doc. 155 -- pla mtn def jgmt - bruce haglund

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

R. Lance Flores,Vicki Clarkson,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Scott Anthony Koster, et al.Defendants.A 9

C I V I L A C T I O N

¹ 3:11-cv-00726-M -BH

Application for DefaultJudgement

APPLICATION FOR CLERK’S ENTRY OF DEFAULT – MEMORANDUM OF LAW &VERIFIED MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGEMENT AGAINST RICO DEFENDANT

BRUCE H. HAGLUND

Now comes the Plaintiffs, Vicki Clarkson and R. Lance Flores (“Plaintiffs”) in their

individual capacities and in behalf of the Nation’s economic system and public interest as

formally pled,1 and petitions the Clerk pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55

for the entry of default, and moves the Court for default judgement against RICO

Defendant Bruce H. Haglund (“RICO Defendant” or “Defendant”). In support of Plaintiffs’

Application and Motion Plaintiffs rely upon the verified evidence of record in exhibit,

the Court’s findings, memoranda, orders in the Court Record of this case, and further

support and prove-up their damages claims by affidavit, attached; Plaintiffs further

show the following in support:

1 The Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose underlying RICO explains that, among other

things, RICO was designed to combat activities that “weaken the stability of the Nation’s economic system,harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burdeninterstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of theNation and its citizens …” Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat., at 922, 923.

Congress found that "organized" criminal "activity" used "fraud" to "drain" "dollars" from the Americaneconomy [*248] and to "harm innocent investors." Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 61 (1980) ("obviousbreadth of the language may well reflect the expansive legislative approach revealed by Congress' expressfindings and declarations.").

20120801210948 Mtn Def Jgmt - BRUCE H HAGLUND.wpd

Case 3:11-cv-00726-M-BH Document 155 Filed 08/08/12 Page 1 of 28 PageID 2282

1. Background and Procedural History

1.1 Plaintiffs filed their Original Complaint, petition for injunctive relief and other

equitable relief in this matter on April 8, 2011, and amended their Original Complaint

with their First Amended Complaint on March 19, 2012, in behalf of the Plaintiffs, and

in the national economic and general public.

1.2 Plaintiffs support their claims in conformance with FRCP Rule 9(b), and

seventeen (17) volumes containing two-hundred sixty-one (261) verified exhibits to

evidence their claims.

1.3 Proper service was made upon all Defendants named in the Original

Complaint according to the Rules or by Court’s Order2 and the following First Amended

Complaint.

1.4 Service of Plaintiffs added this action by the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

was properly and timely served upon the Defendant on July 10, 2012; an appearance

and answer were due on July 31, 2012.

1.5 RICO Defendant has not timely filed an Answer nor otherwise responded to

the First Amended Complaint.

1.6 Plaintiffs amended their Original Complaint with their First Amended

Complaint on March 19, 2012 petitioning for compensatory damages including a plea of

a damages amount directly related Defendant’s acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962, et

seq., (“RICO” violations) of exceeding not less than Two-hundred Twenty Million Dollars

subject to mandatory treble award,3 notwithstanding other compensatory, exemplary,

and injunctive relief;

2 See Court’s statement: “On February 1, 2012, this Court issued a sealed order permitting alternate

service and extending the time for service.” (Flores, et al. v. Koster, et al., 3:11-cv-00726-M -BH Document 47Filed 03/23/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID 1072).

3 Section 1964(c), title 18, provides that “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a

violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court andshall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including reasonable attorney’s fees.”18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).



1.7 Plaintiffs’ FAC pleads RICO Defendant jointly and severally liable for

damages;4

1.8 This matter is brought pursuant to, inter alia, Section 901(a) of the Organized

Crime Control Act of 1970 (Pub.L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, enacted October 15, 1970), and

codified as Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code as 18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968;

1.9 Plaintiffs specifically brought the instant action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

1962(a), (c), (d), and other causes of action elucidated in Affidavit attached hereto.

Divens, Wilde, Woods, and Haglund Protracted Thefts, Conversion, and Admission ofParticipation in a Ponzi Scheme, exhibiting a Pattern of Racketeering -

As A Matter of Record

1.10 In the events relevant to this action, attorney Jon Divens, Steven E. Woods, a

4 See, e.g., United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739, 752 (1st Cir. 1994) at 751-53 (finding that Congress intended

to reach all who participated in the conduct of the enterprise, whether they were “generals or foot soldiers”and holding that the “Reves test” (Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993) was satisfied by evidence thatthe defendant collected extortion payments under the direction of leaders of an extortion collectionenterprise); Napoli v. United States, 32 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1994) (overwhelming evidence that attorneys,although “of counsel” to the law firm enterprise, were not merely providing peripheral advice, butparticipated in the core activities that constituted the affairs of the firm), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110, reh'ggranted, 45 F.3d 680, 683 (2d Cir.) (upholding convictions of law firm investigators who were “lower-rungparticipants” whose racketeering activities were conducted “under the direction of upper management”), cert.denied, 514 U.S. 1084 (1995); United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754 (3d Cir. 2005) at 769-70 (stating that “the‘operation or management’ test does not limit RICO liability to upper management because ‘an enterprise isoperated not just by upper management but also by lower-rung participants in the enterprise who are underthe direction of upper management’”; and holding that Reves liability encompassed city employees whoperformed plumbing inspections and related work for the city’s Construction Services Department, thealleged enterprise) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); United States v. Delgado, 401 F.3d 290(5th Cir. 2005) at 297-98 (same); First Capital Asset Mgmt. v. Satinwood, Inc., 385 F.3d 159, 176 (2d Cir. 2004)(“‘RICO liability is not limited to those with primary responsibility for the enterprise’s affairs’” (citationomitted)); Baisch v. Gallina, 346 F.3d 366, 376 (2d Cir. 2003) (same and adding that “[o]ne is liable underRICO if he or she has ‘discretionary authority in carrying out the instructions of the [enterprises’] principals’”)(citations omitted); DeFalco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d (2d Cir. 2001) at 309 (ruling that RICO liability “is not limitedto those with primary responsibility” or “to those with a formal position in the enterprise,” and finding thatthere was sufficient evidence to satisfy the Reves test where the defendant instructed others to facilitatecommission of racketeering activity) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); United States v.Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 857 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that Reves does not require that the defendant havedecision-making power, only that defendant “take part in” the operation of the enterprise, and holding thatthe defendant was liable under Reves since he bought multi-kilogram amounts of cocaine from the drugenterprise on a regular basis); United States v. To, 144 F.3d 737, 747 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that Reves testwas satisfied by evidence that the defendant planned and carried out a robbery with other members of anAsian crime gang that committed a series of robberies targeting Asian-American business owners andmanagers).



Francis E. Wilde, and Bruce H. Haglund were involved in the intent to defraud clients

obtaining by false pretense, and with intent to steal or embezzle, convert, and secrete,

the property of their clients of over one-and-a-half Billion dollars worth of negotiable

instruments5 and stole about four-hundred thousand in cash. The credibility of Jon

Divens and the Wilde Mob6 should be held highly suspect as another federal court has

found that Divens had previously absconded with the assets belonging to his clients,

moving them to different accounts at different institutions so they could not be located

and stealing the interest generated from the stolen financial instruments; where the

CISC Court5 found Divens testimony not credible and Divens’ or Wilde’s affidavits either

self-serving or not credible.7 Also, (doc. 36 at 169)

5 “On this record, Divens is personally liable for conversion of the FNMA Series CMO”– Chase Investment

Services Corp. v Law Offices Jon Divens & Assoc., Case 2:09-cv-091S2-SVW-MAN, Findings of Fact & Conclusionsof Law, Doc. 120 Filed 10/14/10 8 of 51.

6 Described in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (doc. 36), et passim.

7 Also, (“Chase” Court): “JDA [Law Offices of Jon Divens & Associates, LLC] and Divens also submitted a

direct testimony declaration of Frank Wilde; however, Frank Wilde was not called as a witness at trial.The Court sustains Betts and Gambles's hearsay objections to paragraphs 3, 7, and 8 of the Wilde Declaration.The Court also sustains Betts and Gambles's objections to paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 9 on the ground that thestatements in these paragraphs lack foundation. Finally, Wilde's assumptions about the mental state of theowners of the CMOs stated in paragraph 7 lack foundation and are pure speculation. The remainingparagraphs of the Wilde Declaration are not substantively important.” [emphasis added] Chase, supra, Doc.120- Page 5 footnote 2

“II. FACTUAL FINDINGSAs a preliminary matter, the Court notes that resolution of many of the factual disputes between theparties turns in large part on the credibility of the witnesses. In that regard, the Court finds that[Jon] Divens's testimony was wholly incredible. The Court does not believe that Divens had anyagreement with any representative or agent of Betts and Gambles or Amedraa that entitled Divens or JDA tothe interest generated by the Cobalt CMO or the FNMA [FannieMae] Series CMO. Instead, Divens acquiredthe CMOs under the false promise that he would act solely as an escrow agent with regard to the CMOs.Once the CMOs were in Divens's possession, he absconded[†] with the assets, moving them to differentaccounts at different institutions so they could not be located and stealing the interest generated fromthe CMOs for his own personal use. In short, the Court finds that Divens created a scheme to defraudBetts and Gambles and Amedraa and to steal their assets. His testimony is not credible [emphasis &notation added].” Id., at 6 [† abscond >v. 1 leave hurriedly and secretly to escape from custody or avoidarrest. Oxford University Press]

“However, Divens also testified that within "a week or a month" of the transfer of the Cobalt CMO to JDA's UBSaccount, Williams told him that, in fact, Betts and Gambles was the owner of the Cobalt CMO and that Williamswas a broker trying (unsuccessfully) to purchase the Cobalt CMO from Betts and Gambles. Thus, even if theCourt credits Divens's testimony that he did not know initially that Betts and Gambles owned the Cobalt CMO,as of March 6, 2009, when Betts and Gambles contacted Divens demanding the return of the Cobalt CMO,

(continued...)

20120801210948 Mtn Def Jgmt - BRUCE H HAGLUND.wpd Page 4


1.11 Later, attorney Bruce H. Haglund8 would join the Wilde Mob and be

designated the money man who would move the majority of the Mob’s money through

his trust account.9

1.12 This criminal behavior continued and expanded into the nexus events that

evolved the Plaintiffs’ depicted Amenpenofer Syndicate.

1.13 Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the entirety of Plaintiffs’ First Amended

Complaint and more specifically the facts and allegations, therein as well as the sworn

evidence in exhibit filed in the Court Record, therein identified as Exhibits 1 thru 261,

all hereby re-averred and re-alleged, for all purposes, and incorporated herein with

the same force and effect as if set forth verbatim herein.

7 (...continued)

Divens knew that Betts and Gambles was the owner of the Cobalt CMO and that up Right Holdings could notgenerate the funds to purchase it.

“Divens testified that after he learned about Betts and Gambles in February or March 2009, Betts andGambles orally agreed on a phone call with Divens that Divens could place the Cobalt CMO into a tradeprogram. The Court does not find this testimony credible. Divens has not presented any evidence,other than his self-serving testimony, that any such agreement existed.

3

Furthermore, Divens's testimony is flatly contradicted by the letters Betts and Gambles sent to Divenson March 6, 2009, March 10, 2009, and April 5, 2009, in which Betts and Gambles's counsel clearly indicatedthat Betts and Gambles "has never given its consent to the investment of its CMO into any such [trade]platform" and demanded return of the Cobalt CMO. The Court finds that Betts and Gambles neverauthorized Divens to take any action other than hold the Cobalt CMO in escrow pending the proposedsale to Up Right Holdings [emphasis added].” Id., at 8

8 | 108. “In answer to ¶ 108, Answering Defendant admits that he wired funds to two "old investors"

using new investor money, but denies that the two wires were sent knowingly to old investors. AnsweringDefendant admits that when asked by the Commission what the practice of paying old investors with newinvestors money was called, he responded that such a practice was called a ‘Ponzi scheme.’Answering Defendant admits that those two wires were sent after having received a subpoena from theCommission in connection with the investigation that led to this Complaint.” United States Securities &Exchange Commission v. Francis E. Wilde, et al., Case 8:11-cv-00315-DOC -AJW, Defendant Bruce H. Haglund’sAnswer to Complaint – Doc. 4 Filed 05/13/11 Page 13 of 16 Page ID #:33

9 “THE RELIEF DEFENDANTS

26 | 17. In answer to ¶ 17, Answering Defendant admits that he wired funds from his27 | trust account to IBALANCE LLC ("IBALANCE"). “ Id. at 3.

“ 2 | 18. In answer to ¶ 18, Answering Defendant admits that he wired funds from his 3 | trust account to the account of Maureen Wilde, the wife of Wilde.” Id. at 4.

“6 | 19. In answer to ¶ 19, Answering Defendant admits that Shillelagh Capital 7 | Corporation ("Shillelagh") is a Nevada corporation, owned and controlled by Wilde, 8 | and that Shillelagh has never had a class of securities registered with the Securities 9 | and Exchange Commission. Answering Defendant admits that he transferred10 | approximately $323,500 of investor funds to Shillelagh.” Id. at 4.



2. Legal Standard

2.1 If a defendant fails to plead or defend as required by the Rules, the clerk or

judge may enter default upon a plaintiff's request. Rule 55(a); Shepard Claims Service,

Inc. v. William Darrah & Associates, 796 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir. 1986) (When a

defendant fails to file a responsive answer, he is in default, and an entry of default may

be made by either the clerk or the judge.) Then, if no hearing is needed to ascertain

damages, judgment by default may be entered. Rule 55(b). United Coin Meter Co., Inc. v.

Seaboard Coastline RR., 705 F.2d 839, 844 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing Meehan v. Snow, 652

F.2d 274 (2nd Cir. 1981).

2.2 When a court determines that a defendant is in default, the factual allegations

of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.

Geddes v. United Financial Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d);

Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d 2688.

2.3 Therefore, after receiving a default, plaintiff must still establish the extent of

damages to which he is entitled. Kelley v. Carr, 567 F. Supp. 831, 841 (W.D. Mich.1983).

However, if the damages sought by the plaintiff are a sum certain or a sum that can be

made certain by computation, judgment will generally be entered for that amount

without an evidentiary hearing. Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure:

Civil 2d 2688.

2.4 In assessing damages, the court must review facts of record, requesting more

information if necessary, to fix the amount to which plaintiff is lawfully entitled. Pope v.

United States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944).

2.5 Courts consider the following factors when deciding a plaintiff's motion for

entry of default judgment: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits

of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of

money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts;



(6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy

underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

2.6 When evaluating the Eitel factors10

and assessing liability, the " ‘factual

allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, [are]

taken as true.' " TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987)

(quoting Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). A default

judgment can be entered without a hearing if the "amount claimed is a liquidated sum

or capable of mathematical calculation." Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir.

1981).

District Court’s Power to Seize Passport and Funds

2.7 The Northern District of Texas Dallas Division have take steps of such

measures before, for example in SEC v. W Financial Group, LLC, et al., 3:08-cv-00499-N,

issuing passport seizure as part of contempt sanctions. (Case 3:08-cv-00499-N doc.

347, 01/22/2010) However, this Court needn't await an act of contempt to force the

surrender of Defendant's passport, when such a proceeding in this case would be far

too late once the flight has been taken.

"… the power to order a party to produce funds includes the power toexercise some minimal control over the party subject to that order—but onlywhen doing so is necessary to protect the court's ability to enforce theunderlying order and prevent the loss of assets. Cf. Herbstein v. Bruetman, 241F.3d 586, 588-89 (7th Cir. 2001) (contempt power includes the power toseize a party's passport);

SEC v. Lauer, 52 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 1995) (injunction power reaches

10

"Defendant's failure to answer [Plaintiff's] Complaint makes a decision on the merits impractical, if notimpossible. Under FRCP 55(a), termination of a case before hearing the merits is allowed whenever adefendant fails to defend an action." PepsiCo Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Therefore, the seventh Eitel factordoes not preclude the Court from entering default judgment against Defendants. See id.; see also Philip MorrisUSA, Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 501. “Upon considering all of the Eitel factors, the Court finds that default judgmentshould be entered in this case.” Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986).

A default judgment is appropriate where the defendant “has received actual or constructive notice of the filingof the action and failed to answer.” Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685,690 (9th Cir. 1988).



orders "essential to prevent the dissipation of assets").

“Whether such controls are necessary will depend upon the circumstances ofthe case, but it will be a rare case where any extraordinary steps are needed”Bank of America, NA v. Veluchamy, 643 F. 3d 185 (CA 7th Cir. 2011)

"The district court found that this was the rare case where such an order wasjustified, and we agree. The bases for findings of necessity and flight riskwere clear and largely uncontested. The district court was faced with debtorswho had previously transferred abroad all of the funds now subject to theorder and were simultaneously hesitant to disclose information that wouldhave revealed those transfers. The district court found that theextra-territorial location of the funds threatened its ability to enforce theproduction order; in other words, it found that the only way it could accessthe funds at issue was through the Veluchamys. The court also found that theVeluchamys had minimal assets in the United States, what appeared to besignificant assets abroad, and a reluctance to disclose those facts, all of whichestablished some flight risk. We see no clear error with those findings, andbelieve they are adequate to support the minimal seizure imposed. Cf. UnitedStates v. Shaheen, 445 F.2d 6, 11-12 (7th Cir. 1971) (suggesting that a districtcourt's seizure of a party's passport is permissible when a judgment has beenentered, when there have been significant transfers abroad, and whendomestic funds would be inadequate to satisfy the judgment). Nor do we seeany fatal flaw in the form those findings took; while a district court shouldenter findings to support an injunction, a lack of findings does not necessitateremand where—as here— there is "a sufficient record from which we can render a decision." Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 602 F.3d 879, 885 (7th Cir. 2010)."

"Just as a litigant held in civil contempt has the keys in his own pocket — forhe will be released as soon as he cooperates — so Bruetman can get hispassport back whenever he pleases. All he need do is complete theexamination, fully disclosing all of his assets. Then the proceedings will endand Bruetman will be free to travel (though his assets must stay behind).Bruetman's enduring refusal to cooperate — first by failing to appear forexamination, then by leaving the country, next by concealing his return to theUnited States, and now by using bankruptcy as the excuse for refusing toundergo more questioning — amply justifies restricting his ability to skip thecountry yet again …

"Nonetheless, Bruetman insists, the collection proceeding should bedismissed without taking any further evidence. He gives two reasons: thebankruptcy proceeding and the long duration of the collection proceeding.Neither carries the day. A bankruptcy court does not attempt to enforcejudgments; the court determines creditors' entitlements, but after these havebeen fixed it remains essential to lay hands on the debtor's assets, so there isroom for collection proceedings such as this. Even if the default judgmentwere treated as creating an ordinary unsecured debt subject to discharge,Bruetman still would have to surrender all of his assets (other than those



covered by an exemption). Bruetman has fought tooth and nail to avoidrevealing his assets; we cannot imagine why an asset-discovery proceedingunder way for eight years should be dismissed and Herbstein forced to startfrom scratch in the bankruptcy — especially when the bankruptcy mightitself be dismissed as filed in bad faith. The collection proceeding hasoutlasted the six-month line in Ill. S.Ct.R. 277(f), but that rule adds: "The courtmay, however, grant extensions beyond the 6 months, as justice mayrequire." Justice requires an extension, so that Bruetman's shenanigans donot defeat his creditor's rights. Herbstein is entitled to six months ofcooperation from Bruetman. See RTC v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1228 (7thCir. 1993). So far as we can see, however, he has received only one day ofcooperation in an eight-year period. This citation proceeding will continueuntil Herbstein has received his due." Herbstein v. Bruetman, 241 F. 3d 586(CA 7th Cir. 2001)

3. Plaintiffs’ Plea of Damages

3.1 Plaintiffs’ Compensatory Actual Damages result from Defendants' intentional

and willful acts that directly or proximately caused, inter alia, the following damages:

3.2 Direct and Proximate Caused Actual Damages inflicted by the RICO Defendants

exceed an amount greater than $220,000,000 and, in fact, is $357,014,558 as itemized:

Source $ Assets Description & Reference

MC Commodities Trading, Inc.Minh Da Nguyen,President/C.E.O. Non-recoursefunding

$165,000,00066% × $250,000,000 BG = $165,000,000monetized; Exs Vol. 10, Exs 212, 213, 221,222, 231, 232.

Mockingbird Films International2009/2010 Slate production

$170,350,200Net Profits. Ex. Vol. 15 “Slate Summary” pg 4of 54. Does not include 2010/2011 and2011/2012 production slate revenues.

Michigan Film Incentive Rebatefor The Black Messiah Murders

$7,972,149

Ex. Vol. 14, Ex. 258. Usable for slate pre-funding through Fallbrook (Exs. Vol. 13, Ex.252) to purchase MC Commodities Trading,Inc. SBLC.

Texas Film Incentive Grant forAlter Ego

† and Killing Frank

$1,996,345Ex. Vol. 13, Ex. 251; Ex. Vol. 15, Ex. 259 at 33,51 (see also references below)

††

City of San Antonio - Lone StarBrewery (Studio) Incentive Pkg.

Ex. Vol. 13, Ex. 251. Value of benefit packageestimated at $17MM, not calculated.

St. George’s Project Inc.,studio/sound stage facilityfunding

Value of $510MM funding benefit & value offully developed property losses, notcalculated.



Lone Star Studio Lost Revenues $11,508,864Loss of studios and sound-stage 1 yearrevenues $13,539,840 at 85% use.

Vicki Clarkson $187,000$90,000 funding plus agreed film profitsharing($80,000 BG purchase to Alicorn Capital Mgt )

Damages $357,014,558Actual Direct & Proximately CausedDamages

† Alter Ego (Brennert/Hart, 2009)originally scheduled for Louisiana shoot anticipating 30% taxcredit rebate w/approx. net of 20% tax credit benefit.†† Both Alter Ego and Killing Frank (Holland, 2009) rescheduled for production in Texas

3.3 Consequential Compensatory Damages. Plaintiffs’ plead damages of Three-

million Dollars ($3,000,000) for consequential compensatory damages awarded by

virtue of the losses suffered by the Plaintiffs resulting from the Defendant's intentional

and willful criminal and tortuous acts causing injury to the Plaintiffs’ physical health,

infliction of extreme mental anguish, and harm to Plaintiffs’ professional reputations as

to lower them in the estimation of the community, deterring third persons from

associating or dealing with them throughout the industry, and additionally impugning

their integrity and standing in society.

3.4 Exemplary Damages resulting from Defendants' malice and criminal acts, they

so greatly harmed the Plaintiffs, producers, crews, talent, lost employment in the San

Antonio and Texas communities, revenues to ancillary business, and City of San

Antonio, Texas.

3.5 Pre/Post- Judgment Interest. Plaintiffs also seek pre- and post-judgment

interest on damages and taxable costs of court.

3.6 Attorneys' Fees are not applicable in this instance, but should not be deemed

waived as Plaintiffs anticipate attorneys' fees to be incurred following the summons

and complaint service of the balance of the RICO and Nominal Defendants at which time

Plaintiffs shall hand over the prosecution of this case to their Dallas law firm.



3.7 Plaintiffs, the Nation’s economic system, the Public, and others were harmed

by the RICO Defendants’ predicate acts, and Plaintiffs, directly and proximately through

the Defendant’s RICO predicate crimes and violations, resulting in actual damages for

which Plaintiff are entitled to mandatory treble damages in the amount of not less than

3 × $220,000,000 plus other compensatory relief, attorneys fees and costs.

3.8 RICO Defendants, each having joint and several criminal and civil liability,

through their various legal enterprises, association-in-fact enterprises, and by their

direct individual and collective racketeering acts and conspiracy, are believed to have

secured $18,000,000,000 or more in negotiable securities (doc. 36 at 168) for which

they appear to be beneficiaries of some portion thereof , other cash assets located in

domestic and foreign banks, and have purchased assets with those funds, e.g., a $90,000

Land Rover purchased by Francis Wilde (doc. 36 at 50); further

3.9 Associated Nominal Defendant Banks/Financial Institutions: Bank of America,

N.A.,11

additional banks and financial institutions are identified in affidavit

APPENDIX A.

3.10 Plaintiffs’ pre-discovery investigation uncovered that RICO Defendants used

the Plaintiffs’ cash assets to acquire at least one of ten or more financial instruments

including bonds, of which one domestically acquired $3 billion bond and a European $5

11

Hon. Steven V. Wilson, U.S. Dist. Judge: “‘Divens further testified that at various points betweenFebruary and October 2009, he transferred the interest earned on the Cobalt CMO out of the varioussecurities accounts where the Cobalt CMO was held and into his business account at Bank of America.5 Divenstestified that he used these interest payments for his ‘personal use.’" Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law – Chase Investment Services Corp. v Law Offices Jon Divens & Assoc., Case2:09-cv-091S2-SVW-MAN Document 120 Filed 10/14/10 Page 2 of 51 [5] “While the Cobalt CMO was in the CISC Account, the incoming interest payments generated by the CMOwere automatically reinvested in a money market mutual fund in the CISC Account. (Divens's Tr. Exh. 28[Declaration of Michele Fanner ¶ 9].) Divens frequently instructed Michele E. Fanner, a Financial Advisor andVice President of Investments at ClSC, to liquidate the money market funds and wire the cash balance toDivens's outside account at Bank of America. (Id.) The last of such wire transfers took place on October 27,2009.” Id. at FN 5



billion bond12

with total face value equal to or exceeding eight-billion dollars ($8 billion

USD). (doc. 36 at 42)

3.11 A European $5 billion bond referenced (doc. 36 at 168) is directly tied to the

Plaintiffs’ investment funds. The HSBC pre-advise transaction code and the bank

transmission confirmation was presented to the Plaintiffs as proof and verification of

the instrument that was acquired (doc. 1-4 at 21), in part, from their funds in behalf of

the Plaintiffs. Since the purchase the Five-billion Dollar instrument the Plaintiffs have

located its tracking and note that the bond has matured and may be subject to RICO

disgorgement, divestiture and clawback powers of the Court.

3.12 It appears there were, or still are, at approximately nine MTN13

offshore

instruments, that were acquired. The various instruments are either European, Far East

or Pacific Rim financial instruments secured by the Syndicate using investors’ money,

and never paying out their earning or returns.

Prayer

4. Plea for Relief

Wherefore, Plaintiffs, pray for relief pursuant to Section 901(a) of the Organized

Crime Control Act of 1970 (Pub.L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, enacted October 15, 1970)

codified as Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968;

specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 962 a, c, d, and the Court’s own equitable powers, request that

the Court:

12

Bank of America Corp. and KFW Bank - Financial services Headquarters Frankfurt, Germany.

13

Investopedia explains 'Medium Term Note - MTN'“1. Notes range in maturity from one to 10 years. By knowing that a note is medium term, investors have anidea of what its maturity will be when they compare its price to that of other fixed-income securities. All elsebeing equal, the coupon rate on medium-term notes will be higher than those achieved on short-term notes.

2. This type of debt program is used by a company so it can have constant cash flows coming in from its debtissuance; it allows a company to tailor its debt issuance to meet its financing needs. Medium-term notes allowa company to register with the SEC only once, instead of every time for differing maturities.”



4.1 Award Plaintiffs such preliminary injunctive and ancillary relief as may be

necessary to avert the likelihood of further injury to Plaintiffs during the pendency of

this action and to preserve the possibility of effective final relief, including but not

limited to, temporary and preliminary injunctions;

4.2 Enter a permanent injunction to prevent future RICO and other violations by

RICO Defendant;

4.3 Award such relief as the Court finds necessary to redress harms and injuries

resulting from Defendant’s violations of 18 U.S.C. 1962 et seq., other criminal activities,

restitution, disgorgement, divestiture and clawback of ill-gotten monies from RICO and

Nominal Defendants; and

4.4 that Plaintiffs have judgment against RICO Defendant, jointly and severally,

and judgement based on the actual damages of not less than two-hundred twenty-

million dollars ($220,000,000 USD) described and pled in Plaintiffs First Amended

Complaint;

4.5 that with regard to all claims arising under the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), (c) and (d), Plaintiffs pray for

compensatory damages in an amount pled, that the amount of said damages be trebled,

and that plaintiff be awarded prejudgment interest, costs, and such other relief as is just

and proper, all pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c);

4.6 that with regard to all claims of common law fraud, Plaintiffs pray for

compensatory damages in an amount adjudged by the Court, and that Plaintiffs be

awarded prejudgment interest, punitive damages, costs, and such other relief as is just

and proper;

4.7 that with regard to all claims of civil conspiracy, Plaintiffs pray for



and proper;



4.8 that with regard to all claims of aiding and abetting fraud, Plaintiffs pray for



and proper;

4.9 that with regard to all other claims Plaintiffs pray for compensatory damages

in an amount to be proven at trial, and that Plaintiffs be awarded prejudgment interest,

costs, and such other relief as is just and proper; and

4.10 that Plaintiffs be awarded prejudgment interest, costs, and such other relief

as is just and proper;

4.11 that injunctive relief preventing the sale or disposition of Defendant’s assets

acquired through the diversion of funds from the Plaintiffs;

4.12 that Court order disgorgement, divestiture, and clawback from Nominal

Defendants or other third-parties of tainted monies consumed, spent, or otherwise

disposed of by the Defendant directly or other earnings, profits, or levered acquisition

of any asset related to the use of the tainted monies, from Nominal Defendants or third-

parties including fees paid to attorneys for defense of RICO Defendant;

4.13 that Court issue appropriate turn-over orders when presented with evidence

showing the holding of assets; and that Court order payment of

4.13.1 fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this action;

4.13.2 pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as provided by law;

4.13.3 a finding of alter ego status of RICO Defendant, if any;

4.13.4 that an ORDER be immediately issued against destruction or

spoliation of evidence;

Relief Sought In Behalf of the National and Public Interest



4.14 that, if necessary, a Special Master be appointed unless a proper United

States agency (e.g., CFTC, FTC, SEC, etc.) intervenes in the case to oversee and supervise

injunctive relief, and that

4.14.1 a permanent injunction issue against further abuse upon the United

States, in the national economic interest, and the general public interest, issued

against, RICO Defendant, and any assigns, agents, successors, subsidiaries, holding

companies, related entities, and any other persons or entities under their control

or in concert or participation with RICO Defendant, now or in the future, shall be

permanently enjoined in the United States, and its territories, from participating in

financial trading, sale, promotion, or brokering of financial instruments including

treasury bonds, CMO’s, registered or unregistered securities, mortgage

instruments or any other business related to commercial banking specifically

provided below:

4.14.2 Engaging, assisting, or otherwise participating, directly or indirectly,

commercial instrument trading, brokerage, or sales of any type including,

collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) trades, collateralization or brokerage of

any sort, mortgage loan origination, mortgage brokerage activity, mortgage

assistance, mortgage relief, principal reductions, mortgage purchases or

negotiations, foreclosure consulting, loan modifications, title services,

underwriting, lending, or loan or forensic audits in any capacity;

4.14.3 Soliciting, advertising, selling, marketing, displaying, offering,

performing, or accepting or receiving payment for, directly or indirectly, services,

including lead generation and product sales, relating to commercial instruments,

private or registered securities, trading related to financial instruments or

products of any sort including mortgage or loan origination, mortgage or other

financial instrument brokerage activity, mortgage or commercial instrument

trading, or assistance, financial consulting, or forensic audits; and



4.14.4 Publishing, distributing or disseminating any information, including

written, oral, or video, directly or indirectly, in exchange for money or anything of

value, relating to either private or registered securities, loan origination,

commercial instrument or banking brokerage activity of any sort,

Other Terms and Conditions Requested

5. Enforcement and Collection. This Court should retain jurisdiction over this

matter for the purposes of

5.1 enabling the Plaintiffs to apply, at any time, for enforcement of any provision

of the Judgement and for sanctions or other remedies for any violation of the

Judgement, including contempt and enforcement of the judgment;

5.2 enabling any party to the Judgement to apply, upon giving 30 days' written

notice to all other Parties, for such further orders and directions as might be necessary

or appropriate either for the construction or enforcement of the Judgement or for the

modification or termination of one or more injunctive provisions; and

5.3 enabling the Plaintiffs to collect or enforce any judgment rendered pursuant to

the Judgement.

Plaintiffs pray the Court also order that:

Cooperation

6. RICO Defendant cooperate with all investigations and other proceedings that the

Plaintiffs may bring to enforce the terms of the Judgement, including the obligations to:

6.1 Appear at the request of the Plaintiffs for hearings, depositions, and trial and

provide testimony. All such testimony shall be truthful;

6.2 Produce documents, records, electronic records, or any other tangible things

in response to a subpoena or other written request issued by the Plaintiffs; and



6.3 Accept a subpoena from the Plaintiffs by certified email without need for

service of process, and RICO Defendant shall provide and maintain a reliable email

address for this purpose;.

6.4 RICO Defendant submit to a financial audit of his personal and business

finances from the period of December 1, 2008 until the date of the completion of the

audit, by competent financial audit firm, or certified public accountant (CPA) approved

by the Court, and that costs of audit be taxed against the Defendant;

Duties of Third Parties Holding Defendant’s Assets

7. Any financial institution, business entity, or person maintaining or having custody

or control of any account or other asset of the RICO Defendant, or any corporation,

partnership, or other entity directly or indirectly owned, managed, or controlled by, or

under common control with the RICO Defendant, which is served with a copy of this the

final order of default judgement (the “Order”), or otherwise has actual or constructive

knowledge of the Order, shall hold and retain within his/their/its control and prohibit

the withdrawal, removal, assignment, transfer, pledge, hypothecation, encumbrance,

disbursement, dissipation, conversion, sale, liquidation, or other disposal of any other

assets, funds, documents, or other property held by, or under his/their/its control:

7.1 on behalf of, or for the benefit of, the RICO Defendant or any other party

subject to the above;

7.2 in any account maintained in the name of, or for the benefit of, or subject to

withdrawal by, the RICO Defendant or other party subject to the above; and

7.3 that are subject to access or use by, or under the signatory power of, the

Defendant or other party subject to the above.

7.4 Deny RICO Defendants access to any safe deposit boxes or storage facilities

that are either:



7.4.1 titled in the name, individually or jointly, of the RICO Defendant, or

other party subject to the above; or

7.4.2 subject to access by the RICO Defendant or other party subject to the

above.

7.5 Provide the Plaintiffs, within five (5) days of the date of service of the Order, a

sworn statement setting forth:

7.5.1 the identification number of each account or asset titled in the name,

individually or jointly, of the Defendant, or held on behalf of, or for the benefit of,

the Defendant or other party subject to Section II above, including all trust

accounts managed on behalf of the Defendant or subject to the Defendant’s

control;

7.5.2 The balance of each such account, or a description of the nature and

value of such asset;

7.5.3 The identification and location of any safe deposit box, commercial mail

box, or storage facility that is either titled in the name, individually or jointly, of

the Defendant, or is otherwise subject to access or control by the Defendant or

other party subject to above, whether in whole or in part; and

7.5.4 if the account, safe deposit box, storage facility, or other asset has been

closed or removed, the date closed or removed and the balance on said date, allow

representatives of Plaintiffs immediate access to inspect and copy, or upon

Plaintiffs’ request, within five (5) business days of said request, provide the

Plaintiffs with copies of all records or other documentation pertaining to each such

account or asset, including, but not limited to, originals or copies of account

applications, account statements, corporate resolutions, signature cards, checks,

drafts, deposit tickets, transfers to and from the accounts, all other debit and credit

instruments or slips, currency transaction reports, 1099 forms, and safe deposit

box logs.



7.6 This Section shall apply to existing accounts and assets, assets deposited or

accounts opened after the effective date of the Order, and any accounts or assets

maintained, held or controlled two years prior to the effective date of the Order. This

Section shall not prohibit transfers in accordance with any provision of the Order, any

further order of the Court, or by written agreement of the parties.

8. Repatriation of Assets and Documents Located in Foreign Countries

the Court should further order the RICO Defendant:

8.1 Within three (3) business days following service of the Order, take such steps

as are necessary to repatriate to the territory of the United States of America all

Documents and Assets that are located outside such territory and are held by or for the

Defendant or are under Defendant’s direct or indirect control, jointly, severally, or

individually.

8.2 Within three (3) business days following service of the Order, provide

Plaintiffs with a full accounting of all Documents and Assets by email, that service by

email shall be effective only upon confirmation of delivery (either by a return email

confirmation from recipient or a “read receipt” generated by the sender’s email service,

transmitted to the recipient or by certified email or overnight postal service that are

located outside of the territory of the United States of America or that have been

transferred to the territory of the United States of America and are held by or for the

RICO Defendant or are under his direct or indirect control, jointly, severally, or

individually, including the addresses and names of any foreign or domestic financial

institution or other entity holding the Documents and Assets, along with the account

numbers and balances;

8.3 Hold and retain all such Documents and Assets and prevent any transfer,

disposition, or dissipation whatsoever of any such Documents or Assets; and



8.4 Within three (3) business days following service of the Order, provide

Plaintiffs access to Defendants’ records and Documents held by Financial Institutions or

other entities outside the territory of the United States of America, by signing and

delivering to Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs’ counsel a sworn Consent to Release of Financial

Records of each Financial Institution.

8.5 Defendants shall attach to these completed financial statements copies of all

local, state, provincial, and federal income and property tax returns, with attachments

and schedules, as called for by the instructions to the financial statements.

9. Surrender of Passport and Travel Restriction

Further the Court should order:

9.1 The RICO Defendant, a Judgment Debtor, to temporarily turn over his

passports of any kind and any other documents that would permit international travel

(whether United States-issued or otherwise) to this Court's Courtroom Deputy, by

personal or U.S.P.S. Certified Express Mail. The passport shall remain in the Courtroom

Deputy's possession until the earlier of :

9.1.1 RICO Defendant’s compliance with the provisions of the Order and

completion of Plaintiffs’ discovery,

9.1.2 the RICO Defendant’s debtor’s repatriation of monies or financial

instruments created or transferred outside the United States since December 1,

2008 and deposit thereof into the Plaintiffs per their direction,

9.1.3 the RICO Defendant’s provision of evidence satisfactory to the Court

that the monies were transferred for legitimate reasons other than to remove

assets from the jurisdiction of the Court or hide it from Plaintiffs,

9.1.4 satisfaction of Plaintiffs, or further order or direction of the Court.

9.2 The RICO Defendant may not leave the United States before turning over his

passport and other travel documents or while their passports and other travel



documents are held by the Court; RICO Defendant is shall be prohibited from leaving

the continental United States under any circumstance or condition until the Court has

returned his passport and other travel documents, if any.

10. Maintenance of Records and Reporting of New Business Activity

It is further requested that the Court order RICO Defendant, and (officers, agents,

servants, employees, and attorneys, and all other persons in active concert or

participation with any of them, who receive actual notice of the Order by personal

service or otherwise, whether acting directly or through any trust, corporation,

subsidiary, division, or other device, or any of them, are hereby restrained and enjoined

from:

10.1 Failing to create and maintain books, records, accounts, bank statements,

current accountants’ reports, general ledgers, general journals, cash receipt ledgers,

cash disbursement ledgers and source documents, documents indicating title to real or

personal property, and any other data which, in reasonable detail, accurately, fairly and

completely reflect the incomes, disbursements, transactions, dispositions, and uses of

the Defendant’s assets;

10.2 Destroying, erasing, mutilating, concealing, altering, transferring, or

otherwise disposing of, in any manner, directly or indirectly, any Documents, including

electronically-stored materials, that relate in any way to the business practices or

business or personal finances of Defendant; to the business practices or finances of

entities directly or indirectly under the control of Defendant; or to the business

practices or finances of entities directly or indirectly under common control with any

other Defendant; and

10.3 Creating, operating, or exercising any control over any new business entity,

whether newly formed or previously inactive, including any partnership, limited

partnership, joint venture, sole proprietorship, or corporation, without first providing



Plaintiff and Court’s appointed Master or supervising federal agency with a written

statement disclosing:

10.3.1 the name of the business entity;

10.3.2 the address and telephone number of the business entity;

10.3.3 the names of the business entity's officers, directors, principals,

managers, and employees; and

10.3.4 a detailed description of the business entity's intended activities.

11. Expedited Discovery

It is further requested that the Court order that:

11.1 to determine the appropriate total amount of equitable monetary relief in

this matter, and in lieu of the time periods, notice provisions, and other requirements of

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26, 30, 33, 34, 36 and 45, the Plaintiffs are granted

leave to conduct discovery at any time after service of the Order; that

11.2 the Plaintiffs may depose witnesses upon notice of three (3) business days;

that

11.3 the Plaintiffs may require that all responses to subpoenas duces tecum be

served within five (5) calendar days of the service of such discovery.

11.4 In addition, and in lieu of the time periods, notice provisions, and other

requirements of Rules 26, 30, 33, 34, 36 and 45, the Defendant shall respond to

interrogatories, requests for production of documents, or requests for admissions,

within ten (10) calendar days after service of the interrogatories or requests.

Deposition transcripts that have not been signed by a witness may be used at any

hearing on equitable monetary relief;

11.5 The limitations and conditions set forth in Rules 30(a)(2)(B) and 31(a)(2)(B)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding subsequent depositions of an

individual shall not apply to depositions taken pursuant to this Section.



11.6 Any such depositions shall not be counted toward any limit on the number of

depositions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the local rules of procedure

for the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, including those

set forth in Rules 30(a)(2)(A) and 31(a)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Any interrogatories served pursuant to this Section shall not be counted toward any

limit on the number of interrogatories under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the

local rules of procedure for the District Court for the Northern District of Texas,

including that limit set forth in Rule 33(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and

11.7 Service of discovery, including subpoenas pursuant to this Section, may be

accomplished by any of the following means: facsimile transmission, courier service,

electronic mail, that service by email shall be effective only upon confirmation of

delivery either by a return email confirmation from recipient or a “read receipt”

generated by the sender’s email service, transmitted to the recipient or by certified

email or by hand.

And lastly for relief, Plaintiffs’ ask the Court to order:

12. Financial Statements and Accounting

12.1 that, within ten (10) business days following the service of the Order, RICO

Defendant provide Plaintiffs or their counsel:

12.1.1 A completed financial statement accurate as of the date of service of

the Order upon Defendants and serve same upon Plaintiffs by verifiable email, that

service by email shall be effective only upon confirmation of delivery (either by a

return email confirmation from recipient or a “read receipt” generated by the

sender’s email service, transmitted to the recipient or by certified email ;

12.1.2 For all financial products or financial services marketed, promoted,

offered for sale, distributed, or sold by Defendant, a detailed accounting, verified

under oath, of:



12.1.3 All gross revenues obtained from the sale of each such product or

service (broken down by month) from inception of sales through the date of the

issuance of the Order;

12.1.4 The total amount of each such product or service sold; and

12.1.5 The full names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all clients, or

purchasers of each such product or service; and

12.1.6 A completed and signed Consent To Release Financial Records,

permitting Defendant’s banks and financial institutions to make records available

to Plaintiff upon request. The release shall be returned to Plaintiff within three (3)

business days after service of the Order by email, that service by email shall be

effective only upon confirmation of delivery either by a return email confirmation

from recipient or a “read receipt” generated by the sender’s email service,

transmitted to the recipient or by certified email or by overnight courier service or

U.S. Postal Service overnight mail.

WHEREFORE he Plaintiffs pray an appropriate Order will issue from this Court in

accord with the foregoing and for any other relief the Court deems just and equitable.

Respectfully Submitted on Wednesday, August 8, 2012.

s/

R. LANCE FLORESLead Attorney

3314 Pleasant DriveDallas, Texas 75227 USATel. (Dallas): +1 (214) 272-0349Tel. (Fax): +1 (210) 519-6528ECF & Case Management E-mail:[email protected]

Attorney for the Plaintiff

s/

VICKI CLARKSON

2416 - 36 Street SWCalgary, AB T3E 2Z5

Tel. (Calgary): +1 403-244-9980Tel. (Fax:) +1 (403) 246-3331ECF & Case Management E-mail:[email protected]

Attorney for the Plaintiff



AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT ANDREQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

VERIFICATION OF CLARKSON

I, Vicki Clarkson hereby declare, verify and certify under penalty of perjury as

provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1746 that I am a Plaintiff in the above-styled and -numbered

cause of action, that I have read the foregoing APPLICATION FOR CLERK’S ENTRY OF

DEFAULT – MEMORANDUM OF LAW & VERIFIED MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGEMENT

AGAINST RICO DEFENDANT BRUCE H. HAGLUND, that I am familiar with the contents

therein, and that the matters contained in the motions are true and correct to my own

knowledge, except those matters herein stated to be alleged on information and belief

and, as to those matters, I believe them to be true and correct.

SUBSCRIBED AND EXECUTED on Wednesday, August 8, 2012 pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1746:

s/

VICKI CLARKSON

VERIFICATION OF FLORES

I, R. Lance Flores hereby declare, verify and certify under penalty of perjury as

provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1746 that I am a Plaintiff in the above-styled and -numbered

cause of action, that I have read the foregoing APPLICATION FOR CLERK’S ENTRY OF

DEFAULT – MEMORANDUM OF LAW & VERIFIED MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGEMENT

AGAINST RICO DEFENDANT BRUCE H. HAGLUND, that I am familiar with the contents

therein, and that the matters contained in the motions are true and correct to my own

knowledge, except those matters herein stated to be alleged on information and belief

and, as to those matters, I believe them to be true and correct.

SUBSCRIBED AND EXECUTED on Wednesday, August 8, 2012 pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1746:

s/

R. LANCE FLORES

20120801210948 Mtn Def Jgmt - BRUCE H HAGLUND.wpd Page i

Case 3:11-cv-00726-M-BH Document 155 Filed 08/08/12 of 28 PageID 2306

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On Wednesday, August 8, 2012, I electronically submitted the foregoing document

with the Clerk of Court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the

electronic case filing system (CM/ECF) of the Court. I hereby certify that I have served

all counsel and/or pro se parties of record electronically or by another manner

authorized by Federal rule of Civil Procedure 5 (b)(2).

For the Plaintiffs:

s/

R. LANCE FLORES

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

Local Rule 7.1 does not require conference on actions for judgment as a matter of

law.

For the Plaintiffs:

s/

R. LANCE FLORES

20120801210948 Mtn Def Jgmt - BRUCE H HAGLUND.wpd Page ii


APPENDIX A

Account Holder, Signatory or

Beneficiary

Bank SWIFT or

Routing

Account Number Transaction

Code

SIN/CUSIP

Bruce Haglund Wells Fargo Bank 121000248 2301

Bruce Haglund Wells Fargo Bank 121000248 UZW1

Trask Corporation Limited or

AssignsDeutsche Bank DEUTCNSHPBC 0711

Dale Briggs & Associates

IOLTAWells Fargo Bank WFBIUS6S 8259

Steven WoodsWachovia Bank

(LA, California)

Steven Woods Ozark Mountain Bank 81518375 5676

Hing Teik Choon / New

Eurasia Impex LimitedBank of America Corp. ISIN:

Jon Divens Bank of America N.A.

James Linder Bank of America N.A. 26009593 0191

Maureen Wilde Bank of America N.A. 26009593 488003428395

Falcon International Holdings Citizen's Bank 21313103 4004253194

MM5 LLC M&T Bank 52000113 9851026352

O'Melveny & Myers Citibank 21000089 40780224

James Wan & Company OCBC Bank OCBCSGSG 501041941301

Hing Teik Choon / BMWT /

Falcon InternationalHSBC HSBCHKHHHKH 611-273657-888

Baker McKenzie LLP Barclays Bank 26002574

Hing Teik Choon Unicredit Bank DEKRUA22

Lufti Abdulhaq WakidCitibank International

Banking PLCCITI059AUS W.99/VN677

Hing Teik Choon JP Morgan Chase Bank CHASUS33 CUSIP: 871966AA5

Matrix/BMW/Hing Teik

Choon/New Eurasia Impex

Limited

KFW BankM0

ISIN: US500769CN27

Altofin Bancorp LtdVolksbank Hungary Private

LtdMAVOHUHB

HU79 M

Altofin Bancorp LtdVolksbank Hungary Private

LtdMAVOHUHB

HU75 M

Deutsche Bank ISIN: XS0203185037








20120801210948 Mtn Def Jgmt - BRUCE H HAGLUND.wpd Page iii



CW Capital CUSIP: 19075DAG6

JP Morgan Chase Bank CUSIP: 46630VAG7

FannieMae CUSIP: 31393UA86

Francis Wilde or Assigns Falcon Bank (Switzerland) 114915803

Francis Wilde or Assigns Wegelin Bank (Switzerland) WEGECH2GXXX Swiss

Francis Wilde or AssignsRosbank

(Moscow, Russia)UNEICHGGXXX

Swiss

Scott Anthony Koster TCF Bank 3439447813

Kerim S. Emre US Bank 153462847523

John Childs Citibank 40048141911

Winston J Cook Sun Trust 1000097242100

20120801210948 Mtn Def Jgmt - BRUCE H HAGLUND.wpd Page iv
