Ganzon v. Court of AppealsGRN 93252, Aug. 5, 1991

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconductand misfeasance of office. TheSecretary ofLocal Government issued severalsuspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.ISSUE:Whether or not theSecretary ofLocal Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.HELD:Yes.Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.TheSecretary ofLocal Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.

League of Provinces of the Philippines v. DENRG.R. No. 175368. April 11, 2013

FACTS:This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,praying that this Court order the following: ( 1) declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known as the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control over provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the respondent Secretary of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding and cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.

ISSUES:(1)Whether or notSection 17(B)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional for providing for executive control and infringing upon the local autonomy of provinces.(2)Whether or not, the act of respondent in nullifying, voiding and cancelling the small-scale mining permits amounts to executive control, not merely supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces.

HELD:(1)No. In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the authority to nullify the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-Scale Mining Program is subject to control by respondent DENR. Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitutionprovides that "the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." Under said provision, the DENR has the duty to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining law in the provinces is made subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR under the Local Government Code of 1991, while the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program is to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government agencies. The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or the decentralization of government authority.It does not make local governments sovereign within the State. The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the country's natural resources.

Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts.This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.

(2)No. The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in accordance with the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DENR Secretary's power to review and decide the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with "substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.LEAGUE OF PROVINCES VS. DENR DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT. NO COSTS.SO ORDERED.XXXXXXXXXXXXXSUBJECTS/DOCTRINES:WHAT IS THE ISSUE IN THIS CASE? AT ISSUE IS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 17 (B )(3)(III) OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 AND SECTION 24 OF R.A. NO.7076.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXIF THE VALIDITY OF THE STATUTE IS BEING QUESTIONED, WHAT IS THE PRESUMPTION? THAT IT IS VALID. XXXXXXXXXXXXX WHAT IS THE BASIS OF THIS PRESUMPTION? THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS WHICH ENJOINS THE COURT TO OBSERVE COURTESY TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH.XXXXXXXXXXXXXX WHEN THEREFORE WILL A COURT DECLARE A STATUTE INVALID? WHEN PETITIONER HAS SHOWN A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL BREACH OF THE CONSTITUTION, LEAVING NO DOUBT OR HESITATION IN THE MIND OF THE COURT. Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each others acts.21 This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,22 leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.23 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX HAS DENR CONTROL OVER SMALL-SCALE MINING IN THE PROVINCES? YES.IT IS GRANTED UNDER THREE STATUTES: THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, THE PEOPLES SMALL SCALE MINING ACT AND THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT.Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted by three statutes: (1) R.A. No. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. No. 7076 or the Peoples Small Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX THE DENR SECRETARY DECLARED THE APPLICATION FOR EXPLORATION PERMIT OF AMTC VALID AND CANCELLED THE SMALL-SCALE MINING PERMITS GRANTED BY THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR. WAS THE DECISION OF THE DENR SECRETARY VALID? YES. HIS DECISION EMANATED FROM THE POWER OF REVIEW GRANTED TO THE DENR SECRETARY UNDER R.A. NO. 7076 (PEOPLES SMALL SCALE MINING ACT). Hence, the decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE POWER OF THE DENR TO DECIDE ON THE ISSUE CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE SMALL-SCALE MINING PERMITS? IT IS A QUASI JUDICIAL FUNCTION WHICH INVOLVES THE DETERMINATION OF WHAT THE LAW IS, AND WHAT THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONTENDING PARTIES ARE, WITH RESPECT TO THE MATTER IN CONTROVERSY AND, ON THE BASIS THEREOF AND THE FACTS OBTAINING, THE ADJUDICATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE RIGHTS. The DENR Secretarys power to review and, therefore, decide, in this case, the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respectiverights.53 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX THEN, IS THE ACT OF THE DENR SECRETARY A SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGMENT OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OR CONTROL OVER HIM? NO. IT IS JUST THE DETERMINATION OF THE RIGHTS OF AMTC. The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with substitution of judgment of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor control over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX WHAT IS THE FUNDAMENTAL CRITERION IN DETERMINING THE LEGALITY OF A STATUTE? THAT ALL REASONABLE DOUBTS SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE. In determining whether Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional, the Court has been guided by )Jeltran v. The Secretary of Health, which held: The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail. 55 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXIn this case, the Court finds that the grounds raised by petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Section 17 (b )(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of R.A. No.7076 failed to overcome the constitutionality of the said provisions of law.DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATU MACALIMPOWAC DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI MONTANA BABAO, JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID SABER, and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS, representing the other taxpayers of Mindanao,petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C. CARAGUE, DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,respondents.G.R. No. 89965 November 10, 1989ATTY. ABDULLAH D. MAMA-O,petitioner,vs.HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Budget, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondents.Abbas, Abbas, Amora, Alejandro-Abbas & Associates for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 89651 and 89965.Abdullah D. Mama-o for and in his own behalf in 89965.CORTES,J.:The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan,1scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional .After a consolidated comment was filed by Solicitor General for the respondents, which the Court considered as the answer, the case was deemed submitted for decision, the issues having been joined. Subsequently, petitioner Mama-o filed a "Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File Reply on Respondents' Comment and to Open Oral Arguments," which the Court noted.The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of the following:(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the government of the Republic of the Philippines of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front with the Participation of the Quadripartie Ministerial Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference" took effect on December 23, 1976. It provided for "[t]he establishment of Autonomy in the southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" and enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the "areas of autonomy."2In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for the first time provided for regional autonomy, Article X, section 15 of the charter provides that "[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only the provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:(1) Administrative organization;(2) Creation of sources of revenues;(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;(4) Personal, family, and property relations;(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;(6) Economic, social and tourism development;(7) Educational policies;(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National Government.Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into law on August 1, 1989.1. The Court shall dispose first of the second category of arguments raised by petitioners, i.e. that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement.Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreement is part of the law of the land, being a binding international agreement . The Solicitor General asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty, not having been entered into by the Republic of the Philippines with a sovereign state and ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987 Constitutions, nor a binding international agreement.We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government whether under public international or internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of the land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the latter [SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed., 1974), citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829)]. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a determination by this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs sought.32. The Court shall therefore only pass upon the constitutional questions which have been raised by petitioners.Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that "[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution." Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be clarified.Firs, the questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18, Article X of the Constitution which sets forth the conditions necessary for the creation of the autonomous region. The reference to the constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for it clearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional requirements. Second, there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act:Provided,That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative determination, merge the existing regions.Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it. [See III RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 482-492 (1986)].As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao is made effective upon the approval "by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18]. The question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or both?We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve this question.If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite they would have so indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided that "[t]his Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose ... Comparing this with the provision on the creation of the autonomous region, which reads:The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2].it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution.Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner Mama-o, on the other hand, maintains that only those areas which, to his view, share common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics should be properly included within the coverage of the autonomous region. He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly share the same characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the separation of governmental powers. [Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936); Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424].After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic Act for lack of basis, petitioner Mama-o would then adopt the extreme view that other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao should likewise be covered. He argues that since the Organic Act covers several non-Muslim areas, its scope should be further broadened to include the rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in order for the other non-Muslim areas denies said areas equal protection of the law, and therefore is violative of the Constitution.Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional provision he had earlier invoked. Any determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao should compromise the autonomous region, taking into account shared historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics, would necessarily carry with it the exclusion of other areas. As earlier stated, such determination by Congress of which areas should be covered by the organic act for the autonomous region constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative, whose wisdom may not be inquired into by this Court.Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification [People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1963); Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 (1946); J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Land tenure Administration, G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413]. InDumlao v. Commission on ElectionsG.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392], the Court ruled that once class may be treated differently from another where the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee of equal protection is thus not infringed in this case, the classification having been made by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution itself.Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one had, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. [Art. VIII, Sec. 11. As a condition precedent for the power to be exercised, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist [Angara v. Electoral Commission,supra;Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No. L-34161, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677]. In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 which, among others, states:. . .Provided,That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions:Provided, however,that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President. That the President may choose to merge existing regions pursuant to the Organic Act is challenged as being in conflict with Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution which provides:No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by Pres. dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in the Organic Act which create an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer to the autonomous region of the powers, appropriations, and properties vested upon the regional government by the organic Act [Art. XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. Said provisions mandate that the transfer of certain national government offices and their properties to the regional government shall be made pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the Oversight Committee, and that such transfer should be accomplished within six (6) years from the organization of the regional government.It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are unconstitutional because while the Constitution states that the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect upon approval in a plebiscite, the requirement of organizing an Oversight committee tasked with supervising the transfer of powers and properties to the regional government would in effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less would the organization of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government. The constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be sustained as there is no bases therefor.Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality [Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387 (1925); Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29788, August 30, 1979, 46 SCRA 734; Morfe v. Mutuc,supra;Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30]. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.Footnotes1 Art. II, Sec 1(2) of R.A. No. 6734 provides that "[t]he plebiscite shall be conducted in the provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa, and Zamboanga."2 The provinces enumerated in the Tripoli Agreement are the same ones mentioned in R.A. No. 6734.3 With regard to the controversy regarding the alleged inconsistencies between R.A. No. 6734 and the Tripoli Agreement, it may be enlightening to quote from the statement of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., the principal sponsor of R.A. No. 6734:xxx xxx xxxThe assertion that the organic Act is a "betrayal" of the Tripoli Agreement is actually misplaced, to say the least. Misplaced because it overlooks the fact that the Organic Act incorporates, at least, 99 percent of the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement. Misplaced, again, because it gratuitously assumes that the Tripoli Agreement can bring more benefits to the people of Mulim Mindanao than the Organic Act.The truth of the matter is that the Organic Act addresses the basis demands of the Muslim, tribal and Christian populations of the proposed area of autonomy in a far more reasonable, realistic and immediate manner than the Tripoli Agreement ever sought to do.The Organic Act is, therefore, a boon to, not a betrayal, of the interest of the people of Muslim Mindanao.xxx xxx xxx[Consolidated Comment, p. 26].

Court on November 7, 1985 enjoining said respondents, their agents and representatives, and the police and other peace officers from enforcing the aforesaid Order of the respondent committee is made permanent. Petition is GRANTED. No costs.SO ORDEREDTeehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Ordillo vs. COMELEC case brief summaryOrdillo vs. COMELEC case briefsummary

Facts:Theprovinceof Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao, and Baguio City cast their vote in a plebiscite held in pursuant to R.A. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The result of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was only approved by Ifugao. In consideration of the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR.

ISSUE:Whether or not the province of Ifugao can validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

Ruling:No, in constuing the word region in Article X Sec 15 of the1987 Constitutionit includes provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas, that a region is to be made up of two or more constituent unit.Therefore, Ifugao itself cannot solely constitute a region.ISSUE:whether the sole province of Ifugao can be validly constituted in the Cordillera Autonomous Region under Section 15, Article 10.

RULING:No. the keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connotes that a region consists of more than one unit. In its ordinary sense region means two or more provinces, thus Ifugao cannot be constituted the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

Bai Sandra Sema vs.COMELECPosted onSeptember 10, 2012G.R. No. 177597July 16, 2008Facts:On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces underSec.19,Art.VIof RA 9054, enactedMuslim MindanaoAutonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the province ofShariff Kabunsuanin the first district ofMaguindanao.The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on October 29, 2006.On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ofCotabato Citypassed Resolution No. 3999 requesting theCOMELECto clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201.In an answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 maintaining thestatus quowith Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the FirstLegislative District of Maguindanao.However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsan Province withCotabatoCity.Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from the canvassing of votes cast in Cotabato for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.Issues:1. WhetherSec. 19, Art. VIofRA 9054delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is constitutional.2. Whether a province created under Sec. 19,Art.VIof RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in theHouse of Representativeswithout need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province.Held:1.Sec.19,Art.VIof RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities,for being contrary toSec. 5 ofArt.VIandSec.20of Art. Xof theConstitution, as well asSec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.The creation of LGUs is governed bySec.10, Art.Xof theConstitution:No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code (LGC) and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.Thus, the creation of anyLGUmust comply with 3 conditions: First, the creation of an LGU must follow the criteria fixed in the LGC. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional/legislative bodies the power to create LGUs.However, under its plenary powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provisions of the Constitution. In fact, the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays is constitutional, provided the criteria established in the LGC and the plebiscite requirement in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution is complied.However, the creation of provinces is another matter. Under theLGC, only x x x anAct of Congress can create provinces, cities, or municipalities.According to,Sec. 5 (3),Art.VIof theConstitution:Each City with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least 1 representative in the House of Representatives.Similarly,Sec. 3of theOrdinance appended to the Constitutionprovides,Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than 250,000 shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least 1 Member.Thus,only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise underSec. 5,Art.VIof theConstitutionandSec.3of theOrdinance appended to the Constitution.2.Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an act of Congress. Under the Constitution, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to apportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.Sec. 5 (1),Art.VIof the Constitutionvests Congress the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives.Sec. 5 (4)empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts.The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.Congress exercises these powers through a law the Congress itself enacts, not through a law enacted by regional/local legislative bodies. The power of redistricting xxx is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and is thus vested exclusively in (it) [Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995)].An inferior legislative body cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body which created it.Congress is a national legislature, and any changes in its membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in national law.The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself.Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.The ARMM cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress.Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office becauseSec. 20, Art.Xof the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited only within its territorial jurisdiction. (Nothing inSec. 20, Art.Xof the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions to create/apportion legislative districts for Congress.)It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections.At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.Thus,MMA Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly, creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.

The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1stlegislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1stdistrict of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1stdistrict is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any).Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1stdistrict). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.ISSUE:Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.HELD:RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow thecriteriafixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with thecriteriaestablished in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.

NORTH COTABATO V GRP PEACE PANEL>FACTS:The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought about by the Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The agreement mentions Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).ISSUE:Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutionalHELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution thereof.REASONING:The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and the mobilization and facilitation of peoples participation in the peace process.Article III (Bill of Rights)Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized, access to official records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.Article IISec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic consultations. No project or program be implemented unless such consultations are complied with and approval mus be obtained.Article VII (Executive Department)Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.Article X. (Local Government)Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:1. Administrative organization;2. Creation of sources of revenues;3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;4. Personal, family, and property relations;5. Regional urban and rural planning development;6. Economic, social, and tourism development;7. Educational policies;8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or2. A constitutional convention.Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present constitution and laws shall come into force upon signing of a comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework. The presidents authority is limited to proposing constitutional amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain G.R. No. 1833591, October 14, 2008

Decision:

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively.

Facts:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.

Issues:

1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic

(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and

(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft;

2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;

4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]

If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy;

5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]

If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines;

6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and

7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

Held:

The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.

Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.

That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the identity of party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace PanelThe Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). This Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 is a codification of consensus points reached between GRP and MILF Peace Panel and of the aspiration of the MILF to have a Bangasmoro HomelandAccording to the stipulations in the MOA-AD, Ownership of the Bangasmoro Homeland is vested to the Bangasmoro people. MOA-AD describes the Bangasmoro people as the first nation with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations. The Bangasmoro Juridical Entity (BJE) is granted by the MOA-AD the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangasmoro. It was also stipulated that BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its internal waters.Issues:1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.4. Whether there is a violation of the peoples right to information on matters of public concern.5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself.6. cralawWhether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and7. cralawWhether MOA-AD is constitutionalHeld:Issue 1:The court believes that the petitions in the case at bar provide an exception to the moot and academic principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.Issue 2:Yes. Any alleged violation of the consti by any branch of the government is a proper matter for judicial review. In the case at bar, the failure of the respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected amounts to a departure from the mandate under E.O. No. 3 and the fact that the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution, rendered the petition ripe for adjudication.Issue 3:The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution.Issue 4:Yes, there is a violation of the peoples right to information.An essential element of this right is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people.The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order.The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.Issue 5:No. The MOA-AD is not a document that can bind the Philippines under international law. It would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not parties to the Agreement, this would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law.Issue 6:Yes. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form.These petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases.Issue 7:Yes. The MOA-AD is unconstitutional because it cannot be reconciled with the present constitution. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them. The associative relationship between the GRP and the BJE is unconstitutional because the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.The court denied the respondents motion to dismiss and granted the main and intervening petitions.The basic procedural and substantive doctrines cited in the said decision are summarized below for purposes of legal research of the visitors of this blog insofar as basic principles affecting the Justice System and the Rule of Law are concerned, notable among which are the exceptions to the moot and academic rule, the liberality in the interpretation of the ripeness for judicial review rule, the expanded scope of the locus standi rule, the constitutional right of full access to information on matters of public concern, and the duty of public officials to conduct local consultations. Thus:

1. The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3.

2. The respondents exceeded their authority by the act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution.

3. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.

4. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the petitioners have the requisite locus standi.

5. The non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the petitions. The present petitions are an exception to the moot and academic principle in view of:

(a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved;

(b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest;

(c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and

(d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

6. The peoples right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.

7. The contents of the MOA-AD are a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order.

8. E.O. No. 3 is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

9. Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein.

10. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

11. Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

12. The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy.

13. The Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371.

14. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

15. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel.

16. As the said clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

17. While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.

1. Datu Kida v. Senate of the Philippines., GR 196271 (2012)(Constitutionality of RA 10153)/CONSTITUTIONAL

Facts: RA 6734 provided for the organic act mandated by the constitution for the formation of ARMM. Unfortunately said organic act did not provide for the exact date for the regional elections in ARMM. Because of this, several Laws were enacted to provide for the date of the election ; RA 9054- Second Monday of September 2001, RA 9140November 26, 2001, RA 93332nd Monday of August 2005. And on the same date every three years thereafter.Pursuant to RA 9333, COMELEC made preparations for August 8, 2001 Election but sometime in June, Congress enacted RA 10153- An act providing for the synchronization of the elections in ARMM with the national and local elections.Several people, including herein plaintiff assailed the constitutionality of the said enactment.

Issue/s:

1. WON ARMM is a distinct from an ordinary local government unit and therefore should not be required to hold its election during the local elections mandated in the constitution.

2. WON RA. 10153 is constitutional on the basis that it granted the president the power to appoint OIC for several elective positions until such positions be filled during the May 2013 elections.

Held:1. No ARMM is not a distinct government unit therefore not exempt from the synchronization of election. SC held that the inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading Local Government indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments.

That the Constitution mentions only the national government and the local governments, and does not make a distinction between the local government and the regional government, is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of government, but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes than other local government units, still remain under the category of local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.2.Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of RA 10153stating thatthere is no incompatibility between the Presidents power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.

The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law.This is distinguished from the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.

The petitioners apprehension regarding the Presidents alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the Presidents appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not of the people.

Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners supposition. The provision states:Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.

The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent than real.

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA,in his personal capacity, and in representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,et al., Petitioners, v.SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al.,Respondents.FACTS:On August 1, 1989 or two years after theeffectivityof the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."The initially assenting provinces wereLanaodelSur,Maguindanao, Sulu andTawi-tawi.RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054was passed to further enhance the structure of ARMM under R.A. 6734. Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held onAugust 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.But onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections.Several cases forcertiorari, prohibition andmadamusoriginating from different parties arose as a consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and R.A. No. 10153 questioning the validity of said laws.OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term onSeptember 30, 2011.The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the "elective and representative" character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office.Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.ISSUE:A. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of electionsB. Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 violates the provisions of the 1987 ConstitutionHELD:Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A. 10153intoto.The Court agreed with respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on its position that the Constitution mandates synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every three years.This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations. Furthermore, to achieve synchronization, Congressnecessarilyhas to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).InOsmev. Commission on Elections,the court thus explained:It is clear from theaforequotedprovisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term ofsynchronizationis used synonymously as the phraseholding simultaneouslysince this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the sameday or occasion.This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII)willhave to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the xxxrecordsof the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives fall within the classification of "local" elections, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM. From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article Xof the Constitution entitled "Local Government."Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government.Second issue:Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty nor is there reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other.If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy