document 1.doc

NATRES CLASS DISCUSSIONSSY 2015-2016

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority

Assigned Readings:

1. Separate opinion of justice Puno - Cruz and Europa v. Secretary --- focus on Regalian Doctrine

2. Ayog v. Cusi

3. Republic v. INC June 29, 1982

4. Republic v. Quasha Aug 17, 1972

5. GR No. 113539 March 12, 1998

GRADED RECIT NXT WIK!

The Regalian Doctrine and Related Concepts in the 1987 Consti.

REGALIAN DOCTRINE or JURA REGALIA - this doctrine takes its roots from the Spanish colonization here in the country. Basically, eventually incorporated in our Constitutions (1935, 1973 and 1987).

As a historical overview of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine legal system, we have Chavez v. PEA. Chavez pronounced that the Regalian Doctrine holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions of the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. May iba kase na if you are being asked of what is or how do you define the Regalian Doctrine, some would explain it in relation to how it was used in the Spanish treaties which is okay for our purposes on Natural Resources but we relate that to how it is being incorporated in the 1987 Constitution which we’ll learn later on. So Chavez pronouced that the King as the sovereign ruler and representative of the people acquired all lands and territories in the Philippines except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian Doctrine substituting the State

in lieu of the King.

Kase before, all lands and waters are owned by the Crown/King. So that’s the phrasing before.

CHAVEZ vs. PEA and AMARI [G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, en banc

decision]

Facts:

-November 20, 1973: Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.

-February 4, 1977: Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA with primary mandate "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."

-On the same date, Presidential Decree No. 1085 was signed transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

-December 29, 1981: Pres. Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP directing that all future works in MCCRRP shall be funded and owned by PEA.

-January 19, 1988: Pres.Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land already reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters.


-April 9, 1988: Parañaque RD issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.

-The Freedom Islands have a total land 157.841 hectares.

-April 25, 1995: PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. The JVA was entered without public bidding.

-April 27, 1998: petitioner Chavez, as taxpayer, filed a petition for mandamus contending that the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI.

-Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.

-April 28, 1995: PEA Board confirmed the JVA.

-June 8, 1995, Pres. Ramos approved the JVA.

-November 29, 1996: then Senate Pres. Maceda delivered a privilege speech calling the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams.“ A senate investigation followed.

-March 30, 1999: PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement.

-May 28, 1999: President Estrada approved the Amended JVA.

-The Amended JVA covers a reclamation

area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.

-Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA's "actual cost" in partially reclaiming the Freedom Islands.

-AMARI will also complete, at its own expense, the reclamation of the Freedom Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed.

-AMARI and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net usable area which is defined in the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area less 30 percent earmarked for common areas.

-Under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name.

Issue: WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

Held: The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. CA No. 141 continues to this day as the general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.

The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government


reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect .

Foreshore lands became inalienable as natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by the government and classified as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case they would fall under the classification of government reclaimed lands.

After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties.

These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the government could not sell to private parties.

Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale.

CA No. 141 does not authorize the President to reclassify government reclaimed and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 59 (d).

Lands classified under Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes that the government could sell to private parties.

Most importantly, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority before lands under Section 59 that the government previously transferred to government units or entities could be sold to private parties.

One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted government units and entities from the maximum area of public lands that could be acquired from

the State.

These government units and entities should not just turn around and sell these lands to private parties in violation of constitutional or statutory limitations.

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease.

One purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm'. Huge landholdings by corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest."

The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay.

There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition.

There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

The mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not automatically make such lands private.

To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban


on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

SUMMARY OF THE RULING:

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public

domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

CHAVEZ vs. PEA and AMARI [G.R. No. 133250, November 11, 2003

Resolution of MR]

Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the State’s inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion, absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution.Commonwealth Act No. 141, "foreshore and lands under water were not to be alienated and sold to private parties,"

PEA is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide.

PEA took the place of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) as the government agency charged with leasing or selling all reclaimed lands of the public domain.

In the hands of PEA, which took over the leasing and selling functions of DENR, reclaimed foreshore (or submerged lands) lands are public lands in the same manner that these same lands would have been public lands in the hands of DENR.

This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the


public domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.

As we held in our 9 July 2002 Decision, the Amended JVA "violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.“

In our 6 May 2003 Resolution, we DENIED with FINALITY respondents’ Motions for Reconsideration. Litigations must end some time. It is now time to write finis to this "Grandmother of All Scams."

To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction.

The Regalian Doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land ownership that all lands that were not acquired from the government either by purchase or by grant belong to the public domain. So now it is presently incorporated under Section 2, Article 12 or the NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

IMPORTANT! The 1st sentence of Section 2.

Article 12, Section 2, 1987 Constitution.

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.

The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty percentum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty--five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be proovided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation’s maritime wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Flipino citizens.The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperrative fish farming, with priority subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements wiith foreign-owned corporations involving either techinical or financial assistance forlarge scale exploration, development, utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on realcontributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local, scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within 30 days from its execution.

Basically, Section 2 talks of course the


1st portion would be the Regalian Doctrine. And then, the succeeding sentences actually talk of the Constitutional limitations of the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources. This is perhaps the core of our initial study in the Law of Natural Resources. Section 2 is very important.

So we start with start with the concept of Regalian Doctrine as provided in the 1st sentence and the limitations as provided in the succeeding sentences.

So when we discuss Section 2, of Article 12 of the present Constitution, we take note of these concepts of imperium and dominium.

A. IMPERIUM - the gov’t authority posessed by the State expressed in the concept of sovereignty.

B. DOMINIUM - the capacity of the State to own and acquire property.

This principle of dominium is basically the foundation of the REGALIAN DOCTRINE under Section 2.

So ALL NATURAL RESOURCES are OWNED BY THE STATE.

So we all know that under the present Constitution, as phrased in Section 2, the Regalian Doctrine is already stripped off of its medieval connotations, like yung paano cya narelate to the Crown, to the King or to the Queen. So although the Doctrine is still phrased as the Regalian Doctrine, pertaining to the Crown, the King or the Queen, basically, for concept purposes wala na cya. It is being substituted by the concept of the State.

IMPORTANT LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE:

1. Any person claiming any portion of the public domain must be able to show title from the State.

EXPLANATION: there is still a need of title from the state because it is still public property or part of the public domain. So it can be such title can be obtained from the recognized MODES OF ACQUISITION OF TITLE which we will tackle lateras provided in CA 141.

2. The presumption that such property, if you cannot provide or show title, is presumptively belonging to the State.

EXPLANATION: So public lands not shown to be reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State shall be made part of the public domain.

3. Although when the colonizers introduced the Regalian Doctrine here in the Philippines, it was not intended to strip from the natives the concept of native title. (Carino v. Insular Government).

Carino v. Insular Government

When as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held of individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held ___ from before the Spanish conquest and never to have been public land.

So we will reach to that when we discuss IPRA.

4. Any minerals discovered on a land even if such aland is settled to be private land, still the minerals are reserved to the State.

EXPLANATION: Kase it is provided that ALL natural resources, including minerals, belong to the State. In fact, any private use of the minerals may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract said minerals in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.

LIMITS OF DOMINIUM (Section 2,


Article 12, 1987 Constitution):

NOTE: The entire Section 2.

With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.

While the concept of dominium necessarily includes the power of the State to alienate what is owned by the State, there is a specific provision in the Constitution that ONLY agricultural lands may be alienated.

So we proceed with the next limitation on the Exploration, Development and Utilization (EDU).

For EDU concerns, the important concepts would be the following:

1. Who may participate in the EDU of the natural resources in alienable resources?

ANS: Only Filipinos and Filipino Corporations.

2. How would such EDU be done?

ANS: It is either:

A.) Direct undertaking by the State

B.) Co-production, Joint venture or production-sharing agreements with the State *Still under the full control and supervision of the State.

We quote of Section 2:

The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty percentum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.

It is said that the present Constitution has departed from the earlier provisions which had prescribed that Natural Resources could only be explored, developed or utilized by licensed concession or lease. It is provided in Section 8, Article 14 in National Economy and Patrimony of the 1973 Constitution. So it was different before. Kase in 1973 Constitution, klaro na it could only be by EDU, it could only be by licensed concession or lease. It is very technical, but now it has changed to DIRECT UNDERTAKING, JOINT VENTURE or PRODUCTION-SHARING AGREEMENTS.

Minors Association of the Philippines v. Factoran (240 SCRA

100)

This ammendment or a change of rule is not retroactive. So it applies only upon the enactment of the 1987 Constitution.

So other limitations, still on Section 2 we have the period for the agreements. So we mentioned earlier a co-production, JVA, etc.

So such agreements, according to the Constitution, may be for a period not exceeding 25 years renewable for a period of not more than 25 years and other such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

So we dissect the provision. Just take note na 2 and periods provided in the Section:

A. First, is the 25 year limit of the exploitation of natural resources, but which is not applicable to water right for irrigation etc. Because, the measure and the limit of the grant is beneficial use.

So when you are asked of what is the


limit in the agreements provided in Section 2 as a Constitutional limitation, you categorize. If hindi cya water rights blah blah blah, that is 25 years renewable for another 25 years. For water rights, the measure and limit of the grant is beneficial use.

Also, the present phrasing os Section 2 is said to be stricter on the use and enjoyment of the nation’s “marine wealth” because it is reserved exclusively to Filipino citizens.

Although you can apply your other concepts in Public International Law, wherein principles of International Law wpuld apply as regards the economic zone which is part of the high seas. So medyo technical na cya. But just take note of the Constitutional limitation is Section 2 na sabi na may stricter rule on the use and enjoyment of the marine wealth of the nation because as of present phrasing, “enjoyment is exclusively reserved to Filipio citizens”.

And then we have a special provision in favor of subsistence fishermen and fishworkers -

“The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperrative fish farming, with priority subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons”. -- so this is an added special provision.

And then limitation on service contracts. -- The President may enter into agreements wiith foreign-owned corporations involving either techinical or financial assistance forlarge scale exploration, development, utilization of minerals...

Tke note, this provision only applies for large scale EDU. ...of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general

terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local, scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within 30 days from its execution.

So, the summary of the limitations under Section 2, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated. So with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The ownership (bcoz of the Regalian Doctrine) belongs to the State.

The EDU of all the natural resources, the full control and supervision belongs to the State. So stricter ruleunder the 1987 Constitution.

You also recall the period for agreements. You categorize if it is for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years is applicable or for beneficial use.

And then, limited to Filipino citizens or Filipino-owned corporations (@ least 60% of capital is owned by Filipino citizens).

Use and enjoyment of marine wealth, special provision in favor of subsistence fishermen and fishworkers and then limitation...

7 limitations under Section 2.

Earlier, we mentioned that only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated.

So we proceed with the nxt Section, bcoz this is where the lands of the public domain is being classified, and then the succeeding provisions dwell on the rules of disposition of these lands.


Article 12, Section 3, 1987 Constitution

Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may further be classified by law according to the uses which they may have been devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period of not exceeding 25 years,renewable for not more than 25 years, and not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than 500 ha., or acquire not more than 12 ha. thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of the lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held or leased and the conditions therefor.

Section 3 is very important. So we start with the first part of Section 3 which is the classification of lands. We have 4 classifications under the present Constitution. Later we will tackle the case which compares this to the previous calssifications under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. For now, we have four.

CLASSIFICATIONS OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:

1. Agricultral - may further be classified by law according to the uses which they may have been devoted.2. Forest or Timber3. Mineral Lands4. National Parks

So eto lang yung classification ng lands

of the public domain.

Who classifies land under the present law?

In the case of Director of Lands v. CA, the said classification is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the gov’t. It is not with the courts. So in the absenceof such classification, the land remains as declassified. It was also said in this case that although the Executive’s power to declassify said lands, said power is not not inherent because it is delegated by CA 141 and is only exercised upon the recommendation of the pertinent department. So we’ll take that provision in CA 141 later. So don’t confuse this with the authority of the President or the Executive to classify land with this provision...

... Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.

So students get confused na sabi executive power. And then ano itong provision na further classified by law? (Meaning by Congress)

So you dileanate kung ano ang type of land. Kung covered by the executive power to be classified are lands of public domain. Yung sa by law under Section 3 2nd sentence, is agricultural land lang. So take note.

*Executive Power - public land*Agricultural land - further may be classified by law to __ uses. So that’s for agricultural lands of the public domain.

We now go to the rules on the provision.

Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period of not exceeding 25 years,renewable for not more than 25


years, and not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than 500 ha., or acquire not more than 12 ha. thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.

Q: So, from your reading a portion of Section 3, can you provide us in simplier terms the rules on who are qualified to acquire alienable lands of the public domain?

Let’s start with acquisition, who are qualified to acquire?

A: Private individuals who are Filipino citizens only.

Q: How about aliens?

A: They are not allowed to acquire properties except in cases of succession.

Q: What type of succession?

A: Hereditary succession

Q: How about private corporations or associations? We are still with acquisition.

A: With respect to lands of the public domain, private corporations are not allowed to acquire public lands.

Q: How about hold public lands are they allowed to qualify (private corporations and associations)?

A: They can hold by lease.

Q: So for Filipino citizens, the limit is for area of acquisition?

A: *For ACQUISITION - 12 ha *For LEASE - not more than 500 ha

Q: Now how about for private corporations or associations?

A: Not to exceed for more than 25 years and renewable for not more

than 25 years.

Q: And then the limit for the area is?

A: Not to exceed 1000 ha.

So basically, we’ll just simplify that portion of this Section 3, which is basically the rules on disposition. We have limitations as to the area as well as to the number of years:

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS:

*Lease- 25 years renewable for another 25 years

If you are being asked if the same rule applies to alien individuals or foreigners, Section 7 of the same Article under the 1987 Constitution provides that save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

So it would seem that the phrasing of Section 7 that the capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain, except in cases of hereditary succession.

So you relate that ha because we are incorporating here the concept of ownership of private lands ___ public domain. So as answered earlier, one exception where aliens are allowed to acquire or hold lands is in the case of hereditary succession.

So we highlight the fact that the exception is strictly applied because it is not applicable to testamentary succession. Or otherwise, the Constitutional prohibition would be put meaningless.

So not just succession, but hereditary succession or intestate succession.


Another applicable provision also this time former natural-born citizens...

Article 12, Section 8, 1987 Constitution

Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.

Cruz v. Secretary of DENR

Separate Opinion of Justice Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of DENR Facts:

In 1997, RA 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act/IPRA) was passed. Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, questioning the constitutionality of certain provisions of IPRA: a) It allows the indigenous people/cultural community to OWN NATURAL RESOURCES ; b) It defines ancestral lands and ancestral domains in such a way that it may include private lands owned by other individuals; c) It categorizes ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land; d) It violates due process in allowing NCIP (National Commission on Indigenous Peoples) to take jurisdiction over IP land disputes and making customary law apply to these. In the first deliberation of the SC, the votes were 7‐7, so the case was re‐deliberated upon.

Issue:

Did the IPRA violate the Regalian Theory?

A. IPRA: Under the IPRA law, lands which have not been registered before, if granted with a CADT/CALT, will be recognized as privately owned by the IPs from the beginning‐ thus, has never been part of public domain.

B. Regalian Theory: Lands which has not been recognized as privately owned belongs to the State

Held: No Final Decision. Petition dismissed due to lack of votes; Law remained valid and constitutional (7 to grant ‐7 to dismiss).

Justice Puno’s Separate Opinion: The IPRA Law DID NOT VIOLATE the Regalian Theory

1. These lands claimed by the IPs have long been theirs BY VIRTUE OF NATIVE TITLE; they have lived there even before the Spanish colonization. “Native title refers to ICCs/IPs’ pre‐conquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputable presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest.”

2. AND Native Title is an Exception to the Regalian Doctrine: ... Oh Cho vs Director of Lands: “This exception would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors‐in‐interest since time immemorial”

3. Native Titles provide a different Type of Private Ownership“Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership. ‐‐‐ Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all generations and


therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights.”

4. It complies with Regalian Doctrine: Natural Sources within ancestral domains are not owned by the IPs* The IPs claims are limited to “lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;”* IPRA did not mention that the IPs also own all the other natural resources found within the ancestral domains

Halili v. CA

Facts: Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, defendant appellee [herein private respondent] Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, defendant appellee [also herein private respondent] David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim (Annex A-Complaint), assigning[,] transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon.

Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation, x x x situated in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, containing an area of 6,695 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-170514 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. The quitclaim having been registered, TCT No. T-170514 was cancelled and TCT No. T-120259 was issued in the name of appellee David Rey Guzman.

On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to defendant-appellee [also herein private respondent] Emiliano Cataniag, upon which TCT No. T-120259 was cancelled

and TCT No. T-130721(M) was issued in the latters name.[4]

Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances -- between Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman, and between the latter and Emiliano Cataniag -- and claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Art. 1621[5]of the Civil Code.

In its decision[6] dated March 10, 1992,[7] the trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that Helen Guzmans waiver of her inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to the constitutional prohibition against the sale of land to an alien, since the purpose of the waiver was simply to authorize David Rey Guzman to dispose of their properties in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Philippines, and not to subvert them. On the second issue, it held that the subject land was urban; hence, petitioners had no reason to invoke their right of redemption under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code.

The Halilis sought a reversal from the Court of Appeals which, however, denied their appeal. Respondent Court affirmed the factual finding of the trial court that the subject land was urban. Citing Tejido vs. Zamacoma[8] and Yap vs. Grageda,[9] it further held that, although the transfer of the land to David Rey may have been invalid for being contrary to the Constitution, there was no more point in allowing herein petitioners to recover the property, since it has passed on to and was thus already owned by a qualified person.

Issue: W/N the sale to Cataniag is valid.

Held: Neither do we find any reversible error in the appellate courts holding that

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/mar1998/113539.htm#_edn9







the sale of the subject land to Private Respondent Cataniag renders moot any question on the constitutionality of the prior transfer made by Helen Guzman to her son David Rey.

True, Helen Guzmans deed of quitclaim -- in which she assigned, transferred and conveyed to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests over the property she had inherited from her husband -- collided with the Constitution, Article XII, Section 7 of which provides:

SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

The landmark case of Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds[17] settled the issue as to who are qualified (and disqualified) to own public as well as private lands in the Philippines.Following a long discourse maintaining that the public agricultural lands mentioned in Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, include residential, commercial and industrial lands, the Court then stated:

Under section 1 of Article XIII [now Sec. 2, Art. XII] of the Constitution, natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:

Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred

or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens.Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 [now Sec. 7] is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1 [now Sec. 2]. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 [now Sec. 7] are the very same persons who under section 1 [now Sec. 2] are disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. And the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non transferability of agricultural land to aliens. x x x[18]

The Krivenko rule was recently reiterated in Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals,[19] which involves a sale of land to a Chinese citizen. The Court said:

The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire lands of the public domain (II Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines 439-440 [1988 ed.]).

The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition, exploitation,





development and utilization of all lands of the public domain and other natural resources of the Philippines for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.[20]

In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession.[21]

But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified Filipino citizen? This is not a novel question. Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.[22]

Thus, in United Church Board of World Ministries vs. Sebastian,[23] in which an alien resident who owned properties in the Philippines devised to an American non-stock corporation part of his shares of stock in a Filipino corporation that owned a tract of land in Davao del Norte, the Court sustained the invalidity of such legacy. However, upon proof that ownership of the American corporation has passed on to a 100 percent Filipino corporation, the Court ruled that the defect in the will was rectified by the subsequent transfer of the property.

The present case is similar to De Castro vs. Tan.[24] In that case, a residential lot was sold to a Chinese. Upon his death, his widow and children executed an extrajudicial settlement, whereby said lot was allotted to one of his sons who became a naturalized Filipino. The Court did not allow the original vendor to have the

sale annulled and to recover the property, for the reason that the land has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino citizen who is constitutionally qualified to own land.

Likewise, in the cases of Sarsosa vs. Cuenco,[25] Godinez vs. Pak Luen,[26] Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap[27] and Herrera vs. Luy Kim Guan,[28] which similarly involved the sale of land to an alien who thereafter sold the same to a Filipino citizen, the Court again applied the rule that the subsequent sale can no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer.

The rationale of this principle was explained in Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap thus:

x x x [I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nations lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.[29]

Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective of the constitutional provision -- to keep our land in Filipino hands -- has been served.

Read! Meralco v. Bartolome. Differentiate it with Director of Lands v. IACIPRA & Cruz v. DENR Secretary

IPRA LAW

CA 141 nxt meeting!











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