Disarmament and International Security Committee

2016第二届

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

Topic A: Aggression, Sabotage and Espionage in Cyberspace: Drawing Red Lines

Written by George Mullens Yuji Develle

Topic B: The Kurdish Peace Process: Disarmament and Peace-Building in the relevant regions of Turkey, Syria and Iraq

This document, originally written for use in Oxford

International Model United Nations 2016, is licensed

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(CC BY-NC-SA 4.0).

Any re-use or modification must be made public and

noncommercial and give credit to the original authors.

This Study Guide is ONLY for Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS

Model United Nations Conference 2016, co-hosting by

WELAND International, Oxford Global Education

Development and Shanghai Foreign Languages School

affiliated to Shanghai International Studies University.

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

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CONTENTS

Topic A: Aggression, Sabotage and Espionage

in Cyberspace: Drawing Red Lines

- Introduction pg 3

-Topic History pg 3

-Discussion of the Problem pg 10

-The Future pg 15

-Bloc Positions pg 18

-PRSA .....................pg 19

-Further Reading pg 19

-Bibliography pg 20

Topic B: The Kurdish Peace Process:

Disarmament and Peace-Building in the

relevant regions of Turkey, Syria and Iraq

-Introduction pg 24

-Topic History pg 26

-Discussion of the Problem pg 30

-The Future pg 36

-Bloc Positions pg 37

-PRSA pg 38

-Further Reading pg 38

-Bibliography pg 39

Written by:

George Mullens

Yuji Develle

Disarmament and International Security

Committee

Topic A: Aggression, Sabotage and Espionage

in Cyberspace: Drawing Red Lines

Topic B: The Kurdish Peace Process:

Disarmament and Peace-Building in the

relevant regions of Turkey, Syria and Iraq

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the Disarmament and

International Security Committee! DISEC,

also known as The First Committee, is one of

the most important and powerful UN

committees.

The topics that we will debate are extremely

relevant to the maintenance of international

peace and security. With the increased usage

of technology in our lives, security in

cyberspace is an important security threat to

states. Whilst the Kurdish peace process has

been ongoing for decades without a peaceful

end in sight.

You are all expected to read through this

document carefully and to research both topics.

In your role as a delegate, you are

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expected to represent your country’s foreign 1

opponent to fulfil our will.’ The ‘Fifth

policy and to act like a true diplomat.

TOPIC A: AGGRESSION,

SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE IN

CYBERSPACE: DRAWING RED

LINES

The exponential pace of technological change

has shaken the very foundations of the UN

Charter. Over the past 70 years, international

conflict has morphed into a shape beyond the

San Francisco diplomats’ wildest

imaginations. Carl von Clausewitz, the father

of modern warfare, once declared: ‘War is a

mere continuation of policy by other means;

War… is an act of violence to compel our

Domain’ of warfare, cyberspace, and/or

information warfare has given states and non-

state actors new ways of achieving political

ends through other means.

It is the mandate of the DISEC to oversee

frameworks and solutions to issues that lead to

a destabilisation of peace and security to both

individuals and states alike. Cyberspace has

long been a blind-spot for the UN system,

where criminal and inter-state threats

jeopardize the trust and readiness of collective

security in both the developed and developing

world. Over the past two years, actors like

China, the USA, the E.U., and Great Britain all

shifted their view on cyberspace to include not

only a matter of information security/C4-

infrastructure but also the Fifth Domain of

Warfare.

TOPIC HISTORY

Despite the relative ‘newness’ of cyber

aggression, the past three decades have

gathered quite an extensive record of diverse

cyber-attacks. Throughout the past 25 years,

one notices the increasing complexity and

boldness of attacks, regardless of whether

those are attributed to states, state-sponsored

actors, or independent non-state actors.

Cyber-attacks involve many different types of

actors looking to use attacks in different ways

to achieve different strategic ends. Many of

1Von Clausewitz, On War (Web: Clausewitz.com,

consulted 5 August 2016)

http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/BK1c

h01.html

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the high-profile acts of cyber aggression have

involved a combination of actors, making

exclusive categorisation close to impossible.

Given the nature of the topic and the mandate

of DISEC, the ten following examples of acts

of cyber-aggression are disproportionately

state-influenced and/or have geopolitical

ramifications. However, it is important to keep

in mind that cyber-attacks disproportionately 2

to compromising the US Military’s non-

classified inner network (NIPRNET).

In March 1998, the DoD detected a

penetration of the ‘Non-Classified Internet

Protocol Router Network’ (NIPRNET). The

attackers broke into computer networks

affecting various non-classified areas of US

government, including ‘NASA, DoE, the DoD,

etc. The FBI led an investigation with the affect the private sector.

Timeline of notable attacks:

• 1998 – 2001 MOONLIGHT MAZE

• 2005 – 2011 TITAN RAIN & BYZANTINE

HADES

• 2007 Estonia DDoS Campaigns

• 2008 Russia-Georgia War

• 2010 Operation OLYMPIC GAMES

NIPC, while the newly created JTF-CND

(Joint Task Force for Computer Network 3

Defense) was to coordinate a response’ .

While previous attacks were often attributed to

non-state actors, MOONLIGHT MAZE marks

the beginning of the state-led APT threats

scares. According to Techopedia, ‘[a]n

advanced persistent threat (APT) refers to a

cyber attack launched by an attacker with

substantial means, organization and motivation

to carry out a sustained assault against a 4

• 2011 Winnti Hacks

• 2012 Saudi Aramco Attacks

• 2014 OPM Hack

• 2015 BlackEnergy3 Malware in Ukraine

• 2016 DNC Hacks

1998 – 2001 “MOONLIGHT MAZE”

target.’

As an APT, MOONLIGHT MAZE is still

shrouded in mystery because cyber-attacks

grant a much greater ability for states to

conceal their actions (they can pursue attacks

via proxy actors, proxy servers, rerouting their

connections around the world, using attack

patterns, or signatures associated with other

adversaries, etc.).

Widely known as the first major

state-attributed cyber attack in history (to

Russia), operation MOONLIGHT MAZE led 3 Healey, Jason. A Fierce Domain: Conflict in

Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012 (Print: Washington D.C.,

2013) 2 Information is Beautiful. ‘World’s Biggest Data

Breaches” (Last updated 8 August 2016)

http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/wo

rlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/

4 ‘Advanced Persistent Threat APT’ (Web: Technopedia)

https://www.techopedia.com/definition/28118/advanced

-persistent-threat-apt

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2005 – 2011 TITAN RAIN & BYZANTINE

HADES

The first publicly declared attacks were 5

codenamed TITAN RAIN . Over three or four

years, hackers with links to the People’s

Liberation Army (PLA) compromised

hundreds of systems in US industry and

government.

They hacked an impressive portfolio of

networks including Lockheed Martin,

Northrop Grumman, and BAE Systems. In

2010, Google reported that it was victim of a

“highly sophisticated and targeted attack on

our corporate infrastructure originating from

China… theft of intellectual property.” The

attackers took advantage of an Internet

Explorer vulnerability affecting hundreds of

the largest technology companies. This

culminated in the 2011 attacks on RSA

security, a computer and network security

company. The RSA breaches were used as a

Whether this was an act of espionage (because

of the theft of key US documents and

technology), deliberate aggression (an

intentional attack aimed at degrading key

American industries and infrastructure), or

sabotage (a deliberate action aimed at

weakening the influence of Google and other

industries in China), is still undetermined. This

string of attacks reveals a dire need for the UN

(along with other bureaucracies) to draw red

lines defining and labelling attacks properly.

2007 Estonia DDoS Campaigns

For several days, waves of DDoS (Distributed

Denial of Service) attacks from Russia hacked

and defaced Estonia’s banks, agencies and

governmental websites. ‘Commerce slowed

almost to a standstill for several hours as

financial institutions found their servers

overwhelmed by requests generated by the

botnets behind the attacks. Five years later, the

origin and motivation behind the cyber attacks

stepping stone for breaches on networks 7

is yet unclear.’ These attacks coincided with

associated with the development of the F-35

Fighter Jet. There have eventually been

suggestions that the fuselage of China’s

second stealth fighter jet, the J-31, resembles

that of the F-22 and F-35. This entire episode

of hacking campaigns affecting over 750

targets was codenamed by US

counterintelligence officials as BYZANTINE 6

HADES.

a series of Pro-Estonian/Anti-Russian protests

associated with the relocation of a prized

Estonian artefact to the Estonian Military 8

Cemetery . While the source of the attack is

unknown, whether it may be the Russian

government or Russian patriotic hackers,

Sergei Markov of the Russian State Duma

shed light on the issue when he blamed the 9

Nashi Youth Group for the attack . The attack

5 Nakashima,

Ellenhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/a

rticle/2010/01/15/AR2010011503917.html 6 Healey, Jason. A Fierce Domain: Conflict in

Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012 (Print: Atlantic Council

CCSA, 2013)

7 Richards, Jason. “Denail of Service: The Estonian

Cyberwar and Its Implications for U.S. National

Security” (Web: International Affairs Review)

http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/65 8 ibid 9 Miller, Chuck. “Russia Confirms involvement with

Estonia DDoS attacks” (Web: SC Magazine, March

2009)

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had a minimal effect on the Estonian

economy, but it did reveal the potential for

cyber attacks to completely cut a government

off from the rest of its infrastructure for a time.

“Striking an enemy’s ability to communicate

with the outside world is a very valuable use

of a weapon at the early stages of war,” Jose

Nazario, a security researcher at Arbor 10

Networks, told SC Magazine.

These attacks led to the NATO CCD-COE

creating a seminal outline on cyber-warfare,

the Tallinn Manual.

2008 Russia – Georgia War

ceasefire). Russia retaliated with an invasion

into Georgia the next day. But the cyber

campaign began much earlier. As early as 19

July, Russian hackers focused on ‘denial and

degradation of Georgian communications

systems’ as well as targeting many public-

facing Georgian websites. The website of

then-President Mikheil Saakashvili was victim

of DDoS and site defacement (pictures posted

comparing him to Hitler), taking it down for

24 hours. ‘The pages of the Parliament, the

Foreign Ministry, the Interior Ministry, several

news agencies, and a few banks (were also

hit).’ (Wentworth, “You’ve 12

While ‘the cyber attacks against Estonia in

2007 demonstrated the degree to which

nations might persuade patriotic hackers and

cyber professionals to exert pressure on a

hostile nation’ and set the groundwork for a

framework for cyber-war in the future (the

Tallinn Manual), the Russian cyber campaign

occurring at the same time as the military

campaign against Georgia in 2008 confirmed

many existent thoughts within military circles. 11

Cyberspace was to be an essential

component of C4I (Communications, Control,

Command, Computer and Intelligence)

infrastructure for kinetic operations.

Georgia moved its troops into South Ossetia

from 7 August, capturing the regional capital

and several other villages, allegedly in

response to South Ossetia bombardments (in

violation of the terms of the previous

http://www.scmagazine.com/russia-confirms-involveme

nt-with-estonia-ddos-attacks/article/128737/ 10 ibid 11 Healey, Jason (2013)

Got Malice”).

‘Hackers used sophisticated DDoS methods

against targets, incorporating SQL injections

and cross-site scripting (XSS).’ They made no

clear effort to hide the origin of such attacks,

having written the code in Russian and

embedding the ‘obvious statement

“win+love+in+Rusia” in some of the

messaging.’ (Nazario, “Georgia President’s

web site under DDoS attack from Russian

hackers”).

Was the Georgian War a cyber war? Or was it

simply a war, with cyber-support. Or,

alternatively, was it a war, and was the cyber

campaign a string of attacks disassociated

from the war entirely?

12 Ibid. p. 197

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2010 OLYMPIC GAMES

After Georgia, it was the United States’ turn.

Codenamed ‘OLYMPIC GAMES’, an

American cyber-offensive campaign aimed at

Iran’s critical national infrastructure – its

nuclear enrichment program in particular –

marked a new era of complexity and boldness

in nation-state cyber-attacks. STUXNET,

Flame, and Duqu had some degree of

commonality, with STUXNET as the

centrepiece of the operation.

The story is well-known; In the summer of

2010, a spiked USB was plugged into a

Siemens PLC (a controller with access to some

of the facilities core functions) of the Natanz

uranium enrichment facility, rendering up to

1000 of the 9000 IR-1 type gas centrifuges 13

Iranian infrastructure and international energy

infrastructure. They were caught soon enough.

Iran’s nuclear program was to be the

centrepiece of Iran’s domestic prosperity and

military defence strategy - clearly critical

national infrastructure. This set a precedent for

the deliberate degradation and destruction of

important hardware in other countries. Until

when is this sabotage an act of war? How can

the UN update its policy to comprehend such

bypassing of national sovereignty (over energy

infrastructure and nuclear disarmament)?

14

2011 Winnti Hacks

Winnti, an allegedly Chinese hacking group,

has been active for years and mostly targets

the Asian video-gaming industry. The group

steals digital certificates (online identifiers)

and uses them to sneak into the update servers

of gaming companies to prepare for man-in-

the-middle (MiTM: when hackers impersonate

other people to gain access) attacks for

intellectual property theft (IP theft).

Similar attacks occurred in 2011 on South

Korean social networks Cyworlds and Nate,

this time via a Trojan Horse impersonating

TNK, a Japanese video-gaming company.

Qualitative analysis of the incidents point unusable.

By far the most spectacular instance of cyber-

aggression, this attack did what aerial

bombardment could covertly and without

many political ramifications. Unfortunately,

US and Israeli intelligence (to whom this

towards IP theft at a grand scale, that goes

beyond company secrets but also towards the

ID-theft of users across Asia.

Additional attacks in 2013 with similar IOCs

(Indicators of Compromise) and signatures

attack is attributed) could not control the

spread of the Flame and Duqu malware across

13 Healey, Jason (2013) p. 213

14Kaspersky

Labshttps://securelist.com/analysis/internal-threats-repo

rts/37029/winnti-more-than-just-a-game/

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targeted Tibetan and Uyghur activists using

the digital signature of MGAME Corp, yet

another video-gaming company. This new

information points towards the Chinese

security services having a role in the incident.

15

2012 Saudi Aramco Attacks

The Shamoon (or Disttrack) modular computer

virus was used to conduct cyber espionage in

the oil and gas sector. The most notable attack

was one targeting Saudi Arabia’s largest oil

company, Aramco. The virus quickly

overwrites files in computers throughout a

network with JPEG files, simultaneously

compiling a list of files from specific locations

in the system and sending them back to the

attacker. It then finishes with an overwrite of

the master boot record to prevent system

reboots. Over 30,000 Saudi Aramco

workstations were destroyed.

The virus has hit companies throughout the

energy sector, and the Shia-affiliated group

Cutting Sword of Justice had the strongest

claim over the attack. Early investigations

pointed towards Iran being involved in the

attacks. Should Saudi Arabia have been a less

careful in the attack attributions, this cyber

attack could have – given the geopolitical 16

tension - triggered a war.

15http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/saudi-ara

mco-cyber-attacks-a-wake-up-call-says/ 16 Develle, Yuji. “Attribution Game: the challenges and

opportunities of cyber attribution in policy-making”

(Web: Medium/Strife, 2015)

https://medium.com/wonk-bridge/the-attribution-game-t

he-challenges-and-opportunities-of-cyber-attribution-in-

policy-making-3f99cdacd586#.2hbwd57rq

2014 – 2015 Office of Personnel 17 18

Management Breach (OPM Hack)

In June 2015, US civil service personnel had

their personal information compromised

(Identity Theft) from a hack into the US Office

for Personnel Management. ‘This also

included 19.7 million individuals who applied

for background checks…. And over 1.8

million non-applicants… predominantly 19

spouses or cohabitants of applicants.’

Usernames, passwords, names, addresses,

dates of birth, and even fingerprint and

interview data were stolen. This forced the

OPM to guarantee ID theft insurance for up to

three years to all victims, and the resignation

of the OPM’s director.

At first, the media quickly denounced China

for being behind these attacks. Some attributed

such attacks to “Deep Panda” while others,

such as FireEye (an American network

security company), blamed other Chinese 20

cyber gangs with a history in identity theft.

However, there was controversy. Cyber-

attacks are no less dangerous for their actual

damage than for their reputational damage (the

blowback). The Council on Foreign

Relations denounced the China

17https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-opm-hack-far-wors

e-you-imagine 18http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-dat

a-protection/cyber-security/the-opm-breach-timeline-of-

a-hack/ 19 “Why the OPM Hack is Far Worse than You

Imagine” (Web: Lawfare Blog, 11 March

2016)https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-opm-hack-far-

worse-you-imagine 20 Hesseldahl, Arik. “FireEye identifies Chinese Group

Behind Federal Hack” (Web: ReCode, 19 June 2015)

http://www.recode.net/2015/6/19/11563730/fireeye-ide

ntifies-chinese-group-behind-federal-hack

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attribution, saying it came from unreliable

American news sources, that the stolen

information had little value to the Chinese

government, and that the information would be 21

more valuable to criminals.

December 2015 BlackEnergy3 Malware

causing Huge Blackout in Western Ukraine. 22 23 24 25

Along with the OPM Hack, the Ukrainian

Power Grid attack of December 2015 was a

major wake up call for governments of the

(Supervisory control and data acquisition), the

hackers took 30 electricity substations offline,

damaged 2 power distribution platforms, and

removed 2 or 3 backup power supplies to

ensure maximum duration of damage. Drives

were wiped permanently with KillDisk,

passwords were changed to prevent operators

from accessing control functions, and a

Ukrainian telephone company was TDoS’d

(like DDoS) to prevent customers from

contacting the electricity company. Following

a manual restoration of power, the power came 26

Western world concerning the potential

destructiveness and strategic threat of cyber-

attacks. Over 230,000 residents in the Ivano-

Frankivsk region of Western Ukraine lost

power just before Christmas.

F-Secure Labs identified Quedagh (a Russia-

based gang known to target political

organisations) as the main user of the

BlackEnergy malware toolkit, which was

modified from a DDoS botnet kit to conduct

this latest APT. F-Secure believes a phishing

e-mail could have been opened by a Ukrainian

employee. After entering a SCADA

21 Knake, Robert. “Data Breach at the Office of

Personnel Management: China, Again… Really?”

(Blog: Council on Foreign Relations, 5 June 2015)

http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2015/06/05/data-breach-at-the

-office-of-personnel-management-china-again-really/ 22http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/01/27/ukraine_blac

kenergy_analysis/?page=2 23http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/questio

ns-remain-on-how-cyberattack-caused-ukraine-blackout

-/d/d-id/1323749 24F-Secure Labs, ‘Blackenergy & Quedagh: The

Convergence of Crimeware and APT attacks’ (Malware

Analysis Whitepaper, 2015) 25https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unpre

cedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/

back after 3 to 6 hours.

BlackEnergy was used in patterns attributable

to Russia in the past, such as when Russia

conducted a swathe of attacks on Georgia

during the 2008 Georgian War. Typical of

Russian underground operations, the greater

degree of plausible deniability proposed by the

usage of the BlackEnergy 3 kit (because it’s

used by so many criminals) allows for bolder

attacks. Toolkits and botnets are the weaponry

of cyber-conflict; their increasing availability

and ease of use make attacks all the simpler to

execute.

26 ICS CERT. “IR ALERT H-16-056-01” https://ics-

cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056- 01

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2016 #DNC Hack

A well-timed data leak is all it takes to

completely change the course of a political

campaign, and thus the course of a country’s

policy-making. In June, an attack widely

attributed to Pro-Russian hacker groups “Cozy

Bear” and “Fancy Bear”, stole opposition

research by the Democrats on Donald Trump. 27

A month later, in time for the Democratic

National Convention, the Democratic National

Committee (DNC) had the contents of its

22,000 emails leaked to the world via

WikiLeaks. It is highly likely that this earlier

compromise enabled the same hackers (under

the alias Guccifer 2.0) to access the DNC

27 Galperina, Marina. “Russian Government Hackers

Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear” (Web: Gawker, 14 June

2016)

http://gawker.com/russian-government-hackers-cozy-be

ar-and-fancy-bear-1781960847

email database (and a week later, the Clinton

Campaign database).

There is a growing consensus amongst the

cybersecurity and intelligence community that

Russia is behind the hacks (or at least 28

condoning them). The attack sets a new

precedent in how bold Russian actors have

become in intervening in the politics of other

states, this time striking across the Atlantic. It

is no wonder however, as this specific

electoral campaign is set to deeply affect

Russia’s economic sanctions and its future

influence in the region. The United States has

28 Rid, Thomas. “All Signs Point to Russia Being

Behind the DNC Hack” (Web: VICE/Motherboard, 25

July 2016)

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/all-signs-point-to-russ

ia-being-behind-the-dnc-hack

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of course had a long history of intervening in

the electoral process of Eastern European

states.

While much of the security community called

for a more forceful condemnation of the

attacks, no such statement was made in

Washington (USA), New York (UN) nor

Moscow (Russian Fed). White House

Directive #41 created a scheme that color-

coded various degrees of cyber-attack severity,

at least removing some of the confusion

surrounding the kinetic comparability of cyber

attacks from the White 29

speaking, this lack of clarity would make

majority votes for resolution close to

impossible.

After MOONLIGHT MAZE, Russian

attribution was made due to knowledge of 30

several geopolitical realities :

- Since the End of the Cold War, espionage

‘has largely continued unabated’

- Russian Military Doctrine since the

Chechnya War recognizes the importance of

‘command, control, intelligence and

computers’ (C4I).

House’s point of view.

DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM

The Attribution Problem

As you may have noticed in the ten examples,

it is incredibly difficult to catch the perpetrator

of cyber attacks. The technical process of

properly finding the culprit takes weeks if not

months. By then, the reputational damage of

the attacks is tremendous. Politically speaking,

it is necessary for governments to be able to

attribute responsibility to countries,

governments, or organizations. This is done

via initial forensic findings and geopolitical

estimations. This is a major obstacle in the

UN, as a Security Council resolution

penalizing a damaging cyber attack would

theoretically need a referent object. Practically

29 Koebler, Jason. “Obama Created a Color-Coded

Cyber Threat ‘Schema’ After the DNC Hack” (Web:

VICE/Motherboard, 26 July 2016)

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/obama-created-a-colo

- Russia vigorously denied these allegations.

This also raised issues concerning the degree

to which the state and informal hacker groups

have a relationship (or not).

Attribution became a major obstacle in

coordinating a response as the degree of state

involvement was unknown. The image to the

left shows the complexity of classifying state

involvement for only

one group of hackers, now imagine if multiple 31

groups were to be involved.

‘An undisclosed government source noted that

the attack had been traced to Internet servers

located 20 miles from Moscow…. The pattern

of the intrusions suggested that the attackers

had a regular office-like schedule from 8am to 32

5pm and never on Russian holidays.’ A

senior Energy Department official suggested

30 Healey, Jason (2013) 31 Image Source: J. Healey, ‘Beyond Attribution:

Seeking National Responsibility for Cyber-attacks’,

2011

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that it could be a “sponsored” intelligence

activity due to how organized the attack was.

Is this Cyber War?

What is war? If we use Carl von Clausewitz’

definition, then a war must comprehend

several key identifiers: violence, a clear

political objective, two or more clearly

identified “combatants” and a clear link

between the subject, object, and means of the

employed violence. This raises a number of

difficult questions (that your respective

countries have sometimes answered with

definitions, please follow this website

https://ccdcoe.org/cyber-definitions.html):

● What is violence? Does violence always

involve death or destruction of property? If

so, is information property? How much

violence is needed to move into “act of

war” territory?

● How do we identify political objectives?

As many contemporary wars are

undertaken without a specific declaration

of war, how do we know when we are in a

situation of cyber-peace or cyber-war? Are

we constantly in a state of war or peace?

● If the objective is to steal information,

does this make it any less damaging than

the objective to weaken or destroy

infrastructure?

●

With the use of various geographic and

instrumental intermediaries, what criteria

is needed to attribute attacks to

governments and states? Are the

intermediaries to blame? Should states be

compelled to crack-down on malicious

third-parties?

Extended scholarship has been dedicated to

this subject, we would highly recommend you

read at least two of these publications:

● Rid, Thomas. “Cyber War Will Not Take

Place” (King’s College London, UK:

Journal of Strategic Studies, 5 October

2011) You can find it on tandofonline.

● Stone, John. “Cyber War Will Take Place”

(King’s College London, UK: Journal of

Strategic Studies, 29 November 2012) You

can also find this on tandofonline.

● Masters, Jonathan (Deputy Editor).

“Confronting the Cyber Threat” (Web:

Council on Foreign Relations, May 23

2011)

http://www.cfr.org/technology-and-foreign

-policy/confronting-cyber-threat/p15577htt

p://www.cfr.org/technology-and-foreign-p

olicy/confronting-cyber-threat/p15577

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● Sauter, Molly. “When Is a Hack an Act of

War?” (Web: VICE/Motherboard, July 28

2016)

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/policy-di

rective-41-cyber-incidentshttp://motherboa

rd.vice.com/read/policy-directive-41-cyber

-incidents

● Ranger, Steve. “Inside the secret digital

arms race: Facing the threat of a global

cyberwar” (Web: Tech Republic/Cover

Story)

http://www.techrepublic.com/article/inside

-the-secret-digital-arms-race/http://www.te

chrepublic.com/article/inside-the-secret-di

gital-arms-race/

● Ranger, Steve. “Cyberwar: The Smart

Person’s guide” (Web: Tech

Republic/Security, 19 May 2016)

http://www.techrepublic.com/article/cyber

war-the-smart-persons-guide/http://www.te

chrepublic.com/article/cyberwar-the-smart

-persons-guide/

The Question of Critical National

Infrastructure

Inevitably, the cyberwar debate ventures into

the territory of Critical National Infrastructure

(CNI). Information security and the integrity

of certain pieces of infrastructure are essential

to the economic development and political

stability of many UN states. At the 69th

UNGA meeting, representatives from a

number of political bodies including the ‘Non-

Aligned Movement’ expressed the need to

regulate and secure this space. ‘The

representative of Pakistan said that

technological innovations had been used in

recent years for indiscriminate surveillance

and as a means of waging cyber-attacks. In

view of those dangerous developments, it was

essential to regulate their production and use

“sooner rather than later”.... The representative

of Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the Non-

Aligned Movement, agreed that information

and communications technology could be used

for purposes that were inconsistent with

maintaining international stability and security.

The prevention of political and military

confrontation in that field was particularly

urgent, said the 33

representative of the Russian Federation.’

One particularly promising avenue for

regulation (by DISEC) is linking the idea of

CNI with that of committing an act of cyber-

war. There are various definitions of CNI:

‘systems and assets, whether physical or

virtual, so vital to the United States that the

incapacity or destruction of such systems and

assets would have a debilitating impact on

security, national economic security, national

public health or safety, or any combination of

those matters (Sec. 1016(e)).’ – US 34

Department of Homeland Security

33UNGA Press Release. “Cyber Warfare, Unchecked,

Could Topple Entire Edifice of International Security,

Says Speaker in First Committee at Conclusion of

Thematic Debate Segment” (UN PR: GA/DIS/3512, 28

October 2014)

http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gadis3512.doc.htm 34 Moteff, John & Parfomak, Paul. “Critical

Infrastructure and Key Assets: Definition and

Identification” (CRS Web: Congressional Research

Service, 1 October 2004)

http://fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32631.pdf

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Or the European Commission’s term,

“operators of essential services”:

‘as a public or private entity in the following

sectors: …. Energy, including subsectors…

Transport, including subsectors… Banking,

including credit institutions… Financial

market infrastructures… Health sector,

including hospitals and private clinics….

Drinking water supply and distribution,

including suppliers and distributors of water

intended for human consumption… Digital

Infrastructure, including Internet Exchange

Points (IXPs), Domain Name System service

providers (DNS), and Top Level Domain

(TLD) name registries’ –2016 EP NIS 35

Directive

Both definitions provide different ways to

incriminate and politicize certain cyber-

attacks. The American definition, a product of

a long development process since 1983 has in

its latest iteration (the 2001 Patriot 36

Act), included virtual and real-life

constructions and “events” within the

definition. This means that the DNC Hack of

last July, could have, in fact, been denounced

as an attack on CNI (the DNC being a key part

of an existential event in the American

political calendar, the US Presidential

35 NATO CCDCOE, “EU Adopts Network and

Information Security Directive that sets Security Rules

on National Critical Infrastructure” (Web: CCDCOE

INCYDER Database, 29 July 2016)

https://ccdcoe.org/eu-adopts-network-and-information-s

ecurity-directive-sets-security-rules-national-critical.ht

ml 36 U.S. Patriot Act.

https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ56/pdf/

PLAW-107publ56.pdf

Campaign). This broad definition allows for

flexibility of response.

The EU definition goes into more detail, not

only outlining the specific sectors concerned

by CNI, but adjusting its potential response to

the geographic spread, market share, role of

CNI actors affected by a potential attack. This

specific enumeration clarifies the type of

responses attackers would receive.

The UN should find a coherent way to define

CNI, and include this within a broader strategy

for cyber international security.

Why do states attack in cyberspace?

Rather than simply addressing the question,

“Why do states attack other states?”, this

question looks at why cyberspace is an

attractive or justified space in which states

employ force and violence.

Of course, cyberspace is the “location” where

an increasing share of the world economy and

information flows. An increasing number of

CNI and state defences are connected in terms

of C4I and IoT (Internet of Things).

In accordance with the Revolution in Military

Affairs (RMA) thesis, that developments in

military doctrine and technological change

have irreversibly rendered previous theoretical

understandings obsolete, states and their

security apparatuses have observed a rapid

militarization of cyberspace. Be it the United

States, Russia, or China, it has become

increasingly clear that interstate power

struggles are fought primarily at the ideational

level: wars of ideas vs. wars of territory. China

and Russia have been aware of this change

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since the Cold War, when there was bitterly

aware of ideational weakness versus NATO

nations. More relevantly, the Colour

Revolutions, which saw the democratic

plebiscite of various Eastern European and

Eurasian nations, coincided with the

development of corresponding military

doctrine centred around the combined use of

information and military aggression.

China’s 2015 military strategy focused largely

on updating its capabilities to this new reality,

calling cyberspace a ‘form of war…

accelerating its evolution to

informationalization’ having ‘become new

commanding heights in strategic competition.’

data centres (storage) and certificate

authorities (digital identity providers). No

Root servers, or servers that maintain the

underlying domains that make up the Internet, 41

are located in China.

42

The Internet Map, check it out.

The Internet Map below shows how most

domains are located disproportionately across

the globe: Light blue indicates the USA,

Purple is Japan, Yellow is China, Red is

Russia, Blue Germany, etc.

37

It implies that cyberspace has given

‘anti-China forces’ capabilities in attempting

to ‘instigate a colour revolution’ in its Tibetan 38

and East Turkestan regions. Russian “Hybrid

Warfare” has been an early attempt at

controlling the informational discourse, both at

a strategic (general) and tactical (local) level,

so as to justify its military actions and make 39 40

them more effective.

China, Russia and a swathe of other nations

have all observed how power in cyberspace

disproportionately favours the West. A grand

majority of international data flows through

the United States at any given time through

37 Xinhua. “Full text: China’s Military Strategy” (Web:

China Daily, 26 May 2015)

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/26/conten

t_20820628.htm 38 ibid. 39 On Hybrid Warfare:

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29903395 40 Adamsky, Dmitry. “Cross Domain Coercion: The

Current Russian Art of Strategy” (Ifri Security Studies

Centre: Proliferation Papers 54, November 2015)

Huawei Marine’s ‘Submarine Cable Map’, 43

check it out.

41 Interesting article on Root Servers:

http://www.public-root.com/root-server-locations.htm 42 The Internet Map, available from:

http://internet-map.net 43 On Submarine Cable Map:

http://www.submarinecablemap.com

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The approximate locations of US Naval Fleets 44

across the globe.

These three maps serve to illustrate a more

kinetic view of control. The Submarine Cable

Map shows the worldwide distribution of

Internet around the world (covering close to

98% of worldwide Internet traffic, rest are

relayed to satellites). The United States

controls the only navy in the world that can be

present in all five oceans. Due to the

international nature of the Internet however,

control of so many access points (where the

cables reach data centres) is distressing to

countries like China who seek to control or

regulate their informational services. This

Strife article provides one example of how this

may contribute to China’s strategic objectives 45

for the South China Sea issue.

Concerned by the growing imbalance of

control in cyberspace, states like Russia,

China, DPRK, France, UK, Germany, Israel,

Iran, and Malaysia among others have all

developed specific departments in the military

and intelligence community to conduct a

combination of cyber offensive and defensive

operations. Short of having effective ways to

prevent, defend, detect, and attribute attacks,

they resort to playing this dangerous game.

In doing so, states have associated themselves

with proxy actors with dubious

44 US Fleets location:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5a/

USN_Fleets_%282009%29.png 45 Lai Ki, Cheng. “Somewhere, Under the Sea: maritime

claims and territorial disputes in South China Sea”

(Web: Strife Blog, 12 January 2016)

http://www.strifeblog.org/2016/01/12/somewhere-under

-the-sea/

intentions/methods. While the USA and Israel

(sometimes) have the normative liberty to

conduct cyber-attacks and surveillance via

Spyware (and Encryption Backdoors), most

countries have allied with the criminal

underworld to add layers of separation

between themselves and their targets. Iran is

notoriously famous for aiding proxy hacker

groups (such as Cutting Sword of Justice in 46

the Saudi Aramco attacks). Russia’s unique

economic and social climate cultivates a

thriving criminal hacker community. I once

asked a self-declared F-Secure “cyber-warrior”

why so many hackers came from Russia? He

answered that talented coders and

programmers in Russia were often threatened

into employment by existing hacker

collectives or encouraged by the Kremlin to

have a contractual relationship.

THE FUTURE

States and international bodies have recently

made critical overtures towards reversing the

status quo.

Tallinn Manual

After the 2007 Estonian Cyber-Campaigns, the

newly created NATO CCD-COE (a panel of

cybersecurity and information warfare experts)

got together to write this foundational

document for the ‘rules of cyber-war’. Which

can be found in the bibliography.

46Tucker, Patrick. “Why the military can’t go after Iran

Hacking Your Dam” (Web: Defense One, 24 March

2016)

http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/03/why-

military-cant-go-after-iran-hacking-your-dam/126945/

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47 The Tallin Manual:

http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/tallinn-manual-interna

tional-law-applicable-cyber-warfare/p30415 48 ibid.

The Tallinn Manual explains that ‘[s]tates may

not knowingly allow cyber infrastructure

located in their territory to be used for acts that

adversely affect other states.’ States may be

responsible for attacks happening, without

their prior knowledge, as ‘the State itself is

Source: White House

Although this schema is limited to the USA,

the UN could adapt the schematic to better suit 49

its objectives. Of course, such schemas are

useless if not supported nationally by 50

responsible under international law for any

actions of individuals or groups placed under 47

its direction.’ This is very similar to the

Responsibility to Protect doctrine and coherent

with the UN Charter’s obligations towards

instilling international peace and security. To

corresponding cybersecurity strategies.

Bilateral Agreements

In 2015, the United States and China had a

summit to discuss security issues between the

two powers. One important feature was 51

what extent States must enforce this principle

is yet to be decided upon however.

The Manual also states that the ‘International

Group of Experts agreed that, at minimum,

any cyber operation that caused harm to

individuals or damage to objects qualified as a

use of force... [but that] cyber operations that

merely cause inconvenience or irritation do

something many called a ‘cyber-truce’.

Although both countries officially denied

having taken part in economic cyber-

espionage and cyber-crime, they have

nevertheless engaged in high-level agreements.

They agreed to provide timely responses to

each other's requests for information and

assistance concerning 48

not qualify as use of force.’ What is malicious cyber activities. They also

damaging? Until when is an attack merely an

inconvenience?

White House Directive #41

This directive, signed and proposed in the

committed themselves to holding

cyber-criminals accountable to their own legal

systems, to provide updates to each other

regarding the status and results of

aftermath of the DNC Hack, gives the

responsibility of evaluating cyber-attacks on

CNI to the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI). Almost a picture-perfect copy of

George W. Bush’s Terror alert schema, Barack

Obama’s ‘Cyber Incident Severity Schema’

looks as follows:

49 Koebler, Jason. “Obama Created a Color-Coded

Cyber Threat ‘Schema’ After the DNC Hack” (Web:

VICE/Motherboard, 26 July 2016)

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/obama-created-a-colo

r-coded-cyber-threat-schema-after-the-dnc-hack 50 White House Directive #41: The Color Coded Cyber

Threat Schema

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/0

9/fact-sheet-cybersecurity-national-action-plan 51 Duggal, Pavan. “Cybersecurity Law finds a cradle in

US-China cybercrime truce” (Web: First Post, 1

October 2015)

http://tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/cybersecurity-la

w-finds-a-cradle-in-us-china-cybercrime-truce-283295.

html

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investigations, to create a summit level Group 52

of Experts from both countries, and more.

As reported by FireEye, this set of agreements

lead to a dramatic decrease in the quantity of 53

cybercrime between the two countries. The

report concludes that the agreement probably

forced both parties to adopt more covert attack

tactics and to focus on strategically relevant

targets. Such dialogue can only be part of a

solution.

United Nations Group of Governmental

Experts (UN GGE) on Developments in the

Field of Information and

Telecommunications in the Context of

International Security

In July 2015, the twenty UN GGE countries

(Belarus, Brazil, China, Colombia, Egypt,

Estonia, France, Germany, Ghana, Israel,

Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan,

Russian Federation, Ukraine, United

Kingdom, and the United States of America)

geographical distribution’ (cyber sovereignty)

and including key ‘cyber powers’. In 2013, the

only remarkable declaration produced was an

affirmation that ‘international law applied 54

(without exception) to cyberspace’.

‘The 2015 report focusses on (1) existing and

emerging threats; (2) norms, rules, and

principles for the responsible behaviour of

states; (3) confidence-building measures

(CBMs); (4) international cooperation and

capacity-building; (5) the applicability of

international law, and (6) recommendations

for future work. Unsurprisingly, as the report

represents a diplomatic consensus, it remains

rather general.’ – NATO CCD-COE 55

INCYDER Brief

The following limiting norms, good practices,

and positive duties were suggested

(summarized by the NATO CCD-COE):

“Limiting Norms:

- states should not knowingly allow their

territory to be used for internationally

wrongful acts using ICTs;

- states should not conduct or knowingly

support ICT activity that intentionally

damages critical infrastructure;

- states should take steps to ensure supply

chain security, and should seek to prevent

the proliferation of malicious ICT and the

use of harmful hidden functions; redacted a report based on ‘equitable

54NATO CCDCOE. “2015 UN GGE Report: Major

Players Recommending Norms of Behaviour, 52 ibid. 53 FireEye iSight Intelligence. “Redline Drawn: China

Recalculates its Use of Cyber Espionage” (Special

Report, June 2016)

https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/curr

ent-threats/pdfs/rpt-china-espionage.pdf

Highlighting Aspects of International Law” (Web:

CCDCOE INCYDER, 31 August 2015)

https://ccdcoe.org/2015-un-gge-report-major-players-re

commending-norms-behaviour-highlighting-aspects-int

ernational-l-0.html 55 ibid.

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- states should not conduct or knowingly 57

of cyber-defence best practice. Operational

support activity to harm the information

systems of another state’s emergency

response teams (CERT/CSIRTS) and

should not use their own teams for

malicious international activity;

- states should respect the UN resolutions

that are linked to human rights on the

internet and to the right to privacy in the

digital age.

Good practices and positive duties:

- states should cooperate to increase stability

and security in the use of ICTs and to

prevent harmful practices;

- states should consider all relevant

information in case of ICT incidents;

- states should consider how best to

cooperate to exchange information, to

assist each other, and to prosecute terrorist

and criminal use of ICTs;

- states should take appropriate measures to

protect their critical infrastructure;

- states should respond to appropriate

requests for assistance by other states

whose critical infrastructure is subject to 56

malicious ICT acts;”

Collective Security Assurances

International security organizations like

NATO could apply deterrence theory in

cyberspace, enabling the creation of “cyber

framework nations”, or case-countries which

would serve as examples to the rest of alliance

56 ibid.

partnerships with the private sector (PPPs) and

other international organizations (the EU, UN,

or even other states like Russia) would be in

order. Such regional approaches are attracting

attention around the world, such as this

document’s call for ASEAN leadership in 58

regional strategic cyber defence.

Regulating Attack Toolkits

Malware or virus toolkits and botnet operators

have often acted as intermediaries for

malicious attacks in cyberspace. A possible

way to disarm cyber-criminals and states in

this space would be to work towards

regulating (or cracking down on) these

intermediaries.

Often found on the Darknet, these middlemen

are difficult to track but easy to find. Despite

strong encryption like that of the most popular

rerouter “The Onion Router” (Tor),

intelligence and law enforcement have caught

such actors with “honeypots” (they lured

criminals into revealing their identities).

One example of toolkit regulation is the

regulation of dual-use technologies, tech that

could be used for good or for evil.

‘Embarrassed by evidence suggesting

surveillance technologies FinFisher GmbH

57 The Atlantic Council on Extended Deterrence:

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/cyber-e

xtended-deterrence-and-nato 58 Noor, Elina. “Strategic Governance of Cyber

Security: Implications for East Asia”, Navigating

Change: ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership in East

Asia and in Global Governance (Tokyo: Japan Centre

for International Exchange, 2015)

http://jcie.org/researchpdfs/ASEAN-Japan/NavChange/

9.pdf

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and Hacking Team have been used by

repressive regimes to target activists and

journalists’, the EU ‘is expected to propose

tighter regulations on the export of dual-use 59

goods.’

BLOC POSITIONS

This debate is difficult to split along a

dichotomy. A whole swathe of issues are

addressed in the debate and it is much better to

approach the topic with one’s national interest

close at heart, rather than rely on this list to

orient you in debate. However, the following

countries are likely to work closely together.

Assertive in Cyberspace: USA, UK,

Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Israel and

most of NATO

Often seen repeating the same refrain on many

DISEC committees, these countries believe in

enhancing the current status quo in

cyberspace. It ensures information freedom of

movement and gives unprecedented access to

US-linked intelligence. It condemns the use

cyber-attacks to further political ends

asymmetrically, while maintaining that if

those ends are justified, cyber-defence does

also involve a certain measure of offensive

capabilities.

Cyber-Sovereignty: Russia, China, Brazil,

Germany, India, Turkey and many more who

typically place a premium on national

sovereignty

59 Towsend, Kevin. “Leaked EU Proposal Pushes

Tighter Rules on Dual-Use Technologies” (Web:

Security Weekly, 28 July 2016)

This bloc will be found defending the

‘regionalisation’ (Russia) or ‘localisation’

(China) of cyberspace, into component parts

subject to the laws and regulations of those

spaces. According to this theory, this enables

countries to better detect and prevent cyber-

crime, and defend themselves from externally

based cyber-attacks. Its proponents also

typically advocate for equality of actions

amongst all states: “Why am I not allowed to

spy on you, if you’re spying on me?”

Cyber-War Veterans: Estonia, Georgia,

Ukraine, Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, etc.

These countries discuss cyber-aggression in

the context of cyber warfare. To these states,

the question of cyber-defence is an urgent

matter, to be articulated through the language

of collective defence and updated relevant UN

texts.

Regional Regulation: Relevant members of

the EU and Relevant members of ASEAN

(mainly Japan, the Philippines and Malaysia)

These countries have made inroads in

discussing cyber defence on the regional level.

They argue for the transnational nature of

cyber-threats mandates and multi-stakeholder

and regional approach to defence. The EU has,

with its ground-breaking Human Rights

policy, made progress towards the ethical use

of cyberspace.

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POINTS A RESOLUTION MUST

ANSWER – QUESTIONS A

RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER

● What does war look like in cyberspace?

● What is violence or the use of force in

cyberspace?

● How can the UN update its current efforts

to deal with this new threat?

● What is the role of the UN in this space?

● Is the UN Charter inappropriate?

● What is Critical National Infrastructure on

the global level?

● How can we update and enforce the UN

GGE recommendations?

● Are bilateral agreements or regional

regulations a more favourable way to deal

with the issue?

● What kind of action can DISEC do

towards satisfying demands for cyber

sovereignty?

● How can DISEC make the Tallinn

Manual’s recommendations a reality?

● How can the UN ensure that states enforce

their laws against cybercriminals?

● What measures or missions can DISEC

establish to disrupt the underground toolkit

and botnet economy?

● What is the UN to do with the Darknet?

● How does the UN ensure a justified

balance between security and human rights

in cyberspace (in this context)?

● Can the UN recommend deterrence

schemes in cyberspace, or must it

recommend another theoretical model for

security?

● What set of criteria or schematics can the

UN implement to measure the gravity of

different cyber incidents?

● What is the role of the International

Telecommunication Union in this matter?

● Can stakeholders be brought together to

cooperate on this matter? If so, how?

FURTHER READING

Taddeo, Mariarosaria. “Information Warfare: a

Philosophical Perspective” (Hertfordshire,

Oxford: Academia.edu)

https://www.academia.edu/1505528/Informati

on_Warfare_a_Philosophical_Perspective

Tallinn Manual

http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/

356296245.pdf

Rid, Thomas. “Cyber War Will Not Take

Place” (King’s College London, UK: Journal

of Strategic Studies, 5 October 2011)

You can find it on tandofonline.

Stone, John. “Cyber War Will Take Place”

(King’s College London, UK: Journal of

Strategic Studies, 29 November 2012)

You can also find this on tandofonline.

Healey, Jason. A Fierce Domain: Conflict in

Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012

Masters, Jonathan (Deputy Editor).

“Confronting the Cyber Threat” (Web:

Council on Foreign Relations, May 23 2011)

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21

http://www.cfr.org/technology-and-foreign-pol

icy/confronting-cyber-threat/p15577

ICS-CERT. “Cyber Threat Source

Descriptions” (Web: ICS-CERT)

https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/cyber-threat

-source-descriptions#gao

Sauter, Molly. “When Is a Hack an Act of

War?” (Web: VICE/Motherboard, July 28

2016)

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/policy-direct

ive-41-cyber-incidents

Segal, Adam. The Hacked World Order: How

Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver and

Manipulate in the Digital Age (New York:

Council on Foreign Relations, 2016)

https://www.amazon.com/Hacked-World-Orde r-

Maneuver-Manipulate/dp/1610394151?ie=U

TF8&*Version*=1&*entries*=0

Segal, Adam. “What’s the Future of Chinese

Hacking?” (VICE/Motherboard, 30 July 2016)

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/future-of-chi

nese-hacking?trk_source=recommended

Important for definitions/country distinctions

(see US attack/Defense similarity)

NATO CCDCOE, “Cyber Definitions”

(Tallinn: NATO CCDCOE Resources, up to

date)

https://ccdcoe.org/cyber-definitions.html

Ranger, Steve. “Inside the secret digital arms

race: Facing the threat of a global cyberwar”

(Web: Tech Republic/Cover Story)

http://www.techrepublic.com/article/inside-the

-secret-digital-arms-race/

Ranger, Steve. “Cyberwar: The Smart

Person’s guide” (Web: Tech

Republic/Security, 19 May 2016)

http://www.techrepublic.com/article/cyberwar-

the-smart-persons-guide/

Develle, Yuji. “The Attribution Game: The

Challenges and Opportunities of cyber

attribution in policy-making” (Web:

Medium/Strife Blog, August 28 2015)

https://medium.com/@YDevelle/the-attributio

n-game-the-challenges-and-opportunities-of-c

yber-attribution-in-policy-making-3f99cdacd5

86#.h586rmt6o

Develle, Yuji. “Dear DNC, Here are 7 Ways to

Protect Yourself from the Russians” (Web:

Medium, July 2016)

https://medium.com/@YDevelle/dear-dnc-7-w

ays-to-protect-yourself-from-the-russians-ed53

ff46a746#.4yxxa4mx0

Healey, Jason. “Beyond Attribution: Seeking

National Responsibility for Cyber Attacks”

(Paper: Atlantic Council/Cyber Statecraft

Initiative, 2011)

Veenendaal, Matthijs. Kaska, Kadri &

Brangetto, Pascal. “Is NATO ready to cross

the Rubicon on Cyber Defence?” (Tallinn:

NATO CCDCOE Policy Brief, June 2016)

https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedi

a/pdf/NATO%20CCD%20COE%20policy%2

0paper.pdf

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

On Cyber Sovereignty

Huaxia. “President Xi says China faces major

science, technology “bottleneck”” (Web:

Xinhua English, May 1 2016)

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/01

/c_135402671.htm

Franchesi-Bicchierai, Lorenzo. “Hackers

Target Tibetans with Malicious Google Drive

Files” (Web: VICE/Motherboard, June 16

2015)

https://motherboard.vice.com/read/hackers-tar

get-tibetans-with-malicious-google-drive-files

Peterson, Andrea. “Chinese cyberspies have

hacked Middle East experts at major U.S.

think tanks” (The Washington Post: The

Switch, July 7 2014)

https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-sw

itch/wp/2014/07/07/chinese-cyberspies-have-h

acked-middle-east-experts-at-major-u-s-think-t

anks;

Franceschi-Bicchierai, Lorenzo. “The Massive

Hack on US Personnel Agency is Worse Than

Everyone Thought” (Web:

VICE/Motherboard, June 11 2015)

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-massive-

hack-on-us-personnel-agency-is-worse-than-e

veryone-thought

Nakashima, Ellen & Ryan, Missy. “Pentagon

Publicly Acknowledges its First Major

Offensive Cyber Campaign” (Washington

Post: Atlantic Council/NATOSource, 15 July

2016)

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosour

ce/pentagon-publicly-acknowledges-its-first-m

ajor-offensive-cyber-campaign

Bisson, David. “The OPM Breach: Timeline

of a Hack” (Web: Tripwire/The State of

Security, June 29 2015)

http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/secu

rity-data-protection/cyber-security/the-opm-br

each-timeline-of-a-hack/

Xinhua. “Full text: China’s Military Strategy”

(Web: China Daily.com.cn, 26 May 2015)

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/

26/content_20820628.htm

Krasny, Ros. “Chinese Hacked U.S. military

contractors, Senate Panel finds” (Washington:

Reuters, 17 September 2014)

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military

-cyberspying-idUSKBN0HC1TA20140917

Rid, Thomas. “All Signs Point to Russia Being

Behind the DNC Hack” (VICE/Motherboard,

25 July 2016)

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/all-signs-poi

nt-to-russia-being-behind-the-dnc-hack

Adamsky, Dmitry. “Cross Domain Coercion:

The Current Russian Art of Strategy” (Ifri

Security Studies Centre: Proliferation Papers

54, November 2015)

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

23

Hodge, Nathan & Entous, Adam. “Oil Firms

Hit by Hackers From China, Report Says”

(Web: Wall Street Journal, February 10 2011)

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527

48703716904576134661111518864

Waterman, Shane (UPI Homeland and

National Security Editor). “Analysis: Who

cyber smacked Estonia?” (Web: UPI, June 11

2007)

http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-

Industry/2007/06/11/Analysis-Who-cyber-sma

cked-Estonia/UPI-26831181580439/

Cyber-crime

Acohido, Byron & Swartz, Jon. “Botnet Scams

are exploding” (Web: USA Today, March 16

2008)

http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/co

mputersecurity/2008-03-16-computer-botnets_

N.htm

Barret, Larry. “DIY Malware Kits Growing in

number, toxicity” (Web: eSecurity Planet,

April 28 2010)

http://www.esecurityplanet.com/trends/article.

php/3879226/DIY-Malware-Kits-Growing-in-

Number-Toxicity.htm

ICS-CERT. “Cyber Threat Source

Descriptions” (Web: ICS-CERT)

https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/cyber-threat

-source-descriptions#gao

Key Policy

European Commission, “Directive of the

European Parliament and of the Council:

concerning measures to ensure a high common

level of network and information security

across the Union” (Brussels: SWD(2013)/31 &

SWD(2013)/32 final, 7 February 2013)

Koebler, Jason. “Obama Created a Colour-

Coded Cyber Threat ‘Schema’ After the DNC

Hack” (Web: VICE/Motherboard, July 26

2016)

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/obama-creat

ed-a-color-coded-cyber-threat-schema-after-th

e-dnc-hack

BBC News. “US and China agree on

cybercrime truce” (Web: BBC News, 25

September 2015)

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-3

4360934

Duggal, Paven. “Cybersecurity law finds a

cradle in US-China cybercrime truce” (Web:

Tech2, 1 October 2015)

http://tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/cyberse

curity-law-finds-a-cradle-in-us-china-cybercri

me-truce-283295.html

FireEye. “Redline Drawn: China Recalculates

its Use of Cyber Espionage” (FireEye iSight

Intelligence, Special Report June 2016)

https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-

www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-china-espionage.

pdf

NATO CCDCOE, “2015 UN GGE Report:

Major Players Recommending Norms of

Behaviour, Highlighting Aspects of

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

24

International Law” (NATO CCDCOE:

INCYDER Database, 31 August 2015)

https://ccdcoe.org/2015-un-gge-report-major-p

layers-recommending-norms-behaviour-highli

ghting-aspects-international-l-0.html

Council on Foreign Relations, “UN Group of

Governmental Experts: Developments in the

Field of Information and Telecommunications

in the Context of International Security”

(CoFR, 22 July 2015)

http://www.cfr.org/internet-policy/un-group-g

overnmental-experts-developments-field-infor

mation-telecommunications-context-internatio

nal-security/p36949

Maurer, Tim. “Cyber Norm Emergence at the

United Nations” (Paper: Harvard Kennedy

School Belfer Center, September 2011)

A/70/174, 22 July 2015

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?sy

mbol=A/70/174

HT, Jason. “The UN Calls On Governments to

Stop Shutting Down the Internet” (Web: F-

Secure Safe and Savvy, 8 July 2016)

http://safeandsavvy.f-secure.com/2016/07/08/t

he-un-calls-on-governments-to-stop-shutting-d

own-the-internet/

NATO, Warsaw Summit Communiqué (Press

Release: NATO.int, 9 July 2016)

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_text

s_133169.htm?selectedLocale=en

Paganini, Pierluigi. “NATO officially

recognizes cyberspace a warfare domain”

(Web: Security Affairs, 18 June 2016)

http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/48484/cybe

r-warfare-2/nato-cyberspace-warfare-domain.h

tml

Noor, Elina. “Securing ASEAN’s Cyber

Domain: Need for Partnership in Strategic

Cybersecurity” (Nanyang Technological

University: RSIS Commentary No.236, 26

November 2014)

Cyber Deterrence

Kramer, Franklin. Butler, Robert J. &

Lotriente, Catherine. “Cyber, Extended

Deterrence, and NATO” (Washington D.C.:

Atlantic Council, 26 May 2016)

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosour

ce/cyber-extended-deterrence-and-nato

Incorporation of Cyber under UNC/1/4(2)?

http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chap

ter-i/index.html

Resilience

Goodin, Dan. “New Attack bypasses HTTPS

protection on Macs, Windows, and Linux”

(Web: ArsTechnica, July 26 2016)

http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/new-at

tack-that-cripples-https-crypto-works-on-macs

-windows-and-linux/

Develle, Yuji. “Authentication – Crypto-Wars’

New Frontline” (Web: Strife Blog, August 1

2016)

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

25

http://www.strifeblog.org/2016/08/01/authenti

cation-crypto-wars-new-frontline-strife-blog-s

ubmission/

Peterson, Andrea. “Are squirrels a bigger

threat to the power grid than hackers?”

(Washington Post: The Switch, January 12

2016)

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-sw

itch/wp/2016/01/12/are-squirrels-a-bigger-thre

at-to-the-power-grid-than-hackers/

Cox, Joseph. “Are Data Breaches Becoming

More Common?” (VICE/Motherboard, 28 July

2016)

https://motherboard.vice.com/read/data-breach

es-vigilante-pw

Townsend, Kevin. “Leaked EU Proposal

Pushes Tighter Rules on Dual-Use

Technologies” (Web: Security Week, 28 July

2016)

Houck, Caroline. “Until We Reduce

Cybercrime, Expect More Russian Meddling”

(Web: Defense One Daily, 29 July 2016)

GReAT, “The Epic Turla Operation” (Web:

Securelist, 7 August 2014)

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

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TOPIC B: THE KURDISH PEACE

PROCESS: DISARMAMENT AND

PEACE-BUILDING IN THE

RELEVANT REGIONS OF TURKEY,

SYRIA AND IRAQ

The question of Kurdish sovereignty,

statehood and disarmament has been a

significant issue for the international

community for decades. With violence and

instability brought about by conflicts in Syria,

Iraq and most recently, Turkey, the question of

disarmament and peacebuilding in the region

is vital for the maintenance of international

peace and security in the Middle East.

Kurds are currently the largest stateless

minority in the world. There is presently an

estimated 30 million Kurdish people in only

Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia. Kurds

form around 18-25% of the total population of

Turkey and around 15-20% of the total 60

population of Iraq . Whilst these groups are

identifiable as Kurds, there are lots of

differences between the Kurdish groups in

these countries: from language and culture to

religious beliefs. Disarmament and peace-

building in the region is essential not only for

the Kurds, but all groups.

Violence in recent decades brought about by

Kurdish political groups like the Kurdish

Workers’ Party (PKK) has led to this group

60 Roy, S. (2011) “The Kurdish Issue”, Available from

the Foreign Policy Journal at:

http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/04/22/the-k

urdish-issue/ [Accessed on 19/07/16]

being categorised as a terrorist group by the 61

United States of America , the European

Union and Turkey. This has led to a policy

discrepancy due to the fight against the Daesh,

otherwise known as ISIL. The USA and

Western member states are providing funds

and armaments to Kurdish Peshmerga forces 62

in the fight against Daesh . These efforts have

been successful, but there is no guarantee that

the region will return to peace once Daesh is

defeated, due in part to the presence of

weapons and armed groups in the region.

The current instability in the region was

caused by the Treaty of Sévres of 1920. This

treaty created the modern states of Iraq, Syria

and Kuwait and included the possibility of the

creation of a Kurdish state in the region.

61 U.S. Department of State (2016) “Foreign Terrorist

Organisations”, Available from the U.S. Department of

State at:

http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm

[Accessed on 22/07/16] 62 Shinkman, P. (2014) “Who are the Kurds, and why

should we help them?” Available from USA News at:

http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/11/26/the-d

angers-of-helping-the-kurds-fight-the-islamic-state-grou

p-in-iraq [Accessed on 22/07/16]

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63

However this never implemented due to the

Treaty of Lausanne of 1923.

After the Treaty of Sévres, Turkey, Iran and

Iraq agreed to not recognise a possible Kurdish

state. This led to a particularly harsh treatment

at the hands of the Turkish government

following the overthrow of the Turkish

monarchy by Kemal Ataturk. The Turkish

government of the time discriminated Kurds

by also naming them “Mountain Turks”,

outlawed their language and forbade them

from wearing traditional clothes in cities.

These laws resulted in political movements

like the PKK whose main aim is stop the 64

repression of Kurds . Violence between

Kurdish groups and the countries in the region 65

has led to the deaths of around 40,000 people

. Other member states have repressed Kurds.

In Iraq and Syria, Kurds have been persecuted

for decades.

Peacebuilding and disarmament in the region

is linked to the Syrian Civil War and the

actions of Daesh. For Kurds to live in peace

and without violence, these two issues will

have to be solved. At the time of writing, the

failed coup in Turkey against the government

of Recep Erdogan has resulted in uncertainty 66

towards Kurdish politics in Turkey .

63 OpCit, n.61 64 BBC (2015) “Profile: Kurdistan Workers’ Party

(PKK)”, Available from the BBC at:

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20971100,

[Accessed on 22/07/16] 65 ibid 66 Tash, Y. (2016) “Where does the attempted coup

leave Turkey’s Kurds?”, Available from The New Arab

at:

https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2016/7/19/

History of the Committee

With the creation of the United Nations, it

became apparent that there was a need to have

multiple committees to deal with numerous

issues after the fallout of WW2. The First

Committee of the General Assembly,

otherwise known as the Disarmament and

International Security Committee (DISEC) 67

was formed .

DISEC has strong connections to other

disarmament bodies such as the Geneva-based

Conference on Disarmament and the United

Nations Disarmament Commission. DISEC

also has to work within the scope of the UN

Charter, with article 11 setting out its mandate:

“The General Assembly may consider the

general principles of cooperation in the

maintenance of international peace and

security, including governing

disarmament and the regulation of

armaments and may make

recommendations with regard to such

principles to the Members or to the 68

Security Council or to both" .

Naturally, DISEC is concerned with the

instability in Syria, Iraq and Turkey and as

such, new measures need to be drafted to bring

where-does-the-attempted-coup-leave-turkeys-kurds-

[Accessed on 22/07/16] 67 UN (2016) “Disarmament and International Security”,

Available from the United Nations at:

http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/ [Accessed on 22/07/16] 68 UN (1945) “Charter of the United Nations and the

Statute of the International Court of Justice”, Available

from the United Nations at:

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pd

f [Accessed on 22/07/16]

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stability to the region. Since the establishment

of these states, Kurds have struggled to secure 69

equal rights of citizenship and expression , a

clear concern for the United Nations.

TOPIC HISTORY

The Origins of the Kurdish Issue

The origins of the Kurdish problem are very

much intertwined with local and regional

struggles. Over millennia, numerous

ethnicities have settled and migrated in the

area which we now call Turkey, Syria, Iraq

and Iran. Throughout Kurdish history, the

mountains in the region have brought

protection but also political and literal 70

isolation .

In the early 20th century, with the First World

War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire,

the victorious Western powers made

provisions for a Kurdish state in the Treaty of 71

Sévres . However, the hope brought by the

Treaty was dashed by the Treaty of Lausanne

of 1923 which established the borders of the

modern-day Turkey and made no provisions 72

for a Kurdish state . This left millions of

69 Gunes, C. & Lowe, R. (2015) “The Impact of the

Syrian War on Kurdish Politics Across the Middle East”,

Available from Chatham House at:

https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse

/field/field_document/20150723SyriaKurdsGunesLowe.

pdf, [Accessed on 22/07/16] 70 The Kurdish Project (2015) “Kurdish History”,

Available from:

http://thekurdishproject.org/history-and-culture/kurdish-

history/, [Accessed on 22/07/16] 71 OpCit, n.61 72 Brunner, B. (2015) “Kurdish History Timeline”,

Available from:

http://www.infoplease.com/spot/kurds3.html, [Accessed

on 22/07/16]

Kurds with a minority status in the region and

has resulted in the use of violence through

political groups like the Kurdish Worker’s

Party (PKK) in Turkey, the Kurdistan

Democratic Party (KDP)

in Iraq and as Kurdish Peshmerga forces

(freedom fighters).

The current situation which the Kurdish

people find themselves in is not only due to

violence brought by the Turkish, Syrian and

Iraqi governments, but also due to the

mistakes of Western powers after WW1.

Since WW1, the Kurdish Issue has been

characterised by guerrilla violence as a way to

achieve political goals, fuelled mostly by the

discrimination against Kurds and nationalism.

Kurdish groups in Iraq

After the Kurds supported Iran in the Iran-Iraq

war of 1980-88, Saddam Hussein destroyed

villages and attacked peasants with chemical 73

weapons . This violence resulted in the

73 OpCit, n.61

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29

displacement of over 1.5 million people, many 74

of whom fled to Turkey . After the Gulf War

in which Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait,

encouraged by the United States and Coalition

forces, the Kurds in Northern Iraq rose up and

fought against Saddam’s forces. However

Saddam Hussein quashed this rebellion, killing 75

an estimated 180,000 people in the process ,

in Northern Iraq which became the Kurdistan 79

Regional Government in 1992 . This

government is democratically elected and

governed by two parties, the Kurdish

Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic

Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

Prior to the attacks on the World Trade Centre th

in what is referred to as the Kurdish Genocide. on September the 11 2001 and the invasion of

Although the UN and other member states

failed to aid the Kurds in Northern Iraq (also

known as Iraqi Kurdistan), the Security

Council acted decisively and successfully by 76

passing Resolution 688 against Iraqi actions .

Although it was not permitted, the United

Kingdom, the United States and France

imposed no-fly zones over northern Iraq to

allow humanitarian workers to provide aid to 77

those in need .

The Secretary-General of the time, Boutros

Boutros-Ghali said that the no fly-zone was 78

illegal . However, it allowed the Kurds in the

region to control a 15,000 square mile region

74 OpCit, n.72 75 Sinan, O. (2007) “Iraq to hang ‘Chemical Ali’:

Saddam Hussein’s cousin, Ali Hassan Majid, faces

death for his role in gassing Kurds”, Available from

Tampa Bay Times at:

http://www.sptimes.com/2007/06/25/Worldandnation/Ir

aq_to_hang Chemica.shtml, [Accessed on 23/07/16] 76 UN (1991) “Resolution 688”, Available from the

United Nations at:

https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/G

EN/NR0/596/24/IMG/NR059624.pdf?OpenElement

[Accessed on 23/07/16] 77 OpCit, n.72 78 Pilger, J. (2000) “Labour claims its actions are lawful

while it bombs Iraq, starves its people and sells arms to

corrupt states”, Available from:

http://johnpilger.com/articles/labour-claims-its-actions-a

re-lawful-while-it-bombs-iraq-strarves-its-people-and-se

lls-arms-to-corrupt-states, [Accessed on 23/07/16]

Iraq in 2003, by the United States, the United

Kingdom and other member states, Turkey

refused to allow the U.S. to use military bases

in Turkey to launch an offensive into Northern

Iraq. This refusal empowered the Kurds in

Iraqi Kurdistan who became a powerful ally to 80

the United States . With Kurdish aid, the

United States seized valuable oil fields and

opened a northern front against Saddam

Hussein.

With the formation of a new Iraqi government,

the rights of the Kurdish people gained

traction and resulted in both Arabic and

Kurdish being recognised as the official

languages of Iraq, an entirely unprecedented

gain for Kurds in Iraq. Irrespective of the rise

of Daesh, recent changes suggest a gradual

improvement in the lives of Kurds in Iraq.

Another important development is that a

referendum on Kurdish independence is due to 81

take place in October 2016 in Iraqi Kurdistan

79 Kurdistan Regional Government (2016) “Fact sheet:

About the Kurdistan Regional government”, Available

from http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?l=12&p=180,

[Accessed on 23/07/16] 80 OpCit, n.61 81 Kurdistan 24 (2016) “Barzani: Kurdistan will hold

referendum before October”, Available from Kurdistan

24 at:

http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/05609d37-3569-4a

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

30

. Delegates should keep this in mind whilst

researching this topic.

Kurdish groups in Syria

The 2011 uprising in Syria and eventual civil

war created a massive change in conditions for

Kurdish politics and societies within Syria.

Most present-day Kurdish political parties can

trace their roots to the Kurdistan Democratic

Party of Syria, the first Kurdish nationalist 82

party, founded in 1957 . These parties have

remained illegal under the totalitarian regime

in Syria.

During the 1990s, Syria served as a safe space

for the PKK which was consistently attacked

in Turkey, however it was expelled from the

Syria in 1998 with former members

establishing the PYD in 2003. The PYD has

since acted as one of the main Kurdish groups

during the Syrian civil war, gaining territory in

areas with majority Kurdish populations in the

north of Syria, particularly: Jazira, Kobane and 83

Afrin . This has led to the PYD joining these

administrations into an area called Rojava

(“West”) to represent Western Kurdistan.

8f-a39e-98b97c732503/Barzani--Kurdistan-will-hold-re

ferendum-before-October [Accessed on 26/07/16] 82 OpCit, n.70 83 ibid

The administration of Rojava is widely

different to most political systems in the

region. It is organised on a political theory of

democratic confederalism, advocated by

Abdullah Öcalan (the imprisoned leader of the

PKK). In democratic confederalism, there is

complete equality for women and minorities

and a separation of state and religion. The

approach has brought Rojava international 84

attention .

However, in addition to the conflict between

the Free-Syrian Army (FSA) and the Assad

Regime, there has been an added dimension of

violence brought by Daesh. Kurdish groups

have fought Daesh in order to defend Kurdish

towns and villages from violence, most

notably the People’s Protection Unit (the PYG,

the militia associated with the PYD). The

Free-Syrian Army and the PYG have

collaborated in fighting Daesh, but also remain 85

suspicious of each other . These two groups

have both collaborated and fought militarily

against each other, depending on local

84 ibid 85 ibid

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

31

circumstances along with the wider aspects of

the war.

Current estimates of PYG fighters put them at

around 50,000 fighters strong, gaining the

confidence of Turkey’s allies in the fight

against Daesh. The instability in the region has

also been fuelled by the presence of Russian,

Chinese, Iranian and Eastern European 86

weapons .

While the PYG has been gaining legitimacy by

defending and gaining territory against Daesh,

it is a target of the Turkish military who view

them as an extension of the PKK. The US

Department of State and the EU has told

Turkey to stop bombing Kurdish groups in the

region, who they see as a vital force to stop 87

Daesh .

The military and political position of Syrian

Kurds is of vital importance to Turkey.

President Erdogan is opposed to Kurdish self-

rule as this could lead to the break up of 88

Syria . Turkey has stated it will not tolerate an 89

independent Kurdish authority on its border .

Similarly to Iraqi Kurds, for Syrian Kurds,

irrespective of whoever is going to be in

86 Bender, J. (2015) “Syria and Iraq are awash with

Russian, Iranian and Chinese weapons”, Available at:

http://www.businessinsider.com.au/syria-and-iraq-full-o

f-russian-iranian-and-chinese-weapons-2015-4

[Accessed on 26/07/16] 87 BBC (2016) “Turkey v Syria’s Kurds v Islamic

State”, Available from the BBC at:

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33690060

[Accessed on 25/07/16] 88 ibid 89 ibid

charge of Syria, a recognition of Kurdish 90

rights essential to stop future hostilities .

Kurdish groups in Turkey

As the country with the most amount of Kurds

in the region, Turkey has had a long,

complicated and violent history with Kurdish

politics. Both sides of this conflict have used

violence

to establish political control. Turkey’s current

policies against Daesh in the region have been

influenced by the rise of Kurdish groups.

Founded in 1978, the PKK has been a thorn in

the side of the Turkish government. Originally

founded as a Marxist political group, the PKK

as evolved a political ideology called

democratic confederalism in which the

decision making powers of the state come

from a local level.

Despite the imprisoned leader of the PKK

Abdullah Öcalan calling for a ceasefire and

peace negotiations between the Kurdish and

90 International Crisis Group (2013) “Syria’s Kurds: A

Struggle Within a Struggle”, Available from the

International Crisis Group at:

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20Ea

st%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syri

a/136-syrias-kurds-a-struggle-within-a-struggle.pdf,

[Accessed on 25/07/16]

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32

91

Turkish forces in March 2013 , violence has

always been a pressing concern in the region.

The ceasefire didn’t last long before violence

re-erupted. The PKK was the first to break the

ceasefire when they killed four policemen, the

Turkish government responded by bombing 92

PKK camps in Iraq .

Picture: PKK fighters

Current Turkish policies are based on

domestic political motivations. The ruling

Justice and Development Party (AKP) has

similarly faced a constitutional crisis at home

due to the recent failed coup. The coup has

caused fear as many believe that President

Erdogan would use the coup to change the 93

constitution by giving a executive presidency

. With 200 people killed and thousands

wounded, the Turkish government declared a

state of emergency and withdrew from the

European Convention on Human Rights whilst

purging military, police, academic and 94

bureaucratic institutions .

The situation of Kurdish politics in Turkey is

completely uncertain as the PKK and the

91 Ekurd Daily (2015) “U.S. welcomes Kurdish leader’s

call for disarmament of PKK”, Available at:

http://ekurd.net/u-s-welcomes-kurdish-leaders-call-for-d

isarmament-of-pkk-2015-03-03 [Accessed on 26/07/16] 92 The Economist (2015) “The truce between Turkey

and Kurdish militants is over”, Available at The

Economist at:

http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa

/21659870-truce-between-turkey-and-kurdish-militants-

over-turkey-and-kurds [Accessed on 26/07/16] 93 ibid 94 Shaheen, K. (2016) “Turkish PM: coup suspects’

testimony points to Gülen’s involvement”, Available

from The Guardian at:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/26/turkish

-pm-coup-suspects-testimony-points-to-gulens-involve

ment [Accessed on 26/07/16]

Peoples’ Democratic Party (the HDP, a Social-

Democratic Party mainly led by Kurds)

condemned the coup. However, reports note

that AKP supporters carried out attacks on 95

numerous HDP offices .

The largest fear within Turkey is that the

government could become authoritarian. With

the bombing of the Turkish parliament by pro-

coup airforce jets, peace and democratic

institutions need to be reassured in order to

prevent further conflicts. Those accused of

orchestrating the coup must face a free and fair 96

trial to ensure peace in the region .

DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM

Disarmament in Turkey, Iraq and Syria

The proliferation of weapons in the region has

led to an excess of violence due to the

prevalence of foreign imported weapons over

decades of conflict. Many member states have

used the conflict to profit through arms sales.

According to reports from the Balkan

Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) and

the Organised Crime and Corruption

Reporting Project (OCCRP), Eastern European

countries have approved of the sale of more

than €1.2bn of weapons during the past four

years to Middle Eastern Countries. Thousands

of light and heavy armaments from AK-47s,

rocket launchers and anti-tank weapons have

95 Tashjian, Y. (2016) “Where does the attempted coup

leave Turkey’s Kurds?”, Available from The New Arab

at:

https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2016/7/19/

where-does-the-attempted-coup-leave-turkeys-kurds-

[Accessed on 26/07/16] 96 ibid

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

33

made their way from the Balkans to the

Arabian peninsula to countries which border 97

Syria .

Eight countries have approved of over €1.2bn

of weapons and ammunition exports to Jordan,

United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and

Turkey – key arms markets for Syria and

Yemen. Arms export licenses were granted

despite fears from governments and experts

that the weapons could end up in Syria, in

opposition to national, EU and international 98

law .

While the Free Syrian Army has received

these weapons, they have also fallen in the

hands of extremist groups like the al Qaeda

affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, Daesh and factions

fighting on behalf of Bashar al-Assad. This

development has been confirmed by markings

on ammunition cases identifying the origin

and date of manufacture. Many of the weapons

provided were produced as recently as 2015.

In response to the findings of the investigation,

Patrick Wilckens on behalf of Amnesty

International stated the following:

“The evidence points towards systemic

Since 2012, BIRN and OCCRP state that

around €806m worth of weapons and

ammunition were approved by Eastern

European countries to Saudi Arabia. Jordan

secured €155m worth of export licenses,

whilst UAE acquired €135m and Turkey

€87m. It is not difficult to imagine that these

arms could easily reach groups which are

supported by these member states, thus

bringing even more violence into the region as

Soviet-style weapons are sent to insurgent 100

groups .

Jeremy Binnie, an arms expert specialised in

the Middle East, stated that: “the militaries of

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE and

Turkey use western infantry weapons and

ammunition, rather than Soviet-designed

counterparts. It consequently seems likely that

large shipments of such materiel being

acquired by – or sent to – those countries

destined for their allies in Syria, Yemen and 101

Libya.” US government documents provide

an indication of the types of weapons given to 102

Syrian rebel groups .

Currently the lack of sanctions mechanisms

under the Arms Trade Treaty to punish diversion of weapons to armed groups accused 103

member states has allowed violence to of committing serious Human Rights

Violations, if this is the case, the transfers are

illegal under […] international law and should 99

cease immediately” .

97 Angelovski, I., Patrucic, M. & Marzouk, L. (2016)

“Revealed: the £1bn of weapons flowing from Europe

to Middle East”, Available from The Guardian at:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/27/weapo

ns-flowing-eastern-europe-middle-east-revealed-arms-tr

ade-syria, [Accessed on 27/07/16] 98 ibid 99 ibid

continue in Syria, Iraq and Turkey. As such,

“all these states do have clear, legally binding

responsibilities to stop the transfer of arms

where there is a risk that they will be used for

100 ibid 101 ibid 102 Binnie, J. (2016) “US arms shipment to Syrian rebels

detailed”, Available from Jane’s 360 at:

http://www.janes.com/article/59374/us-arms-shipment-t

o-syrian-rebels-detailed [Accessed on 27/07/16] 103 OpCit, n.97

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

34

serious violations of international human

rights and humanitarian law, and to take

mitigating measures to prevent diversion to 104

unauthorised end users” .

Delegates should consider the importance of

arms agreements, how these can be improved

in order to stop member states from profiting

from the trade of weapons to a region

devastated by violence.

Political Obstacles

What has become clear is that there are

numerous obstacles which will determine

whether any peacebuilding operations will be

successful. The determinant factor in whether

peace and disarmament will succeed in the

region will depend on the political obstacles

which Iraq, Turkey and Syria face.

With the UN special envoy for Syria

estimating that over 400,000 people have been

killed during the war. Peace and disarmament 105

in the region is a difficult future to imagine .

The political obstacles in Syria are

complicated by the fact that the Syrian civil

war is similar to the proxy wars of the Cold

War. Different international actors have been

adjusting their support for groups to ensure

that they aren’t eliminated, with the US

funding groups like the Kurds and Free Syrian

104 ibid 105 Al Jazeera (2016) “Syria death toll: UN envoy

estimates 400,000 killed”, Available from Al Jazeera at:

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/staffan-de-mist

ura-400000-killed-syria-civil-war-160423055735629.ht

ml [Accessed on 28/07/16]

Army and on the other hand Russia and Iran 106

aiding the Assad regime .

Although we will not focus on numerous UN

resolutions that have been adopted by the 107

Security Council , most international

proposals approved by the UN for ending the

war in Syria have focused on a negotiated

settlement between the various warring 108

factions in Syria . This has meant that there

has been a lack of international negotiations

regarding groups like the Kurds. There are

widespread concerns to countries like Turkey,

Iraq and Iran that the Kurds in the region will

be able to establish their own independent

country by regaining land from Daesh and the

Assad regime.

All the negotiations have been fruitless due to

a lack of trust on both sides. There are no

guarantees that if a peaceful negotiation is

reached with Assad, that he would follow all

of the terms. The government could easily

wait for the groups to disarm then simply jail

and kill all opposition leaders, a concern for all

countries which face civil wars against 109

totalitarian regimes . The objective for rebel

groups is to gain control of the central

106 Bozorgmehr, N. (2015) “Iran and Russia reiterate

support for Syria’s Bashar al-Assad”, Available from

the Financial Times at:

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/acd77496-91fc-11e5-bd82-c

1fb87bef7af.html#axzz4FnxJG9MK, [Accessed on

29/07/16] 107 Security Council Reports (2016) “UN Documents for

Syria”, Available at:

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/syri

a/, [Accessed on 29/07/16] 108 Fearon, J. (2013) “Obstacles to Ending Syria’s Civil

War”, Available from Foreign Policy at:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/10/obstacles-to-endin

g-syrias-civil-war/, [Accessed on 29/07/16] 109 ibid

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

35

government to not only ensure their power, but

to save themselves from possible retaliation.

Current negotiations have focused on the idea

of having a transitional government, followed

by free and fair elections supervised by the

United Nations. These plans have received

support, however the priorities for the United

States, Russia, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia

have diverged; specifically on the future of

President Assad. For the U.S. led bloc, the 110

removal of Assad is essential .

On the other hand, Russia and Iran want to

eradicate “terrorist organisations” that have

occupied parts of the country, even though

their definition of what constitutes a terrorist

group has been uncertain. Reports have stated

that the Free Syrian Army has been attacked

by Russian

forces, therefore it is clear that Russia has been

111

aiding Assad . Iran has maintained that it

110 Mousavain, S. (2015) “To Solve the Syria Crisis, We

Need to Overcome These Three Obstacles”, Available

from The Huffington Post at:

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/seyed-hossein-mousavi

an/syria-crisis-obstacles_b_8740514.html, [Accessed on

29/07/16] 111 Shaheen, K. (2016) “Syrian rebels launch operation

to break Aleppo siege”, Available from The Guardian

at:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/01/syrian

should be the Syrians who decide whether

Assad should continue to be their President or 112

not .

This has led to mistrust between these two

groups. Russia and Iran believe that the main

objective for the U.S. led bloc is regime

change and the U.S. led bloc believes that Iran

and Russia solely aim to remove any groups

which threaten the stability of the Assad

regime.

The mistrust between the groups has

complicated peace and disarmament processes

regarding the Kurdish peace process. Kurdish

groups have largely been the most effective

ground forces in Syria in fighting Daesh.

However, the political consequences of a

possible Kurdish nation within Syria has been

a serious threat to Turkey as the member with

the most amount of Kurds. If an independent

Kurdish state was to be formed, the territorial

integrity of Turkey would be threatened

causing further instability.

Delegates should consider the political

considerations of each actor if future

peacebuilding and disarmament aims are to be

effective in bringing peace to the region.

-rebels-launch-operation-to-break-aleppo-siege

[Accessed on 01/08/16] 112 OpCit, n.110

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

36

The Presence of Daesh

The presence of Daesh is clearly a threat to

peace in the region with Western powers

attacking Daesh positions in Iraq and Syria.

Presently, American airstrikes have killed

around 25,000 Daesh fighters in both Iraq and

Syria. The New York Times has estimated that

Iraqi and Kurdish forces have taken back

around 40% of the land seized by Daesh in

Iraq. In the meantime, forces backed by the

West have seized a sizable amount of territory 113

in Syria .

However, despite the successes in regaining

territory and funds from Daesh, it has not

stopped the recruitment, radicalization of

people from all regions of the world. Bringing 114

an increase in lone terror attacks in the West

.

Military officials worldwide recognise the fact

that Daesh is one of the richest terrorist

organisation of all time by looting an

estimated $1bn from bank vaults across Syria

and Iraq. Despite the fact that Daesh has cut in

will continue to remain as an adaptable

adversary, bringing terror to the groups it 115

wants to subjugate to its rule .

At the time of writing, the capitals of Daesh,

Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria, still remain

under Daesh control. Even with reduced

salaries, Daesh collects hundreds of millions 116

of dollars by taxes and extortion . There is no

simple way to remove its vast funds.

Since October 2015, the United States and its

Western Allies have targeted oil fields and

refineries, cutting Daesh’s oil revenue about a

third. With the support of Kurdish forces,

Daesh has been weakened significantly,

resulting in the capture of the Sinjar in 117

northern Iraq .

Current estimates put the population under

Daesh’s control from 4 to 5 million people,

meaning there are lots of sources for taxation 118

and extortion . This factor, along with the

thousands of weapons looted from tanks to

armoured vehicles means that Daesh is still a

capable and well armed fighting source.

These strategies have worked to a certain

extent to reduce the military and financial

capabilities of Daesh. However, further

questions need to be asked about what may

happen if and when Daesh is eliminated from

Syria and Iraq. In particular, who will be

expected to fill the power-vacuum left by the

half the salaries for fighters in the last year, it 115 ibid

113 Rosenberg, M., Cooper, H. & Kulish, N. (2016)

“ISIS Expands Reach Despite Military and Financial

Setbacks”, Available from The New York Times at:

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/world/middleeast/i

sis-iraq-syria.html?_r=0 [Accessed on 29/07/16] 114 ibid

116 ibid 117 ibid 118 Lister, T. (2016) “Is ISIS going broke?”, Available

from CNN at:

http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/04/middleeast/isis-finan

ce-broke-lister/, [Accessed on 29/07/16]

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

37

group? And will these groups be peaceful, or

will they preach the same ideology of terror?

Even if Daesh is defeated, its extremist

ideology will be difficult to eliminate, even

over a long period of time.

Kurdish Independence

For many Kurdish groups in Iraq, Syria and

Turkey, Kurdish independence is a vital

starting point upon which peace and

disarmament can occur. Whilst some member

states support an independent Kurdish state, as

Kurds have been historically repressed by the

countries in the region, there are numerous

obstacles and threats which must be

considered when discussing peacebuilding and

disarmament in the region.

Firstly, many Kurdish parties are divided on

the viability of independence. Massoud

Barzani, the president of the ruling Kurdistan

Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraqi Kurdistan

has pushed for a referendum. The main

opposition party, the Patriotic Union of

Kurdistan (PUK) has remained unconvinced.

Another movement called the Gorran (Change)

movement is concerned by the absence of

democratic institutions which a 119

state could be built .

The PKK in Turkey has been sceptical of the

KDP’s push for independence due to different

119 Al, S. (2014) “Prospects for an independent Kurdish

state are hampered by security challenges, internal

competition, and insufficient international support”,

Available from the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace at:

http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/56374, [Accessed

on 30/07/16]

political beliefs, resulting in a strained 120

relationship between the PKK and the KDP .

Outside of Iraq, the Turkish government has

been fearful of Kurdish independence due to

the precedent it could set for the millions of 121

Kurds who live in Turkey .

Turkey is not the only member state who has

expressed concerns on this matter. The United

States favours a united Iraq and it is unlikely

that the United States will accept the

referendum on Kurdish independence.

Similarly, if the central government in

Baghdad is unwilling to let Iraqi Kurdistan go

then it is extremely unlikely that the other

members of the Arab League recognize an

independent Kurdistan.

Iran has other concerns regarding an

independent Kurdistan. Firstly, Tehran has

close links to the government in Baghdad and

secondly, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu expressed support for an

independent Kurdistan, stating that it would a 122

moderate country into the region . The fear

that Israel would have an influence on the

domestic politics of an independent Kurdistan

is a substantial factor in Iranian policy.

Irrespective of the presence of well trained and

well organised Kurdish militias and fighting

forces, the current security situation in the

region will continue to exist. These risks will

continue to threaten the establishment of a

Kurdish state. The rise of Daesh has also

caused a split in policies between the

120 ibid 121 ibid 122 ibid

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

38

government in Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad

who now practice different foreign policies,

even towards Syria and also control separate

armies. As a result, for many Kurds, the fight

against Daesh is a war of independence due to 123

the failure of the Iraqi army to stop Daesh .

Previous UN Action

The UN has promoted peace and disarmament

in the region by passing numerous Security 124

Council resolutions specifically on Syria .

The UN has acted as a mediator between

opposition groups and the Assad regime,

especially after the use of chemical weapons

by the Assad regime. However, the UN has

not been able to address the Kurdish question

due to the extremely complex situation in the

region.

Whilst the UN has aided the creation of the

Kurdistan Regional Government, it has been

limited in addressing the Kurdish question

along with the future of the Kurdish people if

the referendum on Kurdish independence

occurs in October. France unsuccessfully

attempted to insert a clause in Resolution 687

regarding the Kurdish issue when Saddam

Hussein’s forces were targeting Kurds in Iraqi 125

Kurdistan .

123 Ahmad, A. (2016) “The Time for an Independent

Kurdistan Is Now”, Available from Foreign Policy at:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/04/the-time-for-an-ind

ependent-kurdistan-is-now/?wp_login_redirect=0,

[Accessed on 30/07/16] 124 OpCit, n.107 125 Yildiz, K. & Breau, S. (2010) “The Kurdish Conflict:

International Humanitarian Law and Post-Conflict

Mechanisms”, Available from:

https://books.google.it/books?id=F0hgBwAAQBAJ&pg

=PA180&lpg=PA180&dq=un+involvement+in+kurdist

an&source=bl&ots=JES3BYsLvM&sig=3E5YghzUbCj

Unfortunately, the final text of Resolution 687

focused on the dismantling of Iraq’s chemical

weapons and the abuse of human rights.

Subsequent, Security

Council Resolutions 986 (1995) and 1546

(2004) only addressed the need for

humanitarian aid and the respect of human 126

rights of the new Iraqi government .

The lack of action regarding the Kurdish

question in the Security Council has been key

evidence of Security Council politics. The

Security Council has been unwilling to

condemn the actions of either the PKK or the

Turkish government as the wider concern has

been the ongoing violence in Syria and Iraq.

By addressing the Kurdish question, the

Security Council would have to address the

issues of Kurdish self-determination.

The hindrance to the Kurdish issue has been

under the UN Charter as article 53(1) which

states the following: “no enforcement action

shall be taken under regional arrangements or

by regional agencies without the authorization

of the Security Council, with the exception of

Bq205SUUTCYjPh5o&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj

1mpz4-ZzOAhUBrhQKHa7RB2k4ChDoAQgiMAE#v=

onepage&q=UN&f=false, [Accessed on 31/07/16] 126 ibid

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

39

127

measures against any enemy state” . This has

demonstrated that while member states can

attempt to solve this issue, the Security

Council, and consequently the UN, has been

limited in passing resolutions due to the cross-

boarder nature of the Kurdish question.

THE FUTURE

With instability, violence and widespread

human rights abuses in the region, the future

of all peace and disarmament missions is

extremely uncertain and fraught with risks.

The Assad regime

For any disarmament and peacebuilding

missions to be successful, the future of Assad

needs to be considered. For many member

states worldwide, the actions of Assad in using

chemical weapons against civilians along with

countless human rights abuses have meant that

a different government will need to be formed.

However, supporters of the Assad regime have

also fairly pointed towards the need for the

Syrian people to decide who should govern

them rather what would be considered to be an

imposed “western” government, which is not

likely to have the support of the Syrian people.

Officials representing the Syrian government

in peace talks held in Geneva earlier in 2016

refused to discuss future of President Assad. A

factor which was described as a “provocation”

127 OpCit, n.68

128

by Western governments . The peace talks

organised by the UN and the International

Syria Support Group failed. Firstly, numerous

different groups, including the Kurds, were

excluded from the negotiations (in part due to

the Turkish Government’s refusal) and

secondly the refusal of the Syrian government

to discuss the future of Syria without Assad.

This resulted in the Syrian Opposition’s chief

negotiator, who represented the Free Syrian

Army and other non-Kurdish resistance groups,

resigning by stating “the three rounds of talks

were unsuccessful because of the stubbornness

of the regime and its continued bombardments

and aggression towards the 129

Syrian people.” At the time of writing, this

resignation was followed by

a failure by all parties to agree when the peace

128 Wintour, P. (2016) “Future of Bashar al-Assad

remains ‘red line’ as Syria peace talks begin”, Available

from The Guardian at:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/14/future

-of-bashar-al-assad-remains-red-line-as-syria-peace-talk

s-begin [Accessed on 31/07/16] 129 Wintour, P. (2016) “Syria peace talks in peril after

opposition’s chief negotiator quits”, Available from The

Guardian at:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/29/syria-

oppositions-negotiator-resigns-over-failure-of-un-peace-

talks [Accessed on 31/07/16]

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

40

talks should re-commence, meaning that there

are no peace talks at the present time.

While member states like the UK have

provided humanitarian aid, opposition groups

have stated that Assad has been using

starvation as a weapon of war against the 130

opposition groups .

support the regime. Russia recently called for

the swift recommencement of peace talks.

Russia supports a political settlement under

which Syrian opposition groups would be

brought under a Syrian unity government.

However, opposition groups and critics claim 132

that this does not go far enough .

The future of the Assad regime remains

entirely uncertain. With the lengthening of the

conflict in Syria and the failure of peace talks,

peace and disarmament in the region is far

from certain amidst violence and the complete

destruction of infrastructure in Syria and Iran.

BLOC POSITIONS

The United States and other NATO

members have been key supporters of

Kurdish groups in the region. This support has

been convoluted by American-Turkish

Alliance. The USA has failed to exert any

pressure on Turkey to cease its repression of

the Kurds.

Whilst NATO members have vocalised their

strong disapproval of human rights abuses

against Kurds in Iraq and Syria, there has been 131

a failure to condemn them. The main

priority for NATO members at present has

been the elimination of extremist groups like

Daesh.

The Russian Federation has been a strong

ally of the Assad regime and has been

attacking opposition groups in an attempt to

130 ibid 131 OpCit, n.110

Aleksei Goltiaev, a senior Russian counsellor

to the UN Human Rights Council stated: "the

only way to find a solution to the Syria crisis

and stop the massive violations is to promptly

convene talks with a broad spectrum of Syrian 133

opposition which includes Syria Kurds" .

Turkey’s position has been extremely

convoluted. Whilst the Turkish government

has historically been against the Assad regime,

it has also been hindered by the threat of an

independent Kurdish state. Turkey has also

used its alliance with the USA to stop the

representation of Kurdish groups at the failed 134

peace talks in Geneva .

The recent failed coup in Turkey could also

result in a change in Turkish foreign policy

with regards to Syria and other groups in the

region. In the meantime, Turkey has been

completely against the possibility of a Kurdish

state.

Iran remains a key ally of the Assad regime.

Iranian military and security experts have been

key advisors to the Assad regime since the

132 Nebehay, S. (2016) “Russia calls for swift

resumption of Syria peace talks”, Available from

Reuters at:

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-u

n-idUSKCN0Z70WH [Accessed on 31/07/16] 133 ibid 134 OpCit, n.110

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

41

start of the civil war and have also provided 135

financial assistance to the regime . Whilst the

regime has supported Kurdish militias in Iraqi

Kurdistan, it has remained sceptical of the

possibility of an independent Kurdish state.

Saudi Arabia has been a key opponent of the

Assad regime and has supported Kurdish

groups in Iraq and Syria. Saudi Arabia also

supports the creation of an independent 136

Kurdish state .

POINTS RESOLUTIONS SHOULD

ADDRESS

● How can the Syrian peace-talks be

restarted? Which major obstacles need

to be confronted for the peace-talks to

be successful?

● Which role should Kurdish groups

have in the future if and when peace is

brought back to the region?

● How can the flow of weapons to the

region be stopped? Which major

international conventions need to be

abided by?

135 Fulton, W., Holliday, J. & Wyer, S. (2015) “Iranian

Strategy in Syria”, Available from the Institute for the

Study of War at:

http://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strateg

y-syria [Accessed on 31/07/16] 136 Ekurd Daily (2015) “Why Saudi Arabia seek to

establish Kurdish state in Iraq?”, Available from Ekurd

Daily at:

http://ekurd.net/saudi-arabia-seek-to-establish-kurdish-s

tate-2015-09-01, [Accessed on 31/07/16]

● How have previous UN actions been

hindered by the position of member

states?

● Is it possible to consider peacebuilding

and disarmament missions without

tackling the political obstacles?

● If a Kurdish state is to be formed, what

will be the political impact on

neighbouring member states?

● What is the impact of the failed

Turkish coup on Kurdish rights and

politics?

● Can Kurdish rights be protected in the

region without political reform?

FURTHER READING

● For a good understanding of the

obstacles to peace in Syria:

Fearon, J. (2013) “Obstacles to Ending Syria’s

Civil War”, Available from Foreign Policy at:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/10/obstacles-

to-ending-syrias-civil-war/, [Accessed on

29/07/16]

● For an understanding of the impact of

the Syrian war on Kurdish politics:

Gunes, C. & Lowe, R. (2015) “The Impact of

the Syrian War on Kurdish Politics Across the

Middle East”, Available from Chatham House

at:

https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chat

hamhouse/field/field_document/20150723Syri

aKurdsGunesLowe.pdf [Accessed on

22/07/16]

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

42

● For a comprehensive understanding of

the Kurdish Issue:

Roy, S. (2011) “The Kurdish Issue”, Available

from the Foreign Policy Journal at:

http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/04/

22/the-kurdish-issue/ [Accessed on 19/07/16]

● For an understanding of weapons flows

from Europe to the Middle East:

Angelovski, I., Patrucic, M. & Marzouk, L.

(2016) “Revealed: the £1bn of weapons

flowing from Europe to Middle East”,

Available from The Guardian at:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/

27/weapons-flowing-eastern-europe-middle-ea

st-revealed-arms-trade-syria, [Accessed on

27/07/16]

● For an understanding of the

humanitarian costs to the Syrian Civil

War:

Al Jazeera (2016) “Syria death toll: UN envoy

estimates 400,000 killed”, Available from Al

Jazeera at:

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/staffa

n-de-mistura-400000-killed-syria-civil-war-16

0423055735629.html [Accessed on 28/07/16]

● To understand the obstacles to an

independent Kurdish state:

Al, S. (2014) “Prospects for an independent

Kurdish state are hampered by security

challenges, internal competition, and

insufficient international support”, Available

from the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace at:

http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/56374,

[Accessed on 30/07/16]

● To gain a full understanding of

Kurdish history:

Brunner, B. (2015) “Kurdish History

Timeline”, Available from:

http://www.infoplease.com/spot/kurds3.html,

[Accessed on 22/07/16]

● For an understanding of the current

military and financial capabilities of

Daesh:

Rosenberg, M., Cooper, H. & Kulish, N. (2016)

“ISIS Expands Reach Despite Military and

Financial Setbacks”, Available from The New

York Times at:

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/world/mi

ddleeast/isis-iraq-syria.html?_r=0 [Accessed

on 29/07/16]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ahmad, A. (2016) “The Time for an

Independent Kurdistan Is Now”, Available

from Foreign Policy at:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/04/the-time-f

or-an-independent-kurdistan-is-now/?wp_logi

n_redirect=0, [Accessed on 30/07/16]

Al Jazeera (2016) “Syria death toll: UN envoy

estimates 400,000 killed”, Available from Al

Jazeera at:

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/staffa

n-de-mistura-400000-killed-syria-civil-war-16

0423055735629.html [Accessed on 28/07/16]

The 2nd Session of Oxford GlobalMUN-SFLS Model United Nations Conference

43

Al, S. (2014) “Prospects for an independent

Kurdish state are hampered by security

challenges, internal competition, and

insufficient international support”, Available

from the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace at:

http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/56374,

[Accessed on 30/07/16]

Angelovski, I., Patrucic, M. & Marzouk, L.

(2016) “Revealed: the £1bn of weapons

flowing from Europe to Middle East”,

Available from The Guardian at:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/

27/weapons-flowing-eastern-europe-middle-ea

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