malcolm. coulter, james. the middle speech of plato's phaedrus

7/27/2019 Malcolm. Coulter, James. The Middle Speech of Plato's Phaedrus

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The Middle Speechof Plato's PhaedrusM A L C O L M B R O W NJ A M E S C O U L T E R

IN T HE PRE SE NT PAPE R we o f fe r a con t r ibu t ion to th e s o lu t ion o f tw o p rob lem s int h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e P h a e d r u s ? T h e f i r s t i s t h e q u e s t i o n o f h o w w e a r e t o" re ad " the m idd le s peech . I s it , as s om e hav e s ugg es ted , 2 a gener a l ly we l l in ten -t i o n e d h a l f - w a y s t a g e o n t h e w a y t o P l a t o ' s o w n p o s i t i o n a s e x p r e s s e d i n t h e G r e a tS p e e c h ? O r s h o u l d w e r a t h e r c o n c l u d e , a s o t h e r s h a v e d o n e , 3 t h a t t h e s p e e c h i sf a u l t y i n e v e r y v it a l r e s p e c t, a n d t h a t i t is r e p u d i a t e d b y P l a t o i n t o to? T h e t h e s i so f t he m i d d l e s p e e c h , t h a t t h e n o n l o v e r i s t o b e p r e f e r r e d t o t h e l o v e r , i s c le a r l yr e j ec t e d . B u t , a re t h e r e n o n e t h e l e s s b e n i g n l y p l a c e d a n t i c i p a t i o n s o f t h e f u l l t r u t ht o c o m e ? T h e s e c o n d p r o b l e m i s t h e m u c h d e b a t e d o n e a b o u t t h e u n i t y o f t h eP h a e d r u s . W e d e a l w i t h t h i s i n o n l y a g e n e r a l w a y , a l t h o u g h w e b e l i e v e o u r i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n o f t h e m i d d l e s p e e c h i m p l i e s a c l ea r a n s w e r t o a t l e a st o n e p a r t o f t h ep rob lem , i . e . , " i s the re an i n h e r e n t c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o t h e m e s o f t h ed i a l o g u e , e r o s a n d r h e t o r i c ? " T h e q u e s t i o n a b o u t h o w t o i n t e r p r e t t h e m i d d l es p e e c h is th e c e n t r a l o n e o f t h e p a p e r a n d h a s b e e n t r e a t e d i n f a r g r e a t e r d e t a il .

O u r m a i n a r g u m e n t a i m s a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i n t h e m i d d l e s p e e c h P l a t o i ss k e t c h i n g a c e r t a i n t y p e o f r h e t o r i c a l s o p h i s t w h o s e p h i l o s o p h y ( o r m o r e a c c u r a t e l y" p h i l o d o x y " ) i s t o t a l l y u n P l a t o n i c . W e g o a s t e p f u r t h e r w h e n w e v e n t u r e t oi d e n t i f y th e m e n t a l i t y r e p r e s e n t e d w i t h t h a t o f I s o c r a t e s . W h e t h e r o r n o t t h es t r o n g e r t h e s i s i s t r u e , t h e t h o u g h t o f I s o c r a t e s , r e p r e s e n t i n g a s i t d o e s a t l e a s t t h et y p e o f r h e t o r i c a l s o p h i s t i c c u l t u r e w e h a v e i n m i n d , c a n b e u s e d a s a t o u c h s t o n eo f t h a t c u l t u r e i n t h e s t u d y o f t h e m i d d l e s p e e c h .

1 The "we" of this paper is not an editorial fiction. The two autho rs hav e written thepiece in close coope ration and ne ither of us disclaims responsibility for a ny part of it orfor its organization as a whole. Nonetheless it is true that Brown is principally responsiblefor the writing of the first half, Coulter the second.2 E.g. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge, 1952), p. 40, wh o goes so fa r as to seein the middle speech "a glimpse of the erastes par excellence, Socrates himself." Ha ckfo rthis anticipated, at least in the general view that the middle speech is congen ial to Platon ism,by Hermias (In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia, ed. P. Cou vre ur [Paris, 1901 ], 50, 2-14).3 The notable example of this is P. Friedl~inder, Plato III (Princeton, 1969), pp. 222-226.

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406 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y

Let us f i r s t rev iew the speech to b r ing ou t some of i t s more obv ious fea tu res .I t i s de l ivered by a d issembl ing lover , in b lame of love . Before the speaker ge ts tothe b lame, he execu tes a def in i t ion o f h is sub jec t . Mo reov er he ins ist s up on thegenera l po in t tha t such ' theore t ica l p reambles ' ought to in t roduce any proper lycons t ruc ted speech . The def in i t ion it se lf i s fo rmed on a s t ra ined e tymo logy l ink ingth e w o rd eros to rhome, or fo rce , and impl ies tha t love can on ly be o f bod ies andpleasure f rom them (238C) . The speaker suppor ts the def in i t ion wi th an a rgu-ment ab out the hum an sou l : it has two par ts , and two on ly , name ly epithymia a n ddoxa. In the wel l o rdered sou l , doxa is in the lead posit ion.

Th e pre l iminar ies methodica l ly taken care o f , the speaker p roceed s to thesubs tance o f the a t tack on love . He premises i t on the assumpt ion tha t love can bejudged o n ly in te rms of u t i l i ty , p leasure , and the t rus t which io ins the lovers . Th eform of the a t tack i s as fo l lows: (1 ) when somat ic love i s measured aga ins t thes tandard o f u t i l i ty ( subd iv ided in to psych ic , somat ic and f inanc ia l ) , i t i s foundpos i t ive ly harmfu l , (2 ) i t fa res no be t te r when mea sured aga ins t the p leasures tandard , and (3 ) lovers a re un t rus twor thy : they a re un l ike ly to remain in love . Thespeaker ' s emphas is fa l ls on love ' s e f fec ts on the sou l and i t s educa t ion , espec ia l lywhat he ca l l s i t s ' ph i losophica l ' educa t ion . The in ju ry love does to ' d iv ine ph i los -ophy ' i s c i ted in the f i r s t pa r t o f the a t tack ; in the summing up a t the end i t i s " thesou l ' s educa t ion" tha t tops the l i s t o f goods jeopard ized by love . Educa t ion i s theh o l i e s t a n d m o s t h o n o re d th in g e i t h e r a m o n g m e n o r g o d s , e i t h e r n o w o r e v e r , h esays.

The speech as a whole occupies a midd le pos i t ion be tween those o f Lys iasand P la to concep tua l ly as wel l as in the s t ruc tu re o f the d ia logue . There i s asemblance o f P la to ' s concern fo r v i r tue and educa t ion , and a lso a semblance o fP la to ' s method of def in i t ion . I t i s a midd le concep tua l ly , then , because i t i s l ikeLys ias ' speech in i t s concep t ion o f love , bu t un l ike i t in method , whereas i t i sl ike P la to ' s in method , bu t un l ike i t in the concep t ion o f love .

Who is the speaker , o r wha t i s h is menta l i ty? Le t us hypothes ize , on the bas isof th is rev iew of the speech , an educa tor whose medium is rhe to r ic , and whose" p h i lo s o p h y " i s r e a l l y a " p h i lo d o x y " in s h e ep ' s c lo th in g - - a f a c t s ug g e st e d b y h i stw o -p a r t p s y c h o lo g y h e a d e d b y doxa, his d is to r ted ( ' demot ic ' ) concep t ion o f thev i r tues (as wi l l become c lea r in the seque l ) , and a sharp eye fo r u t i l i ty o r p leasurecon jo i ned wi th a b l indness to Idea l Beau ty . We may no te a cor respo nding lydebased concep t ion o f educa t ion , and of love . More spec i f ica l ly we hypothes ize aneduca tor whose techn ique o f speech-making p laces h im in a midd le pos i t ionbe tween the mere ly rhe to r ica l s ty le o f the mind less phrase - tu rner L ys ias and thepure ly ph i losophica l rhe to r ic o f P la to . Could i t be the same one to who m Socra tesis to bear the message about rhe to r ic which Phaedrus i s la te r ins t ruc ted to bear toLys ias (c f . 278E) , the educa tor I socra tes?

A cavea t i s in o rder . We do no t mean to say tha t P la to a ims a t I socra tes as aperson on ly , bu t a lways a t leas t as a represen ta t ive o f a spec ies o f rhe to r ica l -


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P L A T O ' S P H A E D R U S 40 7sophis t ic cu l ture . Nonet heless i t is worthw hile to d is t inguish a we aker and a s t rongerve rs ion o f ou r thes i s , and to a rgue them in se r ie s . The weake r says on ly tha t thedoc t r ines and me th od o f the midd le speech cha rac te r ize a m en ta l i ty tha t f it sIsocra tes qui te accura te ly , even i f i t may a lso f i t o thers as well ; thus i t implies tha tI soc ra te s mus t be inc luded , and inc luded a s a l ead ing rep resen ta t ive , in any g roupPla to is sketching in the middle speech . The s tronger form says tha t , jus t as in theepi logue to the Euthydemus (306A-C, where I soc ra te s i s a lmos t ce r ta in ly the oneridiculed ), 4 so in the Phaedrus Pla to ' s ske tch a ims a t I soc ra te s h imse l f . P la to ' sc r i t i c i sm conce ives o f I soc ra te s a s somehow in the midd le pos i t ion be tween rhe to r icand ph i lo sophy , a pos i t ion in wh ich the an onym ous f igu re comes o f f worse thane i the r ex t reme in t ry ing to combine bo th ac t iv i t i e s in to one . From the ph i lo sophe r ' spo in t o f v iew the 'b i t o f ph i lo sophy ' inco rpo ra ted in to the speech in the midd le i sworse than n one a t a l l; by re fus ing to subo rd ina te pe r suas ion to t ru th, the midd lespeake r compromises h i s ph i lo sophy hope le ss ly . From the po in t o f v iew o f pu re lyrhe to r ica l e f fec t on the o the r hand - -a po in t o f v iew Soc ra te s exp resses wi l l ingnessto t ake a s he rev iews Lys ia s ' speech (235A)- -aga in the midd le pos i t ion i s in fe r io r .The ch a rm o f wordings and ph ras ings mus t no t be compr om ised ju s t to save thet ru th o r to sa t i s fy the demand fo r me thod , says the mere rhe to r ic ian .

I IWe proceed to support the f i rs t of our theses on the bas is of a de ta i led s tudy

of the speech , i ts method and i ts thought . The thes is is tha t the par t icu lars of thespeech f i t toge the r in to a pa t te rn congruen t to the mind o f I soc ra te s , even i f no t tothe exc lus ion o f al l o the r s . The speech beg ins wi th wha t ma y be ca l led a theo re t ica lp reamble (237C-238C) . Now the idea o f hav ing such a p reamble , in wh ich a de f in i -t ion is offered , e i ther of the topic to be d iscussed or of the method, is sure ly awor thy idea in P la to ' s eyes . In Phaedrus i tse lf Socra tes asks i f he had ( in h israv ing ) r emembered to de f ine love f i r s t (263C) . Many o f the o the r d ia logues a t t e s t ,a lbe i t indirec t ly , to th is . For want of a leading def in i t ion , d iscuss ions of rhe tor ic orv i r tue o r love a re seen to go a s t ray . The speake r he re in Phaedrus pu ts the po in t soforcefu l ly , in fac t , tha t Sextus Empir icus p icks i t up , with only a s l ight change, asa fo rmu la fo r c la r i fy ing one o f Democr i tu s ' th ree "c r i t e r ia o f genu ine knowledge .""Conce rn ing eve ry th ing , son ," Sex tus has Democr i tu s say , " the one p r inc ipa lth ing i s to know wha t the inqu i ry i s abou t" (Adv. Math. VII, 140) . A recent cr i t ichas em phas ized the pr inc ip le of def in i t ion for a d if ferent reason. K . R ies 5 takes the

Rosamond Sprague (Euthydemus [Lib rary o f Liberal Arts, 1965], p. 63) notes bu t doesnot concur in Bluck's skepticism about identifying the anonymous target here with Isocrates.We concur in the principle th at one ought no t fin d Isocrates (or Antisthenes) un der everyPlatonic stone. But this does not prevent their being found under some. There are definiteand further reasons, adduced by Coulter ("Phaedrus 279A : The Praise o f Isocrates," Greek,Roman and Byzantine Studies, 8 [1967], pp. 230-232) for discovering Isocrates in theEuthydemus passage, and these are not unconnected with the Phaedrus.Klaus Ries, lsokrates und Platon im Ringen um die Philosophie (Diss., Munich, 1959),p. 114.


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408 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Yspeaker ' s ru le as an express ion o f P la to ' s ow n funda men ta l requ i re men t fo r rhe to r icto becom e ph i losophica l .But no t jus t any theory can be advanced in th is lead pos i t ion . To sa t i s fy thefu l l -f ledged P la ton ic requ i rem ent , i t has to be the true theory. Thus i t i s pe r fec t lyposs ib le fo r someone P la to represen ts to be ha l f - r igh t in th is mat te r : r igh t ly see ingthe need fo r a def in i t ion , bu t fa i l ing to see the r igh t def in i t ion . Indeed there i s animpor tan t example o f jus t such a success in p r inc ip le which tu rns in to a fa i lu re ine x e c u t io n . P l a to r e p re se n t s A g a th o n in s u c h a " m id d le " p o s i t i o n b e tw e e n m e rerhe tor ic and u l t imate ph i losophica l t ru th in h is speech in the Symposium. N o tsurpr is ing ly in the case o f a fe l low descendan t o f Gorg ias , many congruences inpo in ts o f de ta i l can be l is ted be tween A gathon ' s speech and the one we judge tobe I socra tean . In the f i r s t p lace the top ic o f bo th i s Eros. Secondly , each speakera t tends f i rs t to the m at te r o f def in ing h is top ic . 6 Th i rd ly , the s peaker ca l ls a t ten-t ion to the spec ia l va lue o f such preambles , and c la ims super io r i ty over r iva lspeakers on th is po in t o f method . Four th ly , the speech i t se l f , whi le i t exh ib i t smuc h re f inement o f d ic t ion ( inc lud ing a p lay o n eros-rhome), t reats i ts subjectsha l lowly , be ing res t r ic ted by the sha l low theory o f love which i t i s p remised on .F i f th ly , P la to t rea ts the ach iev ement o f the speech i ron ica lly . He has Socra tespra ise the wor thy a im of pu t t ing theory f i r s t , bu t then condemn the fau l ty execu-t ion : the theory i s fa lse . S ix th ly , P la to then p roceeds to exh ib i t the (P la ton ic ) t ru thof the mat te r , to comple te the re fu ta t ion o f the speech .

Now in I socra tes ' own speeches one f requen t ly f inds h im dr iv ing home th isv e ry p o in t o f m e th o d . H e b o a s t s a t t h e b e g in n in g o f t h e Helen tha t h is speechwi l l be super io r to tha t o f h is r iva l (p resumably Gorg ias ) in tha t he wi l l de f inecorrec t ly the na tu res o f encomia an d apologiai, and avo id confus ing the genres . Heuses th is requ i reme nt as a weapon of sa rcasm when he makes the same po in t a t thebeg inn ing of the Busiris. In t h e To Nicocles the para l le l to the midd le speech ofPhaedrus is s ti l l c loser: 7 Isocra tes te l ls his you ng (ro yal) disciple that b efor e dis-cours ing on how to ru le , he mus t f i r s t de f ine ' k ingcra f t ' .

What de ta i l s o f the Phaedrus speech show that i ts effort a t definit ion is anunsuccess fu l one? Love i s def ined as tha t so r t o f i r ra t iona l des i re fo r en joyment o fbeau ty which charac te r izes a sou l newly ta ken over by des i re. The usurper i sr e in fo rc e d a n d m a d e w a n to n b y o th e r c o m p a ra b le p h y s i c a l a p p e t i t e s . H a c k fo r thhas no ted tha t the def in i t ion leaves an ambigu i ty abo ut the summum genus: is thegenus o f love des i re o r wantonness? I f i t i s des i re , then the spea ker mis loca tes lovewhen he f inds i t w i th in wantonness , which i s no t par t o f des i re , bu t ra ther a spec ia ls ta te resu l t ing f rom i t s ru le . I f i t i s wantonness , then the speaker has taken fo r

Buchheit (Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Gents Epideiktikon [Munich, 1960],pp. 54- 64; 38-40) show s that theoretical preambles were im porta nt in Gorgias himself; thusthe trait is present in the Father. Gorgias defines his genre, however, not his subject of praise.Isocrates does the same in his early speeches (Helen, Busiris), but in a probably later one(To Nicocles) he is Socratic in that he defines the topic instead.r R. L. Howland, "The Attack on Isocrates in the Phaedrus," CQ, XX I (1937), pp. 151-159, finds two references to the To Nicocles in the Phaedrus. We wi ll have reason to returnto this "han dbo ok for rulers," to show the importance o f its political content as w ell as itsrhetorical form in relation to Phaedrus.


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P L A T O ' S PHAEDRUS 40 9summum genus what i s p la in ly on ly an in fe r io r one . From Pla to ' s c r i t i c i sms la te rin the d ia logue one can draw other objec t ions to the def in i t ion . What of thespeake r ' s a s sumpt ion tha t beau ty p rovokes on ly wan tonness a nd un res t ra in t? O nthe con t ra ry , in the Grea t Speech , when the sou l ' s cha r io tee r i s r eminded o fto kalon, he i s r e s t ra ined f rom bod i ly excesses (254B) . Nor i s beau ty exc lus ive ly ,o r even p r imar i ly , bod i ly , a s the speake r a s sumes . In sum, the speake r t akes l e f t -hand ed love for the whole , fa i l ing as he does to d iscr im inate love 's two s ides, s

I t ha s a l ready been po in ted ou t tha t the t echn ique o f theo re t ica l p reamblesexh ib i ted he re has pa ra l le l s in I soc ra te s ' speechwr i t ing . The pa ra l le l be tween themidd le speech and the To Nicocles ex tends fu r the r , however , than ju s t to th i sformal s imilar i ty . The subjec t Isocra tes is def in ing there is k ingcraf t , and the con-ten t o f h i s de f in i t ion wou ld be bound to have s t ruck Pla to a s pe rve rse . / soc ra te sde f ines i t a s "on the one hand min imiz ing pub l ic mis fo r tunes , on the o the r handmax im iz ing pub l ic fo r tunes , and in gene ra l mak in g a lo t ou t o f a l i t t le " (ToNicocles, 9) . In the compan ion p iece composed some few yea rs l a te r , I soc ra te srep resen ts h i s young k ing boas t ing o f h i s own k ing ly ju s t i ce in tha t he avo idedex i l ing o r k i l l ing anyone , bu t none the le s s bu i l t up the roya l t r ea su ry (Nicocles, 32).One i s r eminded o f the de fense I soc ra te s o f fe r s , ou t o f the mou th o f th i s same k ing ,o f the concep t o f "pleonexia with v i r tue" (Nicocles, 2); Isocra tes is defending th isaga ins t those who a t tack rhe to r ic fo r i ts s e rv ice o f p leonex ia a nd w ho a ssum e tha tthe re cou ld be no such th ing a s combin ing i t w i th v i r tue . Th is concep t o f k ing lyv i r tue , in o the r words , i s squa re ly opposed to P la to ' s dep rec ia t ion o f pleonexia, inGorgias as a v ice of indiv iduals , in Republic (423) as a vice of states.

Thus the doc t r ina l f au l t s in the speake r ' s de f in i t ion , f rom Pla to ' s po in t o f v iew,add to the errors of technique . But they a lso lead in to doctr ina l defec ts a t a deeperleve l . The de f in i t ion i s suppor ted wi th an a rgumen t , wh ich i s bu i l t on the p remisetha t the human sou l has two pa r t s and two on ly : epithymia a nd doxa. T h u s w h a tthe speak er represents as the ru l ing e lem ent in the soul is on a level with w hat ,on Pla to ' s accoun t (Rep. 439E f f . ), c an a t bes t fo l low reaso n ' s ru le . Th e ra t iona le lemen t , P la to ' s logistikon, i s consp icuous ly absen t he re . From a Pla ton ic po in to f v iew, then , th i s mus t coun t a s a t runca ted p sycho logy . Bu t i t i s p rec i se ly theone to be found in I soc ra te s eve rywhere . I t i s exp ressed and app l ied to the ques t ionhe re a t i s sue , name ly the ' ru le ' o f one o r ano the r e lemen t wi th in the sou l , a tTo Nicocles, 29 , when I soc ra te s adv ise s h i s p r ince tha t the "mos t k ing ly" va luei s tha t so r t o f con t ro l ove r appe t i t e s wh ich wi l l ma ke h im "see m to o the r s to bebe t te r . " As aga ins t the va lue o f s to r ing up a ma te r ia l e s ta te , such a " fa i r r epu ta -

s As confirmation, we may note that the style mirrors these faults of theory. Platoexpresses scorn for the resulting definition by the disparity he contrives between the earnest-ness of the method itself and the frivolous net result of it. It all ends up in an etymology ofa most fanciful sort: eros is derived from rhome (cf. Helen, 55). The defining formula is alsointroduced by a banal remark. The speaker contrives a balanced antithesis for his sentence,but only at the cost of having to compare, in point of clarity, what is said with what is notsaid. Hackforth follows Burner's text here, which rejects the readings of B and T, and thusremoves the foolishness of the antithesis. On ou r interpretation, the foolishness present inthe best MSS has its point. O ur spea ker has put in some "paddin g" to f ill out his antithesis.Isocrate s' habit of doing this was noted b y Dionysius of Halicarnassus (De Dernosthene[Usener-Radermacher, I.], p. 168).


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410 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Yt i o n " (doxa kale) i s immorta l (32) . Nor was I socra tes unaware o f the an t i -P la ton ictendency of th is exa l ta t ion o f doxa: in Against the Sophists 2-8 he rejectsepisteme i n f a v o r o f doxa in a passage qu i te c lea r ly a imed , i f no t a imed so le ly , a tP la to . 9 I socra tes never t i red o f p ress ing the an t i -P la ton ic consequences fo r m or a l - -o r as he p re fe r red to cal l it , "ph i losophica l" - - -edu ca t ion . I f accura te k nowledge o fa P la ton ic sor t were a t a l l poss ib le , i t would s t i l l be i r re levan t to the mat te r o ft ra in ing the young fo r pub l ic l i fe .

A s t r ict ly cor re la te d and eq ua l ly rad ica l ph i losophica l d isagreement b e tweenI s o c ra t e s a n d P l a to c o m e s n o w to t h e s u r f a c e : c o r r e l a t e d t o " a c c u ra t e k n o w le d g e "in P la to i s the g rade o f " rea l Be ing" (to on ont6s). On th is too I socra tes takes apos i t ion ; in Antidosis 268 he rev iews a se r ies o f specu la t ions on the number andna tur e o f rea l Be ings . He runs the gamut f rom A naxag oras ' in f in ite mul t ip l ic i tydow n th roug h p lu ra l i s t doc t r ines o f d i f fe ren t types , te rmina t ing in the Parm enide anOne and Gorg ian ic None . I socra tes ' v iew is tha t the re may be as many as in f in i te lymany , o r as few as none , w i thou t the "ph i losophica l" educa tor ' s hav ing to makeany a l lowances whatever . H e shrugs o f f such "d ia lec t ica l" ques t ions as noncha lan t -ly as Pro tagoras d id before h im. H . I . M arro u cap tures the an t i -P la ton ic sp i r it inth is ph i losophy accura te ly in h is paraphrase o f To Nicocles 41:There is no point in at tempting to mount into the heaven of Ideas or in playing aboutwith paradoxes: for the purpose of l iving properly what we need is not new andsurprising ideas but established good sense, traditional wisdom. (A History o/ Educa-tion in Antiquity, p. 133.)

Le t us re tu rn to the midd le speech , bea t ing in mind th is deeper leve l o fph i losophica l doc t r ine , the on to logy under ly ing the psychology . Are there anys igns o f the speaker ' s pos i t ion? Indeed there a re : the speaker uses the word ousiaa n d a n o th e r w o rd p r e c io u s t o P l a to , philosophia, in such a way as to reflect as imi la r "ph i lod oxy " in mat te rs on to log ica l . Th e words have unm is takab le P la ton icover tones , bu t P la to has h is speaker use them to qu i te unPla ton ic purposes . M ostno tab ly th is i s the case wi th the te rm ousia, which i s used in two qu i te d is jo in tsenses . A t f i r s t the be ing in ques t ion i s qu i te P la ton ic : one mus t def ine the ousiaof h is top ic f i r s t , the speaker says . But the congruence wi th P la to i s on lymomentary . The speaker ' s c r i t ique o f love inc ludes the po in t tha t i t j eopard izes thebe loved ' s ousia, i .e . h is material possessions! (240A) He drums on this point ,a lways us ing the favor i te P la ton ic word to re fe r perverse ly to the unPla ton icsubs tance (240A2, 240A5, 241C3) . Now th is speaker i s no t the f i r s t to ment ionousia. Lysias ' speech uses i t (232C7) , bu t in such a way as to re fe r to wor ld lysubs tance on ly : lovers wi l l be jea lous o f and v ic ious toward 'men of subs tance ' ,s ince these can t rade on i t to buy the a f fec t ions o f the be loved . But bo th o f theear l ie r speeches o f the d ia logue a re dea l ing in re la t ive ly insubs tan t ia l subs tances ,as the p la ton iz ing Socra tes i s soon to revea l . The te rm ousia echoes aga in xo

9 Howland has made this point, op. cit., as has Jaeger, in Paideia,Highet trans. (Oxford,1961), III, pp. 56-59.lo R. G. B ury makes a similar point abo ut the "responsions" of earlier s peec hes in


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P L A T O ' S P H A E D R U S 411in the Great Speech, but th is t ime s tr ipped of every t race of world l iness . I t s tandsnow fo r those s ingu la r ly P la ton ic en t i t i e s f rom the hype rheaven ly reg ion , the co lo r -less, intangible, figureless ousia ontOs, as he puts i t in h is ecs ta t ic formula (247C).T h e ousia which i s no th ing more than ma te r ia l possess ions i s s imp ly sco rned inth i s speech ; such subs tance i s se t a t naugh t by the t rue and in sp i red love r , a longwi th such no t o rd ina r i ly naugh ty th ings a s mo the rs , b ro the rs and s i s te r s , andf r iends (252A) . So we see tha t the Midd le Speake r comes ou t p rec i se ly in a midd lepos i t ion a l so on ma t te r s on to log ica l : ne i the r does he rema in on the g ross sensua llevel of Lysias , recogniz ing only the k ind of substance one can f i l l one 's purse orlu re a boy wi th , no r does he r i se to the ba i t o f the o the rwor ld ly subs tance wh ichthe winged sou l o f the P la ton ic love r i s to f eed on . The Midd le Speake r r ecogn izesbo th the g ross ly ma te r ia l ousia and an immate r ia l one , bu t can ach ieve noen thus ia sm fo r the imma te r ia l , l aThe o the r f avo r i t e t e rm used , and f rom Pla to ' s po in t o f v iew abused , by thespeake r i s phi losophia (239B4). No doubt the speaker 's use of th is te rm f i ts wel lenough wi th one gene ra l ly accep ted u se : the one exempl i f i ed in Pe r ic le s ' Fune ra lOra t ion in Thucyd ides ( I I , 40 ). Bu t th i s i s on ly a s ign o f how poor ly i t mus t f itwi th P la to ' s qu i te spec ial mean ing , h i s ligh t tha t neve r was , on sea o r l and . In P la tophi losophia i s un th inkab le wi thou t accu ra te knowledge o f the rea l ly rea l . TheRepub l i c defines the phi losopher in te rms of the rea l i ty of h is objec ts of knowl-edge (479f) and longing (490AB). In the hedonis t ic , u t i l i ta r ian , "phi lodoxica l"wor ld o f the Midd le Speech , such ph i lo soph ica l v i s ions and long ings and such"rea l r ea l i t i e s " obv ious ly have no p lace .

No w even when Pla to i s no t pu t t ing such ambiguou s te rms in to the m ou tho f some "c ra f ty fe l low," he i s qu i te capab le o f ca l l ing a t t en t ion to the i r amb igu i ty .In the Cratylus he ana lyses the word ' ep i s teme ' two ways , once ge t t ing e tymolog ica lcomponen ts wh ich imp ly a mov ing knower (412A) , once a knower a t r e s t (437A) .The doub leness o f mean ing in th i s mos t impor tan t t e rm i s acknowledged in thesecond passage : i t i s ' amph ibo lous ' (ibid.) T h u s R . R o b i n s o n , a l t h o u g h h e i sgene ra l ly d i sposed to deny tha t P la to eve r became consc ious o f f a l l ac ie s o fambigu i ty , concedes tha t the re P la to "a lm os t g ives a nam e" to them. 12 And he rein Phaedrus , when Socra tes f in ishes h is two speeches on Eros , he ca l ls a t ten t ion tothe fac t tha t they on ly appear to con t rad ic t one ano the r s ince the Eros in the oneis on ly a 'homonym' o f the Eros in the o the r (266A) . In o the r words , P la to i sSocrates' speech of Symposium (The Symposium of Plato, pp. lvii-lxiv). Term s of earlierspeakers are picked up by Socrates, but used to different ends. Thus he concedes somenominal rightness to the earlier speakers, even while arguing their real error.1~ Jaege r find s an altogether similar echoing o f the language of Platonism in Iso cra tes'Against the Sophists 4, especially in phrases like sympasa he arete or 'total virtue': "Ob-viously Isocrates is aiming som e of his sharpest shafts at the terminological peculiarities ofthe new philosophical method: he tracks them down with the subtle instinct of the stylistfor everything which seems odd or ludicrous to the average educated man . . ?' (Op. cit., III,p. 57).x2 R. Robinson, "Plato's Consciousness of Fallacy," now reprinted in Essays in GreekPhilosophy (Oxford, 1969), pp. 27, 38. Robinson laments Plato's lack of "so me such word asamphibolia to provide a spark" (38), but has earlier conceded the importance of his callingepisteme 'amphibolous' (27).


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412 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Yproducing a spec imen of the sor t o f sophis tic hom ony my a t which Ar is to t le a imsthe proviso about cont rad ic t ion in On In te rpre ta t ion 6: "I speak of s tatements ascont rad ic tory when they a f f i rm and deny the same th ing of the same th ing- -no thom onym ous ly , toge ther wi th a l l o ther such condi t ions tha t we add to counte r thetroublesom e object ions of soph ists ." 13

What is Plato get t ing at , then, by represent ing this lover of opinion usingPla to ' s own favor i te on to log ica l l anguage in such an ambiguous way? I t i s wor thnoticing that Isocrates sponsors , in theory and in his own pract ice, what he cal lsamph ibo lo i logo i . The theory is s tated in a la te work, the Panathenaicus , where hepresents the pr inciple th ro ug h the perso n of one of his disciples . He has a s tudentcatching him in a do ctr inal inconsis tency, but th en extract ing from this a pr incipleof de l ibera te double meanings . Amphibolous ta lk i s "d i sgracefu l and a s ign of anunusua l pervers i ty" when used in speeches des igned for cour t cases. But when oneis wr i t ing on "human na ture and the na ture of th ings , " i t becomes "beaut i fu l andphi losophica l" (240) . Amphiboly of th i s recommended sor t works th roughdescr ib ing th ings of a cont rovers ia l sor t - -about which there i s as much to b lameas to pra i se - -and seeming a t the same t ime to pra i se them to the i r par t i sans , andblame them to their detractors (240f) . The express aim is to create the effect ofsimplici ty and easy access for those who re ad the speech witho ut care, while con-ceal ing from such readers what wil l be revealed to those in on the secret :" f re igh ted wi th a l lus ions to h i s to ry an d ph i losophy ," the message wi l l now beseen to be diff icul t and original , and of course qui te oppos ed to the surfacemessage (246). The immediate purpose in view in the Pana thena icus i s to makesense of a speech by Isocrates in which Sparta is glorif ied and yet his fel lowAthenians can f ind a fundamenta l no te of p ra i se for themse lves . The uncommonlyloud applause which greets the disciple 's discovery of amphiboly, and the factthat the s tudents are represented as then urging i t on Isocrates , tend to confirmthe point that Isocrates is himself (with due indirect ion) sponsoring the principle .

Isocrates ' pract ice of amphiboly is well i l lustrated by the passage of Nicoc le sreferred to above, where he has his young king boast about his own just ice andtemperance . The amphiboly i s the more re levant to our a rgument in tha t i t t radeson Pla ton ized language . The k ing has measured h i s jus t ice by the rap id improve-ment he produced in the royal t reasury without violence (31) . The measure of histemperance is his refusal to cohabit with anyone but his own wife (36) . Toindulge, he comments , only makes for enemies within the palace (41) . But when hefirs t presents these qui te unPlatonic ideas of just ice and temperance, Isocrates hashis ruler indulge in phrasing that is perfect ly Platonic: just ice and temperance areusefu l " in themse lves" (ka th 'haut&') , and fur ther we can see " f rom examiningthe i r na tures , powers and uses" tha t " tho se th ings which do no t par t ic ipa te in theseideas" ( trs men m~ metechous~s toutOn ton ideOn) are causes of great harm (30) .The method of "examining the na tures , powers and uses" reca l l s P la to ' sHippocrat ic prescript ion for an intel lectual is t rhetoric in Phaedrus: i t wil l proceedfrom a knowledge of the natures and powers of various souls and the uses of

13 Categories and De lnterpretatione, J. L. Ackrill trans, (Oxford, 1963), p. 47. Cf. fn. 38.


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P L A T O ' S PHAEDRUS 413var ious sor ts o f speech in mov ing th is o r tha t so r t o f sou l (271AB). But the s t r ik inga m p h ib o ly o c c u r s o f c o u r s e i n th e t a lk a b o u t " p a r t i c ip a t io n " a n d " id e a s . " O b v io u s -ly the k ing ' s temperance i s no th ing more than p ruden t ca lcu la t ion ; ye t he inv i tesus to cons t rue i t a s imply ing a P la ton ic o ther wor ld , an in te l lec tua l i s t " idea"in which h is ac t ions "par t ic ipa te ." 14 Thu s the ve ry wor ld ly po in t abou t n o tfou l ing one ' s own nes t can be made to the g ra t i f ica t ion o f the wor ld ly wise , whi lea t the same t ime the P la ton is t i s d isa rmed by the amphibo lous concess ion to theeternal .

N o w doubles entendres c a n c u t m o re w a y s t h a n o n e , a n d h e w h o a m p h ib o l i z e smust be ag i le as wel l as ambidex t rous . P la to , i f he i s parodying such anamphibo lous " jugg l ing ac t , " cou ld very appropr ia te ly p ic tu re h is rhe to r ic ian ou t -smar t ing h imse l f , ge t t ing h is doubleness on ly a t the cos t o f misunders tand ing onh is own par t . No doubt the bes t parody of a jugg le r i s the maladro i t fe l low whod ro p s a p i e c e o n h i s o w n fo o t - -p r e f e r a b ly a h e a v y o n e , l i k e ousia.

The speaker ' s a t tack on love i s p remised on a concep t ion o f the sou l ' s good ,tha t i s the v i r tues , which i s debased in a charac te r i s t ic way . The speaker ca ta loguesfour v i r tues in the be loved which he c la ims wi l l be damage d b y the lover : thebe loved wi ll no longer be wise, courageous , rhe to r ica l o r sh rewd (sophos, andreios,rh~torikos, anchinous: 239A) . We propose to show tha t th is l i s t i s a var ia t ion o fa d is t inc t ive sor t on the s tandard four v i r tues , which a lso underp in P la to ' sRepublic. The var ia t ion cons is t s in the two no tab le subs t i tu t ions . In the pos i t ion o fJustice, we f ind i ts eidrlon and co unte r fe i t , Rhe tor ic : exac t ly the counte r fe i t whichPla to charges p rac t i t ioners o f rhe to r ica l cu l tu re wi th pass ing o f f fo r the rea l th ingin Gorgias (465C) . Moreover P la to f inds the rhe to r ica l account o f the v i r tuescor rup ted a t exac t ly the two po in ts where the Middle Speaker ' s account i s cor -rup ted . In the Gorgias he has Ca l l ic les recognize the wor th o f w isdom and courageas he i s about to re jec t scornfu l ly jus t ice and tempe rance (491Dr) . Ca l l ic les permi tsh imse l f some am phibo lous ta lk too : i f we can take ' jus tice ' to mean ' ge t ting thebe t te r o f ' o thers , o r , w i th in one ' s own sou l , us ing sagac i ty and courage to securethe g ra t i fica t ion o f every app e t i t e - - i f we ca l l tha t jus t ice, then Cal l icles i s a l l fo ri t . Be ing smar t and courageous , in o ther words , f i t s in wi th a "p leonek t ic" mora l i tyof se l f -asse r t ion , whereas jus t ice and temperance , because they imply se l f -den ia l ,mus t be re jec ted (o r amphibo lous ly endorsed) .

I s the speaker ' s anchinous a var ian t fo rm (cor rup t f rom Pla to ' s po in t o f v iew)o f t h e fo u r th o f t h e s t a n d a rd s et , t e m p e ra n c e ? P l a to ' s a c c o u n t i n Phaedo of thep o p u la r f o rm o f sOphrosyne, a l though i t does no t use the exac t te rm, does b r ing i tc lose to anchinoia in the sense o f tha t menta l qu ickness approp r ia te to sh rewdca lcu la t ions o f p leasures and pa ins . The sfiphr~n in this sense does not achievePla ton ic ind i f fe rence to bod i ly p leasures , bu t r a ther deve lops sk i l l a t t rad ing onefor ano ther , l ike a man good a t t rad ing a less fo r a more va luab le co in (69A) . Inth e Charrnides Socra tes re fu tes the e f fo r t a t de f in ing tempera nce as ca lmness by

x4 In the Great Speech, and perhaps as "responsion" to the mistreatment of Justice andTemperance in the M iddle Speech, Plato desc ribes them as the first of the otherworldlyentities esp ied after absolute beauty (250B).


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414 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Yshowing tha t qu ickness (anchinoia) i s a s much temperance a s ca lmness i s (159E) .Thus wh i le P la to does no t s imp ly a s se r t tha t anchinoia i s an e r sa tz fo rm o fsrphrosyne, he ident if ies the two d ia lec t ica l ly , and refuses to credi t the ident i ty .The Middle Speaker 's doctr ine of the v ir tues , then , f i ts in with h is o ther doctr inesand s tands square ly opposed to Pla to 's own. A soul whose h ighest funct ion isdoxa in a wor ld wh ich exc ludes rea l be ing can a sp i re to no th ing nob le r than powerto pe r suade and sh rewdness .

We a re no t he re in s i s t ing on f ind ing I soc ra te s h imse l f beh ind the midd le speechof the Phaedrus. For the present case i t suff ices to show that rhe tor ica l cu l turegenera l ly , with i ts tendency to re jec t Pla tonic in te l lec tual ism, tended a lso to re jec ti ts in te l lec tual is t def in i t ion of the v ir tues and educat ion . The re jec t ion need not ,however , be open or d irec t . I t could as well be expressed indirec t ly , by pra ise forv ir tues def ined in non-in te l lec tual is t te rms, such as p leasure , u t i l i ty or publ icop in ion . Espec ia l ly in the cases o f ju s t i ce and temperance , wh ich in the i r u sua lmean ings are inconsis ten t with an aggress ive world l iness ben t on se lf -seeking and"ge t t ing more ," the re seems to have been a s tand ing , and i r r i t a t ing , d i sag reemen tbe tween Pla to and the exponen ts o f rhe to r ica l cu l tu re . I f the rhe to r ic ians bo r rowfrom in te l l ec tua l i s t l anguage in o rde r to debase i t s in tended mean ing , th i s' am ph ib o ly ' on ly mak es the i r pos i t ion m ore i r r i t a t ing because decep t ive ly ex -p re ssed . However he may mask i t , the pos i t ion o f the midd le speake r i s who le -hea r ted ly 'demot ic ' .1 s

The Midd le speech , then , a f te r pay ing t r ibu te to the impor tance o f de f in i t ion ,def ines love as a d isorder of the soul , which soul is capable only of appet i te andop in ion. Th e sou l ' s good i s thus reduced to 'd emo t ic ' p ropo r t ions too , to the k ind o fhones ty and the ca lcu la t ing so r t o f sob r ie ty wh ich such a concep t ion rep resen ts . I ft e rms l ike ousia an d philosophia a re pu t in to the speake r ' s mou th by Pla to , i t i snot to ref lec t any ser ious respect for , or even genuine comprehension of , the irPla tonic referents . At most they s tand for the wil l ingness of such rhetor ica leduca to r s to indu lge in amph ibo lous t a lk .

The speake r i s thus a se l f -p roc la imed educa to r , vo ic ing conce rn wi th the s ta teof the boy ' s soul and w ith the cul t iva t ion of i ts v ir tues (239B, 241C). H e is aneduca to r who can , a s we have sugges ted , be a s s igned to a r ecogn izab le and we l l -de f ined in te l l ec tua l mi l ieu . Th is mi l ieu we may cha rac te r ize fo r conven ience a stha t of the sophis t ica l- rhe tor ica l cu l ture of f if th and fou r th c entury Athens . 16 Th e

15 I. M. Crombie (An Examination o] Plato's Doctrines [London, 1962], I, pp. 150 f.)expresses the Platonic distinction aptly as follows:There is 'demotic' virtue which is enough to make a man live soberly and honestly [tem-perately and justly] because he se es that injustice does not pay; but beyond that thereis 'the love of wisdom' which provides an altogether different motivation towardsvirtue.., being the assertion of the soul's true nature as a spiritual being.is In this pape r the terms sophist an d rh etor have been used mor e o r l es s inter-changeably. Some scholars argue that Plato kept these two activities distinct, e.g.H. Raeder,"Plato und die Sophistik,'" Danske Vidensk. Selskab. Hist . -filol. Meddelses 26.9 (1939),pp. 5-12 and D odds, Gorgias (Oxford, 1959), pp. 6- 7. According t o Raeder and Dodds we


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P L A T O ' S P H A E D R U S 41 5s p e a k e r ' s v ie w s o n e p i s t e m o l o g y a n d o n t o l o g y , hi s p s y c h o l o g y a n d h i s t h e o r y o fv i r t u e s , a n d , m o r e p a r t i c u l a r l y s u g g e s t i v e o f I s o c r a t e s , h i s c l a i m s t o e x p e r t i s er e g a r d i n g philosophia ( 2 3 9B ) a l l p o i n t t o t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . T h e s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n -s h i p , m o r e o v e r , w h i c h o b t a i n s b e t w e e n t h e t h r e e s p e e c h e s o f t h e Phaedrus, b yw h i c h t h e m i d d l e s p e e c h i s m a d e t o s h a r e t h e p r e m i s e s o f L y s i a s ' o r a t i o n a n d i sr e j e c t e d a l o n g w i t h i t , a l s o s u g g e s t t h e s a m e i n t e l l e c t u a l a f f i l i a t i o n s .

W i t h t h e s e g e n e r a l p o i n t s i n m i n d i t i s p o s s i b l e t o c l a r i f y s e v e r a l f u r t h e r p r o b -l e m s i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e m i d d l e s p e e c h . F i r s t , w h y d o e s P l a t o , i n t h e b r i e fp r o o i m i o n , t e ll u s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r , d e s p i t e w h a t h e w i l l s a y , i s a l o v e r o f th e b o y ?N o w , f r o m P l a t o ' s p o i n t of v i e w ( a n d w e m u s t k e e p i n m i n d t h a t, w h o e v e r t h e" s u b j e c t " o f t h e p o r t r a i t , h e i s b e i n g s e e n t h r o u g h P l a t o ' s e y e s ) a l l i n t e l l e c t u a le d u c a t i o n c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d a s a s p e c i e s o f e r o t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p i n w h i c h t h ee d u c a t o r i s t h e l o v e r a n d t h e d i s c i p l e t h e b e l o v e d . S o c r a t e s ' r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t hy o u n g m e n s u c h a s A l c i b i a d e s , A g a t h o n , C h a r m i d e s a n d M e n o a r e a ll c a s e s i np o i n t . 17 F r o m a l l o f t h e s e i t is a l s o c l e a r t h a t a l t h o u g h P l a t o i s m o s t e x p l i c i t a n de m p h a t i c o n t h e n e e d f o r c h a s t i t y o n t h e p a r t o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r (Phaedrus 2 5 3 C -2 5 6 E , Symposium 2 1 8 B - 2 1 9 D ) , t h e r e i s n o r e a s o n a t a l l to b e l i e v e t h a t t h em e t a o h o r o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r a s l o v e r r e s ts o n a m e r e l y n o n - e s s e n t i a l p o i n t o fc o m p a r i s o n . F o r P l a t o , t h e a c t i v i t y o f t h o u g h t a n d t h e a r o u s a l o f re f l e c t i o n i no t h e rs b o t h d r a w o n t he s a m e d e e p s o u r ce s o f p a s s i o n w h i c h a n i m a t e o u r s e x u a ln a t u r e s . S o c r a t e s ' r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e s e r i e s o f b r i l l i a n t y o u n g m e n i n t h e d i a -l o g u e s i s t o b e s u r e n o t p h y s i c a l , b u t i t i s , a t t h e s a m e t i m e , u n e q u i v o c a l l y e r o t i c .

I n t h i s v i e w , a s i n s o m u c h e l s e , P l a t o i s m e r e l y r e n d e r i n g m o r e e x p l i c i t a na l r e a d y e x i s ti n g c u l t u r a l p a t t e r n . T h e n o t i o n o f t h e e d u c a t o r a s l o v e r , t h e f u s i o ni n t he a t t i t u d e o f t h e t e a c h e r o f a n e r o t i c in t e r e s t i n a y o u n g s t u d e n t w i t h a c o n c e r nf o r h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a i n i n g , a r e b y n o m e a n s p e c u l i a r t o P l a t o . H . I . M a r r o u ,should not give the name sophist to f igures such as Gorgias (Raeder and Dodds) andThrasymachus (Raeder), because Plato nowhere does. Plato did, to be sure, make a sharptheoretical distinction in the Gorgias between the two activities, but it should not be over-looked that there are two passages in this same dialogue which show that in practice th edistinction could not be rigidly main tained (465C, 520A). The sophists and rhetors, as Soc-rates points out, were virtually indistinguishable, and only a theoretic al scheme which glossedover actual contradictions could separate them. Much the same lack of concern about thetwo terms is in evidence at Phaedrus 257C-D, where logographer and sophist are clearly thesame.Plato 's difficulty, of course, reflects the his torical situation. Even if we accede to Dod ds'skepticism about Gorgias as a serious thinker, it will still be impossible to deny thatThrasymachus was both a rhetorician and sophist. Perhaps, in theory, this should not be so,but Thrasymachus, the historical figure, was both. Raeder 's attempt to deny Thrasymachusthe t i t le of sophist on the grounds that his opinions would not have met with the approvalof the sophists is preposterous, as a comparison with Antiphon's fragments shows. More-over, Navarre 's Essai sur la rhdtorique grecque (Paris, 1900), pp. 24-78, and Kro ll's article"Rhetorik," RE Supplem entbd. 7 (1940), pp. 1043-1048, show that almos t all the sophistswere, to some degree, concerned with rhetorical studies. We may also recall that in theSophist (268B-C) it is only in the last of a long series of divisions that the sophist and rhetorare clearly differentiated (cf. Cornford on Sophist 221C-223B [Plato's Theory of Knowledge,p. 174]).lr The fusion of the erotic and philosophical, not necessarily in a narrowly educationalcontext, is a frequent element in Plato's dialogues; cf. Phaedrus 248D, 249A and D. Syrup.209E-212A, Rep. 475B-C.


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416 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Yamon g o thers , has wr i t ten i l lumina t ing ly on th is aspec t o f Gree k educa t ion . 18 Onem a y c o m p a re , f r o m a m o n g m a n y o th e r e x a m p le s , I s o c ra t e s ' a c c o u n t o f t h e l e a v e -tak ing of h is s tuden ts (Antidosis 87-88) , s t range ly c lose to the mood of Sappho ' spoem in descr ip t ion o f a s imi la r occas ion (Fr . 94 L-P) .

But these a re genera l cons idera t ions . More par t icu la r ly sugges t ive o f the s i tua-t ion por t rayed in the midd le speech i s the work cons idered above , which i saddressed to one o f I socra tes ' mos t ce lebra ted pup i l s , N icoc les , son o f the g rea tEvagoras . In th is p ro t rep t ic d iscourse I socra tes , cas t ing h imse l f in the ro le o f mo ra le d u c a to r , w a rn s N ic o c l e s t h a t t h o u g h th e r e a r e m a n y o th e r s w h o c o m e to h imbear ing g i f t s in search o f roya l favor and wi th mercenary in ten t ions , he d i f fe ren t lyf rom the res t has come to adv ise the young k ing in a sp i r i t o f h igh-minded d is -in te res tedness and wi th a g i f t tha t w i l l no t on ly never lose i t s va lue , bu t w i l l g rowm o re v a lu a b le w i th t im e (To Nicocles, 1-2, 54). In the same way the middlespeaker , hav ing to compete wi th many o thers fo r the favor o f the young boy ,dec la res h is fundamenta l non- invo lvement ; he a lone among the su i to rs i s a non-lover , free f rom the fau l t o f se l f ishness which f igures so p rom inen t ly in h is por t ray a lof the lover . The To Nicocles i s no t on ly impor tan t , h owever , because i t a l lows usa g l impse o f I socra tes in the ro le o f a r iva l su i to r fo r the a t ten t ions o f a wea l thyyoung monarch . I t i s a l so impor tan t because i t l i f t s us f rom the rea lm of pure lypr iva te educa t ion to tha t o f soc ie ty in i t s la rger , po l i t ica l aspec t .

In th is en la rged con tex t , the metaphor o f educa tor as lover i s sub jec ted byPla to to a complex deve lopment . A connec t ion be tween the wor ld o f the rhe to r -ica l lover , who lays c la im to exper t i se in ph i losophica l ed uca t ion and endeavors towin young men over to h is po in t o f v iew, and tha t o f the wor ld ly po l i t ic ian , i s infac t h in ted a t in the Phaedrus 257E-258B (c f . Pol. 303D). Socrates is making theparadoxica l observa t ion tha t the po l i t ic ians , desp i te the i r scorn fo r the speech-wr i te rs , a re rea l ly such themse lves . The po l i t ic ians a re descr ibed as enamored(~ptSot) of writ ing. The difference is that the ir comp osit io ns are laws not speeches.Mo reover , the po l i t ic ian , in h is lawmaking , has such a fondness fo r those whopra ise h is compos i t ions tha t he p re f ixes the i r names , demos a nd boule, t o e a c h a n devery work . S imi la r ly , when Socra tes tu rns to a w ide r c r i t ique o f the two ear l ie rspeeches , the na tu ra l con tex ts to which he d i rec ts h is cons idera t ions a re the po l i t -ica l and d ican ic (259E-260C) . In Greek te rms th is double aspec t o f persuas ion ,i .e . the pub l ic and the p r iva te , i s a fami l ia r way of conce iv ing the mat te r .

Famil ia r , an d c lose ly connec ted , is P la to ' s convic t ion tha t bo th ph i losophersand prac t ica l men of the wor ld , whe ther these la t te r be po l i t ic ians , soph is ts , o rrhe to r ic ians , mus t be thought o f no t on ly as the lovers o f the i r d isc ip les , bu t o fsome la rger idea l as well . Such lovers , tu rned in two d i rec t ions a t once , ac t as in te r -media r ies whose endeavor i s to win over the i r be loved d isc ip les to a cher ishedideal of l i fe . A passage in the Gorgias (481C-482A) is explici t on this point .Socra tes i s address ing Cal l ic les about the ob jec ts o f the i r respec t ive loves . ForSocra tes the be loved a re Ph i losophy and Alc ib iades , fo r Ca l l ic les the Athen ian

18 H. I. Marrou, History o/ Education in Antiquity, tr. G. Lamb (New York, 1964),pp. 150-162.


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P L A T O ' S P H A E D R U S 4 t 7P e o p l e a n d D e m o s , t h e w e l l - b o r n s o n o f P y r i l a m p e s . 19 N o w , i t i s n o t s t a t e d t h a ti t i s a n i n s e p a r a b l e a s p e c t o f S o c r a t e s ' l o v e f o r A l c i b i a d e s t h a t h e s h o u l d d e s i r e t ot u r n t h e y o u n g m a n t o a li fe o f p h i l o s o p h y . B u t i n t h e l ig h t o f d i a l o g u e s s u c h a sth e S y m p o s i u m . w h i c h i s p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h A l c i b i a d e s , a n d t h e Phaedrusi t s e l f , s uch an in fe rence i s i r r es i s t ib le . L es s im m edia te ly ce r ta in , bu t h igh lyp laus ib le in the l igh t o f s oc ia l and ps ych o log ica l cons id era t ions , i s the in fe rencetha t when Ca l l i c les , and m en l ike h im , cu l t iva te the i r p ro teges i t i s a t l eas t in pa r tf o r t he p u r p o s e o f i n t r o d u c i n g t h e m t o t h e w a y o f li fe t o w h i c h t h e y h a v e g i v e nt h e i r o w n p a s s i o n a t e a l l eg i a n c e . 2 ~ A g a i n o n e f i nd s a p a r a l l e l i n I s o c r a t e s . I n t h eA n t i d o s i s (132) and the T o N i c o c l e s ( 1 5 -1 6 ) , I s o c r a t e s u r g e s u p o n T i m o t h e u s a n dNicoc les the v iew ( incons i s ten t ly , a s we s ha l l s ee l a te r ) tha t in the p rac t i ca l con-duc t o f the s t a te i t i s neces s a ry to be a lover o f the polis and s o l i c i tous o f them u l t i t u d e .

H IB e f o r e p r o c e e d i n g t o s u p p o r t o u r s t r o n g e r t h e s i s, w h i c h i d en t if i es t h e m i d d l e

s p e a k e r w i t h I s o c r a t e s , i t w o u l d n o t b e o u t o f p l a c e t o d i s cu s s b r i e fl y t h e q u e s t i o no f t h e u n i t y o f t h e Phaedrus . T h e q u e s t i o n i n i t s m o s t b a s i c f o r m i s t h i s , " I s t h e r ea n y i n t r i n si c c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o p a r t s o f t h e d i a l o g u e , i .e . th e f ir st c o n -s i st i ng o f t h r e e d i s c o u r s e s o n l o v e a n d t h e s e c o n d o f a t h e o r e t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n o fr h e t o r i c ? " P u t i n a n o t h e r w a y , " I s t h e r e a n i n t r i n s i c c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t h e m e so f e ro s a n d r h e t o r i c ? " J a e g e r i s su r e l y c o r r e c t w h e n h e o b s e r v e s t h a t i n f a c t b o t hha lves o f the d ia log ue a re con cern ed w i th rhe to r ic : in the f i r st ha l f the s ub jec t i sa p p r o a c h e d t h r o u g h e x a m p l e s , w h i l e th e s e c o n d is d e v o t e d t o a t h e o r e t ic a lc r i ti q u e . T h i s i s t r u e , b u t t h is s o l u t i o n i g n o r e s t h e i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n w h y l o v e ,and no t some o ther top ic , w a s c h o s e n a s su b j e c t. A n u m b e r o f a n s w e r s h a v e b e e ng iven , bu t they a re a l l , it s eem s to us , l ack ing in an a t t a ina b le p rec i s ion . 21 I f ou rp r e c e d i n g a r g u m e n t s a r e s o u n d , t h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e u n i t y o f t h e

19 In a more precise sense the object of the philosopher's love is not philosophy, but theultimate goal of philosophical endeavor, i.e. being; cL, Rep. 475B-D, 489D and Shorey'snote (b), 490B and Shorey's note (a); Phaedrus 249D-E; Symposium 209C, 210E-212A.20 Cf. Rep. 495C-496A, where sophists a re pseudo-s uitors o f Philosoph y. Socr ates'remarks conce rning the object of Callicles' love are reminiscent of Pericles' exhortation tothe Athenians that they become the lovers of their city (II, 43). Close, too, is the centralsituation of Aristophanes' Knights, in which the Athenian demos is portrayed as the objectof the fervent attentions o f two rival citizens. Similarly, thoug h an explicitly erotic voc abula ryis lacking, the advocate s of sophistical-rhetorical culture , com mitte d to a prag mati c pointof view and to the pursuit of immediate political goals, are characterized in the Republicas suitors of the demos (494A).21 Paideia, III, pp. 183-184. Jaeger suggests that the choice of subject is largely fortuitous;but there are surely reasons beyond a presumed popularity of the subject with 5th centuryrhetoricians (259). Kennedy, The Art ol Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, 1963), p. 75, seesthe connection in the fact that "love beautifully exemplifies what . . . [Plato] . . . has inmind about rhetoric: rather than being a purely objective rational or artistic matter itinvolves the soul of the disputants." Robin, Phbdre (Paris, 1933), 1, and R. Hackforth, Plato'sPhaedrus, pp. 9-10, among others, see the reason for the choice of love in the basic affinityof love and philosophy, a position for which the Symposium is, of course, the major item ofproof.


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418 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H YPhaedrus i s pe rhaps a ra ther s t ra igh t fo rward one . Th e a f fmi ty o f eros a ndrhe tor ic , and there fore the s ingu la r f i tness o f love as a sub jec t fo r rhe to r ic , res tsabove a l l on the fac t which we examined ear l ie r tha t in P la to ' s v iew therhetorician, like the philosopher, is also a lover. A discourse on love wi l l the re foreno t on ly po in t up the sk i l l o f the rhe to r ic ian ; i t i s al so an app ropr ia te means fo rrevea l ing the very essence o f h is ac t iv i ty . But i f ph i losopher and rhe to r ic ian a rebo th lovers , the i r loves none the less d i f fe r p rofou ndly , An d the na tu re o f th isd i f fe rence , we subm it , i s one impo r tan t un i fy ing p r inc ip le o f the Phaedrus.

That the speakers have been g iven the task o f de l iver ing e ro t ic d iscourses i s ,as we hope we have shown, no rea l cause fo r puzz lement . But a par t icu la r p rob lemst i l l remains wi th respec t to the midd le speaker . Why does P la to make a spec ia lpo in t o f the fac t tha t the lover i s dissembling? We are g iven no reasons . We a remere ly to ld tha t tha t love r is ' c ra f ty ' (~ [~ t~o~ 237B). Th ere a re , i t seems, twoposs ib le l ines o f in te rpre ta t ion . E i the r the speaker , w ho i s as we must keep in mindin love wi th the boy , i s descr ib ing a k ind o f e ro t ic re la t ionsh ip which , a l thoughma ny recognize i t a s a k ind o f love , he none the less f inds repe l len t . Or , he i s descr ib -ing the course o f an a f fa i r from the point of view of just such a lover. If this la t tera l te rna t ive i s t rue , the d issembl ing lov er wil l be descr ib ing p rec ise ly the k in d o flove in the g r ip o f which he knows himse l f to be .

Alon g the f ir s t l ine o f in te rpre ta t ion a na tu ra l assumpt io n i s tha t the c ra f tylover o f the p ro logu e i s so meho w to be connec ted w i th Socra tes h imse l f . 22Socrates can be thought o f as in love wi th Phaedrus , and in o rder to p reva i l overrhe tor ica l compet i to rs l ike Lys ias he does consen t to por t ray love in a way whichhe knows to be deep ly un t rue . Jus t so , i t i s a rgued , the c ra f ty lover , f ind ing h im-se l f in heavy compet i t ion , can be imagined as choos ing a cur ious and paradoxica ltack in o rder to impress the young man .

The para l le l s a re s t r ik ing . Yet cons iderab le obs tac les bar accep tance o f th isv iew. In the f i rs t p lace , a l though there is no t m uch uncer ta in ty abou t Socra tes 'mot ives in accep t ing , fo r the occas ion , the thes is tha t one ought to g ra t i fy the non-lover ra ther th an the lover , the re i s no t the smal les t ind ica t ion tha t th is i s themot ive o f the midd le speaker .

Secondly , and fa r mor e weigh ty , i s the necess i ty th is v iew would impose o fattr ibu ting to Socrates chara cteris t ics wh ich are asso ciated with th e w ord cti~t6~.o~and , on Hackf or th ' s v iew, o f imput ing to a man so descr ibed "a rea l conce rn fo rthe wel fa re , espec ia l ly the mo ra l wel fa re , o f the boy . " 23 Ph i lo log ica l ev idence ,even if we al low for i ts l imitat ions, overwhelmingly suggests that the wordct[Ix6)~o~,wi th i t s bas ic connota t ion o f se l f - seek ing dup l ic i ty , i s s imply unreconc i lab le e i therwi th P la to ' s c oncep t io n o f Socra tes o r w i th a ny no rma l no t ion o f good wi ll . 24

In th is mat te r i t i s appropr ia te to reca l l F r ied lander ' s in te rpre ta t ion o f Socra tes 'f i r s t speech . The thes is i s tha t P la to in tends th is speech to be no t on ly a techn ica l

22 Hackforth, loc. cir.23 Ibid.24 The word is fairly Common in early G reek po etry, bu t its occurrence in the Phaedrusis apparently its first in prose, unles s we are to re ad the word in a corr upt pa ssag e un-certainly assigned to Democritus (Diels-Kranz, FVS BI04). It is used of tricksters such as


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P L A T O ' S P H A E D R U S 41 9improvemen t ove r Lys ia s ' , bu t a l so a c la r i f i ca t ion o f human rea l i t i e s on ly h in tedat in the ear l ie r speech and a revela t ion of a level of se lf -awareness of whichLys ia s ' speake r i s s imp ly no t capab le . O n th i s in te rp re ta t ion , Soc ra te s wi l l bepo r t ray ing a man wi th the same a ims a s Lys ia s ' su i to r , bu t possessed , a t the samet ime , o f g rea te r acu i ty o f mind ; r a the r s in i s te r , and le s s na ive , he knows tha t helus ts a f ter the boy (237B), and is wil l ing , in order to win h im over , to employdecei t a nd s lander the god of love . 25In the speech of Lysias, the basic disposition of the speaker was left indefinite, andLysias might well have counted this indefiniteness an advantage. Socrates, however,clearly defines the situation in an opening summary such as was retained for thesefictitious speeches in later rhetoric. The admirer (a "wily flatterer") of a handsomeyoung man who is much loved has fa lse ly persuaded the youth tha t he does not lovehim. Thus, the theme taken over f rom Lysias is not posed paradoxica l ly , for the moreclearly delineated description serves a psychologically determined strategy. (222-223)an dHere in the Phaedrus, the wily friend (239B) asserts that the lover keeps the belovedaway from "div ine phi losophy." He must know, for he h imself is caught up in th iskind of love, after all , as much as he conceals it . Thus, it should not be said that aspecific mod e of life determin ed b y false love is refuted here. W hat happens, rather,is that this specific mode of life is led to reveal itself in its true nature. This is thesubstance and meaning of the first speech of Socrates. (225-226)

We sugges t tha t th i s po r t ra i t f i t s I soc ra te s c lo se ly . Be fo re we b r ing fo rwardour ev idence , however , i t is necessary to c lar i fy one poin t . In the pro logue of themiddle speech Pla to expl ic i t ly apprises the reader of the fac t , however i t is to bein te rp re ted , tha t the speake r consciously keeps h is t rue fee l ings concealed . Can thesame be demons t ra ted o f I soc ra te s ' behav io r toward h i s own pup i l s o r toward thewide r aud ience to wh ich h i s works a re d i rec ted? Mos t l ike ly no t , a t l ea s t no t wi tha n y c e r t a i n t y . T h e c a s e w e m a d e o u t f o r I s o c r a t e s ' ' a m p h i b o l y ' a t m o s t o p e n s u pthe poss ib i l i ty . We a re , a f te r a l l , dea l ing wi th p sycho log ica l and mora l nuanceso f a mos t fug i tive na tu re . None the le s s , the re s ti ll unm is takab l y rema ins , a s wehope to show, an au ra o f s lyness and hypoc r i sy in the cha rac te r o f th i s , a t f i r s tg lance , f la t and ted ious man . 26The s i tua t ion o f the midd le speech can be though t o f o the rwise th an a srep resen t ing a consc ious ly a s sumed pose cove r ing ove r r ea l in ten t ions c lea r lype rce ived by the ac to r . I f we a l low Fr ied l~ inde r ' s in te rp re ta t ion , we may a l so th inko f i t a s P la to ' s dev ice fo r b r ing ing in to c lea re r v iew the t rue mo t ives wh ich an ima teOdysseus (e.g ., Pindar, Ne m 8.3 3), Sisyphus (Theognis, 7 04 ), Prometheus (Aeschylus,Prometheus Bound 206) and Hermes (Hymn to Hermes 13, 317). It is also used with refer-ence to wiles employed for the purpose of sexual seduction (Home r, Odyssey 1.56; Hesiod,Works and Days 78, 374).~ P. Friedl~inder, op. cit., pp. 222-226.2~ It is therefore not, on the face of it, absurd to reject the suggested identification ofCallicles with Isocrates, as Dodds does, op. cir., p. 12.


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420 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Ysuch men , mot ives about which , we can be sure , they a re mos t o f ten themse lvesfa r f rom c lear . Af te r a l l , few men a re so hones t o r shameless as to admit , a s doesthe midd le speaker , to such to ta l se l f i shness . Most , l ike the speaker in Lys ias 'd iscourse , tend , ra ther , to conce ive o f themse lves as rea l i s t ic , en l igh tened , andsophis t ica ted , z7 The con t ras t , f rom the perspec t ive o f Fr ied l~ inder 's in te rpre ta -t ion , would be tha t be tween a se l f -de luded cer ta in ty about the reasons fo r one ' sac t ions , as i s the case wi th Lys ias ' speaker , and ob jec t ive ly perce ived , fa r lessf la t te r ing mot ives fo r these same ac t ions. We wi l l have mov ed f rom the mind of theac tor to the mind of the observer . And th is shou ld no t be a su rpr is ing ambigu i tyof perspec t ive . In c om mo n usage , a f te r a l l , the reproa ch of hypo cr isy jus t as o f tenre fe rs to con t rad ic t ions o f which the "hy poc r i te" is unaware , b u t which o thersperce ive , as to consc ious d ispar i ty be tween word and deed .

Isocra tes ' s se l f -p roc la imed v iew is tha t he i s the " teacher and counse l lo r" o f thep e o p le (Antidosis , 102) , a cu t , we may presume, above the normal run o f po l i t ic ian .In the same sp i r i t , he adv ises Nicoc les to se t h imse l f up as a mora l parad igm forthe ed i f ica t ion o f h is sub jec ts and to see to i t tha t the i r l ives a re condu c ted w i thju s t i c e a n d m o d e ra t io n (To Nicoc le s , 31, cf . 11, 16-19). And yet i t is a lso cleartha t f rom Pla to ' s po in t o f v iew Isocra tes ' pos i t ion i s f lawed wi th an i r redeemablecon t rad ic t ion . For in the very same works in which Isocra tes smugly p resen ts h im-se l f as educa to r and up l i f te r o f the mul t i tude he a lso p ropo unds the v iew (An t i -dosis, 132-133) , commending i t to Nicoc les as wel l (To Nicoc te s , 15-16), that to bea success fu l ru le r one mu s t govern in such a way as to g ra t i fy the masses! Now onemay cons ider th is a defens ib le po l i t ica l pos i t ion invo lv ing no rea l con t rad ic t ion .But su re ly P la to d id no t . He may have a t t r ibu ted the con t rad ic t ions in I socra tes 'v i ew to m u d d le h e a d e d n e s s r a th e r t h a n to d e l ib e r a t e h y p o c ri s y , b u t t h e l in e t a k e n b yIsocra tes , i . e . tha t a genu ine ru le r shou ld seek to g ra t i fy the des i res o f thegoverned , i s , o f course , re jec ted ou t r igh t by P la to . I t would have seemed to P la toa case o f someone eager to ach ieve popula r success mask ing h is ambi t ion wi thh ig h - s o u n d in g p r e t e n s io n s a b o u t v i r t u e a n d p h i lo s o p h y .

T h e T o N i c o c l e s a lso ev idences the same mora l ambigu i ty . Th is d iscourse ,conce ive d in a h igh mora l tone , is pa r t icu la r ly a imed a t deva lu ing , to the ga in o fIsocra tes ' p r ice less adv ice , the mate r ia l g i f t s w i th which h is r iva ls seek to ga inNicoc les ' favor and to be rewarded (1 -2 , 54) . A commendable v iew, to be sure .Wh o would d ispu te the super io r i ty o f w isdom over mate r ia l wea l th? Ye t , in thissame wo rk , I socra tes takes pa ins a t severa l po in ts to impress u pon h isyoung d isc ip le the need fo r generos i ty . He does no t , to be sure , exp l ic i t lyask repayment fo r h is w ise counse ls , bu t i t i s ex t remely d i f f icu l t to suppose tha tth is i s no t h in ted a t in the severa l passages in which he u rges Nicoc les to rewardfriends (19) and view talented advisors with special favor (53, cf . 20, 22, 28). Thereis ev idence fo r be l iev ing , moreover , tha t / socra tes was no t above th is k ind o fmer cena ry re la t ionsh ip wi th h is mos t in t imate s tuden ts , e spec ia l ly me n of wea l thand power , s ince he seems to have charged bo th T imotheus and Nicoc les s izab les u m s o f m o n e y fo r c o m p o s i t i o n s w h ic h h e w ro te fo r t h e m . 2 s

9 Cf. the remarks of Josef Pieper, Euthusiasrn and Divine Madness. tr. Richard andClara Winston (New York, 1964), pp. 6-12.38 Vid. pseudo-Plutarch, Lives of the Ten Orators, 837A, 838A.


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P L A T O ' S P H A E D R U S 421Deviousness o f th is so r t i s no t res t r ic ted to I socra tes ' po l i t ica l ac t iv i t ies , a s

Buchhe i t has convinc ing ly shown in h is s tudy of I socra tes ' Hele n. 29 I t i s Buchhe i t ' sv iew tha t I socra tes i s gu i l ty o f hav ing a t tempted , in an u nder hand ed and un-consc ionab le way , to mis represen t the in ten t ions o f Gorg ias , h is o lder r iva l and ,p e rh a p s , t ea c h e r , w h o m v a n i ty im p e l l e d h im to a t t a c k , b u t w h o m h e l a c k e d th ec o u ra g e to c o n f ro n t in a n o p e n w a y .

This v iew of the mat te r p resen ts us wi th two Isocra tes : the one ted ious lyf a m i l i a r t o a l l r e a d e r s - -p r e a c h y , h ig h -m in d e d , r a th e r p o m p o u s ; t h e o th e r p e e r in gout f rom be tween the l ines - -a f igure o f s lyness , g reed , van i ty , and ambi t ion .Ancien t t rad i t ion , in fac t , knew of th is less a t t rac t ive I socra tes , and there i s reasonto t h in k th a t h i s c o n te m p o ra r i e s f o u n d h i s v a n i ty a n d p o m p o s i ty o v e rw h e lm in g lya t t rac t ive ta rgets , a~ M ore d i rec t ly re levan t to th e m at te r a t han d , K laus R ies hasshown in a recen t s tudy of P la to and Isocra tes tha t a f igure very l ike the dup l ic i tousIsocra tes we have been descr ib ing i s p resen t in P la to ' s account , in Books 5 and 6of the R e p u b l i c , of the cor rup t ing in f luence o f soc ie ty on the g i f ted young and ,more par t icu la r ly , in h is expos i t ion o f the v iew tha t the soph is ts , though professedteachers o f the mul t i tude , a re in rea l i ty i ts w i l ling s laves, a l I t i s mos t l ike ly tha tin P la to ' s v iew, I socra tes was p reeminen t among such men; and , as R ies a rgues , heis c lea r ly a l luded to a t severa l c ruc ia l po in ts in th is sec t ion o f the R e p u b l i c . T h i scon t rad ic t ion ( some migh t ca l l i t hypocr isy) be tween professed a ims and ac tua lcondu c t is , i t shou ld be no ted , p rec ise ly the one to which we po in t ed in ou rear l ie r d iscuss ion o f The A n t i d o s i s a n d T o N i c o c l e s . There i s thus , to rever t tothe ch ie f sub jec t o f our d iscuss ion , some p laus ib i l i ty in the v iew tha t the midd lespeaker , who i s in o ther respec ts so exac t ly remin iscen t o f I socra tes , i s a l so , in themat te r o f h is s lyness and d ishones ty , no t very fa r f rom the mark .

I VIn conc lus ion , we re tu rn to our less ambi t ious thes is , which a t tempts on ly to

loca te the charac te r o f the midd le speaker in a gener ic way . Tha t thes is i s con-s iderab ly conf i rmed by a passage in the S o p h i s t (221C-223B) , a work p robab lyw r i t te n n o t v e ry f ar i n t im e f ro m th e P hae drus . T h e s u b je c t im m e d ia t e ly u n d e rd iscuss ion i s the def in i t ion o f the soph is t as hunter: the soph is t i s a hun te r o f youngmen of rank and d is t inc t ion ; he works no t by v io lence , bu t by persuas ion ; heprac t ices h is c ra f t among pr iva te ind iv idua ls ; un l ike the lover , who g iv e s gifts, hetak e s a fee ; a2 las tly , he a f fec ts a concern fo r the educa t ion o f h is charg e to v i r tue .In P la to ' s eyes he i s, o f course , a p ropo nent o f a spur ious fo rm of educa t ion(dox opa ide u t ik e ) . Now th is ske tch cor responds wi th remarkab le c loseness to thef igure which has emerged f rom our in te rpre ta t ion o f the midd le speech . Thespeaker o f the P h a e d r u s i s , to be sure , a lover , whereas the sub jec t o f P la to ' sske tch in the S o p h i s t i s , by h is own account , an educa tor . But in the l igh t o f our

~Q V. Buchheit, op. cit., pp. 54-64.30 Vid. pseudo-Plutarch, op. cit., 839 A; for contemporaries, vid. J. Coulter, op. cit.,pp. 225-236.31 K. Ries, op. cit.32 Vid. Cornford, op. cit. (above, note 17), pp. 174, 182.


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422 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Ye a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e c l o s e a f f i n it y b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o f i g ur e s , o f t h e s e l f -p r o c l a i m e d e d u c a t i o n a l r o l e o f t h e m i d d l e s p e a k e r , a n d o f t h e c l e a r c o n c e p t u a lc o n n e c t i o n t h a t P l a t o f o r m s h e r e i n t h e Sophist p a s s a g e , e x h i b i t i n g t h e l o g i c a lk i n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e t w o , t h i s i s a d i f f e re n c e w i t h o u t a n y i m p o r t a n c e . 33

T h e c o n c e p t i o n o f l o v e a r g u e d b y t h i s " l e f t - h a n d e d " l o v e r is , a s i s t h e e n t i r ec o m p l e x o f r h e t o r i c a l - s o p h i s t i c a l c u l t u r e o f w h i c h i t i s t h e h e a r t , t o t a l l y a n dp a s s i o n a t e l y r e p u d i a t e d b y S o c r a t e s i n t h e f in a l s p e e c h . S u c h a l o v e r o n l y k n o w sl i a i s o n s o f b r i e f d u r a t i o n . H e i s d e s t r u c t i v e l y p o s s e s s i v e , l a c k i n g i n t r u s t , j e a l o u so f a n y i n d e p e n d e n c e o r m a t u r i t y o n t h e p a r t o f h i s b e l o v e d . H e i s a " r e a l i s t , "w h o s e d e c i s i o n s co n c e r n i n g h u m a n a t t a c h m e n t s a r e c a l c u l a t e d o n t h e b a s i s o n l y o fp l e a s u r e a n d u t i l it y . H e i s , l a s t l y , a m a n o b s e s s e d w i t h necessity . 34

A s o f t e n , A r i s t o t l e p r o v i d e s u s w i t h a d i s c u r s i v e t r e a t m e n t o f a m a t t e r w h i c hs e r v e s as a k i n d o f g u i d e t o P l a t o ' s d r a m a t i c t r e a t m e n t o f it . I n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o ft h e t h r e e t y p e s o f f r i e n d s h i p a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f B o o k V I I I o f t h e NichomacheanEthics ( l 1 5 5 b 1 0 - 1 1 5 7 b 6 ) , A r i s t o t l e d e f i ne s t he t w o i n f e r i o r g r a d e s o f f r i e n d s h i p - -i n fa c t , t h e y a r e n o t r e a l l y f r i e n d s h i p a t a l l e x c e p t t h a n k s t o a n a m b i g u i t y 3 5 - - a sb a s e d e i t h e r o n p l e a s u r e o r u t i l i t y. T h e s e , a s w e s a w e a r l i e r , a r e c e n t r a l n o t i o n s i nt h e m i d d l e s p e e c h . T h e s e f a l s e f o r m s o f f r i e n d s h i p h e r e j e c t s i n f a v o r o f a n e n d u r -i n g f r i e n d s h i p w h i c h r e s t s o n a r e c i p r o c a l l o v e o f v i r t u e . O n e o f t h e j u s t c a u s e s f o rb r e a k i n g o ff a f r i e n d s h i p w h i c h A r i s t o t l e c i t e s i n B o o k I X i s p r e c i s e l y t h e s o r to f d e c e p t i o n w h i c h c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e p e rs o n o f t h e m i d d l e s p e e ch : t h e d e l i b e r a t ep r e t e n s e o f a c o n c e r n f o r t h e b o y ' s c h a r a c t e r i n o r d e r t o c o n c e a l t h e b a s e r c a u s e so f t h e a t t a c h m e n t , p l e a s u r e o r u t i l i ty . S u c h a p r e t e n d e r i s w o r s e t h a n a c o u n t e r -f e i t er , A r i s t o t l e c o m m e n t s , i n p r o p o r t i o n a s t h e t h i n g h e d e b a s e s ( f r i e n d s h i p ) i sm o r e v a l u a b l e ( l 1 65 b 4 f f ) . A r i s t o t l e i s a l s o a w a r e ( 1 1 5 7a 2 7 - 28 ) o f t h e p o l i t i c a la n a l o g u e s t o t h e f o r m s o f p e r s o n a l f r i e n d s h i p u n d e r d i s c u s s i o n : " w e s p e a k o f' f r i e n d l y ' s t a t e s , t h o u g h w e a l l k n o w t h a t p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e s a re f o r m e d o n c a l c u l a -t i o n s o f e x p e d i e n c y . " T h i s p o i n t i s e x t r e m e l y u s e f u l i n r e i n f o r c i n g o u r e a r l i e r

a3 There is an extra ordina rily precise clue which links the two passages. We saw earlie rthat the epithet which P lato applies to the m iddle spea ker is ct[la6~.og. The ancient etym ologistsunders tood the word to be a dim inutive of the Home ric w ord n~pcov, which occurs uniquelyat Iliad V, 49 with a sense that is quite uncertain. (For a collection of ancient etymologiessee Lexikon des #iihgr&chischen Epos, ed. B. Snell et al. [GOttingen, 19 55], s.v.). It occursin th e p hrase ttT~tovct O~pctg generally underst ood in antiquity to mean "skilled at the hunt."Now it is arguabl e that Plat o did not himself thin k of ct[ta6~.og as the d iminutive of {~i~ttov,or that , if he had, he w ould not inevitably have recalled this passage in the Iliad. But it isa most suggestive fact that the only other passage in Plato where the word occurs is in adiscussion of hunting (Laws 7. 832D). In the light of this consideratio n, one is temptedto say that in order to bring out all the nuances of the word in this passage one mustparap hrase U[la6~.og as a "stealthy hunter of yo ung m en."~4 238E, 239A (twice), 239B, 239C, 240A, 240C, 240D, 240E, 241B (twice), 240C. Is thisthe same necessity some mistake for the Goo d a t Rep. 493C?s5 In the Eudemian Ethics, probably written when Plato was still alive (cf. Diiring,"Aris toteles ," RE Supp leme ntband X I 11968], p. 333), Aristotle discusses the sam e topicof fr iends, putt ing emphasis on the logical point about plurali ty of meanings. Also close tothe Phaedrus in time is the Categories, in which Aristotle seems to be codifying results ofexplorations of homonymy in Topics. In any case, when one adds A ristotle 's pleasure-basedto his utility-ba sed friendship, he gets the "left-h ande d" eros of the Phaedrus, and especiallyof the Midd le Speech. But this is the eros which Plato calls a "hom ony m" (266A) of thePlatonic eros of the Great Speech. These matters bear on the studies G. E. L. Owen had doneon the developments of Plato and Aristotle.


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P L A T O ' S P H A E D R U S 423o b s e r v a t i o n s a b o u t t h e w i d e r p o l i t i c a l d i m e n s i o n s i m p l i c i t i n w h a t s e e m e d a ne x c l u s iv e l y p r i v a t e a n d p e r s o n a l s i t ua t i o n . I n d e e d P l a t o m u s t h a v e h e a r d m a n ym e n i n G r e e k p o l i t ic a l li fe w h o o p e r a t e d o n t h e s a m e p r e m i s e s a n d t a l k e d t h e s a m el a n g u a g e a s t h e l e f t - h a n d e d l o v e r o f t h e m i d d l e s p e e c h . T h e y t o o w e r e " r e a l i s t s , "l o o k i n g a t t h e w o r l d i n a c l e a r - e y e d a n d d i s a b u s e d w a y , w e i g h i n g d i s p a s s i o n a t e l yw h a t w a s p r o f i t a b l e a n d e x p e d i e n t , f r e e f r o m " f o o l i s h " a n d " u s e l e s s " i l l u s i o n s .A l t h o u g h m o s t w e r e s u r e l y w i t h o u t t h e s e l f -a w a r e n e s s w i t h w h i c h P l a t o c r e d i t s t h es p e a k e r i n t h e p r o l o g u e . T h u c y d i d e s i s, o f c o u r s e , f u ll o f s p e e c h e s b y s u c h m e n . 36T h e o n l y d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t t h e y a r e w o o i n g n o t a y o u n g b o y b u t t h e A t h e n i a np e o p l e o r a p o t e n t i a l l y v a l u a b l e a l l y .

W e e a r l ie r e x a m i n e d t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n o f t h e m i d d l e s p e a k e r . I t i si m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t f o r P l a t o i t i s n o a c c i d e n t t h a t a m a n w h o t h inks t h e w a y t h el e f t - h a n d e d l o v e r d o e s s h o u l d a l s o c o n c e i v e o f l o v e t h e w a y h e d o e s . T h e r ei s a k i n d o f l o g i c a l n e c e s s i ty w h i c h o p e r a t e s t o b r i n g t h is a b o u t . F o r P l a t o t h es a y i n g i n t h e g o s p e l h o l d s t r u e . " W h e r e y o u r t r e a s u r e i s , th e r e w i l l y o u r h e a r tbe a l s o . " T here i s a l s o a f ac tua l neces s i ty wh ich ho lds s uch a m an in i t s g r ip . I t i s ,in f ac t , a po in t tha t P la to m akes s evera l t im es tha t the po l i t i c ian m us t , i f he i s tos u rv ive , be as s im i la ted to the ob jec t o f h i s love (Gorgias 5 1 2 E - 5 1 3 C , R e p . 4 9 3 D ,494E ) . 37

I n t h i s p a p e r w e d o n o t m e a n t o i m p l y a n y " r e d u c t i o n " o f t h e Phaedrus to am e r e r h e t o r i c a l p o l e m i c . A m o n g t h e r e a s o n s a g a i n s t a n y s u c h r e d u c t i o n i s t h ev i o l e n c e i t w o u l d d o t o i m p o r t a n t , a n d i n Phaedrus i m p o r t a n t l y n e w , m a t t e r s o f l o g i cs u c h as th e n a t u r e o f p a r a d o x , a m b i g u i t y a n d d e fi n it io n . A l t h o u g h w e m a k e n oe f f o rt t o g o i n t o t h e s e c o m p l i c a t e d q u e s t i o n s h e r e , i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e a m b i g u i t yd i s c o v e r e d i n Phaedrus i n th e c a s e o f t h e t w o o r m o r e m e a n i n g s o f " e r o s " h a si m p o r t a n t c o n ti n u it i e s w i t h s o m e o f th e t h e o ri z i ng a b o u t m e a n i n g i n t h e A c a d e m yd u r i n g P l a t o ' s l a t e r y e a r s . T h i s w o u l d g i v e s t i l l o t h e r b a s i s f o r u n i f y i n g t h ePhaedrus i n t e r n a l l y , a n d t h e n f o r u n i f y i n g i t w i t h w h a t i s g r a d u a l l y g e t t i n gc l a ri f ie d a b o u t P l a t o a n d t h e A c a d e m y i n t h e m i d - f o u r t h c e n t u r y . 38Brooklyn Col l ege; Columbia Univers i t y

3~ See especially the speeches of the Corcy rean a mba ssador (I. 32-36 ), Diodo tus (Ill,43-48), and Euphemus (VI, 76-80). Although a detailed comparative study is out of placehere, it can be shown through an examination of specific argumentative terms and con-cepts th at there exists a very close affinity between the min ds of these speakers a nd t hat o fthe middle speaker of the Phaedrus. Especially important are notions such as ophelia, blabeand sophrosyne. Compare also Creon's argument in the Antigone for preferring 'friends' inthe political sense to perso nal friends: only thus does o ne expand one's co untry (11. 182-190).The f

malcolm. coulter, james. the middle speech of plato's phaedrus

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