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TO ANALYSE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE PARIS MOU SATISFIES THE NEEDS OF THE MARITIME INDUSTRY Deniz Genoglu A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the Requirements of Liverpool John Moores University for the Degree of Bachelor of Science with Honour. The author declares that the work is the result of his own independent investigation, except where indicated.

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TO ANALYSE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE PARIS MOU SATISFIES THE NEEDS OF THE MARITIME

INDUSTRY

Deniz Genoglu

A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the Requirements of

Liverpool John Moores University for the Degree of Bachelor of Science with

Honour.

The author declares that the work is the result of his own independent

investigation, except where indicated.

BSc (Hons) MARITIME BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT 2016

ABSTRACTIn light of the many maritime accidents in European waters, involving some 644 ships in

2014 with the loss of 61 seafarer lives and the spillage of over 8000 tons of oil, the need

to control the multi-billion euro industry has been increasing. Previous research has

attempted to establish the remedy for these accidents and incidences, leading to the

establishment of among others, the Paris Memorandum of Understanding.

This study is carried out with the aims of comparing regional shipping and maritime

MoUs on Port State Control, analysing the fulfilment of PSC functions by the Paris MoU,

and identifying the disadvantages to stakeholders of implementing the PSC.

Using a mixture of secondary data, involving literary analysis, and primary data,

involving questionnaires, this research study established that the main cause of

maritime accidents is the failure to comply with safety standards and the inadequate

implementation of safety measures. Out of a sample of 20, only one respondent failed

to carry out to the end. Of the remaining 19, an average of 5.95 agrees with the 22

questions posed about the importance of the MoU and the PSC, with an average of

4.82 expressing strong agreement. Insignificant differences, however, exist between the

views on whether some countries have more restrictions than others or not, while still

party to the MoU, which aimed to level the playing field.

Most respondents agree that whether or not flags, connoting compliance with a

particular agreement, are used as cost minimization strategies, frequent inspection of

vessels through PSC will help improve maritime safety. The respondents argued that

PSC inspections have sustained a functioning port system and that stricter MoUs offer

ports competitive advantages.

i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author is grateful for the contribution of shipping and chartering companies on the

questionnaire. I would like to thank my wife Jeanette and my daughter Leah for their

understanding and love during the past year. Her support and encouragement was in

the end what made this dissertation possible.

ii

ABBREVIATION

Abuja MoU Memorandum of Understanding on Port State

Control for West and Central African Region

AFL International Convention on the Control of

Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on Ships, 2001

Black Sea MoU Memorandum of Understanding on Port State

Control in the Black Sea Region

BUNKER International Convention on Civil Liability for

Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001

Caribbean MoU Memorandum of Understanding on Port State

Control in the Caribbean Region

COLREG Convention on the International Regulations for

Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972

EMSA European Maritime Safety Agency

Equasis MoU Memorandum of Understanding on the

establishment of the Equasis information system

CHS Convention on the High Seas of 29 April 1958

CIC Concentrated Inspection Campaigns

CLC International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil

Pollution Damage, 1969

FCR Federal Code of Regulations

FSC Flag State Control

FSI Flag State Implementation

IACS International Association of Classification

Societies

Indian MoU Memorandum of Understanding on Port State

Control for the Indian Ocean Region

LOADLINE International Convention on Load Lines,

iii

1966 MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of

Pollution from Ships, 1973, as amended

Mediterranean MoU Memorandum of

Understanding on Port State

Control in the Mediterranean Region

MLC Maritime Labour Convention, 2006

MSC Maritime Safety Committee

MSCU Merchant Shipping Code of Ukraine

MSM Marine Safety Manual

Paris MoU Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port

State Control

PSCI Ukrainian Port State Control Inspectorate

PSEJ Port State Enforcement Jurisdiction

PSJ Port State Jurisdiction

Riyadh MoU Riyadh Memorandum of Understanding on Port

State Control

RO Recognised organisation

SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at

Sea, 1974, as amended

STCW International Convention on Standards of

Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for

Seafarers

TCC Technical Cooperation Committee

Tokyo MoU Memorandum of Understanding on Port State

Control in the Asia-Pacific Region

TONNAGE International Convention on Tonnage

Measurement of Ships, 1969

Viña del Mar MoU Latin American Agreement on Port State Control

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the

Seas of 10 December 1982

USCG United States Coast Guard

iv

TABLE OF CONTENT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....................................................................................................................... ii

ABBREVIATION...................................................................................................................................... iii

TABLE OF CONTENT.............................................................................................................................v

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES.......................................................................................................vii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................1

1.1 PROJECT BACKGROUND....................................................................................................1

1.2 AIM AND OBJECTIVES...................................................................................................................3

1.3 INFORMATION SOURCES OF THE PROJECT...........................................................................3

1.4 DISSERTATION STRUCTURE.......................................................................................................3

1.5 JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROJECT.............................................................................................4

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY..........................................................5

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW....................................................................................................................5

2.1.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................................5

2.1.2 Examine the Rationale and Function of Port State Control...............................................7

2.1.2.1 The Origin and Functions of PSC..............................................................................................7

2.1.2.2 Flag of Convenience and Its Effects.........................................................................................8

2.2 REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN PSC IMPLEMENTATION.....................................................12

2.2.3 The Obligation and Rights of Contracting States Regarding PSC.................................14

2.2.4 The regulatory framework for PSC at regional level..........................................................19

2.3 – VESSEL DETENTION THROUGH PSC...................................................................................22

2.3.1 The implications of non-detention for the environment, safety, and security.............22

2.3.2 Implication of Detention to Stakeholders.............................................................................24

2.5 METHODOLOGY.............................................................................................................................26

2.5.1 Research Approach and Strategy...........................................................................................26

2.5.2 Sampling Method........................................................................................................................26

2.5.3 Data Collection Method.............................................................................................................27

2.5.4 Analysis Method.........................................................................................................................27

v

CHAPTER 3: THE PARIS MOU AND COMPARISON WITH OTHER REGIONAL MOU’S.......27

3.1 Introduction.....................................................................................................................................27

3.2 An Overview of the Treaties........................................................................................................28

3.3 COMPARISON OF FACTORS USED IN THE TARGETING SYSTEM IN DIFFERENT PSC REGIONS................................................................................................................................................34

3.3.1. Paris and Tokyo MOU New Inspection Regime (NIR)........................................................34

3.3.2 United State Coast Guard.........................................................................................................35

3.3.3 Classification Society................................................................................................................40

3.3.4 Ship Type and age......................................................................................................................40

3.4.5 Ships Previous PSC Performance..........................................................................................41

CHAPTER 4 PRESENTATION OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS.................................................42

4.1 INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................42

4.2 SUMMARY........................................................................................................................................57

Chapter 5................................................................................................................................................58

5.1 ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS..............................................................................................................58

CHAPTER 6............................................................................................................................................62

6.1 CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................................62

6.2 REFLECTION...................................................................................................................................63

REFERENCES........................................................................................................................................64

APPENDIX 1 RESULATION 1052-27 PAGE 4................................................................................69

APPENDIX 2 QUESTIONNAIRE USED OVER PROJECT...........................................................71

vi

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLES PAGE

Table 2.1 Regional Memorandum founded after Paris Memorandum..........10

Figure 2.2 Ships Total Loss Number over the Time Period ..........................23from 1973 until 2006

Table 3.1 Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and Vina del Mar MOU relevant...............28. instrument Table 3.2 Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and Vina del Mar MOU ship.....................33 detention in first half of 2011Table 3.3 Paris and Tokyo Mou’s Ship Inspection Interval..........................34Table 3.4 Ship Risk Profile For USCG.............................................................37Table : 3.5 Paris MoU (NIR) company's performance calculation table.. ....39

GRAPHICS

Graph 4.1 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................42Graph 4.2 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................43Graph 4.3 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................44Graph 4.4 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................45Graph 4.5 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................45Graph 4.6 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................46Graph 4.7 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................47Graph 4.8 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................47Graph 4.9 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................48Graph 4.10 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................48Graph 4.11 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................49Graph 4.12 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................50

vii

Graph 4.13 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................50Graph 4.14 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire................................... 51Graph 4.15 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................52Graph 4.16 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................52Graph 4.17 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................53Graph 4.18 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................54Graph 4.19 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................54Graph 4.20 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................55Graph 4.21 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire......................................56Graph 4.22 Detail of question 1 of the Questionnaire.....................................56

viii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PROJECT BACKGROUND

International organisations such as IMO and ILO has been proven to be successful in

establishing a significant number of rules and regulations that primarily covers all aspect

to ensure maritime safety and environmental Protection. Over the years, the Maritime

world has been awarded with success of the rules and regulations. For example, the

amount of marine accident and technical failures on vessels has been significantly

decreased. (Cariou et.al, 2008)

Hence, it is essential to establish protections make sure ships fulfil with conventions

also regulating with maritime safety and environmental protection. This is the one and

only reasons that port state control being created. Since Estonia accident in 1994 and

also the Costa Concordia accident in Italy was first big accident in European waters.

Also European waters has not been face any major oil spill since m/t Prestige sank in

the coast of Spain, speculation about that disaster even now continuous in maritime

world. Still, accidents happens, and preventing that accident and reduced to minimal

amount main concern for authorities.

Maritime Cyprus website in 2015 has mention that the most recent serious accident in

European waters to date was the fire on the Norman Atlantic in December 2014 with

Out of 443 passengers, 56 crew and at least 6 stowaways were lost at sea. Meanwhile,

according to the European Maritime Safety Agency, in 2010 there were 644 ships

involved in accidents in European waters, 61 seafarers lost their lives due to accidents

on board and accidents resulted in a total of 8000 tons of oil spill. For seafarers the

research also discloses high levels of occupational accidents and amongst the highest

occupational mortality and morbidity for all occupations (Robertson and Marlow, 2002).

This accident data in mixture with the prospect of constantly increasing maritime

transports indeed highlight the need to stop under the acceptable vessels from working

1

by European coast lines also make sure that enforcing that vessels compliance with

international and national regulations. Port State control is best procedure for that

purpose.

Regardless of a widespread system of Port State Controls (PSC) on ships, inspection

gaps in European control functions have been reported. Also, risk factors related with

fatigue, anxiety and an undeveloped safety principles on board ships have been

identified in earlier researches (Safe and efficient ships, 1996). These mutual risk

factors may pose a severe threat to maritime safety in European ports.

The port state control officers have a varied range of actions at their file they can ask

vessels to improve or correct deficiency they have found, they could detain ship and

they have legal power to stop leaving to port or as a last option a ship could be banned

from European ports and waters. This whole bulk of options with big economic risks, put

fair amount of tension on Port State Control Officer‘s (Psco) shoulders. Psco has to be

fair, same distance to every ship and operator but the mainly legally secure. For the

reason that of this complication, Quality of Port state Control is vital for the safety of

seafarers, marine industry also for environment.

There is also a need to mention that the PSC is certainly not meant to be the first option

for reducing sub-standard ships from those memorandum areas. It usually enforces the

same requirements imposed by relevant international conventions as mentioned for the

flag State control without adding any additional requirements on foreign flag merchant

shipping (Hoopen, 1998).

Some hesitations have always been under discussion by the maritime world, such as

the effectiveness and fairness of PSC, its impact on the implementation of the SOLAS

and MARPOL conventions, and what we can do to improve the performance of PSC. In

this dissertation, this project have tried to answer these questions. The research is

primary based on the literatures of distinguished scholars and other documents from

IMO.

2

1.2 AIM AND OBJECTIVES

As mentioned in the introduction section, the maritime organisation are working hard to

regulate and minimise the number of accidents in shipping industry. The Paris

Memorandum of Understanding is introduced as a part of the treaty and it is the most

advanced memorandum in the world which leads to this project, where the aim is to

analyse the extent to which the Paris MOU is fit for the purpose mentioned. The project

aim is then will be fulfilled through the objectives below:

To examine the rationale and function of PSC

To identify the disadvantages to stakeholders of implementing PSC

To compare various regional memoranda of understanding on PSC

1.3 INFORMATION SOURCES OF THE PROJECT

A review of secondary data in the field form the basis of the survey used for primary

data collection. The concerned secondary data consist mainly of books, marine journal

and articles, and also reports issued by international organizations. As for the primary

data, a questionnaires sent to shipping companies and a number of Master Mariners.

The participants have secrecy and the results are stated without revealing identities of

individuals or companies.

1.4 DISSERTATION STRUCTURE

In Chapter 2 a literature review focusing on history, framework and effect of port state

control as well as detailed methodology is presented. Chapter 3 overview of

differentially between other memorandums and Paris understanding of memoranda.

Followed by chapter 4 where the result of the Port state control and fairness and port

selection effect questioner and the analysis presented. Chapter 5 includes analyses of

the obtained results and the project is finalised by conclusion and reflection in chapter 6

3

1.5 JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROJECT

The aim of the project is to find out and analyse how the Paris Memorandum of

Understanding is filling the gap of some Flag States that these states are unable to

cover and also find the differentials and common point between Paris Mou and the other

existing Memorandum of understandings worldwide. Other researches generally

focuses of the positive impact of the Paris MoU. This project relies on the primary data

compiled in order to try to discover if the other stakeholders are pleased with the

formation of Paris MoU. As this project is receiving an enormous feedback from the

people and companies that is directly involved with PSC instead of the bigger

organisations such as IMO, this will be provide a different angle to understand and in

justifying the PSC.

4

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1.1 Introduction

The Port State Control underlined the necessity to intensify the maritime safety and the

protection of the marine environment as an initiative to establish the importance of

improving living and working conditions on board marine vessels. The establishment of

the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has brought a significant progress

among the being the boosting of regional cooperation (Oral, 2013). The effective

applicability of legal instruments for ship owners and the establishment of equilibrium of

different levels of the port state control regimes within a given area increased the levels

of organisation among the stakeholders and users.

The Paris Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) has become the most prominent tool in

the establishment of regional cooperation with its intention to “enforce and reinforce

IMO agreed standards and not develop new standards.’ Member states of the European

Union and also Canada are part of the agreement can effectively exercise good control

of vessels within their regions. This is due to the rapport that was lubricated by the MoU

that demanded an inter-neighbouring state cooperation for the collective handling of

port activities and information sharing to boost consequently regional cooperation and

development. The data gathered by any port within the signed jurisdiction is shared to

avoid excessive amount of work as well as the inconvenience of vessel traffic. In the

world image, the Paris PSC demonstrated the wish of the participating 27 states to

coordinate their efforts for the enforcement of international standards within their ports.

This approach was a success because of the adoption of the uniform procedures (Rue,

Anderson 1998). Aguilar (2008) wrote an article that developed the progression of the

PSC system.

Besides that, Chatzirigopoulou (2010) has conducted a more general examination, but it

was restricted to the update of the PSC system`s legal foundation. The IMO also

5

presents a manual through a model path on PSC that has been updated since 1995,

which continually undergo harmonisation with a different model on the measures.

Researchers such as Knapp and Frances (2010) have been initiating an econometric

study by the use of binary logistic regression and have focused on the computation of

the international condition on the effectiveness of PSC. As a result, their studies have

established that the handling of lines across the rule differs, stating that there is a need

for coordination in all check areas. Moreover, Cariou and Wolff (2011) utilised the

information collected from the Swedish Maritime Administration between 1996 and 2001

to investigate on how the characteristics of a vessel determine the time between two

successive inspections of PSC, jointly with member of the deficiencies noticed during

the controls. Furthermore, a study conducted by Li and Zheng (2008) have discovered

that the PSC enforcement is effectual in improving the security of a ship in maritime

transport. Bang and Li et al. (2012) also presented a review of the studies.

The Paris MoU also significantly enhanced the authority of the port states to govern

towards environmental conservation while enhancing governance as well (Leeuwen,

2010). In 1992, the element hanged from being regional to global through the resolution

adopted by IMO (Keselj, 1999). Subsequently, the Paris port control system was

recognized as a component of the global environmental governance.

There has been however a dissatisfaction between the states of the Paris MoU

members regarding the authority of steering mechanisms. During the development of

the steering mechanism, there was a division of duties between the states that

proposed, negotiated and decided. The shipping industry itself has been providing a

significant amount of support and expertise to influence the decisions and the final

determination (Leeuwen, 2010). The authority was shared among the member states,

but there was no satisfaction in some participating States since the power was shared

unequally.

This chapter first review a series of previous studies on history and origin of port state

control then regularity framework of port state control and its effect to ports and

stakeholders.

6

2.1.2 Examine the Rationale and Function of Port State Control

2.1.2.1 The Origin and Functions of PSC

Ships are controlled and inspected by a number of regulating bodies and mechanisms.

The parties involved can be beneficiaries that a have direct connection with the vessel,

such as owners, operators, charterers and cargo owners, or may be third party

organizations. These parties carry out inspections and impose regulatory controls for

the safety of the ships and efficient operations for their shipping activities.

Consequently, ships are maintained and manned in accordance with different standards

by different ship owners and operators, resulting in a huge number of casualties over

the last few years.

Aldwinckle (2000) mentioned that in a world fleet of some 84,000 ships of more than

100 gross tonnes (gt), there are over 1,000 reported serious casualties each year.

Figures show that between 1988 and 1997 there were 9,378 serious casualties,

including ship losses. A look at the reasons behind the figures for serious casualties

over the past ten years reveals that, of the 9,378 incidents, 36% were caused by hull or

machinery failures, 19% were wrecked or stranded, 13% 5 were damaged by fire or

explosion, 13% foundered, and 11% were involved in collisions.

It is relevant to mention that in accordance with these figures the main reasons are the

failure of ships to meet required safety standards. It is widely known that under standard

vessels is a direct consequence of “open registry” otherwise known as “flag of

convenience”. Ship owners are fleeing their own national register in order to get more

flexible and advantageous conditions. However, causes that related to natural disaster

such as force majeure or act of god still occupy a small ratio of maritime casualties.

The management of foreign flagships by the countries PSC is required in order for all

worldwide conventions such as UNCLOS 1982 to be adhered. PSC is a vital component

for the assessment of visiting vessels to the port and is one of the leading third party

examination organisation around the globe.

7

The Port State control has been outlined by the IMO as “the inspection of foreign ships

in national ports to verify that the condition of the ship and its equipment compliance

with the requirements of international regulations and that the ship is manned and

operated in compliance with these rules”.(Imo.org, 2016). PSC aims to determine

whether or not foreign vessels are seaworthy and ensure they will not be a potential risk

in terms of pollution. The PSC also carries out checks to make sure the workforce and

their environment is safe and not putting the workers’ health at risk alongside the

specific conventions from the IMO and ILO.

2.1.2.2 Flag of Convenience and Its Effects

After 1950’s, the number of shipping companies registering their vessel with the flag

states has increased significantly with the flag states given that the opportunities of

open registries to foreign vessels. Registering their vessels to those countries gave

them a big economical and other benefit. Under the flag of convenience system, the

access and transfer of vessel from the register is easy as the country of registration

does not need the shipping tonnage for its own purposes but is keen to earn the

tonnage fees. It is possible for owners to avoid taxation and social security

requirements. FOC countries also allows non-residents to own and regulate the vessel

in their flag and this aids the ship owners to not no pay or pay very little tax for their flag

countries. The most negative implication is where the ship manning by a non-national is

freely permitted and ship owners preferring to work with non-compatible and cheap

labour over the years. Some nation also lack the power to execute a national or

international regulations on their Shipowners (Donn, 1988). The other side this exercise

caused excessive number of deficient vessel meet up under so-titled flag of

convenience.

Even though a large number of vessels are sailing under FOC, the FOC states such as

Liberia and Panama does not have an appropriate facility or control mechanism to

manage these vessels, hence they did not appropriately fulfil their international

responsibilities as a flag state. Additionally, most of them were not even able to carry

8

out regular flag states controls. They were more aimed on the registration part of the

operation as moneymaking reasons. The key critics of this problem were as UNCLOS

(United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas) required there are no genuine link

between flag state and ship registered.

The issue of sub-standard vessels and practices subsequently led to co-operation

between countries in efforts to address the problem. PSC originally established as a

multilateral state initiative outside of IMO. The ‘Hague Memorandum’ between several

maritime establishments in the areas around Western Europe was developed in 1978

where it contained the provisions that relates “to enforcement of minimum shipboard

living and working conditions”, as mentioned in ILO Convention. In March 1978, before

the Memorandum came into place, there was grounding taking place of the elite tanker

‘Amoco Cadiz’. Due to this incident there became strong public and political outrage

putting high pressure on governments to improve regulations on the safety of shipping.

Shortly after this, the outcome was the introduction of a new and improved

Memorandum covering the safety of life at sea, prevention of high levels of pollution

from ships alongside living and working conditions on board of ships

Paris MoU on PSC was adopted in January 1982 and was, initially, signed by fourteen

European countries (Lagoni et al., 2010). It come into force on 1 July 1982. Since then,

the Paris MOU has been amended several times to accommodate new safety and

marine environment requirements stemming from the IMO as well as other important

developments such as the various EU Directives which address marine safety.

Currently, 24 European countries and Canada form part of the Paris MOU on Port State

Control. (Rowbotham, 2008)

This MOU has been followed by 8 other regional MOUs these different MoU’s shown on

table below.

Table 2.1 Regional Memorandum founded after Paris Memorandum

9

Name of Memorandum Region covered

Tokyo MoU Asia and Pacific Ocean Region

Acuerdo de Viña del Mar Latin America Region

Caribbean MoU Caribbean Sea Region

Abuja MoU West and Central Africa

Black Sea MoU Black Sea Region

Mediterranean MoU Mediterranean Sea Region

Indian Ocean region Indian Ocean MoU

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Arab States Of the Gulf

Source: Author 2016

Meanwhile the USA (United States of America) has its own PSC programme operated

by the United States Coast Guard. These regional Port State Control MoU’s are

progressively cooperating and exchanging the obtained inspection data electronically.

This has significantly impacting the substandard ships as they have nowhere left to

trade. The IMO is contributing here by playing a proactive role in the global

harmonisation of PSC. IMO does this through the technical assistance in the

development of the regional MOU’s, organisation of technical workshops for secretariats

and database managers of regional PSC MOU’s. It is also in charge of the

establishment of the Flag State Implementation Committee (FSI) and how the taskforce

is developing and progressing to synchronise PSC activities (Ozcayir 2001).

The most significant handicap in PSC is the limited number of human resources Port

state control officer’s (PSCO’s) in comparison with the ships to be inspected in

particular regions (Cariou, Mejia and Wolff, 2007) . Consequently, regional target

inspection rates are settled almost in every PSC Memorandum. These inspection rates

vary from 10% to 80% according to the Memorandum text and committee resolutions.

Moreover, in selecting ships and conducting more efficient controls “ship targeting

systems” are to be used in the biggest and oldest PSC regimes (Paris MOU, Tokyo

MOU, USCG etc.).

10

These ship targeting conducts systems make risk assessment and score vessels by

using certain determinants (factors) which then finally show the risk level of the

particular vessel. The inspection priority will then be given to the ships which have

higher risk levels. These factors can be considered in two groups. First one is the static

or generic factors like ship’s age, type, flag state, recognised organisation and

management company performance. The second, one is the historical factors such as

the vessel previous inspection results, outstanding deficiencies, detention information

and time interval between inspections. Although targeting systems are similar in

principle, different PSC regimes uses a different targeting systems and this sometimes

cause inconsistent results among different regimes and discussions have been made

accordingly (Eyigun, 2013), Paris MoU (2011) and Tokyo MoU (2014) have replaced old

inspection regime with new (NIR) inspection regime, The new database for Port State

Control, named THESIS replaced the former system SIReNac. (Emsa.europa.eu, 2016)

however, each regime is only using its own inspection data collected in the past to

target vessels for inspections, thus overlooking the examination outcomes of other

regimes. (Borg, 2012)

11

2.2 REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN PSC IMPLEMENTATION

As national PSC improves the safety and security of ships, a regional approach in the

meantime will guarantee that the operators of a deficient ships will have fewer places to

hide. Unless a regional approach is put into practice ship owners will just divert their

ships to ports where fewer strict inspections are conducted causing economic

disadvantage to the countries that conducts proper inspection. To remedy this and to

generally improve the effectiveness of inspection presently there is substantial part of

the world is covered by the PSC regime through the existing regional memorandums of

understanding (MOU) in operation.

The development of such organisations has revealed through the years that PSC works

better when it is established on a regional basis. It is relevant, however, to emphasise

that a MOU on PSC is not an international convention or treaty. Member states that

wished to retain individual their own individual competence and the freedom of decision-

making has the right to do so. Consequently, the memorandum could be defined as an

informal diplomatic communication and joint agreement between governments, which

summarises a particular diplomatic purpose or point of view.

In general terms, international law allows states to enter into agreement with other

states, either to restrain or extend their sovereign rights based on the provisions of such

an agreement. Different ways of being party to such agreements have been developed

over the years, in correlation with different degrees of enforcement. Treaties or

conventions are the strictest and the most used method because when states become a

party to these agreements, they are agreeing to be bounded by the legal arrangements

or provisions of the convention and regulation.

Since the PSC exist based on international instruments, the idea of establishing control

on a regional basis was the consequence of the fact that co-operation among member

states will contribute positively to minimise substandard shipping not only regionally but

globally by reducing the freedom of such a category of ships. This regional co-operation

is not only for the benefit of port states but also in the interest of ship-owners and

operators, which can avoid a duplication of control in the same geographical region for a

12

specific period of time (Mohamed, 2000). It also ensures that PSC inspection is carried

out using an identical and unified system worldwide and similar standards is used to all

vessels that faces detention.

According to Ozcayir (2004), when considering the option of global port state control,

the following advantages could be identified where PSC will have a maximum impact on

the operation of substandard ships, as ships will be under constant surveillance. It also

ensures maximum availability of relevant information to port states. This will allow for

maximum harmonisation of port state control performances. The cost of operating of the

PSC system will also be minimal. According to Kasoulides (1993), global PSC also has

disadvantages as it lacks, for geographical reasons a sufficient commitment by

participating PSC members. On top of that, it would require an international convention

to administer the system, which would imply lengthy ratification procedures; time-

consuming, rigid amendment procedures; and much compromise, which is detrimental

to the necessary commitment.

The advantages of PSC as a regional effort could be summarised as member countries

can share common safety and environmental interests. Ships stays under observation

while they are operating in the region, which also significantly decreases its possibilities

to trade and operate. Harmonised PSC procedures prevent distortion of competition

between regional ports. According to Osborne and Gaebler (1992), a disadvantage of

regional port state control is that it is only effective in eradicating the operation of

substandard ships furthermore in that particular region; it tends to generate a shift of

operation of substandard ships to other areas.

A regional concept eliminates the disadvantages that exist in the unilateral forms of port

state control and this will allow member states to add more contribution than an

achievable effort under a global system. The formation of a regional system offers these

member states the authority to ban deficient vessels from their region in an effective

manner without implicating the concept of fair competition among their ports.

13

2.2.3 The Obligation and Rights of Contracting States Regarding PSC

Port State jurisdiction is the capability of States to exercise prescriptive (or legislative)

and enforcement jurisdiction over foreign vessels within their ports.(Ozcayir 2004)

Similar to land borders, ports give access to the mainland of a State, and due to the

logical points of control for customs, immigration, sanitation, and national security

purposes (Molenaar, 2005). Ports also give a clear prospect for verifying if visiting

vessel fulfil with certain national and international legislations and standard. In addition,

whether they have been involved in any illegal behaviour in the maritime regions of the

coastal State in where the port is located, or elsewhere. Port State obligations not only

serve more instantaneous national interests, it could also further the benefits of the

international community, for example, marine environmental protection, sustainable use

and conservation of marine living resources, food security, and conservation of marine

biodiversity (Kachel 2008).

Port states could make very significant impact as make sure all vessels visiting their

port compliance with national and international regulatory effort. There are currently no

descriptions for the terms ‘port State’ or ‘coastal State’ in the UN Convention on the Law

of the Sea or another global instrument with near-universal participation. Subject on the

instrument, the term ‘port State’ may concern compliance with standards within ports. It

may also be within the maritime zones of the coastal State in which the port is located,

within the maritime zones of other coastal States, on the high seas, and within the ‘Area’

(the seabed beyond national jurisdiction; see Art. 1 (1) (1) UN Convention on the Law of

the Sea; International Seabed Area).

All the regional PSC provisions are mainly similar as they are based on the 1982 Paris

PSC MoU. Lavelli n.d, (2006) mentioned that for every MoU that “contained a wording in

the preamble, which point to the need for a regional approach to prevent the operation

of substandard ships in order to avoid misleading competition between ports”.

Lavelle (2006) mentioned that most PSC MoU encourages the national port authorities

to properly inspect visiting vessels to guarantee that these vessels is “constructed,

14

equipped, crewed and also operated in compliance with the standards set by the

relevant international treaties”.

Where vessels that is identified as not being in full compliance with the condition set by

these conventions, related nation has the authority to stop a vessel from departing until

the deficiencies have been resolved (McDorman 2005). Port state control has its basis

and operational principle cooperation between regional states. That cooperation has as

its aims safer ships and cleaner seas, and this aim will only be achieved if all regional

states apply and impose the same rules in a similar way to visiting ships. Where all the

ports collaborate in applying the same procedures in a similar way, then not any single

port takes or gains competitive advantage by proposing to excuse the substandard

vessels (Molenaar, 2005).

The core of port state control is that the visiting vessel has to comply with the national

laws of the host country. As one commentary states, "By entering foreign ports and

other internal waters, ships put themselves within the territorial sovereignty of the

coastal State” (Churchill and Lowe, 1983).

This is due to the fact that these visiting vessel is subject to compliance with the laws

and regulations of the country that it is entering. However, there are several potential

exceptions where if the vessel is owned by a specific government, an issue of

sovereignty or even diplomatic immunity may arise. Secondly, if a vessel in entering the

territorial waters or a port of a nation due to emergency circumstances or to seek for

refuge, there may be a restriction in terms of the customary international law on the port

state’s authority regarding that vessel (Churchill and Lowe, 1983). McDorman (2000)

mentioned that although the legal basis of PSC in excess of visiting ships is very clear,

a reference must be made to the “flag state jurisdiction and the potential conflict

between the laws of a port and the laws of the flag”.

The aim of every regional ports state control is that every PSCO will apply identical

standards as included in the established International treaties. For example, the Paris

Port State Control MoU looks out 17 relevant instruments for the purpose of the

memorandum against all visiting vessels:

15

the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 (LOAD LINES 66); For the purposes

of the Memorandum 'relevant instruments' are the following

the Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention on Load Lines,

1966 (LL PROT 88);

.the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS);

the Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of

Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS PROT 78);

the Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of

Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS PROT 88);

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as

Modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, and as further amended by

The Protocol of 1997 (MARPOL);

the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and

Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW 78);

the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at

Sea, 1972 (COLREG 72);

the International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969

(TONNAGE 69);

the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 (ILO

Convention No. 147) (ILO 147);

the Protocol of 1996 to the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards)

Convención, 1976 (ILO Convención No. 147) (ILO P147)

the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC, 2006);

the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969

(CLC1969);

Protocol of 1992 to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for

Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 (CLC PROT 1992);

International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on

Ships, 2001 (AFS2001);

the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution

Damage, 2001;

16

the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast

Water and Sediments (BWM)

It essential to make certain that the laws and regulations that is enforced by a port state

to a visiting ship does not devoid its legal limit. International law dictates “a port state

can only enforce laws that relate to activities of a foreign vessel that take place while the

vessel is in port.” (Mc Dorman, 2000). This take account of implementing laws

concerning the construction, level of safety, and also the crewing and vessel’s

equipment standards that a vessel must comply with. According to the 1982 Law of the

Sea Convention supra note 16 part VII, Port state control also able to enforce any illegal

or wrongful activities in the water of the host state before the vessel’s entry to port. This

statement primarily implies the concerns that vessels are engaged in piracy activities,

as long as the activities takes place in the territorial jurisdiction of the state, prior to the

entrance of the vessel to the port. Other wrongful activities may also include human and

drug trafficking, and unauthorised propagation on the high seas, where in this

circumstances, the applied law would be based on the laws of the flat or coastal that

where the activities takes place (Mc Dorman, 2000).

Principally, a PSC’s main duty is to apply regional standards to visiting vessels and

ensure not seek to prevent vessel access to ports. Conversely, a result of PSC might be

the areas where a regulation is imposed on commercial vessels entering the port area

and also the possibility for the vessel to be rejected in the port entree to a certain vessel

because of their deficient condition.

The World Trade Organizations in 2016 has mentioned that the Merchant Shipping PSC

Regulations (2011) gives the authority for PSC to deny the access to enter a port for

vessels that “the ship-owner has failed to bring the vessel into conformity with the

relevant standards. Port state denying access or imposing conditions grounded upon

the flag of the ship, but not addressed is the situation where access is denied or

conditions are to be met that are determined by the vessel itself rather than the flag”.

The international law of the sea delivers that a port state control has broad authority

upon vessels voluntarily in their port. Dependent on rights imposed by a specific treaty,

an access to a port can be denied and enforced on foreign vessel. Few restrictions exist

17

in regards to the laws and regulations “that a host state can apply to a visiting vessel

regarding construction, design, equipment, operation and crewing” (Sik, Pinto and

Syatauw, 1997). Lastly, the host state has varied authority to arrest and seize a vessel

in port where local laws are breached. However, the regional port state controls MoU’s

are an effort to evade competition among ports and to stability the legal capability of a

port state with the commercial requirements and modern prospects of the global

shipping industry.

18

2.2.4 The regulatory framework for PSC at regional level

Port state control comes together with couple of different nature coats which constitute

its legal framework and organisational in addition to its mechanism. General universal

principle of PSC mainly covers UNCLOS and its legal groundwork through the

regulatory conventions of an international maritime establishments and organisations. In

the other side, IMO guidelines is globally an endorsed framework on which

supplementary regional MOUs is based on. The latest level in this chain is the specific

countries arrangements on PSC where each level has its own scope and applications of

its legal guidelines.

Nonetheless, it will be revealed that the substantial capacity of the provisions of the IMO

guidelines on PSC are merged into the regional MoU’s that indicates a good success of

IMO to bring the global steady regime of Port state control. As explain by I.M.O

Procedures For Port State Control, 2011(See Appendix 1), Indeed, it is a foundation

problem for the harmonisation of regional MoU’s matter of regional policy among states

where International Maritime Organization place reflects the approach of cooperation

among them. Section two also mentioned an identically vital principle that is implanted,

which are establishes a general recognition in the regional MoU’s. First one is the no

favourable treatment principle. The principle affirms that vessel that is not a party of the

convention should be given no more favourable treatment. The treatment ensures that

an equal number of surveys and inspections is conducted with an equivalent level of

safety which also involves the protection of the marine environment as ensured by IMO

resolution a 1052(27). Where vessels of non-parties states to IMO regulatory

conventions are not provided with correct certificates, or crew members do not supply

STCW certificates, it should be satisfied that such ship or crew do not present a threat

to ship or persons on board or an irrational danger of harm to the marine environment.

Second principle instructs that in applying PSC, only the provisions of the conventions,

that is in force and which the member states have accepted could be applied and

enforced. Hereafter in the similar regional PSC regime, there could be different practice

to the implementation of a regulation, where this is very unwanted for the matter of

19

reliability, particularly where the collaboration within the states is not strong as

supposed to be. Section 1.7 of the resolution A. 1052(27) provides essential definitions.

Two of them are found reflection in the text of MoU’s. Section 1.7.5 outline an inspection

as “a visit on board a ship to check both the validity of the relevant certificates and other

documents, and the overall condition of the ship, its equipment and its crew” that is in

correspondence with equivalent provisions of almost all regional MoU’s. Paris MoU

does not have such description. (Rise.odessa.ua, 2011)

But, there are some alterations made in the text of MoU’s as well. While Black Sea

MoU, Abuja MoU, Mediterranean MoU, in similarity mentioned about complementing on

the living and working condition of the crew while the Tokyo MoU, Indian MoU, Riyadh

MoU does not include this matter but focuses on the hygienic conditions on board

instead.

One more very significant definition of “clear grounds” is given by the IMO Resolution

A.1052 (27), supra note 22, sec. 1.7.2 which is incorporated with minor alterations in the

Tokyo MoU, Indian MoU, Black Sea MoU, and Viña del Mar MoU’s. “Clear grounds” are

described in IMO Resolution A.1052 (27), supra note 22, sec. 2.2.5 as:

“… Evidence that the ship, its equipment, or its crew does not correspond

substantially with the requirements of the relevant conventions or that the master

or crew members are not familiar with essential shipboard procedures relating to

the safety of ships or the prevention of pollution.”

The description of an inspection given above are within the involvement of the

preliminary inspection. It is insisted on that in conducting an initial inspection on ships,

Section 2.2.4 of IBID states that “the validity of the relevant certificates and other

documents and the overall condition of the ship should be checked. If the certificates

are valid and the PSCO has general impression of a good standard of maintenance

onboard then inspection should be confined to be reported or observed deficiencies”.

It is very vital provision, which at times may be ignored by incompetent PSC Officers. As

any further inspection resulted to an extra loss of time for a vessel, PSCO must be very

vigilant about it, of course, in no prejudice of characteristic of an inspection. All MoU’s

20

agreed to accept that provision the at combination with this provision one more caution

is required that “all possible efforts should be made to avoid a ship being unduly

detained or delayed. If a ship is unduly detained or delayed, it should be entitled to

compensation for any loss or damage suffered”. Flag state must be notified as soon as

possible it is vital to inform any detention under its flag. Every MoU recognise this

practice. (IMO Resolution A.1052 (27), supra note 22, sec. 4.1.3.)

Even though the wording of the instruction is not the same in every MoU’s. The

(Resolutions and other decisions of the 25th assembly, 2008) offers for the situation

where:

“The ship has been allowed to sail with known deficiencies; the authorities of the

port State should communicate all the facts to the authorities of the country of the

next appropriate port of call, to the flag State, and to the recognized organization,

where appropriate.”

To permit the vessel is to navigate without repairing its deficiencies is very risky as it

may lead to a partial or full loss if the shipping company has not voluntary

encouragement to do it. However, depending on the circumstances take vessel to

dockyard or facilities where available to fix the deficiencies it may be the only choice.

Moreover, in the application of PSC, section 4.1.2 of IBID has also mentioned that

“whenever a party denies the entrance of a foreign vessel to a port or offshore terminals

under its jurisdiction, whether or not as a result of information about a substandard ship,

it should forthwith provide the master and flag state with reasons for the denial of entry”.

At present, there is single regional MoU, namely Paris MoU according to the associated

regulation such as SOLAS 1/19, MARPOL article 11, and also the Loadline Convention

article 21 that provides the right of PSC to prohibit the entrée of a vessel to any of the

ports in the region. This is very crucial point for many flags of convenience under

standard vessels

21

Ameera, 04/04/16,
Rephrase this so that it fits in the sentence

2.3 – VESSEL DETENTION THROUGH PSC

2.3.1 The implications of non-detention for the environment, safety, and security

In an accident investigation, the most important indicators is the ship's age and type of

vessel. An indicators-related studies by Faragher, (1979) examines in marine accident

caused by the ship's structural disturbances and engine breakdowns proportion against

age of the with the ship, while Pronce (1990) compared the age of the ship and ship

accident end up with the full losses.

Thyregod and Nielsen, (1993) meanwhile investigated on Vessels age which has its

impacts on annual accidents rates, which according to world fleet statistics in 2011, very

small (under 500 grt) and medium tonnage (25000 grt) ship hold big proportion of the

world fleet, 54.2% of the world fleet is 15 years old and over and general cargo as the

dry cargo ship fleet produced %24 of the world fleet. In this circumstances, old dry

cargo ships with small tonnage that constitute a significant portion of the world's fleet

and that clearly show they are in highest risk in terms of accidents, indeed according to

Lloyd's Register, ship accident statistics between 1985 to 1995, out of 1582 accidents

952 ship losses was belong to dry cargo ships. Zheng (2007) investigated ship

accidents changes by times in approximately 40-year period and data’s from his

researches and studies has been published “Casualty Return” and World Casualty

Statistics by Lloyd Register.

Figure 2.1 below analysed the following information. The numbers of accidents resulting

in the loss of the ship, annual average reduction of 3.2% between the time set. In 1973,

363 units of total loss, It fell to 120 in 2006. 1982 considered being the beginning of the

Port State controls, Comparison has been made exact losses between 1973-1982 and

1982-2006 with the accidents completed with complete losses, decreased at a rate of

40% on average compared to the previous period which has been identified.

22

Figure 2.2 Ships Total Loss Number over the Time Period from 1973 until 2006

Source: World Casualty Statistics 2011

When the case of total loss rate compared between 1973-1982 and 1982-2006, will find

highest total lost rate (4.3%) after port state control still lower than lowest (4.86%)in

previous period. After PSC regime was formatted there was serious decline in accidents

in the world, PSC regimes played an active role when it comes to safety in shipping,

especially years between 1990 -2000 while most of ship-owners took advantages of

easy flag, effective parts of PSC very important in reducing accidents, especially since

1993 when Tokyo MoU was introduced after Paris MoU. It is observed that there are

significant decline in number on rate of losses.

International Conventions permission national laws assigning PSCO’s to detain vessels

under definite circumstances (Manual for PSC officers, 2001). Different from a vessel

arrest, there is no condition for past deliberation of the related evidences of detention by

23

an arbiter. Port state control will unavoidably have impacts, particularly if a vessel is

subject to detention or a banning order, and there are likely to be financial implications

for ship owners and other stake holders.

2.3.2 Implication of Detention to Stakeholders

Therefore, there is no legal possibility for a ship owner to stop a provisional detention

order from being issued (Apart of course from the obvious one of ensuring that the

vessel is properly maintained and operated). After detainment, the ship-owner cannot

straightaway retrieve their vessel by confirming the company’s financial security by

using a letter of guarantee obtained from related authorities such as the P&I Club and

other elated authorities. In overall, the only way to the release a vessel from detention is

that proving all the deficiencies has been found on PSCO inspection successfully

remedied (Port state control, 1995).

In most cases, deficiencies could be recovered and repaired quickly and in terms of the

ships planned departure from a specific port, no penalty will be issued. Conversely, in

matter of serious deficiencies or in cases when there is delay in fixing or supply

evidence for deficiencies (For example because of delay in obtaining spare parts or

locating crewmembers certificates of competency). The stopping of the vessel from

departure port can have severe effects for many parties. Vessel detention consequently

has a significant impact on the costs on the vessel owners which involves a possibility

on the loss of revenue from ships and also technical matters which involves vessel

repairs conducted in a short notice, which usually is more expensive.

There are however a case where the vessel is not apparently delayed (Because

deficiencies are remedied within the scheduled “port time). There is a negative feature

to detention as it may affect the reputation of a specific vessel as well as its owner or

operator relating to the the vessel’s future employment prospects. If the vessel in

subject on a time charter, the owner instant financial loss is expected to be that the ship

may be placed off hire (Wilford, Coghlin and Healy, 1978). If it is subject to detention

order, the ship will be off hire and charterers will be excluded and be obliged to pay hire

this will be of course depends on the defined wording of the provisions in the charter

24

party. Also in the matter of the vessel employed on a voyage charter the running lay

time and demurrage will be affected. If a PSCO find, deficiencies it is potential that any

Notice of Readiness will be invalid. (Gard.no, 1999) at the very least commencement of

lay time is likely to delayed. A detention order in particular could have effects could have

the effect of making the voyage overall take longer than anticipated when the

charterparty was originally agreed. Owner calculations of the freight and demurrage

rates require may be of no value. Profit margins may be reduces or even into a loss.

(Kidman, 2003) Certainly even more substantial than delay or detention orders may be

outcomes of a banning order. Any order that avert the ship calling at selected port may

take it impossible for the contract to be achieved. Any failure to complete may cause to

a repudiation of the contract that would be the charterer or other party to end the

contrast and make the claim for the damages. (Kasoulides, 1993). Also in even worse

situation if banning order to ship enforce middle of the voyage for example at an

intermediate port and if vessel still got already cargo on board from previous ports it

most probably vessel will not continue to agreed discharge port and substitute

arrangements will have to be made for delivery cargo .

2.3.2.1 Detention Effect to Ports

Another effects of the ship being detained is taking very precious berth place on many

ports and this can course challenge for the port authority or other shipping companies,

even ship owner has to pay demurrage fee, not able to accommodate other vessels

while detained vessel hold the berth till deficiencies has been found on PSCO

inspection successfully remedied. A carrier’s competence in port can be implicated by

the actions of other carriers that is using the same marine terminal.

Congestion at port may have nothing to do with whether an ocean carrier has a

container prepared for shipper pick-up. Some port congestion problems can be a result

of a combination of factors and Port State control time to time one of them. (Some

Observations on Port Congestion, Vessel Size and Vessel Sharing Agreements, 2015)

It costs money to keep vessels at anchor for days waiting to discharge and to manage

container imbalances.  Carriers are beginning to implement congestion surcharges.

25

For example, Mediterranean Shipping Company has announced that, “With several

weeks of slowdown on U.S. West Coast port operations, our vessels are being worked

at a slower pace, extending the stay at the port, which consequently leads to other

vessels having to wait a significant number of days outside the port. (Mark Szakonyi,

2015)

2.4 PORT STATE CONTROL HARMONISATION

The most difficult task in conducting PSC is the harmonisation of procedures, after the

case of Erica, importance of harmonisation of procedures has been proof again. The

key object for that is not only because different administrations establish different

priorities and items to be inspected, but also that each PSCO in each administration has

his own precedence, based on its own background. Experience has shown that nautical

surveyors and engineer surveyors chose different items to check on board ships when

carrying out PSC.

2.5 METHODOLOGY

2.5.1 Research Approach and StrategyWith reference to the nature of study, this research will make use of qualitative methods

in the collection and analysis of data. Selected from primary and secondary sources, the

information gathered will be presented in descriptive form taking into account thematic

evidence to validate the objective of the research.

2.5.2 Sampling Method The data type from secondary sources will be both quantitative and qualitative as it will

provide statistical accounts of improved operations or port efficiency values over the

years the port state MoU has been in effect. The application of secondary and primary

sources is to adapt a mixed research method making use of complementary qualitative

and quantitative analyses. The primary sources and the secondary accounts from

published materials such as books and journals will be compared regarding observed

likely trends.

26

2.5.3 Data Collection Method Two approaches and two data collection instruments are designed to collect data for the

study. To get information regarding how the Port State MoU serves and how to ship

operators feel about their work of member states. A sample of 25 stakeholders on the

MoU such as port owners, port managers, as well as users of port services. The data

collection instrument, in this case, would be questionnaires. The questionnaire would be

send to the participants through Email. The merit of choosing interviews to collect the

data is associated with the need to acquire as much information regarding the utilization

of the Port State MoU by stakeholders. Also, the method also allows for follow-up

questions to gather insight on the subject matter. However, the data collected would be

analyzed thematically linking the responses to specific themes affecting ports and

related to Port State MoU.

On the other hand, secondary sources of information will be referenced in an attempt to

gather and much Intel on the subject matter as possible.

2.5.4 Analysis Method Data analysis will take into account descriptive approach to interpreting the observed

thematic patterns with statistical patterns reported in published material. In this case, no

statistical modelling will be considered as the sample size does not have a standardized

achievement measure to influence correlations between the variables.

CHAPTER 3: THE PARIS MOU AND COMPARISON WITH OTHER REGIONAL MOU’S3.1 Introduction The primary objective of this research chapter is to compare the Paris MOU with other

MOUs, specifically Tokyo and Viña del Mar. These MoUs are selected due to the fact

that they are the most established and important agreements after Paris MoU. The

chapter first provides a general overview of the general approach adopted by the MOUs

to the implementation of PSC. Subsequently, several parameters are used for

comparison as follows: performance of vessel operator and classification society, flag

27

state, ship type and age and previous inspection outcomes and detention rates.

Additionally, the parameters include the role of authorities that assess whether the

documentation and certificates are in order, assurance on the ship's condition,

machinery, equipment, hygienic conditions, accommodation and whether the staffs is

meeting the MoU requirements.

3.2 An Overview of the Treaties

Every MoU is established to support a successful execution and the general and

constant importance, of the applicable IMO/ILO unions in vessels working in the area

under the MoU. As observed in Table3.1, the three agreements of Tokyo, Paris, and

Viña del Mar are practically consistent in the international instruments provisions

observe, while under the European conformity, the record is additionally broad

Table 3.1 Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and Vina del Mar MOU relevant instruments

TOKYO MOU PARIS MOU VINA DEL LOAD LINE 1966( AMENDED 1988) LOAD LINE 1966( AMENDED 1988) LOAD LINE 1966( AMENDED 1988)

SOLAS 1974 (AMENDED 1978/1988) SOLAS 1974 (AMENDED 1978/1988) SOLAS 1974 (AMENDED 1978/1988)

MARPOL 1973(AMENDED 1978) MARPOL 1973(AMENDED 1978) MARPOL 1973(AMENDED 1978)

STWC 1978 STWC 1978 STWC 1978

COLREG 1972 COLREG 1972 COLREG 1972

TONNAGE 1969 TONNAGE 1969 TONNAGE 1969

ILO 147 ILO 147 ----

---- CLC 1969 CLC 1969

---- CLC AMENDED 1992 ----

AFS 2001 AFS 2001 ----

---- BUNKER 2001 ----

The international maritime conventions mentioned in the previous section, referred to as the “relevant

instruments”, are as follows:

International Convention on Load Lines 1996, as amended, its 1998 protocol, (LOADLINES 66/88);

28

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974, its Protocol of 1978, as

amended, and the Protocol of 1998, (SOLAS 74/78/88);

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the

Protocol of 1978, as amended (MARPOL 73/78);

International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers

1978, as amended (STCW 78);

Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea 1972, as amended

(COLREG 72);

International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships 1969 (TONNAGE 1969);

Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 (ILO Convention No. 147)

International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 (CLC 1969);

Protocol of 1992 to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,

1969 (CLC PROT 1992)

International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001 (+Bunker)

International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships, 2001 (AFS 2001)

Source: Acuerdolatino.int.ar, 2016, Tokyo-mou.org, 2016, Parismou.org, 2016

In 1982, the Paris MoU was the first to execute a local PSC system that introduced two

inspection groups applied to all the vessels and particular kinds of ships believed to be

at major risk (Gupta, 2010). A preliminary examination and a more comprehensive

investigation are established. Inspections that influence definite vessels of particular risk

fall into a single class, the systematic review. Mostly, this inspection system has been

accepted commonly in the other agreements, beginning with the 1992 Viña del Mar

treaty and the 1993 Tokyo treaty.

Besides, the Paris MoU was the first in setting up a technique for picking vessels to be

examined which has been personalized. The Paris MoU had two primary practical

measures for the selection: first, the ship was previously listed; and second, it had a

noble common selection cause. All vessels in the in the sequence are allocated a risk

profile that decides the inspection priority, the maximum inspection interval, and the

inspection scope (Kwiatkowska, & Dotinga, 2001). The information system ships are

29

most likely classified as high, standard or low risk depending on historical and general

limits. The ship’s risk report are recalculated every day after analyzing adjustments in

the most vital factors such as the 36 months’ account, age, and company performance.

What`s more, recalculation takes place after each inspection and when appropriate,

presentation tables for recognized organizations and flags are changed. In the

inspection of the MoUs of Viña del Mar and Tokyo, the authorities decide the priority

order, in standard, by the ship targeting means employed by the committee (Leeuwen,

2010).

Authorities undertake assessments that establish whether the documentations and

certificates are in order, and to assure themselves that the ship's condition, machinery,

its equipment, hygienic conditions, accommodation, and staff meet the requirements.

The structure of precedence and inspection time windows applied in particular MoU can

just be extended to other agreements. The organizational formation based on maritime

authorities’ committees with the existence of supranational institutes, on upholding a

more permanent secretariat, and on appealing to participants from different accords has

been imitated in all the local agreements signed (Liu, 2009). A major problem affecting

the Viña del Mar accord is the impasse that numerous MoU signatory states are not yet

signatories to various international conventions that form the basis of the MoU PSC

system. An additional negative aspect is that the Viña del Mar nations do not have

appropriate policies and operations when compared to the other MoU’s especially

Tokyo and Paris MoU’s (Liu, 2009).

Besides, states with heavy traffic like Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia, have not

achieved the 15% inspection of ships at their ports (Cariou and Wolff, 2011). Recently,

there have been and increasing and high levels of support for the Paris and Tokyo

agreements. PSC Committee Meetings attended by both representatives of the MoUs

through 2011 have indicated relentless efforts and enhanced synchronized measures

made; for instance, there have been numerous demanding assessment campaigns, on

certain main topics, like structural protection, and fire safety systems among others

(Monios, 2014). As a result, it is believed that the Paris and Tokyo agreements are the

two longest-established and satisfactory transactions. The success is attributed to the

30

functions of the more economically good and influential states, and their physical

exposure. These areas also host the most experienced naval services for personnel

training dedicated to the examination and management of ships, with supportive

infrastructures. Several participant states are additionally lively in accomplishing

detailed and intermittent operations on particular topics that need exceptional attention

at certain times (Monios, 2014).

After evaluating the unclear outline, the succeeding step is to inspect the performance

of the inspections when put into practice. The confinement of a ship for non-compliance

signifies a severe intervention in the marine transportation (Monios, 2014). A detention

of a non-complying ship is the only sanction in the control system recognized in the

local memorandums, like those of Tokyo, Paris, Viña Del Marand, Mediterranean and

others; thus, detentions are an essential pointer for establishing if the agreements are

operational and successful.

In the assessment of the data, a broader data found in the MoUs annual reports will be

differentiated from the more extensive data matching the 2011 initial six months. In a

different study, inspections were prepared with the three main and strongest MoU’s that

concluded in the detention of 1,242 vessels. The fraction breakdowns of the overall data

for the MoU’s are indicated in Table 3.2 below.

It is important to note the lack of inspection activity by South America signatories of Viña

del Mar MoU that account for less than 5% of the full investigations under the three

agreements (Cariou and Wolff, 2011). It is declared that a large percentage of the

substandard liners (roughly 40%) were not categorized by an IACS Society member

(Tedsen, Cavalieri, & Kraemer, 2014). Additionally, the conventional of the ships flag

states is found on the blacklist; the arrangement of these undesirable aspects signify

that the protection levels of these vessels are reduced to the lowest scores, and thus

implying the subsistence of a gap in the discovery of official organizations of uncertain

standing. Also, the vessels` age is a significant variable. Noticeably, the old ships have

a high-risk category; in VHR and HR, the typical age of the detained vessels goes

beyond 25 years. Furthermore, the average age of the detained ships is alike in the

31

MoUs under study, though ships under the Tokyo MoU are somewhat less obsolete

(Kidman, 2003).

Findings from most research indicate the technical intricacy differences between types

of vessel, and the old ships held are those of general load while the most recent are the

tankers in the three agreements. Furthermore, related trends and parameters are

observed in the three regions. However, a moderately small amount of ships held in the

Viña del Mar area reduces the strength of the assessment. When similarity is made in

connection with astronomical universal results for the same efforts of PSC applied by

the maritime authorities, by looking at the investigated annual reports of the most

strongest MoUs, around 19,000 assessments were undertaken in Paris` MoU,

compared with Tokyo MoU`s 29,000 (Knapp, and Franses, 2007). When evaluating the

fractions of these inspections that led to holding up of vessels in the regions, the year

2011 figures present: Tokyo 1.50%, Paris 3.61%. During the same period, deficiencies

detected were: Tokyo, 103,549 and Paris, 50,738The diversity of flags between the

inspected vessels is greatly superior in the Tokyo and Paris agreements (Tedsen,

Cavalieri, & Kraemer, 2014). A level of likeness is also observed in the ages of confined

vessels under the Tokyo and Paris agreements, where vessels of approximately 50

years old are substandard. Considering the deficiencies type, differences between the

regions, meaning that the MoU`s may have opposite approaches. For instance, the

proportion of defects initiated in group working circumstances in the MoU of Paris is

higher compared to the other agreements; however, the entitlement is inferior on

matters of pollution (Tedsen, Cavalieri, & Kraemer, 2014).

These second results are probably associated with the enhanced understanding in

Europe relating to the common environment results in vessels being better outfitted. A

different study to present a comparison of the flags lists of flags of ships regularly

sanctioned in the Tokyo and Paris MoU’s it is monitor that certain flag states appear

more often in Asia-Pacific compared to Europe, and the most important scenarios are

found in Panama and Cambodia (Bang, 2012).

32

Table 3.2 Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and Vina del Mar MOU ship detention in first half of 2011

 

Tokyo Memorandum

Paris Memorandum

Vina del Mar Memorandum

Detention 848 335 59

68.28% 26.97% 4.75%

By Flag TypeBlack 320 77 2

37.80% 23% 3.40%

Grey 31 32 8

3.70% 9.50% 13.60%

White 489 216 45

57.70% 64.50% 76.30%

By Black List Per Risk TypeVery high Risk 27 9 0

8.40% 11.70% 0%

High Risk 196 16 0

61.20% 20.80% 0%

Medium High Risk 37 35 0

11.60% 45.40% 0%

Medium Risk 60 17 2

18.80% 22.10% 100%

By Classification Society TypeIACS 478 232 44

56.40% 69.25% 76.40%

NON-IACS 362 93 11

42.70% 27.75% 18.60%

Source: Piniella, Diaz and Alcaide, 2014

33

3.3 COMPARISON OF FACTORS USED IN THE TARGETING SYSTEM IN DIFFERENT PSC REGIONS

3.3.1. Paris and Tokyo MOU New Inspection Regime (NIR)

New inspection regimes (NIR) over the recent years have come into force by both

Tokyo and Paris MOUs. This regime introduces a new intelligence led model which

helps to assign the risk profile of the vessel based on its age, flag and performance of

the company. MOUs database regularly calculates these risk profiles and classifies the

vessels category which could be low or high risk profiles, this then helps with the

evaluation of the vessels and based on that evaluation if its good then the vessels

would not be inspected regularly however high risk ships would be required to

undertake inspections with each 6 passing months whereas the low risk ships would be

inspected every 24 months.

Together based on the performance of the vessel, flag and company a comparison is

then made in four distinct grades: low average, above average, and very low average.

To calculate the company’s performance pervious port state inspections of the particular

vessel are looked at and based on that a calculation is made to determine a vessels

class. SRP in the database are utilized daily with taking the modern information

inspection into consideration. The purpose of the NIR is to recognise, through the use

up to date intelligence the ships that require the greatest attention under port state

control. Following the last 24 months inspections the LRSs are rewarded with no

inspection, with a maximum inspection free time span of 36 months whereas the SRSs

are subjected to being inspected every 12-10 months. HRSs face the most severe

inspections which are every 6 months. Diagram of ship inspection intervals shown

below ,to see ship risk profile diagram check appendix 3

Figure 3.3 Inspection Intervals.

34

Source : Parismou.org, 2011, Tokyo-mou.org,

3.3.2 United State Coast Guard

The US does not involve itself with the agreements on port state control. It accepts

control measures on an independent basis. The US coastguard on 1 st may 1994

introduced its revised initiative for port state control. The main focus of this programme

is to isolate the high risk profile foreign vessels based on their owners previous

performance record, classification society and flag state, which allows them to

systematically target the vessels to board.

In the USA there is no contract or document to identify with what is especially dedicated

towards PSC, hence then it becomes impossible to point out a conclusive list of US port

state conventions. The US enforces its authority through the US Coastguard Foreign

Vessel Boarding Programme, known as the port state control plan. In the USA, the PSC

system is established as the primary factors in the decision-making prior to the vessel’s

on-board inspection process which includes the ship owner or operators list, the list of

classification societies, its flag states, the vessel’s boarding history, and also the vessel

trade and type.

According to the US port state the first three points reflects on the vessels operational

conditions and compliance with addition to the international safety and environmental

standards. And so, if any of these individuals fails to accept its accountabilities fully for a

35

ship’s safe operation, then the ship is likely to be measured a below average vessel by

the US Coast Guard. The likelihood of a foreign vessel being boarded is based on the

number of points the vessel gets under the boarding urgency conditions. However, the

points allocated to a sea-going vessel that is under this targeting system does not

categorise the vessel as below average; only a boarding and examination can reveal

such conditions.

36

Table 3.4 Ship Risk Profile for United State Coast Guard

Owner Flag Class History Ship Type

5 points

Listed owner or

operator

7 points

Listed Flag State

Priority I

Ten arrivals with

detention ratio

more than 4 times

the average OR

Ten arrivals and

involved with at

least one detention

in the previous 3

years.

5 points each

Detention within

the previous 12

months.

1 point

Oil or chemical

tanker.

5 points

Ten arrivals with a

detention ratio

between 3&4 times

the average.

1 point each

Other operational

control within the

previous 12

months.

1 point

Gas Carrier

3 points

Ten arrivals with a

detention ratio

between 2&3 times

the average.

1 point each

Casualty within the

previous 12

months.

2 points

Bulk Freighter over

10 years old.

1 point

Ten arrivals with a

detention ratio

between the

average and twice

the average.

1 point each

Violation within the

previous 12

months.

1 point

Passenger Ship

0 points

Ten arrivals with a

detention ratio

below the average

1 point each

Not boarded within

the previous 6

months.

2 points

Carrying low value

commodities in

bulk.

37

OR

Ten arrivals with

no detentions in

the previous three

years.

Source: Author 2015

3.4.3 Performance of Vessel Operator

The vessel operator’s reputation with regard to performance in PSC inspections is

considered as a major factor in the ship inspection management. However, only in

USCG if the vessels operator does not meet the expected criteria, the vessels operators

is then given 5 risk points. At the beginning the Paris MOU did not take this factor into

account, however since 1st Jan 2011 with new inspection system, companies’

performance has been considered as important criteria. Other MoU’s the ones using

Sirenac targeting system like Vina Del Mou still not taking vessel operator performance

as a main criteria as in their target calculation system. The Paris MOU created a

formula to indicate the company’s performance. If the company's performance is low or

very low vessel is given 2 risk points, and also that vessel is consider in high risk group

then it can expect more frequent inspections.

38

The company's performance calculation table used in the new inspection regime are

given below.

Table : 3.5 Paris MoU (NIR) company's performance calculation table

Source: Author 2016

3.4.2 Flag State

The flag of a vessel is an integral part of the ship, the flag state of a vessel is the first

and main source that indicates if the vessel is meeting with the international

conventions and compliance. It is considered that the flag of the vessel can produce a

major effect on how the vessel is seen. Therefore, it is considered as performance

criteria in all control systems, and the detention rate compared with the average rate of

detention of the ship's flag, with ship risk ratio calculated according to the criteria. when

targeting factor calculating relating to ships flag ,USCG given 7 risk point for

underperformed flag states vessels, with new inspection regime in Paris MoU ships

given 1 or 2 points regarding how satisfying ships flag state with international

conventions,

39

The underperformed flag countries vessels have a high chance of being inspected

frequently. In Tokyo MOU the risk factor is ships flag detention rate against average

detention rate. Also in Paris MOU ships flag countries signing international conventions

and passing IMO control is a factor for the ships flag to be put in the low risk category in

accordance with assessment.

Under Paris MOU there is an effect vessels are put in the low risk categories if their flag

countries have signed all the conventions and passed the IMO control.

3.3.3 Classification Society

The classification societies plays an important part in the ships performance, if a vessel

is class under a particular society then these classification societies are responsible for

the verification of the vessel, and also the publication of the annual certification

requirements and periodic checks. Ships class companies’ performance is an effective

part for calculating ships risk score by port state control mechanism. Vessels that are

registered in the underperformed class companies get 0-5 risk points, by USCG in Paris

MOU they are awarded 1 risk point.

In the Tokyo MOU if vessel is not a member of IACS, then the vessels are likely to get a

huge 10 risk point on its profile. Also in the Paris MOU if the vessels class is not

recognisable by the EU, even after meeting all the requirements it can still be

considered as a high risk vessel.

3.3.4 Ship Type and age

These two factors are generally independent from each however in some targeting

system they are considered similar. For example USCG for chemical, petrol, gas

tankers and passenger ships regardless of their age its given 1 point, bulk carrier older

than 10 years are given 2 points. In new inspection system in the Paris MOU vessels

type and age is not considered as same criteria, and so 2 risk points are given to

tankers, dry bulk and passenger vessels. Also regardless of the vessels age, if its 12

years old it gets 1 risk point, and if the vessel is 15 years old, then the tankers, dry bulk

and passenger vessels will get an additional 4 points,

40

3.4.5 Ships Previous PSC Performance

In all memorandums ships previous inspection record is considered to be a very

importing factor to calculate the ships targeting cause. In the Paris MOU if the vessel

has 2 or more detentions in the last 36 months, the vessel will get 1 risk point, and if the

vessels have passed the every inspections less than 5 deficiencies then it will be

considered as a low risk vessel. And the vessels that have not been inspected in a long

time are also considered as a priority to be inspected. In USCG Also in same time

period (36 month) if ship not inspected, that vessel consider as priority inspected vessel.

If the vessel has been detained in the last 12 months than 5 risk points are added on

the risk targeting calculation in the USCG targeting system.

Tokyo MOU takes into account the vessels last 4 inspections and detention rate and

then gives its risk points which are based in-between 15 to 100. Also in the last 4

inspections if there's a deficiency, amount of deficiency is multiplied by 0.6 and then

added towards the vessels risk calculations, and for each vital deficiency 2 more risk

points are added. Also if last inspection date 6-12 month before 3 points, if 12-24 month

6 points and if last inspection was more than 24 month ago ship targeting factor will be

added extra 50 point

41

CHAPTER 4 PRESENTATION OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

4.1 INTRODUCTION.

This chapter considered the raw data and tabulated in in MS Excel for visual

representation of participants strongly supporting the question views and those with

other views such as strong opposition. The sample size was 19 and the questions were

22. Participants were engaged in answering a closed-ended questionnaire with coded

responses. The codes 5 to 1 indicates strong agreement and strong opposition

respectively.

Graph 4.1 Graphic Detail of Question 1 Of The Questionnaire

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

In PSC (Port State Control) inspection regimes, a target inspection rate should be established

Views on the question that PSC (Port State Control) inspection regimes, a target

inspection rate should be established indicated that the portion of the sample strongly

agreeing is 7 of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 6

against 3 for those considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly

42

disagreeing participants make 3 of the sample for disagreeing and none for strongly

disagreeing. Therefore, the feedback on this question indicates that a target inspection

rate should be established since it carries the majority view.

Graph 4.2 Graphic Detail Of Question 2 Of The Questionnaire

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Targeted inspection rates for ports can be achieved with an adequate number of qualified and experienced PSCO (Port State Control Offi -

cers).

Views on the question that “targeted inspection rates for ports can be achieved with an adequate number of qualified and experienced PSCO” indicated that the portion of the sample strongly agreeing is 6 of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 8 against 5 for those considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing had no participants. Thus, the feedback on this question indicates that “targeted inspection rates for ports can be achieved with an adequate number of qualified and experienced PSCO” is a popular view since it carries the majority affirmative responses.

43

Graph 4.3 Graphic Detail Of Question 3 Of The Questionnaire

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 Outcomes of inspections by PSCOs are reliable

Views on the question on whether “outcomes of inspections by PSCOs are

reliable" indicated that the portion of the sample strongly agreeing is _3of the 19

respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 5 against 7 for those

considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing participants

make 2 of the sample for agreeing and 1 for strongly disagreeing. Thus, the feedback

on this question indicates that “outcomes of inspections by PSCOs are reliable” and

therefore is relative satisfaction with the current inspection strategies.

Graph 4.4 Graphic Detail Of Question 3 Of The Questionnaire

44

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Easy flag (flag of convenience) vessels gener-ally have a greater risk rate than that of other

flagged vessels

Views on whether “easy flag (flag of convenience) vessels generally have a

greater risk rate than that of other flagged vessels” indicated that the portion of the

sample strongly agreeing is 13 of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing

views had a count of 6 against none for those considering themselves uncertain.

Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing views on this question did not have any support.

Thus, the feedback on this question indicates that majority of the participants support

the view that “easy flag (flag of convenience) vessels generally have a greater risks

compared to ordinary vessels.

Graph 4.5 Graphic Detail Of Question 5 Of The Questionnaire

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Frequent inspections of vessels through PSC will improve ship standards

45

Views regarding whether “frequent inspections of vessels through PSC improved

ship standards” indicated that the portion of the sample strongly agreeing is 13 of the 19

respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 4 against none for those

considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing views got no

support from the participants concluding that frequent inspections of vessels through

PSC is one way of improving ship standards.

Graph 4.6 Graphic Detail Of Question 6 Of The Questionnaire

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Classification Societies should have an in-creased role in ensuring shipping standards for

the purpose of PSC

Assessing whether “classification societies should have an increased role in

ensuring shipping standards for the purpose of PSC”, results indicated that the portion

of the sample strongly agreeing is 9 of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing

views had a count of 6 against 4 for those considering themselves uncertain.

Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing views had not support from the sample. The result

here indicates that a majority of the participants have a strong believed that if

classification societies had an increased role in ensuring shipping standards for the

purpose of PSC, the approach would be beneficial.

46

Graph 4.7 Graphic Detail Of Question 7 Of The Questionnaire

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Inspections of low risk vessels owned by reputable companies is a waste of time and

money

Investigation on whether “inspections of low risk vessels owned by reputable

companies was a waste of time and money” showed that the portion of the sample

strongly agreeing is none of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had

a count of 5 against none for those considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and

strongly disagreeing participants make a majority of 9 and 5 respectively. Thus, the

feedback on this study question indicates that inspections of low risk vessels owned by

reputable companies is not a waste of time and money.

Graph 4.8 Graphic Detail Of Question 8 Of The Questionnaire

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

certain countries and certain ports are stricter than other ports in same MoU’s

8 above represents the views on whether “certain countries and certain ports are

stricter than other ports in same MoU’s” and shows that the portion of the sample

strongly agreeing is 5 of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a

count of 6 against 6 for those considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and

47

strongly disagreeing participants make 2 of the sample for disagreeing and none for

strongly disagreeing. Thus, the feedback indicates that some support, but not entirely

reliable, is present regarding the views on whether certain countries and certain ports

are stricter than other ports in same MoU’s.

Graph 4.9 Graphic Detail Of Question 9 Of The Questionnaire

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

The strictness of PSC enforcement in a port could influence the decision for vessels to use

that port

Views on whether “the strictness of PSC enforcement in a port could influence

the decision for vessels to use that port” indicated that the portion of the sample strongly

agreeing is none of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count

of 5 against 7 for those considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly

disagreeing participants make 5 of the sample for disagreeing and 2 for strongly

disagreeing. The mixed feedback however, shows that more investigation should be

carried out to determine whether strictness plays a role.

Graph 4.10 Graphic Detail Of Question 10 Of The Questionnaire

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Some ports use PSC as a tool to enhance their competitive advantage.

48

Views on whether “some ports used PSC as a tool to enhance their competitive advantage” indicated that the portion of the sample strongly agreeing was 3 of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 6 against 4 for those considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing participants make 4 of the sample for disagreeing and 2 for strongly disagreeing. Thus, the feedback on this question indicates that is considerable that some ports may be using PSC as a tool to enhance their competitive advantage.

Graph 4.11 Graphic Detail Of Question 10 Of The Questionnaire

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Political disagreements between states impact on effective PSC.

Investigating whether “political disagreements between states impact on effective

PSC” found out that the portion of the sample strongly agreeing is 5 of the 19

respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 6 against 4 for those

considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing participants

make 2 of the sample for disagreeing and 2 for strongly disagreeing. The negative

views in this case tend to hold little to no significant grounds and therefore do not deny

that “political disagreements between states impact on effective PSC”.

Graph 4.12 Graphic Detail Of Question 12 Of The Questionnaire

49

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Distinction between vessel type is an effective parameter for assessing risk

Studying whether “distinction between vessel type was an effective parameter for

assessing risk’ returned that the portion of the sample strongly agreeing is 5 of the 19

respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 8 against 6 for those

considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing views did not

get support. Thus, the feedback on this question indicates that distinction between

vessel type is relatively effective parameter for assessing risk since a significant portion

of the sample did not appear sure.

Graph 4.13 Graphic Detail Of Question 13 Of The Questionnaire

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

2

4

6

8

10

12

The level of quayside activity influences the extent of PSC vessel inspection

The perspectives on whether the “level of quayside activity influenced the extent

of PSC vessel inspection” showed that the portion of the sample strongly agreeing is 2

50

of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 10 against 2

for those considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing

participants make 5 of the sample for disagreeing and none for strongly disagreeing.

Therefore, it is conclusive that although the level of quayside activity was considered to

have some influence on the extent of PSC vessel inspection, it is not a primary

requirement as such.

Graph 4.14 Graphic Detail Of Question 14 Of The Questionnaire

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

white, grey and black list of flag States is a fair mechanism for distinguishing between vessels

of varying risk

Views on the question whether “white, grey and black list of flag States was a fair

mechanism for distinguishing between vessels of varying risk” showed that the

participant strongly agreeing was 6 of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing

views had a count of 8 against 4 for those considering themselves uncertain.

Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing participants make 1 of the sample for disagreeing

and none for strongly disagreeing. Thus, the feedback on this question indicates that

the color codes indicate varying risks.

Graph 4.15 Graphic Detail Of Question 15 Of The Questionnaire

51

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

2

4

6

8

10

12

If equal income is to be derived from using two ports my company would choose the port with

less strict PSC

Investigating whether “equal income is to be derived from using two ports my company

would choose the port with less strict PSC” found out that those strongly agreeing were

10 of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 2 against 2

for those considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing

participants make 5 of the sample for agreeing and none for strongly disagreeing.

Therefore it is found out that most people would consider choosing the ports that were

less strict to increase their income.

Graph 4.16 Graphic Detail Of Question 16 Of The Questionnaire

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

My company’s vessels have experienced unfair PSC detention.

Investigating on whether participants’ “companies’ vessels had experienced unfair PSC

detention” found that none of the 19 respondents strongly agreed with this view. On the

52

other hand, agreeing views had a count of 3 against 4 for those considering themselves

uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing participants make 6 of the sample for

disagreeing and 3 for strongly disagreeing. This results show that there is strong

evidence that participants viewed detention as unfair in most cases.

Graph 4.17 Graphic Detail Of Question 10 Of The Questionnaire

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

1

2

3

4

5

6

My shipping company tends to check a port’s detention rates before sending vessels to that

port.

Investigating on whether participants” shipping companies tended to check a port’s

detention rates before sending vessels to that port” found that 4 of the 19 respondents

strongly agreed with this view. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 2

against 5 for those considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly

disagreeing participants make 3 of the sample for disagreeing and 5 for strongly

disagreeing. This results show that there is mixed views regarding whether the shipping

companies avoided inspection deliberately.

Graph 4.18 Graphic Detail Of Question 18 Of The Questionnaire

53

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

I am aware of the methods used to calculate a shipping company’s PSC performance

Question 18 aimed at studying whether participants were “aware of the methods used to

calculate a shipping company’s PSC performance”. Results indicate that 4 of the 19

respondents strongly agreed. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 2

against 12 for those considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly

disagreeing views did not achieve any support. The high number of uncertain responses

indicates that the participants lacked sufficient knowledge on the performance

measures

. Graph 4.19 Graphic Detail Of Question 19 Of The Questionnaire

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

The period granted for vessel improvement could be extended beyond the next port of call

depending on the type of deficiency

Investigating whether “the period granted for vessel improvement could be

extended beyond the next port of call depending on the type of deficiency” showed the

portion of the sample strongly agreeing was 5 of the 19 respondents. On the other

54

hand, agreeing views had a count of 14 and no other views were given beyond these.

This feedback indicates that the sample unanimously agreed that the period granted for

vessel improvement could be extended beyond the next port of call depending on the

type of deficiency.

Graph 4.20 Graphic Detail Of Question 20 Of The Questionnaire

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10It is fair that the UK’s target rate is 5% higher

than that of the Paris MoU

Views on whether “it was fair that the UK’s target rate is 5% higher than that of the Paris

MoU” realized that the portion of the sample strongly agreeing was 4of the 19

respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 3 against 9 for those

considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing participants

make 3 of the sample for disagreeing and 0 for strongly disagreeing. The feedback

shows that majority of the views are not certain but a considerable potion seems to

have affirmative bias towards the view.

Graph 4.21 Graphic Detail Of Question 21 Of The QuestionnaireViews on the question regarding whether “detention rates by PSCOs with an engineering background are higher than PSCOs with a nautical background” found out that portion of the sample strongly agreeing was 0 (zero). On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 2 against 3 for those considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing participants make 2 of the sample for disagreeing and 2 for strongly disagreeing. These views show that Detention rates by PSCOs with an engineering background were not higher than PSCOs with a nautical background.

55

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Detention rates by PSCOs with an engineering background are higher than PSCOs with a nau-

tical background.

Graph 4.22 Graphic Detail Of Question 22 Of The Questionnaire

Strongly Agree Agree I am uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

There should be better harmonisation of in -spections across countries of the Paris MoU.

Views on whether “there should be better harmonisation of inspections across

countries of the Paris MoU” observed that the portion of the sample strongly agreeing is

4 of the 19 respondents. On the other hand, agreeing views had a count of 12 against 3

for those considering themselves uncertain. Disagreeing and strongly disagreeing views

failed to stand a chance in this question. Hence it seen that a large portion supports the

notion that here should be better harmonisation of inspections across countries of the

Paris MoU.

56

4.2 SUMMARY The results indicate that considerable and significant number of the sample members

identify with the benefits of PSC and MoUs. Therefore, the study observed a welcoming

attitude to ports reforms. Additionally, the views also show that improvement in some

areas is a desired wish for more participants.

57

Chapter 5

5.1 ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

A majority of participants strongly agreed and agreed with the view that in PSC (Port

State Control) inspection regimes, a target inspection rate should be established. The

responses indicate that the benefits associated with target inspection. This is to ensure

that vessels are not only considered for inspection but can also be commissioned for

inspection if the need to do so is seen as eminent.

An increase in the number of PSCO is a facilitating factor that most of the participants

felt should be implemented to promote targeted inspection rates for ports. While the

policies may be efficient and sufficiently drafted, the lack of enforcing personnel wastes

time and at the same time offering very little, to none, in terms of purpose. In addition,

although participants differed under each response category significantly, it observed

that PSC officers weren’t directly influencing the reliability of the inspection. As a result,

if an increase in these officers was eminent, a corresponding decision to train and

develop them would guarantee the reliability of their inspection.

While risks are factors considered in the ordering of inspections, it is considered, as

most participants agree, that easy flag (flag of convenience) vessels, generally have a

greater risk rate than that of other flagged vessels. With reference to convenience, it

means that the vessel is primarily registered in a sovereign state different from that of

the owners. The purpose of this approach is to ensure that the operating costs of the

ship are drastically lowered when avoiding local regulations. If the regulations are

unfavourable to the vessel owner, the vessel can be registered under a sovereign state

with less strict regulations.

Nevertheless, whether or not easy flags are used as cost minimization strategies,

frequent inspections of vessels through PSC will improve ship standards, which is a

policy that would not leave any vessel out. This response is merited by the fact that

58

more coordinated inspections are likely to influence a higher rate of maintenance. As a

result, owners’ and management teams would ensure that vessels are up to the

expected conditions so that they can avoid penalties and other charges. In addition,

frequent inspections also promote a longer vessel life before it is auctioned for materials

and recycling. This role is majorly entrusted to the classification societies which serves

the duty of ensuring ship standards for the Port State Control purpose.

Classification Societies should have an increased role in ensuring shipping standards

for the purpose of PSC. This, according to the findings is a highly accepted notion that

is linked to the improvement of the overall vessel standards. As a result, for ship-owners

would benefit from standard classification of their vessels such that they can strategize

on business factors besides the inspections and other regulations. Since it is time

consuming to manage their vessels by themselves, it is seen that the employment of a

vessel management firm is a strategic approach to ensuring both low and high risk

vessels are properly inspected (Kwiatkowska, & Dotinga, 2001).

However, the notions that the inspection of low risk vessels owned by reputable

companies is a waste of time and money. When it comes to the regulations by the PSC,

each vessel, regardless of the risk factor, is bound by the jurisdictions requiring it to

adhere to the expectations. On the other hand, low risk vessels from reputable

companies cannot be authenticated as being safe and meeting all policy expectations

through the consideration of their internal policies. Thus, reputable companies may

carry out internal inspections to ensure their business missions are not compromised

while at the same time ignoring a crucial factor in the unmanned inspection. Through

the dedication of time to inspect all vessels, the likely omissions from internally-

commissioned inspections (Gupta, 2010).

From the results, the mean of those strongly agreeing and those agreeing are higher

than the other categories of responses. However, insignificant differences exist between

the views on whether some countries have more restrictions than others while at the

same time serving in the same MoU. Majority of responses indicate that knowledge on

the subject is scarcely dependable to giving any substantial information. However, as

the literature states, MoUs serve as covenants between nations with respect to uniform

59

unbiased application of the memorandums. Thus, member states under any given MoU

should be subscribed to the same MoU policy and also be treated equally across all the

subscribing nations. Therefore, one nation cannot be bound by more restrictions within

the same MoU as another that has fewer. If this was the case, the merit and purpose of

the memorandum would be void. Consequently, the business association between

these nations lead to deteriorating interactions that have the capacity to discredit the

role of the MoUs (Faure, 2006).

Through the use of a stricter MoU, it is observed that it could influence the decision for

vessels to use that port. If strict MoUs are seen to interact well with subscribers, the

restrictions to ensure quality of service and reliability of offered packages, then to the

business platforms, this approach serves as a competing factor. The more reliable a

MoU is; the higher its demand, hence the reason some ports would use it in exchange

of the reputation is creates with the clients. However, for those less strict ports, it is

observed that clients would be sceptical to use the services. Less strict MoUs compel

some ports to avoid them as clients not guaranteed of quality service would also have a

higher bargaining power over the states (Monios, 2014).

Political disagreements between states impact on effective PSC since they are linked

with the business agreements between the nations. Thus, foreseeable disruptions in

politics usually cause a mismanagement hiccup. In addition, distinction the between

vessel type is an effective parameter for assessing risk if management is settled and

functioning without political influence. However, the level of quayside activity influences

the extent of PSC vessel inspection as seen under literature review. However, the

results indicate some of the stakeholders interviewed have not employed or witnessed

any specific reliability improvements on PSC vessel inspection. The role of the

classification societies is to ensure that vessels are well distinguished in white, grey and

black list of flag states as a fair mechanism for distinguishing between vessels of

varying risks. However, the findings show that participants different significantly from

agreeing to disagreeing with the roles of risk ranking.

When responding with respect to expenditure, majority of participants agreed that they

would choose a less strict port with less strict PSC. Additionally, it is observed that

60

participants applauded the roles of PSC vessel inspection as few agreed to having had

their vessels detained unfairly. In addition, the shipping companies that most

correspondents have worked with do not consider detention rates as the fairness in

representation is reliable. Across the industry, a majority of participants are

knowledgeable about the methods used to calculate a shipping company’s PSC

performance. Detention rates by PSCOs with an engineering background are low as

compared to PSCOs with a nautical background – a notion the participating sample

tends to agree with. In recommendation, although PSC is effective in promoting a more

efficient port’s system, participants showed a great interest in requiring a better

harmonization of inspections across countries subscribed to the Paris MoU.

Conclusion

Based on the findings on the role served by the Port State Controls and MoUs adaption

on ports, it is observed that participants argued that PSC requirements and inspections

have sustained a functioning port system. However, results also show that there are

statistically significant but negative associations between participants agreeing and

those disagreeing on the applicability of the PSC and MoUs in the management of

ports. Stricter MoUs, although are not economically influential of the income earned

from port to port, are less preferred although in special occasions serve as competitive

advantage.

61

CHAPTER 66.1 CONCLUSION

In the shipping sector, shipping economics depend on the integration of managerial

roles with the regulating policies. Based on quality of service, the role of the

management is to create and sustain a good business relationship between the

ownership and the consumers. Ship owners are heavy investors especially in the

acquisition of the vessels. Regardless of whether business transactions lead to a break

even and profits, financial security, even for an aged vessel is negotiated in the

management of ships.

. However, in light of Paris MoU and Port State Control, results have shown that most

shippers are prepared to pay more for their commodities to have a secure transportation

without the risk of damage. As a result, choosing to invest with a management firm, the

clients will not only be able to bargain for securer voyages, but the ship owners will

benefit from the flexible packages depending on client demands – these increase the

returns’ value from transactions.

With reference to inspection and inspection approaches, results have shown that PSCs

are reliable in ensuring justice in the flagging or ships. As a result, participants have

associated the role of MoUs and PSCs with better inspection results. In addition,

classification societies are seen to work well with PSCs in the determination of vessel

type, quality, service required, and the overall steps to be taken. The establishment of

the MoU brought significant progress among the being the boosting of regional

cooperation.

This is due to the rapport that was lubricated by the MoU that demanded inter-

neighbouring state cooperation for the collective handling of port activities and

information sharing to boost consequently regional cooperation and development. The

Paris MoU is also found to significantly enhance the authority of the port states to

govern towards environmental conservation while enhancing governance as well.

62

There has been however dissatisfaction between the Paris MoU states regarding the

authority of steering mechanisms. During the development of the steering mechanisms,

there was a division of duties between those states that proposed, negotiated and

decided. The industry itself provided support and expertise to influence the decisions

and the final determination

Under Port State control the Port Control Officer (PSCO) is in charge of inspection of

ships and the annual report in Paris of the MoU declared 74,713 deficiencies during

inspections of 2007. With reference to the results and findings of this study, the role

served by the Port State Controls and MoUs adaption on ports, it is observed that

participants argued that PSC requirements and inspections have sustained a

functioning port system. However, results also show that there are statistically

significant but negative associations between participants agreeing and those

disagreeing on the applicability of the PSC and MoUs in the management of ports.

Stricter MoUs, although are not economically influential of the income earned from port

to port, are less preferred although in special occasions serve as competitive

advantages.

6.2 REFLECTIONThis study was aimed to analyse both the negative and positive aspects of the Paris

Memorandum. The areas being analysed were the main stakeholders, organisations,

small shipping companies, master marines and also chief engineers. However, these

efforts would question the understanding and views behind the decisions made in the

Paris Memorandum. There are many studies that could look at the potential of new

inspection regimes and effects they have on stakeholders. The project also received

less responses than predicted and planned, however a possible reason for this could

have been the time-scale as some businesses were busy and could not provide

responses within the project timescale. One way this project could be developed on

could be to retrieve data from more diverse nations in order to provide a generalisation

of port state regimes around the world and how the Paris Mou fits accordingly

63

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APPENDIX 1 RESULATION 1052-27 PAGE 4A 27/Res.1052Page 4

CHAPTER 1 GENERAL

1.1 PURPOSE

This document is intended to provide basic guidance on the conduct of port State control inspections and afford consistency in the conduct of these inspections, the recognition of deficiencies of a ship, its equipment, or its crew, and the application of control procedures.

1.2 APPLICATION

1.1.1 These Procedures apply to ships falling under the provisions of:

.1 the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended (SOLAS);

.2 the Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS Protocol 1988);

.3 the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 (Load Lines);

.4 the Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 (Load Lines Protocol 1988);

.5 the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocols of 1978 and 1997 relating thereto, as amended (MARPOL);

.6 the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended (STCW);

.7 the International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969

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(Tonnage); and

.8 the International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships (AFS),

hereafter referred to as the applicable conventions.

1.1.2 Ships of non-Parties or below convention size should be given no more favourable treatment (see sections 1.5 and 1.6).

1.1.3 In exercising port State control, Parties should only apply those provisions of the conventions which are in force and which they have accepted.

1.1.4 If a port State exercises port State control based on International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No.147, "Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976", guidance on the conduct of such control inspections is given in the ILO publication "Inspection of Labour Conditions on board Ship: Guidelines for Procedure

70

APPENDIX 2 QUESTIONNAIRE USED OVER PROJECT

Dear sir/madam

I am currently enrolled at Liverpool John Moores University, registered on the BSc degree

programme in Maritime Business and Management and am in the process of writing my

dissertation. A major component of this programme is the completion of a research project in a

related study area. The purpose of the research is to analyse the extent to which the Paris

Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MoU) satisfies the needs of the maritime industry. I am

writing to invite your kind assistance in facilitating the collection of primary data for this study

by completing the accompanying questionnaire.

Your participation in this research project is completely voluntary. You may decline altogether,

or leave blank any questions you don’t wish to answer. The information gathered will be

submitted as part of my dissertation to Liverpool John Moores University. Should you require

your contribution to remain anonymous, please indicate this in the first question. If you agree to

participate in this project, please answer the questionnaire as best you can return the completed

questionnaire to me at the e-mail address below. It should take approximately 5-7 min to

complete.

Please do not hesitate to contact me should you wish to further discuss any aspect of this

research.

Thanking you in anticipation of your support.

Deniz Genoglu (student id :695938)

E-mail :[email protected]

Tel : 07877873967

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SURVEY QUESTIONS REGARDING PSC FAIRNESS AND TARGETING OF VESSELS

For each question please select one option by placing X in the appropriate cell.

Stronglyagree

Agree I am uncertain

Disagree Stronglydisagree

1In PSC (Port State Control) inspection regimes, a target inspection rate should be established

2Targeted inspection rates for ports can be achieved with an adequate number of qualified and experienced PSCO (Port State Control Officers).

3Outcomes of inspections by PSCOs are reliable

4Easy flag (flag of convenience) vessels generally have a greater risk rate than that of other flagged vessels

5Frequent inspections of vessels through PSC will improve ship standards

6Classification Societies should have an increased role in ensuring shipping standards for the purpose of PSC

7Inspections of low risk vessels owned by reputable companies is a waste of time and money

8certain countries and certain ports are stricter than other ports in same MoU’s

9The strictness of PSC enforcement in a port could influence the decision for vessels to use that port

10Some ports use PSC as a tool to enhance their competitive advantage.

11Political disagreements between states impact on effective PSC.

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12Distinction between vessel type is an effective parameter for assessing risk

13The level of quayside activity influences the extent of PSC vessel inspection

14white, grey and black list of flag States is a fair mechanism for distinguishing between vessels of varying risk

15If equal income is to be derived from using two ports my company would choose the port with less strict PSC

16My company’s vessels have experienced unfair PSC detention.

17My shipping company tends to check a port’s detention rates before sending vessels to that port.

18 I am aware of the methods used to calculate a shipping company’s PSC performance

19 The period granted for vessel improvement could be extended beyond the next port of call depending on the type of deficiency

20It is fair that the UK’s target rate is 5% higher than that of the Paris MoU

21 Detention rates by PSCOs with an engineering background are higher than PSCOs with a nautical background.

22There should be better harmonisation of inspections across countries of the Paris MoU.

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APPENDIX 3

74

High Risk Ship (HRS) Low Risk Ship (LRS)

Criteria Weighting Points

Criteria

TypeOil, Chemical, Gas

Bulk, Passenger 2 All types

Age . 12 yrs 1 All ages

Flag

BGW-ListBlack - VHR, HR, M

to HR 2White

Black - MR 1IMO-Audit – – Yes

Recognized OrganizationPerformance

H – – HighM – – –L Low 1 –VL Very Low –

EU recognized – – Yes

Company PerformanceH – – HighM – – –L Low 2 –VL Very Low –

No. of deficiencies. recorded in each inspection within

previous 36 months Deficiencies Not eligible –

≤ 5 (and at least 1 inspection carried out in previous 36 months)

No. of detentions within previous

36 monthsDeficiencies ≥ 2 detentions – No Detention