0.865

Turnover Settlements w/wo Compensation Very High - Very High Very High - - 0.714 0.988



(according to B’s perceptions)

B’s ratio:

Table V. Continued

(c) Palestinians’ Costs from Their Own Concessions*

(d) Palestinians’ Perceptions of Israelis’ Gains*


Priorities 0.13

1

0.03

5

0.27

9

0.03

4

0.00

4

0.03

2

0.08

4

0.04

4

0.01

9

0.01

7

0.31

8

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

Concessions

Polit

ical

Eco

nom

ic

Lan

d / S

ea C

ontr

ol

Psyc

holo

gica

l

Rel

igio

us

Soci

al

Qua

lity

of L

ife

Inte

rnat

iona

l Im

age

Soci

al H

arm

ony

Not

Cha

lleng

ing

Isra

el

Prop

erty

Rig

hts

Publ

ic S

tand

ing

Acc

ess

to R

esou

rces

Acc

ess

to F

amily

Tie

s

Inte

rnat

iona

l Sta

ndin

g

Iden

tity

Mor

al

Div

isio

n

Tot

al

Idea

ls

Accept Two-State Solution Very High - Very High - - - High - - - Very High - - - - - - - 0.723 0.921

Acceptance of Non-Contiguous State Excellent - Excellent - - - Excellent - - - Very High - - - - - - - 0.781 0.995

Acknowledge Israel's Existence as a Jewish State High - High - - - Medium - - - High - - - - - - - 0.642 0.818

Acknowledge Israel's Existence as an Independent State Excellent - Very High - - - Very High - - - Excellent - - - - - - - 0.777 0.989

Agree to Compromise to Demand of Right of Return Excellent - Very High - - - Excellent - - - Excellent - - - - - - - 0.785 1.000

Declare Against Iranian Nuclear Development Medium - Negligible - - - Very Low - - - Negligible - - - - - - - 0.305 0.388

Drop Opposition to Trade & Normal Relations w/ Israel Very High - Medium - - - Low - - - Medium - - - - - - - 0.578 0.737

Incitement of Anti-Israeli Sentiment in Schools Very Low - Negligible - - - Very Low - - - Negligible - - - - - - - 0.265 0.338

Lobby Arab States to Allow Israelis Right to Return Very Low - Very Low - - - Medium - - - Low - - - - - - - 0.382 0.487

Make Compromise on the Status of Jerusalem Very High - Medium - - - Very High - - - Excellent - - - - - - - 0.708 0.901

Denounce & Reign in Violence Excellent - Very Low - - - Low - - - Negligible - - - - - - - 0.381 0.485

Seek Assistance for a Legitimate Settlement of Refugees Medium - Medium - - - Medium - - - Excellent - - - - - - - 0.664 0.847

Sharing of Natural Resources Medium - Very High - - - Very High - - - High - - - - - - - 0.673 0.858

Work Cooperatively w/ Israel High - Low - - - Medium - - - Medium - - - - - - - 0.526 0.671

Priorities 0.16

7

0.04

1

0.01

6

0.09

8

0.03

4

0.03

7

0.01

5

0.02

1

0.13

0

0.17

2

0.27

0

Criteria


Peac

e of

Min

d

Red

uce

Fear

of

Liv

ing

Ret

entio

n of

Isr

aeli

Inm

igra

tion

Lev

erag

ing

Res

ourc

es

Acc

epta

nce

of w

Is

lam

ic W

orld

Acc

epta

nce

of

Isra

elis

Soci

al H

arm

ony

Shar

ing

of R

elio

us

Fest

ival

s

End

ing

of

Apa

rthe

id

Enh

ance

d E

cono

mic

D

evel

opm

ent

Tra

de w

/in R

egio

n

Tot

al

Idea

ls

Accept Two-State Solution Very High - - - - - - - Very Low Medium Medium 0.511 0.807

Acceptance of Non-Contiguous State Very High - - - - - - - Very Low Low Negligible 0.369 0.582

Acknowledge Israel's Existence as a Jewish State Very High - - - - - - - Medium Medium High 0.577 0.911

Acknowledge Israel's Existence as an Independent State Excellent - - - - - - - Negligible Very Low Negligible 0.356 0.561

Agree to Compromise to Demand of Right of Return Excellent - - - - - - - Low Negligible Very Low 0.391 0.618

Declare Against Iranian Nuclear Development Very High - - - - - - - Negligible Negligible Very Low 0.349 0.550

Drop Opposition to Trade & Normal Relations w/ Israel Medium - - - - - - - Very High Medium Very High 0.597 0.942

Incitement of Anti-Israeli Sentiment in School Very Low - - - - - - - High Negligible Negligible 0.303 0.479

Lobby Arab States to Allow Israelis Right to Return Negligible - - - - - - - Low High Very High 0.495 0.782

Make Compromise on the Status of Jerusalem High - - - - - - - Medium Very High High 0.595 0.939

Denounce & Reign in Violence Very High - - - - - - - Excellent High High 0.634 1.000

Seek Assistance for a Legitimate Settlement of Refugees Very High - - - - - - - Very Low Low Medium 0.477 0.753

Sharing of Natural Resources Very High - - - - - - - High Medium Medium 0.563 0.889

Work Cooperatively w/ Israel High - - - - - - - High High High 0.591 0.933

Gain to B from A’s ConcessionB’s Perception of A’s Gain from B’s Concession

¼P

B’s benefits � A’s costs from A’s ConcessionPA’s perceived benefits� B’s costs from B’s Concession



The measure of equality between the parties in thetrade of concessions may be calculated as the ratio ofthe two ratios:A’s ratio/B’s ratio = retributive gain (loss)to A.

Where the retributive gain is the amount that Abenefits from making B ‘pay’, a loss is accounted forby the amount that A ‘lost’ in the negotiation process.Under no circumstance would we expect A to agree toconcessions when there is a perceived loss when A hasdominance over B. In the case where A has domi-nance over B, the best that B can do is to minimizethe disparity in gains.

The ratios for the Israelis and the Palestinians basedon the benefits and costs and perceived benefits andcosts are given in Tables VII and VIII. When a ratiowas less than 1, the ratio was made equal to zero tosignify that a trade-off was not acceptable. These ratiosare used to make trade-offs among concessions accord-ing to two criteria: (1) both parties should get as muchas possible from the concession(s) and (2) the gainsfrom the concession(s) for both parties should be asclose as possible. The first criterion is the objectivefunction of a MaxMin problem, whereas the secondcriterion is imposed as a constraint.

To decide how to match the concessions of one partywith the concessions from another party, we need to firstcreate all possible concession bundles for both parties.A concession bundle is a set of individual concessions.The parties can then trade concession bundles. Theproblem is that there are many possible concession bun-dles even when the parties in conflict have a moderatelysmall number of possible concessions. For example, ifone party had 13 concessions and another had 14 con-cessions, there are 8191 and 16 383 possible concessionbundles, respectively. Because we need to match abundle of one party with all other possible bundles ofthe other party to determine which concession bundleis more advantageous, we need to solve 7563 matchingproblems for one party and 14 787 problems for theother party.Were we to do it all at once, then the problemwould be even more difficult to solve because the

problem would involve 8191� 16383=134217728variables. A possible solution is to divide the conces-sions into groups such as short, medium, and long-term sets and then form the bundles.

Let CA and CB be the set of concession bundles oftwo parties A and B in a conflict. Let ci(k) be the ithconcession bundle of party k. Let p(i,A|j,B) be theratio gain from the ith concession bundle of partyA when party B offers the jth concession. Letq(j,B|i,A) be the ratio gain from the jth concessionbundle of party B when party A offers the ith conces-sion. Let xij be a binary variable where xij= 1 if theith concession bundle of A is matched with the jthconcession bundle of B.

Concession bundles from one party can be pairedwith concessions bundles of the other party.Thus, the total gain of party A is given byP

i2CA

Pj2CB

p i;Að jj;BÞxij and the total gain of partyB is given by

Pi2CA

Pj2CB

q j;Bð ji;AÞxij . To balanceboth gains and provide both parties with the maximumgain, we solve a MaxMin problem, i.e. a maximizationmodel whose objective function is an arbitrary vari-able x0 such that

Pi2CA

Pj2CB

p i;Að jj;BÞxij≥x0 andPi2CA

Pj2CB

q j;Bð ji;AÞxij≥x0 . If all the concessionsare matched, then

Pi2CA

xij ¼ 1 andP

j2CBxij ¼ 1. If

only a subset of SA ⊂CA is matched with CB, thenPj2CB

xij ¼ 1, for i2 SA andP

i2CAxij≤1. If only a

subset SA ⊂CA is matched with a subset SB ⊂CB, thenPj2CB

xij≤1 for i2 SA andP

i2CAxij≤1 for j2 SB.

Thus, the more general problem is given by:

Max x0such that;P

i2CA

Pj2CB

p i;Að jj;BÞxij≥x0X

i2CA

X

j2CB

q j;Bð ji;AÞxij≥x0

X

i2CA

X

j2CB

p i;Að jj;BÞxij �X

i2CA

X

j2CB

q j;Bð ji;AÞxij��

��≤e

X

j2CB

xij≤1; i 2 SAX

j2CB

xij ¼ 0; i=2SAX

i2CA

xij≤1; j 2 SBX

i2CA

xij ¼ 0; j=2SBxij ¼ 0; 1; i 2 CA and j 2 CB

Table VI. Ratings scale for concession evaluation

Ratings scale

Excellent 1.0Very high 0.9High 0.8Medium 0.7Low 0.5Very low 0.4Negligible 0.3

Max x0such that;P

i2CA

Pj2CB

p i;Að jj;BÞxij≥x0X

i2CA

X

j2CB

q j;Bð ji;AÞxij≥x0

X

i2CA

X

j2CB

p i;Að jj;BÞxij �X

i2CA

X

j2CB

q j;Bð ji;AÞxij��

��≤e

X

j2CB

xij≤1; i 2 SAX

j2CB

xij ¼ 0; i=2SAX

i2CA

xij≤1; j 2 SBX

i2CA

xij ¼ 0; j=2SBxij ¼ 0; 1; i 2 CA and j 2 CB



6. DISCUSSION: THE GAIN-TO-LOSS RATIOSOF CONCESSIONS MADE BY BOTH SIDESNEED TO BE CLOSE TO ONE ANOTHER

One of the key takeaways that all participants in theexercise appreciated was that they learned moreabout the other party. One of the primary challengesto the approach turned out to be the same item that

created a greater depth in understanding: a lack ofcommon definitions. A lack of common definitionschallenged the participants to actively engage in dee-per understanding of each other. For future exercisesof this sort though, we suggest that one of the firststeps to pursue is to define terms and language. Forinstance, one of the concessions that is offered is todirect more effort to ‘Human Rights’. How the

Table VIII. Palestinians’ ratios

Palestinians' Ratios

Acc

ept T

wo-

Stat

e So

lutio

n

Acc

epta

nce

of N

on-

Con

tiguo

us S

tate

Ack

now

ledg

e Is

rael

's

Exi

sten

ce a

s a

Jew

ish

Stat

e

Ack

now

ledg

e Is

rael

's

Exi

sten

ce a

s an

Ind

epen

dent

St

ate

Agr

ee to

Com

prom

ise

to th

e D

eman

d of

the

Rig

ht o

f N

o R

etur

n

Dec

lare

Aga

inst

Ira

nian

N

ucle

ar D

evel

opm

ent

Dro

p O

ppos

ition

to T

rade

&

Nor

mal

Rel

atio

ns w

/ Isr

ael

Inci

tem

ent o

f A

nti-

Isra

eli

Sent

imen

t in

Scho

ol

Lob

by A

rab

Stat

es to

Allo

w

Isra

elis

to H

ave

the

Rig

ht to

R

etur

n

Mak

e C

ompr

omis

e on

the

Stat

us o

f Je

rusa

lem

Den

ounc

e &

Rei

gn in

V

iole

nce

Seek

Ass

ista

nce

for

a L

egiti

mat

e Se

ttlem

ent o

f R

efug

ees

Shar

ing

of N

atur

al R

esou

rces

Wor

k C

oope

rativ

ely

w/ I

srae

l

Abandon the Idea of a Jewish State 1.025 1.315 1.023 1.373 1.234 3.566 1.097 4.706 2.002 0.000 1.572 1.196 0.000 1.219

Accept Two-State Solution 0.000 1.121 0.000 1.171 1.052 3.041 0.000 4.013 1.707 0.000 1.340 1.020 0.000 1.039

Comply with UN Resolutions 1.345 1.726 1.342 1.802 1.619 4.680 1.440 6.176 2.627 1.181 2.062 1.569 1.311 1.599

Human Rights 1.156 1.483 1.153 1.548 1.391 4.020 1.237 5.305 2.257 1.015 1.772 1.348 1.126 1.374

Implementation of Refugee Rights 1.231 1.579 1.228 1.648 1.481 4.281 1.317 5.650 2.403 1.081 1.887 1.436 1.199 1.463

Palestinian Freedom of Movement 0.000 1.027 0.000 1.072 0.000 2.785 0.000 3.676 1.564 0.000 1.228 0.000 0.000 0.000

Removal of Wall & Other Barriers 0.000 1.251 0.000 1.306 1.174 3.393 1.044 4.478 1.905 0.000 1.496 1.138 0.000 1.160

Right to Economic Development 0.000 1.098 0.000 1.147 1.030 2.979 0.000 3.931 1.672 0.000 1.313 0.000 0.000 1.018

Right to Education 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.766 0.000 2.330 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Shared Administration of Resources 0.000 1.239 0.000 1.294 1.163 3.361 1.034 4.435 1.887 0.000 1.481 1.127 0.000 1.149

Shared Control of Holy Places 0.000 1.017 0.000 1.061 0.000 2.757 0.000 3.638 1.548 0.000 1.215 0.000 0.000 0.000

Shared Jerusalem 0.000 1.163 0.000 1.214 1.091 3.154 0.000 4.162 1.770 0.000 1.390 1.058 0.000 1.078

Turnover Settlement w / wo Compensation 1.129 1.448 1.126 1.512 1.359 3.928 1.209 5.183 2.205 0.000 1.731 1.317 1.100 1.342

Table VII. Israelis’ ratios

Israelis' Ratios

Acc

ept T

wo-

Stat

e So

lutio

n

Acc

epta

nce

of N

on-

Con

tiguo

us S

tate

Ack

now

ledg

e Is

rael

's

Exi

sten

ce a

s a

Jew

ish

Stat

e

Ack

now

ledg

e Is

rael

's

Exi

sten

ce a

s an

In

depe

nden

t Sta

te

Agr

ee to

Com

prom

ise

to th

e D

eman

d of

the

Rig

ht o

f N

o R

etur

n

Dec

lare

Aga

inst

Ir

ania

n N

ucle

ar

Dev

elop

men

t

Dro

p O

ppos

ition

to

Tra

de &

Nor

mal

R

elat

ions

w/ I

srae

l

Inci

tem

ent o

f A

nti-

Isra

eli S

entim

ent i

n Sc

hool

Lob

by A

rab

Stat

es to

A

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Abandon the Idea of a Jewish State 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Accept Two-State Solution 1.792 1.649 1.525 1.442 2.499 0.000 0.000 2.324 0.000 1.077 1.974 1.186 1.172 1.116

Comply with UN Resolutions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Human Rights 7.906 7.273 6.724 6.361 11.022 0.000 3.975 10.251 0.000 4.751 8.706 5.230 5.167 4.923

Implementation of Refugee Rights 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.109 0.000 0.000 1.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Palestinian Freedom of Movement 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Removal of Wall & Other Barriers 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.385 0.000 0.000 1.288 0.000 0.000 1.094 0.000 0.000 0.000

Right to Economic Development 7.906 7.273 6.724 6.361 11.022 0.000 3.975 10.251 0.000 4.751 8.706 5.230 5.167 4.923

Right to Education 7.906 7.273 6.724 6.361 11.022 0.000 3.975 10.251 0.000 4.751 8.706 5.230 5.167 4.923

Shared Administration of Resources 2.057 1.892 1.750 1.655 2.868 0.000 1.034 2.667 0.000 1.236 2.265 1.361 1.344 1.281

Shared Control of Holy Places 1.753 1.613 1.491 1.410 2.444 0.000 0.000 2.273 0.000 1.054 1.931 1.160 1.146 1.092

Shared Jerusalem 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.314 0.000 0.000 1.222 0.000 0.000 1.038 0.000 0.000 0.000

Turnover Settlement w / wo Compensation 1.234 1.135 1.049 0.000 1.720 0.000 0.000 1.599 0.000 0.000 1.358 0.000 0.000 0.000



parties define ‘human rights’, however, differsgreatly. Even though philosophically there shouldbe an easily determined common definition for‘human rights’, the reality is that the parties took dif-ferent positions on this issue.

The judgement and prioritization process for theconcessions was implemented for each party withoutknowledge of the other party.

The object is to make the ratios of the two partiesclose. Each party can by itself estimate the gain-to-loss ratio of its opponent and determine if his gain-to-loss ratio is much greater than the other party’sgain-to-loss ratio. That also makes the negotiationsmore difficult. The original model sought a solutionthat matched the best one-to-one concession. How-ever, given that the best solution was a stand-off, wefound that one had to consider trading off bundles ofconcessions. The role of the mediator is extremelyimportant in this setting. There are two ways that themediator can help to alter the outcome of ratios. Recallthat both the numerator and the denominator of theratio includes perceptions of the other; in the numeratoris what one party perceives the cost of concessions areto the adversary, whereas the denominator includeswhat one party perceives the other party’s benefits tobe. It is interesting to note that in a retributive conflict,one party perceives the costs to the adversary as abenefit to itself and conversely the gain to the adversaryas a loss to itself. The mediator has a real opportunity tobridge gaps, given the measured difference between thetwo parties and their varying perceptions, interpreta-tions, and respect for ‘international’ law.

Our results underline the differences between theIsraelis and the Palestinians. In particular, the findingshighlight the value of the Israelis’ concessions asmeasured by the Palestinians when compared with thePalestinians’ concessions as measured by the Israelisthrough the large differences in ratios. Given this dispar-ity, there is great opportunity by one party to take aleadership role in the resolution process. Moreover,there is an even greater opportunity for a mediator tohelp bridge the gap in the gain-to-loss ratios. By educat-ing both parties on the true costs and benefits to theadversary, the perceptions are brought more in line withreality and the score differences are minimized. It ispossible that external influences or pressures might benecessary to rationalize the difference in the gain-to-lossratios in order to recognize the discrepancies.

7. EQUALIZING CONCESSION TRADE-OFFS

Mistrust and the inclination to act retributively preventpeople from making all their concessions at once. Todetermine the fairest and maximum gain to both par-ties from concessions being traded off, we computedgain–loss ratios for each pair of concessions, one foreach party. These gain–loss ratios represent the gain toone party from the concession made by the other partydivided by that party’s loss from the concession it made.The gain to one party’s concession is obtained as thebenefits accrued from the other party’s concession mul-tiplied by the perceived costs to the party making theconcession. The loss to one party’s concession is

Table IX. Matching concessions with corresponding gain–loss ratios

Israeli's Concessions Gain/LossRatio

Palestinian's Concessions Gain/LossRatio

• Shared Administration ofResources

1.03 • Drop Opposition to Trade & NormalRelations w/Israel

1.03

• Comply with UN Resolutions 7.27 • Acceptance of Non-Contiguous State 7.27

• Right to Economic Development • Incitement of Anti-Israeli Sentiment inSchool

• Shared Control of Holy Places 2.77 • Acknowledge Israel’s Existence as anIndependent State

2.77

• Turnover Settlement w/withoutCompensation

• Denounce and Reign in Violence

• Accept Two-State Solution 1.08 • Make Compromise on the Status ofJerusalem

1.08

• Shared Jerusalem • Work Cooperatively w/Israel

• Implementation of RefugeeRights

5.17 • Declare Against Iranian NuclearDevelopment

5.17

• Palestinian Freedom ofMovement

• Lobby Arab States to Allow Israelis toHave the Right to Return

• Right to Education • Sharing of Natural Resources

• Human RightsRemoval of Wall and OtherBarriers

7.900.00

• Accept Two-State Solution 1.16



obtained as the costs of the concession it made multi-plied by the perceived benefits to the other party.To make the trade-offs, we considered only pairs ofconcessions with gain–loss ratios for both partiesgreater than one. This means that either side would bereluctant to trade off a concession in return for anotherfrom which its gain is less than its loss.

The trade-off process started by attempting to trade-off single concessions with two objectives in mind:closeness of the gain-to-loss ratios and maximizationof the ratio. If there were no single concessions thatcould be traded that satisfied both criteria to ensurefairness, then groups of concessions were consideredfor trade-off to satisfy the same requirements. As aresult of this process, we obtained Table IX.

The concessions in Table IX, numbered as inTable II, are traded off while maximizing the gain-to-loss ratio for each side and minimizing the differencebetween these ratios to within 1% from each otherexcept for the very last concessions that can only betraded if the 1% constraint is relaxed. All the conces-sions have been traded off except for the ones relatedto the resettlement of refugees (concession 1 for theIsraelis from Table II) and the acceptance of Israelby the Palestinians as a secure, independent, anddemocratic Jewish state (concessions 3, 6, and 8 forthe Palestinians from Table II). These concessionswill need to be addressed as the process is continued.

The outcome shows that with the exception of thetwo concessions mentioned earlier, all the otherconcessions can be traded off either singly or in groupsagainst other concessions without violating the con-strains previously established, namely that the gain–lossratios be not too large and as close to one another as pos-sible. One might question the advantage of trading offall of the concession identified to date without addres-sing the two major issues mentioned earlier. Prior nego-tiations have been hampered by the chaos or confusioncaused by trying to address all of the issues at the sametime. What this process permits is eliminating eithertemporarily or permanently any discussion that wouldimpede attention to the two major matters that seemthe most acrimonious and potentially irreconcilable.Another reason to take care of the tradable issues firstis to give the parties experience in interactingsuccessfully with one another, thus engendering a spiritof trust that could be very helpful when the finalfew but crucially important issues are considered.

Note, for example that the Israeli concession,‘Shared Administration of Resources’ trades offagainst the Palestinian concession ‘Drop Oppositionto Trade and Normal Relations with Israel’ with aresulting gain–loss ratio for both sides of about 1.03.

Similarly, the remaining concessions are traded offagainst those of the other side in groups of two andthree. The final two Israeli concessions in Table VIdo not trade off against the last Palestinian concession.

It should be noted that the solution to the refugeeproblem includes removing the three concessions 3,6, and 8, all of which relate to this issue. However,only the single Israeli concession 1 needs to beremoved from the present deliberations. Trade-offsof these concessions would require focusing theAHP process only on these matters with the possibleparticipation of influential outside parties.

8. PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION—SOMESKEPTICAL OBSERVATIONS

‘The problems we have today cannot be solved bythinking the way we thought when we created them’,said Albert Einstein.

It is possible that either side would be reluctant toaccept the outcome of the trade-off of bundles ofconcessions. Optimally, these bundles of concessionswhen compared both maximize the gain–loss ratio foreach side and also seek equality of this ratio for bothsides. However, even though the solution may be opti-mal, there may still be retributive concerns that theother side may be getting more or that they may haveforgotten some important concessions they want or theydo not trust their judgements or cannot completelydivest the emotions generated over a long period.

It may be that the Israelis and Palestinians havelived with this conflict for so long that they do notthink an acceptable resolution is possible. Peoplewho have experienced pain for a long time haveexpectations about what would make them feel better,and a rational solution would not necessarily satisfythose feelings. We all have a tendency to believe inthe mystical, that the hand of God must be allowedto do its work, and miracles do happen. But does thathand act without action by the parties?

Given the length of time that this controversy hasendured, is there a possibility that the parties at riskwould reject an outcome that has embedded long-standing biases and emotions into a solution thatconsiders all conceivable factors and which producesa recommended outcome that gives both parties anapproximately equivalent set of benefits and costs.The answer may be yes. So of what value has thisprocess been? Should such reluctance be observed, thiswill in no way invalidate the efficacy of this approach.

The approach opens up an avenue of new thinking.Even if people reject the first effort, it may only need



to be modified a bit to make it acceptable, or in anycase, people may reject the unknown, but they livewith it long enough for it to become an accepted andnatural way of thinking. People may be less likely toreject a second or a third revised effort.

Although it would be appealing for the parties toimplement the recommended solution, it may not be pos-sible do so without the influence or even coercion of out-side parties, such as the United Nations, the UnitedStates, the European Union, and Russia. Some of theconcessions cannot be implemented without supervision.

9. CONCLUSIONS

Our objective has been to see if the AHP, a newapproach to group decision making, could be used pro-ductively to move forward the 60-year-old debateabout solving the perplexing Middle East problem. Itwas not our intention to use the process to discover aspecific solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.The AHP provided us with a new way to pursue thedialogue in a context that uses a quantitatively orientedapproach to attach numerical priorities to the issues inwhat has been an emotionally charged conflict. Ourpurpose has been to introduce a process that, were itto be used by the actual negotiators, might offer somenew ways of moving forward on the heretoforeintractable positions adopted by the parties.

One may ask how can a process like this add mean-ing to the plethora of proposed solutions that haveeither fallen on deaf ears more than 60 years or beendestroyed because of the impossibility of implementa-tion? It is important to state the idea that the AHP is asupplement and not a replacement for face-to-facenegotiations. Whenever the process has broken downin the past, there has been no next step to take. Anumber of entities have stepped forward to try to jumpstart the stalled negotiation. The United States has beenthe foremost player in this remediation effort. Theyhave tried to determine what would be a fair outcome,but to date, there has been no real way to measurewhich initiative would constitute a fair and equitablepackage because the issues are so varied, complex,interrelated, and affected by extreme emotions. AHPprovides an alternative approach by helping the partiesto either think outside the box by themselves or engagein exercises that force this creative behaviour. In itssimplest terms, AHP would require the actual negotia-tor to make judgements in a novel way. The outcomeof their judgements could provide an outsider like theUnited States with some confidence that an AHP-typesolution would yield an outcome that is as fair to each

side as is possible with current technology. A thirdparty could then encourage the parties to consider sucha solution with increased confidence that the approachallows, for example, the United States to act in a neutralposition with some confidence that as fair a solution aspossible is being promoted.

It is important to note that the participants in ourmeetings were knowledgeable, informed, thoughtfulIsraelis and Palestinians, who might be able torecommend to actual negotiators ideas and ways tosolve this long-simmering problem. They wereengaged in a simulation—a process to find out ifthese participants had been, indeed, the actual nego-tiators, would they have been able to stay with thenegotiations and to reach some productive outcome.Whether these participants were representative oftheir respective constituencies is irrelevant becausethe results of their deliberations were never expectedto produce a solution to the problem but merely totest an approach. The outcomes of the deliberationssuggested a number of important benefits if theapproach were actually used by real-life negotiators.

We have attempted to find out how the processwould work: would it provide a modicum of an objec-tive basis to trade off the concessions and help to drainthe emotions, so far as was possible, out of discussionsof contentious issues? It was carried out by rating theissues to prioritize them and then rate the concessionswith respect to each issue. We established priorities byassigning quantitative values, which would encouragenegotiators to deal with the importance of one issue ascompared with another issue. By identifying conces-sions that each party could potentially make and ratingthem as to how they addressed each of the identifiedissues, we reached an outcome whereby certainactions could be seen to be more productive thanothers. This is achieved either by bundling conces-sions on one side to address issues raised by the otherside or identifying issues that cannot be traded off byamassing concessions from one party, mainly becausesome of the issues are so fundamental to the negotia-tions that no number of concessions could balancetheir importance. Although some of these conclusionsmay be apparent to the concerned observer, the pro-cess provides affirmation of the conclusions.

Although the casual observer might suggest criti-cally that the conclusions and outcomes of the studywere totally dependent on what the positions of theparticipants on the negotiating team were, we believethat this is indeed an accurate conclusion but does notin any way invalidate the study. The outcomes dependon the judgements made, and the judgements dependon the opinions of the negotiators. It is self-evident that



who does the negotiating will directly affect the out-come. We are less concerned with coming to any par-ticular solution than we are with demonstrating howthe AHP represents an approach that captures realitywithout the burden of excessive emotion. Ultimately,solutions that emerge from the process will dependon the positions and attitudes of the negotiators. Tothe extent that the negotiators represent positions thatencompass varying proportions of the constituenciesthey represent, the solution will either be arrived atwithin a reasonable time, or after extended lengthy dis-cussions, possibly never arriving at a solution. Ourrecommendations noted below include our responseto this phenomenon.

It is important to understand that the process hastwo major components, the first being the identificationof issues, concessions, benefits, and costs to each sideand a second that concerns implementation policies.This simulation covered only the first stage of theprocess. So what was the outcome? We believe therewere eight important conclusions that we could draw.

They are as follows:

1. The exercise validated that our process made it possi-ble to consider the potential concessions each sidemightmake and to consider the trade-offs of such con-cessions, either individually or in bundles. The partici-pants learned how to trade off such concessions toserve the interests of both parties. They identified 27concessions, 14 from one side and 13 from the other.We do not have any reason to believe that thisincluded every possible concession that might bemade. Because the AHP process requires that every-thing possible be considered for inclusion in the struc-ture: the issues and their concessions, with benefitsand costs, it is recommended that every effort bemadeto include the full range of issues and concessions. Inour simulation, we may well have overlooked one ormore of these issues and concessions, and thus, ourstructure may be incomplete. That in no waydiminishes the effectiveness of our simulation. How-ever, before beginning to work with combinations ofconcessions to trade them off, the structure can betrimmed down to include only what are now knownto be the major elements.

2. The outcome in many cases reinforced the con-ventional wisdom of the participants as to whatthe concrete objectives of each side are and whatpositions either side is willing to modify withconcessions from the other side or is not willingto modify regardless of the other side’s conces-sions. But it was now possible to measure the gains

and losses related to various concessions as identi-fied by the party that would be providing theconcessions, as well as their judgement as to whatthe benefits and costs were to the other party inproviding their concessions. Obviously, the opinionof one side about the costs and benefits to theother side of specific concessions sometimes variedwidely from the other side’s opinion as to the costsand benefits to them of the concessions they mightpossibly make. These differences in perception arerevealing, and they often led to differences in gain-to-loss ratios as perceived by each party.

3. The AHP process made it possible for the partici-pants to consider a wide variety of potential trade-offs, either individually or in bundles. By attachingquantitative values to the comparisons, a great dealof the emotionality of the discussion was defused. Itbecame clear that at least, in the case of these speci-fic participants, certain issues appeared not to betradable or that the participants did not know howto trade them. For example, the Israeli need to havea Jewish state and the Palestinian need to have asatisfactory solution to the resettlement of refugeesappeared to be issues that could not be easily com-promised, if at all. One might surmise that solutionsto such issues might require the involvement of out-side parties and that solutions not totally acceptableto either side might have to be imposed. By com-paring costs and benefits of concessions as viewedby either party and establishing hierarchies that per-mitted comparisons of the issues and concessions,some equivalence of pain or cost and of benefit,either by individual comparisons or in bundles,might suggest a reasonably objective statement ofwhat a ‘fair’ or equally painful or equally beneficialoutcome might be. Neither side might feel such asolution would be a ‘win’ for them, an objectiveeach side would prefer to achieve. Theymight be con-vinced, perhaps only by outside parties, that a solutionthat would bring peace could only be achieved if eachparty recognized through a process such as the AHPor otherwise, that trading off a similarly beneficialand painful (as objectively measured) set of solutionsis the only way to achieve peace. A further advantagewould be that outside parties, such as the UnitedStates or the European Union or the United Nations,etc. could pressure the parties to settle, using solutionscarefully balanced to favour neither side and exactingcompromises from both sides that these outside par-ties could feel reasonably comfortable that theirimpact was objectively measured.

4. Participants were willing to talk about sensitiveissues as part of the concession discussion without



feeling threatened by the other party. Althoughthe participants occasionally engaged in heateddiscussions, in general, an order of civility wasengendered. The participants were concerned withlooking at issues at a micro level rather than a macrolevel, with comparisons of priorities, establishmentof hierarchies, and weighting of judgements con-sidered on an issue-by-issue and concession-by-concession basis. This did not necessarily changethe emotionality that each side felt, but by separat-ing the issues and the concessions, participants wereencouraged to consider the relative importance ofone issue and the effect upon it of one or many con-cessions. It is obviously an oversimplification tosuggest that by breaking the problem into smallpieces and then working to measure judgementsmathematically, that participants were so engagedin collating relevant tasks that their emotionalitylargely disappeared. To continue the analogy, parti-cipants had cut the puzzle into a jigsaw of tinypieces where the total picture was not discernibleas they decided which piece fit into which otherpiece. But when the pieces were put back together,the puzzle might look somewhat different. The com-plete puzzle from this experiment has not yet beenput together for a variety of reasons, but when itis, it is fairly certain that it will offer a somewhatdifferent path for proceeding than has been the casethus far. The main reason the puzzle remains inpieces is that we have not yet focused on the secondstage of the process where implementation strategieswill be defined and there are still some parts of theinitial process such as defining the issues and theconcessions in more definitive terms that need tobe carried out again and reconsidered based on ourexperience so far.

5. A major outcome of the process thus far is that theparties have identified 106 issues and numerousconcessions as being relevant to their deliberations.We have arbitrarily grouped these issues andconcessions into major categories. The richness ofthe issues in each category as well as the groupingof the concessions has helped to define the issuesand concessions more exactly. This approach pro-vided a structure where participants have decom-posed the problem rather than sought immediatesolutions. What the parameters of the problemwere was one question addressed. What actionsthe parties could potentially take to address theseissues was a second question answered. In eachsession, we spent only 3 days for the entire processin this effort, so we cannot suggest that every pos-sible concession and issue was identified. But we

do believe that some issues are multifaceted andwhat was suggested as a separate issue may turnout to be a part, large or small, of another issue.A major outcome was that by examining the issuesin contention and the concessions that mightaddress one or many of those issues, the impor-tance of the issues and concessions in terms ofgains and losses as perceived by each party wererepresented by mathematical judgements andquantified.

6. A crucial finding is the need to identify and developimplementation policies for all the concessions.For example, there was much discussion about apossible compromise by the Palestinians on theirdemand for the right of return of those Palestiniansoriginally living in what is now part of Israel. Butwithout an implementation policy or a set ofoptions, if there is more than one possibility, thenthe mere statement of offering such a concessionis ineffective without finding offsetting compro-mises and policies that would probably be difficultto implement. The process we engaged in has gen-erally identified the issues where implementationpolicies are necessary. In some of these cases, con-cessions cannot be provided by the actions of theparty alone offering the concession. There need tobe other parties involved and willing to play a part,so that the concession is truly on the table and atrade can be achieved. The question of how couldthis concession be achieved must be answeredbefore the concession becomes viable. We still needto examine each concession and determine by parti-cipant involvement just what will be required andby whom to make that concession a real possibility.

7. An important outcome of this effort was to identifywhat the parties meant by the use of certain terms.For example, we now know that using the words‘human rights’ that came up time and time againin the discussions is not easily defined. It meansone thing to the Palestinians and something else tothe Israelis. How human rights are identified, dis-played, defined, executed, and implemented needsto be discussed in some detail. Participants cannotmake effective judgements about such terms whenthey are being mathematically compared with otherterms, if the sides have different definitions of theterms. The limitations of time made it impossibleto engage in the complex discussions that wouldhave been required to address this matter. Anotherexample is what is exactly meant by the ‘sharing ofJerusalem’. It is again important to emphasize thatthis problem in no way interfered with the basicquestion we posed, which was how could the



Israeli–Palestinian question be fitted into the AHPstructure and would the process be amenable tousing the AHP approach. We did not expect a solu-tion to emerge, but as the process is furtheremployed and the next stage of discussions occurand perhaps later as the participants in the studyare actual negotiators, the outcomes will perhapsyield some promising avenues for negotiation notyet in play.

8. The experiment we conducted convinced us that areasonably timed conclusion to the conflict wouldbe substantially enhanced if the negotiators repre-sented the viewpoint of some predetermined propor-tion of their respective constituencies. Recognizingthat a suggestion of some non-inclusiveness in thediscussion in the interest of expediency is not onlycontroversial but likely to elicit all sorts of oppro-brium, there is one other way to achieve the sameresult. It is complex and may produce similar out-cries, but at least, it is an alternative. If we coulddetermine, by survey or otherwise, what theproportion in each society was of far right, far left,and centre positions, we could use the AHP(which would weigh the judgements based onthe proportion of that society that the negotiatorrepresented) so that intractable positions are mini-mized, understanding that someone would need todeal with the anger from those whose judgementswere considered less crucial to a final solutionbecause they represented a smaller proportion oftheir respective populations.

A major stumbling block in the negotiationsattempted to date results from the determined effortto address all of the issues in a single format, in oneplace, in a comprehensive manner. Results of ourexperiment suggest that it would be far more feasibleto address a few of the issues and concessions at a time.

During these discussions, the Palestinian represen-tatives indicated that they felt strong anger becauseof their perception that Israel has not taken moreresponsibility in helping to solve the Palestinianrefugee problem. The Israeli representatives, on thecontrary, expressed their sense of anger because thePalestinians failed to participate in helping the Israelisto obtain the level of security that is essential to movethe process forward from the Israeli position.

In summary, these meetings yielded positive butpreliminary results that are clearly inconclusive andincomplete. Nothing that has occurred invalidates theefficacy of the AHP as a novel and comprehensiveapproach to solve this problem. It needs to be carriedto its ultimate conclusion including addressing the

definition and implementation concerns, using actualnegotiators to release the power of the process.

Although the foregoing general outcomes representimportant progress, the capacity of this process to yielduseful conclusions that would move the dialogue for-ward depends on using the results to identify specificsteps that could constitute a new start to the discussions.We also need to examine what remains to be carriedout. Clearly, the approach taken seems to work wellto address the problem. But as the effort continued,it became clearer as to what needs to be carried outin the next round of discussions.

We need to identify those terms where definitionsare crucial and work out agreed upon statements ofexactly what those words or terms meant in order topermit judgements and comparisons that are moreaccurate. We also need to identify which areas ofconcessions need implementation policies developedto make them viable and to examine as many optionsas possible in considering the implementation.

In summary, our participants identified more than100 issues of small and large import, which wereviewed as necessary to address if the Palestinian–Israeli conflict is to be resolved. In the few daysavailable to them, they identified a significant num-ber of concessions both sides could offer, if theywere willing to do so, which would address most ofthese issues. To the extent not all issues wereaddressed by possible concessions, it was eitherbecause the issues were trivial and not worthy of speci-fic concessions or time or imagination did not permitthe identification of appropriate concessions to addressthose particular issues.

The panel was able to trade off all but two majorissues (a secure, independent democratic Jewish staterecognized by the Palestinians and a solution to theresettlement of refugees). These two issues wouldneed to be considered in a separate application ofAHP to find the difficult concessions necessary totrade-off concessions that would meet our restrictionsand still address those two issues directly. Thatprocess remains to be addressed.

To date, the official negotiations have not produceda viable solution. Our research suggests that by orga-nizing the concerns in a more effective way, identifyingconcessions that would address the issues identified,assuming both sides see an advantage in a peacefulresolution quickly, measuring both tangible and intan-gible factors, draining the emotions out of the discus-sions to the extent possible, and decomposing theissues into manageable segments, all of which is possi-ble using AHP, a chance of resolution is enhanced.What have the parties got to lose?



GOAL: ISRAELI BENEFITS FROM PALESTINIAN CONCESSIONS

Benefits Criteria Evaluation

Control

Jerusalem &

Holy Places

Refugee

Compensation on

Settlement

Question

Settlements in

Palestinian

Territory

Increasing

Security

Permanent

Borders

Controlling &

Rationing

Water & Other

Resources

Human

Rights

Palestinian Concessions

Accept Two State Solution Agree to compromise on the demand of the right of return Work cooperatively and in

active engagement w/Israel

Accept a two state solution which

includes a noncontiguous area - Gaza Denounce Iranian pursuit of

nuclear arms & support Israel's

efforts to remove the threat

Seek assistance for a legitimate settlement of refugees Acknowledge Israel's existence as a

Jewish state

Refrain from & work against

any anti-Israel sentiments in Palestinian schools

Make compromise on the status of

Jerusalem Drop opposition to trade and normal relations with Israel

Acknowledge Israel's existence as an

Independent State Share all natural resources w/Israel Denounce & rein in violence

GOAL: ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS OF PALESTINIAN COSTS FROM PALESTINIAN CONCESSIONS

Costs

Lose Argument of Refugees Infrastructure

Lose Victim Status Monetary Cost

Lose Revolutionary Cause as Unifying Factor Accountability & Responsibility (Internal & External)


Accept Two-State Solution Agree to compromise on the demand

of the right of return

Work cooperatively and in

active engagement w/Israel

Accept a Two-State Solution

which includes a

noncontiguous area - Gaza

Lobby Arab states to allow both Israelis and

Palestinians to have the right to return to their land

of origin

Denounce Iranian pursuit of

nuclear arms and support

Israel's efforts to remove the

threat Acknowledge Israel's

existence as a Jewish State

Seek assistance for a legitimate settlement of

refugees

Refrain from and work against

any anti-Israel sentiments in

Palestinian schools

Acknowledge Israel's

existence as an Independent

State

Drop opposition to trade and normal

relations w/Israel

Make compromise on the

status of Jerusalem Share all natural resources w/Israel Denounce and rein-in violence

Figure 1. Hierarchies of Israeli benefits and costs.

APPENDIX



GOAL: ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS OF PALESTINIAN GAINS FROM ISRAELI CONCESSIONS

Gains

International Recognized Borders Independence Law & Order

Member of Nations Peace Economic Trade Pride

Israeli Concessions

Abandon the idea of a

Jewish State

Share Jerusalem as both a religious

& political center w/all parties

Encourage equal opportunity for

Palestinians to achieve equal

economic prosperity

Accept a two-state

noitulos

Turnover settlements of Jewish

settlers on land claimed by the

Palestinians, with or without compensation

Allow the right to have an

education that is non-biased and

equally shares historic

backgrounds

Comply w/all applicable

United Nations

resolutions

Allow the sharing of all

natural resources between

Palestinians and Israelis Comply w/human rights Permit Palestinian freedom of

movement

Allow all parties to have

equal access to and

control of religious sites

and holy places

Implement Palestinian refugee

rights

Remove the wall and other

barriers to Palestinian movement

GOAL: ISRAELI COSTS FROM OWN CONCESSIONS

Israeli Cost Criteria Evaluation

Economic International

Image Political Religious Psychological Security Demographic

Administration (Law &

Order) Civil Disorder (War) Social Unification of Jewish People

Israeli Concessions

Abandon the idea of a

Jewish State

Share Jerusalem as both a religious & political

center w/all parties

Encourage equal opportunity for Palestinians to achieve

equal economic prosperity

Accept a two-state

solution

Allow the right to have an education that is non-biased

and equally shares historic backgrounds Comply w/all applicable

United Nations

resolutions

Turnover settlements of Jewish settlers on land

claimed by the Palestinians, with or without

compensation Allow the sharing of all

natural resources

between Palestinians &

Israelis Permit Palestinian freedom of movement

Allow all parties to have

equal access to and

control of religious sites

and holy places

Comply w/human rights

Remove the wall & other barriers to Palestinian

movement Implement Palestinian refugee rights

Figure 1. Continued



GOAL: PALESTINIAN BENEFITS FROM ISRAELI CONCESSIONS

Benefits Criteria Evaluation

Human

Rights

Permanent

Borders

Sovereign

Palestinian

State

Vacating of

Israelis from

Settlements in

Palestinian

Territory

Shared Control of Jerusalem & Holy Places

Freedom

of

Movement

Shared Water

& Other

Resources

Resolution of

the Refugee

Problem Two-Way

Compensation Security

Israeli Concessions

Abandon the idea of a Jewish

State Share Jerusalem as both a

religious & political center

w/all parties

Encourage equal opportunity for Palestinians to achieve equal

economic prosperity Accept a two-state solution

Comply w/all applicable

United Nations resolutions

Turnover settlements of

Jewish settlers on land

claimed by the Palestinians

with or without compensation

Allow the right to have an education that is non-biased &

equally shares historic backgrounds

Allow the sharing of all natural

resources between Palestinians

& Israelis

Permit Palestinian freedom of movement Comply w/human rights

Allow all parties to have equal

access to and control of

religious sites & holy places

Remove the Wall & other barriers to Palestinian movement Implement Palestinian

refugee rights

GOAL: PALESTINIAN PERCEPTIONS OF ISRAELI COSTS FROM ISRAELI CONCESSIONS

Costs

Ending Superiority (Attitude & Practical) Settlement Evacuation

Change of Zionist Narrative Social Restructuring

Property Restitution & Compensation Unity Based on Common Identity

Israeli Concessions

etatShsiweJafoaediehtnodnabA Share Jerusalem

as both a

religious &

political center

w/all parties

Encourage equal opportunity

for Palestinians to achieve

equal economic prosperity Accept a two-state solution

Comply w/all applicable United Nations resolutions Turnover

settlements of

Jewish settlers

on land claimed

by Palestinians

w/or without

compensation

Allow the right to have an

education that is non-biased

& equally shares historic

backgrounds

Allow the sharing of all natural resources between Palestinians & Israelis

Comply

w/human rights

Permit Palestinian freedom

of movement

Allow all parties to have equal access to and control of religious sites and holy

places

Implement

Palestinian

refugee rights

Remove the Wall & other

barriers to Palestinian

movement

Figure 2. Hierarchies of Palestinian benefits and costs.



GOAL: PALESTINIAN COSTS FROM OWN CONCESSIONS

Palestinian Costs from Their Own Concessions

Political Psychological Quality of Life Challenging Israel Access to Resources Identity

Economic Religious International Image Property Rights Access to Family Ties Moral

Land/Sea Control Social Social Harmony Public Standing International Standing Division


Accept Two-State Solution Agree to compromise on the demand of the right

of return

Work cooperatively & in active

engagement w/Israel Accept a Two-State Solution which

includes a noncontiguous area - Gaza Lobby Arab states to allow both Israelis &

Palestinians to have the right to return to their

land of origin

Denounce Iranian pursuit of nuclear

arms & support Israel's efforts to remove

the threat Acknowledge Israel's existence as a

Jewish State

Seek assistance for a legitimate settlement of

refugees Acknowledge Israel's existence as an

Independent State Refrain from and work against any anti-

Israel sentiments in Palestinian schools Drop opposition to trade & normal relations

w/Israel

Make compromise on the status of

Jerusalem Share all natural resources w/Israel Denounce & rein-in violence

GOAL: PALESTINIAN PERCEPTIONS OF ISRAELI GAINS FROM PALESTINIAN CONCESSIONS

Benefits

Peace of

Mind

(Security,

Defense,

Hostility)

Retention of Israeli

Immigration

Acceptance of Israel with

Islamic World Social Harmony

Reduce Fear of Living

Leveraging Resources Acceptance of Israelis Sharing of Religious Festivals

Ending of

Apartheid of

Israel

Sharing of Religious Festivals Trade within a Region


Accept Two-State Solution Agree to compromise on the

demand of the right of return Work cooperatively & in active engagement w/Israel

Accept a Two-State

Solution which includes a

noncontiguous area - Gaza Lobby Arab states to allow both

Israelis & Palestinians to have

the right to return to their land of

origin

Denounce Iranian pursuit of nuclear arms & support

Israel's efforts to remove the threat


existence as a Jewish State

Seek assistance for a legitimate

settlement of refugees Refrain from and work against any anti-Israel sentiments

in Palestinian schools


existence as an

Independent State

Drop opposition to trade &

normal relations w/Israel

Make compromise on the

status of Jerusalem Share all natural resources w/Israel

Denounce & rein-in violence

Figure 2. Continued



REFERENCES

1. Saaty TL. 1989. “International Center for Conflict Resolu-tion,” Defense Analysis, Vol. 5, 1, 80–82, Brassey’sDefense Publishers Ltd: Great Britain.

2. Saaty TL, Alexander JM. 1986. Conflict resolution. InPartII: Negotiating Conflicts—The Count of Monte CristoSyndrome: Retributive Conflicts. Praeger: New York.

3. Saaty TL, Vargas LG. 2006.Decision Making with the Ana-lytic Network Process: Economic, Political, Social and Tech-nological Applications with Benefits, Opportunities, Costs

and Risks. Frederick S. Hillier (eds). Springer’s InternationalSeries Operations Research and Management Science.

4. Saaty, TL, Zoffer HJ. (2011). Negotiating the Israeli-Palestinian controversy from a new perspective. Interna-tional Journal of Information Technology and DecisionMaking 10(1): 5–64.

5. Zoffer, HJ, Bahurmoz, A, Hamid MK, Minutolo M,Saaty TL. 2008. Synthesis of complex criteria decisionmaking: a case towards a consensus agreement for aMiddle East conflict resolution. Group Decision andNegotiation 17(5): 363–385.



a new approach to the middle east conflict: the analytic hierarchy process

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