democratisation in thailand revisited

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Democratisation in Thailand revisitedNerida M. Cook aa Department of Sociology and Social Work , University of TasmaniaPublished online: 27 Feb 2007.

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November 1997 Democracy in Asia Revisited 157

of Taiwan's citizens truly value their freedom and input into the political system.Any attempts to chop down Taiwan's tree of democracy will find that the rootshave deeply embedded into the soil and that the wood has become very hard.

Democratisation in Thailand Revisited

Nerida M. CookDepartment of Sociology and Social Work

University of Tasmania

Introduction

The first half of 1997 in Thailand seemed an ordinary enough period in terms ofdemocratic practice, representing, once again, an ongoing restabilisation of theelectoral process after the bloody military suppression of unarmed civilians in thestreets of Bangkok during May 1992. By 1991, at least some analysts of Thaidemocracy thought that military intervention had become an anachronism after asustained twelve-year period of stable constitutional government during the1980s. Yet the military coup of February 1991, which eventually led to thearmed suppression nine months later, was no novelty in purporting to restoreorder through eradicating rampant corruption in the government of the time.

So poor was the then government's reputation that the coup became anotable example of how even those social groups which might normally object toundemocratic process, namely Bangkok's substantial middle class and the busi-ness sector, were initially supportive of the military's actions. As has previouslybeen the case in Thailand, these same social groups were among those who laterprotested the prolongation of military control the following fateful May. In whatwas eventually a rather broad-based protest movement, however, they were not,on the whole, among those who died.1 The military's deliberate choice ofarmed suppression of civilians was profoundly disturbing to the Bangkok popula-tion who witnessed the unprecedented extent of violence.

The 1992 widespread protest against the unelected Prime Minister GeneralSuchinda Kraprayoon and the National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC) receivedmore extensive and more immediate international media coverage than had beenthe case with previous similar confrontations in Bangkok. Thanks to the earlyand extensive use of modern communications technology, such as faxes, mobile

1 Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "State and Society in Thailand. How Fragile theDemocracy?", Asian Survey XXXIII, 9 (September 1993), 888-89.

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158 Asian Studies Review Vol. 21, Nos. 2-3

phones and videos, information from protest participants and journalists couldcounteract some of the military's attempts to conceal and distort events. Finally,judicious media coverage of the eventual royal intervention also conveyed to bothnational and international audiences that the nation's most respected institutioncould, as it had on earlier occasions, provide stability.2 Since by then businesshad close links with and considerable representation in elected government, theassurance of investor confidence remained an early priority, despite the lastingshock of the violence.

It has always seemed important to re-examine theories of where Thai democ-racy is going after each coup d'6tat, each an addition to the long pattern ofmilitary interventions in democratically elected governments since the end of theAbsolute Monarchy in 1932. Hewison and others are quite correct to point outthat in the Thai case there is no necessary commitment to parliamentary formsamong the middle class and business groups. Their experience of Thai polit-icians are such that they have not in the past been able to believe that abuse ofthe democratic process would be inherently self-correcting. As the initialsupport for the 1991 military coup shows, middle-class disapproval ofnon-parliamentary rule can be more a matter of principle than practice.3

Consequently, more than usual interest and introspection have followed the mostrecent failure of democratically elected governments to achieve a viable legitim-acy which would prevent military overthrow and a middle- and business-classsanctioning of a proffered quick fix. This reflection, both strategic andanalytical, is still prominent in public oppositional discourse five years after theevents of "Black May".

I recall commencing my earlier analysis of the democratising process withthe events of May 1992.4 At that time the event was still recent, yet four yearslater I am struck by the fact that I, like several others, tend to restart at thispoint rather than at another historical juncture. While Thai politics are oftendifficult to analyse and I am not sure there have been substantial changes sincethat article, my choice of starting point may also have something to do with theportrayal of the political process in the progressive Bangkok media over the lastyear. This portrayal has repeatedly shown a very flexible, even elastic, sense oftemporality that enables events such as May 1992 or even events of two decades

2 Craig Reynolds, "Thailand", in Anthony Milner and Mary Quilty (eds.), Communitiesof Thought (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 100.

3 Kevin Hewison acknowledges the work of, among others, Anek Laothamatas inmaking this point. K. Hewison, "Political Oppositions and Regime Change inThailand", in Garry Rodan (ed.), Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia (Londonand New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 85.

4 Nerida Cook, "Democratisation in Thailand", Asian Studies Review 17, 1 (July 1993),126-34.

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earlier, to seem closer in experience as well as importance to the current momentthan intervening events, such as the most recent elections.

Hewison has recently drawn attention to the longevity and durability inThailand of the oppositional "space" which has been maintained from the periodof the overturn of the Absolute Monarchy, a space in which a range of socialgroups and social movements deal with and contest successive governments andstate power.5 This political space is subject to expansion and contraction underdifferent circumstances and regimes, and enables us to focus on the dialoguesbetween various constituencies in their relations with government and with thebroader public. Also worthy of note is the highly elastic temporal dimension inwhich oppositional activities are negotiated, especially evident in political activityover recent months. 1997 has become an important year in the history of Thaidemocratisation since it has seen the drafting and proposal of a new draft charterto modify the nation's fifteenth constitution in sixty-five years. The draft hasbeen based on an unprecedented level of public input, scrutiny, and comment.This constitutional change, legislated for in 1996, has come about as a result ofpublic demand from below, rather than being a consolidation of an unconstitu-tional or authoritarian regime as was often the case for new constitutions in thepast. The draft charter has, in that sense, developed very much within an oppos-itional space which has been temporarily extended, and which has more usuallybeen host to reactions to constitutions imposed from above.

Resumption of Thai Democracy after May 1992

If the events of May 1992 constituted a watershed in the public's political think-ing, their impact appears to have been short-lived in political practice. While thekey military figures responsible for the suppression of protesters were transferredto inactive posts by the interim prime minister, an amnesty granted to thoseinvolved meant that once again constitutional legality, and justice for slaincivilians remained unexamined and inaccessible. In the election held afterSuchinda's military junta was forced out, the political parties who won werethose which had come to be represented in the media as "angelic", in comparisonto the "devil" parties who had supported Suchinda, and who were thus taintedwith the May bloodshed. However, despite the media polarisation of the twosides, one of the military-linked parties, Chart Thai, received a slight increase invotes after the election,6 and by the following election campaign these distinc-tions ceased to have relevance for most practical purposes.

5 Hewison, op. cit., p. 74.6 Surin Maisrikrod, Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992. Democracy Sustained,

Research Notes and Discussion Paper No. 75 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1992), p. 43.

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The new government elected in September 1992 was headed by ChuanLeekpai, leader of the Democrat Party. Sunn notes that by this time the elector-ate made a close association between the party voted for and its leader as primeminister, novel in a situation where previously the top position had often beenappointed by the military. Chuan struck many as a moderate who claimed tohave tried to provide a constitutional remedy to the May crisis. In this hecontrasted strongly with the formerly popular leader of the Phalang Dharmaparty, Chamlong Srimuang, who had openly confronted Suchinda by going on ahunger strike, and who some blamed for leading protesters to their deaths. Healso compared favourably with Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, leader of the New Aspir-ation Party, who was also openly at odds with the influential factions of themilitary at a time when stability was highly desired. Chuan showed a grasp ofthe economic situation, and stated his intention to follow the economic policies ofthe much admired interim Prime Minister, Anand Panyarachun, which alsoassured business groups and the middle class that investor confidence would bemaintained, and therefore economic growth sustained.7

Within a short time, however, the Chuan government was faced with accus-ations of corruption, in one case linked to one of the Democrat Party's intendedcentrepieces of redistribution of wealth: its land reform scheme. Wealthybusinesspersons, some of them with links to the Democrat Party, were revealedto have acquired some of the land supposedly distributed to the rural poor, anddespite resignations of key ministers, the government could not recover fromsustained opposition attack. Some small steps were taken towards improveddemocratisation under Chuan's leadership, but fewer than might have been hopedfor after the dramatic events prior to the election. Economic growth at this stagemoved firmly in the direction of industry and services, but continued to increasethe economic gap between rich and poor despite Chuan's attempts at reform.8

The succeeding government, headed by Banharn Silpa-archa of the ChartThai Party, immediately confirmed public doubts about the leader's sincerity andcapability when he filled his cabinet with members having few qualifications fortheir tasks and poor histories of public credibility. In only sixteen months hisgovernment, discredited for "corruption, cronyism and economic mismanage-ment", faced defections if he did not allow a coalition party leader, ChavalitYongchaiyudh, to take over the leadership.9 Banharn took the not uncommon

7 Ibid., pp. 40-45.8 Kusuma Snitwongse, "Thailand in 1994. The Trials of Transition", Asian Survey

XXXV, 2 (February 1995), 198-99.9 Kevin Hewison and Surin Maisrikrod, "Thailand's 1996 Election. A Cheer for

Democracy?", Australian Quarterly 69, 1 (Autumn 1997), 31-32.

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step for a Thai prime minister faced with unpalatable coercion from within hisown coalition of dissolving the House of Representatives and calling an election.

The November 1996 election, occurring as it did under conditions ofincreasing economic strain, had both positive and negative features from ademocratic point of view. On the negative side, the campaign has beendescribed as the "dirtiest" in Thai history, not only for violence and lack ofimpartiality of government officials, but for highly extensive vote-buying,particularly in the northeast, as reported by the monitoring organisationPollWatch.10 As usual, political parties failed to develop specific platforms,instead appealing to comparative capacities to manage the ailing economy. Thenew ruling coalition was similar to the previous one, with the added attraction ofthe Chart Thai party of Chatichai Choonhavan. Although overthrown forcorruption by Suchinda, Chatichai was remembered for overseeing strongeconomic growth in 1988-91. Furthermore, as Hewison and Surin note,11 thiselection's considerable continuity of government personnel despite changes inparty fortunes is easily explained by large scale party-hopping by politiciansduring the election campaign. Especially significant was the defection of manyMPs from Banharn's party to Chavalit's, led by a disgruntled Snoh Thienthong,who had wanted to be Interior Minister but was bypassed for the post byBanharn.

On the other hand, there were positive democratising trends in this last elec-tion as well. November 1996 saw an unusually high proportion of eligible Thaivoters take part in the third general election since the May catastrophe, andproduced the fourth government in sixteen years to be composed of both electedMPs and an elected prime minister. Furthermore, Chavalit was the first formermilitary leader to be elected premier.12 In the early 1980s ChavalitYongchaiyudh had been associated with the Democratic Soldiers and support ofthe official change from a military to a political offensive against the communistinsurrection, and had espoused views about the proper aims of democraticgovernment and the corrupt "dark influences" thriving in capitalism which causeoppression and suffering to the poor.13 Although he supported a role for themilitary in Thai politics until such "influences" could be overcome, and his closerelations with then PM (General) Prem Tinsulanond facilitated his rise to the top

10 Bangkok Post Weekly Review, 22 November 1996, p. 3. Hewison and Surin (ibid.,p. 35) note that PollWatch consequently did not ratify the election results, but that thismonitoring body lacks real force.

11 Hewison and Surin, ibid., p. 33.12 Ibid., p. 36.13 See, for example, the discussion in Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Armed

Politics 1981-1986 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1987), pp. 68-71.

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post of Commander-in-Chief in 1986, his political ambitions later led him toretire early and establish the New Aspiration Party, and he became premier afteronly six years in civilian politics. His reputation for a pro-democratic stanceprobably facilitated his party's narrow win in 1996 and set an example of asuccessful democratic route to civilian power for ambitious military officers.14

Moreover, Chavalit stated in his election platform that if elected he woulddissolve the Lower House and call fresh elections when the new constitution wasin force, modestly giving his own prospective government a short initial term.This increased the hope of a guarantee of clean and fair elections under politicalreforms as soon as possible. Five years after "Black May", therefore, there isevidence that some moves to further democracy are indeed allowing consolida-tion of civilian command over the political process.

In the first half of 1997, Bangkok saw many signs of high levels of aware-ness of and participation in political activities by a range of groups across arange of issues. There was a strong sense of acknowledging historical precedentin many of these activities, strengthening the assertion by activist groups ofincreasing footholds in an evolving democratising process. Some of these groupswere continuing to occupy the extended oppositional space generated in theopposition to Suchinda and the NPKC. Their assertions emphasised a develop-ment beyond the achievements of pro-democratic precedents, as well assuggesting their temporal propinquity. When combined with the sense ofoptimism and vigilance generated by the anticipated political reform to emergewith the new constitutional draft, this provided a heightened consciousness ofparticipation in a moment of particular historical significance. This perhapsexplains the tone of much of the Bangkok press, and the strong encouragementfor democratic aspirations emerging from many sections of Bangkok society overthe period. In the meantime, the Thai economy failed to pick up, #nd indeed theextent of the economic malaise was dramatically revealed after the governmentwas eventually forced to float the baht on 2 July 1997.

Rural Development and Rural-Urban Relations

Early in February 1997, a number of groups, mostly from rural areas, convergedon Bangkok, as they had done for a number of successive years, to camp in frontof Government House. They came in order to demand government solutions to arange of urgent problems. Such groups have found it useful both symbolicallyand politically to proceed to the capital and rally at the centre of power, in orderto raise awareness of their plight among media and public, as well as politicians.Ranging from access to land and environmental degradation to inadequate or

14 Hewison and Surin, op. cit., p. 36.

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unpaid compensation for relocation for dam construction, their problems weredirect consequences of development processes. Many of the groups come fromthe arid and most deprived northeastern region, although farmers from otherareas, and even slum dwellers have sometimes joined in. Throughout the nine-ties they have become a recognisable feature of the Bangkok political scene inthe early part of each year, and are known as the "Forum of the Poor".

Four groups protested for a month in 1996 and managed to force conces-sions from the government on a number of their forty-seven problems. In 1997there were six groups, with more demands and increased determination. Their121 problems increased the visibility and the embarrassment factor for thegovernment (as well as the workload implied for Chavalit's team in listening toall of the grievances), highlighting the extent of rural dissatisfaction and theinability of governments to address many rural development issues. This form ofnon-violent protest is a contrast to the earlier more militant groupings, which metviolent suppression, including extrajudicial killings of Farmers' Organizationleaders in the seventies.

The effectiveness of the Forum both reflects and extends rural dwellers'ability to inform urban society of the difficulties and unwanted economic andenvironmental side-effects of development. In this they are aided by NGOworkers, both from projects in their own parts of the country, and from localBangkok-based activists, lawyers, journalists and students, who take up theircauses during their sojourn in the capital, offering negotiating and legal advice,providing moral support, and helping to air their issues and complaints. Indeed,the Forum is one manifestation of the active cooperation being forged betweenthe NGO movement and rural and urban-based groups in recent years.15

Recognition of the effectiveness of this annual journey, as well as experience ofreturning home with only vague promises, were reflected in the 1997 Forum'sannounced intention to stay encamped until all of their demands were met.

The Forum participants appear to have significant goodwill and sympathy ofmany Bangkok residents, not only because of their grievances and poverty, butalso, perhaps, because a number of important environmental battles recognisedby urban dwellers have been won thanks to the initial groundwork of such localgroups. In 1997, Bangkok residents supplied food, drinks and moral support toForum participants, and some even volunteered their time to provide educationfor the children who accompanied their parents, as well as initiating adult educa-tion programs, in order to minimise the disadvantages of their stay away fromhome. Nevertheless they suffered a serious loss of income due to absence from

15 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand. Economy and Politics (KualaLumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 388-93.

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farms and up-country jobs. Sections of the media aligned with middle-classprogressive views maintained sympathetic coverage throughout.

After protracted and unsuccessful negotiations, the government acceded insome form to all demands, so after several months Forum members returnedhome. Victories won, however, came at the cost of ten deaths and considerableill health and hardship for those who had camped out for so long on uncomfort-able city pavements at the height of the hot season. One official in the tradeministry sourly accused their ninety-nine day presence as being responsible forpoor trade figures over the period.

Among Chavalit's attempts to address rural issues, particularly the need forthe country's leaders to be better acquainted with the grievances of those in thecountryside, are "roving Cabinet" meetings to be regularly held in various up-country venues, where they can view local developments and be briefed on localdifficulties in an atmosphere of informality. Something of this spirit, as well asthe promised low-cost travel, was stymied when a number of cabinet membersrefused bus transportation, arguing they needed to use their private governmentcars' mobile phones on the way to attending such meetings.

Healing the Nation's Wounds

Chavalit was seen as less in tune with the sentiments of urban citizens when itwas discovered in late March that in his official capacity as defence minister hehad allowed a government pension to be paid to Narong Kittikachorn, one of thethree regime leaders ousted in a student-led overthrow of the government on14 October 1973. Narong is the son of Thanom Kittikachorn, the Army FieldMarshal who followed his patron FM Sarit into the prime ministership from1963-73, and the son-in-law of Thanom's former deputy and Army commanderPraphat Charusathiara. Unprecedented popular protest in Bangkok, led by tensof thousands of students, ended their increasingly corrupt, repressive andunpopular regime in the first popular overthrow of the government in Thaihistory. Towards the end of their regime, the three regime leaders, known asthe "three tyrants", were seen to be so impervious to public opinion that even theking commented on the need to listen to the people.

When the protests resulted in the killing of student protesters, the monarchset what was to become a precedent for royal crisis intervention by advising theregime leaders to go into exile. The king and queen subsequently presided overthe funerary rites of the slain student "heroes". It was Thanom's return toThailand three years later, ostensibly because of concern for his ailing father,which provided a catalyst for what turned into the right wing-led brutal killingsof student demonstrators at Thammasat University on 6 October 1976. Thissecond armed killing of large numbers of demonstrators brought to an end athree-year period of chaotic experimentation with participatory democracy.

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When Chavalit's decision to grant Narong his military pension was leaked tothe press, bitter protest from student groups, academics, and even governmentministers filled the papers during the first week of April 1997. Many of thesurviving activists of the 1973 and 1976 episodes had also played active roles inthe protest against Suchinda in May 1992, forming pro-democracy groups whichhave still not disbanded. Although Narong had been formally acquitted of anywrongdoing in following orders, he had been seen firing on student protestersfrom a helicopter, and prevailing sentiment as to his guilt did not change.Chavalit's decision to reinstate his pension was therefore seen as a direct insultto those who had defended democracy with their lives on that occasion.Chavalit's haste in approving Narong's pension after becoming premier wasattributed in the press to Narong's considerable support for his party and his ownpolitical career. Another factor was thought to be his continued entrenchment inmilitary hierarchy and patronage, since Thanom, Suchinda, and other seniorofficers unpopular with the people still receive respect from younger militaryofficers.16

Pro-democracy activists also demanded the immediate building of thememorial which had long been promised to commemorate the student demonstra-tors killed in the 14 October 1973 incident. They also called for the rewriting ofsecondary school history books to include the activities of democratic groups onthat occasion, as well as the May 1992 incident, in order to make the nationalhistory of pro-democratic struggle against dictatorship and state violence knownto younger generations. In their representations, these activists explicitly built onthe shock and disapproval generated by the May 1992 military suppression, andits similarities with October 1973. The public view of the 6 October 1976incident remains somewhat more ambivalent, since the suppression of studentdemonstrators, however brutal, was portrayed and to some extent interpreted asanti-communist and pro-monarchical, yet in hindsight similarities link the threeincidents in that the military officers concerned did not acknowledge any wrong-doing on any of these occasions. Later comments on the Narong pension issuestressed not only the similarities between the three events within two decades,but also their cumulative effect.17 They suggest something approaching acritical mass of citizens subject to state violence which has still to become arecognised part of official history.

Chavalit proffered a post-hoc explanation for his decision as an attempt to"heal the country's wounds", still suppurating from the 14 October 1973incident, and pointed out that Narong had reformed, as proved by his running forelections later in his life. Narong, however, referred to the public protest as

16 "Long Ties Linked to Premier's Action", Nation, 2 April 1997.17 See Kavi Chongkittavorn, "Comment" column in Nation, 16 May 1997.

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"mob rule", and challenged his detractors, whose actions he characterised assinful, to come out onto the streets as they had done in 1973. Chavalit quicklygave the go-ahead for the monument to the victims of 14 October 1973 to beconstructed, and acceded to public demands by revoking his decision to allowNarong the pension.18 It was even suggested that the monument also commem-orate those who defended democracy in 1976 and 1992, but officials demurred,and an extreme right-wing group protested against the monument being erected atall.19

It was clear from Chavalit's blunder that the differences manifested twodecades earlier were still keenly felt on both sides. In a notable example ofthese conflicting positions, Narong's daughter attempted to diffuse accusations ofher father's guilt in 1973 by arguing that the student activists had been too youngto know right from wrong, while former students reminded Chavalit that hisactions still offended them now that they were adults and playing significant rolesin society.20

The pro-democrats' preoccupation with past popular protest was most likelypart of a momentum that had developed following the previous year's twentiethanniversary of the massacre of students at Thammasat University on 6 October1976. On this occasion, several original student activists, as well as prominentgovernment officials, attended some of the commemorations. Among the numer-ous publications, analyses and documents marking the occasion, one formerstudent activist, now an academic, highlighted the conspiracy of silence whichstill surrounded the 1976 event, which, he said, prevents public understandingand reflects the close relationships among those in power then and now.21

In May 1997 the events of May 1992 were revisited in a fifth anniversarycommemoration, with yet more analysis and commentary, much of which simi-larly highlighted the continuing dearth of public information about what hadreally happened.22 An official inquiry had failed to clarify events, someinformation had not been released, and an amnesty had prevented the revelationin court of those who had been responsible for the decision to use armed force.There remain disputes over the number of civilians killed, with many present atthe time of the killings still unaccounted for. Student groups, survivors and pro-democracy groups variously demanded an apology from Suchinda while laying a

18 See extensive coverage in Nation, 1-6 April 1997.19 Thongchai Winichakul, "Tomorrow Could Be Ours", Nation, 16 May 1997.20 "PM Backs Down in Row over Pension", Nation, 2 April 1997.21 Thongchai Winichakul, in a paper entitled "Remembering/Silencing the Traumatic

Past" presented at the Sixth International Conference on Thai Studies, Chiang Mai,14-17 October 1996.

22 See Kavi, op. cit.; Thongchai, 1997, op. cit.

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wreath at his house; tried to have the amnesty protecting the military officersinvolved ruled unconstitutional; suggested repeal of the amnesty to reveal thetruth; and demanded official public recognition of the historical significance ofthe event.23 Suggestions were made that the sites of public protests and civiliandeaths be marked with plaques.

A tour organised by academics and political activists to mark Black Mayfollowed a route surrounding Rajadamnoen Avenue and the DemocracyMonument, from the statue of Rama V and the plaque commemorating the 1932democratic change, to Thammasat University. Dubbed by one former student an"outdoor museum", the surprisingly small area included the major sites where allthree protests had occurred. At each notable point, tour leaders narrated theirexperiences or provided an analysis of what had happened in the 1973, 1976,and 1992 demonstrations, creating inconsistencies in memories and the interpret-ation of their significance as well as allowing interesting juxtapositions ofmusical and other contemporary expressions of identity, in a combination whichone commentator labelled "post-modern".24 Rather than suggesting a linearprogression of claims for democracy, the effect produced created an impressionof similar struggles repeatedly staged against, mostly, the same forces of soldiersand police,25 remarkable in its temporal as well as spatial compression. Incontrast to the usual view put forward by politicians presenting democratisationas a necessarily slow process to allow time for the gradual sophistication of theThai population, an impression was created of cyclical repetition in virtually thesame temporal and spatial spot. No politicians took part in the walk, which wastaken by several hundred people across a wide age span, as a testament toThailand's (Bangkok's?) version of "people power".

There is other evidence of the political stirrings of Bangkok's educatedmiddle class. Although only a small number of women (22, or 5.6 per cent ofthe parliament) were elected from the 360 female candidates in the lastelection,26 this compares favourably with the 1 per cent of village andsubdistrict heads and subdistrict council members who are currently women.27

Even so, over the last decade or so a small number of prominent female MPsand well-known and respected female village leaders has increasingly raised theconsciousness of women. Some female MPs have pointedly enlarged their

23 Kavi, op. cit., and coverage in Nation, 18 and 20 May 1997.24 Pravit Rojanaphruk, "History Tour Traces Work of Activists", Nation, 19 May 1997.25 One speaker, the doctor who tended the wounded in the Royal Hotel in May 1992,

argued against blaming these armed forces.26 Hewison and Surin, op. cit., p . 34.27 Sheila Sukonta Thomson, Thai Women in Local Politics: Democracy in the Making

(Bangkok: Gender and Development Research Institute and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,1995), pp. 2 , 7.

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specific duties to take interest in issues such as children's rights, or to spearheadaction on child abuse and domestic violence. Others directly address broaderwomen's concerns and contribute to academic and social debates on genderissues, and there is a quiet sense of progress for particular constituencies thatappears suggestive of pluralist civil society. However, women politiciansroutinely stress the heavy weight of pre-democratic cultural tradition, accountingfor their limited success to date in terms of being the "hind legs of the elephant".

A statement made by a group of academic petitioners against the 1991 coupappears to reflect the views of many educated urbanites, including women, of thenew directions their political system is taking over time: "Thailand has become acomplex, plural society. The democratic system ... provides ... equal opportun-ity to voice opinions and to participate in determining the future course of thecountry without domination by any one privileged group".28

Designs for the Future

Arguably the process of most significance during 1977 for the future of democ-racy has been the writing of the draft charter as a wide-ranging attempt tomodify the Thai constitution to improve the operation of the political system as awhole. Gradual, piecemeal improvements, such as those introduced during theChuan and Anand governments, have served to highlight the need for moresystematic and thoroughgoing change. Accordingly, amendments to Article 211of the Constitution were passed in 1996 to allow for a significant level ofpolitical reform.

The current revisions are ambitious in both their scope and boldness ofvision, as well as the degree of public participation they mandate. The draftershave been obligated at several stages to take into account public opinions andreactions before presenting the completed draft to parliament for'its acceptanceor rejection without amendment. In contrast, politicians have been excluded

28 The statement is quoted in Hewison, op. cit., p. 73. Politicians' messages to womenabout their political prospects are mixed. Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-archa, ingiving his 1996 New Year's address, mentioned women among the disadvantagedgroups to be targeted as of special concern for the government's policies. In 1997, anelected MP from the Phalang Dharma Party, Mrs Sudarat Keyuraphan, was houndedfrom her position as party secretary-general by the rather transparent manoeuvre ofaccusations from party rivals of an affair with a former party leader and pocketingmoney he donated to the party. This highly publicised attempt to cast aspersions onher personal reputation as a woman as well as a politician was seen as so damagingthat her father, once a politician (in another party) himself, stepped in personally tooversee her resignation from the party position to put an end to the rumours (BangkokPost Weekly Review, 14 March 1997, p. 4).

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from participating in the drafting process, and their influence over draftinggroups via proxies has been guarded against. Moreover, if the parliament rejectsthe new draft, the final decision is to be redirected to a public referendum.

The new charter attempts a number of significant improvements, a consoli-dation of the momentum achieved in recent reforms. It aims to raise thequalifications and accountability of those in power; institute checks and balancesat a number of levels; improve transparency in decision making; and increasedecentralisation. It addresses issues of increased representation and participationwhich further the rights and freedoms of both individuals and local communities.A good deal of attention has been given to devising ways of preventing the wide-spread corruption and systems of patronage which currently affect existing powerrelations, and which led to the widespread vote-buying of the last few elec-tions.29 In tackling such problems it has had to try to coordinate reformistelements. An example is the attempt to stop political office providing opportun-ities for accruing great wealth, by preventing the recovery while in office oflarge sums spent during election campaigns. Overall, the process has resulted ina sustained attempt to ameliorate or even eradicate some of the widely recog-nised problems in Thai political life, and has therefore created great controversy,largely among those in power.

However, scandals which have occurred during the drafting have temperedpoliticians' ability to object. These include the enormous loss of funds throughsuspected embezzlement and fraud from the Bangkok Bank of Commerce, andseveral examples of fuzzy understandings of some terminology, such as the caseof a government minister who claimed that his handouts to government officialsas part of a pet ministerial project was not corruption.30 Another irony wasChavalit's attempt to exercise greater control over press coverage of his govern-

29 See Hewison and Surin, op. cit., p. 31 and fn. 2, p . 39.30 The press had satirical fun with the case of the Education Minister's over-enthusiastic

generosity in organising a survey of educational needs in a project to supply schoolswith computers. A former business executive, Sukhavich, had finally to concede thathis understanding of correct political behaviour may have been naive due to hisnewness to politics, but he has not been the only one to fail to see the problem incertain kinds of behaviour applied in the course of government activity. For coverageof both sides of the Sukhavich debate see Bangkok Post in mid-February 1997. Presstreatment of Sukhavich was already influenced by, among other things, his earlierattempt to prevent homosexuals from becoming teachers, unabashedly characterisingthem as "sick", and causing international as well as national human rights reaction (seeBangkok Post, 25 January 1997). For an excellent account of Thai views ofcorruption as well as its embeddedness in many areas of Thai social and political life,see Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Priyarangsan, Corruption and Democracy inThailand (second edn.) (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1994).

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ment while the charter protecting freedom of the press was being finalised.31

One of the most contentious areas of public concern centred on the issue ofdirect election of the prime minister. This eventually led Anand Panyarachun,the highly popular and widely respected chairman of the Constitution DraftingCommittee, to argue against the clearly expressed public preference for directelection on the grounds that this was not suitable for the Thai situation.

Most attention, however, has been paid to the frequently bitter reactions ofpoliticians and government officials to the charter. At one stage, a senator'sstrategy recalled the prelude to the 6 October 1976 incident when he emotivelytold a meeting of village scouts that the new charter would constitute a seriousslight on the king and ought to be resisted. His appeal to a well-known conser-vative group which had acted brutally against students in October 1976, and theuse of highly emotive remarks about the monarchy were quickly criticised asinappropriate, but the argument did not quite die out.32 An embattled InteriorMinister also reverted to seventies' logic in attempting to discredit the charterprocess by calling its supporters communists, a designation, it was noted, thatcould have sparked violence in another era.33

Many officials targeted by the new policies have reacted to defend theirstatus, power and image. For instance, judges have actively opposed theproposed reorganisation of the court system, while the police have protestedagainst the proposed increased rights of suspected criminals. Village headmenand kamnan (subdistrict heads) have campaigned at length against termination oftheir ex-officio membership of local level tambon (subdistrict) administrativecouncils, and threatened massive demonstrations against the draft, an action onlydiscouraged by the Interior Minister when it appeared likely to provoke aninflammatory pro-charter demonstration.

A number of conservative politicians have been outspoken critics of thedraft. The Interior Minister, Snoh Thienthong, for instance, has vociferouslycriticised a number of features, including the provision for voters to be able torequest investigations for corruption against Cabinet members and other highranking officials if they can gather the signatures of 50,000 voters in support ofthe request. Snoh appeared unhappy with the provision in general, but criticised

31 See, for example, Yuwadee Tunyasiri, "Chavalit Reins in Media", Bangkok Post,8 August 1997.

32 It was still being refuted months later: "Role of King Not Threatened", Nation,4 September 1997.

33 "Scrapping of Article 304 will Satisfy Snoh", Nation, 31 August 1997; Thana Poopat,"The Old School", Nation, 31 August 1997.

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the number of voters required in particular as too small, adding in support of hispoint that he could get 200,000 signatures in a day if he wanted them.34

Finally, Chavalit himself was revealed as reluctant to pass the draft in itspresent form, seeking ways to get around the provisions preventing parliamentfrom amending the draft before passing it. The climax of dissembling andsilence which has accompanied Chavalit's reception of the draft has greatlyincreased apprehension about its future, even if parliament accepts it in order tobe able to amend it. One option is dissolving the house in order to buy time.When faced with possible parliamentary rejection of the draft, supporterspublicly expressed concerns about the outcome of a public referendum organisedby Snoh's Interior Ministry, with its history of "tentacular control over localgovernment"35 and the dependence of voters for information on disgruntledheadmen and kamnan. Since its early optimism and energy, the draft charterprocess now seems fragile and in danger of being frustrated.

While the draft charter was in preparation, the nation as a whole, andespecially academics, pro-democracy groups, NGOs, students, former officials,and groups such as "Businessmen for Democracy" have enjoyed to the full theoppositional space created. Now that the resulting product of that political spacethreatens to cross over into the space occupied by the incumbent government andits interests, however, oppositional thought, communication and activism aremeeting strong resistance. The tensions accompanying this process have reacti-vated fears of cyclical repetition of events in contrast to the official andconservative lineal projection of gradual democratisation. There have beenaccusations of distorted and blurred memories arising from the past's unexam-ined secrets, and even battles over the possible total eclipse of past events fromthe collective national memory.

Facing Uncertainties

In the later stages of the charter drafting process another level of threat has creptinto predicted outcomes: that of public dissatisfaction leading to unrest and eventhe likelihood of violence. Supporters of the charter and its potential for reformhave not lost the rare opportunity to refer to "the people" and their wishes. It ispossible to refer to the people in some senses as the authors of the new charter,since their views have been noted and expressed, and their straightforwardmessage sent into the government's arena.

34 Ibid.35 Vithit Muntaporn and Charles Taylor, cited in Sheila Sukonta Thomson, Thai Women

in Local Politics. Democracy in the Making (Bangkok: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung andGender and Development Research Institute, 1995), p . 1.

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While this categorisation of the Thai public as "the people" has some basisin the realities of the 240-day drafting process, it is still truer rhetorically than infact. One Nation reporter was able to find, within a few hours' travel fromBangkok, villagers who had not heard of the constitution, or who did not reallyunderstand the process of change, let alone having access to copies of thedocument.36 Although pro-democracy groups and even a business concern wereactive in handing out thousands of copies of the draft charter on the streets, suchaction was restricted to Bangkok only. In spite of extensive efforts to include allrural areas in the drafting process, according to media accounts much of thebattle seems to have been fought on urban turf. This reflects the continuingdivision between Bangkok and rural voters. The latter perforce often depend onlocal patronage systems and officials, and it remains to be seen whether ruralsociety will experience change if the charter does become law.

The other recent event affecting the Thai political scene which raisesquestions for the future is the effect of the economic slump which Thailand nowfaces, revelations of which appeared in the final stages of the drafting process.Over the last decade or more, the nation's political life has been shaped in partby sustained economic growth, among the best in the region. This has arguablyallowed politicians some leeway for their activities as long as the buoyanteconomic trajectory was sustained. The extent of the economic trough, its realcauses and the time it will take Thailand to recover from it, all raise to unusuallevels of unpredictability the relationship between government, the capitalistclass, and the middle class which has grown so rapidly into a substantial andinfluential proportion of the urban population.

Chavalit has nominally acknowledged the chorus of support for whateveractions are necessary to restore most quickly investor confidence and meet theexpectations of those who have provided the considerable IMF-brokered rescuepackage, but relations between his leadership and economic groups have deterior-ated very rapidly in the face of his government's continued prevarication overthe charter's draft process.37 Business groups have finally linked acceptance ofthe charter to sending the right messages to the market and investors, in theirown attempt to deal with weeks of stalemate. The strong presence of businessinterests in government38 is likely to provide pressure for firmer control over

36 The villager who revealed most ignorance about the constitution ("Is it edible?") was aheadman's wife. Chularat Saengpassa, "Awareness Yet to Reach Grassroots", Nation,4 September 1997.

37 "Businessmen Urge PM to Quit", Nation, 11 September 1997.38 See Hewison's discussion of this point in his article "Thailand", in Kevin Hewison,

Richard Robison and Garry Rodan (eds.), Southeast Asia in the 1990s.Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1993),pp. 177-80.

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policy in order to ensure economic recovery. The government may be less ableto tolerate the self-serving power games that coalition players have engaged in atthe expense of attention to the running of the economy. It may be that, coinci-dentally, the economic crisis Thailand currently faces will, in the initial phases ofimplementation of the first popularly-based constitution in Thai history, help toconcentrate political attention and will on improving performance rather than onretaining extensive political and economic perks.

As the draft charter is introduced at a time of profound economic crisis,there is yet another moment of convergence between the middle and businessclasses, where they both stand to benefit from the work put into regularisingpolitical (and by implication economic) processes by the Constitutional DraftingCouncil. As yet untried in practice, the new draft charter promises both groupsa framework that should minimise the abuses and money politics of the last fewelections and allow for a skilled and transparent process of economic recoverycapable of generating the required national and international business confidence,now significantly reduced. Implementation of the draft may protect the reform-ers among the middle class from the possibility of again contemplating support ofauthoritarian intervention (commonly excused because of economic downturn inthe past) as their livelihoods and standards of living are directly affected by theincreased taxation and belt-tightening any government will be forced to undertakefor what may be an uncertain and extended process of economic recovery.Alternatively, the complexity, depth and comprehensiveness which the newconstitutional changes attempt to provide (estimated to take about ten months tobring into effect), might prove too difficult to implement under conditions ofsevere economic anxiety and constraint.

Ironically, there is still the possibility of another historical repetition, whichmay return to haunt Thai pro-democracy groups: that the proposed draft charter,possibly the lengthiest such document in the world, is being constructed in delib-erate refutation of an anonymous poem found after the May 1992 incident that,in four lines, pictured the heritage of the previous sixty-year period as only"unhealed wounds ... and the ruins of democracy".39

39 In Kasian Tejapira, "Post-May Reform is Incomplete", article circulated on theinternet, 22 May 1997.

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democratisation in thailand revisited

Documents