Socorro Ramirez vs Court of Appeals

No. 2

Case Digests: Statutory Construction

Socorro Ramirez vs Court of Appeals

248 SCRA 590

G. R. No. 93833

September 25 1995

Facts:

A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City

alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office,

allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner

offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality, “contrary to morals, good customs and public

policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The transcript on

which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by

petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping

the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay

City for violation of RA 4200, entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and Other

Related Violations of Private Communication, and Other Purposes.”

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the

ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense particularly a violation of RA 4200.

The trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner.

From the trial court’s Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with

this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the CA.

Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court’s order

null and void.

Issue:

W/N RA 4200 applies to taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a conversation.

Held:

Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of

a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and

interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible

or absurd or would lead to an injustice.

Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized

by all parties to any private communication, to secretly record such communication by means of

a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by

the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private

communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording

is underscored by the use of qualifier “any.” Consequently, as respondent CA correctly

concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with

another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of RA

4200.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision therefore plainly supports the view held

by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private

communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Stat Con Principle: Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.

Legal Maxims: Verba Legis (the statute must be interpreted literally if the language of the statute

is plain and free from ambiguity)

VERSION 2

Facts of the case: Soccoro Ramirez was scolded by Ester Garcia inside Garcia’s office. Ramirez

taped the conversation and later filed charges against Garcia for insulting and humiliating her,

using as evidence the transcript of the conversation, based on the tape recording.

Garcia filed criminal charges against Ramirez for violating the anti-wire tapping act, because it

was done without her knowledge and consent. Ramirez claimed that what the law forbids is for

other parties, who are not part of the conversation, to record it using the instruments enumerated

in the law (there was an earlier case that was dismissed because the instrument used was not

mentioned in the law).

The trial court ruled in favor of Ramirez, granting a motion to quash on the ground that the facts

charged do not constitute an offense, but the Court of Appeals reversed it.

Ratio: First, the court noted that the provision makes it clear that it is illegal for any person to

secretly record a conversation, unless authorized by all parties involved.

“The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought

to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.”

The congressional records also showed that the intent was that permission must be sought from

all parties in the conversation. “This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken

without the authorization of all the parties,” Sen. Tanada said during the deliberations.

“The provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law

makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.”

Decision: Petition denied. Decision of CA affirmed. Costs against Ramirez.

Pedro vs Ramirez (????)

Facts: In the late afternoon, Ramirez, the accused fired his pistol

at Alo Zaragoza four times in various parts of the body.

Zaragoza died two hours later. It was not disputed that the

shooting was preceded by a conversation between Ramirez and

Zaragoza in a restaurant in Tayug. Seated at same table were

Ramirez’s companion, Espero, Mamenta, Carbonel and Castulo.

At another table were two other acquaintances, Robosa and

Arestado, who both could see the group through the doorway.

The conversation was about the setting up of “jueteng”

gambling operation in the town although it was unclear who was

precisely making the proposal. Soon after the conversation,

Zaragoza became agitated and stood up, angrily uttering some

words and pounding the table with his hand. Ramirez also stood

up and walked away from the table, towards the comfort room.

A few minutes later, Zaragoza also walked out of the room.

From this point, two different versions were offered by the

prosecution and the defense.

Prosecution side: After leaving the room, Zaragoza stopped

between two tables in the main eating area to drink beer from

the mug he was holding. While he was standing and drinking,

Ramirez suddenly appeared and fired three shots at Zaragoza.

Alarmed, Robosa grabbed Ramirez to prevent him from firing

more shots, but Ramirez was able to squeeze another shot at

Zaragoza before losing his balance. The pistol slipped from

Ramirez hand, but accused was able to recover it immediately.

Ramirez fired a shot at Robosa but missed. Soon after, Ramirez

fled from the restaurant.

Defense side: According to Ramirez, it was Zaragoza who

suggested the jueteng operation. When he refused, Zaragoza

became agitated and cursed him for not accepting the proposal.

Moreover, he claimed that Zaragoza threatened to kill him when

the latter tried to borrow a gun from his companion. In order to

avoid trouble, he quickly went to the toilet. On his way out,

Carbonel told him that he should go home directly as Zaragoza

was very angry. Accused claimed that he shoved Carbonel and

walked towards the main room. On his way to the main room, he

saw Zaragoza cursing him and saying “I am going to kill you.”

Because of Zaragoza’s previous threat, he quickly drew his

pistol and fired at Zaragoza while fleeing the restaurant.

Accused claimed that he was merely acting on self-defense.

The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty.

Issue: Whether the Regional Trial Court erred in finding the

defendant guilty of murder and in disregarding the evidence of

self-defense

Held: Defendant is guilty. The consideration of self-defense is

out of question. Regional Trial Court’s decision is affirmed.

The Court struck out the possibility of unlawful aggression on

the part of Zaragoza because evidence obtained from both sides,

point to the fact that Zaragoza had no gun or weapon of any

other sort when he emerged from the main room. The evidence

was that Zaragoza was merely holding a glass of beer.

Ramirez’s contention that Zaragoza threatened to kill him was

untenable because there is nothing but defendant’s

uncorroborated testimony to establish this. Even assuming that

Ramirez’s testimony was true, he should have quickly seen that

Zaragoza bore no arms and was launching nothing more perilous

than a verbal onslaught. Clearly, there was no well-grounded

fear of imminent danger to defendant’s life by reason of any real

or perceived unlawful aggression on the part of Zaragoza. Thus,

without the unlawful aggression element, self-defense should be

removed from the equation.

G.R. No. 162540

July 13, 2009

GEMMA T. JACINTO,

Petitionervs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RespondentPERALTA,

J

.:

A petition for review on

certiorari

filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of

Appealsaffirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution denying

petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Facts:

Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma Jacinto a Banco De Oro (BDO) Check in the amount of

P10,000.00. The check waspayment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and

petitioner was then the collector of MegaFoam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank

account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the

former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.Later, Rowena Ricablanca, another

employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank,who was looking for

Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO checkdeposited in

his account had been dishonored. Ricablanca then called and relayed the message through accusedAnita

Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but

theycould be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at

Mega Foam.Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed

Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquinoto replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to

take the cash and divide it equally intofour: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline

Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam'saccountant, reported the matter to the owner of

Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to

confirm that the latter indeed handedpetitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 as payment for her purchases

from Mega Foam. Baby Aquino furthertestified that petitioner Jacinto also called her on the phone to tell

her that the BDO check bounced. Verificationfrom company records showed that petitioner never

remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, BabyAquino said that she had already paid Mega

Foam P10,000.00 cash as replacement for the dishonored check.Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapmentoperation with its agents. Ten

pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted withfluorescent powder by the

NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that shewas going along

with Valencia's plan.Ricablanca, petitioner, her husband, and Valencia then boarded petitioner's jeep and

went on to Baby Aquino'sfactory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of

Baby Aquino, pretending that shewas getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually

brought out from the premises was theP10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco.

Ricablanca divided the money and uponreturning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and

petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia werearrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole

time.A case was filed against the three accused, Jacinto, Valencia and Capitle. RTC rendered its

Decisionfinding them

GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

QUALIFIED THEFT

and sentenced eachimprisonment of

FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS,

as minimum

, to SIX(6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS,

as maximum

.The three appealed to the CA and the decision of the trial court was

MODIFIED

, in that:(a) thesentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands; (b) the sentence against accused Anita

Valencia isreduced to 4 months

arresto mayor

medium, and (c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted. Hence,the present Petition for Review on

Certiorari

filed by petitioner alone,

Issue:

Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft.

Held:

As may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code,

the personal property subject of thetheft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to

gain

from the thing stolen

. This isfurther bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the

accused isdependent on the value of the thing stolen.In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated

check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparentlywithout value, as it was subsequently

dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theftwas actually produced. The

Court must resolve the issue in the negative.

Intod v. Court of Appeals

is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In

Intod (see doctrines laid out inIntod)

, the Court went on to give an example of

an offense that involved factual impossibility,

i.e.

, a man puts hishand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets

nothing since the pocket isempty.

Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in

Intod.

In this case,petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime

against property.Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check

meant for Mega Foamshowed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the

check bounced, she would havereceived the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore,

it was only due to the extraneouscircumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner

at the time, that prevented the crime frombeing produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned

out to be absolutely worthless, because the checkwas eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had

received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.The fact that petitioner was later entrapped

receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was thecash replacement for the dishonored check, is of

no moment. The Court held in

Valenzuela v. People

that under thedefinition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code there is only one operative act of

execution by the actorinvolved in theft

─

the taking of personal property of another.”

As of the time that petitioner took possessionof the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to

consummate the crime of theft,had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case

. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino togive cash as replacement for the check was hatched only

after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank.Since the crime of theft is not a continuing

offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not beconsidered as a continuation of the

theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked moneywas merely corroborating

evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to

have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is adifferent and separate fraudulent scheme.

Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or covered by theallegations in the Information, the

Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violatethe due process clause of the

Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another possiblesource of criminal

liability.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is

GRANTED

. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, are

MODIFIED

.Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found

GUILTY

of an

IMPOSSIBLE CRIME

as defined and penalized in Articles 4,paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively.

Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six(6) months of

arrresto mayor

, and to pay the costs.

Version 2

Jacinto v People

Petitioner had been convicted of

qualified theft and is now seeking

for a reversal of thedecision.

Facts:

Jacinto along with Valencia and Capitle was

charged with qualified theft for having stole

and deposited acheck with an amount of

10,000 php. Such check was issued by Baby

Aquino for payment of her purchasesfrom

Mega Foam, but the check

bounced.Dyhengco found out about the theft

and filed a complaint with the NBI. An

entrapment operation wasconducted, with the

use of marked bills. The entrapment was a

success and the petitioner along with her co-

accused was arrested.

Issue:

Whether this can constitute as an impossible

crime and not as qualified theft

Held:

This constitutes as an impossible crime.The

requistites of an impossible crime are:1. that the

act performed would be an offense against

persons or property

(all acts to consummate thecrime of qualified theft

was consummated – crime against property)

2. that the act was done with evil intent

(mere act of unlawful taking showed intent to

gain)

3. that its accomplishment was inherently

impossible or the means employed was either

inadequate or ineffectual – or the extraneous

circumstance that constituted it as a factual

impossibility

(the fact that thecheck bounced)

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended

acts, even if completed, would not amount to a

crime.(Impossibility of killing a dead person)

Factual impossibility – when extraneous

circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond

his controlprevent consummation of the intended

crime. (Like the example in the case of Intod: a

man puts hishand on the coat pocket of another

with intent to steal but gets nothing since the pocket

is empty)

From the time the petitioner took possession of

the check meant for Mega Foam, she had

performed all theacts to consummate the

crime of theft, had it not been impossible of

accomplishment in this case.Replacement for

the check was no longer necessary for the

consummation of the crime since the crime

of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioners

act of receiving the cash replacement should

not be considered

as a continuation of the theft. The fact that the

petitioner was caught receiving the marked

money wasmerely corroborating evidence to

strengthen proof of her intent to gain.

CASE DIGEST ON PEOPLE v.

SUMALPONG [284 SCRA 464 (1998)]

November 10, 2010

Nature: Appeal from a decision of RTC Cotabato City (1998)

FACTS: On Jan 12, 1994, 8PM, Arola Dilangalen & Mohammad Managuili escorted home their

friend, Jukaris Buan, to Nayon Shariff Kabunsuan on a service owned by 1 Nong Fred. After

dropping off their friend. The 3 went on their way home. Dilangalen & Managuili asked to be

dropped off at 4J Pizza House along Notre Dame Avenue to eat. After w/c, while waiting for a

tricycle to take them home, they saw 4 men near an electric post 5 meters away from the 4J Pizza

Hse entrance. W/o warning, the 4 men suddenly & simultaneously stabbed them. Arola

Dilangalen died of hemmorhage & antecedent multiple wounds while Managuili, who sustained

stab wounds on his right anterior-axillary line, was still rushed to the ER. He was confined for

2nts. On Jan 14 ’94, Police Officer Tayong brought before him 5 persons including appellant

Gerry Sumalpong for identification purposes. He was positively identified by Managuili as 1 of

the assailants. Dilangalen’s mother testified that they spent PhP70K for the burial of her son &

for other Muslim ceremonies for the dead.

Two of the 4 men remain at large. Only Sumalpong and Fernando were convicted w/ the crimes

of murder and frustrated murder. For their defense, both gave their defense of alibi. Fernando

said he was working then from 7-10pm at his employer’s shop, making balusters (railings),

taking only 10 min breaks for lunch and supper. He denied previously knowing the accused.

However, his employer testified that in making balusters, they had to wait for 4 hrs from the time

they poured mixed cement into the molding till it hardened. During this wait, Fernando would

usually go home to eat and sleep and one would just wake him up when his services were again

needed. Sumalpong, on the other hand, claimed that he was a home reading in the evening of

Jan 12. This was attested to by his father.

The court held that their defenses were of no merit. The residence of Fernando was just a few

minutes ride from the scene of the crime. And it was unusual for Sumalpong, a college student,

to be at home and asleep at such an early time in the evening. Moreover, both were positively

identified by victim Managuili as those who attacked them. The court found the presence of

treachery in the sudden and simultaneous attack against the victims who were unarmed and

unsuspecting. It also believed that there was conspiracy among the accused. But w/o

explanation, it found that evident premeditation aggravated the crime. Thus, it imposed upon

both the penalty of death for the fatal stabbing of Dilangalen and reclusion temporal maximum

for the wounding of Managuili, w/ damages.

Both appeal that in the clear absence of any generic aggravating circumstance attending the

murder, appellants may be sentenced only to reclusion perpetua, not death.

HELD: Evident premeditation and even voluntary surrender were wrongly appreciated by the

trial court. Appellant Fernando claim that he voluntary surrendered to the brgy capt. However,

it was shown that the police had tried to arrest him prior but he implicitly allowed his father to

conceal his presence. When the brgy capt came, he submitted himself only w/ the assurance of

his safety. His surrender then was not of his own knowing and unconditional accord as required

by law. It has been held that if the only reason for the accused’s supposed surrender is to ensure

his safety, his arrest being inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and not voluntary.

The court re premeditacion conocida did not make any ratiocination or analysis as to how or why

it was appreciated. For evident premeditation to aggravate a crime, there must be proof, as clear

as the evidence of the crime itself, of the ff elements: (1) the time when the offender determined

to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; & (3)

sufficient laps of time between determination & execution, to allow himself to reflect upon the

consequences of his act. The SolGen correctly observed that these requisites were not duly

established by the prosecution.

Absent any clear and convincing evidence of evident premeditation or other aggr/mit

circumstances, the penalty imposable for the murder of Dilangalen is reclusion perpetua (A63(2)

RPC).

The penalty for the attempt on Managuili’s life is prision mayor in its medium period.

However, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable against appellants is

4 yrs & 2 mos of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to 10yrs of prision mayor medium,

as maximum.

Both sentences shall be served successively. Assailed decision modified.

Case Digest on PEOPLE VS. CUPINO G.R.

No. 125688. March 31, 2000.

November 26, 2010

Cupino and Dejoras were charged and convicted for conspiring to commit murder.

Held:

Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing

evidence, not merely by conjecture. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of

conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the

complicity. Hence, conspiracy exists in a situation where at the time the malefactors were

committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted

effort to bring about the death of the victim. In a great majority of cases, complicity was

established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts that yielded the reasonable inference that

the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design. Therefore, the task in every case is

determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof do

reasonably yield that inference.”

PEOPLE vs. REYNALDO VILLANUEVA Y MARQUEZG.R. NO. 172697September 25, 2007

Facts:

In the morning of January 21, 2000, appellant, Reynaldo Villanueva, then 31 years old, killed hisniece

Angelica Villanueva, aged 8, by boxing her on the head and kicking her several times

onthe different parts of her body. Appellant also mauled his nephews Rexie Villanueva and

EnriqueVillanueva, Jr., aged 5 and 2, respectively.Angelica died of massive brain edema, cerebral

contusion, subdural hemorrhage due to mauling.Rexie sustained injuries, which could have

resulted to massive brain edema and his subsequentdeath, were it not for the medical

intervention. Enrique, Jr. suffered a broken mouth and wasconfined at the Baguio General

Hospital (BGH) for four days. Consequently, appellant was charged with murder for the death of

Angelica, frustrated murder for the serious injuries suffered by Rexie, and attempted murder for the

injuries inflicted on Enrique, Jr.Appellant pleaded insanity. He claimed that he did not know that he killed

his niece Angelicaand that he mauled his nephews Rexie and Enrique, Jr. A doctor testified that appellant

issuffering from a mental disorder classified as schizophrenia, paranoid, episodic with

interepisoderesidual symptoms characterized by intermittent episodes of psychotic signs and

symptoms.The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, frustrated murder,

andattempted murder, which the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification.

Issue:

Whether appellant should be acquitted on the ground of insanity.

Held:

The defense failed to prove that appellant was completely deprived of intelligence in committingthe

dastardly acts. Proof of the existence of some abnormalities in the mental faculties will notexempt the

accused from culpability, if it was shown that he was not completely deprived of f r e e d o m

a n d i n t e l l i ge n c e . A p p e l l a n t ' s r e c o l l e c t i o n o f t h e e ve n t s p r i o r t o t h e c r i me s a n d

h i s emotions afterwards indicate that he was sane before, during, and after the commission

of thecrimes.The CA correctly appreciated appellant's mental disorder as a mitigating circumstance

under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no dispute that appellant has a history of

mental illness. He was diagnosed to be suffering from Schizophrenia, Paranoid, Episodic

withInterepisode Residual Symptoms which began in 1985 and was characterized by

intermittentepisodes of psychotic signs and symptoms since then until appellant's examination on June

21,2000. Such illness diminished the exercise of appellant's will power without however deprivinghim of

the consciousness of his acts.Judgment affirmed with modifications

Licyayo vs. People- Sufficient Provocation

and Intoxication

G.R. No. 169425, March 4, 2008

FACTS:

Licyayo was charged of Homicide with the RTC when he stabbed Rufino in different parts of the

body. The RTC convicted Licyayo guilty of the crime Homicide there being no attending

aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

The petitioner appealed contending that sufficient provocation and intoxication should be taken

as mitigating circumstances attendant in the case. He insisted that there is sufficient provocation

because it was the deceased who punched him first and when the incident ensued he was

intoxicated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not sufficient provocation and intoxication should be considered as mitigating

circumstances attendant in the case.

HELD:

The records do not sufficiently establish who between Rufino and Aron started the brawl which

resulted in the stabbing of Rufino by petitioner. Granting arguendo that there was unlawful

aggression on the part of the victim, it is obvious that immediately he became the underdog,

literally even. He was easily overpowered by the bigger and sober Aron Licyayo. Sufficient

provocation therefore cannot be appreciated in favor of the petitioner.

As testified by the police officers, they said that petitioner indeed was drunk when the scuffle

ensued. However, these testimonies alone do not suffice as proof to appreciate intoxication as a

mitigating circumstance. In the case at bar, there is no plausible evidence showing that the

quantity of liquor taken by petitioner was of such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. On

the contrary, the fact that petitioner could recall the details that transpired during and after his

drinking session with friends is the best proof that he knew what he was doing during the

incident.

Francisco vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 108747

April 6, 1995

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Facts:

Petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, upon humiliating his employees, was accused of multiple grave oral

defamation in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five of his employees, each Information

charging him with gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.

On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found

petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, guilty of grave oral defamation, in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against

him, and sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8)

months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the

information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena

Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for

attorney's fees, plus costs of suit. However, he was acquitted in for persistent failure of the offended

party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.

Issue:

(a) Whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his conviction to the

RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed.

Held:

Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on the

assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of

their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and serious

consequences of the offense they might further commit.

The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave felonies as

defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of the Revised Penal Code, and not necessarily those who have

been convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse.

Hence, the basis of the disqualification of the petitioner is principally on the gravity of the offense

committed and the concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not

exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of

probation.

The Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in each of the

above entitled cases and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance which is analogous to

passion or obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said accused in each case to a straight penalty of

eight months imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law; and to pay the costs.

The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily must

be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the application for probation with the

trial court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow probation after

an appeal has been perfected.

Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive

remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC although the imposed penalties

were already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did not even raise the

issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he filed an application for probation

outside the period for perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant

petition for review should be as it is hereby DENIED.