Diaspora Support in Intrastate Conflict

Lucia Bird

April 25, 2016

Abstract

Militant groups engaged in civil conflict may be incentivized to seek outside sup-

port. While past work has considered the benefits of state sponsorship, I argue that

transnational nonstate actors, specifically foreign diasporas, can influence the dynam-

ics of the intrastate conflict and its termination. If diasporas are willing and able to

support civil war actors, they can increase the capacity of either the militants or the

government in their homeland, as well as contribute to peace building. The govern-

ment in the diaspora’s host state determines whether to allow diasporas to send aid to

recipients in the homeland, improving their probability of success, or to block support

due to the international costs associated with intervention in another state’s domestic

affairs. I argue that the delivery of such aid to militant groups, the conflict actors of

interest in this paper, increases their capacity to militarily compete with or force the

home state into negotiations. I provide a three player sequential game between the mil-

itant group, the host state of the diaspora (external government), and the militants’

home state (internal government). Preliminary conclusions from the model suggest

that, when the external government’s ability to punish the militants is small to mod-

erate, the probability the militants seek diaspora aid increases as the affinity between

the militants and the external government rises.1

1Please note that this is a preliminary draft of my prospectus.

1

Introduction

Most states publicly commit to counter violent nonstate actors domestically and abroad;

however, these states’ inaction regarding potential benefactors, or “passive” support, may

nonetheless yield positive externalities for these militant groups. For example, a major tenet

of American foreign policy is counter-terrorism; yet, the United States (U.S.) allowed Irish

American diaspora members to support the Provisional Irish Republican Army materially

and financially throughout the “Troubles” of the 1970s. The Irish diaspora in the U.S. sent

personal financial contributions through the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID) that

were instrumental in purchasing weapons and supporting the dependents of imprisoned IRA

members (Byman, 2005b). Beyond financial support, Irish Americans were able to send

useful weapons due to the relative availability of arms in the U.S., to provide refuge for

IRA operatives trying to escape legal repercussions of violent activity, and to lobby the U.S.

government to pressure the United Kingdom into concessions concerning Northern Ireland

(Byman, 2005b). While diaspora intervention initially proved helpful to the PIRA, the Irish

American diaspora eventually became disillusioned with the violence of the conflict. As a

consequence of this growing disillusionment and the condemnation of PIRA activities by

Ireland, the Irish American diaspora lobbied the U.S. government to advocate a political

resolution to the conflict (Cochrane, 2007). The evolving interactions between the militant

group (the PIRA), the Irish American diaspora, and the U.S. government, and its impact

on the dynamics of the conflict and its termination, exemplify the political phenomena

motivating this paper.

While conventional wisdom suggests that seeking outside sponsorship from transnational

diasporas benefits needy or ambitious militant groups, this decision requires militants to

additionally be somewhat risk-acceptant. As demonstrated by the experience of the PIRA

and the Irish American diaspora, these transnational nonstate actors can either augment

or undermine the probability that violent nonstate actors achieve military victory in civil

conflict in the homeland. Given that the militants may not have perfect knowledge of the

2

interests or resources of diasporas prior to soliciting their participation, the militants may

unintentionally sabotage their own agenda. Moreover, diasporas do not act in a vacuum;

their actions are influenced by the policy preferences of the governments of the host states

in which they reside. Should such governments view the militants favorably, they are likely

to permit diaspora aid to militants. Conversely, if the diaspora’s host state disapproves of

the militants, it is likely to block diaspora aid and possibly punish the militants further by

enhanced monitoring or intelligence sharing with the government in the homeland. Risk-

averse militants may be able to more securely fund themselves autonomously or obtain

financing from domestic sources (albeit on a potentially smaller scale). Some groups still

seek support from transnational diasporas, even given the uncertainty associated with this

choice, and I explore the conditions under which militants seek such aid.

In the following paper, I present a model that yields some preliminary hypotheses regard-

ing when militants are incentivized to solicit foreign diasporas for resources. Specifically, my

model suggests that the degree of affinity between the government of the state in which

the diaspora resides and the militants is directly related to the probability with which the

militants are motivated to seek transnational support. Due to the potentially grave conse-

quences related to provoking hostile host governments, this model additionally suggests that

militants will take the risk of going abroad for diaspora support only if the external govern-

ment’s punishment capacity is fairly low. Ultimately, I plan to empirically test this argument

using a logistic regression model on the universe of cases identified by the Non-State Actor

Data (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2013).

Relevant Literature

Much recent international relations scholarship has been devoted to studying the causes and

consequences of state support of civil war actors (for example, Byman 2013, Salehyan 2007,

and Carter 2012). However, the scholarship on nonstate support of militant groups is less

3

developed. Nonstate supporters might include diaspora groups, refugees or other displaced

persons, nongovernmental organizations, transnational crime networks, and religious leaders

(Byman et al., 2001a; Asal, Pate and Wilkenfield, 2008). Since Collier and Hoeffler (2004)

identified the positive and statistically significant relationship between the size of diasporas

and likelihood of recurring intrastate conflict, scholars have considered the role that such di-

aspora groups might have in politics in the homeland and host state (for example, Saideman

2012, Smith and Stares 2007, and Sheffer 2014). Since this study will continue in a similar

vein by identifying those factors that motivate militants to seek support from external non-

state actors, I will review research relevant to the subject of diaspora involvement in civil

conflicts in the homeland in this section.

To execute attacks that undermine the state and maintain organizational capacity, mil-

itant groups require financial resources. On the operational side, such funds help militants

promote the group’s ideology via propaganda, pay salaries for militants and their depen-

dents, finance travel and communications costs, train new militants, and provide logistical

support (Force, 2008). In terms of sustaining the organization, militant groups may also allo-

cate welfare goods and administer mass media outlets (like television channels and websites)

(Force, 2008). In short, contrary to the conventional thoughts of policymakers, carrying out

violent attacks and sustaining the organization is not cheap, and so militant groups must

secure substantial financing to survive (Prober, 2005).

Militants can either fund themselves autonomously, through legitimate or illicit means,

or seek outside resources (both domestic and transnational) to meet their financial needs.

Militant groups can self-finance when operatives are engaged in legitimate businesses or

criminal activities if the funds can be effectively diverted from making profit to war. So,

militants can draw on profits from legitimate businesses more easily in certain sectors, such

as those lacking formal qualifications or significant startup investment, when authorities’

ability to ascertain the reported to actual sales ratio is difficult (Force, 2008). Additionally,

militants may engage in criminal activities to support their conflict goals, especially as their

4

hierarchical structures become flattened (Dishman, 2005). Levitt identifies several illicit

fund-raising activities, including prostitution, forgery, drug and arms trafficking, in which

militants engage (2002). For example, the southern Lebanese militant group Hezbollah

acquires funding to support Israeli Arabs’ intelligence efforts with opium profits from poppy

fields in the Bekaa Valley (Kraft, 2000). Alternative forms of illegitimate funding involve

fraud using stolen credit cards and checkbooks (Force, 2008). Finally, some militant groups

can leverage primary commodities in civil conflict, which Collier and Hoeffler hypothesize

may provide opportunities for extortion by the groups or be correlated with poor governance

by the state (2004). The ability of rebels to take advantage of primary commodities, such

as opium, diamonds, or coca, may elongate the war because multiple civil war actors can

earn outside income from the contraband, regardless of fighting (Fearon, 2004). For example,

Levitt identifies militant Islamist groups that profit from exchanges on the gold and diamond

black markets (Levitt, 2002; Farah, 2001).

Conversely, if militant groups cannot sustain themselves independently, they may turn to

external financing from domestic and foreign, as well as state and nonstate, alternatives. Be-

yond personal profits and savings, militants can obtain money from other domestic sources,

such as sympathetic relatives and friends (Force, 2008). Foreign states may be incentivized

to aid militants in order to undermine rivals (Saideman, 2002; Maoz and SanAkca, 2012), to

pursue geostrategic interests like regime change (Heraclides, 1990), or to support similarly

oriented groups (Byman et al., 2001a). Such support may be beneficial militarily, involving

weapons provision or intelligence sharing (Jenkins, 1986), or non-militarily, like providing

ideological direction (Byman, 2005a). Furthermore, states may inadvertently (or neglect-

fully) aid militant groups by allowing them safe havens in their territory. Even though

states may face some costs for hosting violent substate actors, this also enables militants’

sponsors to obtain some bargaining power relative to the host state that is valuable to the

state providing the safe haven (Bapat, 2007). Militant groups frequently take advantage

of such external sanctuaries to avoid repression by the opposing state and to capitalize on

5

the ability to organize for military action (Salehyan, 2007). Similarly, even states that do

not deliberately support or allow sanctuary for militants may permit outflows of aid from

domestic actors to militants abroad in a form of “passive” sponsorship (Byman, 2005a).

Militants may also obtain financing from outside nonstate sources, such as charities, human-

itarian agencies, and other front companies (Levitt, 2002). This funding may be voluntary,

such as donations collected for widows and orphans from diasporas that intentionally or

fraudulently are used in militant activities, or forced by threatening retribution against the

diaspora members abroad or their family and friends at home if funding is refused (Force,

2008).

The relationship between external actors and militants groups may be more nuanced than

previous authors have posited. While some scholarship has worked to theorize the “trian-

gular relationship” present between diasporas incentivized to become involved in homeland

politics, the host state in which they reside, and the civil conflict actors (Sheffer, 2003), this

paper will more comprehensively assess and offer novel predictions related to this relation-

ship. Employing a domestic politics approach, Saideman argues that policymakers’ foreign

policy decisions are determined by their constituents’ interests abroad (2012). Building on

selectorate theory (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2005), Saideman asserts that politically vul-

nerable leaders endeavor to keep constituents in their “winning coalition,” and therefore

are incentivized to send aid to civil actors with whom their constituents share an ethnic

identity as a demonstration of credible commitment to their constituents (2012). Similarly,

Adamson asserts that diasporas with kin groups involved in civil wars in the homeland can

lobby for the militants in order to accrue sympathy and political support from the host state

(2013). While these scholars provide useful initial frameworks through which to consider

this question, some space for improvement exists. For example, current scholarships fails

to adequately address the characteristics of the relationship between the militants and the

host state, which is mediated by the diaspora, that might influence militant groups’ choices

regarding support acquisition. Additionally, further theorizing on the foreign policy impact

6

of multiple salient ethnic groups with distinct demands living in one state is needed.

Diaspora groups should not be conceptualized as a uniform bloc due to intra-group vari-

ation, but they share characteristics that make them unique actors in international politics.

While scholars debate the definition most appropriate for these increasingly relevant transna-

tional actors, I will briefly outline some broad areas of agreement. Smith defines diasporas

as groups that are established in foreign countries (aside from the recognized homelands

from which they or their ancestors departed) (2007). Cohen identifies the collective mem-

ory or mythology of the idealized homeland and feelings of distinction from the mainstream

society as fundamental traits that diasporas share (1997). Also, diasporas simultaneously

endeavor to integrate into their host states while still maintaining strong connections with

the homeland and other diasporas abroad (Sheffer, 2003; Keles, 2015). Such linkages foster

“long-distance nationalism,” which unites communities abroad around common identities,

traditions, and practices in an effort to inspire participation in homeland politics (Schiller,

2009). Finally, diasporas are unique actors in civil wars because they can support armed

conflict in their homelands while avoiding personal experience of the violence (Adamson,

2013). This may change diaspora groups’ preferences regarding the outcome of the civil

conflict. For example, diasporas may prefer continued fighting if they believe conflict will

ultimately result in favorable concessions. Of course, the possibility of retributive violence

against relatives and friends of the diaspora members casts doubt on this claim.

While the conditions under which diasporas identify with their homelands occupy much

of the literature, questions remain regarding what characteristics of diasporas and their host

states incentivize some militant groups (but not others) to seek aid from abroad, as well

as why these diasporas are not as interested in complete integration into their host state.

Diasporas can affect the civil war in the homeland by providing direct aid, such as weapons,

to either conflict actor. Moreover, diasporas may more subtly influence conflict dynamics by

lobbying the host state or other international actors. Diasporas, typically wealthy compared

to coethnics in the homeland, may support militants financially via donations; membership

7

dues for social, religious, or political associations; or contributions to legitimate or fraudulent

foundations that ultimately enable violence (Byman et al., 2001b; Hess, 2007). For example,

Elu and Price find that remittances contribute to the incidence of terrorism in Sub-Saharan

Africa (2012). Additionally, diasporas may provide other types of direct support, such as

fighters, intelligence reports, and arms (Sheffer, 2003). Hegghammer finds that recruits from

diaspora communities more often fight abroad because the foreign conflict is perceived as

more legitimate than attacks executed in the host state (2013). While this is an interest-

ing normative argument, the analysis applies only to recent Islamic militants and may not

generalize across time and space.

Some scholars argue that diasporas’ influence on the conflict is insignificant relative to

state sponsors’ impact (Byman, 2013), but I argue that militants’ relationship to potential

state supporters is mediated by diasporas abroad. Diasporas may influence the prospects

of militants in their homeland by lobbying policymakers in their host state, much like a

transnational advocacy network makes efforts to pressure states into taking political, and

sometimes military, actions (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). These mobilized diaspora groups can

act as “ethnic lobbies,” especially in advanced, industrialized democracies, to raise interna-

tional sympathy for the plight of militants in the homeland using mass and social media

(Lia, 2007). For example, Van Bruinessen hypothesizes that “exile...transformed Kurdistan

from a vaguely defined geographic entity into a political ideal” by engaging educated Kur-

dish diaspora members abroad in homeland politics and providing political opportunities to

influence governments in host states, like Belgium, Germany, France, and the U.S. (2007).

The diaspora’s capacity to influence foreign policymaking by the host government is directly

related to the degree of congruence between the diaspora’s and the host state’s objectives,

in addition to the prevalence of the diaspora abroad (Shain, 1995, 1999). While some schol-

ars have theorized the relationship between diaspora support and its benefits for militant

groups, work remains to be done to determine under what conditions militants make the

risky choice to seek aid from diaspora actors abroad. The militants are taking a risk by

8

asking for diaspora aid since they could be ignored by diasporas abroad or even undermined

by diasporas interested in supporting the homeland government or immediately resolving

the civil conflict (Bercovitch, 2007).

External state and nonstate actors can be beneficial or detrimental to the militants.

Scholars debate the impact of outside support, even that which exclusively increases militant

capacity, on overall violence levels. While Greene (1990) suggests outsider intervention

on behalf of the rebels increases the incidence of violence, Kalyvas (1999) argues that the

probability of rebel violence decreases with foreign support because civilian defection to the

state is less costly. Also, scholars have neglected to theorize the role of diasporas in conflict

resolution. Smith asserts that almost all diaspora groups want peace in their homelands

on their terms, which may involve arming militants or, instead, building state capacity to

oppose dissident militants in the homeland (2007). Diasporas can be instrumental in the

peace process since they can promote dialogue, mediation, and problem solving between civil

war actors (Bercovitch, 2007). For example, Tamil diaspora groups sponsored the Liberation

Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) but disliked the group’s post-9/11 association with terrorism;

consequently, diaspora members urged local LTTE branches to eschew violence and seek a

diplomatic resolution (Fair, 2007).

Additionally, some scholars argue that diaspora aid is costless since diasporas are gener-

ally reliable and refrain from trying to control militants’ agenda (Byman et al., 2001a), but

there are some consequences to the militants that are associated with accepting such support.

For example, militants may still face a loss of agenda control if diasporas or host states have

distinct objectives in the homeland (Horowitz, 1985). Weinstein suggests another potential

pitfall of external support: when foreign aid is available, militants may depend less on the

population and eventually alienate and possibly abuse the civilians supposedly under their

jurisdiction (2006). While scholars originally posited many of these consequences for mili-

tants with states (not diasporas) as the foreign sponsors, I argue that the same mechanisms

are at work regardless of the state or nonstate status of the aid provider.

9

A Theory of Diaspora Support

In this section, I present a model of a militant group’s request for diaspora aid, which is

mediated by the government in the diaspora’s host state, in response to an ongoing conflict

between the militants and the government of the diaspora’s homeland. The players in this

game consist of the militants in the homeland, the external government of the diaspora’s host

state, and the internal government in the homeland. Before the game starts, the militants

and internal government are engaged in a civil conflict, the outcome of which interests the

diaspora and its external government.

Militants

External Government

Internal Government

Internal Government

100

p-CM

1-p-CIG

0

θp-CM

1-θp-CIG

-βCEG

βp-CM

1-βp-CIG

βpλ-KEG

1-KIG

βλ-KEG

Transnational Domestic

Deny Allow

Resist Concede

Resist Concede

Figure 1: Diaspora Support of Militants Game

Figure 1 describes the extensive form representation of the game. The game begins with

the militants’ choice to seek aid from transnational diasporas or keep the conflict, and its

financing, internal. If the conflict remains domestic, the militants opt to self-fund or only

seek support from actors within the homeland, such as friends and family members.

10

If the militants decide to keep the civil war within the boundaries of the homeland by

autonomously financing the conflict or requesting support from the domestic population,

the game ends with the homeland government (henceforth, referred to as the internal gov-

ernment) electing to resist the militants’ demands by continuing the military conflict or

conceding to negotiations. If the internal government decides to fight, the payoffs to the

militants, internal government, and host state government (henceforth, the external govern-

ment) consist of (p-CM ; 1-p-CIG; 0). The militants’ payoff is a function of their probability

p, with p ∈ [0,1], of winning less the cost CM , with CM ∈ [0,1], of fighting the internal

government. The internal government’s payoff, 1-p-CIG, is given by the utility of winning

less the probability the militants win and the cost of fighting the civil war. Because the

militant group stays domestic, the external government does not become involved and thus

receives nothing from the interactions between civil war actors. If the internal government

concedes, the payoffs to the militants, external government, and internal government are (1;

0; 0). I assume that negotiations will lead to a change to the status quo that will benefit the

militants, so I normalize that outcome to 1. The internal and external governments both

receive 0 since the internal government is forced to negotiate with the opposition and the

external government does not play on this branch of the game.

If the militants seek aid from actors abroad, the external government makes the next

move. The external government may prohibit or allow resources to flow from the diaspora

to the militants. By denying diaspora aid, the external government suffers some costs in

the form of technical, financial, or human resources that must be diverted from normal

public spending. This prohibition of diaspora aid is painful to the militants because of

the constraints their transnational operatives may face due to increased scrutiny by the

external government and dangers associated with increased exposure of the militant group

to the international community, which may make repression of the militants by the internal

government easier.

If the external government denies aid from the diaspora group in the host state, the

11

payoffs to the militants, internal government, and external government are (θp-CM ; 1-θp-

CIG; -βCEG). If the militants were to exclusively seek aid when diasporas favor the militants’

agenda, the outcome associated with external government denial (θp) would yield the worst

payoff for the militants. This is because the probability of militant victory p falls to θp.

The parameter θ, with θ ∈ [0,1], indicates the external government’s ability to constrain the

militants by denying diaspora aid, more stringently monitoring the diaspora’s transnational

activities, or sharing intelligence on the militants with the internal government. However,

I assume that militants make the request for diaspora aid under risk because the level and

nature of diaspora aid β, with β ∈ [0,2], is unknown. When β is less than 1, receiving aid

from the diaspora decreases the militants’ chance of success, possibly more than when aid

is denied by the external government. The internal government receives 1-θp-CIG, which

represents the payoff of winning (which I normalize to 1) less the reduced probability that

militants win and the cost of fighting the civil war CIG, with CIG ∈ [0,1]. The external

government’s payoff reflects the costs required to halt diaspora support, CEG, with CEG ∈

[0,1], weighted by β. In this case, β represents the level of diaspora support or political

influence in the host state. More populous, wealthy, or politically active diaspora groups

will be more beneficial to the civil war actor they choose to back, as well as more costly to

external governments that deny diaspora aid. Depending on the regime type of the external

government and the nature of the coalition necessary for the leader to stay in power, the

prohibition of diaspora support can be both politically and logistically expensive (Saideman,

2012).

Conversely, the external government can permit, and perhaps even supplement, the aid

package being sent to the militants in the homeland at this decision node. Such aid will

benefit the militants’ capacity in conflict or bargaining leverage if negotiations ensue. If

the external government does allow support to flow from the host state to the militants,

the internal government makes the final decision of whether to keep fighting the militants

or acquiesce to negotiations. The internal government may be willing to face an externally

12

supported militant group, though the war is likely to be costlier and longer in duration due

to the increased capacity of the militants. Alternatively, the internal government may agree

to negotiations if externally supported militants pose a sufficient threat to the sovereignty

of the state. With outside aid, the militants become more legitimate rivals in conflict, which

may force the internal government to bargain.

If the external government permits diaspora aid to flow to militants, the internal govern-

ment may choose to negotiate or to continue resisting the now externally supported militants.

If the internal government agrees to any negotiated settlement, the payoffs to the militants,

internal government, and external government are (1; -KIG; βλ-KEG). I again assume that

the militants receive a payoff of 1 because they accrue benefits from the change to the sta-

tus quo.2 The internal government, at this outcome, incurs a cost -KIG, with KIG ∈ [0,1].

The parameter K IG substantively refers to the increased cost to the internal government

of dealing with an externally supported group due to the internationalization of the civil

conflict, the likely improved bargaining position militants have due to the incoming flow of

resources from the foreign diaspora, and the perceived legitimation of militants’ cause due to

the tacit support from the external government. The external government’s payoff refers to

the benefit it receives from allowing diaspora aid to the militants less the cost of permitting

diaspora aid. The benefits to the external government are composed of β and λ, with λ ∈

[0,1]. The parameter λ describes the degree of affinity between the militant group and the

external government. The parameter λ substantively refers to how much affinity, in the form

of ideological similarity, strategic objectives, or historical interactions, exists between these

two actors. I assume that increasing affinity means that the external government is more

likely to be sympathetic to the militants’ plight and the diaspora’s lobbying efforts. The

cost of permitting diaspora aid KEG, with KEG ∈ [0,1], refers to the external government’s

2Some scholars, such as Bapat 2007, note that militants receiving state support may be forced to pay a“tax” of sorts to their state sponsors in exchange for help in the civil war. While this assumption is validfor state sponsors, the primary outside supporters in this model are diaspora groups. The diaspora, thoughthey can influence civil conflicts, are not likely to provide as much or as varied support, nor risk as much asstate sponsors. Therefore, I assume the diaspora do not require a “tax” from the militants in this game.

13

potential to receive sanctions or other international reputation costs due to at least implicitly

helping the militants (Byman et al., 2001a).

However, the internal government may decide to continue the fight against the externally

supported militants. If the game concludes with ongoing conflict, the payoffs to the militants,

internal government, and external government are (βp-CM ; 1-βp-C IG; βpλ-KEG). The

militants’ probability of winning is weighted by β less the cost of fighting the civil war.

If I assume that the militants seek transnational support only when the diaspora seem

sympathetic to the cause, the parameter β should increase the militants’ chance of winning.

If, however, the militants’ gamble for financial resources does not pay off because the diaspora

are actually in favor of peace building or victory by the internal government, the β level of

support actually undermines the militants’ ability to overcome the internal government.3

The internal government receives the payoff of winning less the probability that militants

win (weighted by β) and the cost of resistance. The external government’s payoff here is the

probability of the militants’ win, influenced by the level of diaspora support β and affinity

between the militants the external government λ, less the cost of permitting the aid to the

militants. In this case, I assume that the external government’s payoff is influenced by the

outcome of the conflict, which is why the probability of militant victory p is included.

Equilibrium Solutions

I solve this sequential game using the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium solution concept.

The formal solution in its entirety is presented in the Appendix. I describe the equilibria

as a function of β and discuss them based on actions taken by the internal and external

governments at low, median, and high levels of β. I first find the equilibria under complete

information, in which I assume that all the players are informed on the level of β, or support

provided by diaspora. Substantively, this means that each player knows both the amount

of resources the diaspora is willing to send and the civil war actor to whom the aid will be

3In this scenario, β<1

14

delivered. I then find the equilibrium under incomplete information, in which the militants

do not know the level of β. I derive a testable hypothesis from this model concerning the

explanatory variables relevant to determining when a militant group is more likely to seek

diaspora support.

Complete Information Solution

Case 1

I first consider the condition under which the internal government, at the final node, decides

to resist. This occurs when β < β, with β = 1−CIG+KIGp

. I then consider the choices available

to the external government: to permit or to prohibit diaspora aid. The external government

anticipates the internal government’s decision to resist, and so denies when β < β’, with β’=

KEGpλ+CEG

. Under this set of conditions, the militants have a dominant strategy to keep the

conflict and financing efforts domestic. Militants should remain domestic because, if they

go external, their payoff θp-CM is always lower than the utility they would get by staying

domestic, regardless of whether the internal government resists or concedes.

Lemma 1. Militants’ choice to keep the conflict domestic is strictly dominant when β <

β’ < β,4 meaning that the external government denies and the internal government resists.5

Case 2

I next consider the conditions under which the internal government concedes to the militants’

demands at the final node. The internal government makes this decision when β > β

(in fact, β takes on the highest level possible under this case). The external government

has a dominant strategy to allow any level of diaspora support to flow to the homeland if

the internal government concedes to the militants. This is because the utility of allowing

support when the internal government concedes, βλ-KEG, is positive and always greater

4β’<β based on the assumption that the internal government faces higher restrictions than the externalgovernment on actions related to diaspora support of militants.

5See proof in Appendix.

15

than -βCEG, which is the payoff the external government receives from denying support.

If the militants seek domestic support exclusively, the internal government has a dominant

strategy to resist because 1-p-C IG is greater than 0, which is the utility for the internal

government of conceding.

Therefore, if the external government allows the diaspora to send aid, the militants have

an optimal strategy to seek transnational support. The militants should request diaspora aid

because their payoff of going transnational, given that the internal government concedes, is

1. This is greater than the militants’ payoff of remaining domestic p-CM , given the internal

government’s dominant strategy to resist if the militants remain domestic, and is the highest

payoff available to the militants in the game.

Lemma 2. Militants’ choice to request transnational aid from diasporas is optimal when

β > β > β’, that is, when the external government allows and the internal government

concedes.6

Case 3

The third case represents the most substantively interesting set of conditions. Under these

conditions, the internal government decides to fight the militants (β < β), yet the external

government chooses to allow diaspora aid (β > β’). Because the internal government faces

higher constraints than the external government regarding decisions on the militants, I as-

sume that β’ < β. I make this assumption because the militants challenge the sovereignty of

the internal government, meaning the internal government is more constrained in its policy

choices than the external government, which does not face such a threat. Since the external

government’s threshold for choices related to diaspora support is lower than the internal

government’s, the external government has more flexibility in dealing with diaspora support

of militants.

The militant group anticipates the decisions of the internal and external governments.

6See proof in Appendix.

16

The militants then decide to go transnational if the utility associated with seeking diaspora

support, βp-CM , is greater than the payoff received by keeping the conflict domestic, p-CM .

For the militants to receive p-CM by keeping the conflict and resource acquisition efforts

domestic, the internal government must have an optimal strategy to resist. This occurs

under certain conditions. The internal government must optimally prefer to resist rather

than concede if the militants remain domestic, and this occurs when the payoff of continuing

to fight, 1-p-C IG, is greater than the payoff of conceding, 0. This implies that 1-p is greater

than C IG. Given that β = 1−CIG+KIGp

and 1-p is greater than C IG, β must exceed 1. I

assume that β’ is less than β and β is greater than 1, so the relationship between β’ and

1 influences the conditions under which the militants decide to seek external support from

diasporas or remain domestic.

Lemma 3. Militants’ choice to request transnational aid from diasporas is optimal when

max{β’, 1} < β < β.

Lemma 4. Militants decide to keep the conflict and the associated pursuit of resources

domestic when β’ < β < 1.

Incomplete Information Solution

In the incomplete information equilibrium, I again assume that the internal government is

more constrained in its dealing with the militants than the external government, so β’ <

β. The militants do not know the level of β, meaning they lack information on both the

degree of support provided by the diaspora and whether aid will be sent to the internal

government or the militants (though the external and internal governments are aware of the

level of β). Under incomplete information, my prior belief is that β is uniformly distributed

between 0 and 2. To find the total expected utility of seeking transnational aid, I associate

the probability of β falling into the intervals defined by my cutoff points of β (β’ and β) with

the payoffs militants receive (as illustrated by Figure 2). Because the militants are unsure of

the level of β, I cannot use the β that is included in the payoffs. Instead I integrate to find

17

the expected utility of β for militants when the internal government resists and the external

government allows (β’ < β < β). I use this expected value to construct the total utility for

militants of going abroad for aid.

Nature

β < β’ β∈β’,β)β > β

transnational transnational transnational

domestic domestic domestic

p-CM

Militants Militants Militants

p-CM p-CMθp-CM βp-CM 1

Figure 2: Payoffs for Militants on Distribution of β

This incomplete information situation is interesting because the militants are uncertain

whether it is better to fund themselves with domestic sources exclusively or seek aid from

foreign diasporas. Seeking transnational aid is optimal when their expected utility from

going abroad for diaspora support, β′

2(θp - CM) + (β2−β′2)p

4- β−β′

2CM + 2−β

2, exceeds the

utility of remaining domestic, p-CM . This occurs when β’p(2θ - β’) - β(2-βp+2CM) + 4(1-p

+ CM) > 0.

Using comparative statics, I find some relationships between parameters from the model

and my phenomenon of interest, the probability with which militants seek transnational

support from diasporas. Specifically, I identify a direct relationship between λ, the param-

eter representing the affinity between the militants and the external government, and the

militants’ expected utility of seeking support from transnational diasporas. The substantive

implication of this is that militants are more likely to solicit diaspora support as the affinity

between militants and the external government increases. This relationship holds under the

condition that θ, the ability of the external government to punish the militants, is sufficiently

small (θ < KEG(pλ+CEG)

).

18

Theoretical Implications and Discussion

This model provides insights into the conditions under which militants involved in intrastate

conflict are willing to take the risk of seeking aid from transnational diaspora actors. By

provoking diaspora’s participation in the conflict in the homeland, the militant group may

gain significant advantages in capacity to fight against or leverage in bargaining with the

internal government. However, there is a level of risk associated with this decision in that

the diaspora may, in reality, not align with the militants in terms of objective or strategies

and instead prefer immediate conflict resolution or even support the internal government.

This risk is captured in the model with the parameter β, which varies between 0 and 2,

meaning that its effect on the probability p of militant victory may be helpful or harmful.

For example, the Colombian diaspora generally lacks any unilateral preference on a civil

war actor in the homeland and is “reluctant” to engage in the conflict in the homeland;

however, diaspora members in the U.S. overwhelmingly supported a staunch anti-guerrilla

presidential candidate in the 2002 Colombian elections (Bouvier, 2007). So, while Colombian

diaspora members do not participate in the substate conflict beyond voting for candidates

that strongly oppose guerrilla activity, the diaspora’s preferences for stability and against

guerrilla violence suggest that more direct diaspora participation would undermine Colom-

bian militant groups.

Even given the risks associated with seeking transnational aid, militant groups do make

the decision to involve foreign diasporas, and, by association, their external governments.

The choice to turn to transnational options becomes more likely under certain conditions,

derived (as previously mentioned) from the comparative statics of the model. As the affinity

(λ) between the militants in the homeland and the external government increases, the mili-

tants’ payoff for seeking support abroad increases. Substantively, this implies that militants

are more inclined to involve diaspora groups located in host states with (external, in the

terms of the model) governments that are sympathetic to the militants’ agenda. This is

intuitive because the militants are only willing to accept the risk of seeking transnational

19

supporters, in the form of foreign diasporas, when the external government is sufficiently

similar to the militants such that it is likely to allow the diaspora aid to flow to the home-

land. For instance, the American Cuban diaspora, prominent due to wealth and electoral

relevance, successfully aligned its own anti-Castro interests with the anti-communism agenda

of the United States after the fall of the U.S.-supported Batista regime (Grugel and Kippin,

2007). Opposition groups to Castro in Cuba benefited from the diaspora’s intervention on

its behalf as the U.S. allowed the diaspora to direct funding allocations, television and radio

broadcasts, as well as democratization efforts (Vanderbush, 2009).

Additionally, the probability that militant groups would attempt to acquire aid from

transnational diasporas is affected by the degree to which the external government can inflict

cost on the militants or their associated diasporas that otherwise might have been supportive

(represented in the game as θ). From the comparative statics of the game, the degree of

punishment that militants expect from the external government must be low to moderate

if they are still incentivized to risk requesting aid from foreign sources. For the militants,

this penalty represents a cost, such as increased legal prosecution of transnational operatives

or disrupting flows of financial or material resources, that will ultimately weaken military

capacity or bargaining power. This is costly because, had the militants instead chosen to

keep their civil conflict and extraction of resources to support violent activity domestic,

their probability of victory would have been higher. For example, several former leaders of

an American Muslim charity, the Holy Land Foundation, were convicted of sending more

than $12 million to Hamas, the Palestinian terrorist organization and political leadership

in the Gaza Strip (FBI, N.d.). Under the pretense of collecting charitable donations for

humanitarian relief in the Levant, the Holy Land Foundation leaders knowingly sent financial

contributions that were instrumental to Hamas’ violent activities, such as suicide bombing

(Levitt, 2004). While the loss of funds from the Holy Land Foundation likely somewhat

depleted Hamas’ funds, the militant group still operates and launches violent attacks from

Gaza. So, the external government’s ability to punish Hamas, in this case, is unlikely to

20

prevent the group from future requests for aid from transnational diasporas. Thus, I am

able to develop the following hypothesis based on my model:

H1 : As the affinity between the militants and the external government rises, militants are

increasingly likely to seek aid from transnational diaspora groups when the ability of the

external government to punish the militants is small to moderate.

Research Design

In this section, I will discuss future steps for this project in terms of empirically testing the

hypothesis derived from the formal model. To appropriately test the proposed hypothesis, I

will gather data from several sources to operationalize the dependent and key independent

variables. I will use the Non-State Actor (NSA) Data, which augments the Uppsala Armed

Conflict Data, to identify my universe of cases (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009).

This dataset includes information regarding military capacity and political characteristics of

over 500 violent nonstate actors, as well as details on the nature of the termination of the

conflict. I will employ the NSA dataset primarily to acquire information on the dependent

variable of interest in this analysis, which is whether militants seek aid from diasporas abroad.

To gather data on the key independent variables, I will use a number of datasets, such as

the UCDP External Support Data (Hogbladh, Pettersson and Themner, 2011) and the Klein

et al. rivalry dataset (Klein, Goertz and Diehl, 2006). The unit of analysis in my dataset

will be conflict dyad-period, where the dyad consists of the militant group and the internal

government (to use the language of my game).

To identify the external government, I associate the diasporas, which are likely solicited

for aid by the militants, with their host state. The militants in the homeland may potentially

be able to draw upon the support of more than one diaspora. This complicates the link

between the diaspora and the external government. If multiple diasporas abroad might be

sympathetic to and willing to help the militants, I will code the country with the largest share

21

of diaspora members as the external government. I will use the World Bank’s Global Bilateral

Migration Database, which includes estimates of bilateral immigration from 1960-2000 by

decade, to approximate diaspora sizes (Ozden et al., 2011). Because of the limitations on

diaspora data, I drop cases of militant groups whose conflicts with the internal government

fall outside of the specified range of the Global Bilateral Migration Database.

The dependent variable of interest for this analysis is the choice by militant groups in the

homeland to seek aid from foreign diasporas. Though likely unobservable, the decision by

militants to go abroad for support can be identified by using several relevant variables from

the NSA Data. First, NSA includes two variables that demonstrate whether transnational

nonstate actors provide aid to states in a combative or non-combative manner. A third

useful variable to approximate the decision to seek transnational aid is militants’ presence

in foreign states. At these locations abroad, groups’ operatives might be able to request

financial, material, or human resources from targeted diasporas. In the original dataset, these

variables are ordinal (with three levels of support possible). I will recode these measures as

binary, with a 1 if the militants receive any degree of support in either category. Furthermore,

I will create an additive index of transnational nonstate support with seven potential levels by

aggregating these three variables. Statistical analysis with an ordinal variable will be helpful

in specifying the conditions under which militants receive increasing levels of transnational

nonstate support instead of just existence or lack of support.

According to my hypothesis, the key independent variable is the affinity between the

external government and the militants in the homeland (λ in the model). My theoretical

framework suggests that increasing levels of affinity imply that the external government will

be more favorable to allowing the diaspora to send aid to the militants. I will measure this

affinity as a continuous variable that takes into account multiple facets of the relationship

between the militants and the diaspora’s host government.7 I will consider the ideological

similarity between the militants and the external government by reviewing the group’s polit-

7The details of the values that these indicators will take on remain to be specified.

22

ical objectives (included in the NSA case descriptions) and the degree to which they parallel

national policy goals of the state. This affinity variable will also indicate whether the mili-

tants have benefited from interactions with the external government during their campaign,

as demonstrated by evidence in the UCDP External Support (Disaggregated/Supporter)

Dataset (Hogbladh, Pettersson and Themner, 2011). Additionally, I will consider the rela-

tionship that exists between the internal and external governments, which is likely to affect

how much affinity the external government and militants share. The affinity between the

external government and the militants should be higher when a rivalry exists between the

external and internal governments, which I will identify using the Klein et al. data on rivalry

(Klein, Goertz and Diehl, 2006). Furthermore, the degree of trade interdependence between

the host state and homeland should demonstrate the geostrategic importance of this rela-

tionship to the external government. Low volumes of trade between the two states should be

correlated with higher affinity between the external government and militant group. There-

fore, I will aggregate these various indicators to operationalize the affinity parameter λ.

Based on my theory, the effect of the affinity between the militant group and the external

government on the probability that militants seek transnational aid is conditional on the

capacity of the external government to punish the militants (the parameter θ from my game).

I will operationalize this ability to punish the militants as the capacity of the diaspora’s host

state. To measure state capacity, I will employ the the relative political extraction variable

from the Relative Political Capacity Dataset. This is more useful than national GDP, which

is commonly used to measure state capacity, because it more specifically shows the degree

to which governments can apportion national output to achieve policy goals. Moreover, two

versions of this variable, one for developing and the other for developed countries, exist. In

this way, I can more appropriately identify capacity potential depending on development

level of the host state.

Finally, I will include some control variables on which to condition my explanatory vari-

ables of interest. First, I will include the population of the host state and the size of the

23

diaspora residing there (Bank, 2015; Ozden et al., 2011). This is important because the size

of the diaspora is likely to affect whether the diaspora is successful in its attempt to lobby

the external government, but this potentially influential ratio is outside the scope of my the-

ory. Additionally, I will include the population of the homeland and the size of the militant

group (Bank, 2015; Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009). This is relevant because

the size of the militant group is likely to have some impact on militants’ ability to oppose

the internal government, but the relative size of the group to the population is beyond my

theoretical scope conditions. Finally, I will include a control variable to measure regime type

of both the internal and external government from the Polity IV dataset, which may affect

the political opportunity structure of both the diaspora and the militants (Marshall, Jaggers

and Gurr, 2002).

To test the validity of the hypothesis derived from my model, I will employ two models

since my dependent variable can be measured as a dichotomous and an ordinal variable.

The first test will involve a logistic regression model to test simply whether militants seek

transnational diaspora aid. The second test will employ an ordered logistic regression to

ascertain the degree of support militants solicit from foreign diasporas. My empirical analysis

will have more explanatory leverage by including both tests.

Conclusion

This paper provides a theoretical framework to evaluate the conditions under which militant

groups will seek support from diaspora actors in foreign states. The implications of the

model point to the importance of the relationship between the militants and the external

government in determining the extent to which the diaspora can influence conflict dynam-

ics in their homeland. Specifically, the degree of affinity that the external government and

militants share and the capacity of external governments to punish the militants by denying

diaspora aid influence the benefits to the militants, and so their likelihood of seeking support

24

from diasporas. The militants’ decision regarding whether to attempt to acquire transna-

tional resources to fuel conflict is taken under risk because they may be unaware of the level

or nature of diaspora support. Though under-theorized, diasporas may be a double-edged

sword for opposition groups to the state in their homeland. Diaspora groups abroad might

support militants in the homeland by sending financial or material resources, but diasporas

also could prefer the internal government or peaceful resolution to the conflict. Furthermore,

even assuming a favorable diaspora, the external government must permit support to be sent

to the militants in order for the decision to seek transnational aid to be beneficial. Thus,

the militants’ decision to broaden the civil war beyond the boundaries of the homeland is

risky. However, these risks can be mitigated by certain characteristics of the relationship

between the militants and the external government, such as similarity in geostrategic objec-

tives. To ground the implications of my formal model in empirical reality, I will next subject

my hypothesis to statistical testing.

Diaspora groups are increasingly important transnational actors that have previously

been neglected by international relations scholars. This paper contributes to the literature

on external support of civil war actors by theorizing diasporas’ role in intrastate conflicts

in the homeland, as well as integrating the intervening role of the diasporas’ host state into

the framework. Furthermore, this paper also represents one of the first attempts to reconcile

the peace-building and conflict sustaining role that diasporas can have in civil wars in their

homeland using both formal theory and (eventually) quantitative analysis on a global sample

of militant groups. While qualitative studies have usefully posited much important theory

regarding diasporas in conflict, the conclusions from this scholarship lack generalizability

due to their case-specific nature.

Some recommendations for policymakers also stem from the implication of this formal

model. First, in the case that militants are threatening regional stability or continuing a

particularly violent civil war, external governments may be able to enact certain policies to

harness the peace-building capacity of diasporas. For example, Smith and Stares argue that

25

policy interventions can affect whether diasporas contribute to peace or violence in the home-

land (Smith and Stares, 2007). Furthermore, diasporas are more likely to favor negotiated

settlements to conflict in the homeland (as opposed to continuation of violence) if they are

linked with legitimate leadership and organizations in their host state and the international

system (Natali, 2007). The model also suggests that militants will not opt to internation-

alize the intrastate conflict by soliciting foreign diasporas for aid if the punishment ability

of the external government is high. Thus, governments in states with large and influential

diasporas may minimize diasporas’ ability to contribute to militants’ violent capacity by

increasing diaspora monitoring or posturing against violent nonstate actors, which signals

strong commitment to punish militant groups appealing to diasporas. While the impact

of diasporas should not be overstated, understanding the determinants of militant groups’

decisions to seek support from transnational nonstate actors and the role of diasporas’ host

states in this interaction is relevant to academics and policymakers.

Appendix

Internal Government’s Decision on Left Branch

IG

concedes if 1− βp− CIG < −KIG

resists if 1− βp− CIG > −KIG

Because I am mapping this in terms of β, I solve for β:

1-(βp+CIG) ≤ -KIG

1-βp-CIG≤ -KIG

1-CIG+KIG ≤ βp

1−CIG+KIGp

≤ β

1−CIG+KIGp

≤ β Henceforth, I will use β to represent the cutoff point 1−CIG+KIGp

.

26

If 1−CIG+KIGp

> β on the left branch (when Militants go external), then the internal gov-

ernment resists (demonstrated in Figure 3) These are the cases that I find substantively

interesting, so I will focus on these.

β

βIG resists IG concedes

0 2

Figure 3: Internal Government’s Decision to Resist on Left Branch

If 1−CIG+KIGp

< β on the left branch, then the internal government concedes (illustrated by

Figure 4).

β

βIG resists IG concedes

0 2

Figure 4: Internal Government’s Decision to Concede on Left Branch

External Government’s Decision

• Internal Government resists

EG

denies if − βCEG > βpλ−KEG

allows if − βCEG < βpλ−KEG

When the Internal Government resists, the External Government denies or allows de-

pending on the relationship between β and the cutoff point associated with this decision

node (β’), the value of which which I derive here:

-βCEG ≤ βpλ-KEG

27

-βCEG+KEG ≤ βpλ

KEG ≤ βpλ+βCEG

KEG ≤ β(pλ+CEG)

β ≤ KEGpλ+CEG

β’ = KEGpλ+CEG

Henceforth, I will use β’ to represent the cutoff point KEGpλ+CEG

.

If KEGpλ+CEG

< β when the internal government resists, then the external government

allows diaspora support to go to the homeland (shown in Figure 5).

β

βEG allowsEG denies

0 2

Figure 5: External Government’s Decision to Allow

If KEGpλ+CEG

> β when the internal government concedes, then the external government

denies diaspora support from militants in the homeland (shown in Figure 6).

β

βEG allowsEG denies

0 2

Figure 6: External Government’s Decision to Deny

I am now looking for the substantively interesting cases. I know that, if the internal

government concedes, the external government has a dominant strategy to allow any

level of β to militants. The interesting cases are when the external government allows

even though the internal government resists. To figure out when this happens, I need

to know the relationship between β’ and β.

28

It could be the case that β’ < β (shown in Figure 7). This means that the inter-

nal government has higher restrictions on its behavior than external government does.

Substantively, this implies that the external government has a lower threshold than the

internal government for action regarding diaspora support, meaning it will sometimes

allow diaspora aid when the internal government will resist.

ββ’

EG deniesIG resists

EG allowsIG resists

EG allowsIG concedes

0 2

Figure 7: More Constraints on Internal than External Government

Alternatively, β’ > β (shown in Figure 8). This relationship, though, implies that the

external government has higher restrictions than the internal government. Substan-

tively, this means that the external government is more constrained with respect to

decision making on diaspora support than the internal government on civil war, which

is neither interesting nor empirically valid.

β β’

EG deniesIG resists

EG deniesIG concedes

EG allowsIG concedes

0 2

Figure 8: More Constraints on External than Internal Government

• Internal Government concedes

EG

denies if − βCEG > βλ−KEG

allows if − βCEG < βλ−KEG

29

The external government allows the diaspora support because βλ-KEG, the payoff the

external government receives for allowing support weighted by the degree of affinity

between the militants and the external government and lessened by the international

costs of allowing the diaspora support, is a positive value and greater than -βCEG, or

the cost the external government pays to prevent the Diaspora from sending aid. So,

the external government has a dominant strategy to allow for all β ∈ [0,2].

Internal Government’s Decision on Right Branch

IG

resists if 1− (p+ CIG) > 0

concedes if 1− (p+ CIG) < 0

If 1-(p+CIG)>0 on the right branch (when Militants go internal), then the Internal

Government resists. I assume 1-(p+CIG) is a positive value, so the Internal Government has

a dominant strategy to resist.

Militants’ Decision in Complete Information

β= 1−CIG+KIG

pβ’= KEG

pλ+CEG

EG deniesIG resists

EG allowsIG resists

EG allowsIG concedes

0 2

Figure 9: Payoff to Militants depending on Distribution of β

By mapping the distribution of β, I find three sets of conditions under which the militants

must make the decision to remain domestic or seek transnational aid (in complete informa-

tion). These include when 1) the internal government resists and the external government

denies, 2) the internal government concedes and the external government allows, and 3) the

internal government resists but the external government allows (my most interesting case).

Under Case (1), the militants should remain domestic:

30

Militants

transnational if θp− CM > p− CM

domestic if θp− CM < p− CM

Under Case (2), the militants should seek transnational aid:

Militants

transnational if 1 > p− CM

domestic if 1 < p− CM

Under Case (3), the militants should vary between going transnational or staying domestic

based on the value of β.

Militants

transnational if βp− CM > p− CM

domestic if βp− CM < p− CM

Militants

transnational if βp− CM > p− CM

domestic if βp− CM < p− CM

I make the following assumptions:

1. If 1-p-CIG > 0, then 1-p > C IG

2. β = 1−CIG+KIGp

. If 1-C IG > p, then β > 1.

3. β’ = KEGpλ+CEG

. I assume β’ < β.

31

Proof of Assumption 2:

1-p-CIG > 0

1-CIG > p

1−CIGp

> pp

1−CIGp

> 1

β = 1−CIGp

+ KIGp

> 1−CIGp

> 1

These assumptions and the consequential militants’ decisions are displayed in Figures 10 and

11.

ββ’

EG deniesIG resists

EG allowsIG resists

EG allowsIG concedes

0 21

Mils. domesticMils. transnational

Figure 10: Militants’ Decision in Case 3 when β’ < 1

ββ’

EG deniesIG resists

EG allowsIG resists

EG allowsIG concedes

0 21

Mils. domesticMils. transnational

Figure 11: Militants’ Decision in Case 3 when β’ > 1

Militants’ Decision under Incomplete Information

Militants

transnational if β′

2(θp− CM) + β2−β′2

4p− β−β′

2CM + 2−β

2> p− CM

domestic if β′

2(θp− CM) + β2−β′2

4p− β−β′

2CM + 2−β

2< p− CM

Under incomplete information, the militants do not know the level of β, so it cannot be

included in the payoff. Under incomplete information, my beliefs on β are that it is uniformly

distributed between 0 and 2 (β is U∼[0,2]).

32

To find the expected utility of going transnational:

EU[Transnational] =∫ β′

012

(θ p-CM) dβ +∫ ββ′

12

(β p-CM) dβ +∫ 2

β12

(1) dβ

EU[Transnational] = β′

2(θp - CM) + β2−β′2

4p - β−β′

2CM + 2−β

2EU[Transnational] = p - CM

EU[Transnational] > EU[Domestic] if:

β′

2(θp - CM) + (β2−β′2)p

4- β−β′

2CM + 2−β

2> p-CM

4[β′

2p(θ-β

′

2)- β

2(1- β

2p+CM)+1] > 4(p-CM)

β’p(2θ-β’) - β(2-β p+2CM) + 4 > 4(p-CM)

β’p(2θ-β’) - β(2-β p+2CM) + 4(1-p+CM) > 0

When β’p(2θ-β’) - β(2-β p+2CM) + 4(1-p+CM) > 0, the militants go transnational.

Comparative Statics

I now derive with respect to λ to find the comparative statics:

δ(E[transational]−E[domestic])δλ

δ(β′p(2θ−β))δλ

=δ

KEGpλ+CEG

(2pθ)−p KEG2

(pλ+CEG)2

δλ

= - 2p2θKEG(pλ+CEG)2

+2p2K2

EG(pλ+CEG)

(pλ+CEG)4

δ(E[transational]−E[domestic])δλ

> 0 if:

2p2K2EG(pλ+CEG)

(pλ+CEG)4> 2p2θKEG

(pλ+CEG)2

KEG(pλ+CEG)(pλ+CEG)2

> θ, or θ < KEG(pλ+CEG)

KEG > θ (pλ+CEG)

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