discussion paper no. 61 · 2019-04-25 · kenya case study analysis discussion paper no. 61 iii...

European Centre for Development Policy ManagementCentre européen de gestion des politiques de développement

Discussion Paper No. 61December 2004

Monitoring and Evaluation of Supportto Decentralisation and LocalGovernance

Kenya Case Study

Betty Maina

Monitoring and Evaluation of Support toDecentralisation and Local Governance

Kenya Case Study

Betty Maina

Prepared for the European Centre for Development Policy Management

Kenya Case Study Analysis Discussion Paper No. 61

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ContentsForeword ivAcronyms vExecutive summary vi

Chapter 1 Introduction 11.1 Background 11.2 Decentralisation, oversight and local accountability 21.3 Objectives, focus and key questions of this paper 3

Chapter 2 Decentralisation in Kenya 42.1 History 42.2 Decentralised development management 72.3 Elected local government 82.4 Provincial administration 102.5 Devolution in the draft constitution 10

Chapter 3 External assistance to decentralisation in Kenya 133.1 EU external actors supporting decentralisation in Kenya 143.2 Support to local government improvement 153.3 Improvements in decentralised service delivery 203.4 Support to democratic community-driven development 20

Chapter 4 Decentralisation, M&E and local accountability in Kenya 224.1 Main approaches to M&E 224.2 Main approaches to promoting local accountability 234.3 Lessons from the current approaches to M&E in Kenya 24

Chapter 5 Conclusion: Options for strengtheningM&E and local accountability systems 275.1 In general 275.2 ACP-EU cooperation 27

Persons interviewed 30

The European Centre forDevelopment Policy ManagementOnze Lieve Vrouweplein 21NL-6211 HE Maastricht, The Netherlands Tel +31 (0)43 350 29 00Fax +31 (0)43 350 29 [email protected] www.ecdpm.org

Discussion Paper No. 61 Kenya Case Study Analysis

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ForewordIn the course of the democratisation and institutionreform efforts of the 1990s, support to democraticdecentralisation and local governance, has become animportant area for European development co-opera-tion.

Decentralisation processes in the Africa have beenattracting support from a variety of European actorsin development co-operation. Alongside bilateral aidagencies, the European Community and NGOs, sub-national and local governments in Europe havebecome increasingly active in supporting democraticdecentralisation and experimentation with newapproaches to local governance.

In the last years, there has been an increasing interestin the performance of development co-operation.However, as seminar reports and publications illus-trate, assessing the effects and impacts of support todecentralisation on development still constitutes aconsiderable operational challenge for aid managersand their partners.

The ECDPM found it worthwhile to have a closer lookat this issue and conducted research on approachesand tools for monitoring and evaluating support todecentralisation.The following paper analyses thepresent practice in Kenya, a country that has engagedrepeatedly in decentralisation efforts and received

support from a number of European donors.The Kenya case study has been prepared by BettyMaina, a Kenyan national and independent consult-ant with a long experience of work in different proj-ects and programmes supporting decentralisationand local governance in Kenya.

This paper forms part of a series of case studiesexploring the approaches and experiences differentactors in development have made with monitoringand evaluating development cooperation in the fieldof decentralisation. With these publications, theECDPM aims to contribute to stimulate discussionand reflection on present practices and scope forinnovation.

The ECDPM is most grateful to the Swedish Ministryof Foreign Affairs, who co-financed this publication.We would also like to thank the all those who havecontributed their time and insights during interviewsand consultations with the author. Last but not least,we would like to express our gratitude to our formercolleague Charlotte Ornemark, who has planned andset up the research in Kenya and freely providedmany valuable comments in the course of theprocess.

Christiane LoquaiProgramme Officer


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ALGAK Association of Local GovernmentAuthorities of Kenya

CBO community-based organisationCDD community-driven developmentCDTF Community Development Trust FundDDC District Development CommitteeDDO District Development OfficerDFID Department for International

DevelopmentDFRD District Focus for Rural DevelopmentDHMB District Health Management BoardsEC European CommissionEU European UnionGIS geographic information systemsGTZ German Agency for Technical CooperationHWM Household Welfare MonitoringIFAD International Fund for Agricultural

DevelopmentITDG Intermediate Technology Development

GroupKADU Kenya African Democratic UnionKANU Kenya African National UnionKLRG Kenya Local Government Reform

Programme

LA local authorityLASDAP Local Authority Service Delivery Action

PlanLATF Local Authority Transfer FundLUO Local Urban ObservatoryM&E monitoring and evaluationMoLG Ministry of Local GovernmentNGO non-governmental organisationsNUPP Nairobi Urban Poverty ProjectPAMNUP Partnership Approach to Meeting the

Needs of the Urban PoorPRCF Poverty Reduction Co-Financing FundPROLOGS Poverty Reduction through Optimising

Local Governance SystemsSIDA Swedish International Development

AgencyUN-HABITAT United Nations Programme on Human

SettlementsVDC village development committee

Acronyms


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Executive summary In Kenya, as in much of the developing world, movestowards democratisation and participation have beenaccompanied by popular demand for decentralisationand attendant power sharing between the centre andsub-units. This recently culminated in proposals forfull devolution to the district level and to two otherlevels - the regions and locations - as set out in thedraft constitution now under discussion in Kenya'sparliament.

This is not the first time that Kenya faces decisionson decentralisation. The country attained independ-ence with a quasi-federal constitution that devolvedpower and responsibility to the regions (the present-day provinces). This system did not develop to fullmaturity, however, as the independence constitutionwas abrogated within three years of the nation'sbirth. Civil servants and other central governmentbureaucrats frustrated the provisions that wouldhave ensured more decision making at the lower lev-els. However these same civil servants understoodthe benefit of local decision making and the need forservices to respond to local needs. They thereforeundertook initiatives to promote local participation indevelopment, alongside their efforts to reduce localpolitical decision making. De-concentration of servicedelivery was a main means of promoting participa-tion, with systems for public service delivery staffedby central and provincial government servantsaccountable to line ministries in the capital.

External development partners and the local commu-nities involved with these systems have routinelybeen frustrated by the unresponsiveness of decisionsmade to local needs. They call for revision of thisapproach to reflect more democratic control at thelocal level. However, these calls have not yet led tothe development of alternative frameworks. Instead,in furtherance of the move towards democratisationand calls for political decentralisation, the govern-ment, external partners, NGOs and communitygroups have promoted approaches that wouldenhance participation and local accountability. Thesehave been undertaken in parallel with reformsintended to revamp the local government system. Allof these innovations can be seen as incremental stepstowards harmonised decentralisation in Kenya.

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is critical for draw-ing lessons on deepening democracy in Kenya. Areview of the approaches used for M&E in these pro-grammes reveals that much information is collectedin monitoring exercises and then transmitted to cen-tral government offices and to programme sponsorsfor review. Yet there is little analysis and use of theinformation at the local level for decision making.Neither do central government civil servants system-atically utilise information for learning and designpurposes. Rather, they seem to treat such informationas a "conditionality" for extending more support.However, there are also examples where communi-ties have acted on the findings of a monitoring exer-cise or where monitoring has spurred community ini-tiatives, e.g. among local neighbourhood associations.Nonetheless, it is clear that no nationwide process orapproach to utilise M&E results "on the ground" hasas yet developed.

Decentralisation ought to result in a stronger localgovernment responsive to the needs of an active citi-zenry. However, since Kenya does not yet have a com-prehensive decentralisation plan or policy, decentrali-sation initiatives in the country vary. Communitieshave achieved many positive development outcomes,particularly given the weak local government system.But external agencies that support government(mainly through sectoral initiatives) as well as otherforms of delivery (e.g. community developmentthrough social funds) have inadvertently contributedto further weakening of local government. Often theinstitutions of community participation that are sup-ported are not rooted in any legal structures andtherefore are quite insecure.

For greater benefits and development of democracy,it would be useful if further support to decentralisa-tion in Kenya were anchored in the development ofdemocratic local government. To promote accounta-bility, M&E systems must be designed capable of pro-viding actors at the local level - both ordinary citizensand elected representatives - with feedback for deci-sion making and claim making.

Experience gained from initiatives over the past 30years provide a rich fabric from which lessons can bederived to build a robust decentralisation framework


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nested in comprehensive public sector reform inKenya. The lessons enumerated in this report relatemainly to the following:

• the need for an unambiguous policy framework tosupport and build on;

• the importance of trial-and-error and learning by doing approaches;

• the need for donors, NGOs and governments to commit to programmes that build habits and institutions that support democratic decentralisation;

• the need to support rather than bypass localgovernments;

• the need for caution in promoting participation,since local voice may be captured by elites or special interests;

• the need for vigilance in sector-wide programmesto avoid shoring up decision making at the centreat the expense of the locations.


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Introduction 1.1 Background

Throughout much of Africa and the ACP there is pop-ular demand for power sharing between the centreand sub-units in the national territorial system. Thisis reflected in proposals for decentralisation and inthe development of sub-national units with a degreeof autonomy. The move towards decentralisation isalso linked to the current democratisation move-ment, which is concerned with bringing governmentcloser to the people governed so that they can influ-ence the manner in which decisions affecting themare made.

Democratic decentralisation can be defined as a meaningful authority devolved to local units of governance that are accessible and accountable tothe local citizenry, who enjoy full political rights and liberty. It thus differs from the vast majority ofearlier efforts at decentralisation … which were largely initiatives in public administration withoutany serious democratic component (Blair 2000: 21,cited in Johnson 2001: 4).

In the 1990s, Kenya witnessed a growing linkbetween the external support it received anddemands for greater democratisation and obser-vance of human rights. Development assistance wasextended to civil society organisations and to groupsthat sought to expand democratic space. In recentyears, this has been accompanied by supporttowards greater local autonomy, decentralised serv-ice delivery and promotion of decentralisation in thecountry. Kenya currently employs several approachesto local service delivery: through the local authoritysystems, by de-concentration of central governmentfunctions to lower levels via line ministries, andthrough a system that extends direct oversight bythe executive (in this case the presidency) in parallelwith the supervision/coordination provided by theprovincial administration (a carry over from colonialtimes). However, the government has not yet put inplace a legal and institutional framework for har-monised decentralisation. Programmes that have theimplicit goal of promoting decentralisation are there-fore often stand-alone initiatives, and many are quiterecent.

Decentralisation is a complex process that in manyrespects must be guided by a "learning by doing"approach. There is no clear-cut anticipated path forits evolution or for the responses of the societies andstakeholders involved. Hence there is a need todevelop and work with systems that promote learn-ing and can respond quickly. Robust methodologiesare called for, both for monitoring and evaluation(M&E) and for the attendant analysis and re-designof programmes to respond to any changes required.

Systematic collection of information, analysis andreporting of results therefore appear critical to thedecentralisation process. M&E is needed at the locallevel to inform residents and encourage public par-ticipation. At the central level M&E is needed tomonitor and supervise local activities and to provideinformation for policy development and other insti-tutional responses. M&E is particularly relevant in acontext of trial and error and stand-alone initiativesundertaken by disparate actors.

Types of decentralisation

Political decentralisation: Giving citizens andelected representatives more power in decisionmaking.

Administrative decentralisation: Distribution ofauthority, responsibility and financial resourcesfor the provision of services among different lev-els of government. Responsibility for planningand financial management of some governmentfunctions is transferred from the central level tothe local level. Administrative decentralisationhas three main forms, namely de-concentration,delegation and devolution.

Fiscal decentralisation: Transfer of authority fortaxation and expenditure to sub-national organ-isations. Different forms include self-financing,co-financing or co-production arrangements,expansion of locally collected taxes and levies,intergovernmental transfers of tax revenuesfrom the central government, and authority forlocal government to borrow and mobilisere-sources through loans and guarantees.

Kenya is in the process of developing a new legalframework for decentralisation. The call for devolu-tion is in fact a key feature of the draft constitutionthat emerged from the National ConstitutionalConference concluded in March 2004. While devolu-tion remains a contentious issue among the mainpolitical parties, particularly with regard to the specif-ic responsibilities and revenue control to be assumedby the devolved units, there is no doubt that Kenyawill establish a national framework for decentralisa-tion. Experiences from the recent past are thereforequite useful for informing the design and institution-al set-up of decentralisation in the country.

A discussion of current approaches to M&E of exter-nal assistance to decentralisation and promotion oflocal accountability is therefore timely. Now, as in thepast, Kenya receives support for increased decentrali-sation. Both government and external donors andtheir partners within Kenya require an understandingof the impact of their support, to enable them tochannel assistance to promote local accountabilityand learning within the institutions and at the levelsthat are key to deepening decentralisation.

1.2 Decentralisation, oversight and local accountability

The improvement of local governance in terms ofefficiency, effectiveness and accountability is increas-ingly recognised as a primary vehicle for influencinggovernance at all levels: central, regional and interna-tional. This also extends to civil society and the pri-vate sector. Local governance is argued to provide adirect mechanism for people to participate in govern-ment, forming a framework that enables the inter-ests of communities to be represented in decision-making structures. Scholars argue that improvementof governance at the local level is the most effectivemeans of building this relationship, enabling humanand financial resources to be directly and effectivelymobilised in support of improved governance at alllevels.

To this end, many governments and cooperationagencies have devoted resources to decentralisation.The anticipation is that decentralisation will lead toimprovements in service delivery and local accounta-bility. These improvements are foreseen to emergefrom the implementation of programmes in a man-ner responsive to local needs in terms of relevance,

innovation and cost. Such programmes are expectedto leverage local knowledge and, through regularelections and other avenues of participation, remaintrue and responsive to local priorities.

Definition of termsDifferent agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, Habitat, SIDA,DFID, etc.) have developed various definitions forterms used in this paper. From a review of their defi-nitions, composite definitions have been developed.

Monitoring. The purpose of monitoring is to system-atically assess performance and progress in theimplementation of programmes and interventions.Information from monitoring provides the basis fordecisions made during the life of a project or intervention. In this case, monitoring supports immediate decision-making needs and becomes a tool for learning.

Monitoring tools in frequent use are regular progressreports (monthly, quarterly, biannual or annual, base-line, end-of-project reports and others), field visits(often to validate reports) and engagement with pro-gramme partners (e.g. in focus groups or stakeholdermeetings and in participatory M&E).

Evaluation. The purpose of evaluation is to get infor-mation that would lead to conclusions on whetherobjectives have been attained. Evaluation is key toensuring accountability, as it confirms the credibilityof results and validates monitoring reports.Independent actors usually conduct evaluations,which are usually planned for the end of a pro-gramme or halfway through it (the mid-term evalua-tion). Emphasis in evaluation is on reaching judge-ments regarding performance of programmes (and inlaying a relationship with intended outcomes andtargets set at the inception of the programme) aswell as on programme management and administra-tion.

While monitoring focuses on programme implemen-tation, evaluation focuses on outcomes, results, effectsand impacts of interventions. The two together, usu-ally referred to as M&E, provide a critical learning toolfor those who design and implement programmes.

Accountability. A dictionary definition of accountableis (adjective) 'responsible to someone or for someaction' (Binkerhoff 2001: 2). "Accountability" is thenoun form of this adjective. In typical usage account-


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ability refers to answerability; being accountablemeans having the obligation to answer questionsregarding decisions and actions. This has two dimen-sions: provision of information and provision ofexplanations and justification for actions (ibid.).Accountability carries the implicit assumption ofsanctions that could be imposed by those accountedto, that is, the ability of an overseeing actor to imposepunishment on the accountable actor. Such sanctionsare specified in codified instruments such as laws andregulations (ibid.).

The location of overseeing actors in a particular gov-ernance system is key to accountability. Overseeingactors could be within the state system that is repre-sented by the classical separation of powers andinclude entities that have responsibility for oversightover other state agencies. They may also be locatedoutside the state but nonetheless play a key role inholding state actors accountable, e.g. through period-ic elections, media reports and claim-making forums.

Local accountability. The term "local accountability"has gained currency in recent years along with dis-cussions around where accountability should belocated. Institutions and actors in close proximity tothe accountable actors are said to be best placed tooversee the accountable actors. Therefore, in the caseof public service delivery, local state institutionsshould exercise oversight over performance andreceive responses from those who are answerable(horizontal accountability). Similarly, local consumersof public services should exercise oversight over serv-ice delivery and hold state institutions accountable.

Decentralisation and promotion of local accountability As stated earlier there is popular demand for decen-tralisation in much of Africa and the ACP. The movetowards decentralisation is linked to the democratisa-tion movement, a movement concerned with bring-ing decision-makers under effective popular controlof the people they govern as a way of influencing themanner in which the leaders make decisions affect-ing the people.

Advocates contend that decentralisation is one wayto foster local accountability. Devolution of formalpolitical authority, they maintain, can enhance trans-parency, responsiveness and accountability at thelower levels of government. These advocates arguethat devolved authorities have a better understand-ing of the views and needs of local people and that

periodic elections ensure government responsivenessand accountability. Devolution is said to result in poli-cies, programmes and, more importantly, publicexpenditure decisions that respond to the needs ofthe intended beneficiaries.

Nonetheless, several conditions must be met fordecentralisation to be effective in fostering govern-ment effectiveness and accountability:

• Elected bodies must have adequate funds.• Elected bodies must have adequate powers.• There must be reliable mechanisms to ensure

accountability of elected representatives to citizens and of bureaucrats to elected representa-tives (Manor 1999, cited in Johnson 2001: p. 10).

This implies a system in which elected local represen-tatives have authority to raise and spend resources atthe local level. Citizens pay taxes and hence maintainvigilance over the elected representatives and holdthe threat of the vote. However, this fails to take suf-ficient note of the character of policymaking and theinfluence of interest groups. Some public expendituredecisions do not reflect the strength of the benefici-ary constituency in terms of votes.

1.3 Objective, focus and key questions of this paper

This paper contributes to the ongoing debate onmethods and current practice of M&E in support ofdecentralisation in Kenya. At the same time, it con-tributes to the more general discussion regardingpractice in the M&E field. Chapter 2 provides anoverview of the changing Kenyan context for externalsupport to decentralisation, drawing on experiencesfrom the past. Chapter 3 then reviews current donorpractice in M&E of programmes related to decentrali-sation and local governance initiatives. The subse-quent chapter identifies the main approaches toM&E and to promote local accountability and drawssome lessons from these. A final chapter presentsoptions for strengthening M&E and local accountabil-ity systems and provides input to the debate on ACP-EU cooperation in the field of decentralisation andlocal governance.

A literature review and interviews with key inform-ants provided the main information sources for thispaper. Decentralisation in Kenya is still evolving, and


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the country's history of decentralisation is unique.There is thus quite a body of literature on Kenya'sexperiences and recent steps to restore more politicaldecentralisation and promote local accountabilityand participation. The key informants interviewedrepresent both the government and their externalsupport agencies and civil society agencies that havesupported decentralised service delivery and the localgovernment system. A list of persons interviewed isprovided at the end of the report.

During the past few years, Kenya has engaged in aparticipatory process of constitution making. Duringthis period the author was involved in public debatesin which devolution was one of the subjects thatoccupied much attention. These public forums alsoserved as an information source.

The period of this study coincides with the LocalAuthority Service Delivery Action Plan cycle. This plan-ning cycle is a promising development that seeks tolink residents and their elected representatives in cre-ative relationships towards better and more account-able service delivery. The author attended two suchplanning meetings and was able to discuss with resi-dents and civic leaders their views on the process.

2. Decentralisation in Kenya

The Government of Kenya has long maintained arhetorical commitment to decentralisation. The coun-try attained independence with a constitution1 thatemphasised a devolved system of government. Beforeindependence local governments were quite strong,providing a range of important services such as edu-cation, health, roads, water and housing. Howeverthis changed drastically over the next decade, withlocal authorities losing most of their functions andattendant sources of revenue through re-centralisa-tion. This has since been replaced by "de-concentra-tion" of central government functions. Ministry repre-sentatives have established a presence at the lowerlevels of provinces, districts, divisions and locations.These local ministry outposts run in parallel with theprovincial governments, which though their mandateis administrative, are often a key player in coordinat-ing local level activities.

2.1 History

In the run up to independence the matter of localgovernment became a key bone of contention, partlybecause Kenya's pre-colonial inheritance was one ofstrong localism. It is from this strong tradition, rein-forced by vibrant local authorities with responsibilityfor a range of services, that the tradition of decen-tralised power grew. The colonial administrationencouraged the formation of political associationsalong regional-ethnic lines, thereby rendering nation-alist political movements organisationally weak. Thecolonialists forbade nascent political parties fromorganising nationwide, confining such organisationto provinces instead.

Moreover and more importantly, tribal interestsbased upon land and prospects for future economicposition created a polarity in the nationalist move-ment between smaller tribes and the bigger ones.The Luo and Kikuyu, whether in or out of power, haveparticularly dominated political debates in Kenya. Thealignment of tribal and economic interests eventuallyled the nationalist movement to split into the KenyaAfrican Democratic Union (KADU), which broughttogether many of the "small tribes", and the KenyaAfrican National Union (KANU), which broughttogether the two "large tribes" (the Luo and Kikuyu).


Notes1 Usually referred to as the Majimbo constitution, which was

a result of negotiations among the nationalist forces beforeindependence. The colonialist provided logistical support tothe negotiators in London.

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KADU demanded a quasi-federal division of power,with strong local government that would leave anAfrican majority government (controlled by the largetribes) less omnipotent than its colonial predecessor.This demand was driven principally by the desire toreduce the control of Kenya's larger ethnic groups.

Negotiations of these parties with the British govern-ment produced a quasi-federal constitution, the so-called Majimbo constitution, that gave significantpowers to elected regional assemblies. Elected localauthorities (councils), with their own local civil ser-vants and bureaucrats, were to deliver most publicservices, such as education and health. But full imple-mentation of the Majimbo constitution was derailedsoon after independence. The winner of the first elec-tion, KANU, had never shown any sincere commitmentto it and had accepted proposals within the constitu-tion only so as not to delay independence. There wasalso insufficient support for it among the populaceand leaders of the opposition party. After the electionsKADU leaders dissolved their party - which had been astrong proponent of devolved government - and tookup cabinet positions in a new "unity" government.

The colonial system of government had been quitecentralised. The decentralised political structure thatthe Majimbo constitution aimed to put in place wasthus one that Kenyans had not been exposed tothroughout the colonial period. Besides the apparentlukewarm commitment by political proponents, per-haps the deadliest blow to this constitution camefrom the civil service. Central government officialsresisted the implementation of the constitution anddid little to hide their contempt for "decision makingfrom below". The central civil service bureaucracy suc-cessfully maintained a stranglehold on regional devel-opment planning and obstructed the transfer of func-tions. The most telling evidence in this respect wasthe central government's procrastination in devolvingfinancial powers to the regions as provided for in theconstitution. In some cases it even deliberately starvedKADU regional strongholds of development funding.

The Majimbo constitution itself was replete withambiguities, giving central government civil servantsleeway to interpret it as they pleased. For instance,provisions were quite vague about the extent andpurpose of federalism, procedures for participationand the roles of officials at various administrative lev-els. This was in addition to the unwillingness of cen-tral ministries to provide technical and managerialassistance to local government units.

Moreover, while much of the rhetoric accompanyingMajimbo implied that the government was seeking topromote widespread participation, the policy imple-mented created new arrangements for the centralbureaucracy to control local affairs. Inadvertently too,the multiple levels of review and approval throughwhich local plans had to pass created delays that dis-couraged enthusiastic participation by citizens. Thisreinforced the bureaucracy's power to veto or modifyproposals and created uncertainty and perplexityamong rural peoples.

The eight regional governments were abolished in1966. Nonetheless, Kenya maintained a system of localgovernment operational at the district level and inurban centres, albeit made much weaker by the cen-tralisation of functions and revenue control. Table 1presents a chronology of events around decentralisa-tion in Kenya. Attempts in 1967 to strengthen theselocal authorities, to mitigate against the effects andcriticism of abrogation of the Majimbo constitution,had little chance to take root as centralisation wasaccomplished through the Transfer of Functions Act in1969, by which major services such as primary educa-tion, health and road maintenance, were transferredback to the central government. This same Act alsotransferred the Graduated Personal Tax (GPT), themajor source of revenue for local government, to thecentral government.

Over time other provisions introduced through circu-lars and directives further weakened local authorities.At one point local authorities were expected to handover significant revenue sources, e.g. the crop cess, tothe district administration. Also, in the past councillorshad been part-time - ordinary citizens serving in localgovernment. Amendments to the Act required coun-cillors to be full-time, which lessened the calibre ofindividuals attracted to the job. In fact, one of themain criticisms levelled against councils is the medi-ocrity of its cadre of councillors!

Although devolution objectives in the constitutionhad been repealed by the mid-sixties, the governmentremained committed to some form of decentralisa-tion, albeit not political. It maintained policy formula-tion and oversight at the centre but attempted to de-concentrate service delivery. In practice this resulted incentral government service providers controlled andfunded directly from Nairobi working side by sidewith elected local governments starved of resources.


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Time Event

1895 Establishment of the East African Protectorate of which Kenya was part.Establishment of the East African Protectorate ofwhich Kenya was part.

1902 Passing of Village Headmen Ordinance guiding establishment of local government. Provincial administration providedpower to appoint "headmen" responsible for a village or groups of villages. Duties were mainly maintenance of law andorder and assistance in collection of taxes and rural road maintenance.

1920s The Local Authority Ordinance enacted in 1921 and the Native Authority Ordinance of 1924 saw local native councils intro-duced. These were local political forums and the first institutions that enabled Africans to sit on colonial governmentcouncils. They were not independent however. They were controlled by colonial officers, who were ex officio members andwho appointed the native representative on the council, in addition to missionaries and European residents.

1937 Amendment to Native Authority Ordinance provided for election of councillors by the people.

1950 The Local Government Ordinance replaced the Native Authority Ordinance and established African District Councils (forAfrican dominated areas). Europeans had their own councils. Elections were held in 1958. They could not be held earlierbecause of the state of emergency declared from 1952 to 1957.

1961-1962

Sessional Paper2 No. 2 of 1961 on reconstitution of local authorities (following mergers of European and African governedareas) was followed by the publication of a local government bill and local government regulations in 1962. Local govern-ment operated on the basis of the 1962 law and regulations until 1977 when they were replaced by the Local GovernmentAct, Chapter 265 of the Laws of Kenya.

1963 African District Councils merged with European areas to form county councils.

1963 Independence under the Majimbo constitution. Emphasis on strong regional government responsible for service deliveryand revenue mobilisation. The constitution provided for elected regional assemblies and governments. Kenya was dividedinto Nairobi and seven regions. The constitution also provided for local governments within the regions designated aseither county or municipal councils. Regional government had oversight over local governments in their area.

1964 KADU (the party that had won votes on a regionalism mandate) dissolved itself and its leaders accepted cabinet posts.This enabled KANU, the ruling party, to change the constitutions with minimum resistance.

1963-1965

Regionalism was dismantled through constitutional amendments, including repeal of regions' power to levy taxes andraise own revenues, abolition of concurrent functions and transfer or supervision of local authorities from regional assem-blies to parliament. Other amendments redesignated elected regional "presidents" as simply "chairmen". The Ministry forFinance bypassed the regional finance and establishment committees and dealt with appointed executive officers. Regionsbecame dependent on grants from the centre. Other provisions renamed the regions as "provinces", a colonial term thatwas used to distinguish between different administrative areas. Other amendments extinguished the regions' exclusivelegislative and executive powers.

1965 Publication of Sessional Paper No. 10 "African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya". In this the governmentexpressed commitment to decentralised planning.

From1966

Application of decentralised development management as embodied in the Special Rural Development Programme, for-mation of regional development authorities from the early seventies.

1969 Transfer of Functions Act passed. Several major services, including primary education, health and road maintenance weretransferred back to the central government. The Graduated Personal Tax (poll tax) collections were passed from local tocentral government. The GPT was eventually repealed.

1977 Enactment of the Local Government Act embracing the regulations of 1962.

1983 Adoption of the "district focus for rural development" strategy to improve coordination of district level development activities.

1995 Revision of the district focus strategy to embrace participation and a focus on poverty reduction.

2002 Conference on amendments to the Local Government Act, Chapter 265. Amendments not yet presented to parliamentbecause of ongoing constitutional reform.

2004 After 10 months of deliberations, the National Constitutional Conference in March adopted a draft constitution that con-tains provisions for extensive devolution. This must now be enacted by parliament. However, disagreements in the rulingcoalition have ensued regarding provisions on executive power and devolution.

Table 1. Chronology of decentralisation in Kenya

Notes2 Policy paper issued by government to guide policy

developments. Similar to a White Paper.

2.2 Decentralised development management

Several initiatives, which continue today, bear testi-mony to the Kenyan government's interest in andcommitment to some form of administrative decen-tralisation since independence. Yet even today thegovernment and civil service appear disinclined topursue full-scale decentralisation. The government'sforemost strategy statement on economic develop-ment, Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, emphasises theimportance of decentralised planning and extendsplanning functions to the provinces, districts andmunicipalities to ensure that progress towards devel-opment is made in each administrative unit.

Having successfully thwarted the Majimbo constitu-tion (both politically and bureaucratically) the post-independence government moved quickly to show itscontinued commitment to local planning and devel-opment management by more subtle schemes, suchas the establishment of development committees atthe district and provincial levels. These committeeswere to facilitate, among others, coordination ofdevelopment activities and provide assistance in deci-sion making (Republic of Kenya 1966).Decentralisation of development managementreached its apogee at this time with the promulga-tion of the Special Rural Development Programme(SRDP).

Under this programme decisions regarding projectidentification and implementation were to be locallymade with central government ministries playingadvisory roles. Divisional development committeeswere created to support district development com-mittees. Central government used these structures toexert greater control over district affairs. Indeed, ithas even been suggested that the greatest achieve-ment of this rural development programme was toprecipitate the decision to move to district level plan-ning which 14 years later came to be known as theDistrict Focus for Rural Development strategy.

In addition to the SRDP, the government establishedregional authorities in the mid-seventies that coveredKenya's river basins and were to serve as an avenue

for development planning at multi-district levels.Conceived in the tradition of the Tennessee ValleyAuthority of the United States, these authorities wereexpected to promote coordination of activities withinriver basins. Activities included hydroelectric powergeneration and the management of dam siltation.The District Focus for Rural Development strategyadopted in 1983 was another attempt to improvecoordination of development activities and servicesat the district level. Though much discredited withinKenya by scholars, civil society and political leaders(usually those critical of government), this strategyremains the key approach to planning and imple-menting development activities by most governmentinstitutions. The main objectives of the strategy arefour:• shifting responsibility for development planning

and implementation from headquarters tothe districts;

• shifting qualified personnel from governmentdepartments to the districts;

• institutionalising district planning, including budgeting, in each district;

• establishing a nationwide responsive delivery mechanism made up of various developmentcommittees from the sub-locations.

Responsibility for "multi-district" planning andnational programmes was to be placed in the handsof the head ministries, while responsibility for theoperational aspects of the district-specific rural devel-opment projects was to be delegated to the district.Activities of local authorities and non-state actorswere to be integrated into district programmes. Forthis, these local actors were invited to join DistrictDevelopment Committees (DDCs), which formed thecornerstone of the new strategy. Membership of theDDC was to include a district commissioner (DC) aschairperson, a district development officer (DDO),heads of ministerial departments, area members ofparliament, the chairperson of local authorities andofficials of KANU (the then-ruling party).3

In theory therefore, the District Focus for RuralDevelopment was a strategy for decentralised devel-opment planning and coordination, project imple-mentation, management, procurement of goods andservices, management of personnel and provision ofinformation. Local citizens were to be involved inproject identification, design, implementation andmanagement. Most importantly, resources were to beshared more equitably by directing them to the most


7

Notes3 The district commissioner is a presidential appointee with

oversight over a single district. The commissioner is thusessentially a representative of the president - a more or lessunelected sheriff who oversees all matters - thoughprincipally interested in security. The district developmentofficer is an employee of the Ministry of Planning and hasoversight over development coordination in the district.Other ministries, e.g. agriculture, health and education,would also have a district head, e.g. the district healthofficer and the district education officer. The DDC also co-opted representatives of parastatals - government-ownedcompanies and institutions undertaking development workin the district (e.g. the regional development authorities).


8

needy areas (Republic of Kenya 1983). Thus in theorythe programme offered a strong measure of partici-patory development.

In practice, however, as with most decentralisationschemes in Africa, and all of Kenya's previous effortsin this regard, since the strategy was state sponsored,it was by definition, an integral part of state politics.This naturally affected the way it was implemented.Its implementation hiccups reflect the challenges toeffective decentralisation in Kenya.

Though the DDCs were meant to harmonise plansand proposals from committees at subordinateadministrative levels, these subordinate committeeswere in fact not established in many places.Divisional officers, chiefs and sub-chiefs hold develop-ment meetings infrequently, if at all. Where suchmeetings are held, priorities reflect the wishes of thelocal elite and supporters of public officials.Furthermore, ordinary members of the subordinatecommittees have no means of checking that propos-als and plans are actually forwarded for DDCapproval.

Neither have mechanisms for consulting local citizensbeen institutionalised or regularised. Politicians oftenoutsource projects or raise funds for developmentplans that they themselves have conceived. Thoughthey may have local input (often from their con-stituents), they are not subject to oversight by theDDC. Indeed, overwhelming evidence from observa-tions in the country suggests that the more seniorthe local politicians are in the national hierarchy, themore local development institutions and initiativesare subject to their will as part of their patronagenetwork. Many community projects are sponsoreddirectly by senior politicians; some even carry theirnames. This has extended to the bizarre level whereprojects are abandoned or left incomplete when thesponsoring member of parliament loses the seat, thewinners preferring instead to develop their own proj-ects.

Hence whereas the DDCs were supposed to beorgans of popular participation, senior politicianshave become key to what they do or do not achieve.Senior civil servants are also often drawn into thepatronage networks of senior politicians. Senior civilservants often accompany politicians on communityvisits or fund raisers. During the days of KANU (theformer ruling party), presidential functions attracted

the most senior civil servants, despite the politicalnature of these appointments (e.g. party meetings orrecruitment).

As a strategy for decentralised development manage-ment, the District Focus for Rural Developmentapproach has not met its formal objective of democ-ratising local development. The structures set in placedo not promote meaningful citizen participation anddo not empower local people since citizens have noway of sanctioning the DDC, which is made up mostlyof central government-appointed civil servants.

2.3 Elected local government

The main legal framework governing decentralisationtoday is contained in the national constitution andthe Local Government Act, Chapter 265, of the Lawsof Kenya enacted in 1977. Furthermore, the currentLocal Government Act and Kenya's system of localauthorities trace many of their features from colonialtimes as well as from the local government regula-tions of 1963.

The Local Government Act confers the Minister forLocal Government powers over the life and death oflocal authorities. In principle, the minister can create,amalgamate or alter the territorial limits of localauthorities. The minister can dissolve an insolventlocal authority or elevate the status of such anauthority. Further, the Local Government Act empow-ers the minister to control the composition of thelocal authorities and make rules to guide local gov-ernment elections. In particular, it is the minister whodetermines the number of councillors elected to eachlocal authority and the minister also determines eligi-bility to vote or to contest in the local governmentelections. In effect, the minister exercises more con-trol over recruitment to local government councilsthan do local residents. The minister also appointschief officers of local authorities and controls localauthorities' financial affairs, as well as enjoying awide range of administrative powers, such as makingrules on the implementation of the Act and opera-tions of councils generally.

This diminishes the role of local authorities as institu-tions of popular local participation. Councils are notautonomous. Proposals for more autonomous localgovernment and devolution in Kenya reflect concernsand frustrations brought about by weak structures of


9

"local accountability". It also reveals local frustrationwith decentralised development management as rep-resented by the District Focus for Rural Developmentstrategy, which emphasises de-concentration of cen-tral government service delivery.

The limited scope for policymaking and financial deci-sion making has reduced local government's appealfor ambitious individuals. Many councils consist ofindividuals without great academic or entrepreneurialachievement. The limited space for autonomy reducestheir scope for innovative action that responds to theelectorate and instead seems to breed self-centred-ness. Local councils in Kenya are usually characterisedby indebtedness arising from bad spending decisions(usually over-employment at the lower cadres to satis-fy councillors' need to reward electorates), disposal ofcouncil property (land and buildings) to themselvesand little regard for public service.

As noted here, the concept and practice of local gov-ernment originates from a desire to see the citizensof a locality participating in decision making on localaffairs. Central government is too far removed andfew other effective mechanisms of accountabilityexist, e.g. independent audits, parliament and thejudiciary. The intention is that local governmentswould play a foremost role in local development.Specifically, they are expected to provide basic servic-es to residents and serve as avenues for popular rep-resentation and local self-rule. How has the LocalGovernment Act facilitated or hindered this?

The Local Government Act, first, ensures that everycitizen of Kenya (and every inch of Kenyan soil) fallswithin the purview of a local government authority.Secondly, the Act provides for citizens to participatein electing councillors in all local authorities everyfive years. Once elected, councillors constitute anelectoral college, whereupon they elect a mayor anddeputy mayor (in the case of the city council ofNairobi and all other municipal councils) or a chair-person and vice chairperson (in the case of countyand township councils). Additional councillors areappointed to the local councils by various politicalparties depending on the parties' respective numeri-cal strength in council elections nationwide.4

Although citizens participate directly in electing theircouncillors, the performance of local governmentauthorities as an instrument for facilitating popularparticipation in local governance, development and

service provision is abysmal. This is partly due to thelack of clear provisions regularising public participa-tion in the Local Government Act. As a result, publicparticipation in local authorities has been largelysuperficial, irregular and ad hoc. The councillors, whoare the key channel through which citizens expresstheir desires and grievances with respect to develop-ment and service provision, are often unavailable andthere is no formal institutionalised space for theexchange of views and provision of feedback to theelectorate. Councillors are usually local people. Butdespite the geographic proximity, few councils haveinstituted public forums for the interaction with theelectorate. Councillors hardly convene public meet-ings, preferring instead to address meetings called byother local leaders, notably by the chiefs and parlia-mentary representatives.

Early on the local councillors were drawn fromamong professionals and the business elite and theyserved on a part-time basis. However, as mentionedearlier, the administrative changes introduced in themid-seventies required councillors to devote full-timeattention to council work - despite the meagre remu-neration provided. As a result, those successful inother occupations no longer offered their time forcouncil work. The councils began to attract personali-ties who viewed representation as a livelihood ratherthan a calling. Many of these individuals are moreinterested in meeting personal economic objectivesthan in becoming conversant with the operations ofgovernment (local and national), its responsibilities,rules and procedures. The ability of councillors toarticulate the needs of the people they represent wasthus severely curtailed. Indeed, many chief officers -who themselves are usually professional civil ser-vants or former mayors - complain about the calibreof the councillors. In the course of this study one rec-ommendation made by a former mayor pertained tothe need for councillors to have basic academic cre-dentials. This is, needless to say, unpopular amongaspirants to the office!

Their weakness has diminished the councils' potentialas effective local representative institutions providinga strong base for organising local development andpolitical discourse. This has helped tilt centre-localpower relations hugely in favour of parliament.

But the councillors do not shoulder the whole blamefor the low level of popular participation in local gov-ernment. Ideally, the Local Government Act ought to

Notes4 These councillors do not represent electoral wards, but are

nominated by parties in positions originally established tocater for special interests and under-represented groups,but which have since been abused to reward supporters and(usually local mobilisers for) national-level politicians.


10

have been the legislation that resolved the powerbalance between the central government, the localauthorities and the client (citizens). By its very nature,however, the Act fails to provide an effective linkbetween local people and national-level politicalinstitutions, such as political parties and parliament.The Local Government Act not only lacks provisionsthat would enable citizens to hold councillors toaccount, it also confers enormous supervisory andexecutive powers over local authorities to the minis-ter responsible for local government. As a result, localauthorities have increasingly assumed the characterof appendages of the central government, ratherthan institutions fed by and facilitating local partici-pation. Indeed, the Minister for Local Government isthe only member of cabinet with executive functions.Every "important" decision made by local authoritiesmust be approved by this minister.

All of these provisions mean that the councils are notautonomous but are subject to central control.Unsurprisingly, residents and other stakeholders havepreferred to make their contributions and claimsdirectly to the Ministry for Local Government.

Slight changes have been made to these practices inthe recent past, as exemplified by the requirement forlocal participation in development of Local AuthorityService Delivery Plans (LASDAPs), which are a precondi-tion for local authorities to receive a block grant fromthe central government under the Local AuthorityTransfer Fund (LATF)5. However, requirements for localparticipation are not yet automatic, being currentlyassociated only with LASDAP processes.

2.4 Provincial administration

Administratively, a powerful parallel appointive gov-ernment exists in the form of the provincial adminis-trators who wield more authority than elected offi-cials. No legal framework establishes and governs theprovincial administration except with respect to itslowest ranks (chiefs and the administration police).The provincial administration is an important actor indevelopment: NGOs and bilateral programmes oper-ating in the rural areas, for example, are required toregister with the district commissioner.6

Thus through the provincial administration, the cen-tral executive is able to exercise invasive powers ofcontrol down to the local level. In this regard the

provincial administration can be seen as one ofKenya's most extensive experiences in administrativedecentralisation. The coordination role of the provin-cial administration is accompanied by a security role.So whereas this system serves coordination func-tions, e.g. chairing the DDCs, it has also weakened thelocal government system, since provincial officersusually mediate individually on behalf of aggrievedcitizens. The Administration Police Act establishes alocal police force controlled by the district adminis-tration. This is the lowest level of police and is there-fore the one with which communities most interact.

Figure 1 depicts these parallel systems for delivery oflocal services in Kenya.

2.5 Devolution in the draft constitution

The draft constitution approved by the NationalConstitutional Conference in March 2004 (but whichhas not yet been enacted) proposes extensive decen-tralisation of services and resource control as well asdelegation of decision-making authority to lower lev-els of government, where the district is the principalunit.

Under this arrangement elected district councils withan executive head will be responsible for many servic-es including primary education and health, roadmaintenance, land use management and planning.For this, the councils will raise local resources andreceive subventions from the central government tofulfil their responsibilities.

While the anticipated devolution respects and main-tains Kenya as a unitary state, it delegates responsi-bilities and authority to three levels of devolvedunits: the region, the district (as the principal level ofdevolution) and the locations. The nature of powersharing between the centre and localities is usuallyquite a contentious design issue when it comes topolitical decentralisation in a unitary state. Kenya'sdraft constitution assigns responsibilities to the dis-tricts and other sub-national units without providingguidance on the pace of devolution. This is to beaddressed in legislation governing devolution'simplementation. However, the failure of the draftconstitution to provide for phased implementation ofdevolution - so as to build capacity within the districtcouncils - is one reason given by those opposed to the

Notes5 The LATF is discussed in Chapter 4 under Support to Local

Government Improvement.(usually local mobilisers for)national-level politicians.

6 The district commissioner is a rank below the provincialcommissioner and is administrative head of a smallergeographical area.


11

Figure 1. Parallel systems for delivery of local services in Kenya

Source: World Bank/DFID 2002.

CentralGovernment

Province

District

Division

Location

Sub-location

ProvincialAdministration

Sector Systems(Ministries)

Local Government System(Elected)

Office of thePresident

ProvincialCommissioner

SectorLine Ministries

Ministry of LocalGovernment

Sector Provincial

Sector Utility /Commission

Provincial LocalGovernmentOffice

Nairobi CityCouncil

DistrictCommissionerDistrictDevelopment

District SectorCommitteesDistrict SectorOffices

County Councils Mombasa CityCouncil

DivisionDevelopment

Chiefs

Sub-chiefs

Sector / Facility LevelCommittees

• Self-help Water Supply Schemes

• Hospital• Health Centres• Rural Dispensaries• Secondary Schools• Primary Schools

MunicipalCouncils

Town Councils

Urban Councils


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constitution for the delay in its enactment as it nowstands. Another reason given is the constitution's lackof guidelines governing disputes between the centreand devolved units or for preventing the centre fromdelaying or mismanaging the transition to devolution.

The draft constitution also leaves unclear the motiva-tion behind devolution. This revives an ongoingdebate about the objectives of devolution and therole of local government: whether it is principallyabout deepening democracy or only an instrumentfor service provision. Literature on democratic decen-tralisation argues for a comprehensive form in whichservice delivery reflects local priorities and control.Decentralised development management, whichKenya has pursued since the mid-sixties, emphasisesthe efficiency of service delivery more than local con-trol. The case study on decentralised health deliverydiscussed later, in Chapter 3.3, is a good example ofthis approach. Those opposed to full-scale devolutionargue that the councils are incapable of comprehen-sive service delivery, and therefore there remains aneed for a parallel system of decentralised ministryfunctions. This national debate has not yet been con-solidated. The absence of clearly expressed principlesin the draft constitution suggests that it may yet beambitious to laud the devolved units as vehicles forlocal accountability, participation and governance forthe pursuit of a pro-poor policy agenda.

The draft constitution intends to repeal the provincialadministration in its current form and to bring underthe control of the district government all public serv-ices within district boundaries. As such, district gov-ernment is to absorb the structures of decentraliseddevelopment management. There is hereby a need torationalise the current partnership system in thefield, in which almost all government departmentsand ministries have a presence in the districts (thedistrict health officer, etc.) Previous experiences sug-gest that harmonisation is needed to alleviate anyresistance to such a plan that might arise among cen-tral government civil servants. The tendency ofNairobi-based ministries to retain lines of communi-cation with the district heads is expected to remain.This will likely become a source of friction with localcouncils and ought to be addressed in the devolutionlegislation as well.

The draft constitution provides for an elected govern-ment at the national level, the district level and thelocation level. A fourth tier of government, regional,

between the national and district would be constitut-ed through indirect elections by the district council.The head of this regional government is to be electedas a district administrator or governor. All existinglocal authorities (e.g. the county councils, which usu-ally cover the whole district, and the urban councils,which are usually localised governance for conurba-tions of more than 5,000 persons) are to be sub-sumed within the district government. These govern-ments are expected to abide by the principle of par-ticipation and consultation with citizens, as enshrinedas a directive principle of state policy.

The council and not central government will makedecisions regarding local service delivery, with centralgovernment confining itself to developing nationalpolicy. The elected district assembly will hold the dis-trict government to account in the same manner thatparliament holds central government to account.These new developments are expected to foster localaccountability.

3. External assistance to decentralisation in Kenya

As discussed, Kenya has pursued different initiativesin administrative decentralisation. Though politicaldecision making has not been sufficiently decen-tralised, there have been attempts to de-concentratecentral government functions.

Efforts to decentralise development activities havebenefited from external support. The Special RuralDevelopment Programme (SRDP) of the 1960sreceived pooled donor support. Regional develop-ment authorities also relied on external support fortheir main initiatives. Hydroelectric power produc-tion, for instance, benefited from loans provided byinstitutions such as the World Bank (which supportedthe Tana and Athi River Development Authority), theFrench (which as a bilateral donor supported thedevelopment of Turkwell hydroelectric power projectundertaken under the ambit of Kerio ValleyDevelopment Authority) and lately the Japanese (insupport provided to the Lake Basin DevelopmentAuthority).

Following adoption of the District Focus for RuralDevelopment (DFRD) strategy in the early eighties,the country saw focused external support. The Danesled donors in channelling support through the RuralDevelopment Fund. The International Fund forAgricultural Development (IFAD) also made resourcesavailable to the government for programmatic sup-port. The DFRD strategy was also supported by vari-ous donors that chose to work within particular dis-tricts to promote integrated rural development,which was in vogue in the eighties and early nineties.Examples are the programmes started in the districtsof Machakos, Kitui, Keiyo, Laikipia and Kajiado fundedby the Danish, Dutch and Swiss governments alongwith the Arid Lands Resource ManagementProgramme supported by the World Bank. This lastproject covered most of northern Kenya from Turkanain the north-west to Mandera in the north-east andto the coast. Most of these were districts in the aridand semi-arid zone, and the focused external supportwas largely the result of concerted attention beingpaid to these lands following the development of a

national policy for them in 1979. Between 1988 and1993, the European Commission provided resourcesfor a micro-projects programme.

A main feature of these programmes is that theyworked within the government's decentralised devel-opment structures. They were implemented at thedistrict level and sought, insofar as possible, to usethe structures set up under the DFRD strategy andthe DDC system. Though touted as a system thatwould promote local participation and accountability,the membership of the DDCs and control by theprovincial administration militated against this objec-tive. The DDC system subsequently became discredit-ed and associated with political manipulation by thecentral government, intimidation of vocal communityrepresentatives and abuse of external resources chan-nelled to rural development and other public funds.

There was an attempt to revamp this system in 1995to introduce greater community participation in proj-ect planning and implementation, especially follow-ing the commencement of the safety net pro-grammes, such as the Social Dimensions ofDevelopment Programme (SDDP), which aimed atalleviating the impact of structural adjustment onthe citizenry. However, consistent with previous gov-ernments' record of compliance with reform promis-es, not much came out of the initiative.

The last years of the nineties thus saw attempts andinnovations intended to promote local participationand accountability within the established frame-works of decentralisation. Some have sought toadvance the democracy movement by initiating insti-tutions and practices for more local participation anddecision making. This has been promoted both bylocal organisations (both community-based and non-governmental) and by large international NGOs suchas Action Aid, Oxfam and CARE, as well as in the con-text of bilateral assistance.

It is therefore possible to identify a distinct categoryof external support: that focused on innovations andreforms towards deeper decentralisation. Thisincludes support to decentralise management ofservices that were under the control of central gov-ernment (e.g. health, education and roads) and assis-tance to to local authorities in service delivery.

Nonetheless, the Kenyan government has not yetarticulated a comprehensive policy framework on


13

decentralisation in a clear policy paper, though thedraft constitution contains provisions on devolution.In 2003, the Ministry of Planning launched a processto formulate a decentralisation policy, but it has notmoved as quickly as anticipated due to the slow paceof the constitutional reform talks. The Ministry forLocal Government began a review of the LocalGovernment Act and prepared and discussed a newdraft bill with stakeholders in 2002. However, thisproject too was shelved to await final outcomes ofthe constitutional reform.

In this context, external assistance to decentralisationhas taken the form of stand-alone projects, uncon-nected with one another and lacking clear directionfrom government. Experiences from these initiatives,however, can inform the policy development process.The wide variety of initiatives found on the ground inKenya demonstrates how the absence of a har-monised framework can lead to a wide variety ofapproaches to decentralisation, from which lessonscan be drawn with which to consolidate a clear policyposition.

The various types of support can be grouped intothree main categories:

• support to the local government system;• improvements to decentralised service delivery;• support to democratic community-driven

development.

The following sections delve into these types of sup-port and the external donors providing it. The pro-grammes reviewed are recent, from the last ten yearsor so. The review focuses on innovations and isintended to produce lessons for further applicationand replication in the country. The implicit objective isto inform future decentralisation policy and designs.Critical in this regard is the capacity of programmesto facilitate learning within them and from them.This chapter, therefore, reviews not just the pro-gramme objectives but also the designs for learningwithin them.

3.1 EU external actors supporting decentralisationin Kenya

A range of actors have been involved in decentralisedservice delivery within the main government frame-works discussed above. Local government improve-

ment within the Kenya Local Government ReformProgramme received support from the World Bankand the UK's Department for InternationalDevelopment (DFID). DFID, which has also supportedspecific initiatives in Nairobi and Mombasa (the twolargest cities in Kenya), is now supporting PovertyReduction through Optimising Local GovernanceSystems (PROLOGS). PROLOGS will document lessonsfrom previous support to local government throughthe Kenya Local Government Reform Programme andespecially the results of the Local Authority ServiceDelivery Action Plan (LASDAP) and the Local AuthorityTransfer Fund (LATF). The programme has a budget ofsome GB£ 5.8 million (about EUR 8.5 million) exclud-ing management costs. The EC Delegation has provid-ed direct support to local government with its micro-projects programme and, more recently, through a"social fund", the Kenya Community DevelopmentTrust Fund (CDTF). Support from the 9th EuropeanDevelopment Fund is channelled through this fund toimprove local government in several rural councils atan estimated cost of EUR 21 million.

Other actors have supported decentralised servicedelivery by line ministries. The Swedish government,for example, through the Swedish InternationalDevelopment Agency (SIDA), supports decentralisedhealth care delivery and improvements in line with anational strategy developed by the Ministry of Healthat a budget of SEK 75 million (about EUR 8.2 million).The Danish government previously supported thesame ministry - prior to full-scale decentralisation -but withdrew some five years ago citing high levelsof corruption. The Danish government has also beeninvolved in the water sector. In 2003, Kenya startedimplementing the Water Act, which decentraliseswater management to regional boards. The Danishgovernment continues to support this decentralisa-tion effort, though the modalities of the effort arestill being worked out.

Other support is directed to communities. In thisregard, many initiatives around integrated develop-ment programmes and arid and semi-arid landsdevelopment have received support from EU part-ners, including Denmark, Switzerland, theNetherlands and Germany. These programmes haveworked mainly through the DDC system.

A high level of support is provided to community-driven development, following frustrations with thegovernmental system and associated calls for more


14

participation and involvement of local communities.Germany, for example, supported the KilifiDevelopment Programme and the Semi-Arid RuralDevelopment Programme was being implemented bythe Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV),which was operating in three areas of Kenya. Thoughit appeared promising, this programme wound downin 2002 due to a shortage of funding and change ofstrategy by SNV towards support for institutionaldevelopment at meso levels of government. TheGerman-supported programme in Kilifi has becomeone of the often-quoted examples of community-driven development. A review of the experience isuseful in exploring the development potentials oflower levels of local government and other communi-ty-driven initiatives. NGOs are also quite active. ActionAid and Oxfam, which derive some support fromEuropean governments, are notable players here.

Few EU donors had large portfolios in Kenya duringthe nineties. This low level of activity coincided with aperiod in which credibility and integrity problemsassociated with the previous government were high-est. The support that was provided was characterisedby extensive direct involvement of the external part-ners in project implementation on the ground.Following the change of government in 2002 severalpartners began developing new initiatives, and thereare indications of significant increases in portfolios.However, few of these programmes have reachedfruition - they are works in progress.

The initiatives of the nineties are also characterisedby attempts to minimise the role of government;hence the deliberate attempts to build other commu-nity-driven structures. Some of these structures havetaken root and provide useful lessons for the designof comprehensive decentralisation, both political andadministrative. A number of these programmes is dis-cussed in more detail below.

3.2 Support to local government improvement

The Kenya Local Government Reform Programme The Kenya Local Government Reform Programmeseeks to enhance the 'capacity, power, and responsi-bility of locally elected councils' so as to improve'service delivery, enhance economic governance andalleviate poverty' (World Bank/DFID 2002: p. 9).Though conceptualisation of the programme was ini-tiated in 1991, operations really took off in 1996. The

World Bank and the United Kingdom's Departmentfor International Development (DFID) provided themain support for the effort.

The programme has achieved several milestones:rationalisation of the business licensing process so asto reduce the administrative burden on local authori-ties and development of an integrated financial man-agement system. However, the programme's fore-most achievement has been establishment of theLocal Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) (see also box).The centralisation of functions in 1967 and the grad-ual erosion of independent sources of revenue weak-ened the financial base of many local authorities. TheLATF was established to counter this, to provide localauthorities a discretionary block grant to use for serv-ice delivery and organisational improvements (WorldBank/DfID 2002: p. 10). To access the grant, localauthorities must submit four items:

• a service delivery action plan prepared through a participatory process;

• timely budgets, with at least half of the grantamount allocated to capital projects;

• a statement from debtors and creditors and a debt reduction plan;

• a revenue enhancement plan.

Resources for the fund are provided by five percent ofall income tax collected in the country. This amountwas anticipated to gradually rise to twenty percent,but has as yet remained static.

A review of LATF implementation published in itsannual report for 2001-02 suggests that the Fund hasbeen successful in providing both additionalresources and incentives to local authorities toimprove service delivery, increase participation ingovernance and enhance financial management andaccountability. Some Kshs 1.5 billion (EUR 15.3 million)was identified as the aggregate "resource envelope",which amounts to approximately 15 percent of locallyavailable resources. The Fund has also generated asteady flow of local-level planning and financialinformation for policy analysis and monitoring pur-poses. As a result of the Fund, up-to-date abstracts ofaccounts are now available to the controller and audi-tor-general for all local authorities. Debt reductionplans have been signed between local authorities andtheir statutory creditors. Debts are being repaid, anddebt control mechanisms put in place. Local authori-ties were estimated to have spent Kshs 1.1 billion (EUR


15


16

11.2 million) on 1,366 capital projects in financial year2001-02. A substantial proportion (31%) of this expen-diture was on vehicles and council premises. Twentypercent of the capital expenditure was allocated forroads and 14 percent for water and sanitation.

To help ensure that expenditures are targeted in aresponsive and accountable manner, the local author-ities are now preparing revenue enhancement plansand consulting with their citizens through a partici-patory process - the earlier mentioned Local AuthorityService Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP) process - toidentify local priorities to be included in the annualbudget. The first service delivery action plans vary inquality, but in general they represent a step forwardin mobilising citizen input in local-level planning.During the first year, more than 27,900 individualsparticipated in more than 900 meetings through theprocess. In the action planning process, citizens iden-tified more than 3,000 projects and activities, whichare certain to influence the 2002-03 annual budgetpreparation. The challenge is to sustain this participa-tory approach, broaden and deepen the participation,and expand the role of the community in designing,implementing and monitoring local services and pro-grammes. Indeed, interviews with citizen groups (res-ident associations) and civic leaders suggest a needto further institutionalise participation and expand itto encompass implementation of projects and servic-es as well.

In the action planning process, the local authoritieshave convened meetings to identify projects. But theyhave not yet developed forums and spaces for citizenengagement during programme implementation. Inthis regard, many local authorities treat the demandfor participatory planning as nothing more than ahurdle to gaining LATF funds. It is instructive, howev-er, that in some local authorities, e.g. in Nandi, com-munities have formed watchdog committees to mon-itor budgetary compliance with community propos-als.

Even though local authorities are submitting project-ed and actual information on revenues and expendi-tures, including abstracts of accounts, they have sofar tended to overestimate revenue. This has led tobudget deficits and forced the postponement ofsome planned services and projects.

The local authorities are responsible for M&E of theLATF as well as for monitoring their own revenues,

with oversight in the hands of the Ministry for LocalGovernment and the controller and auditor-general.As a block grant, LATF monies are incorporated alongwith own revenues into the local budget. The LocalGovernment Act (Chp. 265) lays down the rules onaccountability for formulation, execution and moni-toring of council budgets. The Ministry for LocalGovernment approves the local budget and has thepower to conduct "extraordinary inspections" toaddress any issues that may arise related to localauthority budgets and performance. The LocalGovernment Act enables the central government totake disciplinary action in cases of violation and non-compliance. Such actions may include the applicationof surcharges, suspension and dismissal. Similarly thecontroller and auditor-general have the power tomonitor ongoing execution of local authority budgetsand to issue reports and instructions for correctiveaction as necessary. Further, the controller and audi-tor-general audit local authority abstracts ofaccounts.

Local government inspections do take place andreports are fed back to the local authority. This is amain way in which the central government monitorsand evaluates service provision at the local level.Nonetheless, in the course of this study, several inter-viewees pointed out that the inspectorate has insuffi-cient capacity to monitor all of the country's 174 localauthorities. In addition, the local authorities haveoften failed to act on recommendations made by theinspectorate. Yet other commentators pointed outthat the inspectors' recommendations were not"redemptive" enough to enable willing councils toundertake remedial measures.


17

The LOCAL AUTHORITY TRANSFER FUND The Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) was established through an Act of Parliament in 1998 to provideresources and incentives to enable local authorities to (i) improve local service delivery, (ii) strengthenfinancial management and accountability and (iii) eliminate all outstanding current local debts.

The LATF was initially capitalized with two percent of the national income tax during its first year ofoperation (financial year 1999-2000) but has since been receiving five percent of the national incometax. The Fund distributed Kshs 1 billion (EUR 10.2 million) in FY 1999-2000, Kshs 2.3 billion (EUR 23.5 mil-lion) in FY 2000-01, and Kshs 3 billion (EUR 30.6 million) in FY 2001-02 to all 174 local authorities basedon a simple and objective formula.

The LATF is administered in accordance with provisions contained in the LATF Act and Regulations. TheFund is under the responsibility of the Minister for Finance and administered by the PermanentSecretary of the Ministry for Local Government. An independent advisory committee headed by a pri-vate sector representative provides advice on the policies and operations of the fund.

The Fund operates in a transparent manner. Newspapers regularly publish reports on the allocation cri-teria and conditions and planned and actual disbursements. In addition, the Fund publishes an annualreport that summarises its operations and overviews planned and actual revenues and expenditures forall local authorities.

The LATF is structured to provide local authorities with supplementary funds, which are combined withown-source revenues, to meet Fund objectives. Local authorities are given the discretion to allocate thefunds and their own-source revenues through the annual budgetary process as stipulated in the LocalGovernment Act of the Laws of Kenya and related financial regulations. LATF monies are subject to thegeneral budget and financial management conditions and not to specific project requirements. Localauthorities are accountable for adherence to their budgets, including the use of the LATF monies, underthe Local Government Act.

LATF allocation criteria are designed to ensure that funds are provided in a predictable, transparent andfair manner. LATF funds in FY 2001-02 were allocated based on the following published formula:• a basic minimum lump sum of Kshs 1.5 million (EUR 15,306) to all local authorities (9%);• a sum allocated based on the relative population of each local authority (60%);• the remainder allocated relative to the proportion urban population (31%).

To receive LATF funds, local authorities must submit budget estimates outlining how the funds, in com-bination with the local own-source revenues, are to be used. There were three general stipulations forFY 2001-02. The local budget must have allocated the equivalent of at least half of the LATF servicedelivery amount to capital projects (including maintenance of capital) and it must not allocate morethan 65 percent of the total budget to personnel (including consultants). In addition, local authoritiesare required to pay all statutory charges in the year in which they are due.

The Fund observes strict deadlines for the submission of all required documentation. In the event oflate submissions, the local authority is penalized. In FY 2001-02, 19 authorities submitted their docu-ments late, resulting in a loss of Kshs 45.7 million (EUR 466,327), about 1.5 percent of total LATF alloca-tions. Of this penalty, Nairobi City Council lost Kshs 8 million (EUR 81,630) for its failure to submit therequired abstracts of accounts. In accordance with the LATF regulations, an individual report was sent toeach local authority detailing the LATF amounts disbursed and explaining any penalties.


18

The LATF is now in its fourth year and, according togovernment annual reports, it is helping local author-ities respond to the challenge to play a more activerole in improved governance, service delivery andpoverty alleviation. It is anticipated that various LATF-linked reforms will be gradually institutionalised asKenya's decentralisation policy - and the institutionsthat eventually emerge from that process - isfinalised.

Poverty Reduction through Optimising LocalGovernance SystemsPROLOGS (Poverty Reduction through OptimisingLocal Governance Systems) is a short, ongoing pro-gramme intended to consolidate lessons from variousinitiatives to support local government in Kenya. Theidea is to document lessons that can inform decen-tralisation policy and institutional design. At thesame time it explores the capacity of local authoritiesto undertake pro-poor work and participatory plan-ning.

PROLOGS has four components. The national compo-nent is essentially a continuation of the Kenya LocalGovernment Reform Programme, which DFID hasbeen supporting. It covers the development of a tar-geted investment fund for poverty reduction, formu-lation of a national decentralisation policy, strength-ening of local linkages with macro reforms and sectorreform activities and capacity building for LATF-linkedreforms. The Nairobi component is a continuation(albeit slimmed down) of the Nairobi Urban PovertyProject (NUPP) funded by DFID as the Kenya UrbanPoverty Programme (KUPP). The Mombasa componentis a version (also reduced) of the PartnershipApproach to Meeting the Needs of the Urban Poor(PAMNUP). Finally, the all-new rural component is apilot action research exercise focused on just twocounty councils, those of Kwale and Nandi. Each ofthese components will benefit from grants targetedat poverty reduction from the planned PovertyReduction Co-financing Fund (PRCF) to be made avail-able following compliance with conditionalities asso-ciated with the LATF.

PROLOGS has been in operation for one year and isscheduled to end in mid-2005. M&E of the pro-gramme has included secondment of programmestaff to local councils, regular field visits and teammeetings. A mid-term review and eventually an end-of-project review are also planned. The emphasis ofM&E has reflected PROLOGS' design as a learning

programme. Field staff make observations and collatethe information during team meetings. Lessons thussynthesised are then communicated to the ministryand to DFID. PROLOGS monitoring activities havealready contributed to changes in the Local AuthorityService Delivery Action Plan process. These have per-tained mainly to making participatory planning aprecondition for accessing LATF resources.

In terms of expansion of local accountability, PRO-LOGS has set a rather limited role for itself, as it inter-prets its task strictly in terms of documentation andlearning. Though it has made some creative sugges-tions on institutionalising participation in the use ofLATF monies nationwide, it does not yet promotefeedback from the local level or provision ofapproaches and advice other than those suggestedby the seconded staff. This approach is not asempowering for the local communities and councilswilling to work hard and try new approaches.

Support to Urban Councils The United Nations Programme on HumanSettlements (UN-Habitat) supports several initiativesin Kenya which though small nonetheless offer usefullessons for support to local government. The LakeVictoria Cities Programme supported by the SwedishInternational Development Agency (SIDA) works withthe three large municipalities on the edge of LakeVictoria - Kampala (Uganda), Kisumu (Kenya) andMusoma (Tanzania). The programme supports thesecities in participatory formulation of city develop-ment strategies and in raising resources to imple-ment the strategies. This is undertaken via a citywideconsultation process. With this support, for example,the city of Kisumu completed strategic and invest-ment plans to address the difficult issue of solidwaste management.

UN-Habitat has not yet worked out a proper M&Eframework for its activities. Indeed, during this studythe organisation was involved in discussions on indi-cators for improved urban governance. The traditionalapproaches of monitoring visits and end-of-projectreviews are utilised however.

The Intermediate Technology Development Group(ITDG), an international NGO headquartered in theUnited Kingdom, has supported urban councils todevelop programmes focused on urban povertyreduction. ITDG was a partner in the Kenya LocalGovernment Reform Programme especially active in


19

assisting municipalities in understanding the LocalAuthority Service Delivery Action Plan process. ITDGhas also helped foster community participation in theaction planning process through independent com-munity sensitisation and by facilitating community-level meetings around the process.

One often-mentioned problem with improved localauthority management is the absence of credibleinformation that can be used in planning. ITDG hasassisted one municipal council, that of Nakuru, todevelop a "local urban observatory". This "observato-ry" is a tool for strengthening participation andaccountability, providing a city or town a focal pointfor urban policy development and planning.Collaboration among policymakers, technical expertsand representatives of partner groups is fosteredwithin the observatory, where urban statistics andinformation are gathered and stored for policymak-ing and consultative purposes. These local urbanobservatories are part of the Global UrbanObservatory initiative, which assists governments,local authorities and civil society organisations indeveloping 'better information for better cities' (UN-Habitat 2003). Establishment of the local observato-ries reflects the appreciation that most councils cur-rently have a weak information base for planningpurposes and they have few structures for electedleaders to engage with communities.

Working with the Nakuru council, ITDG began to buildan information base containing critical poverty-relat-ed data, e.g. that on water and sewerage services, edu-cation and health facilities, disease incidence, electoralboundaries, crime, waste management, environment,land tenure and land use. The information wasanalysed and GIS maps were produced. The maps jux-tapose several categories of information, such as thelocation of schools with the location of water pipesand sewers and leaks. The maps have proven to bepowerful visual instruments for interested electedleaders and communities to use to persuade councilsto locate needed services in needy areas. Such infor-mation is crucial for citizen claim making and decisionmaking by councils. Information bases such as thelocal urban observatory will be invaluable in buildingrobust local authorities in Kenya.

In terms of monitoring, ITDG has utilised the tradi-tional means of field visits and reviews of programmeprogress. Working with only one council has enabledthe NGO to distil lessons from visits and incorporate

these quickly into project operations. Once running,the observatories have improved citizen participationand promoted accountability through the informa-tion they hold. However, much depends on the levelof analysis and access to the information; that is,whether it is in an accessible location and whetherinterested citizens can use it.

Rural council capacity buildingThe rural council capacity-building programme is aninitiative of the European Commission. Though theCommission had little prior involvement in decentral-isation, it has implemented specific programmes thatwork in a decentralised manner, e.g. one focused onhealth in Kenya. The Commission has further beeninvolved in community development in Kenya, firstthrough its micro-projects programme within theMinistry for Planning and subsequently using a socialfund approach with its Community DevelopmentTrust Fund (CDTF).

An evaluation of phase 1 of the CDTF revealed thatwhereas the programme was more successful thanits predecessor in project completion and relevance,few of the projects had forged institutional linkageswith local accountability structures. Hence, lessonsfrom the projects could not be applied more broadly.The Commission therefore initiated a new pro-gramme, Rural Poverty Reduction through LocalGovernment Support, which seeks to improveaccountability and the responsiveness of localauthorities in delivering services to the rural poor.This newest programme aims to empower rural com-munities in the development process as well as buildlocal government capacity in participatory planningand pro-poor service delivery. Each year the pro-gramme will select several rural local authorities tosupport, starting with 15 local authorities and laterscaling up to 30 councils.

This is a new programme. It only recently receivedapproval from the government and has yet to startimplementation. Once it begins, specific indicatorswill be developed for M&E. Meanwhile, project spon-sors anticipate utilising periodic evaluations, field vis-its and twice-yearly audits. In addition to monitoringdone by the Commission, the project will seek waysto increase the capacity of the Ministry for LocalGovernment to inspect the local councils and respondto council needs following inspections as well as toprovide technical support to the provincial local gov-ernment office.


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In terms of promoting local accountability, the pro-gramme will encourage the use of the Local AuthorityService Delivery Action Plans for accessingCommission-provided resources. Community consid-erations will thus be reflected in the project activities.The project will also strive to promote participatoryM&E by citizens in the participating local authorities.

3.3 Improvements in decentralised service delivery

Besides support for improved local government,external support has been geared towards sectoralimprovements. Reforms initiated within key servicesectors have responded to the weaknesses of DistrictFocus for Rural Development (DFRD) structures, aswell as those within the local authorities themselves.In essence, programmes have attempted to bypassthe established systems of the DFRD and localauthorities and create new institutional and financ-ing arrangements. This has affected areas includingeducation, water, roads and health.

Decentralised health managementA health policy framework first approved in 1994 andan implementation and action plan developed in1996 eventually led to Kenya's adoption in 1999 of anational health sector strategic plan (1999-2004). Theplan named decentralisation as one of its key strate-gies for providing quality health care. The govern-ment's intention was to decentralise authority fordecision making, resource allocation and manage-ment of health facilities to the district and facilitylevels. The Ministry for Health established a secretari-at at its headquarters to oversee the decentralisationprocess.

District health management boards were set up anddistrict health management teams made up of tech-nical personnel established at the district and facilitylevels. The teams were to represent community inter-ests. The Ministry for Health is currently piloting thisapproach to decentralisation in 15 districts with thesupport of SIDA and the World Bank. Its intention isto gradually expand the programme to other districtsunder the oversight of the ministry and provincialhealth management teams. The decentralisationstrategy has no role for the local authorities.

SIDA supports seven of the 15 pilot districts, with theWorld Bank supporting the other eight. The assis-tance provided is in line with the National Health

Sector Strategic Plan. The plan emphasises the needfor the district health teams to formulate their ownhealth plans before they can access money, drugs andother supplies. The reform secretariat and the districthealth management teams are the most developedarms of the decentralisation strategy. The districtteams are made up of civil servants, however, andmost were transferred to the area in which theywork. They have therefore exhibited little ownershipof the health plans they implement - though they dohave a functional relationship to the plans!

The programme is monitored through periodic visitsto the districts, quarterly meetings of the districthealth teams with the sponsors (SIDA and the WorldBank) and regular reports and evaluations. At presentM&E emphasises collection of health information(morbidity, case loads, medicine tracking) and reportson work flow and finances. Evaluations mention theinadequate ownership of work plans, but effective-ness is viewed from a purely functional perspective,'by and large the view at the district level was lessone of ownership and increased responsibilities andmore one of possibly more reliable and timely supplyof funds, materials and equipment' (Tamm 2002: p.22). Monitoring information is not processed at thecollection points - the clinics - but rather is passed onto the district health management teams who thenpass it on the central office. It is then all processed atthe ministerial headquarters. While there are usefullessons here, it is also clear that this mode of decen-tralisation, which is not anchored in community andlocal oversight, is fraught with challenges.

3.4 Support to democratic community-driven development

Several NGOs work to support community develop-ment in Kenya. Action Aid, CARE, Oxfam, the AgaKhan Foundation are all active, along with bilateralagencies such as the German Agency for TechnicalCooperation (GTZ) and the Dutch SNV. While theirfocus is principally on community development theseagencies also emphasise democratic self-governancein their work. In many of the programmes, communi-ties apply for development support, analyse theirown problems and situation, explore solutions andform representative bodies to steer the developmentprocess.


21Notes7 However, the constitutional reform process has been the

only one with an expectation of institutionalised wideconsultation.

The Kilifi District Development Programme is a multi-sectoral district-based rural development programmesupported by the Kenyan and German governmentsand implemented by GTZ. It aims to build the devel-opment capacities of communities and serviceproviders in Kilifi district and to contribute to overallpoverty alleviation.

The programme encourages communities to organisethemselves and mobilise resources towards their owndevelopment needs. The communities self-organiseand elect village development committees made upof clan elders (without whose consent it is difficult tomake progress) and younger men and women. Thesecommittees have oversight over the developmentaspirations of their village and are fully responsiblefor overseeing projects. They receive technical sup-port from the government and the project, as wellresources beyond those that can be mobilised fromwithin the community. The Kilifi experience indicatesthat self-organised communities such as these vil-lages can, with the oversight provided by peer devel-opment committees, facilitate village administration,development and a wide array of services, e.g. sanita-tion and water, maintenance of roads (or paths), vil-lage-based health services, education (nursery andprimary schools including bursary administration),village markets and social security. This is the rangeof services expected of well functioning local authori-ties. The experience has led to advocacy for the insti-tutionalisation of villages as the lowest governmentlevel. In the current government structure the lowestlevel is the ward, which consists of several villages.

Organisations such as Action Aid, which adopt rights-based approaches, increasingly encourage communi-ties to engage with the public institutions aroundthem. Kenya has no institutionalised mechanisms forcitizen engagement with public bodies. Though noconsultation and oversight processes are built intolaw, expansion of democratic space over the lastdecade has been accompanied by pushes for suchconsultation.7

The introduction of the LATF, discussed above, and theattendant expectation that the Local AuthorityService Delivery Action Plans would be prepared in aparticipatory manner, has opened an opportunity forinstitutionalised participation. Action Aid and otherNGOs have mobilised communities to participate inthe action plan formulation process and, in severallocalities, to participate in implementation of the

plans as well. Several local authorities, e.g. the Bondoand Embu county councils and the local authority inNandi, have standing Local Authority Service DeliveryAction Plan committees. The action planning processthus seems to have some promise for formally linkingcommunities with public processes in a decentralisedsystem.

In terms of M&E, NGOs utilise the traditional meth-ods of reports, visits and periodic reviews. They arealso increasingly using participatory M&E methods,such as citizen scorecards and report cards. NGOsemphasise sharing and analysing feedback at thelocal level and upward transmission of input for pro-cessing at the centre.

Capacity building for decentralised developmentSNV, a Dutch NGO that previously worked primarily indirect project implementation, has now shifted itsstrategy to capacity development (advisory) servicesfor organisations that work at the meso (intermedi-ate) level. These include organisations working at thedistrict or multi-district level and those active withina specific sector or sub-sector. At present SNV pro-vides advisory support to 53 organisations in Kenya,mostly district-based, as well as to several advocacyorganisations. The support focuses on strengtheningdecentralised structures for public institutions (e.g.councils) and for NGOs. Emphasis is on helping part-ners access and influence decision making at the dis-trict and national levels. Local ownership, capacitybuilding and institutional strengthening are theSNV's guiding principles.

SNV uses both a qualitative and quantitative M&Esystems, though use of the quantitative tools is moreadvanced. Quantitative tools record the spread of thework in terms of numbers of organisations reached,advisory days provided and issues tackled. During theperiod of this study, SNV was finalising developmentof its qualitative M&E tools. Further, the organisationreviews the findings of M&E with its partner organi-sations on a quarterly basis, incorporating partners'responses into the reports.

The range of efforts described in this chapter illus-trates the variety of innovations within Kenya withregard to decentralisation. As argued earlier, thesedifferent innovations have arisen from the absence ofa coherent national policy framework and reflect acertain lack of bearing for decentralisation in thecountry.


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4. Decentralisation, M&E and local accountabilityin Kenya

Decentralisation is a complex process. It is hard topredict with certainty what will or will not work.Systems that facilitate learning are critical in such acontext. This chapter turns to the main approaches toM&E and local accountability found in the initiativesdescribed in Chapter 3. It then distils some lessonsfrom those approaches.

4.1 Main approaches to M&E

The programmes reviewed utilise different approach-es to M&E. At present it appears that the systems inuse promote learning principally by the sponsoringinstitution. Several supporters/sponsors, e.g. DFIDand SIDA, have developed M&E systems that theyutilise throughout the work they support. Reports areprepared in a manner that suggests that the donoragency is the primary audience.

The Government of Kenya, while acknowledging theimportance of M&E, has not quite developed a struc-ture and harmonised institutional framework for it.During the past year, efforts to document currentapproaches to M&E reveal that multiple agencies andinstitutions are responsible for it. However, few pro-grammes have developed M&E guidelines as early asthe design stage. Approaches to monitoring institut-ed in the eighties and nineties, and the location ofthese activities at the provincial level, have assumedan inspection and policing tone. In addition, therehave been few attempts to learn from monitoringreports. The learning that has taken place was stimu-lated by external partners late in the lifespan of long-term programmes (e.g. the review of DFRD's progressin promoting participation which was incorporatedinto the strategy papers in 1995, 12 years after com-mencement of the programme).

Several organisations admit that M&E is not a strongfeature of national programmes at the design stage.While this is understandable, it is regrettable sincelessons derived from practice would be useful for fur-ther development and for the anticipated country-

wide roll out of decentralisation efforts. Where theydo exist, most approaches to M&E extract informa-tion for use at higher levels. Information is seldomanalysed at or fed back to the local level. Few pro-grammes factor in corrective measures in response toinformation and knowledge gathered from monitor-ing.

Indeed, the predominant forms of M&E emphasisemonitoring rather than impact evaluation. Several ofthese approaches are discussed below.

Standard monitoring: Regular reports, annual reportsand validation visitsMany organisations use reports as their main form ofM&E. Formats developed by central authorities arecompleted by project personnel and passed upwardsto the ministerial level. The timeframe for this variesfrom programme to programme, from monthly toquarterly, half yearly and annually. The Kenya LocalGovernment Reform Programme, SIDA support todecentralised health delivery, PROLOGS and SNV allrequire such reporting. Only SNV has institutionalisedanalysis at the lower level. A review of M&E systemswithin the Ministry for Health revealed limited localuse of the information collected in regular reports.The health facilities use at least 45 different reportingforms. The data collected is sent upwards to the dis-trict level and later to the centre. Few of the formsare utilised for analysis and review, however, andfeedback to the health facility is a rarity.

In the case of PROLOGS, a programme managementunit analyses reports completed by staff seconded tothe four participating local authorities. Thereafter, thereports are shared with the Ministry for LocalGovernment and DFID. PROLOGS staff meet regularly(at least monthly) to collate learning and share find-ings and experiences.

Several programmes also utilise field visits for moni-toring. This is quite a popular approach to M&Eamong the programmes reviewed. Some of thesefield visits are announced while others are not. Theyare intended mainly to verify the regular reportsreceived at the centre.

Within the local government reform programme, theMinistry for Local Government has a unit responsiblefor inspection and oversight of local authorities, thelocal government inspectorate. This inspectorate con-ducts field visits to monitor the operations and


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finances of the local authorities. The local authoritiesare responsible for monitoring the use of the LATFmonies and financial management of their own localrevenues. The local authorities are, however, subjectto oversight by the Ministry for Local Government aswell as by the controller and auditor-general. As ablock grant, LATF resources are subsumed with localresources for expenditure through the local budget,which is approved by the Ministry for LocalGovernment. This ministry has the power to conductextraordinary inspections from time to time, in addi-tion to the minister's occasional inspection visits(Republic of Kenya 2002).

Though the LATF is combined with other revenue andallocated within the annual budgetary process, aslaid out in the Local Government Act and other finan-cial regulations, there is nonetheless a tendency forthe Ministry for Local Government and other com-mentators, including the press, to treat the Fund as ifit was distinguishable "project" resources. Many com-mentators speak of "LATF money" rather than "localauthority budget" or "public money", the terms gen-erally used to refer to public resources. This differenti-ation between LATF and own resources carries animplicit threat of withdrawal should the local author-ities be seen to fall short in terms of operations ormanagement. This does not augur well for localauthority autonomy.

The inspectorate within the Ministry for LocalGovernment has oversight over the local authorities.However, local authorities observe that inspectionstake the tone of a financial audit. In addition, littleimmediate feedback is given. Where such feedback isprovided, it is in the form of an audit managementletter emphasising administrative improvements thatneed to be made. Follow-up work from the auditsmay take place only several years later, suggestingthat the department has weak capacity in terms ofreach and breadth of its work.

Evaluations: End-of-term and mid-term evaluationsM&E systems often include regular evaluations con-ducted either during programme implementation orat the end of a project period. End-of-term evalua-tions focus more on the impact of the activities, whilemid-term evaluations emphasise progress towardsset goals and targets. The programmes reviewed inthe previous chapter are all under implementationand most are new. For these, the dominant form ofevaluation identified is the mid-term evaluation, e.g.

the Output to Purpose Review of the PROLOGS pro-gramme and SIDA's evaluation of its support todecentralised health care. There is as yet no evalua-tion of the Kenya Local Government ReformProgramme as such. However, a review of the pro-gramme does exist within the context of a broadersurvey of local service delivery and local governmentin Kenya. Evaluation of the social fund (theCommunity Development Trust Fund) led theEuropean Commission to develop the programmereviewed here, which was recently approved by theKenyan government but has not yet started imple-mentation. UN-Habitat conducted an end of phase 1review of its activities and shared the lessons with itspartners in the three participating cities.

Community development programmes supported byNGOs and the community development dimension ofWorld Bank support to the arid lands initiativeincreasingly use participatory M&E methods such ascitizen report cards.

The Kenyan government conducts national welfaresurveys every five years or so. While not targeted atany of the programmes discussed here, these surveyshave provided information that can be used as base-line statistics or reference points to determine theimpact of interventions. The last such survey was in1997 and plans are under way for one in 2004.

4.2 Main approaches to promoting local accountability

As discussed in Chapter 3, several categories of sup-port to decentralisation in Kenya can be identified:support to the local government system, support todecentralised service delivery by line ministries, andsupport to the communities themselves. Though allof the initiatives reviewed share the underlyingobjective of supporting local accountability, they haveobviously fared differently.

The National Health Sector Strategic Plan, supportedby SIDA and the World Bank, establishes district-levelhealth management boards. Yet inadequate attentionhas been given to the development of these boards,which could constitute an anchor to promote localaccountability. Moreover, this decentralisation efforthas bypassed the local authority systems by estab-lishing community boards. These boards are the leastdeveloped arms of the decentralisation effort. SIDA's


24

evaluation notes that among the various institutionscalled for in the strategy, the district health manage-ment boards have become quite marginalised andtheir 'constitution, mandate and composition is outof step with a decentralised governance system'(Tamm 2002: p. 25). The boards are composed of civilservants, the chairperson of the county council, threecommunity members (one from the business com-munity, one from the religious community and asocial leader who is either a women's group leader oryouth representative). The minister appoints theseboards upon the advice of the medical officer ofhealth (a civil servant). There are no checks and bal-ances on this selection process, meaning that it canbe manipulated by those charged with appoint-ments. In this sense the district level health manage-ment boards are quite vulnerable to changes in gov-ernment, as accountability is to the appointingauthority.

Community development approaches - such as thoseutilised by the European Commission in its socialfund, by NGOs and by the World Bank - make use ofcommunity development committees. These are rep-resentative committees chosen by programme bene-ficiaries or promoters in the case of social funds.Though they often operate democratically, e.g. as inthe Kilifi programme, they are not anchored in legallysecure democratically legitimised structures. They arenot subject to oversight beyond the project area andit is doubtful whether they can be subjected to otherinstitutionalised oversight systems such as a nationalaudit process.

Several programmes have direct links with localauthorities, e.g. the Kenya Local Government ReformProgramme, as well as initiatives of UN-Habitat andITDG. A new programme being undertaken by theEuropean Commission will link directly with localauthorities. The Commission programme intends tosupport better local governance and claim making bycitizens who, according to project documents, will be'active participants in the implementation and moni-toring of project investments'.

4.3 Lessons from the current approach to M&E in Kenya

This section synthesises some lessons from currentapproaches and experiences with M&E in Kenya.

1. Monitoring information is seldom analysed locally.The methods used for M&E extract information fromthe local level and transmit it upwards, usually to thecentre, for analysis and review. It might then bereflected in altered programme designs at somepoint in the future. In this regard, knowledge is sel-dom utilised to build more responsive structures onthe ground or to foster local accountability. As such,decision-makers in the field are seldom held account-able to consumers and residents in their sphere ofoperation.

2. Links between monitoring and learning are weak ornonexistent.Information gathered during monitoring seldomleads to corrective actions to solve the problems iden-tified. Indeed, monitoring often appears to be usedmerely to verify reports or to document situationsthat are already well known at headquarters. Forinstance, the local government inspectorate (a department within the Ministry for LocalGovernment responsible for oversight/supervisionand support of local authorities), regularly reportsthat local authorities are under great stress and thatfew effectively utilise the resources in their budget.Similarly, many cases are documented of misuse ofresources. Given the gravity of the situation and theregularity of such observations, it is remarkable thatthe Ministry for Local Government does not yet havea systematised corrective programme it can offer tolocal authorities faced with such problems and irreg-ularities. The ministry is, however, developing toolsand instruments aimed to link monitoring of thelocal authorities with subsequent improvements andto improve organisational learning within the min-istry itself.

In the case of mid-term and end-of-term evaluations,where these had taken place, those involved observedhow difficult it was to change the design of pro-grammes immediately in order to respond satisfacto-rily to the concerns raised. In the case of PROLOGS, areview revealed the need to clarify some aspects ofthe programme's design. However, by the time thesefindings were reviewed it was noted that the time-frame of the programme was too short for a compre-


25

hensive response to be implemented. In the case ofSIDA's support to the health sector, reviews haveidentified weaknesses in structures for promotinglocal accountability and therefore the programme isworking on ways to resolve this. In other instances,e.g. programmes of the European Commission andUN-Habitat, by the time the final evaluations arecompleted, the institutions have already designed fol-low-up programmes, factoring in only lessons frommid-term evaluations, monitoring and changes innational context.

3. High staff turnover disrupts learning and institu-tionalisation of reforms.Programmes aimed at decentralisation of service deliv-ery rely on the staff implementing them, especiallythose staff at the lowest levels and on the front linesof service delivery. This reliance is particularly strong inearly years, before systems are routinised and institu-tionalised. However, programmes in Kenya have beenbeset by disrupted learning and institutionalisation ofreforms caused by frequent transfers of staff.

4. There is a shortage of staff and competencies forcollecting, analysing and reporting M&E information.In addition to stability and longevity, departmentsneed staff who are competent in information analysisand in preparation of rapid responses. Partly becausemuch of the monitoring information is passedupwards for analysis, few institutions have developedcompetencies in analysis and response at the lowerlevel. For example, in the SIDA-supported decen-tralised health delivery system, staff were found to becompetent in capturing information, but they wereunable to analyse it and prepare responses.

5. Establishment of parallel structures mitigatesagainst local accountability.A number of the programmes reviewed had estab-lished parallel structures and systems that bypasslocal government. Examples are the district healthmanagement boards and the village and communitydevelopment committees. Though the emergence ofsuch structures can be partly understood as aresponse to the weaknesses of the local authoritysystems and the low quality of government councils,it nonetheless shields local activities from thepurview of typical social accountability structures.

6. Learning systems within the Kenyan governmentare weak.The government seems particularly weak in respond-ing to information from the field. M&E information isseldom incorporated into new or revised plans.Indeed, Kenya does not yet have a comprehensiveM&E system. The habit of constant learning is devel-oped though disciplined adherence to such an insti-tutionalised M&E framework. Kenya has no devel-oped structures that would promote systematisedM&E. Though the government acknowledges theneed for M&E, it is not always built into programmes.

7. Links between monitoring and local accountabilityare still developing,Not all is lost however. There are ongoing attempts tolink monitoring and local accountability. The LocalAuthority Service Delivery Action Plan processemphasises participation in planning, but participa-tion has not yet been extended to implementation.In some local authorities, citizens have formed watch-dog committees to follow through on the plannedactivities, e.g. in Nandi and Bondo. Community partic-ipation in implementation has also been stimulatedby NGOs such as Action Aid and ITDG. ITDG accessesinformation on the budget approved by the countycouncil and the minister and extracts relevant figuresfor communities to use in monitoring implementa-tion of the projects in their locations.

8. There is insufficient focus on communities in programme design.M&E systems are often designed with technical per-sonnel or institutions as their primary users. This isconsistent with this study's finding that the systemsare intended to extract information for analysis andresponse at the centre (as opposed to analysis andresponse at the local level). In the case of the healthsector programme, the primary users of the M&E sys-tem are the district health managers. M&E of theKenya Local Government Reform Programme paid lit-tle attention to the local authorities involved and dis-trict residents. This has implications for the design ofsystems as well as for the broad sharing of the infor-mation thus collected.

NGOs such as Action Aid and ITDG have worked withcommunities to promote participation in the LocalAuthority Service Delivery Action Plan process. Theyobserve the lack of provisions for communities to beinvolved in monitoring councils' fidelity to proposalsput forth by the community, in both planning and in


26

implementation. This observation is echoed by theAssociation of Local Government Authorities (ALGAK)and the Kenya Association of Resident Associations(KARA).

9. Links with political processes are weak.All politics is local - so the adage goes. The fact thatthe current M&E approaches do not promote locallearning means that they also do not inform localpolitical discourse. The changes experienced in Kenyaover recent years show that empowered communi-

ties that are able to make claims against the govern-ment can play a significant role in development.Parliament has managed to significantly raise itsstature by utilising the reports from the auditor-gen-eral as well as from independent analysts to interro-gate the executive arm of the government. Yet therehas been no parallel development within local gov-ernment.

10. Do donors factor in promotion of local accountability?It is not clear that donors factor local accountabilityinto their programme designs. The local authoritysystem in Kenya is quite weak and discredited by thecentral government. It is deliberately bypassed andparallel structures set up. Donors have aided andabetted the development of two parallel structuresfor local service delivery. The unintended conse-quence is a further weakening of local accountabilityand institutional strengthening. The structures forcommunity accountability and participation in sectorreforms, e.g. the health management boards, arequite weak and it is not clear that this problem isbeing addressed.

11. What is the incentive? In the SIDA-supported decentralisation of health caredelivery, it was noted that civil servants at the districtlevel view the district health plans and other meas-ures that promote local responsiveness as "condition-alities" for gaining more resources. There was no localownership. Incentives for enhancing ownership andaccountability might therefore need to be created.Years of centralisation and politicisation of decisionmaking at the centre have limited incentive amonggovernment officials to evaluate their work andimprove on implementation. There is virtually nolearning culture in government and little reward foreffective M&E.

Why is there no institutionalised M&E within thegovernment structures in Kenya?• There is no culture of learning.• Civil servants fear having mistakes revealed

and the attendant punishment.• M&E is not seen as part of how the govern-

ment operates, i.e. not part of "business as usual". It requires systemic change.

• Past reactions to M&E have been punitive.Examples were given of previous "monitoring" exercises, particularly at the districtlevel, which punished officers for slow pro-gramme implementation or other anomalies discovered.

• Most officers consider M&E external to themand therefore do not institutionalise it.

• There are no political costs for non-delivery.• There are resource constraints, both human

and capital.• The institutional structure prevents learn-

ing from M&E. Departments within the ministries do not possess structures and forums for learning from each other.Therefore some departments repeat work done by others or do not make reference to previous work in other units.

• It is not clear who and what M&E is for.• There is inadequate planning by spending

units on what to spend money on, which makes monitoring hard.

• Leadership is unwilling take tough decisions.• There is an absence of brave leadership

both nationally and in the districts.

Results of Brainstorming by participants at aworkshop on Participatory Monitoring andEvaluation held in September 2003.


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5. Conclusion: Options forstrengthening M&E and local accountabilitysystems

5.1 In general

Designs that promote learningM&E is not always factored into programmes at thedesign level. Where it is, M&E principally serves thepurposes of programme promoters and not necessar-ily of the communities being served. While M&E isneeded on the programme side, it is also useful tofactor in learning by communities. In this regard,monitoring information should be made available toelected community representatives for their use inlocal analysis and decision making.

Further, these communities need links to capacitybuilding for claim making. Residents need the abilityto access and understand information on the pro-grammes implemented in their locales and to be ableto act vis-à-vis local elected structures.

Decentralisation is about local governmentDecentralisation is principally about relocating deci-sion making to levels nearer the consumers of servic-es. Yet these lower levels must have the capacity toanalyse and respond to feedback from residents andother constituents in their proximity. M&E and theempowerment of local communities will only lay barethe impotence of local institutions should these beunable to respond to citizen action and have to relyon bureaucrats at the centre who are not subjectedto the same level of political control.

Decentralisation support should therefore go hand inhand with development and support to local gover-nance structures. Admittedly Kenya's local authoritiesare quite weak and often lack integrity. Donors havecontributed to establish or support parallel processes,for example, of community development and socialfunds, to bypass the weak local government system.While their motivations are understandable, experi-ences from such programmes cannot inform deci-sions at the local level and do not increase communi-ty leverage over elected leaders. Hence, they are not

fully empowering. This practice therefore needs to berethought.

Links between donor support and national policy andreform processesThe experiences of various organisations involved indecentralisation have not been reflected in publicpolicy processes. This signifies a weak linkagebetween donor support and eventual decision mak-ing within the government. Effective linkagesbetween donor support and national policy andreform processes are hampered by the absence of acomprehensive public sector reform framework ofwhich the anticipated decentralisation frameworkwould be key. The absence of this framework has ledeach sub-sector to follow its own process, leading toa variety of simultaneous stand-alone initiatives.However these initiatives have built up demand formore comprehensive reforms, as reflected in variousreports and culminating in the draft constitution.

It would be beneficial to link and channel future sup-port to the development of comprehensive publicsector reform and decentralisation frameworks.Disjointed support can only lead to more complica-tions along the way and contribute to resistanceagainst more comprehensive rationalisation.

Documentation and dissemination of experiencesThere is extensive knowledge and experience ondecentralisation support in Kenya, but this has notyet been documented and made available in anaccessible format. It is important to compile thisinformation and make it available so that other insti-tutions can learn from it.

5.2 ACP-EU cooperation

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement anticipates a keyrole for non-state actors and local authorities in itsimplementation. Article 6 of the Agreement definesthe partners of cooperation to include both state(local, national and regional) organisations and non-state actors (private sector, economic and social part-ners and civil society in all its forms).

The anticipation is that in the future discussions andprogramming decisions will be made after dialogueand consultation with these new actors. This is a sig-nificant shift that needs to be accompanied by funda-mental changes in the way business is conducted. In


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the past there was principally a relationship betweenstates. The Cotonou Agreement foresees involving awhole new range of partners in programming, includ-ing in identification of areas of support and chan-nelling of aid allocations under the 9th EDF, as well asin implementing and evaluating some programmes.

Over the last few years, the ACP and the EuropeanUnion have worked to create mechanisms for thisbroad-based dialogue and involvement of these newactors. However, it is as yet unclear how well devel-oped these are, given the prior history of planningACP-EU cooperation (as a largely bureaucratic exer-cise with little space or skills for participation).

In Kenya, programming for the 9th EDF has not yetbeen concluded. Past experiences within the countryin promoting participation can therefore be instruc-tive. Kenya does not have a history of institution-alised participation by non-state actors and local gov-ernment. This does not mean that these actors havenot participated in policy formulation in the past:they have, but the process has been rather ad hocand informal and subject to relationships betweenspecific actors. This was especially true of the periodup to 1992. Since 1992, incremental steps have beenmade in expanding the space for participation bynon-state actors. While this space has markedlyexpanded, it is still not institutionalised. The CotonouAgreement aims to institutionalise this in ACP-EUcooperation. However, indications are that in the cur-rent environment results will be less than satisfactoryin the first years.

This discussion paper has outlined features of externalsupport to decentralisation in Kenya and the environ-ment in which this is provided. Kenya does not yethave a comprehensive framework for decentralisa-tion. In the absence of such a framework, initiativestowards decentralisation have fallen into three categories:

• support to the local government system;• improvements to decentralised service delivery;• support to democratic community-driven devel-

opment.

The experiences overviewed in this study, suggest anumber of implications for ACP-EU cooperation.

Defining the policy. It will be hard to realise gainsfrom support to decentralisation without a compre-hensive policy on the same. In this regard, it would beadvisable to allocate time and resources to govern-ment dialogue and policy proposals on decentralisa-tion. The framework thus derived would provide anoutline for further programme support. Some of theissues to be covered by such a policy are democraticcontrol of local government and the responsibilitiesof lower levels of government in service delivery.

Patience and support. Kenya anticipates comprehen-sive devolution when the new constitution is enact-ed. However, some time will be required for this to beimplemented following enactment of the legislativeframework for it. During this period, which shouldcoincide with the implementation period of theCotonou Partnership Agreement, considerable confu-sion and absence of clarity are expected on theresponsibilities of different levels of government. Thiscalls for a trial-and-error, learning by doing approachand differential treatment for different lower levelgovernment departments and agencies.

Innovative programming. In the absence of a compre-hensive policy, any programmes initiated ought toreflect a commitment to building habits and institu-tions that support democratic decentralisation. In thisregard, even if the only space available is workingwithin a decentralised ministry structure, care shouldbe taken to build in local accountability structuresthat are also linked with local political processes.

Support to local governments to engage. Local gov-ernments have suffered various setbacks that haveweakened them in the past. Many initiatives arounddecentralised development management and com-munity-driven development have arisen due to thislocal government weakness. Local governments willrequire support if they are to play the role anticipatedfor them in ACP-EU cooperation. This calls for buildingcapacity within forums and spaces for joint action bylocal governments, e.g. the Association of LocalGovernment Authorities in Kenya (ALGAK). It will alsorequire provision of a constant stream of informationon the progress of dialogues on programming. In thisregard, care should be taken to confirm that dialogueis indeed taking place and that the whole range ofactors is informed. It also calls for dedication of staffand space by the traditional actors - the EuropeanCommission and the ACP government counterpart -to promote engagement of local governments.


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Democratic decentralisation and poverty reduction.A focus on poverty reduction is one of the CotonouAgreement's main platforms. Advocates of democrat-ic decentralisation argue that decentralisation pro-motes participation by interested citizens at the locallevel and accountability in matching governmentdecisions with people's needs. However, other voicesadvise caution, arguing that decentralisation mightnot lead to the intended results for poor people, asthe local elite could capture processes. It is importantto keep this caution in mind and to re-design pro-grammes and activities to ensure maximum benefitsfor the poor. In some instances, the more far-reach-ing results may not emerge from the formal policyprocess, since this process may not be open to influ-ence by the needs of the poor.

Conflicts with sector-wide approaches. Several EUdonors (Sweden, United Kingdom and theNetherlands) have expressed interest in providingprogramme support to the government throughbudget support and adoption of sector-wideapproaches. Often such support depends on decisionmaking at the centre and reinforces the sector/min-istry system. As discussed earlier, this type of systemhas, in the past, been unable to promote localaccountability and links with local governments.Therefore, sector-wide assistance programmes mustbe designed with vigilance regarding local accounta-bility.


Notes8 Attendees at workshop on city management that the

author facilitated during the study period. Though themeeting was on a different subject there was a lot ofdiscussion on local government autonomy and the LATFwhich proved useful in preparing the study.

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Persons interviewed 1. Augustine Odipo, General Secretary, Association of Local Government Authorities in Kenya (ALGAK)2. Cecilia Kinuthia, Human Settlements Adviser, United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) 3. Christine Cornelius, Sector Specialist,World Bank Kenya Country Office 4. Clive Davies, Programme Adviser, Poverty Reduction through Optimising Local Governance Systems

(PROLOGS)5. Clr. Josiah Magut, former Mayor of Eldoret and former Chairman of ALGAK6. David Kuria, Programme Officer, Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG)7. Eve Odette, Policy Unit, ActionAid Kenya8. Guy Jenkinson, EC Delegation9. Jesse Bokhoven, Country Representative, Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV) 10. Josphat Mwaura, Partner, KPMG PROLOGS Management Consultancy,11. Martin Oloo, Development Adviser, Department for International Development (DFID), UK 12. Mayors of Nairobi, Eldoret and Nakuru; Deputy Mayors of Kisumu and Mombasa; Treasurers of Eldoret,

Nakuru and Mombasa813. Mr. Kanake, Kenya Alliance of Resident Associations14. Grace Otieno, Government of Kenya, Rural Planning Department15. Per Vickstrom, Programme Officer Health and HIV/AIDS, Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)16. Roy Kelly, Resident Adviser, Kenya Local Government Reform Programme


31

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