disarmament and international security committee · disarmament and international security...

AMUN XVII February 4-5, 2016

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A Background Guide for the

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Chairs: Christina Xue, Christian Rodriguez, and Kelly Yen

A teenage cattle herder wields an AK-47 which she uses to protect herself and her herd from potentially armed attackers. In banditry-ravaged communities like these in Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudam, The DR Congo, and The Central African Republic, bullets are exchanged at the same rate as corn kernels.

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Contents:

Letters from the Chairs .………………………………….……………………….. 3 Topic A: Small Arms Trade in Africa ………………………………………..…… 4 Topic Introduction ……..…………….…………………………………….. 4 Topic Briefing ……………………………………………………………… 4 Past UN Action …………………………………………………………….. 7 Case Studies ……………………………………………………………….. 8 Liberia ………………..……………….…………………………….. 8 Kenya …………….…………………….…………………..……….. 9 Possible Solutions ………………..…………………………….………… 10 Questions to Consider …………………………………………………….. 11 References ……………………………………………………..…………. 12 Topic B: Espionage as a Means of Intelligence Gathering ……….………..……. 13 Topic History ……….…………………….………………………………. 13 Current Situation …………………………………………………………. 16 Possible Solutions ………………………………………..………………. 17 Questions to Consider …………………….…………………………..….. 18 References ……………………………..…………….…………………… 18 Topic C: Biological Warfare ………………………..…………………………… 19 Topic Introduction ………………….…………………………………….. 19 Topic History ………………………….………………………………….. 19 Case Study - Japan ………………..……………………………………… 21 Questions to Consider ……..……………………………………….…….. 22 References ………………………….…………………………..………… 23

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Bergen County Academies Model United Nations - The 17th Annual Conference -

Hi Delegates!

My name is Christina Xue and I will be serving as the Head Chair of DISEC. I am so excited to welcome you to DISEC and I hope you guys genuinely enjoy this conference! I am currently a junior in the Academy for Business and Finance at BCA, and have been doing Model UN since my freshman year. Through MUN, I have quickly developed a love for international affairs and public speaking, and I have attended various high school and college conferences in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic. Outside of MUN, I am involved in business-related clubs, such as the Federal Reserve Challenge and DECA, serving as Vice President of BCA’s DECA chapter this year. I am also President of Class Council for the Class of 2017, as well as President of the Microfinance Club, and Vice President of the Operation Smile Club and the Wounded Warrior Project. Furthermore, I have played volleyball for the Bergen Tech team since freshman year, and in my free time, I enjoy hiking, listening to music, watching Netflix, and eating cookie dough ice cream! I wish you all the best of luck, and hope you have a great experience at AMUN XVII; if you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to email me.

Sincerely, Christina Xue, Co Chair, DISEC [email protected]

Dear Delegates,

It is with great enthusiasm that I welcome you to our committee, the Disarmament and International Security Committee, at AMUN XVII. I am currently a sophomore in the Academy for Visual and Performing Arts, and have been participating in Model UN since September of my freshman year. In this time, I have attended 10 conferences making new friendships and earning awards along the way. In addition, this past June I chaired the World Health Organization Committee at the inaugural session of the Junior Academy Model United Nations Conference and this year I am serving as Director of Debate for BCA’s Model UN club. My love of international affairs extends into the work of NGOs where I am involved with the Pencils of Promise and Operation Smile Clubs as President and Artistic Director, respectively. In the world of domestic affairs, I compete on our school’s policy and state debate teams and am a contributing editor to the political magazine. Beyond politics, I serve on the executive boards of the Diversity Alliance and NAACP and am pursuing professional adobe design certifications. The topics we’ve selected are personal interests of mine and I hope you they will be as intriguing to you all. Each is a complex, transnational issue, that demands an equally thorough solution. I look forward to meeting each of you in February and hearing your contributions during committee. Until then, if you have any questions please do not hesitate to email me.

Best, Christian Rodriguez, Co Chair, DISEC [email protected]

Hi delegates!

My name is Kelly Yen and I am currently a junior in the Academy for the Advancement of Science and Technology, here at the Bergen County Academies. As one of your chairs for DISEC, I am so excited to welcome you and hope to make your AMUN experience the best it can be. I have been involved in Model UN since the beginning of my sophomore year. I’ve attended various high school and college conferences and have loved every minute of it. Outside of Model UN, I am involved in many clubs including The Innocence Project and China Care, two clubs in which I hold a leadership position. I also play lacrosse for the Bergen Tech girl’s lacrosse team. Outside of school, I enjoy photography, playing lacrosse, and watching Netflix avidly. If you have any questions, feel free to email me. I can’t wait to meet each of you and hope you all have an amazing time at AMUN XVII!

Sincerely, Kelly Yen, Vice Chair, DISEC [email protected]


mailto:[email protected]




Topic A: Small Arms Trade in Africa

Topic Introduction:

Small arms trade has been a prevalent global issue for decades. African countries, especially, have struggled with the illegal trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Illicit trade of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a continuously growing global issue, although it is mainly concentrated in areas of armed conflict, violence, and organized crime. SALW are light, inexpensive, and easy to transport and handle. As small arms are lightweight, concealable and durable, the ways in which they can be smuggled are nearly limitless. Illicit trade occurs both on regional and continental levels. According to the UN Panel of Governmental, small arms consist of “revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns.” Light weapons can be defined as: heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile

systems (MANPADS); and mortars of calibres of less than 100 mm.”

Nations and manufacturers eager to dispose of arsenals of unused arms from post-Cold War political developments and technological innovations view Africa as an attractive market. The international community's inability to control arms transfers and trafficking contributes to the persistence of these devastating conflicts. African leaders have acknowledged that their porous borders and ineffective national legal codes governing SALW commerce play a role in the continent's vulnerability to arms merchants.

Topic Briefing:

The persistence and the complication of wars in Africa specifically are partially due to small arms proliferation. The International Action Network on Small Arms, Saferworld, and Oxfam International reported that armed conflict cost Africa $18 billion USF each year and about $300 billion USD between 1990-2005. During this time period, 23 African nations experienced war and conflict,



including, Democratic Republic of Congo, Algeria, Burundi, Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Sudan, South Africa, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Ghana, Republic of Congo, and Rwanda.

Since 1991, there have been regional agreements involving approximately 110 countries concerning aspects of civilian firearm possession. The Bamako Declaration, was adopted in Bamako, Mali, in December 2000 (just before the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects) by the representatives of the member states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which has since been replaced by the African Union (AU). The provisions of the Declaration recommend that signatories establish the illegal possession of small arms and light weapons as a criminal offense under national law in their countries. The African Union, in 2003, also released a Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa, which notes the linkages between terrorism and organized crime, and the illegal trade and proliferation of SALW.

Developing nations have become host to illicit small arms markets, especially nations in Africa. Only a handful of African nations have the capability to develop small arms. Instead, these weapons are seized or stolen from government forces, looted from state armories, purchased from corrupt soldiers, or taken from private owners. Governments and armed groups from neighboring states are further sources of illicit small arms. Unauthorized production of small arms by local gunsmiths is a significant source of illicit small arms in some areas; these unlicensed gunsmiths have the capacity to produce up to 200,000 weapons a year, some with comparable quality to industrially produced guns. The Small Arms Survey estimates that small arms have resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and millions of injuries each year, and are responsible for 60 to 90% of total conflict deaths. For example, in South Africa, small arms are the main cause of unnatural deaths (around 30% of total deaths). Overall, small arms trafficking has contributed to regional conflicts, civil wars, and arsenals of terrorist organizations, drug cartels, and numerous armed groups, and are often the weapons of choice for these struggles (Approximately half of the international terrorist incidents were



armed with small arms and light weapons). Laws, regulations, and proper management of small arms trade vary from country to country, and can be difficult to assess progress. Reports of lost and stolen SALW are daily reminders of the continued prevalence of weak export controls, poor stockpile security practices, inadequate or nonexistent border security, which all contribute to this international threat.

Furthermore, the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control, and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, was adopted in April of 2004 by Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda (Somalia also joined in 2005). It requires national legislative measures, the strengthening of operational capacity and sufficient measures to control state-owned and civilian possessed SALW. Other provisions include safe disposal, transfer of SALW, and brokering. Member States agreed to cooperate in terms of mutual legal assistance, law enforcement and transparency, and information exchange. The Regional Center on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and

Bordering States (RECSA), is an intergovernmental organization established in 2005, and its mission is to “coordinate against Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation in the Great Lakes region and Horn of Africa.” RECSA Member States have also expressed support for the Arms Trade Treaty. In a regional meeting held in March 2015 in Nairobi, Kenya, representatives of 10 Member States, UN agencies, regional organizations, and the media and civil society committed themselves to ratify and accede to the ATT. In December 2005, the AU held a meeting of governmental experts from member states, to adopt an African Common Position, the Windhoek Common Position, which called on member states to take steps to strengthen its efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW. Among these steps was a suggestion to convene a technical and legal workshop to create a legally binding instrument to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW. Unlike the previously mentioned Bamako Declaration, this Common Position contained provisions for follow-up. In November of 2006, member states had an informal meeting to create a roadmap for such an instrument, and the Conference also



welcomed other related issues and developments, such as civilian possession of military-style weapons, the transfer of SALW to non-State actors, the Transfer Control Initiative, and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

According to the Global Facilitation Network Security Sector Reform, the P5 together account for 88 percent of the world’s conventional arms exports. These exports contribute to gross abuses of human rights in Africa and elsewhere. Legal sales are often made to irresponsible governments who use them to oppress the people. As previously mentioned, some countries make supplies available to rebel groups in an effort to overthrow dictatorial regimes.

Furthermore, African governments have been trying to achieve progress to protect and maintain national security, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration have been an important part of achieving peace, political stability and security, and socio-economic reconstruction, and national reconciliation. However, in a recent UN meeting, the representative of Burkina Faso noted that African countries had, within their limits, done everything possible to eradicate the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons. But limited resources make it

difficult to accomplish that task. Thus, international cooperation is vital in the implementation of the PoA.

Past UN Action:

In 2001, the UN recognized the need for international action on the issue of the proliferation and misuse of SALW. The UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (PoA), was agreed in July 2001. The PoA remains the primary international agreement on the control of SALW, and was adopted by all UN member states. The PoA establishes a range of measures for states to take to manage aspects of the problem, including control of SALW, regulation of brokering, management of stockpiles, and the marking and tracing small arms and assisting in PoA implementation. The UN has worked to support the implementation of the UNPoA at national, regional, and international levels. There has been one Review Conference in 2006, two meetings of states in 2008 and 2010, and one meeting of government experts in 2011.

In December of 2014, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), was entered into force. As of June 2015, Sixty-nine



states (9 being African nations) have ratified the treaty, and sixty-one (30 being African states) have signed the treaty but have not yet ratified it. The ATT seeks to regulate the international trade of conventional weapons to contribute to peace, reduce suffering, and promote cooperation, transparency, and responsible action by nations. However, the ATT has not been signed but not ratified by certain countries such as the United States, Brazil, France, and Germany. In May of 2015, the Security Council passed Resolution 2220, which contained information on small arms and new provisions aiming to strengthen UN coordination and action on small arms, promote effective implementation of UN arms embargoes, and support the Arms Trade Treaty. Members noted that a great threat came from the diversion of arms to terrorists, criminal networks and other armed groups. The resolution stressed the need to avoid civilian casualties, as the illicit transfer and misuse of SALW cause significant loss of life and contribute to instability. The Security Council noted that states must foster environments in which people feel secure and safe. Thus, the Council stressed the importance of increased security measures, training professional personnel, and assisting

countries in creating proper procedures for the handling of SALW. It can also be noted that 6 out of 15 Security Council members abstained from voting on Resolution 2220; Angola, Chad, China, Russia, Nigeria, and Venezuela.

Case Studies:

Liberia

From 1989 to 1996, and then from 1999 to 2003, Liberia experienced civil war that was fuelled by illegal guns and light artillery. A tragic consequence had been that youth had borne the brunt of the armed violence, and are still suffering, struggling to cope with high HIV/AIDS rates, low levels of education, and poor employment.

In 1999, the UN discovered 68 tons of weapons shipped into the country, despite an embargo. In 2002, the UN released a report revealing that Liberia illegally imported more than 200 tons of weapons from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Liberia is prohibited from receiving arms under a March 2001 UN arms embargo imposed for its support of rebel forces fighting at the time in Sierra Leone.



The United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) was tasked with assisting the government in consolidating peace following the 1997 elections. UNOL facilitated the promotion of national reconciliation and good governance and helped mobilize international support for the implementation of reconstruction and development programs. However,the efforts of UNOL were hindered by the inability of the government and opposition party leaders to resolve their differences over issues dealing with governance. The Secretary-General recommended the deployment of a peacekeeping operation comprised of 15,000 troops.The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established as an operation that includes political, military, police, criminal justice, human rights, disarmament and demobilization components. UNMIL works closely with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the AU, and other UN Missions Operations, such as UNAMSIL and MINUCI. However, a few years ago, UNMIL begun to withdraw soldiers; these troop reductions will continue through June 30, 2016, the deadline set by the Security Council for Liberia to take

over the tasks being carried out by UNMIL. Liberia has met several benchmarks, such as ratifying the ATT and taking over responsibility for marking and registering arms. However, with the UNMIL deadline quickly approaching, there is still much left to be done. Liberia must keep its main priorities in mind and continue to work towards security and peace.

Kenya

Several African countries are creating their own arms producing industries; Kenya built a bullet manufacturing plant in Eldoret that is capable of producing 20 million rounds a year, and secrecy surrounds the plant so that little is known about who purchases those bullets and whether they are exported. In addition, kinship ties among communities located on country borders facilitate the movement of firearms and the spread of conflicts, and there is a thriving market for guns at country borders. The presence of guns along borders is so strong that many openly carry these weapons, and violent conflicts involving SALW are on the rise. Kenya is also a major transit point for weapons shipments headed to countries involved in conflicts in the



Great Lakes region of Africa. The large quantities of weapons transported through Kenya to these areas add to the stockpiling of weapons. United Nations investigators have reported suspicious arms flights that have suggested the weapons on board may have been destined to embargoed parties. In addition, impoverished rebels, herders, and corrupt officials supply Kenya’s illegal arms market by selling their SALW to dealers.

The work of customs officers has also been made more challenging, due to arms brokers and agents who use false documents, file fake flight plans, hide weapons in secret compartments, and traffic weapons. Kenyan authorities take measures to prevent such behavior, but better techniques and equipment are needed to do so. Furthermore, Kenyan security officers, face difficult challenges. They lack resources, training, equipment, and personnel to effectively monitor conditions. Government presence is also lacking in many parts of the country, and low pay, low morale, and low professionalism deter officials from working in difficult conditions, which encourages corruption and bribery within communities and police forces.

However, the Kenyan government acknowledged the need to

stem the proliferation of small arms in 2000. Kenya has taken an active role to promote initiatives to stem this proliferation at national and regional levels, has supported calls for international action and assistance for small arms initiatives in poor countries. Kenya has signed the Nairobi Protocol, and further steps can include signing and ratifying the ATT. Kenya has made real progress in acknowledging the problem, and is paving the way for more action to achieve peace and security.

Possible Solutions:

RECSA directed the development of the Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol on SALW. The guide provides general operational guidelines and procedures on aspects of SALW, to contribute to the development of policy and the review of national legislation. These guidelines have been considered by states of the international community, as comprehensive and beyond the measures to strengthen the implementation process of the PoA. RECSA holds seminars on key issues such as, stockpile management, import, export and transfer, tracing and brokering, public awareness raising,



collection, disposal and destruction and mutual legal assistance and operational capacity.

Nations should also be fully implementing the PoA and the ATT to establish guidance on arms export licensing and post-shipment follow-up and improve transparency with respect to export licensing decisions. The ATT and PoA can be revised, or a new protocol can be created (similar to the Nairobi Protocol), in order to address specific issues and set guidelines for governments; a common set of laws, regulations, and proper management of SALW may make it easier to assess progress and manage the trading of SALW. There should be administrative procedures and laws regarding the production of small arms within nations, including the export and import of these weapons. Governments must increase security and establish clearer communication to root out the illegal trading occurring within rebel and terrorist groups and corrupt soldiers, as well as to reduce and prevent smuggling among borders. Tracing and regulation of stockpiles of SALW by states is also essential to prevent the weapons from falling into the wrong hands.

Measures and laws regarding the corruption of officials and police forces should also be considered, and training

programs, better equipment, and resources for authorities may increase effectiveness of officials, which reduces the transit of weapons and prevents arms brokers and shipping agents from the illegal trading of SALW. Corruption within governments must also be reduced, and it is imperative to note that international mutual legal assistance and and information exchange is important in addressing this issue and in promoting stability and peace.

Questions to Consider:

1. Is there another treaty or protocol that can be established to deal with SALW, and what would this document entail?

2. How can the smuggling and trade of SALW be reduced and prevented internationally?

3. What are issues with the current guidelines from the ATT that are preventing countries from signing and ratifying it?

4. What are the most prevalent concerns today with the trade of SALW in Africa, as well as other parts of the world?

5. How can national governments prevent the illegal trade, production, and usage of SALW



6. within their own borders and ensure SALW are used for legal and proper purposes?

7. What are the roles of authorities and police forces for handling SALW?

8. What resources do authorities and officials need in order to effectively combat illegal trading, misusage, and other issues with SALW?

9. How should governments address rebel and terrorist groups that cause violent conflicts and disrupt stability?

10. How should post-conflict areas affected and damaged by SALW be helped by both national governments and the international community?

References:

1. http://unmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3937&language=en-US

2. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-region/africa-and-the-middle-east.html

3. http://www.recsasec.org/index.php/en/

4. http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/dc3032.doc.htm

5. http://afjn.org/impact-of-small-arms-proliferation-on-africa-2/

6. https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2013/06-21-liberia-arms-trade-treaty-att.htm

7. http://www.poa-iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/8.aspx

8. http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/dc3032.doc.htm

9. http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-illicit-trade-of-small-arms-4273/

10. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/salw

11. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/kenya/Kenya0502-03.htm#P279_44894


http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publicati

http://www.recsasec.org/index.php/en

http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/dc3032.doc.htm

http://afjn.org/impa

https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/document

http://www.poa-iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/8.aspx

http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/dc3032.doc.htm

http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-illicit-trade-of-small-arms-4273/

http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/salw

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/kenya/Kenya0502-03.htm


Topic B: Espionage as a Means of Intelligence Gatheirng

Topic History:

Espionage has played a role in the operation, both foreign and domestic, of most militarized civilizations in history. The rise of city states and later empires bred societies devoted to the preservation of their ruling regimes; meaning that each needed to know the temperament and intent of their opponent. In the early Egyptian dynasties, spies sniffed out disloyal subjects and pinpointed weak tribes that could be conquered and enslaved. Several millennia later, Chinese and Indian military strategists Sun Tzu and Chanakya each wrote treatises containing espionage tactics. Sun Tzu's The Art of War, hailed as the bible of modern warfare, contains an entire chapter on the subject, and the extensive subversion methods Chanakya formulates in Arthasastra brought the illustrious Mauryan Empire to power for nearly 150 years. Similarly, the Roman Empire was particularly adept at employing espionage; spies engaged in foreign and domestic operations, gauging the political climate across the Empire by eavesdropping in the Forum and

reporting back to the capital. During the Second Punic War, the Carthiginians attempted to use the Romans' own tactics against them by placing spies within Rome, but they were quickly ferreted out and the Romans cut off their hands in the public square to send a message. Later, accounts of Roman society in the third century C.E. describe the presence of a secret police force, the frumentarii, which practiced extensive censorship. The use of clandestine intelligence reappears in the 13th and 14th centuries C.E. In Mesoamerica, the Aztecs trained a unit of soldiers called quimitchin to infiltrate opposing tribes during wartimes. In East Asia, Genghis Khan established an unprecedented informant network known as the Yam system. This communications network spanned the entirety of the Mongol Empire and allowed information to travel 200-300 miles in a single day. Meanwhile, in Europe, the Roman Catholic Church had become the principle political authority and had a powerful surveillance network to match. The system was known as the Inquisition. It was a court established for the sole



purpose of discerning and brutally punishing heresy Following the Middle Ages, the most notable example of clandestine intelligence is in the Revolutionary War. General Washington sent covert operatives on reconnaissance missions and met secretly with the Continental Congress to propose further operations and review tactical strategies. Following the American Victory in the first State of the Union address, Washington advocated for the establishment of a "secret service fund" as he knew how valuable counterintelligence and covert action had been in defeating the stronger British forces. Two years later, Washington's secret service fund accounted for 10% of the federal budget. In the early 1800s, Thomas Jefferson drew from the fund in the United States' first covert attempt to overthrow a foreign government: one of the Barbary pirate states in Northern Africa. More prominently, during the Civil War both the Union and the Confederacy implemented large-scale intelligence systems which included sending operatives to Europe to secure foreign investment in their cause. These systems were largely deactivated after the South's surrender, but set a critical foundation for further U.S. intelligence.

Modern espionage arose in the early 20th century in the years prior to World War I. One of the central causes of World War I was competition to have the most powerful military, and a central component of this military development was covert intelligence. This rapid build up of military capacity greatly augmented tensions in the world, and it was single act of espionage (the assassination of Franz Ferdinand) that ignited them and began the war. During the conflict, all key actors had refined intelligence programs which: obtained classified military information (through the use of spies), committed acts of sabotage, spread propaganda, and conducted interrogations of prisoners-of-war. An important alliance soon formed between Britain, France, and the Netherlands. British and French intelligence services recruited and trained Belgian and French refugees and deployed these spies as Dutch citizens. This elaborate scheme was high successful, and in total employed over 6,000 Belgian and French refugees in 200 plus spy rings. The triumvirate's success can also be contributed to its development of aerial reconnaissance and code-breaking. First, the novel use of photography in surveillance missions could not only predict enemy movements, but also



allowed the study of enemy machinery. Second, the interception and decryption of radio communications built up the emerging field of signal intelligence which would become critical in the Cold War era. Towards the end of the War, U.S. intelligence capabilities had caught up to their European counterparts. American operatives were stationed abroad, throughout Europe and the Ottoman Empire, and the Bureau of Investigation was established within the Justice department. The Bureau gathered intelligence on domestic opposition to American involvement in the war and simultaneously led a U.S. spy overseas to obtain a confidential treaty between France and the Ottoman Empire. Although extensive espionage operations took place during the second world war, the Cold War overshadows it in history as the clash defined by covert intelligence. Also, intelligence gathering during the Cold War is more relevant to this committee as we will be discussing clandestine intelligence during peacetime, or rather nonviolence. Spies in the Cold War, like World War I, were used to acquire knowledge about the other side and to disseminate false knowledge of what the other side was doing. Further, the most effective agents were those who

could disguise themselves as native to where they infiltrated, so, in the 1950s, the Soviet employed men from Britain to spy on Britain. 'The Cambridge Five' was one such group. As a result of their prestigious backgrounds, they had achieved high positions in the British Establishment which gave them access to many classified documents that they passed on to the KGB, or Soviet intelligence. Later, in 1961, another group of five employed by the British nuclear research program handed over blueprints for Britain's first nuclear submarine. Although members of this group were imprisoned on charges of treason, the KGB operation of "turning" British officials continued into the 1908s. Conversely, in 1960 the Soviet Union shot down an American U-2 spy plane flying in Soviet airspace. The pilot, Francis Powers, was sentenced to 10 years in prison on espionage charges, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower was forced to reveal that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been conducting similar operations for years - directly violating Soviet sovereignty. Such blatant violations of national sovereignty greatly increase tensions in the international community which, as this history points out, can lead to violence.



Current Situations:

Espionage in the 21st century looks radically different than it did just two decades ago. The dawn of the digital age reengineered the landscape in which intelligence is gathered, and the terrorist attacks of the 1990s and early 2000s galvanized governments across the globe into developing complex cyber security systems. The result: modern espionage is the tacit war over resources, cyber attacks into powerful corporations, and government surveillance of other governments. As major players on the international compete for resources like oil, natural gas, water, and arable land, many have set their sights on Africa. At the same time, stronger African states with reasonable intelligence services like South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt have shifted their focus to combat the spread of extremist Islamic groups in Northern Africa - leaving the door open behind them for foreign powers like China, France, the U.S., and Israel to claim the continent's largely untapped energy and exporting potential. China's role in the content has been in financing infrastructure projects including housing, highways, factories, and skyscrapers in Ethiopia, Angola, Kenya, and rural Egypt.

Chinese developers have been building cities from the ground up just like they did in Shanghai. These economic oases fulfill two primary goals for China: they have new hands to produce their goods as the middle class continues to expand back home, and state affiliated corporations have nearly unrestricted access to drilling and nuclear energy programs. A 2010 report by South African counter-intelligence described an act of espionage committed by Chinese spies in such a facility. Chinese developers constructed a mini-city outside of Pelindaba while South African authorities constructed the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor, a nuclear research facility in the same region. First, Chinese agents made several cyber attacks into the facility's system stealing an unknown number of classified documents about the reactor's construction and operation. This prompted South Africa to call upon U.S. and French intelligence in the vicinity for support, but it was later discovered that in the process of repairing the facility's security the American and French operatives embedded monitoring software within it. On the other end of the continent in Sudan, Israel, the world's second largest processor of diamonds, is relentlessly working to undermine the government and gain access to



Sudanese mines. Initially, Israel indirectly supported the militants in the initial Sudanese conflict. Following its resolution with the establishment of South Sudan, Israel is attempting to economically pressure Sudan to export its raw diamonds to Israel for processing and sale. While these events and others like them remain shrouded in uncertainty, in late 2015 Al-Jazeera received a classified list of the names, phone numbers, photos, addresses, and state-affiliations of 75 spies working out of South Africa nearly confirming acts of espionage have been taking place across the African continent for some time. The presence of foreign intelligence services in Africa weakens states' abilities to further develop their young economies and to take advantage of their critical resources. Further, Africa's cyber infrastructure is severely underdeveloped, and its continued abuse at the hands of covert operatives creates an issue of national security for African states, and also one of national sovereignty.

Starting in June of 2013 a large number of documents with specifics on surveillance conducted by intelligence agencies based off of the US National Security Agency (NSA) were leaked by whistleblower Edward Snowden. These leaks revealed huge programs

including both legal and illegal interception of communications; further, information exposed spying initiatives taken by the United States on friendly nations and the UN during international meetings. News of the NSA’s ability to monitor phone and internet use in 193 countries as well as its capability to collect 5 billion records of mobile phone location a day and 42 billion internet records a month sent waves across of backlash across the globe. The United States’ strongest criticism came from Brazil and Germany. Although the NSA’s surveillance program is connected with programs in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom under the Five Eyes Alliance, even some of the US’s closest allies oppose the inherent lack of transparency violation of sovereignty.

Possible Solutions:

The definition of espionage remains curiously ill-defined under international law which makes drafting legislation on the subject all the more difficult, yet it is unrealistic to mandate a stop to all espionage. Likewise, modern intelligence gathering systems collect valuable data that nations should continue to share as make to



more informed policy decisions, and reforms have been made to reign in certain operations like the United States' domestic surveillance program. An incredible rift in international legislation remains, though. Resolutions might lessen this gap by: creating a framework for dismantling foreign intelligence networks in developing regions, revising international copyright guidelines, distinguishing an act of cyber terrorism from and act of cyber espionage, implementing transparent intelligence systems in underdeveloped regions, and setting repercussions for acts of political espionage.


1. How developed is your country’s military complex and intelligence service?

2. Should digital violations of sovereignty be given equal weight as physical ones?

3. What steps, if any, should be taken to scale back overbearing intelligence systems?

References:

1. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/24/africa-el-

dorado-espionage-leaked-intelligence-files

2. http://www.economist.com/news/international/21660104-electronic-spycraft-getting-easier-more-controversial-old-style-human-sort

3. http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&context=auilr

4. https://www.law.unc.edu/journals/ncilj/issues/volume40/issue-2-winter-2015/countering-statesponsored-cyber-economic-espionage-under-international-law/

5. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/us/russian-hackers-read-obamas-unclassified-emails-officials-say.html?_r=1

6. http://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/12/10/the-new-industrial-espionage/

7. http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122441/corn-wars

8. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol2no4/html/v02i4a08p_0001.htm

9. http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/herders-in-pastoral-areas-value-guns/-/1107872/2708660/-/h97uw7z/-/index.html


http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/24/africa-el-dorado-espionage-leaked-intelligence-files

http://www.economist.com/news/international/21660104-electronic-spycraft-getting-easier-more-controversial-old-style-human-sort

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&context=auilr

https://www.law.unc.edu/journals/ncilj/issues/volume40/issue-2-winter-2015/countering-statesponsored-cyber-economic-espionage-under-international-law/

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/us/russian-hackers-read-obamas-unclassified-emails-officials-say.html?_r=1

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/12/10/the-new-industrial-espionage/

http://www.new

http://republic.com/article/122441/corn-wars

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol2no4/html/v02i4a08p_0001.htm

http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/herders-in-pastoral-areas-value-guns/-/1107872/2708660/-/h97uw7z/-/index.html


Topic C: Biological Warfare

Topic Introduction:

Biological warfare is a pressing issue worldwide as the threat of bioterrorist attacks continues to grow. Many countries worldwide employ the use of biological warfare as a means of gaining tactical and strategic advantages against adversaries, either through the threat of or deployment of biological weapons. Biological warfare, involving the use of biological toxins and microorganisms as weapons of war, can yield a catastrophic aftermath. The repercussions of biological toxins and infectious agents can continue for months and spread disease through large areas. The use of biological toxins as a means of warfare has been prevalent through many notable conflicts, including World War I, in which Germany exposed infectious agents to horses and cattle owned by allied armies. World War II introduced the Japanese’s experimentation with infectious agents including bubonic plague, typhus, yellow fever, hepatitis, cholera, and glanders, among others. Many biological toxins, such as smallpox and anthrax, are bacteria that can be contracted through the air and cause

lethal diseases. These infectious agents can target a range of people, such as a single individual or an entire population. Though the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) outlawed the mass production and use of biological weapons, many countries worldwide continue to develop and conduct research into biological toxins as a means of warfare.

Topic History:

The history of biological warfare dates as far back as the 6th century BC, during which the Assyrians placed a parasitic fungus, known for causing delusions when ingested, in the wells of their adversaries. During the siege of Krissa of the First Sacred War in Greece, the toxic herb known as hellebore was also used as a biological means of warfare against enemies. The further presence of biological toxins in warfare is prominent throughout history, as shown through the outbreak of smallpox in New South Wales in 1789. While numerous instances of biological warfare have been debated and declared as inconclusive, the use of



biological toxins was confirmed during World War I and World War II. The use of biological weapons of warfare in World War I was encouraged through the new discoveries of the ability to isolate and produce stocks of deadly biological toxins in the 19th century. World War I gave the international community means to attack a wide range of people, such as entire populations. Specifically, Germany exposed infectious agents, such as anthrax and glanders, to horses and cattle of allied armies on both the Western and Eastern fronts. Supposedly, German agents exposed the infectious agents to cattle and horses in the United States, prior to their shipment across the Atlantic to France, allies of the United Forces. Furthermore, this led to speculation about a 1915 attempt to infect St. Petersburg by the Germans in attempts to sabotage the Russian army. This introduced the tactic of biological sabotage, in which biological agents were used against adversaries in order to gain tactical and strategic advantages over enemies. The use of chemical and biological weapons of warfare helped lead the way to drafting and signing the Geneva Protocol in 1925. The Geneva Protocol, for the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons in

international armed warfare, was drafted and signed in Geneva,

France on June 17, 1925. Specifically, the treaty was drafted to prohibit the use of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases” and “bacteriological methods of warfare”. However, though the protocol was put in place to prohibit the use of chemical and biological weapons in international armed conflicts, no restrictions were placed on the research of or production of biological agents. Rather, the treaty still allowed for the use of biological weapons against nonratifying parties or as a means of retaliation. Furthermore, the treaty did not prohibit the use of biological agents in civil armed conflicts. Many signatories of the treaty continued to develop and stockpile biological toxins in preparation of attack, as the protocol granted them the right to retaliate.

Further global developments to international biological warfare programs continued in the 1940’s with Russia and the United States launching large offensive programs. However, the United States’ program was soon abandoned and all offensive biological weapons research and production was disbanded in 1969. By 1972, the United States destroyed all remaining stockpiles of biological munitions and toxins and joined in support of a treaty



outlawing all development, possession and stockpiling of biological weapons for offensive purposes in warfare.

Due to the lack of prohibition of development of biological weaponry, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was created to supplement the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The BWC, also known as, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, was signed on April 10, 1972 and put into effect on March 26, 1975. The BWC was recognized as the first multilateral disarmament treaty targeting the prohibition of biological weapons. The BWC consists of eight articles, each addressing the development of biological weapons. Under the terms of the BWC, the States Parties involved agreed to complete annual reports on activities involving the BWC, such as data on research laboratories, information on outbreaks of infections caused by toxins, information on vaccine production facilities, and other activities relative to the BWC.

The BWC has held seven quinquennial review conferences in the past. The Second Review Conference of 1986 implemented confidence-building dataexchanges in hopes of strengthening the BWC and improving

international relations and cooperation. The confidence building measures continued to be expanded during the Third Review Conference in 1991. The Fifth Review Conference, which took place soon after the September 11 attacks and anthrax scare, convened twice, once in November and December of 2001, and once more again in November of 2002. The Conference was suspended for a year due to the lack of a final declaration because of disagreements over certain issues. The Seventh Review Conference was held for 18 days in December of 2011 in Geneva France. The Final Declaration documented during the conference stated, in Article IV, that “under all circumstances the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons is effectively prohibited by the Convention.”

Case Study - Japan:

The development of biological weapons continued to grow in World War II, specifically in Japan. According to Fort Detrick scientists, Japan’s biological warfare program spread through 150 buildings and 5 satellite camps. Over 3,000 scientists and technicians, worked tirelessly to increase the country’s stock of



biological weapons. The Japanese’s experimentation with infectious agents included toxins such as bubonic plague, tularemia, typhus, yellow fever, anthrax, gas gangrene, hepatitis, cholera, smallpox, and glanders, among others. Japan’s deployment of biological weaponry encompassed various germ weapons such as toxinfilled bombs, which were used to infect thousands of people in at least 11 cities in China. At one point, Japan’s aircrafts were releasing tens of millions of plague-infected fleas to populations worldwide. Many of Japan’s biological weapons were used against prisoners in Manchuria, causing the deaths of thousands of prisoners after exposure to meningitidis, shigella, yersinia pestis, B. anthracis, and many more biological toxins. The Japanese experimentation ended in the death of over 3,000 human subjects, on whom biological toxins and delivery mechanisms were tested.


1. What measures can be taken to prevent already developed biological weapons of warfare from being deployed?

2. What measures could be taken to prepare the international community, in the event of a biological attack?

3. How does your country’s investment in biological warfare affect its stance on the development of biological weapons?

4. What does your country believe is most pertinent to the issue of biological warfare, ceasing the development of or preventing the deployment of current stockpiles of biological weapons?

5. What methods could be used to dispose of current stockpiles of biological weapons?

6. How should the global community increase international cooperation in terms of ceasing the development of biological weapons of warfare?

7. When should the eight BWC Review Conference take place and what possible amendments should be proposed?

References:

1. http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/19/arts/biological-weaponsliterallyolderthan-methuselah.html



2. http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/pdf/Status_Protocol.pdf

3. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/genevaprotocol.htm

4. http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4784.htm

5. http://www.britannica.com/topic/GenevaProtocolonGasWarfare

6. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1326439/

7. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwc

8. http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/

9. http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/Fourth_Review.shtml


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