Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Comparative Politics.http://www.jstor.orgDo Participatory Governance Institutions Matter? Municipal Councils and Social Housing Programs in Brazil Author(s): Maureen M. Donaghy Source:Comparative Politics, Vol. 44, No. 1 (October 2011), pp. 83-102Published by:Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New YorkStable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/23040659Accessed: 12-06-2015 13:31 UTCREFERENCESLinked references are available on JSTOR for this article: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23040659?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contentsYou may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jspJSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.This content downloaded from 143.107.3.127 on Fri, 12 Jun 2015 13:31:53 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsDo Participatory GovernanceInstitutionsMatter? Municipal CouncilsandSocial HousingPrograms inBrazil MaureenM. Donaghy Manydevelopment scholars argue thatwhenmorecitizensareinvolvedin politics, politicians willdistributeresourcesmore equitablyamong the population.1 Itstands toreasonthatin developing countries, wherethe poorrepresent the majority ofthe population,participatorygovernance institutionsshouldleadto policies and programs incorporating theirinterests.Tothat end,scholars,developmentpractitioners, and donorsrecommendthecreationofdecentralizedandformalinstitutionstoincrease par ticipation.2 In Brazilcivil societyorganizations(CSOs) lobbiedfor the inclusionof decentralizationand participatorygovernance institutionsintheConstitutionof1988. CSOs,includingnongovernmentalorganizations andsocial movements, continuenow to demandthe implementation of participatory governance institutions and the release ofresourcesfromthefederaltothe municipal level. Thoughparticipatory budgeting initiatives, particularly those in Porto Alegre, have receivedthemostinternationalattentionas examples ofinstitutions demonstrating the potential benefitsofcollaborationbetweencitizensand government, numerousother types of municipal-level councilsexist throughoutBrazil, taskedwithboth policy and programmaticresponsibilities. Thesecouncils generally allocatehalftheseatsfor government officialsandhalffor representatives ofcivil society. Whileinformativecase studies suggest these municipal councilsandother types of participatorygovernance institutions provide avoicefor previouslymarginalizedcitizens,questions remain regarding theextentof resulting benefitsforthe poor andthecontextinwhichthese institutionshavethe greatestimpact.3 Thisarticlefocusesontheeffectof participatorygovernance institutionson pro poor policy outcomes,examining two questions:(1) Does incorporation of civil society throughparticipatorygovernance institutionshavean impact onthe provision ofsocial programs? (2) If so, is the effectiveness of participatory governance institutions in bring ing about program adoption contingent on a highly organized civil society? Past research suggests that civil society must be highly organized to influence policy and program 83 This content downloaded from 143.107.3.127 on Fri, 12 Jun 2015 13:31:53 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsComparative PoliticsOctober2011 decisions, andthata strong civil society increasestheeffectivenessof participatory governance institutions.Few researchers,however, have comparedparticipatorygov ernanceinstitutionsacrosscontextsor concretely defined policy outcomesasameasure ofeffectiveness.In response to questionone, I hypothesize that participatorygovernance institutionshavean independent effecton increasingprogramadoption. A public forum forcommunicationanddebateshould encourageresponsiveness and accountability of government officials.Officialsare presenteddirectly with information regarding the needsofthe community andaremore likely toactonCSOdemandsmadein public, particularly if they areconcernedwithreelection. Regarding thesecond question, I hypothesize that a highly organized civil society increasesthe effectiveness of partici patorygovernance institutions.Civil society needsthe capacity tomake proactivepro posals whilealso presenting aunitedfronttocounteractthereticenceof government officialsto expend scarceresourcesonsocial programs. Totestthese claims, Iexaminesocial housingpolicy asanareathatholds impor tant consequences forthe poor. InBrazil approximately sevenmillionfamilieslack accessto housing, whiletenmillionmorelivein housing without adequate infrastruc ture.4 Housingpolicies and programs inBrazilareadministeredalmost entirely atthe municipallevel,thoughincreasingly resourcesand programmaticguidelines aretrans mittedfromthefederallevel.Underanewfederal system for housing,by theendof 2009all Brazilian municipalities receiving federal funds had to have a municipal housing council, withmembersfromcivil society andthe government. Evenbeforethisman date, many municipalities had already created participatory municipal councilsto direct housing policy and program decisions.Asan increasing number of municipalities adopt housing councils, it is critical to assesswhether the formal incorporation of civil society intolocal government decision making hashadan impact on policy and program outcomes. Brazilian governmentdata,supportedby evidencefromthe field, areusedtoassessthe impact of municipalhousing councilsandcivil society onsocial housingprograms. Across Brazilian municipalities, theevidenceaffirmsthefirst hypothesis that municipalhousing councilsleadtomoreresourcesdedicatedto housingprovision forthe poor. Formalincor poration ofcivil society does appear tobe important forredistributionofresources. Contrary tothesecond hypothesis,however, a highlyorganized civil society doesnot appear tohave aconsistent impact onthe adoption of housingprograms where municipal councilsexist.A strong civil society doesnot necessarily influence government officialsto expend resources any morethanCSOsinaweakercivil society environment.Thisis good newsinthatit suggests thattheeffectivenessof participatorygovernance institutionsisnot contingent on a highly organized civil society. Across contexts, incorporation of civil society in par ticipatory governance institutions may still lead to pro-poor policy change. Municipal Councilsand HousingPolicy Municipal councilsin Brazil, which deliberate on policydirection, program implemen tation, and the allocationof resources, are one type of participatory institution.5Brazil's 84 This content downloaded from 143.107.3.127 on Fri, 12 Jun 2015 13:31:53 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMaureenM. Donaghy 1988Constitutionestablished municipal-level councilsfor healthcare,education, social assistance, andchild/adolescent rights.Many other types of councils,including thosefor housing,emergedlater, either through thedemandsofcivil society or byideologically driven municipal officials.6 Municipalpolicycouncils, suchasthosefor health, are directly involvedintheformationofnational legislation.Programmaticmunicipal councils, suchas housing, aredirectedmoretoward developinggovernmentprograms forawell-defined population.7 Differentcouncilsare givenvaryingdegrees of respon sibility. For example, healthcouncilshavethe power tovetothe plans oftheHealth Secretariat, whichleadsto funding being withheld from the Health Ministry.8 Where municipalities haveestablisheda specific fund for housing, municipalhousing councils are generallyresponsible for allocating thosefunds.'' According totheBrazilian Constitution, the municipality isthe entityresponsible for implementinghousingpolicy.10 As such,municipalhousing councilswouldseem well placed tomakea largeimpact on policy and program decisions.In2005 municipal housing councilsexistedin18 percent of Brazilian municipalities, while by 2008the percentage hadrisento31."Across years, councilsarecreatedeither bylegislation passedby the city councilor by decreefromthe mayor. Bothmechanisms generally establishrulesforthe composition ofthe council, howoftenthecouncilwill meet, andthe scope ofthecouncil's decision-makingauthority. The greatmajority ofcouncils mandatethatatleasthalfthecouncil's membership comefromcivil society, with municipal andstate government officials makingup theotherhalf.12Ininterviewsin citiesacross Brazil, councilmembersfromvarious types ofCSOstoldmetheirroleon thecouncilsisbothto propose new programs and policies andto respond to government proposals andinformation provided oncurrent programs. Inthis way, civil societyplays both proactive andreactiverolesin establishing social housingpolicy. Sincedemocratizationuntil2005whenfederallawcreatedtheNational System for Housing intheSocial Interest, Brazilhadnothadanational housingpolicy.13 AsRenato Cymbalistaargues, evenwiththenewfederal system resourceshavebeenslowinreach ing municipalities.Municipalhousingpolicies include providing new units, upgrading favelas,distributing land titles,allocating construction materials, and intervening inslum disputes.Though these types of housingpolicies arecommon throughout the developing world, andtosomeextentinindustrialized countries, scholars argue thatBrazilhasan especially diverse array of housingpolicies and programs asaresultofthedecentralized policymakingprocess.14 The tendency inBrazilhasbeentoward recognizing informal settlementsand improving settlements throughtechnical,social, and legal intervention. However, moretraditional programs toconstructnewunitsfor the poor, either through rental or ownershipmechanisms, arestillthemostcommon types of programs acrossBrazil. Civil Society for Housing Issues The goals ofCSOs working on housing issuesinBrazilandother developing countnes revolve primarily around government provision of resourcesandlandclaims.CSOs 85 This content downloaded from 143.107.3.127 on Fri, 12 Jun 2015 13:31:53 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsComparative PoliticsOctober2011 relatedto housingpolicies and programsrange fromsmall neighborhood associations representing narrowintereststonationalor regional umbrella organizationsrepresenting numerous NGOs, social movements, andassociations.In identifying CSOsrelatedto housing, Ifocusonthose organizationsacting intheinterestsofthe poor.Municipal councilsconcentratetheireffortson policies directedtoward improving slumsand pro ducing low-cost housing forthe poor, whichcoincideswiththe primarygoals ofmost CSOselectedtothecouncils. Both nationally and locally,organizations mBrazilhavebeen particularly vocalabout theneedfor strongparticipatory institutionstowhich they candirecttheirdemands.15At thesame time,many CSOscontinuetoundertakeanumberofdifferent strategiescalling for policychange and increasinghousing assistance.For instance, socialmovements concernedwith housing in urban areas, suchastheMovimentodosTrabalhadoresSem-Teto (MTST, ortheRooflessWorkers' Movement), which began inSaoPauloandnow operates aroundthe country,carry out occupations of citybuildings. CSOsalso engage indirect lobbying, arranging personal meetings with municipal housing officials, or, if they cannot securea meeting,protesting outsidethe housing secretariatuntiltheirdemandsfor nego tiationaremet.Inrural areas, workers' organizations andsocial movements, suchas theMovimentodosTrabalhadoresRuraisSemTerra (MST, orLandlessWorkers'Move ment),struggle forbenefitsfromthe municipal,state, andfederal governments. While urbanCSOsareconcernedwith improvingfavelas,rehabilitatingcitycenters, andcon structing new units, inruralareasCSOsaremore likely to petition for programs to provide construction materials,plots of land, andflexible financingoptions. CSOsofallkindsinvolvedin housingdevelopedstrength inthe1980sunderdemoc ratization, wanedinthe1990sunderstructural reforms, and reemerged inthelate1990s under worsening economicconditions.16Since democratization, socialmovementsfocused on housing haveconsolidatedunderfour majorgroups, whichlead policy demandsat the federal,state, and municipal levels.17 Though SaoPauloandRiodeJaneiroremain thecentersof activity formovement leaders, eachofthefourmainmovementshas strong networksofmembers throughout the country. Theirdemandscanbetracedfromfederal legislation and spendingpriorities to municipal-levelhousing councilsand increasingly diverse programs atthelocallevel. Alongside social movements,professionalNGOs, such astheInstituto Polis, are engaged in research,advocacy, and capacitybuilding forsmaller organizations, andoften participate inthecouncilsthemselves. Theoretical Background When and how CSOsaffect policy outcomes remain enduring questions in political science. Previous studies suggest that CSOson their own and working throughparticipatorygover nance institutionsinfluence policy outcomes basedon the dynamics of responsiveness and accountability.18 CSOs present informationto government officials regarding the depth and intricaciesofthe problem inaneffortto provokesatisfactoryresponses. Once government officials make promises to act on this information, councilsthen offer transparency and a 86 This content downloaded from 143.107.3.127 on Fri, 12 Jun 2015 13:31:53 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMaureenM. Donaghy public forumto encourageaccountability.19 Some scholars,however, findthat participa torygovernance institutions perpetuate clientelistic relationships betweenCSOmembers and government officialswhereCSOsare primarily concernedwith securing benefitsfor theirmembers.20 Municipalcouncils,then, wouldservetheneedsofCSOswithout gen erating anincreaseinsocial housingprograms tobenefitthe population more broadly. Contrary tothese claims,however, thecontentioninthisarticleisthat municipal coun cilswill produce social housingprograms tobenefitthe poor duetotheexistenceofa formal space for airing demandsandtothe public natureofdeliberation. In addition, wherecivil society ismore highlyorganized, its capacity toworkcol laboratively should help tocounteractbusinessinterestsand government reluctanceto allocatescarceresourcestosocial programs. Civil society needsthe capacity to express demandswithinthecouncilinordertobe proactive andformalliancesto prepare responses to governmentproposals.Working incoordinatednetworkswithinthecoun cilsis likely todilutethe strength ofbilateral relationships betweenCSOsand govern ment officials,resulting inthe adoption ofabroad range of programs. Responsiveness and Accountability Within municipalcouncils,government offi cialsandcivil society membersaretaskedwith discussingproblems and deliberating together to generate solutions.21 Through this process, officialssitface-to-facewith CSOmembersandaremadeawareofthe preferences ofcitizens.Officialscanthen respond more effectively to heterogeneous needsinthe community.22 Giventhe locally specific natureof housingpolicy and programs,municipal councilsensurethatattention is given tothe precise needsofthe community. Studiesof participatorygovernance institutionsoftenmaintainthatcivil society is abletohold governments accountable through thesediscussions byexposing officials' policypositions. The public natureoftheforumsaddstothe transparency ofthe policy makingprocess.Byincreasing information sharingamong andbetween CSOs,govern ment officials, andthe public at large, scholars argue thatCSOshold governments accountablewithintheforumandwithinthe municipalitybygeneratingpublicscrutiny.23 Whenthe public hasaccessto greater informationandCSOscommunicateissuesto their members, both appointed and directly electedofficialsare persuaded toactout ofself-interesttomaintaintheir positions. For example, severalstudiesfindthatthe publicparticipatorybudgetingprocess inPorto Alegre hasresultedin greater accessto services,including waterandsanitation.24 Benjamin Goldfrankclaims specifically that the municipalgovernment inPorto Alegrebegan toinvestmorein public works projects asaresultof publicpressurethroughparticipatorybudgeting councils.25With outthe councilsthere isnoformal space for civil society to air grievances andfor the government totransmitinformationaboutitsactivitiestocivil society. Armedwith informationabout governmentactions, civil society shouldbebetter equipped to pub licizeshortfallsinthe government'sresponse to housingneeds,including toresidents within favelasfor whom housingweighsheavily in voting decisions. Accountability hasalsobeendefinedinterms of reductionin corruption and clientelism.John Ackermanclaimsthat participatory governance institutions reduce 87 This content downloaded from 143.107.3.127 on Fri, 12 Jun 2015 13:31:53 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsComparative PoliticsOctober2011 possibilities andincentivesfor corruption, the political useof funds, andthe capture of stateinstitutions by elites.26Merilee Grindle,however, findsthatin municipalpartici patory institutionsin Mexico,organizations wereabletoextractmoreresourcesfor their constituents, butwerelessableor willing tohold governments accountablefor corrupt orclientelisticbehavior.27InthesecasesCSOmembersof participatorygov ernanceinstitutions appear tobe acting intheirrationalself-interestto provide selec tivebenefitstotheir bases,along thelines suggestedby MancurOlsoninhis classic, The Logicof CollectiveAction In Brazilian municipalhousingcouncils, the opportunity to promote self-interests certainlyexists, butthereareseveralreasonsto expect that municipal councilsstilloffer an opportunity for promoting broadbenefits. First, asotherscholarshave argued,par ticipatorygovernance institutionsoffer spaces for negotiating between groups, which leadstoabreakdowninbilateral CSO-government ties.29Asanactivistin Recife, Brazil suggests,municipal councilslevelthe playing field in terms of CSOaccess to governmentofficials,leading to negotiationamonggroups forbenefitsratherthan local government officials selectivelychoosing which groups shouldreceiveaccess.30 Second, notallCSOselectedtocouncilsaresocialmovementsor neighborhood asso ciations responsible totheirmembers.ProfessionalNGOswithout membership bases also participate inthecouncilsandare likely tosteer program decisionstowarda broader pro-pooragenda.Third, since municipal councilsfor housing inBrazilare increasingly adopted in response to the newfederal system instead of by ideologically driven mayors,municipal officialsandCSOsareoftenfromdifferent parties andlack strongparty ties.This may makethecouncilsevenmorerelevantas spaces for nego tiationbetweensidesotherwisenot apt to cooperate. Butdoesa particularlystrong civil society haveadifferenteffectontheoutcomes of participatorygovernance institutions?Mostscholars studyingparticipatorygover nance institutions,building onRobertPutnamand others,arguespecifically that high levelsofsocial capital are necessary for participatorygovernance institutionstohave anysignificantimpact.31 Ina cross-municipalstudy of participatorybudgeting councils in Brazil, LeonardoAvritzerfoundthatan existingcommunity of organizations was necessary tocreatetheintendedforumfordeliberation.32Withoutconsiderablemobili zationof demands, participatorygovernance institutions may be easilycooptedby elites andhavenoeffectondemocratic deepening or policy outcomes.33Withouta strong civil society, scholarshave argued,participatorygovernance institutions may belittlemore thanrubber stamps for governmentproposals.34 In addition, Brazilianresearchersfind thateffectivecouncilsare dependent onCSOs'technical capacity toformulateand analyzepublicpolicy and on their ability to make strategic alliances.35 The counterargument isthata stronger civil society environmentcouldalsolead establishedCSOsaccustomedto competition forscarceresourcesto fight forselective benefits within the councils,thereby limiting the broadeffectivenessof the councils for generating pro-poor benefits. In fieldwork I witnessed professional CSOs,including NGOsandsocialmovementsdedicatedto housing,usingstrategiesdeveloped overtime to gain accessto government officials in private or publicmeetings. In these meetings, 88 This content downloaded from 143.107.3.127 on Fri, 12 Jun 2015 13:31:53 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMaureenM. Donaghy mostofthediscussionscenteron specifichousingprojectswhich familieswillbe included, andthecontributionsfromthe municipal,state, andfederallevelsratherthan broaderallocationofresourcesacrossdiverse programs. Theintroductionof participa tory foratodebate programmatic decisionsshould mitigate theneedforthese types of bilateral strategies. Wherecivil society is particularly well established, thedesirefor CSOstocontinuetoseek particularistic benefitsfortheir members, andfor govern mentsto appease CSOmembers byresponding totheirdemandsin exchange for politicalloyalty,may remain strong.However, basedon myobservations,particularly in the cities of SaoPauloand Salvador, CSOshavelearned the valueof working in a coordinatednetworktoconfront governmentproposals andbusinessinterests.Civil societyrepresentatives arestillaccountabletotheir membershipbases, but they also recognize there is strength in numbers.An organized civil societyworkingthrough municipal councilsshouldthereforeincreaseratherthandecrease governmentalrespon sivenessand accountability. As developing countriesmoveforwardwithdecentralizationand participatory democracy, itiscrucialtoassesswhen participatorygovernance institutionsand a strong civil societyactually leadto policies and programs toreduce poverty and inequality. Municipal councilsfor housing in Braziloffer an opportunity for systematic comparison ofthe outputs of participatorygovernance institutionsandthe impact of civil society on policiesbenefiting the poor in developing countries. Data Survey dataforthis analysis werecollected by Brazilian governmentagencies. Cur rently in Brazilthere are 5,564municipalities,providing a high degree of variation. Anannual survey conducted by thenationalstatistical agencyyields considerabledata onthestructureof municipalgovernments, withthematic questionsvaryingbyyear.36 The survey issentto municipal officials annually andis mandatory to complete. In most years ofthe survey sinceit began in 1999, thereare questionsrelating to housing needs,institutions, and programs. Forthe presentanalysis, datafromboth2005and 2008areusedtoincreasethe reliability ofthe findings. HousingPrograms as Dependent VariablesTheexistenceofvarious types ofsocial housingprograms indicatesthecommitmentofthe municipality to addressinghousing needs.In the survey, municipalgovernment officials check "yes" or "no"to indicate whethereach type of housingprogram existsintheir municipality. Theconstruction ofnew units,provision ofconstruction materials,regularization ofland titles, and awarding of plots oflandareall programs thataddressthedemandsofCSOs represent ing the needsof the poor. Theseneedsinclude affordable, safe housing on land they can occupy without the threat of seizure by the state or private entities. In 2008the survey includedthree additional types of programsforacquiringhousingunits, improving units, and urbanizingneighborhoods. These programsrepresent the shiftingpriorities 89 This content downloaded from 143.107.3.127 on Fri, 12 Jun 2015 13:31:53 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsComparative PoliticsOctober2011 in housingpolicy, influenced by national housingmovements,trickling downfromthe federaltothe municipallevel, often through federal funding.Thoughprograms for constructing newunitshavebeenthemostcommon type of intervention,37 CSOsalso have fought for programs that stop shortof removing residentsand relocating them todistant peripheral areas lacking infrastructureand jobopportunities.Programs to improve favelas through street paving,supplyingelectricity,rehabilitatinghouses, or acquiring unitsforrenovationofteninurbancentersallowresidentstoremainintheir communities, and provide alternatives for reducing the housing deficit. For this analysis, Iassessthedeterminantsofindividual types of programs aswellasthenumberof programs in a municipality using a housingprogram index. Adoptingmultiple housing programsrepresents the government'swillingness toaddressdiverseneedsofcitizens anddemandsofCSOs. MunicipalHousing CouncilsThe key independent variable of interest for this analy sisistheexistenceofa municipal councilfor housing.Participationthrough a municipal housing councilshould putpressure onthe municipality toenact housingprograms and may alsoleadtoasearchformoreresourcesfromthefederallevel.Thereis significant variationintheexistenceofcouncils byregion and population levelsinboth2005and 2008, butthedatashowthattheseinstitutionsarenotlimitedtoone region or tourbanareas.38 HI: Municipalities with housing councilsare significantly more likely to adopt individual programs andadiverse array of programs asmeasured by a housing program index. Civil Society While broad data on CSOsat the municipal level are limited, the registry ofbusinessesinBrazilcoordinated by IBGEoffersasectionofdataon nonprofits and foundationsfrom2005.39Tomeasurethe depth ofcivil society inthe municipality, Iuse thenumberof nonprofits andfoundations percapita.40Thoughnonprofits andfounda tionsdonot comprise the entirety ofcivil society,they arean importantpart ofthe whole.Itis important to note,however, thatthismeasureaccounts only for registered CSOs, which may notincludelessformalized housing movementsand neighborhood associations.The average numberof nonprofits andfoundations per1,000 residentsin a municipality is 2.6, withastandarddeviationof2.4anda range from.043to32.A strong civil society environment may havean independentimpact onthe probability of municipalitiesadoptinghousingprograms,though the keyquestion hereiswhethera strong civil society makesa difference in the outcomesof municipalhousing councils. A strong civil society shouldincreasethe government'swillingness to adopt social housingprograms,particularly wherethereisalsoa municipal counciltoenablecol laboration among CSOs. H2:Where municipal councils exist, a higher number of CSOs per capita is associatedwith anincreasein the probability of municipalitiesadopting all types of housingprograms. 90 This content downloaded from 143.107.3.127 on Fri, 12 Jun 2015 13:31:53 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMaureenM. Donaghy AdditionalFactors InfluencingHousingProgramAdoption In general, local gov ernmentschooseto adopt social programs of anytype basedon need, accesstore sources, and political will. Thoughhousing councilsand civil society theoretically are important to determiningprogramadoption, hereIalsocontrolforandassesstheinde pendent effectsofothervariables. Ideologyof the administration. For both 2005and 2008, the ideology of the admin istrationismeasured by theexistenceofaPT mayor. PreviousresearchinBrazilindi catesthatthePTisoftenassociatedwithanincreaseinsocial programs,41leading tothe expectation thatthePT may alsohavea positive effecton housingprograms. Availabilityof resources.Wheremoreresourcesare available, therewill likely bea greater numberof housingprograms. Anestablishedfunddedicatedto housing programs illustratesthecommitmentofthe municipality to expend resourceson low-income housingprograms.42 Municipalities with housing funds shouldbemore likely to adoptmultiplehousingprograms.Also, forboth years Iincludeameasure ofthe municipalbudgetpercapita.Municipalities with higherbudgetary resources shouldbemore willing andableto allocate funding for housingprograms.Finally, Iusestate dummy variablestocontrolforvariationinstateresourcetransfersfor housingprograms. Inequality. Within anysetting,inequalitymay reduce governmentalaccountability bylimiting participation of the poor.43 Iusea municipal-level Ginicoefficient from 2000to measure inequality. Where inequality is highest, elites may belessinclined to implement social programs for housing. TheGini coefficient among Brazilian munici palitiesranges fromalowof.358toa high of .819, with.56asthe average. Urbanizationand population size. According tothe data, asthe population increases,municipalities are significantly more likely to adopt all types of housing programs, withthe exception of programs to provide constructionmaterialsforwhich the marginal differenceissmall.Iuseboth percentage ofthe populationliving inurban areas,44 aswellas populationsize,45 since theoreticallypopulation size represents thesizeofthe municipality whereasthe percentage urban representsclustering inthe administrativecenterofthe municipality.Perhapssurprisingly, thesetwomeasures arecorrelated only at.165.Sincethefederal government oftenuses population and urbanizationascriteriafor programeligibility, boththesemeasuresshouldcontrolfor thefederal impact on programadoption. Need.Inwealthier municipalities, thereshouldbelessneedfor housingprograms. Therefore, income per capita is expected to havea negativerelationship with housing programs. Income per capita varies widely among Brazilian municipalitiesfrom a low of R$28to a high of RS955, with R$ 171 asthe average.46 In addition, a variableindi cating the presence offavelasisavailablefromtheMUNIC survey.Clearly, wherethere 91 This content downloaded from 143.107.3.127 on Fri, 12 Jun 2015 13:31:53 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsComparative PoliticsOctober2011 arefavelas registeredby the municipalgovernment, thereisaneedforsome type of housingprogram toaddressthe housing deficit. AddressingEndogeneity Before proceeding withthestatistical analysis, itisuseful to clarify therole endogeneitymayplay in biasing theestimates. First, one mightexpect that housing councilswerecreatedin municipalities inwhich government officialswere already interested in addressinghousing needs.These municipalities wouldthen be more likely tohave previouslyadoptedmultiplehousingprograms,creatingendogeneity between housing councilsand housingprograms. Toaddressthis concern, Ievaluated whether municipalities with each type of housing program in 2005were more likely than average tocreatea housing council by 2008.About21 percent of municipalities across Brazil adopted a housing councilbetween 2005and 2008. Municipalities with existing programs in2005were onlyslightly more likely to adopthousing councils.The excep tion are municipalities with regularization programs, which were about16 percent more likely than average to adopt housing councils.This is probably becauseboth regulariza tion programs and housing councilsare significantly more likely tobe adopted inurban areas.Inthefull model, inwhichIinclude population and percentage of population in urban areas, this relationship shouldbe mitigated. Second, thereisa question of endogeneity betweencivil society and housing coun cils. Particularlyprior to 2005, whenthefederal government createdthenew system requiring municipalitiesreceiving federal funds to create municipalhousing councils by theendof 2009,housing councilswerecreated largely in response tothedemands ofCSOs. Therefore, it mightappear thatthe depth ofcivil society is endogenous to thecreationof municipal councilsfor housing.However, thedatashowthattheaver age number of nonprofits andfoundations per capita across municipalities(.0026) is not significantly different than the average in municipalities with housing councils (.0033in2005and.0031in 2008). Forthis reason, Idonotbelievethatthismeasure ofcivil society is endogenous totheexistenceof housing councils. rurther, thePIhasbeenthe party most strongly associatedwith participatory governance institutions.47 According tothe data,however,municipalities with housing councilswere approximately 3.5 percent more likely tohaveaPT mayor in charge across years.Though thisshowstheoddsare slightlyhigher thata municipality with icouncilhasaPT mayor, thedifferencedoesnotleadmetoconcludethatthePTis endogenous totheexistenceofacouncil. Model1estimateseveral probit modelstoassessthe relationships betweenthese independent variablesandthe adoption of housingprograms. Probit is an appropriate regression modelfor dichotomous dependent variablesand provides intuitive results regarding the probability of program adoption. I alsouse negative binomial regression modelstomeasuretheeffectsonthe adoption of multiplehousingprogramsusing a lousingprogram index.481 begin with the first hypothesis that municipal councilslead to housingprogramadoption, before using interactivemodelsto analyze theeffectof :ivil society within and outsideof municipalities with housing councils. 11 This content downloaded from 143.107.3.127 on Fri, 12 Jun 2015 13:31:53 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMaureenM. Donaghy MunicipalHousing Councils Theexistenceof municipalhousing councilsisassociatedwithanincreaseinthe adoption ofall types ofsocial housingprograms across years(see Tables1and 2).49 This provides evidencetoconfirmthe primaryhypothesis that participatorygovernance insti tutionsleadto programsbenefitting the poor. Table1ProbitResultsforthe Impact on HousingPrograms, 2005* Constr. of Units Offer MaterialsOffer Land Regularization Other Programs MunicipalHousing Council0.26***0.100 24***0.39***0 34*** (0.07)(0.07)(0.08)(0.09)(0.07) MunicipalHousing Fund0.39***0.31***0.34***0.25***q19*** (0.07)(0.07)(0.08)(0.09)(0.07) Population(log) 0.27***0.13***0]9***0.44***0 27*** (0.03)(0.03)(0.04)(0.05)(0.04) PercentUrban Population(log) 0.16***0.12**019***0.080.12* (0.06)(0.06)(0.07)(0.10)(0.07) MunicipalBudgetper capita(log) 0.61***0.46***q 43***0.36***0.40*** (0.08)(0.08)(0.08)(0.10)(0.08) PT Mayor 0.050 27***-0.02-0.110.20** (0.08)(0.08)(0.09)(0.12)(0.09) GiniCoefficient0.510.85**0.080.870.77* (0.42)(0.43)(0.49)(0.63)(0.46) Income percapita(log) -0.19**-0.306***-0.120.23*-0.12 (0.09)(0.09)(0.10)(0.13)(0.10) Non-profits andFoundations percapita(log) 0.07*0.000.03-0.01q12*** (0.04)(0.04)(0.04)(0.06)(0.04) Existenceof Favelas0.07-0.02-0.20***-0.010.08 (0.06)(0.06)(0.07)(0.08)(0.06) Constant-5.66***-4.06***-5.20***_9 99***-5.11*** (0.81)(0.80)(0.88)(1.10)(0.84) Observations38693864387838693878 * Statedummiesincludedin model.Standarderrors in parentheses: *** p