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An Analysis of President Obama’s global Engagement Policy through the lens of Collective Needs, Fears and Identity.

Melissa Meler The American University of Paris

PO5058Conflict Management, Prevention and Resolution

Ambassador BolewskiFall 2012

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Abstract:

Through a retrospective look at US-Iran relations and engagement policies one can point out failed tactics and strategies that can be reversed by acknowledging them as failed attempts at engagement and using the perspective of unmet needs, fears and identity as a way of understanding the other sides perspective and reasoning for entering into and continuing a conflict. The lens of needs, fears and identity can also be used in finding solutions to these issues and promoting mutual awareness and cultural understanding that can foster trust and build a sustaining relationship.

Introduction:For over thirty years the United States and Iran has been in a constant state of conflict

with no current diplomatic solution. Each Nation has its own agenda and each is unwilling to

lose in order to gain at the negotiation table. This mixed with historical collective histories of

mistrust, rhetoric of power and unsuccessful attempts at discussion has lead to stalemate of

negotiation and conflict on the brink of war.

By reviewing past Iran-U.S. relations, policies and attempts at engagement through the

lens of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s unmet needs, fears and loss of collective identity as a

legitimate reason for conflict over its nations survival the Obama Administration can find and

alter its past mistakes and begin a new path of relationship building and mutual understanding

before negotiation that can alter negative norms, rebuilt lost trust and create a collaboration with

a possible compromise on important mutual issues such as oil and nuclear power.

Conflict based on Unfilled Needs and Violence:According to human needs theorists the cause of “conflict is people’s unyielding drive to

meet their unmet needs on the individual, group, and societal level” (Marker: 2003). There are

two categories of basic needs; the first, are undeniable needs. This includes security (stability and

freedom from fear), self recognition and collective identity (which includes: shared values,

beliefs and norms). The second category is basic developmental needs like physical needs (food

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and water), safety (shelter and protection), participation and distributive justice (fair division of

resources). All of these needs are universal and nonnegotiable and “should be addressed as a

basis for negotiating peace settlements”. (Doucey: 2011).

It is the loss of one’s universal needs that causes pathological fear making them violently

react for survival. Therefore, “collective fears, which are fueled by the denial of basic needs, can

lead to violent reactions, as an ultimate attempt of a people to secure the necessities of life and

rectify the perceived injustice” (Doucey, 5). In the terms of the Iranian U.S. conflict there are

thirty years of the United States removing Iran’s basic needs through sanctions and destroying

their identity through regime change and power struggles. All these factors lead to conflict fueled

by what Doucey calls a “denial of basic needs” and problem that cannot be solved without

understanding the root causes, dialoguing and finding a solution that adheres to both Nations

wants, needs and desires.

US-Iran Relations:Iran, once known as the empire of Persia was ruled by a series of kings called Shahs for

2,500 years. It was during this time that the United States first established relations. This

relationship remained cordial during the first half of the cold war because each country needed

the other. Iran believed the U.S. could help them break free from British and Russian dominance

and the U.S. was supportive of many unpopular and repressive regimes in hopes of gaining

power against the Soviet Union. Deterioration began in the 1950’s when the Iranian people

elected the secular democrat Mohammad Mossadeq as Prime Minister. During his reign he

nationalized British petroleum holdings and the Anglo-Iranian oil company (AIOC). This act

expelled western companies from the oil refineries in Abadan and ultimately took Iranian oil

from the control of Britain and brought it back into the hands of the people of Iran. The British

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government retaliated by placing an embargo on the oil. Many powerful countries followed this

embargo, placing economic hurt upon Iran and a period of crisis occurred.

During this Abadan Crisis the United States and President Truman encouraged Great

Britain to negotiate with Iran instead of invading. They appeared to have taken a stance of being

a moderator between the two countries. They spoke of resistance to Britain and at the same time

they supported Iran. The U.S. give Iran “significant amounts of economic aid”, invited

Mosaddeq to Washington and even made “frequent statements expressing support for him”

(Gasiorowski: 2004, 273). While Iran believed they had America’s full support the U.S. was also

honoring the British embargo. Playing both sides could only mean that the U.S. had an

empowering plan. This plan came into play in the summer of 1953 when the CIA conducted a

covert operation called ‘Operation Ajax’ through the American Embassy in Tehran that helped

organize the coup d’état that successfully overthrew and imprisoned Prime Minister Mosaddeq.

Once Mohammad Mosaddeq was out of power Great Britain and the United States

engineered the installation of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as Shah. The young Shah had close ties

to the U.S. and remained friendly with them and Great Britain throughout his reign. The United

States even helped build up his regime by donating $68 million in emergency aid (Gasiorowski:

2004, 257). The Shah enjoyed obeisance and excess and spent the money he was given while keeping

power through ruthless order and corrupt police. With this new regime came an era of starvation,

terror and torture in Iran.

During Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s repressive reign he also pushed for a westernization

of Iran: which included a modern economic policy, consumerism, and a strong pro-western

foreign policy. These ideologies increased his connections with the United States but caused the

Iranian people to believe that the Shah was merely an American puppet. His campaign thus

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produced thoughts of conspiracy while also enraging many of the traditionalists in Iran and a

revolution began. By 1979 the people of Iran overthrew the monarch, replacing him with the

once exiled Ayatollah Khomeini, an anti-American Supreme Leader. With this regime change

came a time of score settling, distrust and chaos in Iran. In the United States there was surprise,

shock and uncertainty. America never saw change coming and even reported six months before

the chaos that “Persia is not in a revolutionary or even a ‘prerevolutionary’ situation” (U.S. House

of Representatives Staff Report: 1979, 7).

Khomeini created a new ideology in Iran by declaring America as the “Great Satan” (

Katz: 2010, 186). With this statement brought the beginning of the end of the friendly relations

between the U.S. and Iran. Before this the Carter Administration still had hopes of re-stabilizing

the relationship through diplomacy and discussions. Instead they got a massive anti-American

campaign that forced them to remove their National Security Adviser Zibigniew Brzezinski.

Without friendly discussions the tensions between Iran and the U.S. were intensifying, especially

in perspective of the fate of exiled Shah. The people of Iran wished to have him tried and hanged

for what they believed to be severe crimes against the community. At the same time Iran was

asking for justice The U.S. was trying to figure out what to do with the dying monarch they spent

years building up. America had initially refused to give any further support to the Shah but after

additional review they accepted his request for Asylum in the U.S. for treatment of cancer. The

American embassy in Tehran opposed the request since they were trying to regain relations with

this new revolutionary government of Iran and the United States but powerful pro-Shah figures

in America pressured President Carter who agreed to the dying man’s last request. This deal

outraged the people, who took to the streets outside the U.S. embassy in Tehran in protest,

demanding the return of the Shah.

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This incident was then used to justify the storming of the American embassy on

November 4, 1979 where a revolutionary group of Iranian students held up the embassy with 52

American diplomats as hostages for 444 days. Some believed that this action was necessary in

order to sever American influence over Iran, while others believed it needed to be done to stop

the United States from plotting another coup from inside the embassy. The 1953 removal of the

Iranian Prime Minister was an act that was seen as unforgivable in the eyes of the Iranian people.

From the U.S. perspective the hostage takeover was seen as a violation of the International Law

written in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that grants diplomat’s

sovereignty in the territory of the host country they occupy, giving them immunity from arrest

(United Nations Treaty Collection).

With each side playing the blame game the situation was not quick to end, but was

officially resolved in January, 1981 by the signing of the Algiers Accords in Algeria. After the

treaty was signed the hostages were released but the damage was done. On April 7, 1980 the

United States broke diplomatic relations with Iran, a severe break which has yet to be restored

and to this day The United States Government does not have diplomatic or consular relations

with Iran (U.S. Department of State U.S.-Iran Fact Sheet: 2012).

An Era of Sanctions: According to the United States Government fact sheet on U.S. and Iran relations for the

past 30 years Iran and United States has been a state of conflict without a diplomatic solution or

talks of peaceful negotiation. In our recent history The United States has been concerned over

Iran’s nuclear program, sponsoring of terrorists and human rights violations. The only solution

the world could find was placing numerous sanctions on the country making life in Iran difficult

(U.S. State Department: 2012). Between the 1980’s and 1990’s Iran saw its toughest sanctions,

this includes President Clinton’s 1995 Executive Order 12957 and 12959 banning all trade with

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the country of Iran. It was the belief of the United States Government that this ‘tough love’

approach to diplomacy would “compel Iran to engage seriously in discussions with the

international community” (U.S. State Department: 2012).

These sanctions brought about hardship in Iran, including creating expensive basic goods

and diminished healthcare which only increased the ever widening gap of trust between the

United States and Iran. For some it appeared as if neither side could put away their differences in

order to find a peaceful solution, leaving war to be the only answer. Since Americans were not

willing to go war they set out to find change. The last remaining peaceful option of getting Iran

to the negotiation table would be electing a President who was willing to understand Iran’s

situation, dialogue and find a way to create a relationship that could produce change. In 2008 the

people elected a president who stood for ‘hope’ and ‘change’ and promised to put all his efforts

into making a difference.

A New Beginning (Obama’s 2008 Election):

In 2008 America stood up for hope and change and elected Barack Obama as the

President of the United States. In his victory speech Obama claimed, “America can change. Our

union can be perfected” and in his speech over global engagement Obama relayed the message,

“My administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before

us…we seek instead engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect” (Barack Obama,

“Videotaped Remarks by the President in Celebration of Nowruz,”: 2009). To many his message

seemed idealistic but Obama set out to prove them wrong. He wanted to show the world that

America could change, especially in its relationship to Iran. He believed he could create a

diplomatic answered that could end thirty years of conflict and bring Iran to the negotiation table

over its nuclear power. With this positive position Obama “entered the White House in 2009

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carrying an olive branch for Iran” (Zakaria & Bohen: 2012). He was determined to show the

world that America was not the villain. He began by carefully drafting a letter to Iran’s Supreme

Leader, Ali Khamenini. This was an act of reaching out to Iran in hopes of emphasizing a “new

beginning” (Zakaria & Bohen: 2012). In this letter he showed his willingness to work with Iran,

his seriousness for involvement and an outstretched hand for peace. President Obama repeatedly

referred to the “’Islamic Republic of Iran’. It was recognition of the formal name of the

government and a signal that ‘regime change’ was not the U.S. policy” (Zakaria & Bohen: 2012).

He chose each word carefully, discussing differences, histories, nuclear ideals and other issues

that frequently come up in negotiations between the two nations. A U.S. official stated, “A letter

from the President was the clearest signal of our intentions that we could possibly make”

(Zakaria & Bohen: 2012). This was a letter that intended to showcase true honesty and a

willingness to work together, to solve the issue at hand.

President Obama’s engagement policy was set up to resolve “animosities that have

plagued bilateral relations for the past three decades” (Mousavian: 2012, 2). For the first time in

since the 1979 revolution Iran has a President who ‘has a freer hand towards rapprochement with

the United States” (Mousavian: 2012, 2). Ahmadinjad could bring about a new era of relations

between the U.S. and Iran and after President Obama’s engagement speech he seemed more open

and ready for the possibility of working together. He offered Obama a “grand bargain” and sent

him a message detailing “Iran’s readiness to hold direct talks with the U.S., to engage in bilateral

negotiations, without conditions, on the basis of mutual respect, and by helping the U.S. in

Afghanistan and elsewhere” (Mousavian: 2012, 2). With this statement Iran was welcoming the

change in regime in America and was stating its readiness to engage in negotiations that would

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lead to a compromise between both parties. It is as if they had hopes that a change in America’s

thinking would change how the two countries worked together.

Though there was this exchange of information by letters the United States Government

declared that President Obama wrote letters to Iran in order to showcase his willingness to go the

extra mile with dialogues but that Iran did not give anything back. The Administration believed

that Khamanei response to President Obama was not filled with any encouraging news because it

had nothing the U.S. government could act on and use during negotiations. With the news that

the diplomacy letters had failed at producing negotiations some declared that “when you have a

U.S. president who is not playing the role and saying look we’ve had a difficult history, let’s

look forward, the regime loses one of its most powerful propaganda tools” (Zakaria & Bohen:

2012). The other reason could be that Khamanei was not so willing to trust America that quickly

or easily. He stated, “Show us if really anything other than your language has changed ….

Should you change, our behavior will change too” (Tehran Times: 2009). Here it can be seen that

the idea that mere talk of change is not enough to persuade the Iranian leader but instead he was

holding out for proof that America could in fact be different.

With the failure of the first letter President Obama sent a second, which also produced

little results. Frustrated, loosing time and unsure what Iran was saying by their responses he gave

up on the concept his initial engagement policy and President Obama simply changed his tactics

from ‘soft’ to ‘hard’ power.

A Change in Tactics: President Obama lifted an olive branch towards Iran in 2009 when he wrote his letter of

engagement, three years later these ideas were long since forgotten and the President who

promised the world change was instead pushing sanctions on Iran just like every president before

him. This type of engagement policy caused tensions over Iran’s nuclear program to escalate,

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Tehran threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz a major oil shipping lane, and the American

Government started a new campaign that was reminiscent of the past. These changes started

when Secretary Panetta named Iran a “Pariah State”. In his statement he declared that he hoped

Obama’s policy of increased sanctions and pressures would “weaken this nation so that

ultimately they have to make a decision about whether they continue to be a pariah or whether

they decide to join the international community” (Mousavian: 2012, 6). This began a shift from

diplomacy to harsher tactics. It appeared as if America has run out of patients with Iran. They

were no longer willing to work towards a friendship but instead they wanted quick results over

Iran’s rights to nuclear power. This meant that they would try anything to get Iran to submit to

the United States demands, including adding more sanctions which reduced Iran’s economy to

“shambles” (Mousavian: 2012) while also isolating the Islamic republic from the international

community.

With a new strategy of watching and waiting for Tehran to feel the heat from the

sanctions the United States gave up on its time consuming engagement policy, opting for

strategies that undercut Iran in hopes of producing quicker results. They no longer wanted a

relationship, but merely a way to make them accept the International community’s terms. The

United States did things like; accuse Iran of planning to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador in

Washington, placing sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and embargos on oil, increasing the

unilateral sanctions, Sponsoring a U.N. resolution against Iran on terrorism and human rights,

having covert operations to assassinate Iranian nuclear scientists and working with Israel to wage

cyberwarfare against Iran’s nuclear program. Though Iran is not an innocent country in its

relationship to American and the global sphere but they have suffered greatly from coercion by

the United States. The claustrophobic atmosphere created by this coercion has lead Iran to attack

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what it feels to be a savage aggressor. Both parties ended up frustrated by lack of understanding

or movement towards change and a standstill of negotiations at a tipping point of war was how

President Obama ended is four year term of Presidency.

A Second Chance to prove Change: On November 6, 2012 Barack Obama beat out Mitt Romney 332 votes to 206 in the

United States Presidential election. With this reelection the American people were giving the

president a second chance at creating change and letting their voices be heard that they did not

want a third war a Muslim country (Cohen: 2012). In the global arena, upon hearing the election

results the Guardian Newspaper reported the reaction of the people of Iran Iranian. They stated,

“Obama’s victory has reinforced hopes of a diplomatic solution to the stalemate over Tehran’s

nuclear program…as Obama takes the mandate for a second term, senior figures are signaling

that such negotiations are possible” (Branigan: 2012). With this positive feedback to his win and

now that he is in his second term of office the political cost of engagement with Iran is low,

meaning he has nothing left to lose. This should push Obama to focus primarily on diplomacy

with Iran and finding a mutual understanding as a way to form trust and negotiations between the

two nations.

Obama’s previous message of ‘change’ was over shadowed by frustration that lead

undiplomatic tactics and strategies. These options did not provide a submission of Iran, nor a

relationship, but instead an angry republic willing to engage in war for survival of its collective

identity and to regain access to its resources that have been restricted by EU and U.S. sanctions.

As the social psychologist Herbert Kelman put it, “needs for identity and security and similarly

powerful collective needs, as well as the fears and concerns about survival associated with them,

contribute heavily to the escalation and perpetuation of conflict once it has started” (2009, 181)

and “conflict arises when a group is faced with non-fulfillment or threat to the fulfillment of

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basic needs” (Kelman: 2009, 171). Iran not only survives principally on the resources gained

through oil exportation but that by denying Iran control of this oil and its right to make its own

decisions the international community is denying Iran its basic needs for identity and security.

Due to a fear of survival Iran reacts in threats of nuclear power and possible conflict as means to

regain the basic needs have been taken from them.

For Obama and the United States this means that in order to move foreword with the

engagement policy the president needs to review the tactics he employed throughout his last four

years. He needs to focus on them through the lens of collective identity, unmet needs and fear.

He should review why those actions they were a mistake, how he can remove or counter them

and what does it mean to take steps towards mutual understanding and honest dialoguing.

Steps foreword:

President Obama’s engagement policy failed due to the absence of dialogue and

unacceptable replacements such as covert operations and sanctions that are did nothing more

then force Iran to enter into conflict over identity, rather then being willing go to the negotiation

table. Over the last four years President Obama had four tactical errors relating to unmet needs,

fears and identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Without reviewing these errors and searching

for new options to reverse them there will be escalated conflict and a high chance of the United

States third war in a Middle Eastern country.

The four tactical errors committed by the Obama Administration are as follows: 1)

Rhetoric of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ 2) control rather then dialogue, 3) regime change, 4) zero-sum

game. In reviewing them and finding ways to counter them there is a possibility of rebuilding a

relationship with Iran. These are steps that the U.S. should take in order to showcase to Iran and

the world that they are willing to change, negotiate through an understanding the Islamic

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Republic of Iran’s fears of unmet needs and legitimate actions towards conflict for survival.

These actions will show an America willing to change and find a solution alongside Iran rather

then forcing pressuring the state.

Rhetoric of ‘us’ and ‘them’

Each culture is a group of individuals interpellated to believe they are a community

bound together through shared identities. They have shared norms and ideologies that allow them

to connect together and think as a collective character. Once formed there can be a distinction

between two different groups, giving a sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Iran and the United States both

have norms and ideologies that are distinct to their own collective identities and within them they

have norms built on distrust of the other. These norms of distrust have been established through

the historical traumas, such as the 1979 Iranian revolution.

These collective norms and histories lay a strong foundation for competition among

different players that are expanded through demonizing rhetoric. It is the story of the “demonic

enemy and the virtuous self” (Doucey: 2011) and it can be seen through the speeches and news

articles relating to both nations. Columnist Roger Cohen wrote that in Obama’s first term,

“demonization of Iran was never ending source of rhetorical inspiration” (Leverett & Leverett:

2012). The United States has spoken of Iran as the “axis of evil” and a “pariah state” while

declaring its own society to be “the greatest nation in the world” (The Guardian: 2012). These

actions do nothing more then deepen the distinction between the two countries which causes

“identity-based violence” that “center on notions of in-group purity and out-group vice”

(Doucey: 2011, 5). This means it creates a theme of self-fulfilling prophecies that prove a society

is correct in taking action against the ‘other’ who cannot be trusted. Once these norms of distrust

breeds within a society parties “find evidence that confirms their negative images” (Kelman:

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2009, 175) which makes it even more difficult for societies to find a reason to want to understand

the others perspectives in order to build a relationship.

Full progress towards diplomatic relations has been stalled due to a rich history of

resentment and distrust. In order to move foreword the United States must first recognize that the

mistrust is mutual and dates back to 1953 coup against elected Iranian prime minister that ended

all diplomatic ties between the two nations. This act by America has been seen as unforgivable in

the eyes of the Iranian republic, creating a sense that America cannot be trusted because they try

and be helpful while secretly producing covert mission as a way to stab you in the back. Iran

must also recognize that the coup took place thirty years and though the United States has thus

been unhelpful in showcasing a willingness to change its actions and policies Iran needs to be

more open and willing to change its norms of distrust as a way of creating interaction around

“sharing perspectives, differentiating the enemy image, and developing a language of mutual

reassurance” (Kelman: 2009, 175). This negotiation based on changing norms will allow both

nations’ reconciliation, a change in attitude and ultimately a transformation in their relationship.

Control rather then Dialogue:

Rather then opening up dialogue with Iran the United States has opted for measures that

are seen as more controlling rather then building a relationship. The current way of working with

Iran has been a ‘tough love’ approach, hard power ‘diplomacy with pressure’ or what the United

States Government calls the ‘carrot and stick approach’. This approach has been “presented as a

dual-track policy” (Mousavian: 2012) that works likes this; whenever Iran does something good

they get a ‘carrot’ or something favorable but if they undermine America’s authority or the

International community they are given the ‘stick’. This stick is usually in the form of sanctions

that create hardships in Iran. In theory this concept should be done with equal amounts of carrot

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and stick but in practice “they have meant ‘99% sticks’ and ‘1% carrots’” (Mousavian: 2012).

This strategy can be seen as a bad child (Iran) and a dominating parent (America), whenever the

child doesn’t ‘play’ by the parents strict rules he gets ‘grounded’. In this scenario Iran is not a

helpless child, they also have their own form of the dual-track policy with the United States

which involves “inflammatory rhetoric that has antagonized the United States” (Mousavian:

2012) as a means of sabotage.

This approach as thus far been completely unsuccessful because each subject “neither

wants the carrot nor fears the stick” (Pugliese: 2012) and when it proved to be an unsuccessful

tactic the Obama administration opted for the ‘tactical pause’ approach which means the removal

of America’s presence in Iranian relations completely. Columnist Cohen wrote in early July 2009

that “Obama must leave [Iran] dangling for the foreseeable future” (Leverett & Leverett: 2012).

The pause was taken during the 2009 Iranian elections and was justified by the U.S. as a chance

for Iran to figure everything out. Instead it was shown as an opportunity to “enhance Mousavi’s

chances for victory, and with that victory, get Iran back on the path toward a more westernized,

liberalized, and ultimately secularized political future” (Leverett & Leverett: 2012). It was

hopefully that if the U.S. removed itself from Iran things would either fall apart or the election

would play out in U.S. favor. They believed that this action, or lack of action, would result in

Iran coming to America for guidance, granting America control over Iran. This would lessen the

burden of trying to build a relationship and simply produce a solution that would be favorable for

everyone except Iran.

The tactical pause approach was later reviewed and seen as a wasted opportunity for the

Obama administration to step in and show a willingness to work with Iran and rebuild trust. The

election brought with it the “largest street protest in the Islamic republic’s history” (Zakaria &

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Bohen: 2012) which would have been a golden opportunity for rebuilding relations with Iran.

Jim Steinberg, former deputy secretary of state, reported that the United States Government

knew what was happening but they “knew that too overt an embrace in some ways could hurt the

Iranian opposition” (Zakaria & Bohen: 2012), meaning the U.S. was unwilling to reach out a

hand in fear that it would undercut the Iranian opposition and give more power to those opposing

US-Iran relations.

Whether the tactical pause was America’s way to gain power either through regime

change or an Iran asking for assistance or a chance to step away and being a noble party that

allows the Iranian people to choose its actions the tactic has done little to produce any form of

change. The ‘tactical pause’ was just as in effective as the ‘carrot and stick’ strategy and creating

mutual trust and fostering negotiation. These tactics have shown nothing but one country trying

over power the other. Whether its Iran using rhetoric and propaganda in order to create a story of

being bullied or of holding ultimate power or the United States trying different sly tactics as a

way to produce results in favor of their wants rather then Iran’s survival needs. Ayatollah

Khammenei has said “they say that they have extended their hand towards Iran. What kind of

hand? If it is an iron hand covered with a velvet glove, then it will not make any good sense”

(Mousavian: 2012). From Iranian perspective the U.S. has neither shown steps towards dialogue

nor signs towards mutual collaboration.

Since Iran feels as if the United States is either not trying to work with them or only

willing to engage to gain control and the United States feels as if Iran is using comprehensive

negotiations as a stalling technique to further its nuclear program the future conversation can

only go two ways: co-production or dominant voice. The dominant voice approach would be

continuing down the same path of engagement with Iran. It is the notion that you want to shape

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the outcome by asking questions and showcasing openness for discussing without necessarily

agree with the others views and ultimately choosing your own view over what the other said.

This engagement is used to gain power over the other. It’s a hegemonic relation. The concept is

of an elite group going into a society claiming they are there to open up a global sphere of

discussion. They make those involved think they are a part of negotiation but instead they are

strategically keeping them just out of the loop. In order to make sure that the society is happy

and won’t revolt you give them a ‘cookie’ for being good. Then they have to be thankful because

you gave them something but you are not creating sustainability but instead making that society

more reliant on you, giving the ‘elite’ power over the ‘other’.

The second option is to enter the society with the long term plan of relationship building.

This object starts off by finding a way to foster participation and give the under represented a

voice. “By providing opportunities for people to express themselves and to be heard, and to

engage in dialogue” (Cowan & Arsenault: 2008, 19) you give them an empowering voice that

can create just the right type of change the society needs. By creating an honest dialogue that

goes beyond the political realm and into the interests of the individuals you are creating an

atmosphere of trust that can start honest dialogue. By setting up a discussion you are gaining

more then just a response but you are gaining participation which will lead you down a path of

collaboration on issues and empower the people by giving them their own voice to speak out

about issues that are troubling them. Once you have a group of empowered people who trust and

respect you and your relationship with them you can collaborate on issues, negotiate more

openly and solve the conflict in a way the fits both of your needs because you have spent the

time learning about each other you will have a full understanding of what the other parties needs

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are and why they want them which will allow you to make a compromise rather then a take-it-or-

leave-it bargain.

Regime Change:

Coercive regime change has been a core objective throughout America’s rhetoric of

engagement since the 1953 coup. This constant theme has also been the main item of complaint

the of Tehran government and “serves as the most fundamental barrier to useful dialogue

between the two countries is U.S. displays of intent to bring about regime change in Iran” (David

Crist in Simpson: 2012). The United States constantly denies that they want regime change but

their actions counter their rhetoric. Senator Mark Kirk spoke about the sanction bill that passed

against Iran’s Central Bank stating that the intent of the plan was “to cause so much suffering

among ordinary Iranians that they will be forced to rise up against the regime” (Mousavian:

2012, 9). Actions such as the strict sanctions against Iran’s Central Bank that threaten the

survival of the Iranian people can be seen as a tool to destroy the states reputation. If a people’s

needs are being unfulfilled “because the state fails to properly address them, or if a group feels

these needs are unmet or perceives a threat to these needs, violence can emerge” (Doucey: 2011,

4). This means that if the state is the one who is unwilling or unable to provide for its people then

the violence among the collective might erupt, severing the collective identity that keeps the

group bound together. Once this bond is destroyed the people will be searching for a new power

to create safety and stability.

The United States has appeared to be pro-regime change because a change in ideology

and norms that are more western favorable with a westernized political leader who will lead

them towards a liberal democracy will give the U.S. greater control over Iran and ultimately an

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easier chance at destroying Iran’s nuclear program. The problem is that at the same time the

United States is trying to manipulate the Iranian people to rise up against the regime who has

denied them their basic needs the Iranian government has produced counter arguments to its

people that they are “victims of an aggressor” (Reuters: 2012). This rhetoric strengthens

nationalism by showcases a need to fight an enemy that threatens the “Islamic character”

(Reuters: 2012).

Once a collective identity is formed it can be manipulated. This is a problem in terms of

Iran’s fear of regime change. The United States may feel they are slyly forcing regime change

through removing Iran’s needs and collective identity but instead they are actually creating a

stronger bound between the state and its people. This bond can be used by a wise political leader

in order to spark patriotism and a united sense of Nationalism especially in the “context of

national security and survival” (Kelman: 2009, 176) which the most powerful tool for gathering

support and making a collective more willing to be involved in a conflict. Only if and when this

strong need to stand up for its collective identity and security are removed will a dialogue begin.

Iran has made it clear that they are not willing to negotiate with a country who’s trying to control

them or force them to be something they are not. Thus, it is extremely important and must be

made clear not only to Iran but also the international community that the U.S. does not support a

“forceful or coercive change in Iran’s leadership” (Pugliese: 2012).

In order to move foreword the United States must stop all actions that support a regime

change in Iran. In order to prove that the U.S. is not looking for a regime change they will have

to find some act that showcases support for Iran and Iranian decisions. They must show that they

are willing to back down and let the people of Iran have control over their domestic issues. This

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will only start when the U.S. is willing to allow Iran to have control over its own oil. This one

single act will empower Iran most options. It will be like giving them the keys to their own car.

Discussing Iranian oil is a plausible alternative to nuclear power. Discussing such things as

foreign sources and prices would not only be accepted by Iran but it would also help build

international respect and trade relations. It would be the ability to support their nation through its

own resources and give them a voice within the international community. Once you give Iran

something that can solve all of their unmet needs for survival, security and identity they will be

more willing to reopen relations and negotiate over nuclear power, which is an alternative option

for gaining power within the international community and why it is so desired.

Zero-Sum Game:

Every issues discussed before has stopped relationship building and the fostering of trust

between Iran and the United States but the fear of the zero-sum game tends to be a leading

problem of getting any conflicting parties to the negotiation table. In the case of Iran and the

United States there is no doubt that both sides are “confused about whether engagement is, for

the other side, a strategy or a tactic” (Mousavian: 2012, 9). History and recent events have taught

both parties that going to into discussions will mean somebody will have to loose in order for the

other to gain, or even that you have to loose everything in order to gain something. For example,

“The Obama administration put its (one-sided) proposal for a fuel ‘swap’ to refuel the Tehran

Research Reactor on the table as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, thereby dooming prospects for

a deal” (Leverett & Leverett: 2012). These “all or nothing” deals and “grand bargains” do little

to foster trust or build a relationship. Instead they are ways to temporarily solve an issue with no

thought of further sustainability.

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America’s one time grand bargain offers have had little help on ending the conflict due

to the fact that Iran does not trust them. Past experience has taught them that there will be little

follow up and even less success with them. If there is no future involved in a bargain or

compromise they feel as if there is no reason to accept the offer.

Since Iran does not trust America due to past experiences with little success the United

States will have to create a step-by-step process of building compromises through relationships

and getting to know the other country and what they want. Iran has stated that they “participate

in a dialogue with the US in an atmosphere of equality and mutual understanding and respect”

(Beaumont: 2012). For this solution to be successful the U.S. will have to start with providing

temporary compromises (not deals) with long lasting solutions that will be followed up. This will

be a long process but the relationship building and proof of sticking to one’s word is an

important aspect for fostering trust and creating change. During this period of relationship/trust

building the United States will have to address the “full spectrum of Iranian concerns in relations

to the United States” (Sadat & Hugh: 2012) and in the perspective of what they need in order to

survive as a nation.

In order to a negotiation to begin the United States must give priority to Iran’s survival.

They must realize that Iran is willing to go to war because the sanctions and pressures have

caused a crisis in Iranian identity and resources. Iran cannot agree to negotiation that would put

jeopardize these needs. At the same time there is a need to create a compromise that will identify

Iran’s “security concerns even if it does not explicitly grant legitimacy to the regime” (Pugliese:

2012). Nuclear weapons are Iran’s ultimate security guarantee that will grant them power and a

voice within the international community but starting out with a negotiation with lifting the oil

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embargo and giving them back their number one resource will be a good start towards discussing

a compromise about Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Both sides need to realize that each has something to gain and something to loose and

“diplomacy involves accepting that in order to get what you want you have to give up

something” (Cohen: 2012). Both countries need to first realize that there is a possibility of give

and take and not merely a “winner takes all” method being involved. The most ideal way

fostering this type of negotiation is by bringing in a third party member. By bringing in this an

outside power, like a Non-Governmental Organization, that can break up the dilemma and create

an atmosphere of fairness to mediate the negotiation that can produce a favorable environment

for both parties and begin talks of “‘what do we want, what do they want, what do we both

want?’” in which the overlapping areas are the ones being discussed and developed. (Cohen:

2012).

Conclusion:

Iran-U.S. relations have been thirty years of conflict, lack of understanding and

distrust. Neither country has been made grand steps towards building a relationship and fostering

collaborative efforts. Instead both parties blame the other for lack of negotiation and state that

they would be willing to go to the negotiation table if the other nation would simply change.

Sanctions, demonizing rhetoric, regime change, take-it-or-leave-it offers and covert affairs have

all be past strategies used by the U.S. Government as means of forcing Iran to change its views.

Iran has simply refused to negotiate and use threats of possible nuclear war as way to make the

U.S. back off.

Iran feels like America is an aggressor and America feels like Iran is unpredictable and

fear that it is becoming more like North Korea every day. Both sides have thus far reused to look

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at the possible root causes of their conflict. The problems of collective historical mistrust and the

removal of Iran’s ability to provide for its country that is causing a conflict based on unmet

needs, fears and collective identities.

Since the conflict is based on needs, fears and identities an effective engagement policy

must be slow moving, relationship building and holistic in addressing the full spectrum of issues

the concern Iran. The United States must realize that the dominant concern of Iran’s government

is its nations own survival. The lack of resources and the constant pressure of regime change

from the United States has produced a lot of insecurity in Iran. This threat is seen as a danger to

Iran’s survival and thus they are fighting to regain unmet needs. This conflict will not and cannot

end until Iran feels like their needs are being met. They need to feel as if they have basic needs

and identity are being met through empowerment within the international community. Iran feels

as if ultimate guarantor of survival is its nuclear program because it will give them resources and

power. Instead of telling Iran ‘no’ or threatening them with more sanctions the U.S. needs to

understand that all Iran wants this simple for survival. The best solution will be finding an

alternative solution such as giving them power over their oil. Iranian oil is the second biggest

commodity that will empower the nation. Once Iran feels it is equal to the United States a

relationship can begin. A relationship built on trust that is fostered through empowerment of the

Iranian people and sincere dialogue that is used to understand the other and can be maintained

for years is the key to ending the thirty year conflict with Iran.

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