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Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion Literature Applications Portfolio Choice General Equilibrium Consumption & Savings Conclusion Optimal Expectations Markus K. Brunnermeier and Jonathan Parker Princeton University October 25, 2006

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Page 1: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Optimal Expectations

Markus K. Brunnermeier and Jonathan Parker

Princeton University

October 25, 2006

Page 2: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

ratio

nal v

iew

Bayesian rationality Non-Bayesian

Page 3: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

rationalexpectations

ratio

nal v

iew

Lucas rationality

Bayesian rationality Non-Bayesian

Page 4: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

rationalexpectations

biases: confirmation, optimism,overconfidence .... be

havi

oral

vie

wra

tiona

l vie

w

Lucas rationality

Bayesian rationality Non-Bayesian

Page 5: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

rationalexpectations

biases: confirmation, optimism,overconfidence .... be

havi

oral

vie

w

Lucas rationalitycommon priors

Harsanyi rationality

Bayesian rationality

ratio

nal v

iew

non-common priors

Non-Bayesian

Page 6: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

rationalexpectations

biases: confirmation, optimism,overconfidence .... be

havi

oral

vie

w

Lucas rationalitycommon priors

Harsanyi rationality

Bayesian rationality

ratio

nal v

iew

non-common priors

Non-Bayesian

no disagreementno-trade theorem

Critic:

Page 7: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

rationalexpectations

biases: confirmation, optimism,overconfidence .... be

havi

oral

vie

w

Lucas rationalitycommon priors

Harsanyi rationality

Bayesian rationality

ratio

nal v

iew

non-common priors

Non-Bayesian

no disagreementno-trade theorem

everything goesno structure

Critic:

Page 8: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Overview: Three Main Elements

1 Felicity at t: Et [U (c1, ..., cT )]• Agents care about utility flow today and• expected utility flows in the future⇒ happier if more optimistic

2 No split personality• Distorted beliefs distort actions⇒ better outcomes if more rational

3 Optimal beliefs balance these forces

• Beliefs maximize well-being 1T E

[∑Tt=1 Et [U (c1, ..., cT )]

]

Page 9: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Overview: Three Main Elements

1 Felicity at t: Et [U (c1, ..., cT )]• Agents care about utility flow today and• expected utility flows in the future⇒ happier if more optimistic

2 No split personality• Distorted beliefs distort actions⇒ better outcomes if more rational

3 Optimal beliefs balance these forces

• Beliefs maximize well-being 1T E

[∑Tt=1 Et [U (c1, ..., cT )]

]

Page 10: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Overview: Three Main Elements

1 Felicity at t: Et [U (c1, ..., cT )]• Agents care about utility flow today and• expected utility flows in the future⇒ happier if more optimistic

2 No split personality• Distorted beliefs distort actions⇒ better outcomes if more rational

3 Optimal beliefs balance these forces

• Beliefs maximize well-being 1T E

[∑Tt=1 Et [U (c1, ..., cT )]

]

Page 11: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Outline

1 Optimal Expectations Framework

2 Discussion

3 Related Literature

4 ApplicationsPortfolio ChoiceGeneral EquilibriumConsumption & Savings

5 Conclusion

Page 12: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

The General Framework

Actions: At each t agent chooses ct to maximize felicityt givensubjective beliefs π

(st |s

¯t−1

), and resource constraints.

Felicity at t: Et [U(c1, ..., cT )]with time-separable exponential discounting equals

t−1∑τ=1

βτu (cτ )︸ ︷︷ ︸‘memory’ utility

+ βtu (ct) + Et

[T∑

τ=t+1

βτu (cτ )

]︸ ︷︷ ︸

‘expected’ utility

Note: βs for past consumption could be replaced with δ.

Page 13: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Utility Flow, Felicity and Well-beingfelicity at t = 1

t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8

Page 14: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8

felicity at t = 2

sunk

felicity at t = 3

Well-being ª

t=2

felicity at t = 1Utility Flow, Felicity and Well-being

t=3

Page 15: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Beliefs: At t = 0 optimal beliefs are πOE(st |s

¯t−1

)

��

��

�>

ZZ

ZZ

Z~

����*

HHHHj

����*

HHHHj

����:XXXXz

����:XXXXz

����:XXXXz

����:XXXXz

π

that maximize

Well-being: W = 1T E

[∑Tt=1 Et [U(·)]

]subject to:• agent behavior given these beliefs• πOE

(st |s

¯t−1

)are probabilities

• πOE(st |s

¯t−1

)= 0 if π

(st |s

¯t−1

)= 0

Page 16: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Two-period Example withConsumption at t = 2

t = 1 t = 2

felicity in period 1 βE [u(c2)]felicity in period 2 βu(c2)

Actions maximize felicity: βE [u(c2)]

Beliefs maximize well-being: W = 12βE [u(c2)] + 1

2βE [u(c2)]

Page 17: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Two-period Example withConsumption at t = 2

t = 1 t = 2

felicity in period 1 βE [u(c2)]felicity in period 2 βu(c2)

Actions maximize felicity: βE [u(c2)]

Beliefs maximize well-being: W = 12βE [u(c2)] + 1

2βE [u(c2)]

Page 18: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Discussion

1 Subjective probabilities are chosen once and forever• Bayes’ Rule (LIE) holds,• Can be interpreted as choice of priors

2 If beliefs are objective, wellbeing = felicity• Only incentive to distort beliefs is anticipatory utility gain

3 Rational expectations are optimal only if• anticipatory utility does enter felicities or• anticipatory utility does not enter well-being W.

4 Different memory discounting in felicity• Paper’s results hold qualitatively for any memory

discounting• But can introduce additional incentives to bias beliefs

Page 19: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Discussion

1 Subjective probabilities are chosen once and forever• Bayes’ Rule (LIE) holds,• Can be interpreted as choice of priors

2 If beliefs are objective, wellbeing = felicity• Only incentive to distort beliefs is anticipatory utility gain

3 Rational expectations are optimal only if• anticipatory utility does enter felicities or• anticipatory utility does not enter well-being W.

4 Different memory discounting in felicity• Paper’s results hold qualitatively for any memory

discounting• But can introduce additional incentives to bias beliefs

Page 20: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Discussion

1 Subjective probabilities are chosen once and forever• Bayes’ Rule (LIE) holds,• Can be interpreted as choice of priors

2 If beliefs are objective, wellbeing = felicity• Only incentive to distort beliefs is anticipatory utility gain

3 Rational expectations are optimal only if• anticipatory utility does enter felicities or• anticipatory utility does not enter well-being W.

4 Different memory discounting in felicity• Paper’s results hold qualitatively for any memory

discounting• But can introduce additional incentives to bias beliefs

Page 21: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Discussion

1 Subjective probabilities are chosen once and forever• Bayes’ Rule (LIE) holds,• Can be interpreted as choice of priors

2 If beliefs are objective, wellbeing = felicity• Only incentive to distort beliefs is anticipatory utility gain

3 Rational expectations are optimal only if• anticipatory utility does enter felicities or• anticipatory utility does not enter well-being W.

4 Different memory discounting in felicity• Paper’s results hold qualitatively for any memory

discounting• But can introduce additional incentives to bias beliefs

Page 22: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

... Discussion

5 Frictionless Extreme

6 Why optimal expectations?

• It is optimal: “as if” interpretation• Parents/Upbringing affects (prior) beliefs• Neuroscientific “story”:

prefrontal cortex exerts effort to reduce overoptimism

(subconscious process)

7 Payoff: biases are endogenous• biases are small when distort behavior a lot• large when provide the most expected future utility

Page 23: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

... Discussion

5 Frictionless Extreme

6 Why optimal expectations?

• It is optimal: “as if” interpretation• Parents/Upbringing affects (prior) beliefs• Neuroscientific “story”:

prefrontal cortex exerts effort to reduce overoptimism

(subconscious process)

7 Payoff: biases are endogenous• biases are small when distort behavior a lot• large when provide the most expected future utility

Page 24: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

... Discussion

5 Frictionless Extreme

6 Why optimal expectations?

• It is optimal: “as if” interpretation• Parents/Upbringing affects (prior) beliefs• Neuroscientific “story”:

prefrontal cortex exerts effort to reduce overoptimism

(subconscious process)

7 Payoff: biases are endogenous• biases are small when distort behavior a lot• large when provide the most expected future utility

Page 25: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Related Literature

1 Adam Smith (1776)“That the chance of gain is naturally overvalued, ...”“That the chance of loss is frequently undervalued, ...”

2 Anticipatory utility (‘Pleasure of Expectation’):• Bentham, Hume, Bohm-Barwerk, Marshall, Loewenstein,• Geanakopolis-Pearce-Stacchetti, Caplin-Leahy

3 Models of belief distortions:• cognitive dissonance (Akerlof-Dickens),• agents choose beliefs (Yariv and Landier),• intrapersonal (confidence) games (Benabou-Tirole),• cognitive dissonance and overconfidence (Gervais-O’Dean),• procrastination (O’Donoghue-Rabin),...• follow up: link to prospect theory (Gollier), (Glaeser)

Page 26: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Related Literature

1 Adam Smith (1776)“That the chance of gain is naturally overvalued, ...”“That the chance of loss is frequently undervalued, ...”

2 Anticipatory utility (‘Pleasure of Expectation’):• Bentham, Hume, Bohm-Barwerk, Marshall, Loewenstein,• Geanakopolis-Pearce-Stacchetti, Caplin-Leahy

3 Models of belief distortions:• cognitive dissonance (Akerlof-Dickens),• agents choose beliefs (Yariv and Landier),• intrapersonal (confidence) games (Benabou-Tirole),• cognitive dissonance and overconfidence (Gervais-O’Dean),• procrastination (O’Donoghue-Rabin),...• follow up: link to prospect theory (Gollier), (Glaeser)

Page 27: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Related Literature

1 Adam Smith (1776)“That the chance of gain is naturally overvalued, ...”“That the chance of loss is frequently undervalued, ...”

2 Anticipatory utility (‘Pleasure of Expectation’):• Bentham, Hume, Bohm-Barwerk, Marshall, Loewenstein,• Geanakopolis-Pearce-Stacchetti, Caplin-Leahy

3 Models of belief distortions:• cognitive dissonance (Akerlof-Dickens),• agents choose beliefs (Yariv and Landier),• intrapersonal (confidence) games (Benabou-Tirole),• cognitive dissonance and overconfidence (Gervais-O’Dean),• procrastination (O’Donoghue-Rabin),...• follow up: link to prospect theory (Gollier), (Glaeser)

Page 28: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Applications

• Portfolio choice⇒ preference for skewed returns

• General equilibrium⇒ endogenous heterogenous prior beliefs⇒ equity premium puzzle versus long shot phenomena

• Consumption-savings problem with stochastic income⇒ optimism and overconfidence in future income⇒ consumption profiles concave due to “news”⇒ choose incomplete consumption insurance

• Optimal timing of a single task⇒ procrastination, planning fallacy, context effect

Page 29: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Applications

• Portfolio choice⇒ preference for skewed returns

• General equilibrium⇒ endogenous heterogenous prior beliefs⇒ equity premium puzzle versus long shot phenomena

• Consumption-savings problem with stochastic income⇒ optimism and overconfidence in future income⇒ consumption profiles concave due to “news”⇒ choose incomplete consumption insurance

• Optimal timing of a single task⇒ procrastination, planning fallacy, context effect

Page 30: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Applications

• Portfolio choice⇒ preference for skewed returns

• General equilibrium⇒ endogenous heterogenous prior beliefs⇒ equity premium puzzle versus long shot phenomena

• Consumption-savings problem with stochastic income⇒ optimism and overconfidence in future income⇒ consumption profiles concave due to “news”⇒ choose incomplete consumption insurance

• Optimal timing of a single task⇒ procrastination, planning fallacy, context effect

Page 31: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Applications

• Portfolio choice⇒ preference for skewed returns

• General equilibrium⇒ endogenous heterogenous prior beliefs⇒ equity premium puzzle versus long shot phenomena

• Consumption-savings problem with stochastic income⇒ optimism and overconfidence in future income⇒ consumption profiles concave due to “news”⇒ choose incomplete consumption insurance

• Optimal timing of a single task⇒ procrastination, planning fallacy, context effect

Page 32: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Portfolio Choice

• Setup

1 Two period problem:invest in period 1, consume in period 2

2 Two assets:a risk-free asset, return R; a risky asset, return R + Z

3 Uncertainty:S > 2 states, πs > 0 for s = 1 to S ,Zs < Zs+1, Z1 < 0 < ZS

4 c ≥ 0 in all states

Page 33: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Portfolio Choice

• Setup

1 Two period problem:invest in period 1, consume in period 2

2 Two assets:a risk-free asset, return R; a risky asset, return R + Z

3 Uncertainty:S > 2 states, πs > 0 for s = 1 to S ,Zs < Zs+1, Z1 < 0 < ZS

4 c ≥ 0 in all states

Page 34: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Portfolio Choice

• Setup

1 Two period problem:invest in period 1, consume in period 2

2 Two assets:a risk-free asset, return R; a risky asset, return R + Z

3 Uncertainty:S > 2 states, πs > 0 for s = 1 to S ,Zs < Zs+1, Z1 < 0 < ZS

4 c ≥ 0 in all states

Page 35: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Portfolio Choice

• Setup

1 Two period problem:invest in period 1, consume in period 2

2 Two assets:a risk-free asset, return R; a risky asset, return R + Z

3 Uncertainty:S > 2 states, πs > 0 for s = 1 to S ,Zs < Zs+1, Z1 < 0 < ZS

4 c ≥ 0 in all states

Page 36: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Portfolio ChoiceStage 2: Agent maxα β

∑Ss=1 πsu (R + αZs)

FOC: 0 =S∑

s=1

πsu′ (R + αZs) Zs ⇒ α∗(π)

Stage 1: Choose πs to maximize well-being

1

S∑s=1

πsu (R + α∗Zs)︸ ︷︷ ︸felicity at t = 1

+1

S∑s=1

πsu (R + α∗Zs)︸ ︷︷ ︸‘average’ utility at t = 2

FOC:β

2(uS − us′)︸ ︷︷ ︸

benefits of anticipation

2

S∑s=1

πsu′ (R + α∗Zs) Zs

dα∗

d πs′︸ ︷︷ ︸costs of changed behavior

Page 37: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Portfolio ChoiceStage 2: Agent maxα β

∑Ss=1 πsu (R + αZs)

FOC: 0 =S∑

s=1

πsu′ (R + αZs) Zs ⇒ α∗(π)

Stage 1: Choose πs to maximize well-being

1

S∑s=1

πsu (R + α∗Zs)︸ ︷︷ ︸felicity at t = 1

+1

S∑s=1

πsu (R + α∗Zs)︸ ︷︷ ︸‘average’ utility at t = 2

FOC:β

2(uS − us′)︸ ︷︷ ︸

benefits of anticipation

2

S∑s=1

πsu′ (R + α∗Zs) Zs

dα∗

d πs′︸ ︷︷ ︸costs of changed behavior

Page 38: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Portfolio ChoiceStage 2: Agent maxα β

∑Ss=1 πsu (R + αZs)

FOC: 0 =S∑

s=1

πsu′ (R + αZs) Zs ⇒ α∗(π)

Stage 1: Choose πs to maximize well-being

1

S∑s=1

πsu (R + α∗Zs)︸ ︷︷ ︸felicity at t = 1

+1

S∑s=1

πsu (R + α∗Zs)︸ ︷︷ ︸‘average’ utility at t = 2

FOC:β

2(uS − us′)︸ ︷︷ ︸

benefits of anticipation

2

S∑s=1

πsu′ (R + α∗Zs) Zs

dα∗

d πs′︸ ︷︷ ︸costs of changed behavior

Page 39: Discussion Optimal Expectations - Princeton …ationality Bayesian ra tionality rational view non-common priors Non-Bayesian Optimal Expectations Brunnermeier & Parker Framework Discussion

OptimalExpectations

Brunnermeier& Parker

Framework

Discussion

Literature

Applications

Portfolio Choice

GeneralEquilibrium

Consumption &Savings

Conclusion

Proposition Excess risk takingdue to optimism

(i) Agents are optimistic about states with high portfolio payout

if α∗ > 0,S∑

s=1(πs − πs) u′ (R + α∗Zs) Zs > 0;

if α∗ < 0,S∑

s=1(πs − πs) u′ (R + α∗Zs) Zs < 0.

(ii) Agents go even more long (short) than agent with RE orin the opposite directionif E [Z ] > 0, then α∗ > αRE > 0 or α∗ < 0;if E [Z ] < 0, then α∗ < αRE < 0 or α∗ > 0;

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Preference for Skewed Returns

• Empirical Phenomena:• Horse race long shots: Golec and Tamarkin (1998)• Lottery demand: Garrett and Sobel (1999)• Security design? Swedish lottery bonds, PS-Lotteriesparen

• Setup• 2 states with payoffs: Z1 < 0 < Z2,• hold variance and mean fixed and E [Z ] < 0

-

Z1 0 Z2

π1

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Preference for Skewed Returns

• Empirical Phenomena:• Horse race long shots: Golec and Tamarkin (1998)• Lottery demand: Garrett and Sobel (1999)• Security design? Swedish lottery bonds, PS-Lotteriesparen

• Setup• 2 states with payoffs: Z1 < 0 < Z2,• hold variance and mean fixed and E [Z ] < 0

-

Z1 0-

Z2

increase skewness

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Proposition Skewness

An agent with an unbounded utility function holds some of theasset even though its mean payoff is negative if the payoff issufficiently skewed.

• Remark:• Agent goes long for large π1 even though E [Z ] < 0, since

• there is not much room to short and distort beliefs• shorting becomes very risky

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General Equilibrium

• Empirical Phenomena:• betting & gambling• high trading volume (stock and FX market)• home bias⇐ endogenous heterogenous prior beliefs?• negatively skewed: equity premium puzzle• positively skewed: IPO underperformance, long-shots

• Setup:The portfolio choice problem with

• A continuum of agents with identical endowments• A fixed supply of ‘bonds’ with normalization R = 1• The risky asset in zero net supply: 1 + Zs = 1+εs

Pe

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General Equilibrium

• Empirical Phenomena:• betting & gambling• high trading volume (stock and FX market)• home bias⇐ endogenous heterogenous prior beliefs?• negatively skewed: equity premium puzzle• positively skewed: IPO underperformance, long-shots

• Setup:The portfolio choice problem with

• A continuum of agents with identical endowments• A fixed supply of ‘bonds’ with normalization R = 1• The risky asset in zero net supply: 1 + Zs = 1+εs

Pe

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Proposition HetereogeneousPriors

For S > 2 agents split into two groups with different beliefs

(i) Optimists with E i[ZOE

]> 0 and αOE ,i > 0 = αRE

(ii) Pessimists with E j[ZOE

]< 0 and αOE ,j < 0

both groups trade against each other and {πi} 6= {π} 6= {πj}.• Example

• u (c) = 11−γ c1−γ with γ = 3,

• π1 = 0.25, π2 = 0.75,• ε1 = −0.6, ε2 = 0.2 so PRE = 1.

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Proposition HetereogeneousPriors

For S > 2 agents split into two groups with different beliefs

(i) Optimists with E i[ZOE

]> 0 and αOE ,i > 0 = αRE

(ii) Pessimists with E j[ZOE

]< 0 and αOE ,j < 0

both groups trade against each other and {πi} 6= {π} 6= {πj}.• Example

• u (c) = 11−γ c1−γ with γ = 3,

• π1 = 0.25, π2 = 0.75,• ε1 = −0.6, ε2 = 0.2 so PRE = 1.

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0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

Figure: Wellbeing as a function of subjective beliefs, π2

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In this example, as we vary the economic environment, beliefschange . . .POE > PRE = 1 if payoff is positively skewed (long-shots, IPO)POE < PRE = 1 if payoff is negatively skewed (stock market).

Conjecture

For multi-asset case with positive net supply:� Heterogeneity in beliefs is less pronounced.� Agents invest in different skewed assets

(forgo diversification benefits to hold skewed assets.)

Complicates Aggregation:Representative agent has different preference structure fromindividual (possibly identical) investors.

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In this example, as we vary the economic environment, beliefschange . . .POE > PRE = 1 if payoff is positively skewed (long-shots, IPO)POE < PRE = 1 if payoff is negatively skewed (stock market).

Conjecture

For multi-asset case with positive net supply:� Heterogeneity in beliefs is less pronounced.� Agents invest in different skewed assets

(forgo diversification benefits to hold skewed assets.)

Complicates Aggregation:Representative agent has different preference structure fromindividual (possibly identical) investors.

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Consumption & Savings

• Empirical Phenomena:• households expect upward sloping consumption profile

(Barsky et al. (1997))• actual average consumption growth is non-positive and

profiles are concave (Gourinchas & Parker (2002))

• Setup:• Finite-lived agent, quadratic utility u(ct) = act − 1

2bc2t ,

• one risk-free asset, Rβ = 1,• i.i.d. income:

Objective prob.: yt independent over time Π(yt |y

¯t−1

)= Π(yt),

dΠ (yt) > 0 for all y ∈[y , y].

Subjective prob.: Π(yt |y

¯t−1

)≥ 0 for all y ∈

[y , y]

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Optimal Consumption

Euler equation:

ct

(At , y

¯t

)= E

[ct+1

(At+1, y

¯t+1

)|y¯t

]Consumption rule:

c∗t

(y¯t

)=

1− R−1

1− R−(T−t)

(At + yt +

T−t∑τ=1

R−τ E[yt+τ |y

¯t

])

Note: c∗t depends only on E[yt+τ |y

¯t

](not higher moments)

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Optimal Consumption

Euler equation:

ct

(At , y

¯t

)= E

[ct+1

(At+1, y

¯t+1

)|y¯t

]Consumption rule:

c∗t

(y¯t

)=

1− R−1

1− R−(T−t)

(At + yt +

T−t∑τ=1

R−τ E[yt+τ |y

¯t

])

Note: c∗t depends only on E[yt+τ |y

¯t

](not higher moments)

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Optimal Beliefs

So ⇒ Variance only lowers anticipatory utility,but does not affect c

⇒ OE exhibit no uncertainty for quadratic utility.Therefore

E[u(c∗t+τ

)|y¯t

]= u

(E[c∗t+τ |y

¯t

])Note: agents who expect risk have the same behavior andlower felicity

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Optimal Beliefs

So ⇒ Variance only lowers anticipatory utility,but does not affect c

⇒ OE exhibit no uncertainty for quadratic utility.Therefore

E[u(c∗t+τ

)|y¯t

]= u

(E[c∗t+τ |y

¯t

])Note: agents who expect risk have the same behavior andlower felicity

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Certainty + Euler equation ⇒ wellbeing simplifies to

1

T

T∑t=1

ψtE[u(c∗t

(y¯t

))]and FOC implies an actual consumption path of

c∗t

(y¯t

)=

a

b− ψt+τ

ψtRτ(a

b− E

[c∗t+τ

(y¯t+τ

)|y¯t

])where ψt = βt−1

(1 +

∑T−tτ=1 (βτ + (βδ)τ )

)

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averageconsumption

path

×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ××average consumption average consumption

path for agent with path for agent with rationalrationalexpectationsexpectations

tT-11 2 3 4 5 T

Figure: Consumption Path

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consumption at consumption at t t = 1= 1for agent with for agent with

optimaloptimal expectationsexpectationsaverageconsumption

path

++overconsumptionoverconsumption((overoptimismoveroptimism))

×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ××

tT-11 2 3 4 5 T

Figure: Consumption Path

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++

×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ××

expected expected consumption consumption path for agent path for agent with optimal with optimal expectationsexpectationsat at t t = 1= 1

consumption at consumption at t t = 1= 1for agent with for agent with

optimal expectationsoptimal expectationsaverageconsumption

path

overconsumptionoverconsumption((overoptimismoveroptimism))

t1 2 3 4 5 T-1 T

Figure: Consumption Path

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1 2 3 4 5 TT-1

×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ××

++

averageconsumption

path

++Reduce consumption Reduce consumption since income in t=2 since income in t=2

was lower than was lower than expectedexpected

t

expected expected consumption consumption path at path at tt = 2= 2

consumption at consumption at t t = 2= 2for agent with for agent with

optimal expectationsoptimal expectations

Figure: Consumption Path

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consumption at consumption at t t = 3= 3for agent with for agent with

optimal expectationsaverage

consumptionpath

optimal expectations

1 2 3 4 5 TT-1

×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ××

++ ++ ++expected expected consumption consumption path at path at tt = 3

Initial overInitial over--consumptionconsumption((overoptimismoveroptimism))

= 3

t

Figure: Consumption Path

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averageconsumption

path

++ ++ ++Initial overInitial over--consumptionconsumption((overoptimismoveroptimism))

++

×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ××

t1 2 3 4 5 T-1 T

Figure: Consumption Path

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averageconsumption

path

1 2 3 4 5 TT-1

+++

×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ×× ccRERE((tt))

++ ++ ++ ++ ++

+++

++

Initial overInitial over--consumptionconsumption((overoptimismoveroptimism))

ccOEOE((tt))

t

Figure: Consumption Path

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Proposition Undersaving

For all t < T

(i) E[∑T−t−1

τ=0 R−τyt+1+τ |y¯t

]> E

[E[∑T−t−1

τ=0 R−τyt+1+τ |y¯t+1

]|y¯t

](ii) c∗t

(y¯t

)> E

[c∗t+1

(y¯t+1

)|y¯t

](iii) E

[c∗t+1

(y¯t+1

)|y¯t

]> E

[c∗t+1

(y¯t+1

)|y¯t

](iv) as T →∞, c∗t

(y¯t

)→ cRE

t

(y¯t

)• Model predictions

• optimism and overconfidence• consumption profile hump-shaped• agent surprised by declining consumption on average• “overconsumption” declines with costs (length of life)

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Proposition Undersaving

For all t < T

(i) E[∑T−t−1

τ=0 R−τyt+1+τ |y¯t

]> E

[E[∑T−t−1

τ=0 R−τyt+1+τ |y¯t+1

]|y¯t

](ii) c∗t

(y¯t

)> E

[c∗t+1

(y¯t+1

)|y¯t

](iii) E

[c∗t+1

(y¯t+1

)|y¯t

]> E

[c∗t+1

(y¯t+1

)|y¯t

](iv) as T →∞, c∗t

(y¯t

)→ cRE

t

(y¯t

)• Model predictions

• optimism and overconfidence• consumption profile hump-shaped• agent surprised by declining consumption on average• “overconsumption” declines with costs (length of life)

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Conclusion

• Rational expectations are sub-optimal:• Agents with rational beliefs makes the ex post best

decisions• but agents that care about the future can be happier with

some optimism• Utility gain determines biases

• Optimal expectations is a structural model of non-rationalbeliefs

• beliefs are most distorted when decision errors are small• beliefs are most distorted when “dream” benefits are

largest• excess risk taking due to optimism, preference for skewness• endogenous heterogenous beliefs; agreeing to disagree• overconfidence, optimism, and lack of consumption

insurance• subjective procrastination, planning fallacy, context effect

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Conclusion

• Rational expectations are sub-optimal:• Agents with rational beliefs makes the ex post best

decisions• but agents that care about the future can be happier with

some optimism• Utility gain determines biases

• Optimal expectations is a structural model of non-rationalbeliefs

• beliefs are most distorted when decision errors are small• beliefs are most distorted when “dream” benefits are

largest• excess risk taking due to optimism, preference for skewness• endogenous heterogenous beliefs; agreeing to disagree• overconfidence, optimism, and lack of consumption

insurance• subjective procrastination, planning fallacy, context effect