DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 348 600 CG 024 418

AUTHOR Sonnert, Gerhard; Commons, Michael L.TITLE Society and the Highest Stages of Moral

Development.PUB DATE Apr 92NOTE 18p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the

Eastern Psychological Association (63rd, Boston, MA,April 3-5, 1992).

PUB TYPE Viewpoints (Opinion/Position Papers, Essays, etc.)(120) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.DESCRIPTORS *Individual Development; *Moral Development;

*TheoriesIDENTIFIERS Kohlberg (Lawrence)

ABSTRACTKohlberg has produced the most influential theory of

moral development both within individuals and within society. As acognitive-developmentalist, Kohlberg considered mathematical andlogical intellectual operations to underlie both social and moraloperations. The hierarchical arrangement of the stages was thusgrounded in the hierarchical arrangement of those operations.Kohlberg's postconventional period (Moral Stages 5 and 6) beginssometime after adolescence; fully postconventional thinking andaction appear after early adulthood. At Moral Stage 5, the SocietalUniversal stage, people justify actions on the basis on universalabstract principles. Kohlberg also posited a Moral Stage 6 but thisproved to be the most problematic stage in his model for conceptualand empirical reasons. Conceptually, Kohlberg had difficulty insetting Moral Stage 6 apart from Moral Stage 5, and empirically, hefound it difficult to identify subjects reasoning at Moral Stage 6. Ameaningful Moral Stage 6 cannot be defined within individual moraldevelopment; it has to be understood as a discourse, as the propertyof a social enterprise. Thus Kohlberg was looking for Moral Stage 6in the wrong place, and as a consequence, came up empty handed. Atearlier stages, society is seen as a necessary environment forindividual moral reasoning. At Moral Stage 6, moral reasoning isconstituted by the social enterprise. Moral Stage 6 reasoningrequires actual discourse, rather than monologically simulateddiscourse. (ABL)

***********************************************************************

Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be madefrom the original document.

***********************************************************************

Society and the Highest Stages of Moral Development

Gerhard SonnertDepartment of PhysicsHarvard University

Copies may be obtained from:

Michael L. Commons, Ph.D.Lecturer and Research AssociateDepartment of PsychiatryHarvard Medical SchoolMassachusetts Mental Health Center74 Fenwood RoadBoston, MA 02115-6196, (617) 497-5270

BEST COPY MIME 2

Michael L. CommonsDepartment of PsychiatryHarvard Medical School

U S DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONOtt.ce of Ea:aloha, Research and improvement

EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATIONCENTER ERIC.

/This document has been reproduced asrece,,,ed Ifon, III,. pi...5c, otgamzatonongoatogMmot changes nave Dee- made to imOtOvereproduction CIUWty

Points or vie. Or opinions stated in Its docu-ment do not neCeSsati, ,ewesent otficolOE RI 005i! On Or 00' ry

PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THISMATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCESINFORMATION CENTER iERIC).

Abstract

In this paper, Moral Stage 6 emerges from an examination of the inadequacies both of Moral Stage 5and earlier stages in Kohlberg's justice-reasoning stage sequence and of his attempts to define MoralStage 6. The task is to construct Moral Stage 6 in a non-arbitrary way that satisfies General StageModel (Commons & Richards, 1984a) criteria for what constitutes a stage. This construction impliesa social redefinition of Moral Stage 6. At Moral Stage 6, morality is no longer a property ofautonomous individuals, as it is at earlier stages, but a property of the social enterprise. Moral Stage6 manifests itself only intersubjectively. It is actual discourse and cannot be monologically simulated.

Introduction

The prevalent notions of relativism in politicaltheory have recently been challenged byapplications of developmental theory topolitical development (Em ler, Renwick, &Malone, 1983; Habermas, 1979; Rosenberg,1988, 1989; Rosenberg, Ward & Chilton,1988; Wagner, 1986, 1990). Whereasrelativism posits that a non-arbitrary, aculturalevaluation of societal and political systems isimpossible, developmental theory provides themeans for such an evaluation.

As part of the movement towardsunderstanding political reasoning and actionusing developmental notions, we examine therelation between society and the highest stagesof moral development. In order to do so wewill introduce new descriptions of the higheststages of development. Political reasoning isrelated to moral reasoning insofar as bothshare an underlying concern for the just.In general, developmental theory can discoverthe common core of seemingly unique anddiverse political ideologies. The theory canorder ideological reasoning in a non-relativistsequence, and point to possible avenues ofdevelopment. More specifically, by focusingon the highest stages of development,developmental theory leads to an understandingof what the possibilities and limitations of thedevelopment of political reasoning might looklike and why.

Kohlberg has produced the most influentialtheory of moral development both withinindividuals (Kohlberg, 1984) and withinsociety (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989).In the course of development, the reasoningabout fairness increases in complexity andbecomes more inclusive.For example, at the highest child stages,people are always particular persons (such asmy self or my parents) who do particularthings (If I don't keep my promises, then myparents won't trust me anymore). At all ofKohlberg's adult stages, people can beregarded as abstractions (If one can't keep apromise, it tends to show poor character).

4

"My parents won't trust me" is about specificpeople and acts whereas "show poor character"is a property of an abstract person. As acognitive-developmentalist, Kohlbergconsidered mathematical and logicalintellectual operations, such as those used todiscern amount, balance, and causality, tounderlie both social and moral operations.The hierarchy of the stages was thus groundedin the hierarchical arrangement of thoseoperations.

Cross-cultural data from over 30 societiesshow that although people's developmentfollows an invariant sequence, the end pointsof development vary (Colby & Kohlberg,1987; Snarey, 1985). Movement through thedevelopmental stages is unidirectional.Barring mental illness or loss of mentalcapacity, people move only up through thestages, never down.

General Stage Model

To counter the possible objection ofarbitrariness in the definition of moral stages,we will ground them in the hierarchical-complexity stage criteria of the General StageModel (GSM). Commons and Richards(1984a, b) suggested that developmental theoryaddresses two conceptually different issues: 1)

the hierarchical complexity of the task to besolved; and 2) the psychology, sociology andanthropology of how such task performancedevelops. They used the hierarchicalcomplexity of tasks as the basis for construingthe notion of stage in the General StageModel.

Abstract modern algebra grounded hierarchicalcomplexity of tasks in mathematical models(Coombs, Dawes, & Tversky, 1970) andinformation science (Lindsay & Norman,1977). The description of stages in theGeneral Stage Model belongs to issue 1)bause the General Stage Model is a strictlyanalytical theory describing discrete orders ofhierarchy of task complexity. It sets forth aset of axioms that have to be satisfied in orderto define a stage sequence and describes the

necessary analytical properties of stages.

In the General Stage Model (Commons, 1991;Trudeau, 1991) the four Hard StageConditions of Kohlberg and Armon (1984) aremet and surpassed. Condition 1, "qualitativedifferences in stages" is shown in a GSMtheorem. Condition 2, "invariant sequence,"is shown by a theorem that follows from thedefinitions. Condition 3, As an axiom ontasks, "structure-of-the-whole," is trueeverywhere, in every domain and content.Condition 4, "stages are hierarchicalintegrations" is fulfilled by definition.

We add a 5th condition, which makes theGeneral Stage Model even a "harder" stagemodel. Condition 5 is that the logic of eachstage has to be explicit so that the sequence ofstages can be tested analytically and new taskscan be classified systematically. The GeneralStage Model does not posit detailed empiricalforms of stages or the empirical processes thatcause stage change.This paper focusses on the analytic propertiesthat Moral Stage 6 should have if it exists. Itdoes not claim to describe an existingphenomenon empirically. Sonnert (inpreparation) considers the empiricalramifications of Moral Stage 6. Commons andhis colleagues (in preparation) examinepossible Moral Stage 6 social perspective-taking in actual institutions, such as theSociety for Research in Adult Developmentand the Program in Psychiatry and the Law inthe Department of Psychiatry at HarvardMedical School.

At this point, we will briefly review the mainelements of the General Stage Model. In thismodel, the successful completion of a taskrequires an action of a given hierarchical orderof complexity. A logical analysis of thosetasks shows the following (Commons &Grotzer, 1990; Commons & Richards, 1984a,b; Commons & Rodriguez, 1990): Actions,including reasoning, at a given order ofhierarchical complexity are defined in terms of

5

2

the actions at the next lower order ofhierarchical complexity. Actions at a higherorder of hierarchical complexity usuallytransform and organize lower-order actions.We say the higher-order action coordinates theactions of the next lower order. Thisorganization of lower-order actions is new andunique and cannot be accomplished by thoselower-order actions alone.

For example, multiplying 3 x (9 + 2) requiresa distributive action at the concrete order ofhierarchical complexity. The distributiveactions is as follows: 3 x (9 + 2) = (3 x 9) +(3 x 2) = 27 + 6 = 33. That actioncoordinates (organizes) adding and multiplyingby uniquely organizing the order of thoseactions. The distributive action is thereforeone order more complex than the acts ofadding and multiplying alone. Althoughsomeone who simply adds can arrive at thesame answer, being able to do both additionand multiplication in a coordinated mannerindicates a greater fry nom of mentalfunctioning. Through such task analysis, thehierarchical complexity of a task may bedetermined.'

The following paragraph gives a capsuledescription of the analytic properties of thestages in the General Stage Model indescending order. When moral stages areviewed from a General Stage Modelperspective, it is useful to translate the moral-stage numbers into the General Stage Modelstage numbers. Table 1 shows theircorrespondence.' Stage 6b (Cross-paradigmatic, Moral Stage 7) in the GeneralStage Model requires actions that coordinateand integrate fields.A Stage 6a (Paradigmatic, Moral Stage 6) fieldconsists of coordinated sets of Stage 5b(Metasystematic, Moral Stage 5) supersystems.

A Stage 5b metasystematic supersystemcoordinates the Stage 5a (Systematic, MoralStage 4) systems. A Stage 5a system is a

coordination of Stage 4b formal operational(Moral Stage 3/4) relationships--formaloperations mark the top stage of Piaget'ssystem of stages as he designated them.A Stage 4b fonnal operation coordinatesvariables from Stage 4a (Abstract, Moral Stage3).

A stage 4a variable, in turn, is constructed outof Stage 3b (Concrete, Moral Stage 2/3)instances of operations acting upon objects bysubstituting "equals for equals"--an operationthat coordinates two sets of operations fromthe concrete stage.

Kohlberg's Stages

In what follows, we give our interpretation ofKohlberg's stage theory. Kohlberg posits 3periods of development in the moral domain,as shown in Table 1: the preconventional, theconventional and the postconventional. Eachof these three periods is subdivided into twostages so that Kohlberg's model comprises sixstages of moral development.

The preconventional period (Moral Stages 1and 2) begins in early childhood and extendsthrough elementary school. At Moral Stages 1and 2, people justify actions in terms ofavoiding punishment and obtaining rewards.Adults generally consider moral reasoningduring this period inadequate. The judgmentsdo not fulfill conventional norms of adulthood.

The conventional period (Moral Stages 3 and4) begins at the onset of post-elementaryschool education and extends across the life-span of all but a small portion of thepopulation. This period generates theconventional norms of adulthood. Reasoningat each stage of this period contains enoughlogic that it can find its most elaborateexpression in some current adult philosophy.

At Moral Stage 3, the Group stage, action isjustified in terms of the reputation andcharacterization of the individuals or groups

6

3

that are involved. People and groups can begood or bad, for instance, nice or nasty,authoritative or untried. Action is oftenjudged on the basis of individuals' or groups'underlying sentiments or motives. Role andperson may be confused.

At Moral Stage 3/4, the Bureaucratic stage,the reasons given for labeling an action as fairand good are logical and abstract.Bureaucratic norms, laws, rules, andregulations guide behavior and are seen as"given"; they are not seen as responsive toindividuals or particular situations. Role andperson are no longer confused as they were atthe previous stage.

At Moral Stage 4, the Societal or Institutionalstage, the yardstick for evaluating the moralityof an action is the preservation (or destruction)of a system--or a society. Norms, laws, rulesand regulations form a logically coherentsystem. People at this stage reason in terms ofhow an action would effect one's individualrole and status within the system, as well as onthe system's capability to function. Hence,there is a tension between societal and personalrights on one hand, and societal and personalduties on the other.

For the individual, part of this tension is aconflict between independence from anddependence on both others and the system.For the government, part of the tension is theconflict between protecting the system'sinterests and the individuals' interests. Theauthority of societal law, (individual andgroup) rights, and duties are all meaningful."What would happen to society ifeveryone...?" is a question characteristic ofthis stage. At this stage, justifications may beparentalist when they refer to the authority ofthe expert within the system. The termparentalist is used instead of paternalist ormaternalist.

The postconventional period (Moral Stages 5and 6) begins sometime after adolescence;

however, fully postconventional thinking andaction appear after early adulthood (Colby &Kohlberg, 1987). Some contemporaryphilosophies use postconventional arguments.In fact, Armon (1984, 1989) has reinterpretedphilosophical debates in terms of conventionalversus postconventional arguments. Forknown societies, only a small portion ofmembers achieves postconventional stages ofreasoning.

At Moral Stage 5, the Societal Universal stage,people justify actions on the basis of universalabstract principles. Many such principles canbe found in the works of philosophic, political,and religious thinkers. Many modern societiesalso articulate these (Reiser, Bursztajn,Appelbaum, & Gutheil, 1987). Moral Stage 5principles are general in their application,irrespective of the person affected. Thespecific content of the principles may becontingent upon the society in question.Rawls's (1971) theory of justice, for example,contains the principle that actions should notworsen the situation of the least advantaged.People are assumed to have different interestsand expertise. Society is seen first as acreation of individuals and second as thecontext in which people develop.

From a developmental-stage perspective, theprinciples coordinate duties with correspondingrights. They also coordinate dependence withthe corresponding independence stances of theprevious stage. The interests of the societyand the individual are coordinated. The resultis to support truly joint decision making andautonomy. Due processes ranging fromlotteries to consensus votes are some of themethods of decision making.

Roughly speaking, when persons can engage inreal discourse, this is the preferred method ofdecision-making, but real discourse can bereplaced by imaginary discourse if realdiscourse fails or is impossible.Unconventional decisions may be sanctioned aslong as the process of arriving at those

4

decisions is reasonable in the light of higherprinciples. Principles do not emerge fromdiscourse but from notions of universal humanrights and dignity.

Kohlberg also posited a Moral Stage 6, butthis proved to be the most problematic stage inhis model for conceptual and empiricalreasons. Conceptually, Kohlberg haddifficulty in setting Moral Stage 6 apart fromMoral Stage 5 (Diessner & Commons, inpreparation), and empirically, he found itdifficult to identify subjects reasoning at MoralStage 6.

Plan of the Argument

In order to fully discuss the relationshipbetween society and moral development, thispaper makes a new proposal for Kohlberg'sMoral Stage 6. By addressing the conceptualproblems with Moral Stage 6, we hope that theempirical problems will be solved as well. Ameaningful Moral Stage 6 cannot be definedwithin individual moral development; it has tobe understood as discourse, as the property ofa social enterprise. Thus, Kohlberg waslooking for Moral Stage 6 in the wrong placeand, as a consequence, came up emptyhanded.

The paper advances the proposition that MoralStage 6 relates to society in a way that isqualitatively different from all precedingstages. At earlier stages, society is seen as anecessary environment for individual moralreasoning. At Moral Stage 6, moral reasoningis constituted by the social enterprise.

The General Stage Model (Commons &Richards, 1984a, 1984b; Commons &Rodriguez, 1990; Commons, Stein &Richards, 1987, April) serves as the basis forcritiquing Kohlberg's Moral Stage 6 notion(Kohlberg, 1986; Kohlberg, Boyd, & Levine,1986, 1990). After considering certainshortcomings of Moral Stage 5 reasoning, wedevelop and explore a discursive notion of

Moral Stage 6. We conclude with anexamination of both the individual and thesocietal implications of Moral Stage 6.

Definition of Moral Stage 6

Within the General Stage Model, we defineMoral Stage 6 using the hierarchicalcoordination criterion. Moral Stage 5 (GSMStage 5b) meta-rules coordinate Moral Stage 4systems of rights and duties by prioritizingthem. The Moral Stage 4 (GSM Stage 5a)systems coordinate logical relations (GSMStage 4b) among rights propositions (GSMStage 4a) and among duties propositions (GSMStage 4a). At Moral Stage 6 (GSM Stage 6a)coordinations of systems of rights and dutiesare coordinated. The crucial point is thatparadigmatic (GSM Stage 6a) coordinationscannot be done by one individual alone, i.e.,by an individual's coordination of metasystemsof rights and duties. Individual efforts are notsufficient. An individual's coordination wouldbe either inconsistent or indeterminate.

From an individual's perspective, one wouldnot know which incomplete but consistentmetasystematic coordination to choose.Rather, paradigmatic coordinations are aproperty of the social enterprise. Aparadigmatic coordination cannot bemonologically predicted, because it consists ofa set of metasystematic coordinations that maybe inconsistent or incomplete or both. All theindividual metasystematic coordinations canaffect each other in unpredictable ways. Anysingle paradigmatic coordination might bechanged by the interaction and the exchange ofinformation and arguments among theparticipating metasystematic coordinations.

No a priori consideration can predict thedirection or extent of the change. Thedirection, extent and nature of the change canbe determined only by the actual process. Inother words, actual interaction among themetasystematic coordinations is needed inorder to arrive at their coordination. Adapting

S

5

a valuable Habermasian concept, we call thiscoordination of coordinations discourse.

Given the discursive properties of Moral Stage6, there will be no single instantiation ofMoral Stage 6. Moral Stage 6 recognizes theuniqueness of every individual and system; itunderstands the basis for their differences. Itrespects individual differences but integratesthem in a discursive solution, whereas at theend of

Moral Stage 4 people see these differences asarbitrary and at most historical, withoutunderstanding how to transcend them, and atMoral Stage 5, people rely on universalprinciples to evaluate these differences. MoralStage 6 replaces hypothetical universalizationwith real consensus. Moral Stage 6 is actualdiscourse rather than hypothetical discourse.3

One has to be critically aware of thelimitations of one's own viewpoint. MoralStage 6 reasoning implies some understandingof the norms of societies and their histories, asthey are and how they might be. The MoralStage 6 view of society focuses on societalconsensus that is historically unique andlimited. The ideal has to be saturated with theactual and divested of its context-freeuniversalist validity claim that is typical ofMoral Stage 5.

The Moral Stage 6 view has to be respectfuland understanding, but still critically aware ofalternatives. Again, this in no way impliescultural relativism or the like, because thecoordinations at Moral Stage 6 are highlyconstrained by hierarchical complexityrequirements. Although there are many MoralStage 6 solutions, the creation of each ishighly unlikely.

Moral Stage 6 implications on the individuallevel

The central element of individuals' "reasoningat Moral Stage 6" is the realization that

individual moral reasoning is limited andattainment of Moral Stage 6 is beyond theirindividual efforts. Moral Stage 6 has to beaccomplished by actual cooperation of allmoral reasoners in a dialogue.

Individuals must have the potential to reason atMoral Stage 5, but, in addition, they mustunderstand the dilemma of Moral Stage 5reasoning and surrender part of moralautonomy or responsibility to the discoursewhere Moral Stage 6 reasoning takes place.Again, Moral Stage 6 reasoning itself cannotbe found in individuals but only in actualdiscourse.

We now demonstrate how more traditionalMoral Stage 6 notions of unconditional respectfor, and solidarity with, others (Kohlberg,1986) can easily be accommodated into thenew notion of the social nature of Moral Stage6. Moral Stage 6 is the most radicalexpression of unconditional respect for others,because a Moral Stage 6 solution depends onthe actual approval of all the others. Each andevery person has "vetopower" against thepossibility of a Moral Stage 6 solution.At this stage, the others have to speak forthemselves. There is no way in which allpossible contributions can be simulated.

A person reasoning at Moral Stage 6recognizes the inclination towards egocentrismin people but emphasizes that each individualis part of humanity. Whereas local andparticular views represent the effects of eachperson's life, genes, and culture, there areunifying principles that are universal.Compared with Moral Stage 5, the concept ofuniversal principles takes on another meaning,however. At Moral Stage 5, moral principlesare universal at the price of limiting respectfor others; at Moral Stage 6 principles aresubjected to discourse to allow theuniversalization of respect for others.

Solidarity extends not just to one's own socialgroup but to humanity. Intermediate

6

particularistic social groups, such as thosebased on gender, race, religious community,or nation, lose significance. There is aHegelian dichotomization between theuniversal community of humankind on the onehand and the autonomous and emancipatedindividual on the other hand (also see Armon,1989). In contrast to Moral Stage 5 solidarity,which rests on fundamental moral principlesthat are considered valid for all humans, MoralStage 6 solidarity extends to all humansprecisely because there are no abstractuniversal principles.

Ultimately, all individuals are alone becausethey cannot completely take another'sperspective. At the same time, all individualsare interdependent, because everybody mayhave to rely on everybody else as partners indiscourse. Moral Stage 6 "reasoners" knowthat perfect understanding between one anotheris impossible. They also know that it isnecessary to understand one another at apragmatic level and that the world mustmaintain discursive interaction.

There is no illusion of establishing universalmoral principles. Moral Stage 6 solidaritycounterbalances alienation. All individuals arealienated from one another, but they are allconnected by the bonds of universal solidarity,which acknowledges no preferred individual orgroup. Moral Stage 6 recognizes the dilemmaof the person at Moral Stage 5: we cannotchoose who we are; we cannot take anotherperson's perspective completely. It is notenough to say that I assume another person'spoint of view ("stand in this person's shoes"),because it is impossible for me to be the otherperson, have lived the other person's life andexperienced the world as the other person has.Exactly because universal rules fall short ofcapturing the uniqueness of individuals,solidarity has to refer to particular individualsand, by encompassing all individuals, becomesuniversal in a new meaning of the term.

At Moral Stage 6, individuals are involved

with the community at its different levels.There is no issue of individual versus societalrights (Moral Stage 4), nor of theircoordination (Moral Stage 5). Individualrights are constituted in the societal process,which, in turn, depends on the input of allindividuals. As Habermas points out, non-strategic (genuinely communicative) thinkinghas to replace strategic thinking before realdiscourse can begin. Strategic thinking isgoal-oriented. It sets the agenda for ourselvesand our institutions. By fixing the unconsciousas well as conscious agenda, strategic thinkingmakes it impossible to hear others accuratelyor to co-construct a perspective of reality.One has to have the strength to stop defendingand asserting oneself while communicating.This may require metasystematic egodevelopment and beneficence.

4-Step Model of Equilibration in the MoralDomain

Systematic to Metasystematic Stage Transition

Temporarily fully equilibrated stage 5abehavior (Revised Moral Stage 4)(Stage 5b-0, 5a-4) a. First, subjects attendto only one aspect of a problem. This isMoral Stage 4 in Kohlberg's scheme or theAbsolutist stage. The subjects attend to thesystem of which they are a part. For example,they see a problem either in terms of rights orduties but not both. Or, they may see theproblem as hurtful or helpful but not both.They may perceive a voting system as fair orunfair.

Transitions to the Metasystematic Stage(Stage 5b-1) b. Second, subjects negate theirconcentration on the one aspect of the systemthey previously attended and turn toconsidering another aspect. They might switchfrom responsibilities to rights, from thesatisfying the power that be to satisfying theself. People may switch from supporting avoting system to rejecting it, or adopting analternative. This is the beginning part of the

0

7

relativism that Kohlberg refers to as MoralStage 4/5. This is the very beginning ofmetasystematic reasoning.

(Stage 5b-2) a. or b. Third, subjects begin toalternate between attending to one aspect of theproblem and then to another. This is the nextpart of relativism that Kohlberg refers to asMoral Stage 4/5. Cultural relativism anddualism prevail. The frame of reference inwhich a system is embedded comes into play.

There are two important variants of this step.One is the belief that all systems of ethics areequally valid. That is system A or system Bor system C could be valid. The rules forevaluation change with the frame of referenceappropriate to the system.

The other variant is a kind of situational ethicswhere different ethical principles are applied indifferent situations. That is system A is bestin situation 1, and system B is best in situation2, etc. For example, rights might beimportant in one situation and duties inanother. One might prefer a voting system inwhich to the ideological positions of thecandidates matter at the national level. Butone might prefer a voting system in which theincumbency of candidates matters at theconstituency level.

(Stage 5b-3) a. and b. Fourth, a cognitiveconjunction of the two aspects of the problemtakes place. For example, systems of rightsand systems of duties are considered together.There is no full reversibility. Reversibilitywould mean that if one has a right to vote in afair election one has the duty to abide by thedecisions such as paying taxes. This isKohlberg's early Moral Stage 5. Again, manysubjects scored as Moral Stage 5 in Kohlberg'sscheme fall into this group.

There is a yearning for order but the subjectssee the subjectivity of forced conjunction ofrights and duties. First good conjunctions aregenerally recognized. Later bad ones are

rejected. For example for voters, making theballot secrete (system a), is general seen as animprovement to voting systems with publicballots.

Yet to know whether to return incumbents,one would like their ballots in office to bepublic (system b). This seems to successfullycontextualize each system so that they canjointly apply. Yet what do we do about voteson secrete national security matters or personalvotes of office holders for other candidates?At this step, people are aware of the differentsystems they would like to combine, but theylack the proclivity to combine them in asystematic and sensible manner. This istransitional metasystematic (5b-3).

Temporarily fully equilibrated stage 5bbehavior (Revised Moral Stage 5)(Stage 5b-4. Stage 6a-0) a. with b. (AlsoStage 6a-a.) Fifth, from the subjects'conjunction of the two aspects of the problem,they discover new relationships andinterrelationships between the aspects of theproblem. This is Kohlberg's Moral Stage 5/6and old Moral Stage 6 as Diessner andCommons (in preparation) show. It is fullymetasystematic (5b-4). Rights and duties arenecessary reciprocals. There is the doublegolden rule. One's rights are others' dutiesand visa versa. Because one has rights onealso has corresponding duties. This stage isalso Step 6a-0, the departure point of thetransition to the paradigmatic stage.

Metasystematic Stage to Paradigmatic StageTransition

Temporarily fully equilibrated stage 5bbehavior (Revised Moral Stage 5)(Stage 6a-O) see Stage 5b-4 above. a. First,when Moral Stage 6 is suggested, it isperceived as coordinated systems (seeKohlberg's old Moral Stage 6). There is nonew paradigm, however. Instead, there is aconsideration of a "possible" Moral Stage 6proposal. A supersystem containing a

consistent subset of possible conditions for afair voting system is selected and defended onthe basis of "the 1 9st advantaged" voter. Allof this is also the end of Moral Stage 5.

Transitions to the Paradigmatic Stage(Stage 6a-1) b. Second, there may be aconsideration of an alternative Moral Stage 6proposal. Or, there may be a denial ornegation of Moral Stage 6. They mayelucidate what is wrong with the major attemptin Moral Stage 6a-0. This is the first step inKohlberg's new Mural Stage 6. This stepcorresponds to the beginning of theparadigmatic stage (6a).

(Stage 6a-2) a. or b. Third, there areconsiderations of a number of "possible"Moral Stage 6 proposals. There is analternation between adopting various conditionspeople think are necessary for Moral Stage 6.For example, the fair voting proposals fromstep 6a-0 and step 6b-1 are alternativelysupported.

(Stage 6a-3) a. and b. Fourth, there areattempts at a new Moral Stage 6 integration ofmoral meta-perspectives. It is a transitionalstep towards paradigmatic operations. Thereis just a juxtaposition of considerations peoplethink are necessary for Moral Stagu 6. Theregenerally is some recognition of possibleMoral Stage 6 proposals. Subjects detect apositive match of proposals to some idealtemplate for a sufficient coordination. Later,subjects develop a proclivity to reject falseattempts at coordinating metasystems.Subjects now detect failures to match all of theideal template for a sufficient coordination.For example, subjects find that attempts of acoordination of new Moral Stage 5supersystems are either incomplete orinconsistent.Both detections do not occursimultaneously until the next step. There is nocoordination of a positive sort forming a newparadigm.

Temporarily fully equilibrated stage 6b

behavior (Revised Moral Stage 6)(Stage 6a-4) a. with b. This is fullyparadigmatic. Fifth, at Moral Stage 6,morality is no longer a property ofautonomous individuals, as it is at earlierstages, but a property of the social enterprise.Moral Stage 6 manifests itself only inter-individually. It is actual discourse and cannotbe monologically simulated. The non-strategicdiscourse co-constructs a paradigm foraddressing the moral dilemma.

Stage and Social Enterprise

By locating Moral Stage 6 in the socialenterprise we can acknowledge theimpossibility of an individual's reconstructingof a Moral Stage 6 reasoning process withoutgiving in to the temptation to assigntranscendental properties to Moral Stage 6.Transcendentalism may be a consequence offailing to discern the importance of, or tofunction at, the next stage. Baldwin's (1906)version of postformal reasoning wastranscendental. Gilligan and Murphy (1979)and Gilligan, Murphy and Tappa (1990)suggest the need for a transcendental stage.For a discussion of transcendental solutions interms of hard and soft stages see Kohlberg,1990). Many Moral Stage 6 models embodytranscendental properties, as does Kohlberg's(Kohlberg, 1984; Kohlberg & Power, 1981;Kohlberg, 1990) Moral Stage 7. Some of thepeople Kohlberg has chosen as exemplars forMoral Stage 6 had a transcendental apocalypticview of the world, which supposedly liberatedthem from reasoning at Moral Stage 5. Someresearchers (Alexander, Drucker & Langer,1990; Koplowitz, personal communication,June 21-23, 1985) have divided thetranscendental from the traditionaldevelopmental stages.

The social construction of Moral Stage 6entails a new relationship between moralreasoning and society. At all levels ofdevelopment, the stages of moral developmentare, of course, related to stages of societal

12

9

development. On the one hand, the politicallegitimation of societies must be adapted tomake sense to the moral reasoning of theirmembers. On the other hand, the societalenvironment influences the moral developmentof individuals. But at Moral Stages lower thanMoral Stage 6, in contrast, moral developmentand societal development coincide. We nowidentify the societal prerequisites of MoralStage 6 reasoning (political system, culture) aswell as a major societal corollary of the MoralStage 6 notions of universal respect andsolidarity (collective identity).

Political System

The coordination of society cannot be carriedout by authoritarian means, because there is noway to legitimize authoritarian behavior atMoral Stage 6. The political systemunderlying Moral Stage 6 discourse mustfollow some egalitarian and democraticprinciples. Decisions have to be discursivelysanctioned. The ultimate sovereign is "thepeople," whereby people does not meanmembers of a particular nations, class, culture,or any group as in earlier stages, but theuniversal community of human beings. Itfollows that a particular political unit below auniversal world society cannot be legitimatedin principle.

Culture

Universally available means of co-constructionof knowledge and the communication ofjudgement ad experience are central features ofMoral Stage 6. Organizational structure has toprovide ongoing opportunities for the co-construction.

Collective Identity

A particular society can no longer be based ona particular collective identity, because thesecollective identities subside and lose theirvalidity. Solidarity is universal, extending its

10

range from a particular social group toeverybody. Moral Stage 6 collective identityis the universal community of cosmopolitans,of citizens of the world. This concept ofMoral Stage 6 as a Moral Stage 6 society isapparently utopian. The problem of non-Moral Stage 6 elements in a Moral Stage 6society is addressed by Sonnert (submitted).In a real societal environment, the possibilitiesof social Moral Stage 6 reasoning are limited.People who understand Moral Stage 6 willinvariably be forced to act within institutionalcontexts that are not conducive to Moral Stage6.

Conclusions

The study of moral development has,traditionally, been the study of individualmoral development. At Moral Stage 6,however, the focus on individual moraldevelopment becomes insufficient becausemoral reasoning is socially constituted. MoralStage 6 reasoning requires actual discourse,rather than monologically simulated discourse.

References

Alexander, C. N., Druker, S. M., & Langer,E. J. (1990). Introduction: Major issues inthe exploration of adult growth. In C. N.Alexander, & E. J. Langer (Eds.), Higherstages of human development: Perspectiveson adult growth, (pp. 3-32). NewYork: Oxford University Press.

Armon, C. (1984a). Ideals of the good lifeand moral judgment: Ethical reasoningacross the life span. In M. L. Commons,F. A. Richards, & C. Armon (Eds.),Beyond formal operations: Vol. 1. Lateadolescent and adult cognitive development(pp. 357-380). New York: Praeger.

Armon, C. (1984b). Ideals of the good life:A cross-sectional/longitudinal study ofevaluative reasoning in children and adults.Unpublished doctoral dissertation, HarvardGraduate School of Education, Cambridge,MA.

Armon, C. (1989). Autonomy. In M. L.Commons, J. D. Sinnott, F. A. Richards, &C. Armon (Eds.), Adult Development, 1,Comparisons and applications of adolescentand adult developmental models, NewYork: Praeger.

Arrow, K. J. (1951). Social choice andindividual values. New York: John Wiley.

Baldwin, J. M. (1906). Thoughts andthings or genetic logic (3 Volumes). NewYork: Macmillan.

Campbell, R. L., & Bickhard, M. H. (1986).Knowing levels and developmental stages.Contribution to Human Development, 16.

Carter, R. (1985). Does Kohlberg avoidrelativism? In S. Modgil and C. Modgil,(Eds.), Lawrence Kohlberg: Consensus andcontroversy. (pp. 9-20). Philadelphia, PA:The Falmer Press.

Colby, A., & Kohlberg, L. (1987). Themeasurement of moral judgement: Vol. 1.New York: Cambridge.

Commons, M. L., & Grotzer, T. A. (1990).The rel)tionship between Piagetian andKohlbergian stage: An examination of the"necessary but not sufficient relationship."

14

11

Adult Development, Models and methods inthe study of adolescent and adult thought, 2.New York: Praeger.

Commons, M. L., & Hallinan, P. W. withFong, W., & McCarthy, K. (1989).Intelligent pattern recognition: Hierarchicalorganization of concepts and hierarchies. InM. L. Commons, R. J. Herrnstein,S. M. Kosslyn, & D. B. Mumford (Eds.),Ouantitative analyses of behavior, 2,Computational and clinical approaches topattern recognition and concept formation.

Commons, M. L., & Richards, F. A.(1984a). A general im_Ndel of stagetheory. In M. L. Commons, F. A.Richards, & C. Armon (Eds.), Beyondformal Vol. 1. Lateadolescent and adult cognitivedevelopment (pp. 120-140). NewYork: Praeger.

Commons, M. L., & Richards,F. A. (1984b). Applying the General StageModel. In M. L. Commons,F. A. Richards, & C. Armon (Eds.),Beyond formal operations: Vol. 1. Lateadolescent and adult cognitive development(pp. 141-157). New York: Praeger.

Commons, M. L., Rodriguez, J. A. (1990)."Equal access" without "establishing"religion: The necessity for assessing socialperspective-taking skills and institutionalatmosphere. Developmental Review, 323-340.

Commons, M. L., Stein, S. A., & Richards,F. A. (April, 1987). A General Model ofStage Theory: Stage of a Task. Paperpresented at the Society for Research onChild Development, Baltimore.

Coombs, C. H., Dawes, R. M., & Tversky,A. (1970). Mathematical psychology: Anelementary introduction. Englewood Cliffs,New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Diessner, R. & Commons, M. L. with Arabos,V. N. (in preparation). Differentiatingpostconventional stages of justice reasoning.

Elmer, N., Renwick, S., & Malone, B.(1983). The relationship between moralreasoning and political orientation. Journal

of Personality and Social Psychology, 41,1073-1080.

Fischer, K. W. (1987). Unpublished coursehandout, Harvard Graduate School ofEducation.

Fischer, K. W., Hand, H. H., & Russell, S.(1984). The development of abstractions inadolescents and adulthood. InM. L. Commons, F. A. Richards, &C. Armon (Eds.). Beyond formaloperations: Late adolescent and adultcognitive development (pp. 43-73). NewYork: Praeger.

Fischer, K. W., Kenny, S. L., & Pipp, S. L.(1990). How cognitive processes andenvironmental conditions organizediscontinuities in the development ofabstractions. In C. N. Alexander, & E. J.Langer (Eds.), Higher stages of humandevelopment: Perspectives on adult growth.(pp. 162-187). New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

Flavell, J. H. (1963). The developmentalpsychology of Jean Piaget. New York: D.Van Norstrand Co.

Gilligan, C., & Murphy, J. M. (1979).Development from adolescence toadulthood: The philosopher and the dilemmaof the fact. In D. Kuhn (Ed.), Intellectualdevelopment beyond childhood (pp. 85-99).San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Gilligan, C., Murphy, J. M., & Tappan, M.B. (1990). Moral Development beyondadolescence. In C. N. Alexander, & E. J.Langer (Eds.), Higher stages of humandevelopment: Perspectives on adult growth.(pp. 208-225). New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

Habermas, J. (1979). Communication and theevolution of society. T. McCarthy(Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press.

Habermas, J. (1983). Interpretive socialscience vs. hermeneuticism. In N. Haan,R. Bellah, P. Rabinow, & W. Sullivan(Eds.). Social Science as Moral Inquiry.New York: Columbia University Press.

Habermas, J. (1990). Moral Consciousnessand Communicative Action. C. Lenhardt &

15

12

S. W. Nicholsen (Trans.). Cambridge,MA: MIT Press.

Hardin, G. (Ed.). (1977). Managing thecommons. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

Inheider, B., & Piaget, J. (1958). Thegrowth of logical thinking from childhoodto adolescence: an essay on the developmentof formal operational structures.(A. Parsons & S. Milgram, Trans.). NewYork: Basic Books (originally published,1955).

Kohlberg, L. (1967). Moral and religiouseducation and the public schools: Adevelopmental view. In T. Sizer, (Ed.).Religion and Public Education. Boston:Houghton Mifflin.

Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence:The cognitive-developmental approach tosocialization. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.),Handbook of socialization theory andresearch. (pp. 347-480). Chicago: RandMcNally.

Kohlberg, L. (1973). The claim to moraladequacy of a highest stage of moraljudgment. Journal of Philosophy, 70, 630-646.

Kohlberg, L. (1976). Moral stages andmoralization. In T. Lickona (Ed.), Moral,development and behavior. (pp. 31-53).New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Kohlberg, L. (1981). The philosophy ofmoral development: Moral stages and theidea of justice. San Francisco: Harper andRow

Kohlberg, L. (1984). Essays on moraldevelopment: Vol. 2. The psychology ofmoral development: Moral stages, theirnature and validity. San Francisco: Harper& Row.

Kohlberg, L. (1985). A current statement onsome theoretical issues. In S. Modgil andC. Modgil, (Eds.), Lawrence Kohlberg:Consensus and controversy. (pp. 485-546).Philadelphia, PA: The Falmer Press.

Kohlberg, L. (1987). Child psychology andchildhood education: A cognitive-developmental view. New York: Longman.

Kohlberg, L. (1990a). Which postformal

levels are stages? Adult Development, 2,Models and methods in the study ofAdolescent and adult thought. (pp. 263-268). New York: Praeger.

Kohlberg, L., & Armon, C. (1984). Threetypes of stage models used in the study ofadult development. In M. L. Commons,F. A. Richards, & C. Armon (Eds.).Beyond formal operations: Vol. 1. Lateadolescent and adult cognitive development(pp. 383-394). New York: Praeger.

Kohlberg, L., Boyd, D. & Levine, C. (1986).The return of stage 6: Its principle andmoral point of view. In W. Edelstein & G.Nunner-Winider (Eds.). Zur Bestimmungder Moral Philosophische andsozialwissenschaftliche Beitrage zurMoralforschung. Frankfurt/Main:Suhrkamp Verlag.

Kohlberg, L., Boyd, D. & Levine, C. (1990).The return of stage 6: Its principle andmoral point of view. In T. E. Wren (Ed.).The moral domain: Essays in the ongoingdiscussion between philosophy and thesocial sciences. (pp. 151-181). Cambridge,MA: MIT Press.

Kohlberg, L., & Kramer, R. (1969).Continuities and discontinuities in childhoodand adult moral development. HumanDevelopment, 12, 93-120.

Kohlberg, L., Levine, C. and Hewer, A.(1983). Moral stages: A currentformulation and a response to Critics.Contributions to Human Development n.Basel: S. Karger.

Kohlberg, L., & Power, C. (1981). Moraldevelopment, religious thinking and thequestion of a seventh stage. In L. Kohlberg(Ed.). Essays on moral development: Vol.1. The philosophy of moral development.San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Kohlberg, L., & Ryncarz, R. A. (1990).Beyond justice reasoning: Moraldevelopment and considerations of a seventhstage. In C. N. Alexander, & E. J. Langer(Eds.), Higher stages of humandevelopment: Perspectives on adult growth,New York: Oxford University Press.

13

Kuhn, D., & Brannock, J. (1977).Development of the isolation of variablesscheme in experimental and `naturalexperiment' contexts. DevelopmentalPsychology, la, 9-14.

Kuhn, T. S. (1962, 1972). The structure ofscientific revolutions (Second Edition).Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lindsay, P. H., & Norman, D. A. (1977).Human Information Processing: Anintroduction to psychology, (2nd ed), NewYork: Academic Press.

Luchins, A. S., Luchins, E. H. (1965).Logical foundations of mathematics for thebehavioral sciences. New York: HoltRinehart and Winston.

McCarthy, T. (1978). The critical theory ofJurgen Habermas. Cambridge, MA: MITPress.

Plott, C. R. (1967). A notion of equilibriumand its possibility under majority rules.American Economic Review, 5_7, 787-806.

Plott, C. R. (1971). Recent results in thetheory of voting. In M. D. Intrilligator(Ed.). Frontiers of quantitative economics.(pp. 109-127). Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Plott, C. R., & Levine, M. E. (1978). Amodel of agenda influence on committeedecisions. American Economic Review, 68,146-160.

Power, F. C., Higgins, A., & Kohlberg, L.(1989). Lawrence Kohlberg's approach tomoral education: A study of threedemocratic high schools. New York:Columbia University Press.

Puka, W. (1987). Moral Developmentwithout the philosophical captivation.Moral Education Forum, v12(4).

Puka, W. (1990). The majesty and mysteryof Kohlberg's stage 6. In T. E. Wren(Ed.). The moral domain: Essays in theongoing discussion between philosophy andthe social sciences. (pp. 182-223).Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Reiser, S. J., Bursztajn, H., Gutheil, T. G.,Appelbaum, P. S. (1987). Divided staffs,.

16

divided selves: A case approach to mentalhealth ethics. Cambridge, England:Cambridge University Press.

Richards, F. A. (1990). Equilibrationalmodels and the framework of postformalcognition. Adult Development, Models andmethods in the study of adolescent and adultthought, 2. New York: Praeger.

Rosenberg, S. W. (1988a). The structure ofpolitical thinking. American Journal ofPolitical Science, 32, 539-566.

Rosenberg, S. W. (1988b). Reason. ideologyand politics. Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press.

Rosenberg, S. W., Ward, D., & Chilton, S.(1988). Political reasoning and cognition.Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Schrader, D. E. (1987, June 30-July 4).Overview of moral development. Presentedat the annual Moral Judgment InterviewScoring Workshop, Harvard GraduateSchool of Education, Cambridge, MA.

Selman, R. L. (1976). Social-cognitiveunderstanding: A guide to educational andclinical practice. In T. Lickona (Ed.),Moral development and behavior. (pp. 299-316). New York: Holt, Rinehart andWinston.

Selman, R. L. (1980). The growth ofinterpersonal understanding New York:Academic Press.

Selman, R. & Byrne, D. (1974). A structuraldevelopmental analysis of levels of roletaking in middle childhood. ChildDevelopment, Al 803-5.

Snarey, J. R. (1985) Cross-culturaluniversality of social-moral development:A critical review of Kohlbergian research.Psychological Bulletin, 21, 202-232.

Sonnert, G. (in preparation). A sociologicalapproach to higher moral stages.

Trudeau, E. J., & Commons, M. L. (1991,May). Mathematically demonstratedhierarchical complexity of tasks andbehavior development theory. Presented atthe 17th Annual Convention for theAssociation of Behavior Analysts, May,1991.

I 1-.11 If

14

Wagner, J. (1986). A critique of past andpresent theories of political tolerance:discovering rational, democratic citizensthrough the application of developmentalstages. Political Behavior, 45-80.

Wagner, J. (1990). Rational constraint inmass belief systems: The role ofdevelopmental moral stages in the structureof political beliefs. Political Psychology,11(1), 147-171.

Walker, L. J. (1986). Experiential andcognitive sources of moral development inadulthood. Human Development, 29(2),113-124.

15

1. The Notion of Stages: In the General Stage Model (GSM) of Commons and Richards(1984b), when a person successfully performs a task at a given order of hierarchical complexity,the stage of their performance is of the equivalent order. Throughout the text, the GSM stagenumbers appear in the parentheses ( ). The General Stage Model (Commons and Richards,1984,b) as well as Skill Theory (Fischer, Hand & Russell, 1984) has demonstrated thatKohlberg's (1984), Armon's (1984a, b) and Selman's (1976) half stages are actually whole stagesand will be referred to as such here.

2. E. Joram (personal communication, Friday, June 26, 1987) suggested a modification to the upper end ofthe stage sequence in the General Stage Model. What is now called Stage 6b, cross-paradigmatic (Moral Stage7), directly followed Stage 5b, metasystematic (Moral Stage 5). The name metasystematic was suggested byDeanna Kuhn. Now, we recognize an intermediate stage number as Stage 6a, paradigmatic (Moral Stage 6).The name paradigmatic was inspired by Thomas Kuhn's (1962, 1972) work.

3. In contrast, General Stage Model Stage 6a can be monological in non-moral domains. Aprominent example of paradigmatic reasoning is Darwin's theory of evolution. Another examplethat has not been achieved yet is the synthesis of quantum and relativity theories in physics.Here nature makes possible a monologically discernible solution to the problems ofincompleteness and inconsistency facing the coordination of coordinations. Thus nature andsociety have equivalent functions in the two types of General Stage Model Stage 6a, monologicaland dialogical reasoning. equivalent under the threat of incompleteness and inconsistency.

18