democracy and victory: why regime type hardly matters is... · 2003. 5. 7. · will win most ofits...

Whether democraciesare more or less likely to win wars has long been a contentious issue TheGreek general Thucydidesrsquo chronicle of the defeat of democratic Athens in itstwenty-four-year struggle with authoritarian Sparta in The Peloponnesian Warparticularly his account of the Sicilian debacle remains the classic indictmentof the inability of democracies to prepare for and ght wars1 Indeed for mostof Western history pessimism dominated thinking about democracy and warldquoDemocratic defeatistsrdquo from the French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville tomid-twentieth-century realists such as EH Carr George Kennan and WalterLippmann believed that democracy was a decided liability in preparing forand ghting wars Particularly during the Cold War the pessimistic perspec-tive on the ghting power of democracies was dominant2 Even leaders of thefree world such as John F Kennedy believed that when democracy ldquocompeteswith a system of government built primarily for war it is at a disadvan-tagerdquo3 Despite the end of the Cold War a few Cassandras remain concernedthat democracies are unprepared to meet the next major military threat fromauthoritarian states such as China or international terrorist organizations suchas al-Qaeda4Democracy and Victory

Not everyone shared this pessimism however The Greek historian Herod-otus argued that democracy increased military effectiveness ldquoAs long as the

Democracy and Victory Michael C Desch

Why Regime Type Hardly Matters

International Security Vol 27 No 2 (Fall 2002) pp 5ndash47copy 2002 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

5

Michael C Desch is Professor and Associate Director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and Interna-tional Commerce at the University of Kentucky

For their extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article I thank Eugene GholzDouglass Gibler Hein Goemans Samuel Huntington Stuart Kaufman Edward Manseld DanielMarkey John Mueller John Odell Robert Pape Dan Reiter Helena Truszczynska Steven Voss Ste-phen Walt participants in seminars at the Program for International Security Policy at the Univer-sity of Chicago and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F KennedySchool of Government Harvard University the anonymous reviewers for International Securityand especially John Mearsheimer I received generous nancial support from the Smith Richard-son Foundation and indispensable research assistance from Glenn Rudolph and John Hajner

1 Thucydides The Peloponnesian War Bk 7 trans Rex Warner (Middlesex UK Penguin 1954)2 See for example Jean-Franccedilois Revel How Democracies Perish (Garden City NY Doubleday1984) p 33 Quoted in Melvin Small Democracy and Diplomacy The Impact of Domestic Politics on US ForeignPolicy 1789ndash1994 (Baltimore Md Johns Hopkins University Press 1996) p xiii4 Donald Kagan and Frederick W Kagan While America Sleeps Self-Delusion Military Weaknessand the Threat to Peace Today (New York St Martinrsquos 2000) pp viii 307 and Robert Kagan and

Athenians were ruled by tyrants they were no better warriors than their neigh-bors but once they got rid of the tyranny they became best of all by a longshotrdquo5 With the democratic Westrsquos victory in the Cold War a renewed opti-mism about the military prowess of democratic states has taken root ldquoDemo-cratic triumphalistsrdquo note that an examination of major wars since 1815 revealsthat the more democratic states have been on the winning side in the over-whelming majority of cases6 ldquoThere is something about democratic regimesrdquotwo triumphalists suggest ldquothat makes it easier for them to generate militarypower and achieve victory in the arena of warrdquo7

Democratic triumphalists offer different explanations for why this should bethe case and sometimes they dissent from each otherrsquos arguments taken as awhole however they suggest two reasons why democracies tend to win wars8

Some argue that democracies are better at picking the wars they get into start-ing only those they know they can win This is the ldquoselection effectsrdquo argu-ment Others maintain that once at war democracies ght more effectivelyThey have bigger economies form stronger alliances make better decisionshave higher levels of public support or can count on greater effort from theirsoldiers This is the ldquomilitary effectivenessrdquo argument

The aim of this article is to question this sanguine view about democracyand military victory I make three arguments First an examination of the his-torical data and methodological approach does not strongly support thetriumphalistsrsquo claim that all other things being equal democracies are morelikely to win in war

Second the logic that underpins the triumphalistsrsquo case is unpersuasiveSpecically there is no reason to believe nor is there much evidence to suggestthat leaders of democracies are more careful in selecting their wars than theirauthoritarian counterparts The same charges can be made against the militaryeffectiveness argument

International Security 272 6

William Kristol ldquoGetting Seriousrdquo Weekly Standard November 19 2001 httpwwwweeklystandardcomContentPublicArticles000000000518hrpmoasp5 Quoted in Donald Kagan Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Athenian Democracy (New York FreePress 1991) p 16 See also Victor Davis Hanson The Soul of Battle From Ancient Times to the PresentDay How Three Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny (New York Free Press 1999)6 David A Lake ldquoPowerful Pacists Democratic States and Warrdquo American Political Science Re-view Vol 86 No 1 (March 1992) pp 24ndash37 See also Dan Reiter and Allan C Stam III Democraciesat War (Princeton NJ Princeton University Press 2002)7 Dan Reiter and Allan C Stam III ldquoDemocracy and Battleeld Military Effectivenessrdquo Journal ofConict Resolution Vol 42 No 3 (June 1998) p 259 For similar sentiments see Aaron L FriedbergIn the Shadow of the Garrison State Americarsquos Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy (PrincetonNJ Princeton University Press 2000) p 340 and Hanson The Soul of Battle p 48 William Reed and David H Clark ldquoWar Initiation and War Winnersrdquo Journal of Conict Resolu-tion Vol 44 No 3 (June 2000) pp 378ndash395

Third explanations other than those based on regime type more plausiblyexplain how states perform in war Some of these explanations are well knownFor example an advantage in military power is often a reliable indicator ofwhich side is likely to win a war9 The nature of the conict can also inuencemilitary outcomes In particular the opposing sides in a war often have asym-metrical interests which sometimes produce a paradoxical outcome where theweaker state defeats its more powerful adversary10 Moreover states that imi-tate the military organization and doctrines of the leading states in the interna-tional system are likely to prevail in war11 Nationalism has also proven to be apotent source of increased military effectiveness in democracies (eg revolu-tionary France 1789ndash94) and in autocracies (eg Prussia and Spain 1807ndash15)12

Other explanations are less well known It is possible for instance that the cor-relation between democracy and victory is spurious Certain factors that makeit more likely that a state will be democratic also increase the likelihood that itwill win most of its wars13 Finally whether a regime is consolidated or notcould determine its performance in war

My case against the triumphalists should not be read as support for the pes-simistsrsquo claim that democracies are especially inept at ghting wars and there-fore likely to be defeated by rival authoritarian states Rather it supports the

Democracy and Victory 7

9 Ivan Arreguiacuten-Toft ldquoHow the Weak Win Wars A Theory of Asymmetric Conictrdquo InternationalSecurity Vol 26 No 1 (Summer 2001) p 97 nds that in interstate wars between 1800 and 1998the stronger actor won nearly 71 percent of the time See also John J Mearsheimer ldquoAssessing theConventional Balance The 31 Rule and Its Criticsrdquo International Security Vol 13 No 4 (Spring1989) pp 54ndash89 and John J Mearsheimer The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York WWNorton 2001)10 Andrew M Mack ldquoWhy Big Nations Lose Small Warsrdquo World Politics Vol 27 No 2 (January1975) pp 175ndash200 and Arreguiacuten-Toft ldquoHow the Weak Win Warsrdquo pp 93ndash12811 Kenneth N Waltz Theory of International Politics (Reading Mass Addison-Wesley 1979)pp 76ndash77 127ndash128 See also Joatildeo Resende-Santos ldquoAnarchy and the Emulation of Military Sys-tems Military Organization and Technology in South America 1870ndash1914rdquo Security Studies Vol 5No 3 (Spring 1996) pp 193ndash26012 Aside from Carl Maria von Clausewitz On War ed Anatol Rapoport (Middlesex UK Pen-guin 1968) pp 384ndash385 the best general discussions of military consequences of increasing na-tionalism are Peter Paret ldquoNationalism and the Sense of Military Obligationrdquo Military Affairs Vol34 No 1 (February 1970) pp 2ndash6 Robert R Palmer ldquoFrederick the Great Guibert Buumllow FromDynastic to National Warrdquo in Peter Paret edMakers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nu-clear Age (Princeton NJ Princeton University Press 1986) pp 91ndash122 Barry R Posen ldquoNational-ism the Mass Army and Military Powerrdquo International Security Vol 18 No 2 (Fall 1993) pp 80ndash124 and Stephen Van Evera ldquoHypotheses on Nationalism and Warrdquo International Security Vol 18No 4 (Spring 1994) p 3013 John Mueller makes a similar argument about the spurious relationship between democracyand peace in ldquoIs War Still Becoming Obsoleterdquo paper prepared for the annual meeting of theAmerican Political Science Association Washington DC August 1991 pp 50ndash52 See also JohnMueller Quiet Cataclysm Reections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics (Reading MassAddison-Wesley 1995)

view that on balance democracies share no particular advantages or dis-advantages in selecting and waging wars In other words regime type hardlymatters for explaining who wins and loses wars

The remainder of the article is laid out as follows The triumphalistsrsquo case ispresented in the next section In the following section I critique the data andapproach that undergird the triumphalistsrsquo claim that in war democracies aremore likely to be victorious The logic and evidence that underpin thetriumphalistsrsquo casemdashselection effects and military effectivenessmdashare analyzedin the next two sections Throughout the article I use among other cases Israelsince 1948 to illustrate the problems with these arguments Israel is a big win-ner in the triumphalistsrsquo data sets and so should be an easy test for their claimThe standard view is that Israel a small embattled democracy has won itswars despite overwhelming odds for many of the reasons that triumphalistssuggest14 If their theories do not in fact explain these victories there are evenmore grounds for discounting them15 The article concludes with a brief dis-cussion of the implications of my ndings for scholarly debates on the relation-ship between democracy and war It also offers some policy recommendationson how to think about the sources of military effectiveness

The Triumphalistsrsquo Case

The foundation of the triumphalistsrsquo claim that democracies are more likely towin wars is based on two studies that employ different sets of cases selectedfrom the same databases In a 1992 study David Lake looked at every warsince 1815 listed in the Correlates of War (COW) data set and selected those in-volving states with a democracy score of 6 or higher based on the widely usedPOLITY democracy index16 This criterion makes sense because states withsuch scores exhibit the characteristics that we expect of democracies17 Using


14 Reiter and Stam Democracies at War p 6515 This is essentially what Stephen Van Evera calls a ldquohoop testrdquo that is if a theory is correct itshould easily pass this test if it does not there are grounds to doubt the theory See Van EveraGuide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca NY Cornell University Press 1997) p 3116 Lake ldquoPowerful Pacistsrdquo The COW data set refers to J David Singer and Melvin Small Cor-relates of War Project International and Civil War Data 1816ndash1992No 9905 (Ann Arbor Mich Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [ICPSR] 1994) This data set contains in-formation about war participation outcomes various indices of military power and war initiatorsFor the most recent version of the POLITY democracy index see Keith Jaggers and Ted RobertGurr Polity III Regime-Type and Political Authority 1800ndash1994No 6695 (Ann Arbor Mich ICPSR1996) From that data most analysts calculate a composite democracy score (210 to 10) by sub-tracting their AUTOC from DEMOC scores17 On a 21-point scale from 210 to 10 6 is the generally accepted cutoff point for democracy

Lakersquos method I have determined that in the most current versions of theCOW and POLITY data sets there have been 31 wars involving democracies3 of which are excluded because they were draws (Korean War 1969War of At-trition and 1982 Lebanon War) Democracies won 23 of the remaining 28 warsor 82 percent (see Table 1)18

In a more recent study Dan Reiter and Allan Stam examined most of thewars since 1815 in the COW data set to determine how often controlling forother factors the more democratic state prevailed over the less democraticstate Like Lake Reiter and Stam used the POLITY democracy index to mea-sure the level of democracy in the warring states Utilizing that criterion andthe most current versions of the COW and POLITY III data sets I counted 75wars 24 of which were excluded because (1) data are missing on the level ofdemocracy for all participants (2) the wars involved states with the same de-mocracy score (3) the war ended in a draw or (4) the conict was ongoing Themore democratic state won 36 of the remaining 51 wars or 71 percent (seeTable 2)19

In sum the historical record appears to support the triumphalistsrsquo claim thatwhether one looks at wars involving states with democracy scores greater than6 or expands the universe to consider all wars in which more democratic statesbattled less democratic ones there is a strong correlation between democracyand victory

Do Democracies Really Win Wars More Often

To determine whether regime type really explains a statersquos military perfor-mance it is to necessary to look more closely at both the data and the approachthat lead triumphalistsrsquo to conclude that democracies are more likely to wintheir wars


Karen Rasler and William R Thompson ldquoPredator Initiators and Changing Landscapes forWarfarerdquo Journal of Conict Resolution Vol 43 No 4 (August 1999) p 718 Lake ldquoPowerful Pacistsrdquo pp 24ndash37 Because there was often more than one state on eachside in these wars Lake actually has an N of 121 The Gulf War which occurred subsequent to thepublication of Lakersquos article should also count according to his criteria19 The 1994 version of the COW data set including these wars has an N of 269 Reiter and StamDemocracies at War pp 52ndash57 employ many (but not all) of these wars leaving them with an N of197 Specically they do not include the following wars First Schleswig-Holstein (1848ndash49) Span-ish-Chilean (1865ndash66) Sino-French (1884ndash85) Franco-Thai (1893) Central American (1906) Lithua-nian-Polish (1919ndash20) Franco-Turkey (1919ndash22) Sino-Japanese (1937ndash41) Chankufeng (1938)Franco-Thai (1940ndash41) Korean (1950ndash53) Second Kashmir (1965) Football War (1969) Sino-Viet-namese (1979) Iran-Iraq (1980ndash88) Gulf War (1990ndash91) and Azeri-Armenian War (1992ndash98) Theyalso disaggregate World War I World War II the Vietnam War and the Yom Kippur War into dis-tinct phases

dataThere are at least six problems with the data that the triumphalists use to sup-port their claim that democracies excel at winning wars First conicts aremisaggregated in a number of cases Misaggregation couldmdashand sometimesdoesmdashbias the results in favor of democracy20 Second there are cases ofdemocracies winning wars as members of mixed alliances where thenondemocracy accounted for the majority of the winning alliancersquos military


Table 1 Outcomes of COW Wars (democracy score gt 6)

Pessimists Triumphalists Not Counted

Mexican-American (1848)Roman Republic (1849)Crimean (1853plusmn 56)Anglo-Persian (1856plusmn 57)Sino-French (1884plusmn 85)

Greco-Turkish (1897)Spanish-American (1898)Boxer Rebellion (1900)Spanish-Moroccan (1909plusmn 10)First Balkan (1912plusmn 13)Second Balkan (1913)World War I (1914plusmn 18)Hungarian-Allies (1919)Russo-Polish (1919plusmn 20)

Russo-Finnish (1939plusmn 40)World War II (1939plusmn 45)Palestine (1948)

Korea (1950plusmn 53)Sinai (1956)

Sino-Indian (1962)Second Kashmiri (1965)Vietnam (1965plusmn 75)

Six-Day (1967)Football (1969)

War of Attrition (1969plusmn 70)Bangladesh (1971)Yom Kippur (1973)Turko-Cypriot (1974)Falklands (1982)

Lebanon (1982)Gulf War (1990plusmn 91)

Total 5 23 3

20 Other scholars have recognized this problem too See for example D Scott Bennett and AllanC Stam III ldquoThe Declining Advantages of Democracy A Combined Model of War Outcomes andDurationrdquo Journal of Conict Resolution Vol 42 No 3 (June 1996) p 246 and Reiter and Stam De-mocracies at War p 39


Table 2 Outcomes of COW Wars (winner democracy gt loser democracy)


Franco-Spanish (1823)Russo-Turkish (1828plusmn 29)

Mexican-American (1848)Austro-Sardinian (1848plusmn 49)

First Schleswig-Holstein(1848plusmn 49)

Roman Republic (1849)La Plata (1851plusmn 52)

Crimean (1853plusmn 56)Anglo-Persian (1856plusmn 57)

Italian Unification (1859)Spanish-Moroccan (1859plusmn 60)Italo-Roman (1860)

Italian-Sicilian (1860plusmn 61)Franco-Mexican (1862plusmn 67)

Ecuador-Columbia (1863)Second Schleswig-Holstein(1864)

Lopez (1864plusmn 70)Spanish-Chilean (1865plusmn 66)

Seven Weeks (1866)Franco-Prussian (1870plusmn 71Russo-Turkish (1877plusmn 78)

Pacific (1879plusmn 83)Sino-French (1884plusmn 85)

Central America (1885)Franco-Thai (1893)Sino-Japanese (1894plusmn 95)

Greco-Turkish (1897)Spanish-American (1898)Boxer Rebellion (1900)Russo-Japanese (1904plusmn 05)

Central America (1906)Central America (1907)

Spanish-Moroccan (1909plusmn 10)Italian-Turkey (1911plusmn 12)

First Balkan (1912plusmn 13)Second Balkan (1913)World War I (1914plusmn 18)Hungarian-Allies (1919)Russo-Polish (1919plusmn 20)Lithuanian-Polish (1919plusmn 20)

Greco-Turkey (1919plusmn 22)Franco-Turkey (1919plusmn 22)

Sino-Soviet War (1929)Manchuria (1931plusmn 33)

Chaco (1932plusmn 35)Italo-Ethiopian (1935plusmn 36)

Sino-Japanese (1937plusmn 41)Chankufeng (1938)

strength21 A ldquomixed alliancerdquo is one in which the democratic participant ac-counts for less than 50 percent of the power potential in two out of three powercategories such as iron and steel production number of troops and total pop-ulation Third in some cases a democracy was much more powerful than itsadversary and used that advantage to overwhelm its rival A ldquogross mis-matchrdquo is a conict in which one side has a better than 21 advantage in twoout of three power indices Such gross mismatches should be considered onlyif the triumphalistsrsquo can prove that regime type caused the imbalance of


Table 2 (continued)


Nomohan (1939)Russo-Finnish (1939plusmn 40)

World War II (1939plusmn 45)Franco-Thai (1940plusmn 41)Palestine (1948)


Russo-Hungarian (1956)Sino-Indian (1962)Second Kashmir (1965)Vietnam (1965plusmn 75)


War of Attrition (1969plusmn 70)Bangladesh (1971)Yom Kippur (1973)Turko-Cypriot (1974)

Vietnamese-Cambodian(1975plusmn 79)Ethiopian-Somali (1977plusmn 78)Uganda-Tanzania (1978plusmn 79)Sino-Vietnamese (1979)Iran-Iraq (1980plusmn 88)

Falklands (1982)Lebanon (1982)Sino-Vietnamese (1985plusmn 87)

Gulf War (1990plusmn 91)Azeri-Armenian (1992plusmn 98)

Total 15 36 24

21 Bennett and Stam ldquoThe Declining Advantages of Democracyrdquo p 248 n 20 also identied thisproblem It is not clear however given the large number of missing data points and the fact thatcapabilities may not measure real contribution to the war effort that their solution of gauging eachparticipantrsquos role in the alliance based on their individual capabilities solves the problem of whocontributed what in a mixed alliance

power22 Fourth in several cases the triumphalistsrsquo coding is questionable andwhen corrected weakens their case Fifth there are cases in which thebelligerentsrsquo interests in the outcome of the conict are so asymmetrical that itis impossible to ascribe the outcome to regime type and not to the balance ofinterests Sixth many of the cases involve states that cannot really be consid-ered democratic and therefore are not strong tests of the triumphalistsrsquotheories

A number of the cases in the COW data set are not fair tests of whether re-gime type affects the likelihood of a state winning its wars A fair test of a the-ory involves identifying crucial cases that clearly rule out alternativeexplanations23 For example in Lakersquos data set World War II is treated as a sin-gle war involving the same belligerents from 1939 to 1945 in which the democ-racies prevailed This characterization is misleading however because the warcomprised at least three distinct conicts involving different actors and differ-ent scenarios the Battle of France (MayndashJune 1940) the European War (June1941ndashMay 1945) and the Pacic War (December 1941ndashAugust 1945) TreatingWorld War II as single war overstates the effectiveness of the democracies andmisses the real reasons why they were on the winning side

In the spring of 1940 Nazi Germany went to war against Britain BelgiumFrance and the Netherlands Early in the war the Germans who were aboutas powerful (081 in iron and steel production 091 in military manpower and081 in population) as their democratic adversaries nonetheless defeated themdecisively thus contradicting the triumphalistsrsquo expectations24

In the ensuing war in Europe a mixed alliance including Britain the SovietUnion and the United States defeated an alliance of fascist states led by NaziGermany and Italy Although the democraciesmdashBritain and the UnitedStatesmdashwere on the winning side this case does not strongly support thetriumphalistsrsquo claim for two reasons25 First the Soviet Unionmdashnot Britain and


22 Because Reiter and Stam Democracies at War p 58 reject other triumphalist arguments that de-mocracies win wars because of a preponderance of powermdasheither their own or their alliesmdashtheyought to be particularly eager to nd cases of democracies being relatively evenly balanced withnondemocracies23 On the importance of ldquocrucial casesrdquo for devising ldquofair testsrdquo for comparative theory testingsee Arthur Stinchcombe Constructing Social Theories (New York Harcourt Brace and World 1968)pp 24ndash2824 Classic accounts include William L Shirer The Collapse of the Third Republic An Inquiry into theFall of France in 1940 (New York Da Capo 1994) Eugen Weber The Hollow Years France in the 1930s(New York WW Norton 1994) and Alistair Horne To Lose a Battle France 1940 (New York Pen-guin 1988)25 In Democracies at War Reiter and Stam who do disaggregate the war in Europe separatelycredit the United States and Britain with defeating Nazi Germany Their data set also credits demo-

the United Statesmdashwas principally responsible for defeating Nazi GermanyMost historians agree that the war in Europe was settled mainly on the easternfront26 Indeed roughly 85 percent of the Wehrmacht was deployed along thatfront for most of the war not surprisingly about 75 percent of German casual-ties were suffered there27 Second this case is a gross mismatch The Allies hada 381 advantage in iron and steel a 171 advantage in military manpowerand a 2471 advantage in population over the Axis

In the Pacic War the United States with support from Australia BritainChina and New Zealand inicted a decisive defeat on Japan in 1945 Al-though the democracies were on the winning side in this conict Japan lost be-cause it was far less powerful than its rivals Although the military manpowerbalance was roughly even the Allies had a 131 advantage in iron and steelproduction and a 101 advantage in population

Several Arab-Israeli cases also illustrate the problems with miscodings in thetriumphalistsrsquo data set Reiter and Stam for example code the 1969ndash70 Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition and the 1982 Lebanon war as victories for demo-cratic Israel Most analysts however including the original compilers of theCOW data set regard them as draws As Ezer Weizman concluded ldquoIt is nomore than foolishness to claim that we won the War of Attrition On the con-trary for all their casualties it was the Egyptians who got the best of itrdquo28 Evena few miscodings can bias the triumphalistsrsquo ndings about the propensity ofdemocracies to win their wars

Other Arab-Israeli cases illustrate how asymmetric interests might be abetter determinant of military success Israel did well in conventional wars inwhich its survival was at stake (eg 1948 and 1967) In contrast Israel foughtpoorly in unconventional wars where its survival was not on the line (egLebanon in 1982 and the rst Palestinian intifada [uprising] in 1987)29 This isnot surprising because as Martin Gilbert notes the 1982 Lebanon war ldquowas


cratic Israel with not one but two victories in the 1973 Yom Kippur War by dividing it into twowars Israel versus Egypt and Israel versus Syria This coding tilts the scale in favor of democra-cies although it is balanced by their counting as separate victories Germanyrsquos defeats of Belgiumthe Netherlands Denmark and France26 Alan Clark Barbarrossa The Russian-German Conict of 1941ndash45 (New York Quill 1965) Rich-ard OveryWhy the Allies Won (New York WW Norton 1995) pp 63ndash100 and Richard Overy Rus-siarsquos War A History of the Soviet War Effort 1941ndash45 (New York Penguin 1997)27 W Victor Madej ldquoEffectiveness and Cohesion of the German Ground Forces in World War IIrdquoJournal of Political and Military Sociology Vol 6 No 2 (Fall 1978) pp 233ndash24828 Quoted in Martin van Creveld The Sword and the Olive A Critical History of the Israeli DefenseForce (New York PublicAffairs 1998) p 215 On Lebanon see Zersquoev Schiff and Ehud Yarsquoari IsraelrsquosLebanon War (New York Simon and Schuster 1984)29 Quoted in van Creveld The Sword and the Olive p 296

the rst war in Israelrsquos history for which there was no national consensusMany Israelis regarded it as a war of aggressionrdquo30 The abysmal performanceof the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and indeed the Israeli government as awhole was even more marked in Israelrsquos efforts to suppress the rst intifadaAs Martin van Creveld wrote ldquoNever known for its discipline the IDFrsquos tradi-tional strengthsmdashoriginating in the Yishuvrsquos prestate military organizationsmdashhad been initiative and aggressiveness in defeating Arab armies in short sharpwars Now those very qualities started turning against it in a prolongedconict that demanded patience professionalism and restraintrdquo31 The late Is-raeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin concurred ldquoIt is far easier to resolve classicmilitary problems It is far more difcult to contend with 13 million Pales-tinians living in the Territories who do not want our rule and who are em-ploying systematic violence without weaponsrdquo32

Of the 75 wars since 1815 listed in the most recent version of the COW dataset 54 are clearly unfair tests This leaves 21 cases of fair ghts Of these themore democratic state won 12 times and the less democratic state won 9 times(see Appendix)33 This approach of looking at wars involving states that arerelatively more democratic increases the number of relevant cases howeverit also results in the inclusion of many cases of wars between states where atleast one of the belligerents does not score a 6 or above on the democracyscalemdashfor example the Pacic War (1879ndash83) the Sino-Japanese War (1894ndash95) the Russo-Japanese War (1904ndash05) the Manchurian War (1931ndash33) theSino-Japanese War (1937ndash41) and Changfukeng (1938) There were 31 wars in-volving states that were clearly democratic however 22 of these involvemisaggregations mixed alliances gross mismatches or asymmetric interestsThus of the remaining 9 cases 3 support the pessimists and 6 support thetriumphalists34

In both cases democracies do better than their rivals They seem to do betterin wars involving one clearly democratic state (democracies win in 67 percent


30 Martin Gilbert Israel A History (New York William Morrow 1998) p 50431 Van Creveld The Sword and the Olive p 34432 Quoted in Gilbert Israel p 52633 This adds 12 cases to those listed in note 34 Five support the defeatists Ecuadorian-Colombian (1863) Second Schleswig-Holstein (1864) Central American (1906) Sino-Soviet (1929)and Chaco (1932ndash35) and seven support the triumphalists Pacic (1879ndash83) Central American(1885) Sino-Japanese (1894ndash95) Russo-Japanese (1904ndash05) Manchurian (1931ndash33) Sino-Japanese(1937ndash41) and Chankufeng (1938)34 These are the rst part of World War I (1914ndash17) the Battle of France (MayndashJune 1940) and theSino-Indian War (1962) which seemingly support the defeatists and the Russo-Polish War (1919ndash20) the Israeli War for Independence (1948) the Six-Day War (1967) the Football War (1969) theYom Kippur War (1973) and the FalklandsWar (1982) which appear to support the triumphalists

of the 9 cases) as opposed to all wars (democracies win in 57 percent of the 21cases) Yet based on these ndings it is difcult to have condence in theproposition that democracy is the reason states are more likely to win theirwars

Table 3 illustrates the potential impact of misaggregations mixed alliancesgross mismatches asymmetric interests and miscodings on the triumphalistsrsquondings Model 1 is a simple probit model using Reiter and Stamrsquos data esti-mating the effects of the level of democracy (without any control variables) onthe likelihood of a state winning a war Not surprisingly the model supportstheir argument that a democracy is more likely than a nondemocracy toachieve victory Model 2 shows what happens when the misaggregations inWorld War II (crediting Britain and the United States with defeating Nazi Ger-many) and the Yom Kippur War (crediting Israel with two victories) are cor-rected the miscodings are eliminated (Israel should be credited with drawsrather than victories in the 1969ndash70 War of Attrition and the 1982 Lebanonwar) and the focus is exclusively on cases that are fair tests of thetriumphalistsrsquo theories With these changes the democracy variable is no lon-ger signicant

approachSome might argue that a better approach would be to keep the unfair tests andcontrol statistically for other factors that may account for why democracieswin wars more often than nondemocracies The major advantage of this ap-proach proponents argue is that it offers a large number of cases that makeadvanced statistical analysis possible Yet even if one accepts the validity of allthe historical cases and tries to control for competing explanations there arestill reasons to question the triumphalistsrsquo claim that democracy is the key tomilitary victory

First Lake as well Reiter and Stam employ approaches that utilize ldquopooleddatardquo consisting of a number of countries some of which are involved in mul-tiple wars to generate each data point A central assumption of statistical anal-ysis is that each data point is independent (the outcome of one war is notaffected by the outcome of previous ones) homogeneous (the wars are roughlycomparable) and exchangeable (if a democracy can beat one nondemocracy itshould be able to defeat all similar nondemocracies) Reiter and Stam for ex-ample have an N of 197 but this actually consists of only 66 countries a smallnumber of which are looked at repeatedly Among the most democratic statesin their data set (scores of 9 or 10 on the democracy index) threemdashBritainIsrael and the United Statesmdashcomprise approximately 56 percent of the cases


Of the most democratic states that won wars these three countries account for75 percent of the results Given that three states play such a large role in thetriumphalistsrsquo ndings it makes sense to ask whether there are particular cir-cumstances in each case or variables not contained in the triumphalistsrsquo mod-els that explain their propensity for winning particular wars This is thepotential problem of ldquoxed unobserved effectsrdquo that a recent article suggestsaffects much large-N research in international relations35 Some scholars arguethat this problem can be solved simply by reporting robust standard errors36

The optimal solution to the xed effects problem however is to collect moreand better data that would make it possible to control directly for the unob-served variables that might be unique to each case37 This is by no means aneasy task Unobserved variable bias would not be much of a problem if it wereeasy to identify and measure those variables Therefore another way to ad-dress the problem is through in-depth process tracing in obviously relatedcases to ascertain whether factors unique to those cases can explain theoutcome


Table 3 Probit Results (winlose)

Variables Model 1 Model 2 (fair fights gt 6)

Constant 01410283 203440138(0097201) (0227655)

Democracy 00359429 00364302(00137452) (00313352)

Pseudo R2 00248 00332

LL 213304446 221342535

N 197 34

NOTE Data are available at httpwwwyaleeduplsc151a I used the variables politics andwl

005 (all tests two-tailed) 001 0001Robust standard errors

35 Donald P Green Soo Yeon Kim and David H Yoon ldquoDirty Poolrdquo International OrganizationVol 55 No 2 (Spring 2001) pp 441ndash46836 John R Oneal and Bruce M Russett ldquoClear and Clean The Fixed Effects of the Liberal PeacerdquoInternational Organization Vol 55 No 2 (Spring 2001) p 47137 Gary King ldquoProper Nouns and Methodological Propriety Pooling Dyads in International Re-lations Datardquo International Organization Vol 55 No 2 (Spring 2001) pp 497ndash507

Second although there is a correlation between democracy and victory cor-relation does not mean causation38 To establish causation the most likely al-ternative explanations need to be ruled out There are however alternativeexplanations that the triumphalists cannot rule out by controlling for them sta-tistically For example a large body of scholarship argues that democracy takesroot and ourishes as the result of a distinct set of preconditions includinghigh levels of aggregate wealth equitable wealth distribution free marketshigh levels of social development a strong feudal aristocracy a strong bour-geoisiemiddle class high levels of literacy and education a liberal politicalculture (eg toleration compromise and respect for the law and individualrights) Protestantism strong intermediary organizations capable political in-stitutions low levels of domestic political violence moderate politics occupa-tion by a democratic state geographical security (water mountains etc)strong allies and weak adversaries39

Some of these preconditions for democracy confer decided military advan-tages as well40 For example wealthy highly developed well-educatedstrongly institutionalized states that are geographically secure and have strongallies and weak adversaries are also more likely to win wars Rather than de-mocracy explaining this outcome it is possible that certain preconditions ofdemocracy produce both a democratic political system and an impressive re-cord of military success If this argument is correct then the correlation be-tween democracy and military victory is spurious The preconditions notdemocracy per se account for both

If the preconditions argument is correct there should be little variationin the military effectiveness of states over time especially pre- and post-democracy but signicant variation across cases with different preconditionsSome democracies such as the United States and Israel were founded on dem-ocratic principles so they are not useful for assessing the preconditions argu-ment Two other democraciesmdashBritain and Francemdashhave long predemocratic


38 Important cautions about overreliance on correlational ndings include Jack S Levy ldquoDomes-tic Politics and Warrdquo Journal of Interdisciplinary History Vol 18 No 4 (Spring 1988) p 669 and Da-vid Dessler ldquoBeyond Correlations Toward a Causal Theory of Warrdquo International Studies QuarterlyVol 35 No 3 (September 1991) pp 337ndash35539 Samuel P Huntington The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (NormanUniversity of Oklahoma Press 1991) pp 37ndash3840 Brian M Downing The Military Revolution and Political Change Origins of Democracy and Autoc-racy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton NJ Princeton University Press 1992) pp 78ndash79 For theclassic discussion of how a benign security environment is more conducive to democracy see OttoHintzersquos treatment of Great Britain in ldquoMilitary Organization and the Organization of the Staterdquo inFelix Gilbert ed The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York Oxford University Press 1975)pp 178ndash215

histories They have also had strikingly different records of military successsince 1648 Britain has fought about 43 wars since the end of the Thirty YearsrsquoWar winning 35 (81 percent) of them Britainrsquos record in the COW data set isslightly better It has fought 9 wars and won 8 (89 percent)41 The preconditionsargument would attribute these results to the fact that Britain is a wealthy geo-graphically secure state with many allies allowing it to win wars with little do-mestic mobilization Conversely France has few of the preconditions necessaryfor democracy and military success and thus has been both an inconsistent de-mocracy and a less successful belligerent France has fought 31 wars since 1648and won 18 of them (58 percent) In the COW data set it fought 16 wars win-ning only 9 (56 percent)

Another possible explanation for how a state performs in war is whether itsgovernment is consolidated The mean democracy score for Lakersquos winners is059 which is well below the democracy range42 The average democracy scorefor winners in Reiter and Stamrsquos data set is even lower 2141 The distributionof winners in all wars since 1815 by democracy score shows that this remark-ably low average is due to the large numbers of highly authoritarian states thatwon their wars too (see Figure 1) This leads Reiter and Stam to propose thatthe effect of the level of democracy is curvilinear (ie the most democraticand most autocratic states win but those in the middle tend to lose)43 Thispattern however is also compatible with an argument that ascribes victorynot to the level of democracy but to whether a regime has been politically con-solidated as one would expect with highly democratic and authoritarianstates The mixed regimes in between high democracy and high autocracywhich are referred to as ldquoanocraciesrdquo may perform poorly in war because theyare unconsolidated transitional regimes44 The primary reason for characteriz-ing anocracies as transitional regimes is that they do not stay at this levelas long as regimes do when they are either in the democracy or autocracyrange45


41 British and French military track records since 1648 were calculated from R Ernest Dupuy andTrevor N Dupuy The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History From 3500 BC to the Present 4th ed(New York HarperCollins 1993)42 Lake ldquoPowerful Pacistsrdquo p 31 n 3143 Reiter and Stam Democracies at War pp 25 12944 This logic parallels Edward D Manseld and Jack Snyder ldquoDemocratization and the Dangerof Warrdquo International Security Vol 20 No 1 (Summer 1995) p 35 who suggest that an alternativeexplanation for their nding about the increased likelihood of international conict in democratiz-ing states is that states undergoing any sort of political change are more likely to engage in war45 For evidence that anocracies are short-lived see Haringrvard Hegre Tanja Elligson Scott Gatesand Nils Peter Gleditsch ldquoToward a Democratic Civil Peace Democracy Political Change andCivil War 1816ndash1992rdquo American Political Science Review Vol 95 No 1 (March 2001) p 34

In sum the historical data do not strongly support the triumphalistsrsquo claimthat democracies are more likely to win wars than nondemocracies In particu-lar many of the cases they employ are not fair tests of their claim and thereforecannot be used to support (or refute) it Nor does the triumphalistsrsquo approacheffectively rule out two alternative factors that may explain why states winwars (1) the existence of common preconditions for democracy and victoryand (2) the degree of regime consolidation In the following two sections I as-sess the causal mechanisms that the triumphalists use to explain why in theirview democracies are more likely than other types of regimes to win theirwars

Selection Effects

According to the selection effects argument democracies win wars becausethey start them only if they have a high probability of being victorious The


2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2

SOURCES J David Singer and Melvin Small Correlates of War Project International and CivilWar Data 1816plusmn 1992 No 9905 (Ann Arbor Mich Inter-University Consortium for Politicaland Social Research ICPSR 1994) and Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr Polity IIIRegime-Type and Political Authority 1800plusmn 1994 No 6695 (Ann Arbor Mich ICPSR 1996)

Figure 1 The Distribution of Winners By Democracy Score

reason for this caution is that democratic leaders must run for ofce and vot-ers will punish those who initiate unsuccessful wars Authoritarian leaders onthe other hand are rarely held accountable by their populations and thus canmore easily weather a losing war46

Lake as well as Reiter and Stam use statisticalmethods that aim to show thatwhether or not democracies start wars matters tremendously for the outcomeTheir data show that even controlling for power and other factors democra-cies are more likely to win the wars they initiate triumphalists interpret this assupport for the selection effects argument (see Table 4)47

Despite this apparent support for the triumphalistsrsquo case there are three rea-sons for skepticism First victory in war is a complex and overdetermined phe-nomenon in which many factors play a role The key question is Which factorsplay the biggest roles As Table 5 makes clear a calculation of the ldquomarginal ef-fectsrdquo for each variable in Table 4 shows that democracy has one of the smallesteffects of any variable Marginal effects are derivatives of the probability thatthe dependent variable will equal 1 (in this case that the state wins) with


46 Levy ldquoDomestic Politics and Warrdquo pp 658ndash659 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph MSiverson ldquoWar and the Survival of Political Leaders A Comparative Study of Regime Types andPolitical Accountabilityrdquo American Political Science Review Vol 89 No 4 (December 1995) pp 841ndash855 Kenneth A Schultz ldquoDomestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crisesrdquo AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol 92 No 4 (December 1998) p 830 Bennett and Stam ldquoThe DecliningAdvantages of Democracyrdquo pp 346 365 Dan Reiter and Allan C Stam III ldquoDemocracy War Initi-ation and Victoryrdquo American Political Science Review Vol 92 No 2 (June 1998) p 378 and BruceBueno de Mesquita Randolph M Siverson and Alistair Smith ldquoPolicy Failure and Political Sur-vival The Contribution of Political Institutionsrdquo Journal of Conict Resolution Vol 43 No 2 (April1999) pp 147ndash161For the claim that initiators are more likely to win wars see Kevin Wang and James Lee Ray

ldquoBeginners and Winners The Fate of Initiators of Interstate Wars Involving Great Powers since1495rdquo International Studies Quarterly Vol 38 No 1 (March 1994) pp 139ndash15447 Lake ldquoPowerful Pacicistsrdquo uses a logit model to measure the impact of two independentvariablesmdashdemocracy and initiationmdashon the dependent variable which is the likelihood of win-ning or losing a war Based on that for example going from a democracy score of 5 to 10 (egfrom Syria in 1948 to the United States in 1941) more than doubles the likelihood of victory Logitmakes it possible to calculate the odds likelihood ratio by applying anti-logs to both sides of thebasic equation logit(p) = a 1 szligXwhich yields the odds likelihood ratio from the formula

p = ea1bx = ea(eb)x1 2 p

This reveals the effect of a one-unit increase in the democracy score on the likelihood of victoryReiter and Stam Democracy at War p 45 (Table 22) particularly model 4 (which best captures

the argument that democracies are better able to pick winning wars) employ more sophisticatedprobit models (including more control variables and a broader spectrum of cases) Unlike Lakewho measures the interaction effect between democracy and war initiation by including both vari-ables in the same equation Reiter and Stam assess selection effects by including a number of inter-action terms between democracy and war initiation in their equations along with various controlvariables



Variables RampS Model 4

democracyinitiation 00675943(00298018)

democracytarget 00639582(00275639)

initiation 09142049(03422103)

capabilities 3726842(05249923)

allies capabilities 4721843(06837011)

quality ratio 00522075(00329194)

terrain 21093261(2937978)

strategyterrain 3560021(09689448)

strategy1 7235081(2886022)

strategy2 3478767(1993146)

strategy3 335718(1428867)

strategy4 3069146(1252304)

Constant 25517191(1698374)

Pseudo R2 05244

LL 264886064

N 197

NOTE I used the following variables polini poltarg init wl concap qualrat capasst terrainstrat1 strat2 strat3 strat4 and staterr These variables are discussed at length in DanReiter and Allan C Stam III Democracies at War (Princeton NJ Princeton UniversityPress 2002) pp 40plusmn 44 I also estimated this model using only the fair-fight cases andfound no selection effects for democracies


respect to each independent variable by itself The marginal effects calculationmeasures the sensitivity of that probability of winning to changes in the valuesof various independent variables The higher the absolute value of the mar-ginal effect of an independent variable (ie the larger the value of dydx) themore sensitive the probability of the dependent variable equaling 1 is tochanges in each independent variable and thus the greater the effect of that in-dependent variable In other words the marginal effects calculation measureshow much a statersquos chance of winning changes because of variations in the in-dependent variables The interaction between democracy and initiation hasone of the smallest effects (00267582) whereas terrain (24327838) andpowermdashboth the statersquos (1475326) and its alliesrsquo (1869212)mdashand the interac-tion between strategy and terrain (1409287) have the largest effects on whowins48

Second there is little reason to think that caution about starting a warshould be unique to democratic leaders In fact even some triumphalists con-cede that leaders of every kind of regime incur signicant costs from starting alosing war and thus they are apt to be careful about blundering into one AsBruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph Siverson note ldquoThe leadermdashwhether


Table 5 Marginal Effects of Variables in Probit

Variable dydx

democracyinitiation 00267582democracytarget 00253188initiation 03469761capabilities 1475326allies capabilities 1869212quality ratio 00206671terrain 24327838strategyterrain 1409287strategy1 06914264strategy2 05623581strategy3 0851552strategy4 05051578

dydx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

48 I calculated these effects using STATArsquos ldquomfx computerdquo function which holds the values ofother variables at their mean in computing the marginal effect of each variableReiter and Stam Democracy at War Figure 22 provide data on the marginal effects of increases

in the democracy score but not on the relative effect of democracy compared with those of othervariables In an earlier work Allan StamWin Lose or Draw Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War(Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press 1996) Figures 28 45 does Not surprisingly myndings about democracyrsquos relatively small marginal effect on the likelihood of victory are similarto his

president prime minister or president-for-lifemdashwho adopts policies that re-duce the security of the state does so at the risk of affording their political op-ponents the opportunity of weakening the leaderrsquos grasp on powerrdquo49 As thisstatement makes clear the general logic of their argument applies equally todemocracies and autocracies

One could even argue that democratic leaders should be less cautious aboutgoing to war than their nondemocratic counterparts The worst fate that ademocratic leader faces is removal from ofce and disgrace On the otherhand authoritarian leaders who lose wars are frequently exiled imprisonedor put to death Given that fact it seems hard to maintain that an authoritarianleader would be less wary than a democratic leader about losing a war50 Al-though the probability of democratic leaders being ousted may be higher thecosts to autocratic leaders of losing power are so great that the net resultshould be that both are equally wary of losing a war Finally if democracies areactually more selective in choosing their wars starting only easy ones theyshould engage in fewer wars than authoritarian states because there are notlikely to be many sure victories In fact it is widely acknowledged by scholarsthat democracies are at least as if not more war prone than other types of re-gimes51 In short the logic undergirding the triumphalistsrsquo selection effectsargument is unconvincing

Third the Israeli cases provide little empirical support for the selection ef-fects explanation Of the three wars that Israel started just onemdashthe 1967 Six-Day Warmdashindisputably supports the triumphalistsrsquo claim The 1956 Sinai Warcannot be credited as a victory for Israel because Israel was forced to returncaptured Egyptian territory by the United States The disastrous 1982 Lebanonwar clearly demonstrates that Israel has not consistently initiated successfulwars52


49 Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson ldquoWar and the Survival of Political Leadersrdquo p 853 See alsoWilliam R Thompson ldquoDemocracy and Peacerdquo International Organization Vol 50 No 1 (Winter1996) p 14950 HE Goemans War and Punishment The Causes of War Termination and the First World War(Princeton NJ Princeton University Press 2000) pp 39ndash40 For a logically rigorous argumentthat the incentives facing democratic and authoritarian leaders are similar see Gordon TullockAutocracy (Dordrecht Kluwer 1987) p 1951 See Jack Levy ldquoThe Causes of War A Review of Theories and Evidencerdquo in Phillip E TetlockJo L Husbands Robert Jervis Paul C Stern and Charles Tilly eds Behavior Society and NuclearWar Vol 1 (New York Oxford University Press 1989) p 270 I thank Hein Goemans for remindingme of this point52 Miriam Fendius Elman ldquoIsraelrsquos Invasion of Lebanon 1982 Regime Change and War Deci-sionsrdquo in Elman ed Paths to Peace Is Democracy the Answer (Cambridge Mass MIT Press 1997)p 329

If the triumphalistsrsquo data and approach are accepted without reservation de-mocracy plays one of the smallest roles in accounting for why states that startwars tend to win them However logical problems with the selection effects ar-gument and the lack of empirical support for it in what should be easy casesfor them are grounds for questioning even this modest role for democracy Insum democracy matters relatively little if at all in explaining whether stateswisely select and then win their wars

Military Effectiveness

The triumphalists offer ve causal mechanisms to support their claim that de-mocracies are better at ghting wars than nondemocracies Democracies (1) arewealthier (2) make better allies (3) engage in more effective strategic evalua-tion (4) enjoy greater public support and (5) have soldiers who ght more ef-fectively than their counterparts in authoritarian states It is impossible to dojustice to each of these arguments in the space of one article Nevertheless abrief assessment of these causal mechanisms suggests that none is logicallycompelling or has much empirical support

democracy and wealthLake maintains that as a rule democracies are wealthier than authoritarianstates and because wealth is the foundation of military power democraciesare more likely to win wars53 This claim is based on the belief that democra-cies are less prone to rent seekingmdashthat is the governments of democratic gov-ernments are less likely to meddle in their economies thus fostering freemarkets that produce greater national wealth


53 Lake ldquoPowerful Pacistsrdquo p 24 and before him Frederic C Lane ldquoThe Economic Meaning ofWar and Protectionrdquo in his Venice and History The Collected Papers of Frederic C Lane (BaltimoreMd Johns Hopkins University Press 1996) p 389 n 10 applied this argument to military powerA related argument is that liberal institutions make it easier for governments to borrow money towage war See Kenneth A Schultz and Barry Weingast ldquoLimited Governments Powerful Statesrdquoin Randolph M Siverson ed Strategic Politicians Institutions and Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor Uni-versity of Michigan Press 1998) pp 15ndash50For general arguments about democracies being less prone to rent seeking see Mancur Olson

ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo American Political Science Review Vol 87 No 3 (Sep-tember 1993) pp 567ndash576 Barry Basinger Robert B Ekeland Jr and Robert Tollison ldquoMercantil-ism as a Rent-Seeking Societyrdquo in James M Buchanan Robert D Tollison and Gordon Tullockeds Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (College Station Texas AampM University Press1980) pp 235ndash268 and Mark Brawley ldquoRegime Types Markets and War The Impact of PervasiveRents in Foreign Policyrdquo Comparative Political Studies Vol 26 No 2 (July 1993) pp 178ndash197

Triumphalists maintain that democracies are better wealth creators thanother types of regimes but they provide no supporting evidence for thisclaim54 Even the large body of scholarship on the relationship between levelsof democracy and levels of economic development does not provide much of afoundation for their assertion To be sure there is some evidence that bolstersthe triumphalistsrsquo contention that democracy makes economic growth morelikely55 but there is much more evidence for the converse proposition thatwealth is a key factor in creating democracy56 Thus there is no consensus inthe development literature on which way the causal arrow runs57 Thereforethere is little basis for believing the triumphalistsrsquo claim that democracies pro-duce greater wealth than nondemocracies

Another reason to doubt the triumphalistsrsquo assertion that democracies aresuperior wealth creators is that the rent-seeking logic that underpins theirclaim is awed There is no reason to think that rent seeking should be less fre-quent in democracies Indeed there are compelling reasons why it should bemore common

Rent seeking is the effort by interest groups in a society to gain excess protsthrough nonmarket mechanisms58 For example tobacco producers receivespecial tax breaks and subsidies as a result of political lobbying which injectseconomic inefciencies into the marketplace that slow the rest of the economyEconomists offer compelling arguments for why it is more likely that interestgroups will be successful rent seekers in a democracy59 ldquoCountries that have


54 Lake ldquoPowerful Pacistsrdquo p 2855 ldquoDemocracy and Growth Why Voting Is Good for Yourdquo Economist August 27 1994 pp 15ndash17and Yi Feng ldquoDemocracy Political Stability and Economic Growthrdquo British Journal of Political Sci-ence Vol 27 No 3 (July 1997) pp 391ndash418For a largely theoretical argument that democracy causes growth because of the greater credi-

bility of democratic governmental institutions see Douglass C North and Barry WeingastldquoConstitutions and Commitment The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seven-teenth-Century Englandrdquo Journal of Economic History Vol 49 No 4 (December 1989) pp 803ndash83256 John F Helliwell ldquoEmpirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growthrdquo BritishJournal of Political ScienceVol 24 No 2 (April 1994) pp 225ndash248 Ross E Burkhardt andMichael SLewis-Beck ldquoComparative Democracy The Economic Development Thesisrdquo American Political Sci-ence Review Vol 88 No 4 (December 1994) pp 903ndash910 Deane E Neubaur ldquoSome Conditions ofDemocracyrdquo American Political Science Review Vol 61 No 4 (December 1967) pp 1002ndash1009 JohnB Londregen and Keith T Poole ldquoDoes Income Promote DemocracyrdquoWorld Politics Vol 49 No 1(October 1996) p 2 and Larry Diamond ldquoEconomic Development and Democracy Recon-sideredrdquo American Behavioral Scientist Vol 35 Nos 45 (MarchJune 1992) p 45057 Mark J Gasiorowski ldquoDemocracy and Macroeconomic Development in UnderdevelopedCountriesrdquo Comparative Political Studies Vol 33 No 3 (April 2000) pp 319ndash35058 James M Buchanan ldquoRent Seeking and Prot Seekingrdquo in Buchanan Tollison and Tullock To-ward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society pp 3ndash15 and Robert D Tollison ldquoRent Seeking A SurveyrdquoKYKLOS Vol 35 No 4 (November 1982) pp 575ndash60259 Mancur Olson ldquoA Theory of Incentives Facing Political Organizations Neocorporatism and

democratic freedom of organization without upheaval or invasion the long-estrdquo Mancur Olson argues ldquowill suffer the most from growth-repressing orga-nizations and combinationsrdquo60

Lake identies governments not interest groups as the main rent seekersBut even if democratic governments are less likely to engage in rent-seekingbehavior the fact remains that interest groups in democracies are more likelyto be engaged in this kind of behavior Lake provides no evidence howeverthat the lack of government interference in a democracyrsquos economy offsets thenegative effects of rent seeking by interest groups

Moreover although wealth is necessary for generating military might it alsois essential that a state be able to mobilize its wealth for military purposes61

This two-step process raises a question that Lake does not address but thatmight be thought essential to his position Are democracies better able to ex-tract resources from their societies than nondemocracies The best availablestudy on the subject maintains that regime type is largely irrelevant ldquoPoli-tically capable governments can mobilize vast resources from the society un-der stress of war but totalitarian democratic and authoritarian regimes do notdetermine the level of performancerdquo62 In short democracies are no better thannondemocracies at transforming economic might into military power

Contrary to Lakersquos rent-seeking argument Israel between 1948 and 1982 didnot have a bigger economy except in per capita terms than its Arab adversar-ies63 Israeli democracy did not inhibit state rent seeking In fact Israel was aclassic example of a state with one of the major preconditions for rent seeking


the Hegemonic Staterdquo International Political Science Review Vol 7 No 2 (April 1986) pp 165ndash189and Tollison ldquoRent Seekingrdquo p 59060 Mancur Olson The Rise and Decline of Nations Economic Growth Stagation and Social Rigidities(New Haven Conn Yale University Press 1982) p 7761 This is a classic argument See Alexis de Tocqueville Democracy in America Vol 1 (New YorkVintage 1945) p 243 See also Reiter and Stam ldquoDemocracy andWar Initiationrdquo p 378 and Reiterand Stam Democracies at War pp 117ndash12962 See Jacek Kugler andWilliam Domke ldquoComparing the Strength of Nationsrdquo Comparative Polit-ical Studies Vol 19 No 1 (April 1986) pp 39 50 66 See also Adam Przeworski and FernandoLimongi ldquoPolitical Regimes and Economic Growthrdquo Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol 7 No 3(Summer 1993) pp 51ndash69 Erich Weede ldquoThe Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth SomeEvidence from Cross-National Analysisrdquo KYKLOS Vol 36 No 1 (February 1983) p 35 and JoseacuteAntonio Cheibub ldquoPolitical Regimes and the Extractive Capacity of Government Taxation in De-mocracies and Dictatorshipsrdquo World Politics Vol 50 No 1 (April 1998) pp 372ndash37363 According to data in the International Institute for Strategic Studies Military Balance (LondonIISS various years) Israel had a gross national product of only $36 billion compared with a com-bined Arab GNP of $161 billion in 1967 in 1969 and 1970 the ratio between Israel and Egypt was$45 billion to $63 billion and $54 billion to $645 billion respectively and in 1973 it was $87 bil-lion to the combined Arab GNP of $2353 billion In 1982 however Israel enjoyed an overall ad-vantage over Syria of $2177 billion to $16158 billion

The Heritage Foundation ranks Israel very high (4 on a scale of 5) in terms ofthe level of government intervention in the economy64 This is not surprisinginasmuch as the economic ideology of Israel has always been socialist and col-lectivist As one historian of Israel points out ldquo[Israel] had originally been cre-ated by East Europeans who brought with them not the ideas of Westernliberal bourgeois democracy but the collective socialism of the old Russian in-telligentsiardquo65 Democracy did little to constrain state intervention and did notprovide Israel with more economic resources than the Arabs

In sum it is clear that democracies are wealthier than nondemocracies andit is indisputable that national wealth is a key building block of military powerBut contrary to what Lake and others triumphalists believe democracy doesnot appear to be the source of that wealth It seems equally plausible that statesbecome wealthy rst and then become democratic not the other way aroundMoreover democracies enjoy no special advantage over authoritarian states inmobilizing that wealth for military purposes Finally even if Lake is right thatstate rent seeking is less of a problem in democracies there are a number oflogical reasons why rent seeking by interest groups is more of a problem indemocratic political systems

democracy and alliancesAccording Randolph Siverson and Juliann Emmons democracies tend to formalliances with each other because they share a deep-seated commitment to twonorms cooperation and amity66 Some scholars argue that democratic alliancesare more durable that other types of alliances67 This durability of democraticalliances leads Lake and others to conclude that in war the resulting demo-cratic alliances are more effective than either mixed alliances or alliances com-


64 See Kim R Holmes Bryan T Johnson and Melanie Kirkpatrick 1997 Index of Economic Freedom(Washington DC Heritage Foundation andWall Street Journal 1997) pp xxx 242ndash244 255ndash25765 Geoffrey Wheatcroft The Controversy of Zion Jewish Nationalism the Jewish State and the Unre-solved Jewish Dilemma (Reading Mass Addison-Wesley 1996) p 24166 Randolph M Siverson and Juliann Emmons ldquoBirds of a Feather Democratic Political Systemsand Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Centuryrdquo Journal of Conict Resolution Vol 35 No 2 (June1991) pp 285ndash300 The classic statement of the normative argument is Immanuel Kant ldquoPerpetualPeacerdquo in Ted Humphrey ed Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics History and Morals (Indi-anapolis Hackett 1983) pp 107ndash145 More recent work combines normative and institutional ar-guments See for example Kurt Taylor Gaubatz ldquoDemocratic States and Commitment inInternational Relationsrdquo International Organization Vol 50 No 1 (Winter 1996) pp 110ndash11167 On the greater durability of democratic alliances see William Reed ldquoAlliance Duration andDemocracy An Extension and Validation of lsquoDemocratic States and Commitment in InternationalRelationsrsquordquo American Journal of Political Science Vol 41 No 3 (July 1997) pp 1072ndash1078 andD Scott Bennett ldquoTesting Alternative Models of Alliance Duration 1816ndash1984rdquoAmerican Journal ofPolitical Science Vol 41 No 3 (July 1997) pp 846ndash878

prising only nondemocracies68 One underlying assumption that could lead tothis conclusion is that democratic leaders must worry about audience costs ifthey renege on their alliance commitments which should make them highlyreliable allies69 There are reasons to suggest however that this is not the case

The proposition that democracies are likely to align with each other nds lit-tle support in the historical record70 In fact history offers few examples ofpurely democratic alliances most have been either mixed or betweennondemocracies exclusively Siverson and Emmonsrsquos own data indicate thatdemocratic alliances accounted for only 324 percent of the total in the 1920ndash39period and 1097 percent in the 1946ndash65 period71 These data can be interpretedto mean that the growth of purely democratic alliances was largely a Cold Warphenomenon where the Soviet threat not ideological afnity brought democ-racies together72

The Israeli cases do not lend much support to the ldquobirds of a feather argu-mentrdquo that democracies are natural and constant allies Early in its independ-ence Israel experienced difculty forming alliances with other democracies Itdid however nd signicant support from the Soviet Union Czechoslovakiaand Yugoslavia The Soviet Union was one of the rst states to formally recog-nize the new state of Israel And Golda Meir concluded that ldquohad it not beenfor the arms and ammunition that we were able to buy in Czechoslovakia andtransport through Yugoslavia and other Balkan countries in those days at thestart of the war I do not know whether we actually could have held out untilthe tide changed as it did by June of 1948rdquo73 More recently Israel made com-mon cause with such nondemocratic states as South Africa74 In fact the Israeli


68 Lake ldquoPowerful Pacistsrdquo p 24 and Anjin Choi ldquoCooperation for Victory Democracy Inter-national Partnerships and State War Performance 1816ndash1992rdquo John M Olin Institute for StrategicStudies Harvard University April 200269 For the institutional argument that because democracies have large audience costs (eg lead-ers cannot change policies because the public is wedded to them) their commitments (or threats)are more credible see James D Fearon ldquoDomestic Political Audiences and Escalation of Interna-tional Disputesrdquo American Political Science Review Vol 88 No 3 (September 1994) pp 577ndash592and Joe Eyerman and Robert A Hart Jr ldquoAn Empirical Test of the Audience Costs PropositionrdquoJournal of Conict Resolution Vol 40 No 4 (December 1996) pp 597ndash61670 Michael W Simon and Erik Gartzke ldquoPolitical System Similarity and the Choice of AlliesrdquoJournal of Conict Resolution Vol 40 No 4 (December 1996) pp 617ndash635 and Brian Lai and DanReiter ldquoDemocracy Political Similarity and International Alliances 1816ndash1992rdquo Journal of ConictResolution Vol 44 No 2 (April 2000) pp 203ndash22871 Siverson and Emmons ldquoBirds of a Featherrdquo p 30072 This observation about the time boundedness of the democratic ldquobirds of a featherrdquo phenome-non is similar to the nding that the so-called democratic peace is also a recent development Onthis see Henry S Farber and Joanne Gowa ldquoPolities and Peacerdquo International Security Vol 20 No2 (Fall 1995) pp 239ndash26273 Golda Meir My Life (New York GP Putnamrsquos Sons 1975) pp 230ndash23174 Van Creveld The Sword and the Olive p 206

government and the South African apartheid regime were so closely alignedthat they even cooperated secretly in developing each otherrsquos nuclear pro-grams75 In short democratic Israel has aligned itself with different types ofregimes

There is also little evidence to think that democratic alliances are militarilymore effective than mixed or nondemocratic alliances Large-N studies of thisissue have produced contradictory ndings76 Moreover in the COW data setthere is only one war (the debatable case of the 1956 Sinai War in which IsraelFrance and Britain defeated Egypt) where the victorious alliance was com-posed entirely of democracies In the overwhelming majority of other wars inwhich democracies won in alliance with other states these alliances includednondemocracies77

Moreover the assumption that democracies should ally with each other isunconvincing because there are equally plausible reasons why democraciesshould ally with nondemocracies Michael Simon and Eric Gartzke for exam-ple argue that because democracies and authoritarian states have differentstrengths and weaknesses (eg democracies have greater difculty keeping se-crets than authoritarian states) they make good allies78 Mancur Olson andRichard Zeckhauser suggest an alternative rationale for why different kinds ofregimes attract each other Collective action among democratic allies is likelyto be difcult they argue because the bonds of friendship may cause democ-racies to contribute less than their fair sharemdashthat is they might think thattheir partners will pick up any slack out of a sense of fraternal obligation In al-liances that include nondemocracies every member is more likely to pull itsown weight because each recognizes that the others are motivated strictly byself-interest Therefore they will not tolerate the kind of free riding that islikely in an alliance made up solely of democracies79 In short there is no goodreason why democracies should prefer to ally with each other rather than withnondemocracies

There is also reason to question the audience costs argument which couldprovide the theoretical foundation for the claim that democratic alliances are


75 Seymor Hersh The Samson Option Israelrsquos Nuclear Arsenal and Americarsquos Foreign Policy (NewYork Random House 1991) pp 271ndash28376 Compare Reiter and Stam Democracies at War pp 111ndash113 with Choi ldquoCooperation for Vic-toryrdquo p 3277 Reiter and Stam ldquoDemocracy and War Initiationrdquo p 37878 Simon and Gartzke ldquoPolitical System Similarity and the Choice of Alliesrdquo pp 617ndash63579 Mancur Olson Jr and Richard Zeckhauser ldquoAn Economic Theory of Alliancesrdquo in Julian RFriedman Christopher Bladen and Steven Rosen compilers Alliance in International Politics(Boston Allyn and Bacon 1970) p 186

especially durable and therefore more militarily effective Although JoeEyerman and Robert Hart conclude that crises between democracies are re-solved more easily than those between nondemocraciesmdashand they interpretthis nding as support for at least some aspects of the audience costs argu-mentmdashthere is still no evidence that these costs make democracies better al-lies80 The level of public support within democracies for foreign attachmentsvaries widely in cases where the public is not seriously engaged there are noaudience costs for failure to honor an obligation81 Indeed there is considerableevidence that democratic publics are not particularly attentive to internationalaffairs which means that more often than not audience costs play little role inthe calculations of democratic leaders82 Even in those cases where the publicstrongly supports a commitment to another state such support can evaporatequickly83 Finally leaders have considerable latitude to shape public attitudestoward alliances which means that they will sometimes be able to explainaway broken promises without incurring signicant audience costs In thebest available study on regime type and commitments Kurt Gaubatz con-cludes that the evidence supports only the more modest conclusion that de-mocracies are no worse than other types of regimes in making ldquolastingcommitmentsrdquo 84

The democratic state that should have had the highest audience costs inbreaking a commitment to Israel was the United States But despite the pres-ence of an inuential pro-Israel constituency in the United States after WorldWar II this alignment did not become very tight until the 1970s Indeed the


80 Eyerman and Hart ldquoAn Empirical Test of the Audience Costs Propositionrdquo pp 597ndash616 Butsee Stephen M Walt ldquoRigor or Rigor Mortis Rational Choice and Security Studiesrdquo InternationalSecurity Vol 23 No 4 (Spring 1999) pp 33ndash35 for a discussion of the limits of this empirical sup-port For suggestions of other logical problems with the audience costs argument see KennethA Schultz ldquoDo Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform Contrasting Two Institutional Per-spectives on Democracy and Warrdquo International Organization Vol 53 No 2 (Spring 1999) p 237n 1181 This point is made by Walt ldquoRigor or Rigor Mortisrdquo pp 33ndash3582 Ole R Holsti ldquoPublic Opinion and Foreign Policy Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Con-sensus Mershon Series Research Programs and Debatesrdquo International Studies Quarterly Vol 36No 4 (December 1992) p 447 and John MuellerWar Presidents and Public Opinion (LanhamMdUniversity Press of America 1985) p 283 Charles D Tarlton ldquoThe Styles of American International ThoughtrdquoWorld Politics Vol 17 No4 (July 1965) pp 584ndash614 This trend had become even more pronounced until September 11 2001The Chicago Council on Foreign Relationsrsquo most recent survey of public opinion nds that foreignpolicy is not even a top-ten issue for the American public See John E Reilly ed American PublicOpinion and US Foreign Policy 1999 (Chicago CCFR 1999) p 7 Figure I-2 which showed that thepublicrsquos concern about international problems is the lowest ever See also John Mueller ldquoElevenPropositions About American Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in an Era Free of CompellingThreatsrdquo Department of Political Science Ohio State University April 19 200184 Gaubatz ldquoDemocratic States and Commitment in International Relationsrdquo p 137

US government was ambivalent about Israeli independence in 194885 op-posed the democratic coalition that Israel fought beside in 1956 in Suez andhamstrung the Israelis in 1967 Not surprisingly once the US-Israeli alliancewas consolidated the Israelis remained somewhat skeptical86 Other democra-cies such as Britain France and Germany were not always reliable allies ei-ther87 As Golda Meir recounted ldquoOne day weeks after the [Yom Kippur] warI phoned [German Chancellor] Willy Brandt who is much respected in the So-cialist International and said lsquo I need to know what possible meaning so-cialism can have when not a single socialist country in all of Europe wasprepared to come to the aid of the only democratic nation in the Middle East Isit possible that democracy and fraternity do not apply in our casersquordquo88 TheUS-Israeli alliance was based not on high domestic audience costs but on thestrategic interest of the United States in having allies in the Middle East to bal-ance against the Soviet Union and later Iran and Iraq89 Realizing that theserealpolitik considerations might someday lead to the US abandonment of Is-rael the Israelis and their American supporters have consistently sought tocloak the alliance in the mantle of democratic confraternity90 In short demo-cratic leaders are not necessarily constrained by alliance commitments sothere is little reason to believe that democratic alliances should be more effec-tive than other types of alliances at winning wars

democracy and sound strategySome triumphalists believe that democracies are better strategic decision-makers than nondemocracies because the voters and their representatives notjust a handful of elites have a say in how to wage war According to BruceRussett this has two positive effects Greater public involvement in decision-making produces better military policies because those who would pay thecosts of going to war make the decisions about how it is conducted and thegreater the number of individuals participating in the decisionmaking process


85 Tom Segev The Seventh Million The Israelis and the Holocaust (New York Hill and Wang 1993)p 19186 Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry R Posen Israelrsquos Strategic Doctrine RAND Report 2845-NA (SantaMonica Calif RAND September 1981) pp 9 24 More recently see Stephen J Glain ldquoFor SomeIsraelis US Aid Is a Burden Some Say Strings Attached to Military Assistance Arenrsquot Worth theMoneyrdquo Wall Street Journal October 26 2000 p A2387 Gilbert Israel p 44888 Meir My Life p 44689 Van Creveld The Sword and the Olive p 252 and Gilbert Israel pp 165 225 326 367 407 44590 Wheatcroft The Controversy of Zion p 308

the lower the likelihood of strategic blunders91 Optimal security policies usu-ally prevail in the marketplace of ideas which is what Stephen Van Evera JackSnyder and others argue occurs in a democratic political system92 On close ex-amination however these claims are unpersuasive for three reasons

First there are no studies available that assess whether democracies ornondemocracies make better decisions about how to wage war Indeed thetriumphalists offer no systematic evidence to support this claim but rathermake their case by emphasizing the logic that underpins it There is howeverevidence to suggest that democracies are no better at making strategy than au-thoritarian states

Israeli democracy has not consistently fostered high-quality strategic evalua-tion and decisionmaking Indeed Israel has made a number of major strategicblunders since 1967 The lapses in judgment that produced the 1987 Palestinianintifadawere rooted in decisions made after Israelrsquos 1967 victory in the Six-DayWar Even though it had been clear to many Israeli leaders early on that retain-ing the Occupied Territories would be more trouble than they were worth93

the electoral dynamics of Israeli democracy made it difcult for any leader tounilaterally withdraw from them94 The intelligence failures that nearly re-sulted in Israelrsquos defeat in the Yom Kippur War were thoroughly documentedby the 1974 Agranat Commission95 Both Defense Minister Moshe Dyan andPrime Minister Meir resigned after the release of the commissionrsquos report of1974 but that has not ensured that subsequent Israeli governments have beenany wiser96 Consider for example the many mistakes made by Israeli leadersthat led to the 1982 Lebanon debacle97 Prime Minister Menachem Begin re-


91 Russettrsquos reasoning follows Condorcetrsquos jury theorem which holds that if there is a 55 percentchance of any individual making the right decision and 1000 people decide using majority rulethen there is a 999 percent chance that such a democratic procedure will produce the right out-come Bruce M Russett Controlling the Sword The Democratic Governance of National Security (Cam-bridge Mass Harvard University Press 1990) pp 106 15092 Stephen Van Evera ldquoPrimed for Peace Europe after the Cold Warrdquo International Security Vol15 No 3 (Winter 199091) p 27 Jack Snyder Myths of Empire Domestic Politics and InternationalAmbition (Ithaca NY Cornell University Press 1991) pp 18ndash19 and Reiter and Stam Democraciesat War pp 23ndash24146 16093 Gilbert Israel p 39894 Ibid p 396 and Wheatcroft The Controversy of Zion p 31295 Chaim Herzog The War of Atonement October 1973 (Boston Little Brown 1975) pp 31 278Chaim Herzog The Arab-Israeli Wars War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of Independencethrough Lebanon (New York Vintage 1982) pp 236ndash239 Amos Perlmutter ldquoIsraelrsquos Fourth WarOctober 1973 Political and Military Misperceptionsrdquo Orbis Vol 19 No 2 (Summer 1975) pp 434ndash460 and ldquoChief of Military Resigns in Israel Blamed in Inquiryrdquo New York Times April 3 1974pp 1 596 Gilbert Israel p 46597 Schiff and Yarsquoari Israelrsquos Lebanon War

signed after the Lebanon campaign yet the architect of that debacle ArielSharon is Israelrsquos current prime minister98

Moreover the Israeli government has traditionally revealed very little infor-mation about its national security decisionmaking to the Israeli public99

Reecting on the situation during the Yom Kippur War former Israeli Presi-dent Chaim Herzog observed that ldquoMrs Meir rsquos method of governmentbrought about a system whereby there were not checks and balances and no al-ternative evaluations Her doctrinaire inexible approach to problems and thegovernment was to contribute to the failings of the government before the warShe was very much the overbearing mother who ruled the roost with an ironhand She had very little idea of orderly administration and preferred to workclosely with her cronies creating an ad hoc system of government based onwhat was known as her lsquokitchenrsquo But once war had broken out these verytraits proved to be an assetrdquo100 Therefore contradicting the marketplace ofideas argument that free and unfettered debate should produce optimal war-time policy this undemocratic system has been effective for Israel in wartimeThe fact that Israel is a democracy has not necessarily meant that it has craftedbetter security policies But the lack of public input has not uniformly hinderedIsraeli decisionmaking either

Second there is no question that the public wants to avoid strategic blun-ders Nobody wants to die if it can be avoided The key issue however iswhether there is a mechanism for translating that motivation into betterwartime decisionmaking In fact there is not The root of the problem is thatthe soldiers who ght wars hardly ever have the expertise to improvethe decisionmaking process Invariably they have signicantly less informa-tion and expertise than the civilian and military elites charged with direct-ing the war In the end how well those at the top make decisions is all thatmatters

Finally a political system that gives voice to large numbers of individualswith diverse preferences may not be able to reconcile those differences andproduce coherent policies For example Gaubatzrsquos recent application of Ken-neth Arrowrsquos ldquoparadox of democracyrdquo to illustrate how national security deci-sions are made suggests how difcult it is to aggregate the diverse opinions


98 Gilbert Israel p 51599 Van Creveld The Sword and the Olive pp xviii 68 109ndash110 and Perlmutter ldquoIsraelrsquos FourthWarrdquo p 435100 Herzog The War of Atonement p 282

common to democracies101 Unfortunately the marketplace of ideas is not nec-essarily an efcient producer of sound strategy102

democracy and public supportAccording to Aaron Friedberg democratic leaders can count on greater publicsupport for their wars than their authoritarian counterparts because electedpolicymakers are accountable to the people and so will conduct wars in such away as to ensure that public support remains high103 Although there is noquestion that democratic leaders are answerable to their constituents it isdoubtful that this link translates into greater public support for their statesrsquowars or that it explains why they win them

Friedberg argues that it is especially difcult for democracies to rely on coer-cion and centralized control to wage war while maintaining public supportbecause they place a high premium on the norm of consent and they usuallyhave a limited and decentralized form of government To maintain public sup-port for the war effort Friedberg maintains democratic leaders must conductwars while relying on the voluntary consent of the public Doing so in factis likely to increase the prospects of military success This approach accord-ing to Freidberg explains why the democratic United States rather thanthe authoritarian Soviet Union prevailed in the Cold War It is not clear how-ever how much regime type affects the level of public support for a wareffort xxxx

First there are other reasons why the United States did not become a largeintrusive and coercive garrison state during the Cold War that could haverisked losing public support in the struggle against authoritarian communismStructural factors such as geographic isolation and possession of nuclearweapons rather than norms and institutions offer an equally plausible expla-nation for why the United States could wage the Cold War while relying onvoluntary consent and with a less intrusive government than that of the SovietUnion Therefore the problem with Friedbergrsquos argument is in part one of case


101 Kurt Taylor Gaubatz ldquoIntervention and Intransitivity Public Opinion Social Choice and theUse of Military Force Abroadrdquo World Politics Vol 47 No 4 (July 1995) p 538 Kenneth Arroworiginally laid out his ldquoparadox of democracyrdquo argument in Social Choice and Individual Values(New York Wiley 1951)102 For cautionary notes from an early proponent of the ldquomarketplace of ideasrdquo see Stephen VanEvera ldquoWhy States Believe Foolish Ideas Non-Self-Evaluation By States and Societiesrdquo version35 January 10 2002 p 11 n 21103 Friedberg In the Shadow of the Garrison State and Aaron Friedberg ldquoWhy Didnrsquot the UnitedStates Become a Garrison Staterdquo International Security Vol 16 No 4 (Spring 1992) pp 109ndash142

selection His normative institutional and structural factors all anticipate asmaller and less coercive US government relative to the Soviet Union In theCold War the United Statesrsquo antistatist ideas and weak governmental institu-tions coincided with geographical insulation and nuclear weapons Thus it isnot the best case to demonstrate that antistatist ideas and institutions were thedriving force behind these strategic choices In fact this case could just as plau-sibly be interpreted as indicating that both democracy and success in war werethe results of a favorable geographic location and nuclear weapons

Second Friedbergrsquos assertion that the Cold War US government wassmaller and less intrusive than it might have otherwise been is debatable If thecomparative baseline for measuring the expansion of the US Cold War state iseither World War II or what some proponents of big government advocated itwas certainly smaller and less intrusive The United States was much largersignicantly more intrusive and somewhat more coercive however than ithad been during the interwar period or at various times in the nineteenth cen-tury104 Indeed all successful states become more centralized and coercive inwartime105 Authoritarian Nazi Germany which lost World War II had re-markably little wartime centralization On the other hand the victors (ie theauthoritarian Soviet Union and the democratic United States and Britain) werehighly centralized106 This suggests that more centralized and more coercivestates are more likely to win wars and also that regime type may not be themost important factor in explaining which states are able to more effectivelymobilize societal resources in wartime

Third the triumphalistsrsquo claim about democracy and public support is notlogically compelling In particular there is reason to believe that leaders andtheir publics often have different time horizons that affect their thinking aboutthe utility of war As Donna Nincic and Miroslav Nincic suggest democraticpublics like consumers tend to focus on short-term considerations whenthinking about the use of force What is the immediate payoff In contrastdemocratic leaders are inclined to think about war the way investors do Whatwill be the long-term payoff107 Given these different perspectives on the use


104 Friedberg In the Shadow of the Garrison State pp 30ndash31105 Karen A Rasler and William R ThompsonWar and State-making The Shaping of Global Powers(Boston Unwin and Hyman 1989) and Bruce D Porter War and the Rise of the State The MilitaryFoundations of Modern Politics (New York Free Press 1994)106 Overy Why the Allies Won p 206 and Alan S Milward War Economy and Society 1939ndash1945(Berkeley University of California Press 1977) pp 99ndash131107 Donna J Nincic andMiroslav Nincic ldquoCommitment to Military Intervention The DemocraticGovernment as Economic Investorrdquo Journal of Peace Research Vol 32 No 4 (July 1995) pp 413ndash426

of force it is reasonable to expect democratic leaders and their publics to beout of step in their enthusiasm for particular wars

Fourth there are no comprehensive studies to support the triumphalistsrsquoclaim that democracies enjoy greater public support in wartime than authori-tarian states There is actually plenty of anecdotal evidence however bothtypes of regime enjoy varied levels of public support in times of conict andneither has an apparent advantage over the other For example the Americanpublic strongly endorsed US participation in World War II (1941ndash45) but itssupport for the Vietnam War (1965ndash73) evaporated over time leading theUnited States to withdraw from the conict Authoritarian Russia on the otherhand saw public support for World War I disappear between 1914 and 1917yet the Soviet Union enjoyed broad and deep public support throughoutWorld War II108 The historical record thus appears to show that regime typehas hardly any effect on the level of public support in wartime

There can be little doubt that historically the state of Israel was able to counton the overwhelming support of its citizens when it went to war between 1948and 1973 But this support was not the result of its democratic system as thetriumphalists would argue Rather Israelis believed that they were ghting fortheir very survival109 Golda Meir made clear why Israeli society came togetherin wartime despite overwhelming odds ldquoWe couldnrsquot afford the luxury of pes-simism so we made an altogether different kind of calculation based onthe fact that the 650000 of us were more highly motivated to stay alive thananyone outside Israel could be expected to understand and that the only op-tion available to us if we didnrsquot want to be pushed into the sea was to win thewarrdquo110 Van Creveld echoes this point ldquoIsraeli public opinion continued to seethe IDF as the one great organization standing between it and death Evenmore than before it was prepared to do its utmost to ensure the armyrsquos successby providing the necessary resources in terms of material and the very bestmanpower at its disposalrdquo111 In short common threat rather than shareddemocratic ideology provides a more compelling explanation for why Israelisociety supported Israelrsquos war efforts so enthusiastically


108 See the discussion of resurgent Russian nationalism during World War II in Overy Why theAllies Won pp 290ndash293109 Van Creveld The Sword and the Olive pp 125 153 197 241110 Meir My Life p 233 See also similar comments by David Ben Gurion and Moshe Dyan inDyan Moshe Dyan Story of My Life (New York GP Putnamrsquos Sons 1975) pp 92 396 441111 Van Creveld The Sword and the Olive p 153

democracy and fighting proficiencyReiter and Stam maintain that because democratic governments have greaterlegitimacy than their authoritarian counterparts their soldiers perform betteron the battleeld They attribute this nding to the political culture of democ-racies which they argue fosters greater individual initiative and better leader-ship among their soldiers112 They reject as an alternative explanation thatnationalism rather than democracy produces superior leadership and initia-tive arguing that nationalism results only in higher morale

There is reason to think however that nationalism also enhances individualinitiative and leadership Many scholars believe that the French Revolutiontransformed warfare precisely because it democratized French society Thisthey maintain fostered a greater sense of loyalty to the regime which in turnincreased the military effectiveness of the French army in all three areas113

This effectiveness however had its roots in prerevolutionary France and sur-vived the collapse of French democracy and the coming to power of NapoleonBonaparte114 Prussia and Spain two highly nationalistic but not democraticregimes played important roles in defeating Napoleon by employing many ofthe same tactics that served revolutionary and then Napoleonic France sowell115 Nationalism and democracy though they sometimes reinforce eachother are not inseparable116 Indeed Reiter and Stam concede that nationalismnot democratic ideology may account for combat prowess Unfortunately theyhave not systematically tested nationalism as an alternative explanation forwhy militaries in their data set performed well on the battleeld117 Thus theircase rests not on explicating an unbroken chain of logical reasoning but onshowing that there is a signicant statistical correlation between democracyand various combat skills

At rst glance Reiter and Stam appear to have assembled impressive statis-tical support for their claim that soldiers in democratic societies display greaterleadership and initiative than those from nondemocracies On close inspection


112 Reiter and Stam ldquoDemocracy and Battleeld Military Effectivenessrdquo pp 259ndash277 and Reiterand Stam Democracies at War pp 58ndash74113 John A Lynn The Bayonets of the Republic Motivation and Tactics in the Army of RevolutionaryFrance 1791ndash94 (Boulder Colo Westview 1996)114 Theodore Ropp War in the Modern World (New York Collier 1962) pp 98ndash142115 Peter Paret ldquoNapoleon and the Revolution in Warrdquo in Paret Makers of Modern Strategypp 123ndash142116 Michael Howard War in European History (Oxford Oxford University Press 1976) pp 110ndash111 argues that democracy and nationalism are intimately related However Ropp War in theModern World pp 126 138 reminds us that the Spanish and Prussian cases during the NapoleonicWars demonstrate that nationalism and democracy are not necessarily linked117 Reiter and Stam ldquoDemocracy and Battleeld Military Effectivenessrdquo p 264

however the Combat History Analysis Study Effort (CHASE) data set of bat-tles which provides the basis for these ndings is unreliable In 1982 the His-torical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO) was commissioned toassemble this data set for the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) Af-ter receiving the initial version of the data set in 1984 CAA randomly selected8 battles from it and submitted them for analysis to the US Army MilitaryHistory Institute the US Army Center for Military History the Department ofHistory at the US Military Academy and the US Army Combat Studies Insti-tute A total of 159 codings were checked in the 8 cases The results seriouslycalled into question the data setrsquos reliability 106 codings (67 percent) werejudged to be in error another 29 (18 percent) were deemed questionable andonly 24 (15 percent) were ascertained to be correct by the reviewers118

Despite two revisions there is still reason to question the reliability of the1990 version of the CHASE data set that Reiter and Stam employ The principalproblem is that the codings of certain items in the data set are imprecise Theformer CAA project manager for example concedes that ldquoeven with our bestefforts error rates of 5 to 30 are to be expectedrdquo119 As a result of continuingconict between CAA and HERO over the reliability of the CHASE data setHERO was relieved of responsibility for updating that data set in 1987 Never-theless HERO continues to work on its own to update the 1987 version of theCHASE data set which it calls the Land Warfare Data Base (LWDB)120 Re-cently HERO (which is now called the Dupuy Institute) compared the 1990version of the CHASE data set with the current LWDB focusing on 1196 datapoints common to both data sets They found that almost half (500) of thecodings for those same data points were different121

There were no differences between the CHASE and LWDB data sets in theldquoleadershiprdquo category but the consistency between the two data sets is not evi-dence that the data on leadership are reliable In its various revisions to theCHASE data set after 1987 HERO focused exclusively on relatively hard vari-ables such as order of battles and casualties while ignoring softer variablessuch as initiative and leadership According to a HERO staff member these


118 See Management and Support Directorate Military History A Data Base of Selected Battles1600ndash1973 Vol 1 Main Report (Bethesda Md US Army Concepts Analysis Agency September1984) p 21 See also Mearsheimer ldquoAssessing the Conventional Balancerdquo p 66 n 29119 Robert Helmbold ldquoLessons Learned Regarding Battle Data Basesrdquo January 14 1987HowardWhitley Archives Box 1 Center for Army Analysis Ft Belvoir Virginia120 Discussions with Christopher Lawrence and Richard Anderson of the Dupuy InstituteMcLean Virginia April 2000121 Letter (with attachments) to author from Christopher Lawrence executive director DupuyInstitute June 8 2000

two variables were the ldquoleast looked at and poorest proofed section of thedata baserdquo because their codings were widely regarded as ldquoall a judgementrdquoanyhow122

Problems with the HERO data set notwithstanding Reiter and Stam believethat their ndings are still valid on two related grounds First unless there issystematic bias in the codings the fact that there is a very large number ofcases should still make it possible to trust the ndings Second because theprincipal architect of the original CHASE data set did not regard democracy asa key explanation for military prowess we can be condent that the data arenot biased in favor of their claims about the battleeld advantages of soldiersof democratic states123

Although there may be no systematic bias in the CHASE data set there is somuch potential measurement error in the data set generally and particularly inthe leadership and initiative variables that Reiter and Stam are left withinefcient models Consider for example that if the relatively hard variableshave a 5ndash30 percent error rate in their coding how much more imprecise thesesoft variables are124 There is an even more serious data problem possible biasor error in the coding of the independent variablemdashdemocracy Ido Orenmakes a convincing case that the POLITY democracy scores are highly subjec-tive and thus unreliable125 The combination of problems with data for both thedependent and independent variables casts doubt on Reiter and Stamrsquosndings that democratic armies demonstrate greater initiative and leadershipskills on the battleeld

Reiter and Stam note that there is another unbiased source of data on com-parative military competence that can be used to test the triumphalistsrsquo propo-sition about the relationship between democracy and military performance126

Allen Millett Williamson Murray and Kenneth Watmanrsquos study of the greatpower militaries in World War I the interwar period and World War II pro-


122 Christopher Lawrence telephone conversation June 19 2000123 Reiter and Stam Democracies at War pp 71ndash72124 On the problems of bad data due to ldquomeasurement errorrdquo see William H Williams ldquoHowBad Can lsquoGoodrsquo Data Really Berdquo American Statistician Vol 32 No 2 (May 1978) pp 61ndash65 Seealso Gary King Robert O Keohane and Sidney Verba Designing Social Inquiry Scientic Inferencein Qualitative Research (Princeton NJ Princeton University Press 1994) pp 158ndash163 concerninghow nonsystematic error in the dependent variable reduces efciency125 Ido Oren ldquoThe Subjectivity of the lsquoDemocraticrsquo Peace Changing US Perceptions of ImperialGermanyrdquo International SecurityVol 20 No 2 (Fall 1995) p 266 For a thoughtful discussion of theother limitations of the POLITY data set see Kristian Gleditsch and Michael D Ward ldquoA Reexami-nation of Democracy and Autocracy in Modern Politicsrdquo Journal of Conict Resolution Vol 41 No3 (June 1997) pp 361ndash383126 Reiter and Stam ldquoDemocracy and Battleeld Military Effectivenessrdquo p 264

vides indicators of their military effectiveness127 It offers little evidence how-ever that democratic armies ght better than nondemocratic armies128 Giventhe problems with the CHASE data set and the evidence of at least one otherdata set there are grounds for doubting the triumphalistsrsquo claims that democ-racies are more likely to win their wars because their soldiers ght better

This conclusion is hardly surprising given the consensus among militaryhistorians that the three most formidable armies of the twentieth century interms of initiative and leadership were (1) Imperial Germanyrsquos army duringWorld War I (authoritarian state)129 (2) Nazi Germanyrsquos army during WorldWar II (authoritarian state)130 and (3) Israelrsquos army between 1948 and 1973(democratic state)131 In the Israeli cases necessity rather than shared demo-cratic ideology accounted for the superior performance of Israeli soldiers onthe battleeld between 1948 and 1973 Van Creveld attributed the combatprowess of Israeli soldiers to the fact that they had no choice but to ght wellor risk death ldquoNothing mattered any longer not even fear of incurring casual-ties Was not Nasser a second Hitler Was not another Holocaust just aroundthe corner Thus motivated the Israelis fought like demonsrdquo132 Israeli troopsfought so valiantly not because their democratic political system made themwant to ght better but because they had to if they wanted to survive

It is clear that ideology did play an important role in Israeli military successthat ideology however was not liberal democracy but rather nationalism133

The common Arab threat solidied the sense of Israeli national identity whichin turn increased the willingness of Israeli society to support the war effort andits soldiers to ght hard In contrast there is little evidencemdashdespite much


127 Allan R Millett Williamson Murray and Kenneth Watman ldquoThe Effectiveness of MilitaryOrganizationsrdquo International Security Vol 11 No 1 (Summer 1986) p 37128 Lt Gen John H Cushman US Army (ret) ldquoChallenge and Response at the Operational andTactical Levels 1914ndash45rdquo in Williamson Murray and Allan R Millett eds Military EffectivenessVol 3 The Second World War (Boston Allen and Unwin 1988) pp 320ndash340 Cross-tabulations andx

2 for POLITY III democracy scores and Cushmanrsquos operational and tactical effectiveness gradesfor various countries covered in the three-volume study (A = 4 B = 3 C = 2 D = 1 F = 0) show nosignicant relationship between regime type and effectiveness129 Niall Ferguson The Pity of War Explaining World War I (New York Basic Books 1999)pp 290ndash303 and Timothy T Lupfer The Dynamics of Doctrine The Changes in German Tactical Doc-trine during the First World War (Fort Leavenworth Kans Combat Studies Institute US ArmyCommand and General Staff College 1981)130 For a comparative discussion of the combat power of the German army see Martin vanCreveld Fighting Power German and US Army Performance 1939ndash1945 (Westport Conn Green-wood 1982)131 Van Creveld The Sword and the Olive p xvii132 Ibid p 197133 Yehoshaphat Harkavi ldquoBasic Factors in the Arab Collapse during the Six Day Warrdquo OrbisVol 11 No 3 (Fall 1967) p 680 and Gilbert Israel p 174

pan-Arab rhetoricmdashthat the Arab-Israeli wars ever generated much nationalistsentiment in the Arab world beyond Palestine in recent years According to Is-raeli historian Benny Morris this lack of nationalist identity put the Arabs at adistinct military disadvantage vis-agrave-vis the Jews ldquoFor the average Arab vil-lager political independence and nation-hood were vague abstractions hisloyalties were to his family clan and village and occasionally to his regionMoreover decades of feuding had left Palestinian society deeply dividedrdquo134

Given this lack of national consciousness it is not surprising that the highlynationalist Israelis were generally more militarily effective than their Arabneighbors

In sum the triumphalistsrsquo arguments about the relationship between democ-racy and the economy alliances decisionmaking public support and the bat-tleeld performance of soldiers as explanations for why democracies shoulddo well once in war are unconvincing

Conclusion

My skepticism about the triumphalistsrsquo argument that democracies more skill-fully choose and effectively wage wars is based on two ndings First much ofthe data supporting the correlation between democracy and victory are uponcloser inspection of little value for testing the triumphalistsrsquo claim becausethey suffer from various shortcomings Second neither of the triumphalistsrsquoarguments that democracies do well because they are better at selecting warsthey can win or that democracies ght better once at war are persuasive Bothrest on faulty logic and have only modest empirical support

Therefore if one wants to understand the sources of military effectivenesseither for onersquos own state or for potential allies and adversaries whether or notthat state is democratic is not the most important factor to consider Althoughdemocracies and autocracies undoubtedly have different strengths and weak-nesses that may affect some aspects of their performance in wartime overallthey seem to cancel each other out and so regime type confers no clear advan-tage or disadvantage Moreover at least until recently military power could beproduced in a variety of ways through many different combinations of socialorganization economic potential specic doctrinal and training decisions and


134 Benny Morris Righteous Victims A History of the Zionist-Arab Conict 1881ndash1999 (New YorkAlfred A Knopf 1999) p 192 For the link between family and clan loyalty and the inability ofArabs to succeed in modern mechanized wars see Kenneth M Pollack ldquoThe Inuence of ArabCulture on Arab Military Effectivenessrdquo PhD dissertation Massachusetts Institute of Technology1996

strategic choices In other words the ldquoreciperdquo for effective military perfor-mance had a lot of variability which meant that very different regimes couldproduce similar levels of capability by combining other ingredients in differentways Given this fact it is not surprising that democracies and nondemocraciesare sometimes good at ghting and sometimes bad regime type alone does notconfer a clear advantage or disadvantage in selecting or ghting wars

One might accept that regime type was irrelevant in the past but argue thatwhether a state is democratic or not is now becoming more important Accord-ing to this line of reasoning the lesson of the past eleven years is that if a statewants to have a truly cutting-edge military fully capable of taking advantageof the so-called revolution in military affairs it cannot do this in a centralizedcoercive and information-controlled society Specically if a country wants tobe able to ght as successfully as the United States did in the 1991 Gulf War itmust have an open democratic society where everyone is able to freely ex-change ideas and knowledge and avail themselves without restriction of com-puter and communication technologies135 The collapse of the Soviet Union atthe end of the Cold War largely because it was a centralized and coercive polit-ical system that was unable to compete militarily with the West lends credenceto this view China however which remains fairly centralized and undemo-cratic suggests that it may be possible for a state to reform its economy and re-vitalize its technology base so as to produce an effective military withoutpolitical democracy136 Indeed China is one of the cases that scholars need towatch to accumulate additional evidence about how much regime type maymatter for military effectiveness in coming years

My skepticism about the importance of regime type for military effective-ness stands in direct contrast to the current trends in the US government es-pecially the intelligence community in which there has been a renaissance ofinterest in the domestic-level sources of military effectiveness137 But if I amright analysts should be wary about relying on monocausal theories of mili-


135 For the general logical underpinning of this argument see Van Evera ldquoPrimed for Peacerdquopp 14ndash16 and Friedberg In the Shadow of the Garrison State p 304136 For an example of how China has been able to modernize without across-the-board liberaliza-tion see Evan A Feigenbaum ldquoWhorsquos Behind Chinarsquos High-Technology lsquoRevolutionrsquo How BombMakers Remade Beijingrsquos Priorities Policies and Institutionsrdquo International Security Vol 24 No 1(Summer 1999) p 119 For an argument that China does not have to match the United Statesacross the board to pose a serious regional challenge to it see Thomas J Christensen ldquoPosingProblems without Catching Up Chinarsquos Rise and Challenges for US Security Policyrdquo InternationalSecurity Vol 25 No 4 (Spring 2001) pp 5ndash40137 ldquoCulture as Tool in National Security Analysis A Roundtablerdquo sponsored by the StrategicAssessments Group Directorate of Intelligence US Central Intelligence Agency McLean Vir-ginia April 29 1999

tary effectiveness whether they are based on regime type or some otherdomestic-level factor Rather they should look at a constellation of factors in-cluding the balance of actual and potential military power resources the na-ture of the conict the willingness and ability of states to emulate the mostsuccessful military practices nationalism whether states have the commonpreconditions for military effectiveness and democracy and whether their re-gimes are consolidated or not as indicators of how a state will do in war138

The good news is that contrary to some defeatists inside and outside the USgovernment democracy is not a liability for a state in choosing and effectivelywaging war The bad news however is that democracy is not as large an assetas triumphalists maintain In sum regime type hardly matters


138 See for example Jeffrey A Isaacson Christopher Layne and John Arquilla Predicting Mili-tary Innovation documented brieng (Santa Monica Calif RAND 1999) and Ashley J TellisJanice L Bially Christopher Layne Melissa McPherson and Jerry Solinger Measuring NationalPower in the Post-Industrial Age RAND Report 1818-A (Santa Monica Calif RAND July 1999)


AppendixFairTests

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Fran

co-S

pan

ish

xn

oR

uss

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Mex

ican

-Am

eric

anx

no

c

Au

stro

-Sar

din

ian

xn

ob

Firs

tS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inx

no

Ro

man

Rep

ub

licx

no

c

LaP

lata

xn

oC

rim

ean

xn

oc

An

glo

-Per

sian

xn

oc

Ital

ian

Un

ific

atio

nn

ob

Sp

anis

hM

oro

ccan

no

a

Ital

o-R

om

ann

ob

Ital

o-S

icili

anx

no

Fran

co-M

exic

anx

no

Ecu

ado

r-C

olo

mb

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

Sec

on

dS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inye

sp

essi

mis

tsLo

pez

xx

no

Sp

anis

h-C

hile

anx

no

Sev

enW

eeks

no

b

Fran

co-P

russ

ian

no

b

Ru

sso

-Tu

rkis

hn

oa

Pac

ific

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

Sin

o-F

ren

chx

no

c

Cen

tral

Am

eric

an(1

885)

yes

pes

sim

ists

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

ts


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Gre

co-T

urk

ish

xn

oc

Sp

anis

h-A

mer

ican

xn

oc

Bo

xer

Reb

ellio

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

6)ye

sp

essi

mis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

7)n

ob

Sp

anis

h-M

oro

ccan

xn

oc

Ital

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Firs

tB

alka

nx

no

c

Sec

on

dB

alka

nx

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

Ix

xn

oc

Hu

ng

aria

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Po

lish

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Lith

uan

ian

-Po

lish

xn

oG

reco

-Tu

rkis

hn

ob

Fran

co-T

urk

ish

no

b

Sin

o-S

ovi

etye

sp

essi

mis

tsM

anch

uri

anye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

hac

oye

sp

essi

mis

tsIt

alo

-Eth

iop

ian

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

han

kufe

ng

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

No

mo

han

xn

oR

uss

o-F

inn

ish

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

IIx

xx

no

c

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

o


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Isra

eli

ind

epen

den

ceye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Ko

rea

xn

oc

Ru

sso

-Hu

ng

aria

nn

ob

Sin

aix

no

c

Sin

o-I

nd

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

c

Sec

on

dK

ash

mir

i

no

c

Vie

tnam

xn

oc

Six

-Day

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Foo

tbal

lye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Att

riti

on

xn

oc

Ban

gla

des

hx

no

c

Yom

Kip

pu

rye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsTu

rkis

h-C

ypri

ot

xn

oc

Vie

tnam

ese-

Cam

bo

dia

nn

oa

Eth

iop

ian

-So

mal

in

oa

Ug

and

an-T

anza

nia

nn

oa

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

979)

no

a

Iran

-Ira

qx

no

Falk

lan

ds

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Leb

ano

nx

no

c

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

985plusmn

87)

no

a

Gu

lfW

arx

no

c

Aze

ri-A

rmen

ian

xn

o

NO

TE

For

furt

he

rd

iscu

ssio

ns

of

thes

eco

din

gs

see

ordfAss

ess

men

to

fth

eC

OW

Un

iver

seo

fIn

ters

tate

War

ssi

nce

1815

ordmh

ttp

ww

wu

kye

du

AS

Po

liS

ciD

esch

re

sear

chh

tm

a=

equ

ally

dem

ocr

atic

b

=m

issi

ng

de

mo

cra

cysc

ore

sc

=d

emo

crac

ysc

ore

gt6

Athenians were ruled by tyrants they were no better warriors than their neigh-bors but once they got rid of the tyranny they became best of all by a longshotrdquo5 With the democratic Westrsquos victory in the Cold War a renewed opti-mism about the military prowess of democratic states has taken root ldquoDemo-cratic triumphalistsrdquo note that an examination of major wars since 1815 revealsthat the more democratic states have been on the winning side in the over-whelming majority of cases6 ldquoThere is something about democratic regimesrdquotwo triumphalists suggest ldquothat makes it easier for them to generate militarypower and achieve victory in the arena of warrdquo7

Democratic triumphalists offer different explanations for why this should bethe case and sometimes they dissent from each otherrsquos arguments taken as awhole however they suggest two reasons why democracies tend to win wars8

Some argue that democracies are better at picking the wars they get into start-ing only those they know they can win This is the ldquoselection effectsrdquo argu-ment Others maintain that once at war democracies ght more effectivelyThey have bigger economies form stronger alliances make better decisionshave higher levels of public support or can count on greater effort from theirsoldiers This is the ldquomilitary effectivenessrdquo argument

The aim of this article is to question this sanguine view about democracyand military victory I make three arguments First an examination of the his-torical data and methodological approach does not strongly support thetriumphalistsrsquo claim that all other things being equal democracies are morelikely to win in war

Second the logic that underpins the triumphalistsrsquo case is unpersuasiveSpecically there is no reason to believe nor is there much evidence to suggestthat leaders of democracies are more careful in selecting their wars than theirauthoritarian counterparts The same charges can be made against the militaryeffectiveness argument


William Kristol ldquoGetting Seriousrdquo Weekly Standard November 19 2001 httpwwwweeklystandardcomContentPublicArticles000000000518hrpmoasp5 Quoted in Donald Kagan Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Athenian Democracy (New York FreePress 1991) p 16 See also Victor Davis Hanson The Soul of Battle From Ancient Times to the PresentDay How Three Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny (New York Free Press 1999)6 David A Lake ldquoPowerful Pacists Democratic States and Warrdquo American Political Science Re-view Vol 86 No 1 (March 1992) pp 24ndash37 See also Dan Reiter and Allan C Stam III Democraciesat War (Princeton NJ Princeton University Press 2002)7 Dan Reiter and Allan C Stam III ldquoDemocracy and Battleeld Military Effectivenessrdquo Journal ofConict Resolution Vol 42 No 3 (June 1998) p 259 For similar sentiments see Aaron L FriedbergIn the Shadow of the Garrison State Americarsquos Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy (PrincetonNJ Princeton University Press 2000) p 340 and Hanson The Soul of Battle p 48 William Reed and David H Clark ldquoWar Initiation and War Winnersrdquo Journal of Conict Resolu-tion Vol 44 No 3 (June 2000) pp 378ndash395































Total 5 23 3



























Table 2 (continued)











Total 15 36 24





























Constant 01410283 203440138(0097201) (0227655)

Democracy 00359429 00364302(00137452) (00313352)

Pseudo R2 00248 00332

LL 213304446 221342535

N 197 34














Selection Effects



2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2

















initiation 09142049(03422103)



quality ratio 00522075(00329194)

terrain 21093261(2937978)


strategy1 7235081(2886022)

strategy2 3478767(1993146)

strategy3 335718(1428867)

strategy4 3069146(1252304)

Constant 25517191(1698374)

Pseudo R2 05244

LL 264886064

N 197







Variable dydx















































































































Conclusion















AppendixFairTests

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Fran

co-S

pan

ish

xn

oR

uss

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Mex

ican

-Am

eric

anx

no

c

Au

stro

-Sar

din

ian

xn

ob

Firs

tS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inx

no

Ro

man

Rep

ub

licx

no

c

LaP

lata

xn

oC

rim

ean

xn

oc

An

glo

-Per

sian

xn

oc

Ital

ian

Un

ific

atio

nn

ob

Sp

anis

hM

oro

ccan

no

a

Ital

o-R

om

ann

ob

Ital

o-S

icili

anx

no

Fran

co-M

exic

anx

no

Ecu

ado

r-C

olo

mb

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

Sec

on

dS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inye

sp

essi

mis

tsLo

pez

xx

no

Sp

anis

h-C

hile

anx

no

Sev

enW

eeks

no

b

Fran

co-P

russ

ian

no

b

Ru

sso

-Tu

rkis

hn

oa

Pac

ific

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

Sin

o-F

ren

chx

no

c

Cen

tral

Am

eric

an(1

885)

yes

pes

sim

ists

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

ts


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Gre

co-T

urk

ish

xn

oc

Sp

anis

h-A

mer

ican

xn

oc

Bo

xer

Reb

ellio

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

6)ye

sp

essi

mis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

7)n

ob

Sp

anis

h-M

oro

ccan

xn

oc

Ital

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Firs

tB

alka

nx

no

c

Sec

on

dB

alka

nx

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

Ix

xn

oc

Hu

ng

aria

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Po

lish

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Lith

uan

ian

-Po

lish

xn

oG

reco

-Tu

rkis

hn

ob

Fran

co-T

urk

ish

no

b

Sin

o-S

ovi

etye

sp

essi

mis

tsM

anch

uri

anye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

hac

oye

sp

essi

mis

tsIt

alo

-Eth

iop

ian

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

han

kufe

ng

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

No

mo

han

xn

oR

uss

o-F

inn

ish

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

IIx

xx

no

c

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

o


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Isra

eli

ind

epen

den

ceye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Ko

rea

xn

oc

Ru

sso

-Hu

ng

aria

nn

ob

Sin

aix

no

c

Sin

o-I

nd

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

c

Sec

on

dK

ash

mir

i

no

c

Vie

tnam

xn

oc

Six

-Day

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Foo

tbal

lye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Att

riti

on

xn

oc

Ban

gla

des

hx

no

c

Yom

Kip

pu

rye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsTu

rkis

h-C

ypri

ot

xn

oc

Vie

tnam

ese-

Cam

bo

dia

nn

oa

Eth

iop

ian

-So

mal

in

oa

Ug

and

an-T

anza

nia

nn

oa

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

979)

no

a

Iran

-Ira

qx

no

Falk

lan

ds

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Leb

ano

nx

no

c

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

985plusmn

87)

no

a

Gu

lfW

arx

no

c

Aze

ri-A

rmen

ian

xn

o

NO

TE

For

furt

he

rd

iscu

ssio

ns

of

thes

eco

din

gs

see

ordfAss

ess

men

to

fth

eC

OW

Un

iver

seo

fIn

ters

tate

War

ssi

nce

1815

ordmh

ttp

ww

wu

kye

du

AS

Po

liS

ciD

esch

re

sear

chh

tm

a=

equ

ally

dem

ocr

atic

b

=m

issi

ng

de

mo

cra

cysc

ore

sc

=d

emo

crac

ysc

ore

gt6































Total 5 23 3



























Table 2 (continued)











Total 15 36 24





























Constant 01410283 203440138(0097201) (0227655)

Democracy 00359429 00364302(00137452) (00313352)

Pseudo R2 00248 00332

LL 213304446 221342535

N 197 34














Selection Effects



2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2

















initiation 09142049(03422103)



quality ratio 00522075(00329194)

terrain 21093261(2937978)


strategy1 7235081(2886022)

strategy2 3478767(1993146)

strategy3 335718(1428867)

strategy4 3069146(1252304)

Constant 25517191(1698374)

Pseudo R2 05244

LL 264886064

N 197







Variable dydx















































































































Conclusion















AppendixFairTests

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Fran

co-S

pan

ish

xn

oR

uss

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Mex

ican

-Am

eric

anx

no

c

Au

stro

-Sar

din

ian

xn

ob

Firs

tS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inx

no

Ro

man

Rep

ub

licx

no

c

LaP

lata

xn

oC

rim

ean

xn

oc

An

glo

-Per

sian

xn

oc

Ital

ian

Un

ific

atio

nn

ob

Sp

anis

hM

oro

ccan

no

a

Ital

o-R

om

ann

ob

Ital

o-S

icili

anx

no

Fran

co-M

exic

anx

no

Ecu

ado

r-C

olo

mb

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

Sec

on

dS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inye

sp

essi

mis

tsLo

pez

xx

no

Sp

anis

h-C

hile

anx

no

Sev

enW

eeks

no

b

Fran

co-P

russ

ian

no

b

Ru

sso

-Tu

rkis

hn

oa

Pac

ific

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

Sin

o-F

ren

chx

no

c

Cen

tral

Am

eric

an(1

885)

yes

pes

sim

ists

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

ts


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Gre

co-T

urk

ish

xn

oc

Sp

anis

h-A

mer

ican

xn

oc

Bo

xer

Reb

ellio

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

6)ye

sp

essi

mis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

7)n

ob

Sp

anis

h-M

oro

ccan

xn

oc

Ital

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Firs

tB

alka

nx

no

c

Sec

on

dB

alka

nx

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

Ix

xn

oc

Hu

ng

aria

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Po

lish

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Lith

uan

ian

-Po

lish

xn

oG

reco

-Tu

rkis

hn

ob

Fran

co-T

urk

ish

no

b

Sin

o-S

ovi

etye

sp

essi

mis

tsM

anch

uri

anye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

hac

oye

sp

essi

mis

tsIt

alo

-Eth

iop

ian

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

han

kufe

ng

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

No

mo

han

xn

oR

uss

o-F

inn

ish

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

IIx

xx

no

c

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

o


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Isra

eli

ind

epen

den

ceye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Ko

rea

xn

oc

Ru

sso

-Hu

ng

aria

nn

ob

Sin

aix

no

c

Sin

o-I

nd

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

c

Sec

on

dK

ash

mir

i

no

c

Vie

tnam

xn

oc

Six

-Day

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Foo

tbal

lye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Att

riti

on

xn

oc

Ban

gla

des

hx

no

c

Yom

Kip

pu

rye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsTu

rkis

h-C

ypri

ot

xn

oc

Vie

tnam

ese-

Cam

bo

dia

nn

oa

Eth

iop

ian

-So

mal

in

oa

Ug

and

an-T

anza

nia

nn

oa

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

979)

no

a

Iran

-Ira

qx

no

Falk

lan

ds

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Leb

ano

nx

no

c

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

985plusmn

87)

no

a

Gu

lfW

arx

no

c

Aze

ri-A

rmen

ian

xn

o

NO

TE

For

furt

he

rd

iscu

ssio

ns

of

thes

eco

din

gs

see

ordfAss

ess

men

to

fth

eC

OW

Un

iver

seo

fIn

ters

tate

War

ssi

nce

1815

ordmh

ttp

ww

wu

kye

du

AS

Po

liS

ciD

esch

re

sear

chh

tm

a=

equ

ally

dem

ocr

atic

b

=m

issi

ng

de

mo

cra

cysc

ore

sc

=d

emo

crac

ysc

ore

gt6


























Table 2 (continued)











Total 15 36 24





























Constant 01410283 203440138(0097201) (0227655)

Democracy 00359429 00364302(00137452) (00313352)

Pseudo R2 00248 00332

LL 213304446 221342535

N 197 34














Selection Effects



2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2

















initiation 09142049(03422103)



quality ratio 00522075(00329194)

terrain 21093261(2937978)


strategy1 7235081(2886022)

strategy2 3478767(1993146)

strategy3 335718(1428867)

strategy4 3069146(1252304)

Constant 25517191(1698374)

Pseudo R2 05244

LL 264886064

N 197







Variable dydx















































































































Conclusion















AppendixFairTests

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Fran

co-S

pan

ish

xn

oR

uss

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Mex

ican

-Am

eric

anx

no

c

Au

stro

-Sar

din

ian

xn

ob

Firs

tS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inx

no

Ro

man

Rep

ub

licx

no

c

LaP

lata

xn

oC

rim

ean

xn

oc

An

glo

-Per

sian

xn

oc

Ital

ian

Un

ific

atio

nn

ob

Sp

anis

hM

oro

ccan

no

a

Ital

o-R

om

ann

ob

Ital

o-S

icili

anx

no

Fran

co-M

exic

anx

no

Ecu

ado

r-C

olo

mb

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

Sec

on

dS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inye

sp

essi

mis

tsLo

pez

xx

no

Sp

anis

h-C

hile

anx

no

Sev

enW

eeks

no

b

Fran

co-P

russ

ian

no

b

Ru

sso

-Tu

rkis

hn

oa

Pac

ific

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

Sin

o-F

ren

chx

no

c

Cen

tral

Am

eric

an(1

885)

yes

pes

sim

ists

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

ts


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Gre

co-T

urk

ish

xn

oc

Sp

anis

h-A

mer

ican

xn

oc

Bo

xer

Reb

ellio

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

6)ye

sp

essi

mis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

7)n

ob

Sp

anis

h-M

oro

ccan

xn

oc

Ital

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Firs

tB

alka

nx

no

c

Sec

on

dB

alka

nx

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

Ix

xn

oc

Hu

ng

aria

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Po

lish

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Lith

uan

ian

-Po

lish

xn

oG

reco

-Tu

rkis

hn

ob

Fran

co-T

urk

ish

no

b

Sin

o-S

ovi

etye

sp

essi

mis

tsM

anch

uri

anye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

hac

oye

sp

essi

mis

tsIt

alo

-Eth

iop

ian

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

han

kufe

ng

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

No

mo

han

xn

oR

uss

o-F

inn

ish

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

IIx

xx

no

c

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

o


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Isra

eli

ind

epen

den

ceye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Ko

rea

xn

oc

Ru

sso

-Hu

ng

aria

nn

ob

Sin

aix

no

c

Sin

o-I

nd

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

c

Sec

on

dK

ash

mir

i

no

c

Vie

tnam

xn

oc

Six

-Day

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Foo

tbal

lye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Att

riti

on

xn

oc

Ban

gla

des

hx

no

c

Yom

Kip

pu

rye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsTu

rkis

h-C

ypri

ot

xn

oc

Vie

tnam

ese-

Cam

bo

dia

nn

oa

Eth

iop

ian

-So

mal

in

oa

Ug

and

an-T

anza

nia

nn

oa

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

979)

no

a

Iran

-Ira

qx

no

Falk

lan

ds

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Leb

ano

nx

no

c

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

985plusmn

87)

no

a

Gu

lfW

arx

no

c

Aze

ri-A

rmen

ian

xn

o

NO

TE

For

furt

he

rd

iscu

ssio

ns

of

thes

eco

din

gs

see

ordfAss

ess

men

to

fth

eC

OW

Un

iver

seo

fIn

ters

tate

War

ssi

nce

1815

ordmh

ttp

ww

wu

kye

du

AS

Po

liS

ciD

esch

re

sear

chh

tm

a=

equ

ally

dem

ocr

atic

b

=m

issi

ng

de

mo

cra

cysc

ore

sc

=d

emo

crac

ysc

ore

gt6




























Constant 01410283 203440138(0097201) (0227655)

Democracy 00359429 00364302(00137452) (00313352)

Pseudo R2 00248 00332

LL 213304446 221342535

N 197 34














Selection Effects



2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2

















initiation 09142049(03422103)



quality ratio 00522075(00329194)

terrain 21093261(2937978)


strategy1 7235081(2886022)

strategy2 3478767(1993146)

strategy3 335718(1428867)

strategy4 3069146(1252304)

Constant 25517191(1698374)

Pseudo R2 05244

LL 264886064

N 197







Variable dydx















































































































Conclusion















AppendixFairTests

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Fran

co-S

pan

ish

xn

oR

uss

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Mex

ican

-Am

eric

anx

no

c

Au

stro

-Sar

din

ian

xn

ob

Firs

tS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inx

no

Ro

man

Rep

ub

licx

no

c

LaP

lata

xn

oC

rim

ean

xn

oc

An

glo

-Per

sian

xn

oc

Ital

ian

Un

ific

atio

nn

ob

Sp

anis

hM

oro

ccan

no

a

Ital

o-R

om

ann

ob

Ital

o-S

icili

anx

no

Fran

co-M

exic

anx

no

Ecu

ado

r-C

olo

mb

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

Sec

on

dS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inye

sp

essi

mis

tsLo

pez

xx

no

Sp

anis

h-C

hile

anx

no

Sev

enW

eeks

no

b

Fran

co-P

russ

ian

no

b

Ru

sso

-Tu

rkis

hn

oa

Pac

ific

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

Sin

o-F

ren

chx

no

c

Cen

tral

Am

eric

an(1

885)

yes

pes

sim

ists

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

ts


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Gre

co-T

urk

ish

xn

oc

Sp

anis

h-A

mer

ican

xn

oc

Bo

xer

Reb

ellio

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

6)ye

sp

essi

mis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

7)n

ob

Sp

anis

h-M

oro

ccan

xn

oc

Ital

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Firs

tB

alka

nx

no

c

Sec

on

dB

alka

nx

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

Ix

xn

oc

Hu

ng

aria

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Po

lish

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Lith

uan

ian

-Po

lish

xn

oG

reco

-Tu

rkis

hn

ob

Fran

co-T

urk

ish

no

b

Sin

o-S

ovi

etye

sp

essi

mis

tsM

anch

uri

anye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

hac

oye

sp

essi

mis

tsIt

alo

-Eth

iop

ian

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

han

kufe

ng

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

No

mo

han

xn

oR

uss

o-F

inn

ish

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

IIx

xx

no

c

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

o


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Isra

eli

ind

epen

den

ceye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Ko

rea

xn

oc

Ru

sso

-Hu

ng

aria

nn

ob

Sin

aix

no

c

Sin

o-I

nd

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

c

Sec

on

dK

ash

mir

i

no

c

Vie

tnam

xn

oc

Six

-Day

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Foo

tbal

lye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Att

riti

on

xn

oc

Ban

gla

des

hx

no

c

Yom

Kip

pu

rye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsTu

rkis

h-C

ypri

ot

xn

oc

Vie

tnam

ese-

Cam

bo

dia

nn

oa

Eth

iop

ian

-So

mal

in

oa

Ug

and

an-T

anza

nia

nn

oa

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

979)

no

a

Iran

-Ira

qx

no

Falk

lan

ds

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Leb

ano

nx

no

c

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

985plusmn

87)

no

a

Gu

lfW

arx

no

c

Aze

ri-A

rmen

ian

xn

o

NO

TE

For

furt

he

rd

iscu

ssio

ns

of

thes

eco

din

gs

see

ordfAss

ess

men

to

fth

eC

OW

Un

iver

seo

fIn

ters

tate

War

ssi

nce

1815

ordmh

ttp

ww

wu

kye

du

AS

Po

liS

ciD

esch

re

sear

chh

tm

a=

equ

ally

dem

ocr

atic

b

=m

issi

ng

de

mo

cra

cysc

ore

sc

=d

emo

crac

ysc

ore

gt6











Selection Effects



2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2

















initiation 09142049(03422103)



quality ratio 00522075(00329194)

terrain 21093261(2937978)


strategy1 7235081(2886022)

strategy2 3478767(1993146)

strategy3 335718(1428867)

strategy4 3069146(1252304)

Constant 25517191(1698374)

Pseudo R2 05244

LL 264886064

N 197







Variable dydx















































































































Conclusion















AppendixFairTests

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Fran

co-S

pan

ish

xn

oR

uss

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Mex

ican

-Am

eric

anx

no

c

Au

stro

-Sar

din

ian

xn

ob

Firs

tS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inx

no

Ro

man

Rep

ub

licx

no

c

LaP

lata

xn

oC

rim

ean

xn

oc

An

glo

-Per

sian

xn

oc

Ital

ian

Un

ific

atio

nn

ob

Sp

anis

hM

oro

ccan

no

a

Ital

o-R

om

ann

ob

Ital

o-S

icili

anx

no

Fran

co-M

exic

anx

no

Ecu

ado

r-C

olo

mb

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

Sec

on

dS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inye

sp

essi

mis

tsLo

pez

xx

no

Sp

anis

h-C

hile

anx

no

Sev

enW

eeks

no

b

Fran

co-P

russ

ian

no

b

Ru

sso

-Tu

rkis

hn

oa

Pac

ific

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

Sin

o-F

ren

chx

no

c

Cen

tral

Am

eric

an(1

885)

yes

pes

sim

ists

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

ts


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Gre

co-T

urk

ish

xn

oc

Sp

anis

h-A

mer

ican

xn

oc

Bo

xer

Reb

ellio

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

6)ye

sp

essi

mis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

7)n

ob

Sp

anis

h-M

oro

ccan

xn

oc

Ital

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Firs

tB

alka

nx

no

c

Sec

on

dB

alka

nx

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

Ix

xn

oc

Hu

ng

aria

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Po

lish

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Lith

uan

ian

-Po

lish

xn

oG

reco

-Tu

rkis

hn

ob

Fran

co-T

urk

ish

no

b

Sin

o-S

ovi

etye

sp

essi

mis

tsM

anch

uri

anye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

hac

oye

sp

essi

mis

tsIt

alo

-Eth

iop

ian

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

han

kufe

ng

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

No

mo

han

xn

oR

uss

o-F

inn

ish

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

IIx

xx

no

c

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

o


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Isra

eli

ind

epen

den

ceye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Ko

rea

xn

oc

Ru

sso

-Hu

ng

aria

nn

ob

Sin

aix

no

c

Sin

o-I

nd

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

c

Sec

on

dK

ash

mir

i

no

c

Vie

tnam

xn

oc

Six

-Day

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Foo

tbal

lye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Att

riti

on

xn

oc

Ban

gla

des

hx

no

c

Yom

Kip

pu

rye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsTu

rkis

h-C

ypri

ot

xn

oc

Vie

tnam

ese-

Cam

bo

dia

nn

oa

Eth

iop

ian

-So

mal

in

oa

Ug

and

an-T

anza

nia

nn

oa

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

979)

no

a

Iran

-Ira

qx

no

Falk

lan

ds

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Leb

ano

nx

no

c

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

985plusmn

87)

no

a

Gu

lfW

arx

no

c

Aze

ri-A

rmen

ian

xn

o

NO

TE

For

furt

he

rd

iscu

ssio

ns

of

thes

eco

din

gs

see

ordfAss

ess

men

to

fth

eC

OW

Un

iver

seo

fIn

ters

tate

War

ssi

nce

1815

ordmh

ttp

ww

wu

kye

du

AS

Po

liS

ciD

esch

re

sear

chh

tm

a=

equ

ally

dem

ocr

atic

b

=m

issi

ng

de

mo

cra

cysc

ore

sc

=d

emo

crac

ysc

ore

gt6















initiation 09142049(03422103)



quality ratio 00522075(00329194)

terrain 21093261(2937978)


strategy1 7235081(2886022)

strategy2 3478767(1993146)

strategy3 335718(1428867)

strategy4 3069146(1252304)

Constant 25517191(1698374)

Pseudo R2 05244

LL 264886064

N 197







Variable dydx















































































































Conclusion















AppendixFairTests

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Fran

co-S

pan

ish

xn

oR

uss

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Mex

ican

-Am

eric

anx

no

c

Au

stro

-Sar

din

ian

xn

ob

Firs

tS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inx

no

Ro

man

Rep

ub

licx

no

c

LaP

lata

xn

oC

rim

ean

xn

oc

An

glo

-Per

sian

xn

oc

Ital

ian

Un

ific

atio

nn

ob

Sp

anis

hM

oro

ccan

no

a

Ital

o-R

om

ann

ob

Ital

o-S

icili

anx

no

Fran

co-M

exic

anx

no

Ecu

ado

r-C

olo

mb

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

Sec

on

dS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inye

sp

essi

mis

tsLo

pez

xx

no

Sp

anis

h-C

hile

anx

no

Sev

enW

eeks

no

b

Fran

co-P

russ

ian

no

b

Ru

sso

-Tu

rkis

hn

oa

Pac

ific

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

Sin

o-F

ren

chx

no

c

Cen

tral

Am

eric

an(1

885)

yes

pes

sim

ists

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

ts


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Gre

co-T

urk

ish

xn

oc

Sp

anis

h-A

mer

ican

xn

oc

Bo

xer

Reb

ellio

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

6)ye

sp

essi

mis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

7)n

ob

Sp

anis

h-M

oro

ccan

xn

oc

Ital

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Firs

tB

alka

nx

no

c

Sec

on

dB

alka

nx

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

Ix

xn

oc

Hu

ng

aria

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Po

lish

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Lith

uan

ian

-Po

lish

xn

oG

reco

-Tu

rkis

hn

ob

Fran

co-T

urk

ish

no

b

Sin

o-S

ovi

etye

sp

essi

mis

tsM

anch

uri

anye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

hac

oye

sp

essi

mis

tsIt

alo

-Eth

iop

ian

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

han

kufe

ng

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

No

mo

han

xn

oR

uss

o-F

inn

ish

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

IIx

xx

no

c

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

o


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Isra

eli

ind

epen

den

ceye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Ko

rea

xn

oc

Ru

sso

-Hu

ng

aria

nn

ob

Sin

aix

no

c

Sin

o-I

nd

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

c

Sec

on

dK

ash

mir

i

no

c

Vie

tnam

xn

oc

Six

-Day

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Foo

tbal

lye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Att

riti

on

xn

oc

Ban

gla

des

hx

no

c

Yom

Kip

pu

rye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsTu

rkis

h-C

ypri

ot

xn

oc

Vie

tnam

ese-

Cam

bo

dia

nn

oa

Eth

iop

ian

-So

mal

in

oa

Ug

and

an-T

anza

nia

nn

oa

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

979)

no

a

Iran

-Ira

qx

no

Falk

lan

ds

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Leb

ano

nx

no

c

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

985plusmn

87)

no

a

Gu

lfW

arx

no

c

Aze

ri-A

rmen

ian

xn

o

NO

TE

For

furt

he

rd

iscu

ssio

ns

of

thes

eco

din

gs

see

ordfAss

ess

men

to

fth

eC

OW

Un

iver

seo

fIn

ters

tate

War

ssi

nce

1815

ordmh

ttp

ww

wu

kye

du

AS

Po

liS

ciD

esch

re

sear

chh

tm

a=

equ

ally

dem

ocr

atic

b

=m

issi

ng

de

mo

cra

cysc

ore

sc

=d

emo

crac

ysc

ore

gt6





Variable dydx















































































































Conclusion















AppendixFairTests

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Fran

co-S

pan

ish

xn

oR

uss

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Mex

ican

-Am

eric

anx

no

c

Au

stro

-Sar

din

ian

xn

ob

Firs

tS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inx

no

Ro

man

Rep

ub

licx

no

c

LaP

lata

xn

oC

rim

ean

xn

oc

An

glo

-Per

sian

xn

oc

Ital

ian

Un

ific

atio

nn

ob

Sp

anis

hM

oro

ccan

no

a

Ital

o-R

om

ann

ob

Ital

o-S

icili

anx

no

Fran

co-M

exic

anx

no

Ecu

ado

r-C

olo

mb

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

Sec

on

dS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inye

sp

essi

mis

tsLo

pez

xx

no

Sp

anis

h-C

hile

anx

no

Sev

enW

eeks

no

b

Fran

co-P

russ

ian

no

b

Ru

sso

-Tu

rkis

hn

oa

Pac

ific

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

Sin

o-F

ren

chx

no

c

Cen

tral

Am

eric

an(1

885)

yes

pes

sim

ists

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

ts


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Gre

co-T

urk

ish

xn

oc

Sp

anis

h-A

mer

ican

xn

oc

Bo

xer

Reb

ellio

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

6)ye

sp

essi

mis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

7)n

ob

Sp

anis

h-M

oro

ccan

xn

oc

Ital

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Firs

tB

alka

nx

no

c

Sec

on

dB

alka

nx

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

Ix

xn

oc

Hu

ng

aria

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Po

lish

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Lith

uan

ian

-Po

lish

xn

oG

reco

-Tu

rkis

hn

ob

Fran

co-T

urk

ish

no

b

Sin

o-S

ovi

etye

sp

essi

mis

tsM

anch

uri

anye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

hac

oye

sp

essi

mis

tsIt

alo

-Eth

iop

ian

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

han

kufe

ng

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

No

mo

han

xn

oR

uss

o-F

inn

ish

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

IIx

xx

no

c

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

o


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Isra

eli

ind

epen

den

ceye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Ko

rea

xn

oc

Ru

sso

-Hu

ng

aria

nn

ob

Sin

aix

no

c

Sin

o-I

nd

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

c

Sec

on

dK

ash

mir

i

no

c

Vie

tnam

xn

oc

Six

-Day

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Foo

tbal

lye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Att

riti

on

xn

oc

Ban

gla

des

hx

no

c

Yom

Kip

pu

rye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsTu

rkis

h-C

ypri

ot

xn

oc

Vie

tnam

ese-

Cam

bo

dia

nn

oa

Eth

iop

ian

-So

mal

in

oa

Ug

and

an-T

anza

nia

nn

oa

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

979)

no

a

Iran

-Ira

qx

no

Falk

lan

ds

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Leb

ano

nx

no

c

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

985plusmn

87)

no

a

Gu

lfW

arx

no

c

Aze

ri-A

rmen

ian

xn

o

NO

TE

For

furt

he

rd

iscu

ssio

ns

of

thes

eco

din

gs

see

ordfAss

ess

men

to

fth

eC

OW

Un

iver

seo

fIn

ters

tate

War

ssi

nce

1815

ordmh

ttp

ww

wu

kye

du

AS

Po

liS

ciD

esch

re

sear

chh

tm

a=

equ

ally

dem

ocr

atic

b

=m

issi

ng

de

mo

cra

cysc

ore

sc

=d

emo

crac

ysc

ore

gt6











































































































Conclusion















AppendixFairTests

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Fran

co-S

pan

ish

xn

oR

uss

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Mex

ican

-Am

eric

anx

no

c

Au

stro

-Sar

din

ian

xn

ob

Firs

tS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inx

no

Ro

man

Rep

ub

licx

no

c

LaP

lata

xn

oC

rim

ean

xn

oc

An

glo

-Per

sian

xn

oc

Ital

ian

Un

ific

atio

nn

ob

Sp

anis

hM

oro

ccan

no

a

Ital

o-R

om

ann

ob

Ital

o-S

icili

anx

no

Fran

co-M

exic

anx

no

Ecu

ado

r-C

olo

mb

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

Sec

on

dS

chle

swig

-Ho

lste

inye

sp

essi

mis

tsLo

pez

xx

no

Sp

anis

h-C

hile

anx

no

Sev

enW

eeks

no

b

Fran

co-P

russ

ian

no

b

Ru

sso

-Tu

rkis

hn

oa

Pac

ific

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

Sin

o-F

ren

chx

no

c

Cen

tral

Am

eric

an(1

885)

yes

pes

sim

ists

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

ts


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Gre

co-T

urk

ish

xn

oc

Sp

anis

h-A

mer

ican

xn

oc

Bo

xer

Reb

ellio

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

6)ye

sp

essi

mis

tsC

entr

alA

mer

ican

(190

7)n

ob

Sp

anis

h-M

oro

ccan

xn

oc

Ital

o-T

urk

ish

no

a

Firs

tB

alka

nx

no

c

Sec

on

dB

alka

nx

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

Ix

xn

oc

Hu

ng

aria

nx

no

c

Ru

sso

-Po

lish

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Lith

uan

ian

-Po

lish

xn

oG

reco

-Tu

rkis

hn

ob

Fran

co-T

urk

ish

no

b

Sin

o-S

ovi

etye

sp

essi

mis

tsM

anch

uri

anye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

hac

oye

sp

essi

mis

tsIt

alo

-Eth

iop

ian

xn

oS

ino

-Jap

anes

eye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsC

han

kufe

ng

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

No

mo

han

xn

oR

uss

o-F

inn

ish

xn

oc

Wo

rld

War

IIx

xx

no

c

Fran

co-T

hai

xn

o


Appendix(continued)

War

Misaggre-

gation

Mixed

Alliance

Gross

Mismatch

Asymmetric

Interests

Draw

Fair

TestFavors

Isra

eli

ind

epen

den

ceye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Ko

rea

xn

oc

Ru

sso

-Hu

ng

aria

nn

ob

Sin

aix

no

c

Sin

o-I

nd

ian

yes

pes

sim

ists

c

Sec

on

dK

ash

mir

i

no

c

Vie

tnam

xn

oc

Six

-Day

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Foo

tbal

lye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsc

Att

riti

on

xn

oc

Ban

gla

des

hx

no

c

Yom

Kip

pu

rye

str

ium

ph

alis

tsTu

rkis

h-C

ypri

ot

xn

oc

Vie

tnam

ese-

Cam

bo

dia

nn

oa

Eth

iop

ian

-So

mal

in

oa

Ug

and

an-T

anza

nia

nn

oa

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

979)

no

a

Iran

-Ira

qx

no

Falk

lan

ds

yes

triu

mp

hal

ists

c

Leb

ano

nx

no

c

Sin

o-V

ietn

ames

e(1

985plusmn

87)

no

a

Gu

lfW

arx

no

c

Aze

ri-A

rmen

ian

xn

o

NO

TE

For

furt

he

rd

iscu

ssio

ns

of

thes

eco

din

gs

see

ordfAss

ess

men

to

fth

eC

OW

Un

iver

seo

fIn

ters

tate

War

ssi

nce

1815

ordmh

ttp

ww

wu

kye

du

AS

Po

liS

ciD

esch

re

sear

chh

tm

a=

equ

ally

dem

ocr

atic

b

=m

issi

ng

de

mo

cra

cysc

ore

sc

=d

emo

crac

ysc

ore

gt6

democracy and victory: why regime type hardly matters is... · 2003. 5. 7. · will win most ofits...

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