discourse and psyche in plato's phaedrus

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DISCOURSE AND PSYCHE IN PLATO'S "PHAEDRUS"Author(s): John McCumberReviewed work(s):Source: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 16, No. 1 (June 1982),pp. 27-39Published by: De GruyterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40913480 .

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DISCOURSE

AND PSYCHE

IN

PLATO'S

PHAEDRUS

The

Phaedrus ontainsmostof

the

doctrines

raditionally

ssociatedwith

Platonism,

hichmakes f it a

very

omplex

ialogue

ndeed.

Opinions

ivide,

though

carcely

ith

latonic

igor,

verwhether

his

omplexity

xpresses

latonic

insightt itsmost nergetic or an overheatedollapse owardsmere iddiness.1

The

two

views

may

not, ndeed,

e

mutually

xclusive.

We,

however,

y

focussing

on

ust

one

threadn

Plato's

tapestry,

nd

showing

ow

much f the

dialogue

on-

tributes

o

ts

development,

ill

ome

down n the

positive

ideof

the

dichotomy.

The

threads

actuallypun

rom

wo eros nd

rhetoric.

cholarlyrguments

over

which

f these s

the

entralheme f the

dialogue

atefrom

ncient

ays,

nd

have ed

to

suspicions

hat he

elationship

etween

hem,

nd

n

fact he

portrayal

of

their

nseparability,

s the

Phaedrus'

nitary

oncern.2

To come

laiming,

s Plato

does,

hat

hetoricnd

eros

ntail ne

nother,

hat

they

re

nseparable

n

occurrence,

s

unusual

ehavior

or

nyone

at east

n

our

time. n

Plato,

s

is

so often

he

ase,

he

trangeness

oth charmsnd lluminates.

But thesis nsupportedxcept y ts wn eductivenesss,whetherrhetorical" r

not,

ertainly

nphilosophical.

ur

problem

ere

s to see

whether

lato'sview

be

t

the

ingle

entral

heme f the

Phaedrus

r

not)

has,

n

addition

o its

undoubted

allure,

hilosophical

oundationsndwork

o do. We

shall

ttempt

o

show,

n

fact,

that

ts

foundation

s

the

heory

f

Forms;

nd

that,

mong

ther

hings,

t

enables

Plato to

resolve

what

we

shall all a

"paradox

f

anguage".

The

paradox

s

of

central

mportance

o

inquiry

tself.

anguage,

n the

one

hand,

ppears

o be

"universal" n

that he

meanings

f

at least

ome

f ts

erms

are the

ame

for

ll

human

eings.

ndeed,

hey

must

e,

if

we are

to claim

hat

truthsan be

stated

with

which ll

men

an

agree

a

possibility

ithout

hich

t

makesittle ense o calloneself scientistrphilosopher.et anguageanalso, t

is

manifest,

peak

n

different

ays

o

different

en:

what

strikes

ome"

to me

may

make

no

sense t all

to the

erson

n

the

next

hair,

r the

next

ountryeven

f

translated

ntohis

anguage;

ven f

ranslations

possible).

f

anguage

ere

urely

"universal",

uch

udience-relative

peech

ught

o be

mpossible,

nd

t

would

be

nice or

hilosophers

nd

cientists

f

t

were.

ut o

deny

he

xistencef

uch

par-

ticular"

anguage,

newouldhave

o

restrict

ne's

gaze,

not

merely

o

the

heavens,

but

o the

ip

of

one's nose

keeping

hat

esolutely

owards

he

fixed

tars.

Two

ways

f

dealing

with his

aradox

an

be

distinguished

or ur

purposes

here.

One

way

wouldbe

to

suppose

hat

here

re

different

evels

r

domains f

language,

ome

xpressing

eanings

nd

truths

dentical

or ll

men,

thers

ot.

One couldundertake,iacross-linguisticomparison,ofind utwhicherms nd

propositions elonged

o

which

trata,

producing

ventually

comprehensive

cataglogue

f

the

whole. t s

ntuitively

oubtful,

owever,

hat

uch

istinctionsf

linguistic

trata

n

fact xist.

Even

f

they

o,

a

further

ype

f

resolution

ould

be

demanded

n ethical

grounds:

henwe ook t

anguage,

ot s

a

field

f

research

n

ts

wn

ight,

ut

n

terms

f thehuman

eings

who

are ts

users.

We

all

grow

p

speaking,

ot

pure

universal

language",

but

various

different

anuguages

English,French,

Chinese,

r

Twi.

Each

expresses,

mong

ther

hings,

set

of

particular

eanings

(e.g.

that

f the

English

mind",

which

annot

e

translated

irectly

nto

rench).

Ifwe arecontentusttoaccept nd ivewithinurparticularanguagendculture,

27



this

presents

o

problem.

But

if

we wishto

criticize,

nd

perhaps

ven to

improve,

them,

we need

larger

tandards

n

terms

f which o do so

-

standardsno

longer

relative o

just

a

single

culture,

ut

in

some sense "universal". Without

ccess to

such

arger

tandards,

ll

language

would remain

ncorrigibly

ribal.

Universal

iscourse,

s

expressing

uch

standards,

s

not on this

view

o be

pur-

suedmerely or ts own sake, as a linguistictratum nto itself. t mustrather e

related o the

particular

ides of

language

n

such a

way

that

hese

an

be

"improv-

ed"

by

t. This meansthat

knowledge

f theuniversal

must

give

us

knowledge

f the

particular

at least of

ways

n

which t needs

to

be

corrected.

And

to do

that,

t

must

give

us

knowledge

f what

n

the

particular

s

already

orrect r

valuable,

and

can be retained.

he

meanings

nd truths

xpressed

n

universal

iscoursemust

hen

include or entail the

positive

lements f

particularmeanings

nd truths.

Only

if

universal nd

particular

omainsof

language

re not

merely

atalogued

eparately,

but

appropriated

o one another

n

such a

fashion,

can the

ethical form

of the

paradox

be resolved.

To

the ancient

Greeks,

who

spoke particular

ialectsof

a

single and

hence,

f

onlyrelatively, universal") language,theproblemwas immediate: f.Protagoras

341

f for an

example.

It is

visible,

think,

behind

the tale

(in Odyssey

X)

of

Polyphemus,

he

Cyclops

who

had no "common council"

even

with

his

fellows,

who looked

upon

outsiders

s mere

food,

and

who,

whenhe lost

his

single

way

of

looking

t

things,

was

blinded

completely.

Within lato's

Athens,

t

was

posed

by

Socrates

himself.

ocrates

was the "child" of the

city,

nd never

as

he tellsus at

Crito

52a-c)

left

t;

he

passed

his ife

peaking

mong

one

of the

most

xtraordinary

populations

n

human

history.

et

he undertook o criticize

adically

his

polis

and

people

-

in

a criticism

hich,

f

it

did

not

base itself n universal

meanings the

Forms) ought,

n

Plato's

view,

to

have done so.

Plato's

interest

n

the

paradox

we

have sketched, nd in an "ethical" resolutionn terms f language-users,would

thus

not be matter or

surprise.3

Such a

resolution

s

presented

n the

Phaedrus,

n thecourse

of

establishing

he

inseparability

f

language

nd

eros. For

rhetoric,

s

finally

efined

here,

mbraces

all discourse

"all

things

aid"

(261 lf);

and the

theory

f eros thatPlato

presents

in

the

guise

of

myth

s

really,

we shall

argue,

a

theory

f

psyche

of the human

soul,

to be

precise,

s

she risesfrom

henaive state

ntowhich he falls

t birth o the

heavenof theuniversal

orms.

n

showing

hatrhetoric

s

erotic, hen,

what

Plato is

attempting

s to

relate

anguage

o

itsusers

nd to render t

ethically

eneficial,

o

to

speak,

for

them.

Moreover,

as

we shall

see,

the

dialogue

has

already

posed

our

paradox

when

the

theory

of

eros

is

propounded.

Making

language

"ethically

beneficial"thusrequires esolving hatparadox.

The

inseparability

f

eros

and rhetoric

s,

on our

reading

of the

Phaedrus,

established

n

two

stages.

First,

n

the

hree et

peeches

f the

dialogue,

he

oncepts

are

portrayed

s

having

estricted

but thoroughly

latonic)

senses,

from

which he

inseparability

s

clear.

In

the

ensuing

conversation,

Plato

first

redefines

"rhetoric"so

s to obliterate

he distinction

etween t and

all

persuasive

iscourse:

all

artful

anguage

omes

to have

an erotic

imension.

his,

of

course,

eems

bsurd

to

us;

but

when,

n the

course

of the

subsequent

iscussion,

he

broadened

oncepts

are

further

larified,

heir

nseparability,

s

again

obvious

-

and Plato's

resolution

of

the

paradox

we are

considering

s evident.

It is importanto our undertaking ot to approach

the Phaedrus

in

terms f

28



views Plato

propounds

elsewhere

n

the

dialogues.

If,

for

example,

we

conceive

rhetoric

n

the

Phaedrus

along

the

lines

presented

t

Gorgias

463e

seq.

and

502d

seq.,

we shall

think f

it as a

purely

public

and

political phenomenon

and be

prone

o

miss hecrucial

'expansion*

of ts

domain.

We

may

then,

n

turn,

e led

to

thinkthat

Plato is

contrasting,

ather

hen

assimilating,

he narrow

and broad

meanings f theterm, nd thence o the viewthatthenarrowerand moreclearly

"Platonic") meaning

is

for

Plato

"good,"

and

the broader

correspondingly

"bad".4

In

fact,

we

shall

argue,

the

Phaedrus is

trying

o

appropriate

he lower

levelsof

discourse nd

soul

to

philosophy,

ot read themout of it. Some

kinds

of

both

are

unavoidably

banished,

but

precisely

for that reason are

of

secondary

interest.5

The

restricted

hesis s

portrayed,

n

a

mythopoetic

ontext,

t

255a-256b. The

lovers,

because

they

re

philosophical,

onfine heir

rotic

elationship

o

discourse;

and,

since

hey

re

essentially

nd

unconditionally

ommitted o each

other,

ll their

discourse

s

portrayed

s

erotic,

But

what,

here,

s

"eros?" What

"discourse"?

Does

either erm

have

any

ascertainable

meaningbeyond

or behind)

the

myth

n

which hey ccur?

Plato

thought

he

problem

f

"demythologising"mportant

nough

to

discuss

it

at the

opening

f the

Phaedrus,

n

a

case with

triking

arallels,

both

n

form nd

content,

o the

myth

ere:

the

egend

f Boreas

and Oreithuia.6

oth the

egend

nd

the

portrayal

f the overs n

the

Palinode are

stories f

divine

possession.

n

one,

the

god

Boreas

snatches

way

άρπάσαι,

29b5)

a little

irl;

n

the

other,

he

overs

"lay

hold

of"

(εφαπτόμενοι,

53a2)

their

particular

od.

The

parallel

s

clearer

f

we

remember

hat,

for

Plato,

divine

possession

s

in

no sense

an

"indwelling

f the

spirit";

as Robin

puts

t,

... le

mot ne

doit

donc

pas

être

ntendu

n ce

sens

que

l'être

seraithabitépar le dieuqui l'inspire.L'hommeinspiré st au

contraire

hors de

lui-même:

e dieu

. . .

l'élève et

le

tient

suspendu

lui comme

des

anneaux

de

fer

ont

suspendus

la

pierre

magnétique.7

Structurally,

oth

myths

re

followed

by

Socrates'

comments n

them;

but,

where

he

myth

f

the

overs s

treated

s

part

of

the

rhetorical

whole n

which

t s

embedded,

hat

of the

child s

discussed

s

myth:

ocrates

ays

that

he will

accept

t

until

he

understandshimself

better.

"Know

thyself"

s

here

interpreted

uite

specifically:

t

means

to know

what

kindof

person

ne is

-

and

to be

a kind

of

per-

son

is

to

resemble

god

(in

the

case of

Socrates,

he

fears,

Typho

the

monster:

23Oa3f).

We have here a generalwarning gainstdemythologising:houghPlato later

states

at

271d2f)

that

here

s

a

determinate

umber

f

types

f

soul,

and

classifies

souls

mythically

ccording

o the

god they

ollow

252c-253c)

and

implicitly

ccord-

ing

to

their

"metaphysical

location"

(on

earth,

in

the

heavens,

in

the

"hyperouranios

opos,"

etc.),

he never

ttempts

non-mythical

ccount

of

soul.

The

reason s

stated

t

246a3f:

t would be a

very

ong

tale,

and

proper

o

gods

to tell

it.

The

implication

s

that,

t the ime f

Plato's

writing,

o

one

understands is

own

soul

well

enough

to

undertake

o

demythologise.

On

the

other

hand,

we

also have one

important

arrant o

demythologise.

or

at

252d-253a,

the

lovers

also

resemble,

n

personality

nd

lifestyle,

he

god they

follow;applyingwhatSocratessays in theBoreas-episode, t seemsclearthat the

29



resemblance onsists

n

having

ouls of

the ame kind.

Further,

he

Palinode's

port-

rayal

of the overs'

shared ikeness o a

god,

and

of

their

ndertaking

o

develop

t

mutually,

s the

portrayal

f

their ove itself.

We

can

then ake

eros,

as

presented

n

the

Palinode,

to

symbolize

he

possession

and cultivation

y

two

people

of

their

common

type

of

soul.

Sucheros,rarified s it s,contrastswith ypes resentedarliern thedialogue.

Closest

to it

-

indeed,

ts

precursor

is

themute

passion

of the oul whichhas

seen

the beloved but does not

yet

dare converse

with

him

250e-252b).

Further

emoved

are,

of

course,

he

cynical

ut

openly

elf-seeking

rrangementsresented

n thefirst

of the

three et

speeches,

nd the

passion

of the self

dissimulating,

et

oherent

nd

thoughtful,

peaker

of

the second. Furthest

emoved,

presumably,

s the

merely

physical

ust of the

very mpure

oul

(250e seq.).

Unlike

eros,

discourse s not

given

a detailed

portrayal

n

the

Palinode;

it is

simply resented

s the

persuasion

nd counsel

the over

gives

o the

oved

253b6f;

255b).

There re detailed ontrasts

o

be

found,

however,

with he

ypes

f discourse

presented

n

the

first

wo

speeches

as

well,

of

course,

as with he

anguished

ilence

ofthe smittenoul in the Palinode itself).We must hereforeiscuss hose peeches

in

some

detail.

The first

peech,

which for

our

purposes

can

be divided into three

parts,

presents

n absolute

minimum

f

communication

etween overs.

n

the

first

art

(230e6-231d6),

the over

s shown

n

terms f

his own

internalmental

processes;

n

the second

231d6-232b5),

over

and

loved are

seen

in

relation

o

society

t

large.

Only

n

the

final

part

232b5-233b6)

are lover

and loved

at last seen

together.

In

the

first ection

in

addition

to his

various

mental cts of calculation

nd

repentence),

he

over

a)

says

that

he

will do whatever

he beloved

asks and that

he

loves

him

only,

and

(b)

admits

that

he is

(mentally)

ick. This

admission,

ike the

liar's paradox,renders urther iscourse mpossible: he overdoes not say things

because

they

re

true,

but

to

please

the beloved

or to

express

his own

feeling

f the

moment

233a5-bl);

whether he other

tatements

e see

him

making

n

this

peech

are

true s

thus,

to

say

the

east,

open

to doubt

cf

231c4).

In

the

second

part,

the

lover

will

depending

n how

we construe

he

Greek)8

ejoice

n the talk of

others

about his

successor

enjoy

boasting

bout

t to

others;

while

hey,

n

turn,

will

ee

the

lovers

alking

ogether

nd

will

gossip.

n thefirst

ase,

the over

ither oes

not talk

at

all or

(once

again)

conveys

nformation

nly

about

himself.

n

the

other,

over

and loved

are seen

to be

talking

διαλεγόμενοι,

32a8f),

but we cannot

conclude

that

they

re

conversing

n

Plato's

technical

ense:

as

the case of

Socrates

howed,

society

t

large

s

hardly

apable

of

distinguishing

ruediscourse

from

ounterfeit.

In thefinal ection, ommunication etween overand lovedis at lastdirectly

portrayed:

s

quarrels

διαφοπας,

232b6f),

as

the lover

discouraging

he beloved

from

onsorting

ith

thers,

nd

as

praise

or

blame

from he

over

which

depend

on

how

he

himself

s

feeling,

ather

han

on

the

genuine

merits r defects

f the

oved.

Even such

"communication"

will

be

assigned

secondary lace,

since

the over

will

be

first

oncerned

with

exploring

he loved

one's

body,

rather han

his character

(τρόπον,

232e4).

The lover

thus

speaks

only

to

express

his own

feelings

r

advance

his

own

in-

terest.

His

"communication"

s a

very

orry

ffair

ndeed,

consisting

n

quarrels,

boasts,

empty

hatter,

nd

speech

necessary

o

prevent

urther

ommunication

such

as his admissionof sickness nd interdiction

f association

with

others).

The same

30



holds,

as

might

be

expected,

for the

speech's portrayal

f

the

non-lover,

whose

discourse s

presented nly

n

negative

erms: t seemsto be for

pleasures

ther han

sex

(though

we are not told

which,

232b4);

he will

not

keep

his loved one from

associating

with

thers

again

from

elf-interest:

e

assumesthat hosewho

shunhis

youth ass

negative

udgment

n

him,

232d5f).

At

233b6ff,

we are told that he

non-

lover administers o the futuredvantage"of thebeloved,butagainthis urns ut

to be

negative:

t

s

ust

thenon-lover's

elatively

mild

expression

f his own mental

state bout the oved

233cl-5);

no

positive

dvice,

and

certainly

o true

dvice,

s

presented.

A

final

triking

eature f this

peech

s the

peaker's gnorance

f the

person

o

whom he is

talking,

s

indicated

by

locutions such as

"if

anxiety

builds

for

you

because

you udge

it to be

difficult.."

(232b5f)

and

"if

you respect

stablished

convention"

231e3)

-

surely

n

early hing

o learn

about

anyone

In

the first

peech,

then,

he

speaker

has

no

knowledge

f his

interlocutor;

e

expresses

nly

his own mental

tate,

nd

speaks

for he ole

purpose

f

gratifying

is

own self-interest.

he result s an

absolute minimum

f

communication,

nd

the

speech ivesup fully oitsown firstwords:"concerningmy ffairs" 230e6). Unless

there

s

something

more for

anguage

to be

about,

discourse f

any very

nteresting

or

worthwhile ind

will

be

impossible.

The second

speech

begins,

"concerning

verything"

237b7),

and

presents

he

opposite,

mpersonal

xtreme f

discourse. ts

innovations re a

matter

f form f

presentation,

ather

hanof content

resented:

he

over

will

seek or

cultivate n

in-

ability

o talk on the

part

of the

beloved

239a3-6),

and

to this end

will

keep

him

from

philosophy

239b4).

He hurls

gross

compliments

nd drunken

nsults t the

other

240e4-6);

he

makes

promises

nd

vows,

but after

eturning

o

rationality

oes

not

keep

them

240e7-241bl);

as made

by

a

madman,

hey

were

rguably

not

"pro-

mises" anyway.

Structurally,

he

peech

falls

ntotwo

parts:

definition,

y

division,

f "love"

(237c-238c);

and a

description,

lso

by

division,

f its

harmful

ffects

238e-241c).

That the

definition

s

by

division s

manifest

cf.

264e

seq.);

that the rest

of the

speech

s as well

is

less

so,9

but a

partial

recapitulation

f it

should

establish

he

point.

The

general

topic

is

"why

the

lover,

as

defined,

hould

not

be

accepted;"

it

divides

nto

two

parts:

the

over

gives

neither

dvantage

238e-240a)

nor

pleasure

(240b-241c)

to the

oved. As

to

advantage:

the

overwill

harm

he

oved

n

ntellect,

body,

and

possessions.

He will

harm

the

intellect n

regard

both to

itself nd

to

others.

With

respect

o

itself,

he

ntellect

ill

be

kept

from

hilosophy

nd

harmed

ineachof tsfourvirtues.10 ithrespect oothers, he overwillkeepthe ovedfrom

profitable

and

especially

hilosophical)

discourse

with

hem.As

to the

oved

one's

body,

t will

be

damaged

with

regard

o

itself

oth

n

"substance"

(it

will

be

weak

and

soft)

nd in

"accidents"

(the

oved will

use an

excess

of

cosmetics).

With

respect

to

others,

he

damaged

body

will

ow

fear

mong

his

friends nd

comfort

mong

his

enemies.As

to

possessions,

harm

will

come in

three

ways:

the

overwill

attempt

o

deprive

the

beloved of

(a)

personal

relationships

with

equals,

superiors,

nd

in-

feriors,

b)

real

property,

nd

(c) money.

The

divisions

ontinue

ediously

hrough

he ack

of

pleasure

from

lover,

but

further

ursuit

f detail

s

perhaps

unnecessary.

hough

the

general

process

of divi-

sion

here

s clear,there s a confusion s to theprinciples ctuating tsindividual

31



steps.

Some

spring

rom he

kind

of

analysis

f deas described t 265e-266b

where

this

peech's

definition f

soul

is

given

s an

example).

Others,however,

make

use

of what

appears

to

have been

ordinary

Athenian)

ommon

ense,

such as

the divi-

sion into

mind,

body,

and

possessions,

nd

the

treatmentf

personal

relationships

as

possessions.

The speakerdoes not distinguishhedivisionsmade via conceptualanalysis

from hose

n

accordance

with ommon

sense,

and

this

failure

o

discriminate

he

necessary

rom

he

agreed-upon

mirrors n

ambiguity

n

the

speech's concept

of

definition:

Most

people

do

not

know

that

hey

re

gnorant

f the ssence

ούσίαν)

of each

thing.

As

already knowing,'

hey

o

not reach

full

greement

n

the

beginn-

ing

of

the

nvestigation"237c2-4).

One

wonderswhether he

definitions to

remedy

the

gnorance

r the

discord;

as Sinaiko

points

out,

"the

initial

notion

of a

defini-

tion

s

expressing nowledge

f the

nature f a

thing

lmost

mmediately

asses

nto

another

onception

f definition

s

agreement

etween

heconcerned

arties

bout

the nature f

a

thing."11

The first

onception

s not

n

this, think,

wholly

bandoned.

The definition

s

nota "pure" agreementnthe ensethat t couldbe changed twillbytheparties o

it,

but formulates

standard

ccording

o which he entire

nvestigation

ust

pro-

ceed

(237dlf).

In

that

sense,

the definition

xpresses

knowledge

f

a

selfsame,

n-

during

"essence."

But it is an essence

constituted

hrough

he

agreement

n

its

definition

cf.

237dl,

taking

μολογίςι

s an instrumental

ative).

f such

an

essence

can

be said to

"exist",

the

definition

erefits

what R.E. Allen

has called the

tradi-

tional

and,

indeed,

the

contemporary)

ccount of

real definition:

s a "nominal

definition

lus

an existence-claim".

ut

this s

not,

Allen

argues,

what

Plato

meant

by

definition,

hich

s

"analysis

of

essence".12

ndeed,

formulating

heessence

via

dialectical

analysis")

can

be

distinguished

rom

ositing

t

by

"agreement")

only

if hedefiniendumxistsndependentlyf thatformulation only f,forPlato, it s

a Form.

Such

is not

thecase

for he

econd

speaker,

who

never

mentions heForms

and

who cannot

distinguish

heresults

f a

priori

onceptual

nalysis

from

he

data

of common

ense.

Tied to

this,

perhaps

surprisingly,

s another haracteristic

f the

speech:

the

description

f

consequences

where

he

istener

ught

personally

o be

addressed,

f

the

speaker

wishes to

persuade

him)

is

entirely eneral,

nd without

eference o

either

peaker

r

hearer s

individuals. he latter

s not

addressed nce

after he

pro-

cess of

division

ets

under

way

at

237d3;

for herest

f

the

speech,

he is referred

o

in the

third

erson.

This is

in contrast

o the

Palinode,

where he

youth

s addressed

at

least

eight

imes,

nd to

the

first

peech 23

times).

The content

f

the

speech as

we haveseen npart)merelynumeratesheevilconsequences or ny youthnhav-

ing

lover;

t takes

no account

of characteristics

hich

might

et

ts hearer ff

from

other

youths.

This

again

contrasts

with he

Palinode,

where he

speech

s

avowedly

for

Phaedrus'

sake

243e6f;

257a5)

and

contributes,

t

dialogue's

end,

to

convincing

him;

even

the

first

peaker,

s we

have

noted,

s

able to make

a few

blind

stabs at

what

his hearer

may

be

like

231e3,

232b5f).

As to

the

upposed

peaker,

he s entire-

ly

hidden

behind

his

complicated

issimulation

s

a non-lover

237b2-6),

ust

as

the

real

speaker,

Socrates,

is

hidden behind

his

cloak

(237a).

The non-lover

the

pretended

dentity

f

the

speaker

is not

discussed

t all.

The connection

of

this to

the

dialogue's

concept

of definition

an

only

be

adumbrated ere. t seemsclearenough,however, hat he secondspeaker, hough

32



he has

gotten

eyond

the

purely

ubjective

ndividualism

f

the

first,

an come to

know another

human

being

no

more than he. For the second

speaker

tructures

is

speech,

s he

indicates

237c8-d3),

entirely

n the

knowledge iven

him

by

defini-

tion;

and one cannot

defineforoneself

he nature f anotherhuman

being,

who is

neither

posited

ssencenor a common-sense-datum.ustwhat

he is remains o

be

seen,and then heproblemwith he secondspeechwillbe learer.For now, t s evi-

dent hat ts

peaker,

f

he

is

not to

fallback

into

the

ubjectivity

f the

first

peaker,

must

keep

his discourse

purely

niversal.

We can now

see what

discourse,

s

presented

n

the

Palinode,

must

be

in

order

to contrast

with hat

presented

n

the

previous

peeches.

First,

t

cannot

be

merely

subjective;

o do

anything

more

than

express

ne's

own mental

processes

nd

try

o

get

others

to accede to

them,

discourse

must have some kind of

intersubjective

validity.

ut this annotbe all that

t

has,

forthen t would

be

entirely

universal"

in

scope.

The second

speech

hows that

discourse

mustbe able to

speak

specifically

to

certain

ndividuals,

nd

thereby oses

the

paradox

we

have sketched.

We can outline

a

quintessentially

latonic

way

it would be resolved.

f

the

meanings evealed n definitions ere not established ythosedefinitions, utex-

isted

ndependently

f such

agreements;

nd

if

they

not

merely

id

so,

but were

recognizably though

n

different

ays)

instantiated

n

sensible

ndividuals;

then

they

would

give

us

knowledge

of those individuals.

n

particular,

he

meaning

"man",

once

defined,

would

give

us

rigorous if

doubtless

ncomplete) nowledge

of human ndividuals.

If we

look at the

Palinode,

with the

theory

of Forms

explicitly resent

(247c

-e3;

249e4-250c6)

and

the

symbolic

f eros

unpacked

as we have

done,

we

come a

long

way

towards uch

a Platonic

solution.

As we

have

seen,

to

engage

n

a

love

affair uch as the

Palinode

portrays

s

to resemble

god,

i.e. to have a certain

typeof soul. Further, o "know oneself" is to know whichgod one resembles, r

what

type

of soul one has. The

lovers

n

the Palinode

know their

ommon

type

of

soul,

and can aim their

discourse o foster heir

mutual

resemblance o their

om-

mon

god.

But

they

lso have

available to them he

bstract

onceptual rocedures

f

the econd

speaker,

with

knowledge

f the

Formsto

"guarantee"

that

divisions re

made

according

o theForms

or

"natural

oints,"

265elf),

rather han

ccording

o

common-sense

greement.

heirdiscourse s

not

merely particular",

but "univer-

sal" as well. Some of

it,

"according

to Forms"

(249b7),

would be

valid

for

ll

per-

sons;

the rest

would "strike

home" to

some

people,

but not

to others.

The

erotic

paideia

of the

Palinode thus

portrays

solutionto the

paradox

of

language

we sketched

arlier.

But,

as

such a

solution,

he

ove

portrayed

as at

least

three roblems. n thefirst lace, t srestrictedo a singular etofcircumstances:o

the discourseof

erotic

paideia.

The

interplay

f

universal nd

particular

evels

of

discoursereaches

far wider

-

into

statecraft,

aw

courts,

nd

diplomacy,

not to

mention uch

modern

phenomena

as

international

ongresses

of

scientists

nd

savants. Plato has

restricted ros

to

discourse nd

vice-versa

y

defining

oth

in

terms

f

the

theory

f

Forms. But the

new

meanings,

hough

most

Platonic,

are far

too narrow o

resolve he

broader

paradox

of

language.

Second,

even

within tsown

sphere,

he

olution s

whatwe

earlier

haracterised

as

"cataloguing",

rather

han

"appropriating".

This

can

be seen

by

considering

he

possibilities

f

communication

mong

souls of

different

ypes.

None

is

portrayed:

though t 247a-c followers f all thedifferentods are portrayed s capable of

33



attaining

he

visionof

the

Forms,

t

252c-253c

Zeus-type peak

only

o

Zeus-types,

Hera-types nly

to

Hera-types,

nd

so on.

Indeed,

t s not shown

that

Zeus-type

attempting

o

speak

to a

Hera-type

would

be

better ff

hanthe

econd

speaker:

he

could

converse

with uch

a soul

on a

purely

niversal,

uman

evel,

but

would

not

know and

could

not take

into account

the

particular

nature

of

the other

soul.

Knowledge f theuniversal, ere,does notprovideknowledge ftheparticular; he

content

of the

latter

falls outside the former.

The resolution

here

portrayed

s

ethically

nadequate,

hen,

nd

does

not

ive

up

to the

portrait

f

Socrates,

he

Zeus-

type

250b7)

who

is

shown

throughout

he

dialogues

conversing

with

haracters

s

diverse s

Euthyphro,

rotagoras,

Crito,

and Callicles.

Finally,

we have no

certainty

and,

given

he

mythopoetic

ature

f

Plato's

treatment ere of the different

ypes

of

soul,

every

reason

to

doubt

-

that

the

number

f

types

f

soul

is

knowable.

Plato

mentions

welve

247a2),

but

what

fnew

ones

kept ropping p?

What

f

there

were billion?

What

f

every

uman

being

had

a

different

ype

of soul

-

how

would erotic

paideia

be

possible

at all?

To answer the

latter wo

difficulties

ould

be

fairly imple

for

Plato

//

he

"gods", paradigms and obviously ternal nes) ofdifferentypes fsoul,were n-

terpreted

s Forms

hemselves

as

subtypesin

some

sense

we,

ike

Plato,

shall

not

discuss

here)

of a Form

of soul

which

we shall

similarly

ot

discuss).

We could

then

have

knowledge

f the

different

ypes

f

soul

by

division.

t would

be

possible

n

principle

o demonstrate

ow

many

f

them

here re

and,

since

therealm

of

Forms

is said

to be

completely

nowable

at

247c

seq.),

there

s

no

reason

to think

hey

would

be

impracticably

many.

Knowledge

of

the

types

of

soul,

obtained

via

"universal"

discourse,

would

then

give

ts

possessor

knowledge

f souls

differing

n

type

from

his own.

He could converse

ppropriately

ithdifferent

orts

of

person.

To

respond

o

the

first

ifficulty,

owever,

equires

longer

oad.

Plato

would

havetoexpand"eros" and "discourse" from he pecific ituation ferotic aideia

and show

how universal

nd

particular

trata f both

can

function

n wider

fields f

human

nteraction.

he

route,

ndeed,

s

impossibly

ong;

but

Plato,

as

we shall

see,

maps

it out

programmatically

n

the

second,

conversational

art

of

the

dialogue.

In that

part,

xplicit

ttention

s

on

"rhetoric;"

but

the term omes

to

have,

at

261c4-d9,

an

extremely

road

application.

It

covers,

not

merely

awsuits

and

"public

harangues",

but

also the

kind of

thingpractised

n

small

groups

by

"the

Palamedes of

Elea",

Zeno. Since

(as

Plato

tellsus

at Parmenides

127b)

Zeno

was

said

to

have

engaged

n erotic

paideia,

"rhetoric"

presumably

ncludes

he

kind of

thing depicted

n the

Palinode.13

n addition to

private

conversation,

ne

can

rhetorically

ddress

nyone

n the

city

via

public

peeches),

r

even

273e5ff)

god.

One's topiccan be anything hich s like orunlike, ne ormany 26 d) - anything

at all.

Rhetoric

thus

covers

speech

with

anyone

about

anything;

nd,

since

misperception

f

like

and unlike

re

necessary

or

false belief

262b2f),

rhetoric

s

concerned

with

getting

eople

to

believe

ruly

r

falsely,

nd

merges

inally

ntothe

"art

of

discourse"

itself:

"περί

πάντα

τα

λεγόμενα

μία τις

τέκνη

εΐπερ

έστιν

(261elf).

Lacking

n

this

passage

and,

I

believe,

onspiciously o)

is

any

ndication

hat

the

art of

rhetoric

as

subspecies

proper

o the

various

social

contexts

nd

subjects

that

can

be

handled

rhetorically:

he

"single

art"

seems to

be

(as

it

is on

Gorgias'

view,

Gorgias

456a-457c) homogenous

n

all

its different

pplications.

The lack

is

conspicuous because it makes thingsrhetoricallymore difficult or

Socrates.

34



Phaedrus

s

surprised

t

rhetoric's

ast extension nd

has

difficulty

ollowing

he

argument

cf

261b5;

262c7f;

262d7). Making

the

art

complex,

rather

han

uniform,

would

presumably

essen

the

shock and make assent

easier,

but Socrates

avoids

it.

This

self-uniformity

f

rhetoric

repares

what,

for the modern

reader,

s a

much

greater

urprise.

f

the

discourse

whichwas shown

n

the Palinode

to

be

in-

separablefrom ros has now been shown to be homogenouswith all persuasive

speech,

we

cannot

but

concludethat ll such

speech

s

inescapably

rotic.

This

ap-

pears

at first

o be

both a

monumental

bsurdity

nd an

insult o the

wingedgod,

who would

assuredly

not want to

be

connected

with much of what

passes

for

discourse

n

ancient nd

modern

ociety.

But,

as we shall

see,

Plato

gives

us

enough

clues to

interpret

he

broadened

ensesof "eros" and "discourse"

in

a

way

sensible

but not

insolent,

nd whichdoes not

rely

n unwarranted

emythologizing.

In

criticizing

he first

wo

speeches,

ocratesdiscusses

dialectic,

whichhe iden-

tifies

(266b7-cl)

with the methods of collection

(265d3-7)

and division

(265el-266bl).

Collection

nds

in

definition f a

single

Form

265d3f),

whiledivi-

sion

begins

nd ends with uch

as

shown t

265elf). Knowledge

f the Forms thus

guarantees he correct pplication f the twomethods,nthe sense that twillkeep

their

sers from he second

speaker's

error f

mixing

ommon-sense-datanto

his

conceptual nalyses.

That

speech,

then,

howed

ndirectly

hat

knowing

he

Forms

was

necessary

o

being

able to divide

correctly.

Now we see that

knowledge

f a

Form s sufficientor

being

ble

to

perform

ollection nd

division

with

espect

o

it

(though

or he

former,

f

course,

he

knowledge

may

be

"forgotten",

f.

250al-8).

That

all

men

have seen the

Forms

s

stated

mythically

n

the Palinode

(249b5;

249e4-250al).

If

knowing

heForms s

necessary

o

collection

nd

division,

t s

im-

plied

outside hecontext f

myth y

Socrates' statement hat

division nd collection

enable

him

and, presumably,

ll

men)

to

think

nd

speak

266b3-5).

We thenhave

warrant o take literally he statement f the Palinode that all human beings

"understandwhat s

spoken

according

o Forms"

(249b6f);

this,

one

assumes,

n-

cludes

both collection nd

division,

houghonly

the

former s

mentioned.

Thus, dialectic,

r collection nd

division

ccording

o

Forms,

s

discourse hat

all

persons

an

follow;

t

s in

that ense

"universal"

discourse

though

ll

may

not

follow t

equally

well,

or understand

hy

t

works).

What sense

can

we

now make of

"universal

ros"?

Plato,

one would

hope,

was

not so

obstinately

blivious

o thefacts f ife s

to

maintain

hatwe

are

only

ttracted

o

people

who have the ame kind

of soul as we.

For

proof,

we

need not turn

o

Alcibiadesand

Socrates

n

the

Symposium;

we

need

only

ook at the

precursor

f erotic

paideia,

the mute

passion

of the smitten

oul

presentedt 251a-252b.

This

experience

ccurs

prior

o the

selection f a

lover on the

basis of shared

soul

type.

The

passion

s

aroused,

not

by

the

oved

one's

likeness o a

"god,"

but

by

his

resemblance

o a

Form: the

Beautiful.

Beauty, says

Plato,

assumes this

role

because it

is thatForm

"most

manifest o

sense,

and

most

charming

f them

ll"

(25Od7f).

We

may

suggest

hat

t

functions s a

token

for the

domain of

Forms n

general,

nd that he

resemblance f

the oved

one is

to the

entire

ealm

of

Forms,

not

solely

o theBeautiful.14uch

generic

esemblances

stated

more

clearly

or he

smitten

oul

herself;

he is

only

smitten

ecause,

prior

o

birth,

he

saw

the

Forms

(249d5-el).

At that

ime,

oul and Forms

resembled

ach other n

being

whole and

unblemished" ολόκληροι, 250cl-4).15We may thenconclude that,as the love

35



between

wo

persons

of

the same

soul-type

s the

development

f

their

ikeness

o

(and memory

f:

252a2f)

a

"god",

so the ove

among

people

not

of

the ame

type

"universal" eros

-

is founded

n

their

ikeness

to,

and

memory

f,

the Forms

themselves.

That

discourse nd

eros,

n

these "univeral"

senses,

re

inseparable

for

Plato

is, I think, lear.A personcannot undertake o develophis innate ikeness o the

Formswithout

peaking

nd

thinking

ialectically

ith

thers;

nd

one cannot

prac-

tise dialectic

without

gaining

nsight

nto

the

Forms,

thus

developing,

for

oneself

and one's

interlocutors,

he common

human ikeness

o

the

Forms.

Socreates

peaks

of

thenature

f

discourse

mongpeople

of the ame

soul-type

at

271a-274b,

in

discussing

he "true" rhetoric

n

opposition

o

the debased forms

he

finds around

him in

Athens. The

two

differ

n

that

the

true rhetorician as

knowledge

f

the

soul,

of

its

parts,

nd

-

recurred

o

at

greatest

ength

of

its

types 271bl-5;

271cl0-272b2;

273d8-e7).

There are a finite umber

f

these,

nd

different

ypes

of

discourse

λόγος)

will

persuade

each

more

readily.

Thus,

as

distinct

rom

universal

discourse,

which

ends

with

and,

in

the case

of

division,

beginsfrom) efinitionfForms,we haveparticularypes fdiscoursewhich nd n

persuasion.

They

nclude,

not

merely rguments

rom

remisses

o

conclusions

not

"guaranteed"

by

the

Forms,

but also rhetorical

igures

272a4f)

and

even

mythsthe

story

of

Theuth

s

called a

"λόγος"

at

275b4;

the

Palinode

itself,

t 257cl

and

249d4).

We have seen that

the view that

types

f

soul are

Forms would

permit

true

resolution

f the

paradox

of

language.

Plato uses

similar

anguage

to

describe

he

soul's

relationship

o

both

kinds

of

eternal

paradigm

e.g.,

as we have

seen,

"resemblance"

and

"memory").

At

271d4,

Plato

finally ays

thatthetrue

rhetori-

cian attains

his

knowledge

f the different

ypes

f

soul

by

division

διηρη

μένων).

This suggests hat "soul" is not forPlato an "άτμητον" (277b7) and thatthe

various

types

of

soul are

(somehow )

for

him

Forms

(they

are called

"είδη"

at

271d2,4

and

"γένη"

at

271b2;

at

230a6,

Socrates

had said thathe

"participated"

n

some

particular ot).

The view that

types

f

soul are

Forms,

now

implied, xplains

(as

we have

seen)

how

knowledge

f the Forms universal

nowledge,

vailable

n

principle

o

all

persons

can

give knowledge

f the

particular;

nd

it

explains

s

well

Plato's

confidence

that

the different

ypes

of

soul can

be

numbered

nd

known.16

Plato's

answer

to

the

paradox

of

language

earlier

ketched s

now

clear.

The

nature

f

anguage

annot

be understood

part

from

n

understanding

f

the

beings

who

use

it. Those

beings

re

humans,

nd humans

like

all

other

beings

for

Plato)

arewhatthey rethroughheir elation oForms herepresenteds resemblance.

Because

the human

soul

can resemble

nd

know the

Forms,

it

can use

language

whose

meanings

are

universal,

and

can

perform

onceptual

operations

whose

universality

s

"guaranteed"

by

those

meanings.

he

purpose

f these

perations,

s

dialectical,

s

to

come

to

see

the

reality

whichdiscourse

xpresses:

t

aims,

we

may

say,

at

providing

nderstanding.

pposed

to

this,

n

Plato's

view,

s

language

which

aims at

providing

ersuasion,

r

agreement

o

propositions

ot

"guaranteed" by

the

Forms.This

s

a

function

f the

particular

ype

f

soul

the nterlocutors

ave,

and is

language

which

will affect ome

people

but

not

others.

Since

even these

particular

types

f

soul

are what

they

re because

they

articipate

n

Forms,

the

two

realms

f

languageare "appropriated" to one another: he content f theparticulars to be

36



found

within he

universal,

nd

knowledge

f the former

ives

knowledge

f the

latter.

The

paradox

s resolved

by

the

Theory

f Forms. t remains or he

speaker

of

the second

speech,

who

as we saw fails

to

distinguish

etween definition s

somethinggreed

upon

and as

expressing eality.

We

can now see his dilemma

more

clearly. fthe greementn a definitionsnotknowledge fa Form, t mustbe per-

suasion,

and mustbe

grounded

n

the

nature

of

the

souls who

agree.

The

speaker

cannot

xpect

o

persuade

he

youth

with

λόγοι

whichhe does

not

understand

but

this

means,

for

him,

by λόγοι

withwhichhe

does

not

agree. Similarly,

e

mustuse

λόγοι

which the

youth

will

understand,

.e.

with which he

will

agree.

Since the

second

speaker

s not a true

rhetorician,

nd

does not know whether he

youth

will

assent

to

arguments

e

personally

inds

persuasive,

he must

resort

o those

per-

suasive to

every

Athenian

-

or

else fall

into

the blind

conjectures

of

the

first

speaker.

Socrates,

by

contrast,

s a true rhetorician: e has a fund of

λόγοι

in-

cludingμύθο

-

λόγοι),

whichhe can use on interlocutors ithout imself

ssenting

to them.

He can

converse

n

appropriate

ways

with ll kindsof

people.

John

McCumber,

College

of

Arts,

Sciences,

and

Letters,

Dearborn,

Michigan.

U.S.A.

Notes

1. Schleiermacher

riginally ut

the

matter hus:

". . .

the existence

n

the

Phaedrus of the

germs

f

nearly

hewholeof

[Plato's] system

s

hardly

o

be

denied;

butthen

heir

ndeveloped

tate s

quite

as

clear,

and at the same time heir

mperfectionetrays

tself

. ."

Schleiermacher,

.E.D.

Introduc-

tions

o

the

Dialogues

of

Plato

(Dobson,

Wm.,

tr.

London, Parker,

1836) p.

68. For

examples

f the

"giddiness" view, cf. the discussionby Rodis-Lewis, Geneviève,"L'Articulation des thèmesdu

Phèdre",

Revue

Philosophique

de France et de

l'Etranger

LXV

(1975) p.

3,

to whichwe

may

ppend

that

of

J.N.

Findlay

n

Plato: The Writtennd

Unwritten octrines

London: Routledge

nd

Kegan

Paul,

1974) p.

151 On theother

ide,

apart

from

he

authorswe

will

deal with ater

n

this

paper,

we

may

ite

he

defense,

tself

eautiful,

f the esthetic

uality

f thePhaedrus

by

Emile

Bourguet,

Sur

la

composition

u

'Phèdre,'"

Revue

de

Métaphysique

t

de Morale 26

(1919) pp.

335-353. Much

more

recently,

hung-Hwan

Chen has

argued

that the

dialogue

contains he doctrines f both the

"early"

and the "late"

Plato,

and is thus the

key

transitionalwork

n

the Platonic

corpus:

"The

*

Phaedrus' as the Transitionfrom the Platonism

n

the Earlier

Dialogues

to

the

Dialectics and

Theology

n the Latter

Dialogues",

Studii

nternazionali

i

Filosofia

IV

(1972) pp.

77-90. The

only

judgment

n the

dialogue,

it

seems,

to which one can

subscribewithout eserve s Friedlaender's

rueful kein anderer

Dialog

Platons muss sich so verschiedene

nterpretationenefallen

assen ..."

Friedlaender,

aul Piaton

(Berlin;

de

Gruyter,

vols

1960)

III 222.

2.

For a list f variouswriters ho have

opted

for ne or another

f

the

andidates, f.

Hoerber,

Robert

G.

"Love or

Rhetoric

n

Plato's Phaedrus?"

Classical Bulletin

34

(1958) p.

33. Robin

argues

that

neitherove nor rhetoric an be the oletheme fthedialogue:Platon,Phèdre Robin,Leon, ed. & tr.

Paris: Budè. 7thed.

1970) pp.

xxvi-lix;

t does

not follow hatboth

together

annotform

he

unitary

theme.Hack

forth,

owever,

ccepts

both

negatives

nd

gives

number f other

reasons

why

Plato

could have writtenhe

dialogue:

Hackforth,

.,

tr.

Plato's

Phaedrus

Cambridge:Cambridge

Univer-

sity

Press,

1972) pp.

8f.

Among

writers

ho

suggest

hatthe mutual

ntailment r

inseparability

f

eros and rhetoric

onstitutes he themewe

may

cite

Friedlaender,

ol. cit.

p.

223; Helmbold,

W.C.

and

Holther,

W.B. "The

Unity

f the

Phaedrus'"

University

f

California

ublications n Classical

Philology

XIV

(1950-52) pp.

387-417;

Kelley,

William

J.,

Jr.

"Rhetoric as

Seduction"

Philosophy

and Rhetoric

(1973) pp.

69-80;

Plass,

P.

"The

Unity

f the

Phaedrus"'

Symbola

Osloensisfasc.

43

(1968) pp.

7-30.

37



3.

Also

unsurprising

s that he

problem

houldhave

cropped

up

later,

specially

ince herise f

thever-

naculars.

This,

Leibniz undertook

first

n his

De

Ars

Combinatória)

o

create mathematical

ym-

bolism whichwould

be accessibleto all men.

Hegel,

to

give

another

xample,

riticized

eibniz and

offered is own

complex

resolution f

the

paradox,

which have treated

n

"Hegers

Philosophical

Languages", Hegel-Studien

forthcoming).

n

contemporary

hilosophy,

oth "continental"

and

"analytic", emphasis

has been ess on

universally-

alid

"meanings"

than on

patterns

nd

dynamics

of discourse on

logic

and

grammar.

n

his discussions f Greek

texts,

however.

Heidegger

deals

with he

meanings

f

certain

key

words s

they

nfold

n

a

variety

f "worlds":

cf. for

xample

he

essays in Heidegger,Martin Vortraegeund Aufsaetze (Pfullingen:Neske, 1954). Saul Kripke's

distinction f names nto

"rigid"

and

"non-rigid"

designators,

he

former

esignating

he

same ob-

ject

in

all

possible

worlds,

may

be

reawakening

he

problem

n

analytic hilosophy:

f.

Kripke,

aul

"Identity

nd

Necessity"

n

Identity

nd Individuation

Milton

Munits,

ed.

New

York:

New York

University

ress,

1971).

4.

Among

thosewho hold thatPlato is

trying

o

separate

rhetoric rom

hilosophy

re

Ritter,

who

sug-

gests

that rhetoric s

necessary

or the masses but not for the

philosophical

ew:

Ritter,

onstantin

Platon: Sein

Leben,

Seine

Schriften,

eine Lehre

Muenchen:

CG. Becksche

Verlagsbuchhandlung,

vols

1923)

I

39-41;

and

Kelley,

who

contrasts

he

narrow

meanings

f "love" and

"philosophy"

with

the broader

and

baser)

"rhetoric" and

"seduction":

Kelly,

Wm.

J.

Jr.,

op.

cit.

p.

79.

5.

Examples

are eros whichremains

urely

hysical

nd does

not

grow up

to

include ove of

character

and

soul

(250e),

and rhetoric hich s not

founded n a

theory

f soul

(270d-e).

Both are

essentially

deprived:

hey

re

not

what ove or

rhetoric,

or

Plato,

ought

to be or

"truly"

are.

Cf. also Rodis-

Lewis: "Platon, en divisant nouveau l'irrationel, ermet ux puissanceaffectives e s'associerà

l'esprit,

ontre e

qui

lui échapperatoujours", op. cit. p. 18.

6.

Robin

suggest op.

cit.

p. xxviii)

hat

he

point

of

the

passage

s to introduce he "sin of

mythology",

which consists

n

enjoying myths

without

eeing

them as occasions "to

reflect

upon

oneself".

Hackforth

op.

cit.

p. 26) suggests

hat he

episode's organic ignificance,

f

t has

any,

s to warn he

reader

way

from

ttempting

o rationalise

ocrates' reactions o

the

divinities

n the area.

It is dif-

ficult o see either

f these s the

full ccount of the

purpose

of

the

passage.

On Hackforth's

iew,

Plato is

spending

ffort nd

space

to

guard gainst

what

s,

n

comparison

with

he

problems

nvolved

in

understanding

he

great

myth

f the

Palinode,

a

relatively

minor

ossibility

f

miscomprehension.

Robin's

point

s somewhat

ague: ust

how

is a

myth upposed

to

give

us

occasion to

"reflect

pon

ourselves?"

The

major

myth

f

thePhaedrus

gives

Socrates

occasion,

rather,

o reflect

pon

rhetoric;

psychology

s

brought

n

only

s

necessary

o that

purpose. It

may

be

well

to

note

here

hat

ll trans-

lations

n this

paper,

from

ny language,

re the

author's.)

7.

Robin,

Leon

Théorie

Platonicienne e Vamour

Paris,

Alcan,

1908) p.

141.

8.

If

we take

"τφ

λέγειν" 232a2)

as

an instrumental

ative,

he

meaning

f

the entence

s

"will

be

flat-

tered

by

the talk

viz.

of

others)."

Hackforth

oes

not

do this

op.

cit.

p.

28),

but Verdenius oes:

Verdenius,

W.

J.

"Notes on

Plato's Phaedrus

Mnemosyne

eries

,

Vol.

VIII,

ad 232alf. Vries

up-

ports

him,

aying

hat

here s no

subject

for

λέγειν"

nd

to

take

t as the

object

of

"έπαρθήναι"

as

must

Hackforth)

would be

"intolerably

harsh:"

Vries,

G.

A

Commentary

n Plato's

Phaedrus

(Amsterdam,

akkert,

969)

p.

62.

Thoughtempted

o

read with

Verdenius,

have followed ut both

alternatives

n the

paper.

9.

Sinaiko,

on

whose outline

f this

peech

base

my

view nd

summary

e

here,

nevermentions

hat t

proceeds

y

division:

inaiko,

Herman

L.

Love,

Knowledge

nd Discourse n Plato

(Chicago:

Univer-

sity

f

Chicago

Press,

1965)

pp.

29f. But cf. Helmbold

&

Holther,

p.

cit.

p.

394;

Rodis-Lewis,

p.

cit.

p.

10.

10. That

these

parody

he four ardinal

virtues f

the

Republic

themselves

eached,

f

course,

hrough

sort f

"division" of

the

polis

nto tsconstituent

lasses)

s

argued

by

Brown,

M. &

Coulter,

J.

"The

Middle Speechof Plato's Phaedrus" Journal f theHistory f Philosophy1971p. 406.

11.

Sinaiko,.

op.

cit.

pp.

32f.

12.

Allen,

R.E. Plato's

Euthyphro

nd

theEarlier

Theory f

Forms

New

York:

Humanities

ress,

1970)

p.

79.

13.Friedlaender

rgues

that the

"Eleatic

Palamedes"

is Parmenides

Friedlaender,

ol.

cit.

pp.

2150;

since

t was

Parmenides

who

was rumored

o

have been Zeno's

lover,

he

point

remains.

t

has been

long

noticed:

one

scholium

o this

passage

runs,

Ζήνωνα

φησί

τον

Παρμευίδου

έταΐρον,"

Greene,

W.C.

(ed.)

Scholia

Platónica

(Haverford,

Pa.:

American

Philological

Association,

1937) p.

85.

14.

The

unique

role of the

Beautiful

n

awakening

he oul's

knowledge

f

the

Forms s not

mentioned

n

discussions

f anamnesis

n

the

Meno

(where

t does not

seem

compatible

withthe

view that

"all

nature

s

kin",

81c9f)

or Phaedo.

Human

beings

an,

presumably,

resemble"

other

Forms,

uch as

38



thoseof

virtues;

ut

these,

hough erhaps

more

"worthy"

than

he

Beautiful,

o not have clear en-

sible

mages cf.

Politicus285e

seq.).

A

human

being

does

not,

of

course,

"resemble"

the entire

o-

main of Forms

by participating

n

all

possible qualities,

but

by

"imitating"

featureswhich

hey

ll

have in

common,

uch

as

unity, mmortality, on-identity

ith

ensibles, tc.; these,

suspect,

re

what

s

to be included

n the

meaning

f

"ολόκληροι"

here.

15. That Forms nd soul are kin

s,

again,

stated

non-mythically

n

Plato's

writings:

f.

Phaedo

79c-80d;

Republic

490ab;

Second

Letter,

12e.

Thus,

our

demythologising

ere

s not unwarranted.

16. The view that

people

forPlato instantiate knowablenumber f

types

f soul bears on the ssue of

whether he

dialogues

re,

n their

onclusions

nd

argumentation,hetorically

dhominem

if only

n

principle) hilosophically

nd

universally

efinitive.

ll

possiblepositions,

t

might

eem,

have recent-

ly

been

taken on the issue.

Chaim Perelman

has

put

forththe view

that,

since

philospphical

significance

n

a writtenwork

requires

universal

validity,

ach character

incarnates

the

universal

audience",

responding ccording

o whatever ational

apacitiesbelong

o all

humans:

Perelman,

h.

&

Olbrechts-Tyteca,

.

The New Rhetoric

John

Wilkinson nd Purcell

Weaver,

rans.NotreDame:

University

f

NotreDame

Press,

1969) p.

36. StevenRandall takes n

opposite

view,

pointing

ut that

Socrates

e.g.

in

the

Gorgias)

handles different

nterlocutors

n

different

ays

and

maintaining

hat

any given argument

s to hold

only

for the

individual haracter onvinced

by

it:

Randall,

Steven

"Dialogue, Philosophy,

nd

Rhetoric: he

Example

of Plato's

Gorgias"

Philosophy

nd Rhetoric

(1977) pp.

164-179. The "middle

road" is taken

by

Albert

William

Levi,

in

"Philosophy

as

Literature: he

Dialogue"

Philosophy

nd Rhetoric

(1976) pp.

1-20. Levi

recognises

t least the

claim of universal

validy

for all

philosophical

discourse and

maintains

hat Plato neither

imply

fulfills or gnorest,but that here s a "tension"between heuniversal umanityf the nterlocutors

(required

hilosophically)

nd theirndividual

ersonalities

required

or

iterary

iveliness).

All three

of

theseviewsrest

pon

a

dichotomy

f thehuman

ndividual nd

his universal

umanity.

f

different

characters

epresent,

ot the

atter,

ut

particular

ypes

f

soul,

we can

accountfor

hedifferentinds

of

argumentation

sed

against

different

nterlocutors

ithout

acrificing

he "definitive"

nature

of

the

dialogues.

When an

interlocutor,

e would

say,

is

convinced,

he

argumentation

mustbe

per-

suasive for ll

people

of that

oul-type

provided,

f

course,

that

f

presents

he

position fairly"

n

the ense

of Theaetetus

67d-168d).

f

Socrates

hould,

on some

ssue,

succeed n

winning

ver

fairly

representatives

f all

soul-types

something

e

never,

f

course,

even

comes close to

doing)

the

topic

would be

decided and the

nvestigation

ould

have reached

definitive esult.

39

discourse and psyche in plato's phaedrus

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