Deliverable No. 5.2.

Project acronym: EcoFishMan

Project title:

" Ecosystem-based Responsive Fisheries Management in Europe "

Grant agreement No: FP7-265401

Project co-funded by the European Commission within the

Seventh Framework Programme

Start date of project: 1st March 2011

Duration: 36 months

Due date of deliverable: 31st May 2012

Submission date: 31st August 2012

File Name: D 5.2 ECOFISHMAN Report on RFMS prototype 1 tested in

case study 1

Revision number: 01

Document status: Final

Dissemination Level: PP1

Revision Control

Role Name Organisation Date File suffix2

Authors Sigríður Sigurðardóttir,

Sveinn Margeirsson, Jónas

R. Viðarsson.

Matís

Kristófer Gunnlaugsson,

Sveinn Agnarsson,

UI

Kåre N. Nielsen, Petter

Holm, Michaela Aschan

UiT

WP leader Sveinn Margeirsson Matís

Administrative

Officer

Oddur M. Gunnarsson Matís

Coordinator Anna K. Daníelsdóttir Matís

1 PU: Public, PP: Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services), RE: Restricted to a group specified by the

consortium (including the Commission Services), CO: Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission

Services) 2 The initials of the revising individual in capital letters

Table of contents

1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 2 RFMS prototype 1 ..................................................................................................................... 3

2.1 Task 4.1: Conceptualization of RFMS – Prototype 1 ........................................................ 3 2.2 References ........................................................................................................................ 16 2.3 Task 4.2: Design and development of guidelines formaking a general MP .................... 19

2.4 References ........................................................................................................................ 25 2.5 EcoFishMan Glossary ...................................................................................................... 26 2.6 References ........................................................................................................................ 28

3 MP0: Current status of the Icelandic lumpfish fishery ........................................................ 29 3.1 Fishery overview .............................................................................................................. 29 3.2 Indicators and outcome targets......................................................................................... 35 3.3 Harvest strategies ............................................................................................................. 36 3.4 Monitoring, compliance, sanctions .................................................................................. 37

3.5 Documentation ................................................................................................................. 37 3.6 Planning process .............................................................................................................. 38 3.7 References ........................................................................................................................ 38

4 Management Plan Invitation .................................................................................................. 39 4.1 Identification of fishery .................................................................................................... 40 4.2 Outcome Targets .............................................................................................................. 41

4.3 Implementation strategy ................................................................................................... 42

5 MP1: Management Plan for the Icelandic lumpfish fishery based on RFMS ................... 43 5.1 Fishery overview .............................................................................................................. 43 5.2 Indicators and outcome targets......................................................................................... 50 5.3 Harvest strategies ............................................................................................................. 51

5.4 Monitoring, compliance, sanctions .................................................................................. 52 5.5 Documentation ................................................................................................................. 53

5.6 Planning process .............................................................................................................. 53 5.7 References ........................................................................................................................ 53

6 Certified documentation system for the Icelandic Lumpfish fishery ................................. 55 6.1 Lumpfish licenses............................................................................................................. 56

6.2 Inspections by NASBOs representatives ......................................................................... 57 6.3 Logbooks .......................................................................................................................... 58

6.4 Reports from processors ................................................................................................... 59 6.5 VMS data ......................................................................................................................... 60 6.6 Biomass index .................................................................................................................. 60

7 Simulation model for the Icelandic lumpfish fishery ........................................................... 61 7.1 Objectives and Outcome Targets ..................................................................................... 61

7.2 The model......................................................................................................................... 62 7.3 Input modelling (parameter estimation) ........................................................................... 64 7.4 Dynamics of the lumpfish fishery .................................................................................... 69 7.5 Results from simulation ................................................................................................... 70 7.6 References ........................................................................................................................ 71

8 Conclusion and discussion ...................................................................................................... 72

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1 Introduction

This document is a deliverable in work package 5 (WP5 – case studies) in the FP7 project EcoFishMan. It is a report on how the RFMS (Responsive Fisheries Management System) prototype 1 was tested i.e. implemented and simulated, in the Icelandic lumpfish fishery, which is case study 1a in the project. This is the first case study in EcoFishMan and the outcome will be used as basis for making a more advanced RFMS prototypes, to be implemented/tested in other, more complex, case studies.

RFMS prototype 1 is a blueprint for how to adopt a Results-based management (RBM) in a fishery. EcoFishMan WP4, which has the title “overall design of RFMS” supplied WP5 with the RFMS prototype 1. It was then the job of WP5 to follow the blueprint, so that it could be tested on the Icelandic lumpfish fishery.

In accordance with the defined RFMS prototype 1 work procedures, WP5 case study 1a partners (Matís and UI) began by making a report, called MP0, which describes the current situation of the fishery. The next step was to make a draft document called Management Plan invitation (MP invitation), which explains to the “operators”, i.e. the resource users, the basics behind the RFMS and invites them to a pre-invitation meeting. The pre-invitation meeting is a preparation meeting, where ground rules are explained and dialogue started with the “operators” on how to develop and implement a RFMS for the fishery in question. Then a formal MP invitation is sent to the “operators”, inviting them to draft a MP according to the RFMS. If the “operators” accept, they send the “authority” a MP draft, which is then the basis for dialogue between the operators and the authority. A final result of this dialogue is an accepted management plan (MP1), which is in essence a contract between the operators and the authority.

An important component of a successful RFMS is the reversion of the burden of proof, which means that operators need to accept increased responsibility of collecting data. To make such a data collection process standardised, a set of agreed (certified) documentation systems need to be established. This certified documentation system was therefore established for the lumpfish fishery and has been incorporated as such into deliverable 5.1 (D5.1 Certified documentation system).

While the MP1 was being developed a team of experts were developing a modelling to simulate the fisheries management system, which predicts the effects of the MP1 if implemented. The model uses historic data to simulate what affects changes in the management might have on a number of indicators.

This report is divided into the following chapters:

MP0, which describes the lumpfish fishery as it is today.

MP invitation, which is the formal invitation from the authority to the operator to enter negotiations on RFMS for the Icelandic lumpfish fishery.

MP1, which is the actual RFMS management plan for the Icelandic lumpfish fishery.

Certified documentation system, which describes what data is required from resource users.

The model/simulation system for the Icelandic lumpfish fishery, which describes the components of the model, its inputs and results.

Discussion on the whole process and lessons learned

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It should be kept in mind when reading this report that this is the first case study in EcoFishMan, and that four other case studies will follow. The project is designed so that each case study will be drawing on experience from the other case studies, as this is a learning process. It is therefore clear that this first case is not perfect, but will serve as a valuable input for the next case study.

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2 RFMS prototype 1

This chapter consists of three separate texts: 1) Task 4.1: Conceptualization of the Responsive Fisheries Management system (RFMS) – Prototype 1, 2) task 4.2: Design and development of guidelines for making a general management plan and 3) the EcoFishMan Glossary updated at the annual meeting in FARO in February 2012. It should be kept in mind that the guidelines for making a general management plan (task 4.2) is continuously developed throughout the progress of the EcoFishMan project.

2.1 Task 4.1: Conceptualization of RFMS – Prototype 1

The purpose of this text is to propose an initial conceptual model of Responsive Fisheries Management Systems (RFMS) based on the notion of Results Based Management (RBM).

The term RFMS refers to the management system that will be proposed as the main outcome of the EcoFishMan project. RFMS is an adaptive management system that is results-based, ecosystem-based, and that seeks to reduce micro-management through a greater involvement of stakeholders in the management process.

This work draws on the insights of the review on existing RBM Systems performed in deliverable D1.1 as well as on the RBM definition launched and refined within the EcoFishMan project. The proposed model (fig. 1, p13) is deliberately kept generic at this stage; it will be the purpose of other work packages to allow for its elaboration and specification.

2.1.1 Introduction: What is Results Based Management?

Results Based Management (RBM) is focused on achieving specified results, and about documenting that they are achieved. This is to be viewed in contrast to a management system that is focused on specifying detailed requirements of a management process, which is often referred to as ” micro-management”. It is helpful to think of RBM as a type of contract between a management authority (henceforth referred to as the “authority”) and an operating partner (henceforth referred to as the “operator”). If we for instance think of car manufacturing, RBM might imply that the authority specifies the minimum quality standards for the cars. As long as the operator (in this case the car manufacturer) adequately documents that these requirements are satisfied, the authority will not intervene in the way the operator chooses to work. The corresponding micro-management scenario would be that the authority species a long list of conditions for the way the operator should work (e.g. type of engine, working procedures, etc.).

Contemporary fisheries management in a European context has appropriately been characterized as micro-management (Degnbol 2005); it includes countless regulations that, among other things, specify what, where, how, when and with which gear specifications one may fish. The regulations have a tendency to spawn more regulations (Jentoft and Mikalsen 2004), and yet they often seem unable to achieve the main objectives of the CFP – namely a biologically, and socio-economically, sustainable fisheries (Froese and Proelß 2010; Piet and Rice 2004).

Simplistically, RBM in fisheries would imply that the authority specifies a set of minimum quality conditions for the marine (socio-economic) environment and then leaves it to the operators (i.e. the fishermen and other potential resource users) to use the resources in the way they see fit – as long as they document that their operations satisfy the minimum conditions . From the perspective of the operator RBM comes with flexibility and positive incentives for performing better in terms of their business as well as for inventing more efficient and workable management solutions. This, of course, is also an advantage from the perspective of the authority. The authority’s main role in the work of

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managing simplifies to establishing standards and to evaluate the documentation supplied by operators, which informs about the operators performance with regard to the standards.

This description of RBM is not only highly simplistic; it is also rather idealistic. In fact, a range of practical considerations and complications have been left out of consideration. In the context of fisheries management a range of questions may be asked: What kind of agencies are, respectively, the “operator” and the “authority”? Which level of the EU administration are we talking about? Is the operator a fisherman or a particular type of group of fishermen? What kind of quality standards should the authority develop, and what kind of documentation should it accept from the operators with respect to these standards? Will the operators have capacity and resources to provide sufficient documentation? Which sanctions should the authority impose if the standards are not met?

Along with such practical considerations, the brief description of RBM calls for an articulation of important conceptual issues. Perhaps most importantly, the description implies a shift in the burden of proof as it makes the operator responsible for documenting state of affairs with respect to the quality standards established by the authority. As will become clear the placement of the burden of proof on the operator is not an explicit requirement of most conceptualizations of RBM that have been formulated in other contexts than that of fisheries management. However, the question of the burden of proof involves an important conceptual choice, not least for the EcoFishMan project. It will here be suggested that the EcoFishMan project indeed should develop a concept of RBM by which the burden of documentation rests on the operator3. Placing the burden of documentation on the operator (i.e. resource user) is in accordance with the definition of RBM that was included in the EcoFishMan project proposal (EcoFishMan 2010), and which we return to below. One of the tasks of the EcoFishMan project will be to articulate what this choice could entail in principle and in practice.

This text is organized into the following parts:

In Section 2, a selection of RBM concepts will be presented and discussed. Particular attention will be given to a discussion of the RBM definition presented in the EcoFishMan project description (EcoFishMan 2010)4. Main elements of the definition will be identified and it will be compared to RBM definitions promoted and adopted respectively by UN and the OECD. These inter-governmental organizations have been undergoing reform processes that are based on RBM and they have accordingly contributed with an extensive literature on conceptual frameworks and operational guidelines for RBM.

Section 3 offers a selective review of RBM experiences. While extensive experiences with RBM have in particular been obtained and documented within intergovernmental organizations such as the UN and the OECD (section 3.1), particular emphasis here will be on presenting experiences related to RBM in the context of fisheries management (Section 3.2).

Section 4 presents a conceptual model of RFMS, which is based on the concept of RBM (Fig. 2-1, p 13). The model includes three agencies (authority, operator and assessor) and depicts their role in a RBM process.

2.1.2 RBM: background and concepts

RBM in public administrations is part of a loosely defined reform trend that, in particular in OECD countries, has been going on since the 1980s, and which is commonly referred to as New Public Management (NPM). This style of management had taken inspiration from result oriented management in the private sector. Characteristic thematic components of NPM include emphasis on

3 Note that this is consistent with that the operator in practice may choose to outsource the work of documenting. 4 The RBM concept related to this definition was explained further in the “EcoFishMan Glossary” (see

EcoFishMan Deliverable 1.1).

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accountability, decentralization, delivery of measurable results (rather than regulating and overseeing a particular process) and “value for money” (Binnendijk 2001; Hood 1991; Oladele 2010).

2.1.2.1 The RBM definition in the EcoFishMan project

There are two main difficulties with getting a good grip on RBM. First, in spite of that it has inspired management reforms in a number of public administrations there is little academic literature available about RBM. Second, the notion tends to be somewhat vaguely conceived of, and it is rarely defined explicitly (Martin and Jobin 2004).

In the EcoFishMan project proposal, RBM is defined as:

Defining a maximum acceptable negative impact and then leaving it to those concerned to identify the means to meet the requirements and to document the effectiveness of the means (EcoFishMan 2010).

This definition, which is from the call text to which the EcoFishMan proposal was addressed5, is appropriate for the EcoFishMan project. Before we examine it more closely, however, we propose three revisions of the formulation. First, we find that it is better not to specify that RBM is only about “maximum negative impact”. For instance, socio-economic Outcome Targets might be defined as minimum positive impact. The formulation may hence be simplified by replacing “maximum acceptable negative impact” with “acceptable impact”. Second, the phrase “leaving it to those concerned” is ambiguous with respect to what it means and who is refers to6. For the purposes of the EcoFishMan project, it is important that this phrase refers to those that wish to use the marine resource in question (e.g. fishermen or, generically speaking, the operators). For this purpose, the formulation is potentially misleading because other types of stakeholders than the operators are likely to be “concerned”. The formulation can be improved by replacing “those concerned” with “resource users”. For our research purposes, the term “operator” will often be used instead of “resource users”. But since we wish to disseminate our definition broadly, it is preferable to use a definition that is immediately understandable to other readers. Third, the formulation may suggest that it is sufficient for resource users to propose means to meet requirements and documents the effectiveness of the means. However, resource users should also be held accountable for that the acceptable impacts (outcome targets) are indeed achieved. This point can be made explicit by adding the phrase “and ultimately achieve the requirements”.

In sum, we propose the following definition of RBM:

Defining an acceptable impact and leaving it to resource users to identify the means to meet the requirements and to document the effectiveness of the means, and ultimately achieve the requirements.

2.1.2.2 RBM in EcoFishMan – comparison with definitions from UN and OECD

The definition of RBM in EcoFishMan (as revised in section 2.1) includes 3 important elements:

The specification of acceptable impact

That operators have flexibility of choosing management means

5 The EcoFishMan project proposal refers this definition to FAO. (1996). The Precautionary Approach to

Fisheries and its Implications for Fishery Research, Technology and Management: An Updated

Review.Precautionary approach to fisheries - Part 2: Scientific papers. FAO, Rome. However, the mentioned

FAO document does not contain a definition of RBM. 6 The sentence can be misunderstood to have imply the opposite of the meaning it was intended to express: if a

relevant stakeholder group, for instance a group of fishermen, is not “concerned” (i.e. in the non-intended sense

of being concerned about the environment) the formulation may suggests that it should not be left to this group

to “identify the means to meet the requirements and to document the effectiveness of the means”.

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That operators are required to document the effectiveness of management means

As we will return to in section x the interpretation of RBM that is comprised by these elements is consistent with the way RBM is discussed in the EUs Green Paper on the reform of the CFP (Ref: Green Paper, 2009: 11-12) 7. Each of these elements will play a significant role in the generic model that we will propose in section 4. It is important to note, however, that the explication of these three elements in EcoFishMan’s definition of RBM sets it apart from two widely disseminated RBM definitions, namely the definitions of the UN and the OECD:

The UN defines RBM as:

A broad management strategy aimed at achieving important changes in the way government agencies operate, with improving performance (achieving better results) as the central orientation (Binnendijk 2001; UN 2004).

In turn, the OECD defines RBM as:

A management strategy focusing on performance and achievement of outputs, outcomes and impacts (OECD, 2002).

While the definitions of the UN and the OECD both stress that the focus of RBM is on improving performance, this is not mentioned in the EcoFishMan definition. We do not find that this absence is critical for the EcoFishMan definition since it is implicit that the point of a management strategy is to achieve better performance in some sense.

Conversely, we note that the UN’s definition of RBM does not explicate the three elements listed for the EcoFishMan definition above: It does not articulate a requirement for a specification of performance levels (e.g. outcome targets), nor does is explicate a requirement of documentation of performance, and nor does it explicitly place the burden of documenting results on the agencies or elsewhere. The OECD definition refers to a specific and refined vocabulary for performances (i.e. “outputs, outcomes and impacts”), but it does not articulate a requirement of documentation nor which agency should be responsible for documenting. The absence of these elements from the RBM definitions should not be taken to imply that these issues relating to these three elements are not given attention in the UN and the OECD. In both organizations, these issues are addressed in a number of documents on RBM concepts and practice such as text proposing conceptual frameworks, guidelines, list of key concepts, and reviews of practice. We find it preferable that these three elements are made explicit in the EcoFishMan definition as this makes it easier to communicate what RBM is and how it differs from the established resource management system. While the current resource management system in CFP is continuously undergoing reforms in order to improve performance (and hence could be understood as RBM), it is important for the EcoFishMan project to establish how RBM differs from current management systems in this context.

2.1.3 Experiences with RBM in fisheries and in other contexts

RBM has been extensively used as an instrument to reform public administration in major intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, OECD and the World Bank. In addition, national administrations and state governments in some countries have been conceived of and analysed in

7 Martin and Jobin (2004) introduce RBM much along the same lines as the EcoFishMan definition: “As its

name indicates, RBM is an approach of public administration that aims at putting the focus on the results of the

public action, allowing the administrators to be more flexible. RBM implies a measurement of the results, the

integration of the information about the performance in the decision making process and the use of the

information about results for a continuous improvement. RBM also implies that a governor accepts his/her

responsibility over his/her results and informs the citizens by making reports” (Martin and Jobin 2004: 305

(translated)).

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terms of RBM (Martin and Jobin 2004; Moynihan 2006). RBM has also been applied to administrative bodies such as regional management of forestry and national aid programs. Table 1 lists a number of useful references regarding experiences with RBM.

Table 2-1: List of selected works reporting on RBM concepts and experiences (in other contexts than that

of fisheries management (see below for the latter))

RBM case References The UN system:

UNDG

UNDP

UNESCO

(UNDG 2010)

(UNDP 2007)

(Oladele 2010)

OECD (OECD 2002)

World Bank (WB 2002)

National administrations (Martin and Jobin 2004)

Federal state administration (Moynihan 2006)

Forestry (British Colombia) (Fraser et al. 2006;

MOFARFPB 2010)

2.1.3.1 Cross-cutting RBM experiences and lessons

An important and widely acknowledged experience with RBM in organisational development is the need for realistic expectations. One should not expect that RBM can perform miracles over short time spans; improving organisations based on RBM requires considerable investments of time and resources. Part of the reason why one needs to be patient with RBM reforms is that a transformation towards an efficient RBM system to some extent is premised on a cultural change in organizations; in practice, organizations may often resist the adoption of a “RBM culture”.

RBM involves devolution of practical management responsibility (i.e. in our terms from authority to operator). The devolution of responsibility is conditioned on that results are achieved, and that this is documented. The possibility for the operator to achieve results may often depend on the invention of creative solutions. In this context it is important to note that adopting a focus on accountability for results without granting operators flexibility to do things differently may easily lead to disappointment (Moynihan 2006).

When designing a RBM system, the specific choice of indicators (in terms of which results are defined) becomes an important issue. A popular rule of thumb is that indicators should be “Specific Measurable Attainable Relevant and Trackable” (i.e. SMART) (e.g. Binnendijk 2001). The process of deciding on indicators is also important. In one case, it was reported that the consultation of a broad range of stakeholders in the selection of socioeconomic and ecosystem indicators was rewarding for the management process in so far it increased different stakeholders understanding of each other’s concerns. However, this process also had the drawbacks of being slow and of leading to the inclusion of too many indicators, which reduced effectiveness of the management process (Fraser et al. 2006).

2.1.3.2 Experiences with RBM in the context of Fisheries

As in other contexts, RBM has been conceived of differently with regard to fisheries management. We will here take starting point in EcoFishMan’s definition of RBM (presented in section 2), which requires that there is a specification of results to be achieved, and that operators have a flexibility of the means to achieve the results but also an obligation to document their achievement. We will here briefly present and discuss a 5 cases, which will tentatively be arranged with respect to the presence or absence of these RBM features (Table 2). As defined within EcoFishMan, RBM has only been applied in a limited number of cases of fisheries management, and there are very few works

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published on experiences with such cases. Indeed, we are currently only aware of three such cases. These cases concern management of scallop fisheries in New Zealand (Arbuckle and Drummond 2000; Mincher 2008), management of goose barnacles in Galicia (Molares and Freire 2003) and the case Spencer Gulf Prawns in South Australia (Hollamby et al. 2010; Zacharin et al. 2008).

It is conceivable that a much greater number of cases comprise some, but not all, of these RBM features. We present and discuss two such cases that are of particular interest to the EcoFishMan project. The first is the case of standard, TAC based, “micro-management” within the CFP. The importance of this case stems form that it represents the management system that the EcoFishMan project intents to reform based on RBM. Noting that we here cannot do justice to the complexity and differences between individual cases of fisheries management within the CFP, we here refer to deliverable D1.2, which offers a review of fisheries management in the CFP. The second of these cases is the Catch Quota Management system, which, based on RBM thinking, has been developed and proposed as a way to improve fisheries management in the CFP.

Note that we here do not seek to evaluate and rank the management performance within the different cases; the purpose is to present and arrange the cases with respect to the features of RBM they do (or do not) comprise. We also note that the scoring of the presence or absence of the RBM features in each case is both crude and tentative: it will be followed up by a more refined analysis and discussion.

Table 2-2: Tentative arrangement of cases of fisheries management in regard to defining features of

Results Based Management as defined in the EcoFishMan project

Outcome

Targets defined

and

documented

Burden of

documentation

on operators

Operators have

flexibility of

choosing

management

means CFP “micro- management (3.2.1) yes8 no no

CQM by CCTV (3.2.2) yes some no

NZ Scallops

Challenger (3.2.3)

yes yes yes

Goose barnacle Cofradías (3.2.4) yes yes yes

Spencer Gulf Prawns (3.2.5) yes yes yes

Standard TAC based “micromanagement” in the CFP

As RBM in the EcoFishMan project is proposed as an alternative to how fisheries management is conducted within the CFP, it is important to clarify how these management forms differ. For this purpose, it will here suffice to imagine a standard CFP model of fisheries management: TAC management based on ICES stock assessment and advice, with the fishing operations being subjected to a range of regulations that specify where, how, what, when and with which gear one may fish (i.e. “micromanagement”). In this system, there is little incentive to avoid discards or to cooperate with science and authorities about issues of management and documentation.

8For some EU stocks the state of the stock is not known. For these stocks an Outcome Target (TAC) is set

without underlying documentation. A list of such stocks can be found here:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/publications/cfp_factsheets/tacs_en.pdf (last visited 15.02.2012)

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This standard CFP model of fisheries management nevertheless comprises an important RBM feature: It specifies Outcome Targets to be reached (stock objectives specified in terms of reference levels of SSB and F) and there is a system for documentation relationships between management measures and the Outcome Targets (i.e. TAC levels linked to the specific stock objectives in ICES catch forecast)9. Moreover, ICES stock assessments allow for an evaluation of the extent to which previous Outcome Targets were reached. In practice, the short term objectives are often not met for many CFP stocks, and the assessments are often subjected to high uncertainty, not least for depleted or overfished stocks. But the point here is that this case formally comprises the RBM feature of setting outcome targets and documenting the performance regarding these targets, irrespective of that the management system in many cases may actually perform poorly with respect to these features.

Two other RBM features, however, are not present in this CFP standard model. First, the burden of documenting a need for interventions, in principle as well as in practice, is on the management authority (Lassen et al. 2008). This fundamentally remains the case even after the precautionary approach has been implemented in ICES advice and in the CFP though a system of reference points (Hauge et al. 2007). Second, there is no flexibility regarding the management means in this standard case, notably including regulations of the conduct of fisheries, such as regulations about what, where, and with which gears one may fish. The absence of these RBM features is the reason why the CFP standard case is not a case of RBM as defined in the EcoFishMan project.

Catch Quota Management by CCTV

Catch Quota Management (CQM) involves management and documentation of catches (which include discards) as opposed to management of landings. Proposed by the Danish government , a CQM system was tried in a pilot project which involved electronic monitoring of the catches of six Danish vessels fishing for cod (Kindt-Larsen et al. 2011)10. The catches of these vessels were continuously filmed by Closed Circuit Television cameras (CCTV), and the images were later used to estimate discard volumes and compositions. The main incentive for fishermen that wished to enter the CQM scheme was that the catch quota they would receive would be higher than the landing quota they would otherwise obtain. From a perspective of sustainability, an advantage of CQM is that it creates and economic incentive to avoid catches below the legal landing size in order to maximize the revenue from the catch quota11.

The CQM system comprises a range of RBM features. Importantly, it creates an incentive for the fishermen to reduce discards, as these are subtracted from their catch entitlements. In addition, the electronic monitoring produces improved data about catches and discards, which can be utilized to enhance assessments of the stocks. In terms of the RBM features that derive from EcoFishMan’s definition of RBM, the CQM system includes outcome targets (catch quotas) and a system for documentation with respect to these (by way of CCTV). Further, the CQM scheme confers the fishermen with a partial burden of documentation, namely insofar the participation in the scheme comes with an obligation of continuous monitoring of catches by CCTV. However, the fishermen in this case are not formally responsible for the documentation process. This responsibility seems to remain with the relevant management authorities. Finally, it appears that the CQM does not provide fishermen with flexibility with respect to management means. The fishermen in the CQM scheme are subjected to the same regulations as they would otherwise be (except that their TAC allowance is replaced by a catch allowance). While a CQM system in which fishermen are formally responsible for

9 But see previous footnote. 10 Other experiments related to CQM have been performed (Fitzpatrick et al. 2011); see also following footnote. 11 Reports on experiences with CQM systems in Denmark, Scotland and England are available here:

www.fvm.dk/yieldoffish (last visited 10.02.2012).

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catch documentation and are granted extensive flexibility of management means can readily be imagined, such a system has apparently not been tried out in practice so far.

RBM in New Zealand: The case of Challenger

Located at the Northern tip of the South Island of New Zealand, the Southern Scallop fishery is to a considerable extent self-managed by an industry led company named Challenger (Arbuckle and Drummond 2000; Harte 2001; Mincher 2008). Challenger was established in 1994 by scallop quota owners to organize and exercise management and stock enhancement activities in this fishery, which is the largest scallop fishery in New Zealand. Later, Challenger also was contracted to provide management services (e.g. planning, organization and implementation of management activities) for a number of other fisheries. For the scallop fishery, Challenger is responsible for planning stock enhancement (i.e. harvesting and distribution of oyster spat) as well research, management and compliance activities. Challenger annually presents a plan for these activities, seeking approval by the Ministry of Fisheries. The considerable devolution of management responsibility from the Ministry to Challenger was formalised in a Memorandum of Understanding, which among other things specified the Ministry’s requirements regarding the information supporting the management plans proposed by Challenger. The Government consented Challenger considerable legal flexibility, such as allowing for an exemption to the MSY criterion for sustainability (instead Challenger found it preferable to work for sustainability of the scallop fishery by way of a rotational harvesting scheme). It has been argued that such regulatory flexibility has been an important factor in Challenger’s relative success with managing the fishery. The costs of management measures and research for Challenger are covered by a levy on harvested scallops (Arbuckle and Drummond 2000; Mincher 2008).

For New Zealand’s Ministry of Fisheries, Challenger became an early “proof of concept” of the Ministry’s intent to move in the direction of co-management through the development of a fisheries management plan.12 Such management plans have now been developed for most of New Zealand’s fisheries (Anon 2011a). Illustrating the close affinity between New Zealand’s fishery policy and the way RBM has been defined in the EcoFishMan project, the Ministry of Fisheries envisaged that the development of harvest strategy standards would be a central element in the fisheries plans:

It is anticipated that the harvest strategy standard, once approved, will be implemented in fisheries plans. A fisheries plan is an agreement between parties to manage the fishery in a particular way. Fisheries plans will explicitly say what tangata whenua13, stakeholders, and the Ministry want from a fishery, how to get there, and how to ensure that plan objectives are met (Anon 2006: 5).

In the fisheries plans, the role of the standards will be to represent what the Government “considers to be the minimum level necessary to ensure sustainable fisheries “ (Anon 2006: 4)

The case of scallop management and stock enhancement by Challenger’s comprises the RBM features RBM outlined in table1: The management plan includes the outcomes to be achieved as well as documentation of why they can be expected to be achieved based on the suggested management means. In practice the burden of documentation (including the responsibility and costs of data gathering of contracting research services for analysis and assessment of the data) rests on the operators. Finally, the authorities have granted the operators flexibility to achieve policy objectives in a ways they consider to be efficient.

12 Two other early fisheries plans were developed and proposed for the Orange Roughy fisheries and for the

“Blue Buff” Oyster fishery Hill, N. A. O., Michael, K. P., Frazer, A., and Leslie, S. (2010). "The utility and risk

of local ecological knowledge in developing stakeholder driven fisheries management: The Foveaux Strait

dredge oyster fishery, New Zealand." Ocean & Coastal Management, 53, 659-668, Yang, Y. W., Frazer, A., and

Rees, E. (2010). "Self-governance within a QMS framework — The evolution of self-governance in the New

Zealand Bluff oyster fishery." Marine Policy, 34, 261–267. 13 Tangata whenua is a Māori term of the indigenous peoples of New Zealand.

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Co-management of Goose barnacles in Galicia

The management of Goose barnacles (Pollicipes pollicipes) in Galicia, in North Western Spain, has since 1992 been carried out in co-management arrangements between the fisheries authority and local organized guilds of fishermen (i.e. cofradías). The cofradías are permitted to exploit resources in accordance with management plans that have been approved by the fisheries authority. The plans need to fulfil a range of official requirements and are evaluated by fisheries biologists and personnel in the public administration. While the organisational capacities differ between the cofradías, it has been reported that an increasing number of them are acquiring the capacity to develop and implement such plans (Molares and Freire 2003). Successful cofradías manage implementation, control and surveillance of harvest allocations and regulations in a way that is more effective and less costly than if exercised by regional authorities (Frangoudes et al. 2008). A project developed a Geographical Information System, which allowed for the collecting and analysing data with a higher space/time resolution than previously. This system in turn allows for the more precise assessment as well as “real time” management” by the cofradías based on information from catch rates (Molares and Freire 2003).

Management plans that are in accordance with formal requirements comprise, in our terms, both outcome targets as well as relevant documentation of the feasibility of achieving the outcome targets through the proposed management measures. While questions relating to in which sense, and to what extent, the burden of proof rests in principle on the operator would invite a more specific analysis of this case, it seems clear that the practical burden of documenting is carried by the cofradías in collaboration with researchers. Finally, we note that cofradías have flexibility of choosing management means, as exemplified by its “real-time” management of permitted harvesting areas.

Spencer Gulf Prawns in South Australia

The management of Spencer Gulf Prawns in South Australia has been described as a successful case of a high and increasing degree of self-management in the trawl fishery (Hollamby et al. 2010; Zacharin et al. 2008). While the formal management responsibility resides with the Minister for South Australian Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, an industry organisation that represents the fishermen and licensees in this fishery (The Spencer Gulf and West Coast Prawn Fishermen’s Association) has developed a capacity to propose and implement management measures. The industry association proposes harvests strategies, which are incorporated into a perennial management plan, which is then drafted by the staff members in the ministry for approval by the minister14. The plan specifies how the general policy objectives for fisheries in South Australia will be met (Dixon and Sloan 2007). Jointly coordinated by the Association and the South Australian Research and Development Institute, research surveys are performed by fishermen. The surveys support stock assessments, which in turn are used as a basis for proposing harvests strategies. In addition, the Association recruits fishermen to undertake “spot surveys”, which are used for making real-time management decisions (i.e. opening and closing fishing grounds based on catch compositions). Fishermen are compensated economically for undertaking surveys, and these costs, together with other research and management expenses are paid for by the industry through licence fees collected by a public authority (the Fisheries Agency) (Zacharin et al. 2008). A new fisheries management act from 2007 (Anon 2011b) opens up for even more industry self-management in this fishery. However, it has been noted that the industry will not receive the full management

14 The latest management plan for this fishery: Dixon, C., and Sloan, S. (2007). "Management Plan for the South

Australian Spence Gulf Prawn Fishery", Department for Primary Industries and Resources South Australia).

City: Adelaide.

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responsibility as certain management functions such as compliance, regulations and audit will remain with the public authorities (Hollamby et al. 2010; Zacharin et al. 2008).

In sum, the management of Spencer Gulf Prawns in South Australia is a highly promising candidate for RBM in the sense defined in the EcoFishMan project. Outcome Targets (related to generic policy objected) are specified, and it is documented how they may be achieved in a harvest strategy. As with the case of cofradías a refined discussion regarding the placement of the burden of documentation would invite a more thorough analysis. However, it seems clear that the practical work of documenting is carried by the Association in collaboration with researchers. Finally, the Association has flexibility of choosing management means, as exemplified by its “real-time” opening and closure of fishing grounds.

2.1.4 A conceptual model for RFMS – Prototype 1

Drawing on the definition of RBM in the EcoFishMan and on experiences with RBM in fisheries management as well as in other contexts, we now propose a conceptual model of Responsive Fisheries Management System (Fig. 1). The model will at this stage be kept at a rather abstract level; the elaboration and contextualisation of the RBM concept in EcoFishMan will be a collaborative outcome, which will be nourished and shaped though outcomes of the projects different work packages.

2.1.4.1 Explaining the model of Prototype 1

The RFMS model (Fig. 1) fundamentally conceptualises RBM as a contract between an Authority and an Operator. In the context of resource management, the operator would be a resource user, typically an organized group of fishermen. The contract, i.e. the management plan, specifies the conditions under which the Authority can permit the Operator to use the resource in question. The model includes a third agency: the assessor. The role of the assessor is to evaluate whether the contract between the Authority and the Operator has been fulfilled.

The model is based on EcoFishMan’s definition of the RBM:

Defining an acceptable impact and leaving it to resource users to identify the means to meet the requirements and to document the effectiveness of the means, and ultimately achieve the requirements.

The model’s key elements follow from this definition: The specification of acceptable impact (i.e. Outcome Targets); that operators are required to document the effectiveness of management means (so that it can be expected that the Outcome Targets will be reached; and that operators are granted flexibility of choosing management means.

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Figure 2-1: Conceptual model of a Responsive Fisheries Management System (RFMS)

The Figure above shows a conceptual model of a Responsive Fisheries Management System (RFMS). The model includes three key agencies. The Authority has the final responsibility for resource management. The authority specifies outcome targets to be reached in a specific context. The Operator proposes a management plan, which documents that the outcomes targets are achievable through a suggested set of management measures. The Operator may cooperate with the authority about the development of the plan, but the required quality of documentation is decided by the Authority. If a management plan is approved by the Authority, the Operator can proceed with its implementation. Also at this stage the Operator may cooperate with the Authority (the Authority may for instance supply enforcement services). While implementing the plan, the Operator is responsible for collecting information required for assessing whether or not the Outcome Targets were (or will be) achieved. The Operator may contract research services to this end. The documentation provided by the Operator is reviewed by an Assessor, which is institutionally independent from the both Authority and the Operator. The Assessor assesses whether or not (or the extent to which) the outcomes targets are achieved. For the Operator, the assessment will provide a basis for drafting modified management plans. For the Authority, the assessment may be a basis for implementing sanctions (if outcome targets were not achieved), for rewarding achievements, or for revising outcome targets. See text for further explanation.

The basic intention of this model of RBM is captured in the Commission’s Green paper on the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, which explicitly links RBM to a shift in the burden of proof:

The industry can be given more responsibility through self-management. Results-based management could be a move in this direction: instead of establishing rules about how to fish, the rules focus on the outcome and the more detailed implementation decisions would be left to the industry. Public authorities would set the limits within which the industry must operate, such as a maximum catch or maximum by-catch of young fish, and then give industry the authority to develop the best solutions economically and technically.

Results-based management would relieve both the industry and policy-makers of part of the burden of detailed management of technical issues. It would have to be linked to a reversal of the burden of proof: it would be up to the industry to demonstrate that it operates responsibly in return for access to fishing (CEC 2009: 11-12).

How, and in which sense the burden of proof should be placed on the operator is not a straightforward question (Charles 2002; Fitzpatrick et al. 2011; Lassen et al. 2008), and the refinement of EcoFishMan’s model of RBM in this respect will require further work. In the context of

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fisheries management there may for instance be legal barriers to shifting the burden of evidence in theory, but not to shifting a certain responsibility for outcomes in practice (Wakefield 2010).

The model depicted in figure 1 describes stages of a RBM process. In the following each of the stages, as well as the agencies responsible for their conduct, will be briefly introduced.

The RBM agencies: Authority, Operator and Assessor

The Authority is an organizational entity enacting authority in pursuit of the management objectives decided for a fishery. It represents the interests of the public, and it is ultimately responsible for the management. With regard to fisheries management in an EU context, one task in EcoFishMan will be to specify an appropriate agency of this kind: Is it the Council of Ministers, the Commission, or should the authority be exercised on a member state level? Or should the authority be some combination of these? Such questions represent the kind of specifications of the RBM concept required to develop an operational RFMS.

The Operator is an organizational unit with delegated authority to develop management plans and oversee or conduct fishing operations within the standards decided by a management authority. It is an organization that represents a group of similar resource users. It could be a group of fishermen fishing for the same type of resource and/or could be specified in terms of gear type or areas.

The Assessor is a scientific organization capable of assessing and reviewing the documentation that the operator is responsible for delivering. While the operator may purchase a scientific service to help with preparing the required documentation, the Assessor should be institutionally independent from both the Operator and the Authority in order to facilitate objectivity. In the context of fisheries management in Europe, ICES would have the capacity to perform the role of such an assessor.

Outcome Targets

Specified by the authority, the outcome targets reflect overall policy objectives. For instance, the stated objective of the current CFP is to “ensure exploitation of living aquatic resources that provides sustainable economic, environmental and social conditions” (Anon 2002). Presently, the specific Outcome Target used in CFP context seems to be MSY, as it is a declared aim to bring all EU stocks to MSY levels by 2015 (Froese and Proelß 2010). In practice, however, the Precautionary reference points may remain negative Outcome Targets (negative in the sense that they are states one should avoid rather than aim for). One task in the EcoFishMan project is to propose appropriate forms of Outcome Targets. This work will rely on the selection of a set of appropriate indicators (WP 2; Task 2.1 and 2.2).

The Management Plan

The management plan is a contract between the authority and the operator: it specifies the conditions under which the latter may operate. The plan will formally be proposed by the operator, although the authority may assist with the development of the plan (as it typically is the case with fisheries management plans in New Zealand and Australia). In practice, the draft plan may circulate between Operator and Authority until it is found acceptable to both parties.

In the proposed plan, the authority will pay attention to how the Outcome Targets are to be met, and to how the Operator will provide information that allows for an assessment of whether or not the targets have been met in practise once the plan has been implemented. As long as they appear to comprise a realistic way to achieve the Outcome Targets (and are within the laws), the authority will not interfere in the operator’s planning of management measures. One important question concerns

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how other stakeholders than the operator in question may be accommodated into the planning process.

A management plan may be proposed for a number of years. In this case, it may only be slightly revised, reflecting for instance information in (say) annual resource assessments.

Implementation of the management plan

Once the management plan has been approved, it may be taken into implementation. Also at this stage, there may be different degrees of cooperation between authority and operator, depending on the organisational capacity of the latter and so forth. Often the authority may provide enforcement service, but the operator may prefer to monitor and ensure compliance itself.

The documentation system

During the implementation phase, the operator is responsible for gathering data required for the documentation process. The operator may typically choose to do this in cooperation with a contracted research provider. Under a cost recovery regime (and when carrying the responsibility for documentation as a condition for being allowed to use the resource), the operator has an incentive to find efficient ways to minimise research costs (Arbuckle and Drummond 2000; Harte 2001; Stokes et al. 2006). One way to achieve this might be that the resource users themselves participate in data-collection (Bjørkan 2011; Zacharin et al. 2008).

Assessment and feedback procedures

The main purpose of the assessment is to evaluate whether (or the extent to which) the Outcome Targets in question have been achieved. The quality of the submitted documentation will also be assessed as adequate documentation is part of the requirement for access to the resource. One question to be resolved is how the assessor can be funded without undermining its independence of the authority and the operator. The way ICES is funded may actually be rather ideal in this respect.

The assessment will be submitted to both the operator and the authority. For the operator, the assessment is a useful when preparing a new/updated management plan for the authority. For the authority, the assessment is the background for deciding whether previous Outcome Targets are still adequate (to represent the fisheries policy) or whether they should be revised.

If the assessment shows that the Outcome Targets are achieved, the operator may submit its previous management plan with minor updates, and it may be immediately accepted by the authority. In turn, if the Outcome Targets are not met, the authority will implement sanctions for the operator, and it may also raise its requirements for subsequent management plans. More serious types of sanctions include suspension of privileges granted to an operator, or even access rights to the resource in question.

2.1.5 How the transition towards a RFMS can be facilitated in practise

Because the RFMS presented here implies a rather radical shift from present fisheries management practises in a European context, it is important to think about how a transition to this model can be made feasible. A meaningful shift of responsibilities for documentation and management functions to resource users is conditioned on that the resource users develop capacity for executing these functions in a reliable and efficient manner. It is therefore worth noting that reported successful cases in which responsibilities for such management functions have been gradually shifted to resource users appear to have involved long time spans. To implement RFMS as the new general resource management system in one fell swoop may neither be politically feasible nor likely to work well in a transition phase.

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One alternative would be to offer RFMS as an alternative to the existing management system. On a voluntary basis, organised operators could then propose management plan for a specific fishery. Since the operators in RFMS systems have more responsibilities than they have within the existing management system, however, it may be difficult to motivate an RFMS alternative. In New Zealand and Australia, much of the motivation for operators to organise management and research activities stems from that fisheries management in these countries is subjected to cost recovery, which makes it interesting for the operators to seek to reduce costs. Without a cost recovery regime it would seem unlikely that RFMS would be implemented widely on a voluntary basis in Europe. In order to motive RFMS as a voluntary alternative, one option would therefore simply be to implement (full or partial) cost recovery, perhaps in combination with other incentive mechanisms (such as the catch quota bonus allocated to those that volunteer for the CQM system).

An alternative strategy would be to implement RFMS on a non-voluntary basis in a step-wise fashion. This could be done by preserving a certain share of the TAC for RFMS proposals. To be eligible for using the RFMS TAC share in a given fishery, resource users would need to get organised, to propose a management plan, and to seek its approval from the authority. The TAC share reserved for RFMS could then be increased with time in pace with operators development of RFMS capacity.

This task will be followed up with work dedicated to the specific design and development of an operational RFMS model.

2.2 References

Anon. (2006). "Harvest Strategy Standard: Standards for Stocks Managed Under § 13 of the Fisheries Act", Ministry of Fisheries, . City: Wellington.

Anon. (2011a). Annual Report – 2010/11. Ministry of Fisheries, Wellington. Anon. (2011b). "South Australia Fisheries Management Act 2007", Government of South Australia,

City: Adelaide. Anon. (2002). "COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation

and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy." Official Journal of the European Union, L 358/59.

Arbuckle, M., and Drummond, K. (2000). "Evolution of self-governance within a harvesting system governed by individual transferable quota", R. Shotton, (ed.) Us of property rights in fisheries management. City: FAO: Rome.

Binnendijk, A. (2001). Results based management in the development co-operation agencies: a review of experience. OECD.

Bjørkan, M. (2011). Fishing for Advice: The Case of the Norwegian Reference Fleet University of Tromsø, Tromsø.

CEC. (2009). "Green Paper: Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy". City: Commission of the European Communities: Brussels.

Charles, A. T. (2002). "The Precautionary Approach and 'burden of Proof' Challenges in Fishery Management." Bulletin of Marine Science, 70(2), 683-694.

Degnbol, P. (2005). "Indicators as a means of communicating knowledge." ICES Journal of Marine Science, 62, 606-611.

Dixon, C., and Sloan, S. (2007). "Management Plan for the South Australian Spence Gulf Prawn Fishery", Department for Primary Industries and Resources South Australia. City: Adelaide.

EcoFishMan. (2010). "Ecosystem-based Responsive Fisheries Management in Europe: Using results-based management to achieve CFP objectives." 7th Framework Project Proposal.

FAO. (1996). The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries and its Implications for Fishery Research, Technology and Management: An Updated Review.Precautionary approach to fisheries - Part 2: Scientific papers. FAO, Rome.

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Fitzpatrick, M., Graham, N., Rihan, D. J., and Reid, D. G. (2011). "The burden of proof in co-management and results-based management: the elephant on the deck!" ICES Journal of Marine Science: Journal du Conseil, 68(8), 1656-1662.

Frangoudes, K., Marugán-Pintos, B., and Pascual-Fernández, J. J. (2008). "From open access to co-governance and conservation: The case of women shellfish collectors in Galicia (Spain)." Marine Policy, 32, 223–232.

Fraser, E. D. G., Dougill, A. J., Mabee, W. E., Reed, M., and McAlpine, P. (2006). "Bottom up and top down: Analysis of participatory processes for sustainability indicator identification as a pathway to community empowerment and sustainable environmental management." Journal of Environmental Management, 78(2), 114-127.

Froese, R., and Proelß, A. (2010). "Rebuilding fish stocks no later than 2015: will Europe meet the deadline?" Fish and Fisheries, 11(194–202).

Harte, M. (2001). "Opportunities and barriers for industry–led fisheries research." Marine Policy, 25, 159-167.

Hauge, K. H., Nielsen, K. N., and Korsbrekke, K. (2007). "Limits to transparency—exploring conceptual and operational aspects of the ICES framework for providing precautionary fisheries management advice " ICES Journal of Marine Science, 64(4), 738-743.

Hill, N. A. O., Michael, K. P., Frazer, A., and Leslie, S. (2010). "The utility and risk of local ecological knowledge in developing stakeholder driven fisheries management: The Foveaux Strait dredge oyster fishery, New Zealand." Ocean & Coastal Management, 53, 659-668.

Hollamby, K. L., McShane, P. E., Sloan, S., and Brook, J. (2010). Competition to collaboration: exploring co-management models for the Spencer Gulf Prawn Fishery. Spencer Gulf and West Coast Prawn Fishermen’s Association.

Hood, C. (1991). "A public management for all seasons?" Public Administration 69, 3-19. Jentoft, S., and Mikalsen, K. H. (2004). "A vicious circle? The dynamics of rule-making in Norwegian

fisheries." Marine Policy, 28(2), 127-135. Kindt-Larsen, L., Kirkegaard, E., and Dalskov, J. (2011). "Fully documented fishery: a tool to support a

catch quota management system." ICES Journal of Marine Science, 68(8), 1606–1610. Lassen, H., Sissenwine, M., Symes, D., and Thulin, J. (2008). Reversing the burden of proof for fisheries

management. Copenhagen. Martin, V., and Jobin, M. (2004). "Results-based management: Comparison of the management

framework of eight jurisdictions " Canadian Public Administration (in French), 47(3), 304-331. Mincher, R. (2008). "New Zealand's Challenger Scallop Enhancement Company: From Reseeding to

Self-Governance.", R. E. Townsend, R. Shotton, and H. Uchida, (eds.), Case Studies in Fisheries Self-Governance. City: FAO: Rome

MOFARFPB. (2010). Fort St. John Pilot Project Review Report. Ministry of Forests and Range Forest Practices Branch, Victoria.

Molares, J., and Freire, J. (2003). "Development and perspectives for community-based management of the goose barnacle (Pollicipes pollicipes) fisheries in Galicia (NW Spain)." Fisheries Research, 65(1–3), 485-492.

Moynihan, D. P. (2006). "Managing for Results in State Government: Evaluating a Decade of Reform." Public Administration Review, 66(1), 77-89.

OECD. (2002). Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management. Development Assistance Committee, Paris.

Oladele, A. (2010). "RBM-Enhanced Policy Procedures in Unesco: Reflections on a United Nations' Management Reform Strategy." International Journal of Arts and Sciences, 3(19), 174-196.

Piet, G. J., and Rice, J. C. (2004). "Performance of precautionary reference points in providing management advice on North Sea fish stocks." ICES Journal of Marine Science 61, 1305-1312.

Stokes, T. K., Gibbs, N., and Holland, D. (2006). "New Zealand’s cost recovery regime for fisheries research services: an industry perspective." Bulletin of Marine Science, 78, 467- 485.

UNDG. (2010). Results-Based Management Handbook: Strengthening RBM harmonization for improved development results. United Nations Development Group.

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UNDP. (2007). Evaluation of Results Based Management at UNDP. Uited Nations Development Program.

Wakefield, J. (2010). "Organisational and legal problems in reversing the burden of proof in results-based management of fisheries", P. Degnbol, S. Kuikka, and D. Wilson, (eds.), ICES Theme Session P: Reversing the burden of proof: results based management of fisheries. City: ICES: Nantes.

WB. (2002). Better Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing for Development Result. World Bank. Yang, Y. W., Frazer, A., and Rees, E. (2010). "Self-governance within a QMS framework — The

evolution of self-governance in the New Zealand Bluff oyster fishery." Marine Policy, 34, 261–267.

Zacharin, W., Dixon, C., and Smallridge, M. (2008). "Towards self-management for the Western King Prawn Fishery in Spencer Gulf, South Australia", R. Townsend, R. Shotton, and H. Uchida, (eds.), Case studies in fisheries self-governance. City: FAO: Rome.

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2.3 Task 4.2: Design and development of guidelines for making a general

MP

2.3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this text is to propose guidelines for making a general management plan (MP) within an RFMS context. As suggested in Task 4.1, the MP is a contract between an authority and an operator with regard to the management of a specific fishery for a limited period of time. While the plan formally is proposed by the operator, the authority will be responsible for supplying some of its key elements (i.e. outcome targets and planning guidelines), and may also assist with the development of the plan in different ways. In practice, the draft plan may circulate between an operator and an authority until it is found acceptable to both parties.

The guidelines proposed here are general in scope and are intended to be used:

1. As a basis for the further development of the documented and tested Management Planning Procedures and Framework (D4.5). The guidelines for the general management plan will be formulated on the basis of the conceptual model of the RFMS (Task 4.1) as well as principles and experiences drawn from existing results based management systems (D1.1).

2. As a framework for the development of a RFMS management plan from the individual case fisheries within EcoFishMan. Since the implementation of RFMS procedures for these cases starts in an existing micro-management regime, this framework will not be identical to one developed for a full-fledged RFMS regime.

The guidelines for the general MP developed here are organized as a list of specifications that must be addressed in order for the plan to be approved by the authority. Such specifications include, in addition to requirements with regard to the MP boundaries and the identity and responsibilities of the operator, a description of the fishery and the main management challenges; the outcome targets decided for the fishery; the harvest strategies proposed; the implementation strategy; the documentation system; planning procedures; and monitoring and control system (see section 3.2.4 below).

The format and content of the MP, as well as the procedures for its development, are dependent of the properties of the RFMS system. The general guidelines proposed here (section 3.2.4) have been developed for a transformation scenario, where the starting point is a micro-management regime. This starting point is characterized by a lack of a legal framework to support an ideal RFMS (e.g. general ban on fishing as default, except in terms of approved MPs). If the authority and operators in a fishery agree to introduce the RFMS in one go the MP invitation and the MP should be designed accordingly. In any case the decision on a transformation phase contra immediate implementation has to be agreed upon in a pre-MP-invitation meeting between authority and operators.

In the pre-MP-invitation meeting the suggested invitation should be discussed and agreed upon. There should be an agreement on the identification of the fishery including operators involved, planning period, target species, geographical range, management objectives and conditions for approval of MP. Then outcome targets relevant for the management objectives should be identified and discussed before they are set by the authority in the final invitation for the MP of the fishery in case.

Another highly important constraint at this starting point is that potential operators are unlikely to hold the organizational capacity required to develop and implement a MP for large and complex fisheries. These constraints will be taken into close consideration in the planning of initial RFMS.

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Starting with a brief presentation RFMS and as well as of the relevant definitions of key RFMS terms (Complete EcoFishMan Glossary in chapter 4.), section 3.2.3 offers an outline of the RFMS planning procedure. An important part of this procedure is a template for the MP invitation issued by the authority to an operator. The MP invitation, together with the MP guidelines, establishes the framework within which the operator can develop the management plan.

On the basis of the general planning guidelines proposed in Section 3.2.4, a practical procedure for developing an initial management plan for case fisheries is proposed in Section 3.3. Within the EcoFishMan context, WP4 does not have previous access to information needed in order to develop an informed MP invitation to WP5. In advance of the MP invitation it is necessary to establish a "pre-invitation meeting" between the authority and potential operators in order to initiate the management planning process. Here the upcoming invitation is discussed to ensure that it is specific enough and has the acceptance of the operator. Attention is given to the identification of the fishery and the timeframe of the MPs as these issues are particularly relevant in the transition towards RFMS.

Since the purpose of the EcoFishMan project is to develop and test the RFMS model, the procedures and specifications proposed here are provisional and open for revision.

2.3.2 RFMS system specifications

RFMS is an adaptive management system that is results-based and ecosystem-based. The RFMS attempts to reduce micro-management by involving stakeholders and may include elements of rights-based management and co-management, as appropriate. A key idea in results-based management is that management authorities define acceptable impact and leave it to resource users to identify the means to meet the requirements and to document the effectiveness of the means, and ultimately achieve the requirements. In the RFMS model (see Task 4.1 Fig. 1) the management plan (MP) is a contract between an authority and an operator. The MP specifies the conditions under which the authority can permit the operator to use the resource in question.

2.3.2.1 RFMS Concepts

The Authority represents the interests of the public, and it is ultimately responsible for the management.

The Operator is an organization that represents a group of similar resource users. It could be a group of fishermen fishing for the same type of resource and/or could be specified in terms of gear type or areas.

The Assessor is an organization capable of assessing and reviewing the documentation that the operator is responsible for delivering in a RFMS. The assessor evaluates whether or not outcome targets have been met. To strengthen the objectivity and legitimacy of the assessments, the assessor should be institutionally independent from both the operator and the authority, and the assessment work should be financed in a way that allows for this.

A Management plan is a formal arrangement between a management authority and operators that specifies the partners in the fishery and their respective roles, the agreed objectives for the fishery, the management rules and regulations that apply, and provides other relevant details about the fishery. The formal responsibility for developing the management plan is delegated to an operator.

Outcome targets are specific and measureable performance objectives defined for a fishery a management authority.

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2.3.2.2 Basic institutional and legal RFMS conditions

An ideal RFMS model presupposes a general legal framework where access to harvest a resource is allowed on the conditions specified in a management plan approved by an authority, and that an operator can be made responsible for developing and implementing this management plan. In the case where such institutional and legal conditions are not fulfilled, the authority must develop an implementation plan that includes a preliminary RFMS model designed to work under micro-management conditions and a procedure by which ideal RFMS conditions can be developed and implemented. In the following, a transitional RFMS planning procedure is proposed, which invites operators to propose a management plan for a limited fishery (e.g. lumpsucker) or a part of a fishery (e.g. 20%).

2.3.2.3 RFMS planning procedure and the management plan invitation

The planning process starts when the authority issues an invitation for operators to propose a management plan for a specific fishery for a limited period of time. The invitation should be finalized after a pre MP invitation meeting with authority and operator/s. The MP invitation is a formal document containing the elements suggested in the table below (Table 3). The invitation must be read in conjunction with the MP guidelines suggested in section 3.2.4. In the final management plan, key sections will be based directly on the MP invitation, or information within this invitation.

Table 2-3: The Management Plan Invitation: Transition scenario

The Management Plan Invitation: Transition scenario

Content Comments 1. IDENTIFICATION

Introduction setting out the purpose of the MP

invitation, including:

a. The identity of the fishery it is valid for

(targets species; geography)

b. The identity of operators qualified to

respond (fleets; organizational

requirements)

c. The time frame

d. The main focus and purpose of the plan

requested

e. Relevant elements of the transition plan

When RMFS systems are introduced within micro-

management regimes, the legal (and political)

conditions are not in place to make management

planning a condition for access. While the authority

may request approved MPs in before granting any

access to limited and/or special cases of fisheries (such

as the lump sucker case), potential operators will at the

outset be unlikely to have the organizational capacity

required to develop and implement MPs for larger and

more complex fisheries such as Iceland’s demersal

fisheries. In such cases, the MP invitation must initially

be incentive-based and/or only consider a part of the

fishery in question. In such cases we propose to set off

(e.g.) 20% of the TAC for RFMS. This RFMS TAC can

only be harvested on the basis of an approved

management plan. Note that the MP invitation should

foresee and determine distributional issues relating to

cases in which only some quota holders have developed

an MP that has been approved by the authority. A

transition towards RFMS can be achieved gradually

though increasing the RFMS TAC in pace with

operator’s organizational capacity development.

2. OUTCOME TARGETS

This section identifies the key management

objectives and outcome targets, with indicators, that

must be addressed by the MP. The Management

objectives must address the following dimensions:

a. Biological and ecological

b. Economic

c. Social & cultural

In addition, this section may include a list of

In a transition scenario, there will be no general policy

process for formulating management objectives and

principles as outcome targets. This is a problem, but can

also be turned into an advantage. Instead of a complete

set of outcome targets, it is possible to accept the

management goals in place, and on top of that focus on

a select range of outcome targets for the RFMS fishery

(the CQM model). For instance, the focus of the MP

could be to eliminate discards by developing, selective

fishing, flexible quota regimes & documentation

22

allowed management instruments. systems. Alternatively, the focus of the MP could for

instance be on energy efficiency and emissions.

2.3.2.4 The Management Plan Guidelines

The MP Guidelines will vary according to the implementation scenario as outlined above. If a

MP invitation is issued for a transition scenario, as it is the case here, it will be up to the

authority to device a transition plan by way of the changing the specifications of the MP

invitations through time. The planning task for the operator, in turn, will focus on meeting the

issued MP invitations. See Table 4.

Table 2-4: The Management Plan

The Management Plan

Content Example and comments 1. INTRODUCTION

Explanatory text, setting out the purpose of the MP,

the identity of the fishery it is valid for, the parties

that are bound by it, the time frame and the main

focus and purpose of the plan.

The text can be developed on the basis of section 1 in the

MP invitation. In addition, it can explain the practical

details of the planning process.

Example: Dixon & Sloan 2007: p8

2. FISHERY OVERVIEW

A brief description of the fishery in question,

including the target species and the condition of the

resource, the fleet and technology, etc. This is

largely contextual info. Nevertheless, this section

can be used to give a general status report, and note

recent development trends and specific issues and

management challenges.

This is a section which can be updated and improved in

each new version of the MP. It can be supplied by the

operator, but must be reviewed by the authority. It may be

a good idea for the authority to provide a template and

page restrictions. But this must vary according to the

complexity & scope of the fishery.

Example: Dixon & Sloan 2007: 9-14

Note that this section can be used to focus attention

towards specific management challenges such as by-catch

and discards.

3. OUTCOME TARGETS

This section identifies the key management

objectives and outcome targets, with indicators, that

must be addressed by the MP. The management

objectives must address the following dimensions:

Biological and ecological

Economic

Social & cultural

The text here is provided by the authority as part of the

MP invitation.

In case of a transition strategy, the list of relevant outcome

targets will be restricted unless they can be derived from

the existing management framework (MP0).

Examples:

Dixon & Sloan 2007: 21-25

Management plan for Icelandic Cod (see

appendix)

4. HARVEST STRATEGIES

This section reports the key decisions, where the

operator is taking over responsibility from (old-

style) management authorities. This section of the

plan reports on the results of the planning exercise

& negotiations (among members) undertaken by

the operator. Ideally, each outcome target, linked to

a performance indicator, is here made operational

by linking specific indicator limits to specific

management actions, for instance in the form of

Harvest Control Rules.

This section should report on the strategies for each of the

three dimensions (biological, economic and social), but

also must comment on how these interact.

See Dixon & Sloan 2007 (p 35-37) for a way to report the

key propositions of a management plan in table format.

Here, each performance indicator is linked to an outcome

target, which is a trigger linked to a management response

list.

See management plan for Icelandic Cod (appendix) for an

example of a harvest strategy.

5. MONITORING, COMPLIANCE

SANCTIONS

The focus here is on the system that allows the plan

to be implemented as intended.

a. Monitoring systems and instruments (e.g.

stock assessment surveys, electronic

logbooks, systems for accounting for by-

This concerns the extent to which the operator can carry

out operations in accordance with the plan, including how

the operator is can make its members comply with the

plan. While this concerns the capacity of the

documentation system described below, it also concerns

how the operator will deal with breaches, when such are

detected (penalties; exclusion).

23

catch & discards)

b. Compliance & sanctions systems: In case

of breaches, how will operators ensure that

damage is repaired and prevented

(exclusion of non-complying

vessels/personnel)

c. Identification of risk: The work

undertaken to identify risk factors &

situations and ensure that these get

appropriate attention

6. DOCUMENTATION

The issue here is how reliable information is

mobilized so that the authority can be confident that

the management plan is appropriately constructed

and carried out and the outcome targets achieved.

The documentation system must be designed so

that it will be possible to measure the performance

on relevant indicators, so that appropriate

management responses are triggered. That is, if the

outcome target is derived from an MSY criteria,

and there is a harvest control rule that uses biomass

level as trigger for TAC determination, there must

be a documentation system (e.g. stock assessment)

that allows timely and reliable production of stock

biomass estimation.

This section can follow the same outline as the

previous, with description of the documentation

systems for each of the three categories of outcome

targets.

Regarding the assessment of biological outcome targets, a

transition scenario could take a starting point from the

division of responsibility between national marine labs

and ICES, so that the lab functions are left to the operator

(or the operator purchases this service from an

independent lab) and this work is reviewed and assessed

by ICES (in the role of assessor).

The documentation tasks along the other dimensions can

be solved in the same way, either by setting up an internal

system or hiring external consultancies.

7. PLANNING PROCESS

This section reports on the planning process and

decisions undertaken under 3 and 4 and 5 above.

The main question concerns whether the plan was

made with appropriate possibilities for all members

to participate and influence the result. In general,

the MP plan should reflect good governance ideals.

Also required is some kind of procedure by which the MP

gets support by a majority of the members. How external

stakeholder groups are consulted in planning may also be

an issue.

2.3.3 A practical procedure for developing an initial management plan for case

fisheries (MP0)

In a mature RFMS regime, the authority issues a MP invitation. A prospective operator will respond to this invitation, developing a management plan using the information in the invitation together with the MP guidelines above. In a mature RFMS regime, both the authority and the operator will be well established and have experience with the fishery and the management challenges it faces. Much of the basic information needed for making the plan will be readily available, for instance in the form of previous planning documents. The situation the EcoFishMan project faces is very different from this for two reasons. First, neither WP4 nor WP5 have experience & previous knowledge as managers of the fisheries in question. Even if such knowledge exists in the required form, we do not have access to it. Second, the management knowledge that do exist in the sector, is formatted to accommodate the micro-management regime, and does hence not fit perfectly to EcoFishMan requirements.

In the following, guidelines for collecting the relevant information on case fisheries for EcoFishMan purposes are suggested. The intended uses of this information are twofold (Table 5).

First, it is needed by WP4 in their capacity as “authority” in order to be able to develop the MP invitation outlined above. For this purpose, the following items must be covered: The identification

24

of the fishery and the boundaries of the planning area; information that allows identification of possible operator candidate and evaluation of their capacities; information that allows for identification of existing management goals and how they can be transformed into outcome targets; and information with regard to the basic management regime characteristics that allows for the development of a reasonable transformation strategy.

Second, the information collected is needed by WP5 in the capacity as “operator” on order to be able to respond adequately to the MP invitation outlined above and interpret the MP guidelines correctly.

Table 2-5: Guidelines for the initial Management Plan for fisheries (MP0)

Guidelines for MP0

Content Comments 1. FISHERY IDENTIFICATION

Identify the fishery in question by some

combination of:

a. Target species

b. Ecosystem characteristics

c. Geographical location

d. Gear type

e. Vessel types

f. Etc

The four EcoFishMan cases have been identified in the

DoW. The identification here must build on that, but

probably needs to be more precise.

Used for: MP invitation, section 1

For the Icelandic case, which target species are

included, which are left out? Does the case include the

all fleet segments? (Offshore; coastal fleet; tourist

fishing; leisure fishing)

2. EXISTING MANAGEMENT

STRUCTURES & PROCESSES

This section identifies main feature of the existing

management regime in a way that facilitates the

operationalization of the RMFS model to inform the

MP invitation.

a. Information regarding the identity of key

RFMS agencies: authority, potential

operators and assessor. Since these must be

built on existing structures, we need

information of the existing structure and

the division of responsibilities in the

established management process

b. Information of relevance to a

transformation process. This includes info

on basic legal requirements: Is the

management authority in position to make

access to fishing conditional on the

existence of a MP? Can industry groups

(i.e. “operators”) be made responsible for

planning? If access to fishing is an

established right, what incentives are

available for making industry groups take

on planning responsibilities voluntary? Can

transferability regimes be implemented for

transformation purposes?

Used for: MP invitation section 1 and 3

3. MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES AND

INSTRUMENTS

This section identifies the existing management

objectives and the allowed management

instruments. Since these objectives originate in a

micro-management regime, they will usually be of

another form than outcome targets. Nevertheless,

they can usually be translated into outcome targets.

Within the established regime, management objectives

will usually be present for all three dimensions, i.e.

a. Biological and ecological

b. Economic

c. Social & cultural

Nevertheless, some dimensions will usually be more

emphasized (e.g. biological) than others (e.g. social),

and they will not necessarily be expressed in the same

way. For instance, while biological goals may come in

25

the form of Harvest control rules, economic and social

coals may be expressed as access conditions (e.g. who

can own fishing vessels & quotas) and allowed

management instruments (ITQs). Used for: MP

invitation section 2

Note: In order to keep the focus on key tasks, we propose that information at this step is kept at a minimum, focusing only on what we need for the purpose of the MP invitation.

2.4 References

Dixon, C. and S. Sloan (2007). Management Plan for the South Australian Spencer Gulf Prawn Fishery. Department for Primary Industries and Resources South Australia. Adelaide.

26

2.5 EcoFishMan Glossary

2.5.1 Introduction

The main objective of the EcoFishMan project is to develop what we have called a Responsive Fisheries Management System (RFMS), which is a type of Results Based Management (RBM) system specifically adapted to fisheries within the CFP framework. In this note, we propose a terminology for EcoFishMan. This is done by developing a Glossary of key terms used for elements and relationships in RBM systems. The Glossary is partly based on OECD’s Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management (OECD 2011). The glossary will be further developed by WP4.

2.5.2 Proposed Glossary

Assessor An organization capable of assessing and reviewing the documentation that the operator is responsible for delivering in a RFMS. The assessor evaluates whether or not outcome targets have been met. To strengthen the objectivity and legitimacy of the assessments, the assessor should be institutionally independent from both the operator and the authority, and the assessment work should be financed in a way that allows for this (EcoFishMan).

Indicator A variable, pointer, or index related to a criterion. Its fluctuations reveal the variations in those key elements of sustainability in the ecosystem, the fishery resource or the sector and social and economic well-being. The position and trend of an indicator in relation to reference points or values indicate the present state and dynamics of the system. Indicators provide a bridge between objectives and actions. (Source: FAO 1999)

Management authority Organizational entity enacting authority in pursuit of the management objectives decided for a fishery (Source: EcoFishMan, WP 4). Authority could be a coastal state or the European Commission.

Management goal The higher-order objective to which a management intervention is intended to contribute (OECD 2011). A management goal is derived from a management principle (constitutional-order) and is specified into a set of more operational management objectives (collective-order).

Management intervention Strategies or instruments aimed to impact the state of a fishery with reference to authorized objectives. Examples are input and output controls and economic measures15. Authority may define sanctions towards the operator if outcome targets are not fulfilled.

15 This is based on OECDs definition of Development intervention.

27

Management objective A purpose to be achieved within the overall principles of sustainable development. Objectives are often hierarchical, referring to specific scales within the system. Objectives encompass all the dimensions and relevant criteria of sustainable development. (FAO 1999)

Management plan A formal arrangement between a management authority and operators that specifies the partners in the fishery and their respective roles, the agreed objectives for the fishery, the management rules and regulations that apply, and provides other relevant details about the fishery. In RBM, the formal responsibility for developing the management plan is delegated to an operator (Based on FAO 1999 and EcoFishMan, DoW).

Operator Organizational unit with delegated authority to develop management plans and oversee or conduct fishing operations within the standards decided by a management authority (Source: EcoFishMan, WP 4).

Outcome target Specific and measureable performance objectives defined for a fishery on the basis of agreed and appropriately authorized general goals, standards and principles, as defined by the authorities based on the policy objectives. In the case of a RBM, the outcome targets are found in policy documents (Table 6). Since the exact formulation of the outcome targets depends on the infrastructure of the RBM system, outcome targets are not found in conventional management settings. (Source: specification of EcoFishMan, DoW)

Reference point A classification device, defined in relation to the measure of an indicator, for distinguishing different management-relevant states of the system under management. A Biological Reference Point is a metric of stock status. A Target Reference Point indicates a state of a system which is considered to be desirable and at which management action should aim. A Limit Reference Point indicates a state of a system which is considered to be undesirable and which management action should avoid.

Responsive fisheries management system (RFMS) RFMS is a term generated for use in the EcoFishMan project, and it is used to refer to the new system that we are proposing to develop. The RFMS is an adaptive management system that is results-based and ecosystem-based. The RFMS attempts to reduce micro-management by involving stakeholders and may (or may not) include elements of rights-based management and co-management, as appropriate. (Source: EcoFishMan, DoW)

28

Results based management (RBM)

Defining an acceptable impact and leaving it to resource users to identify the means to meet the requirements and to document the effectiveness of the means16, and ultimately achieve the requirements.

RBM is a management strategy focusing on performance and achievement of results. In particular RBM differs from conventional management with regard to the division of responsibility between a management authority and the operator as it delegates defined responsibilities from the former to the latter.. The role of the management authorities is to decide and follow up on a relatively small set of specified and enforceable objectives, outcome targets. How these objectives are going to be pursued and achieved is left to the operator/operators on the condition that the results are acceptable. In contrast to a conventional management system, the management authority will not attempt to regulate the conduct of the industry in detail. Instead, the operator is left considerable discretion with regard to how they conduct the fishing – as long as they achieve the targets specified for the fishery in question (Source: EcoFishMan, WP 4).

Table 2-6: Examples of outcome targets in a RBM

Management

goal

Management

objective

Outcome target Indicator Target

reference point Sustainable

ecosystem

Sustainable fishery Catch < TAC Annual catch

Etc.

Fmsy= 1.3

Sustainable

ecosystem

Sustainable fishery Maximum by-catch

of young fish < 5%

of total catch

% by-catch

received from

observers and

CCTV

Etc.

1% by-catch

2.6 References

EcoFishMan (2010) Ecosystem-based Responsive Fisheries Management in Europe, Description of work, KBBE.2010.1.4-07: Using results-based management to achieve CFP objectives, 120 pp.

Commission of the European Communities (2006). “Green Paper: Towards a future Maritime Policy for the Union: A European vision for the oceans and seas”, Brussels, 7.6.2006, COM (2006). 35 p.

OECD (2011). Glossary on Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management. Paris, OECD. Punt, A. E. (2006). "The FAO Precautionary Approach after almost 10 years: have we progressed

towards implementing simulation-tested feedback-control management systems for fisheries management?" Natural Resource Modeling 19: 441-64.

16 This formulation revises the RBM definition presented in the EcoFishMan project proposal (which stemmed

from the call text that the proposal addressed). The term “resource users” replaces the term “those concerned”.

“Those concerned” is ambiguous because other types of stakeholders than, for instance, fishermen may be

“concerned” in the (non-intended) sense of having concerns. Further, “impact” replaces “negative impact” in

order to allow for the possibility of specifying (minimum) positive impacts in RBM. Finally, the term

“ultimately achieve” has been added as the resource users are responsible for achieving requirements not, only

for documenting the effectiveness of management means.

29

3 MP0: Current status of the Icelandic lumpfish fishery

This chapter contains a description of the current status of the Icelandic lumpfish fishery and the management plan used to regulate it. This MP0 will serve as reference point when making MPs according to the RFMS (Responsive Fishery Management System). The current MP for Icelandic Lumpfish has the key goal to ensure that an appropriate balance exists between the need to ensure long term ecological sustainability of the lumpfish resources and the optimum utilisation.

The authority responsible for the MP is the Ministry of fisheries and agriculture. Monitoring and assessment of performance is in the hands of the MRI (Icelandic marine research institute), Directorate of fisheries and the Icelandic coast guard. All of the operators are members of NASBO (the National association of small boat owners).

3.1 Fishery overview

Lumpfish is found all around Iceland, but some fishing grounds are though richer than others. Since the lumpfish is almost entirely fished for its more valuable roe, used in caviar production, the lumpfish fisheries are conducted in late winter - early spring when the stock migrates to shallow water to spawn. Lumpfish is caught with special gillnets, simply named lumpfish gillnets, using small fishing boats from 5-15 meters (Directorate of Fisheries, 2012). The crew size varies from 1 to 3 persons per boat, but in most cases there are 2-3 crewmembers. The fishing vessels are operated on day trips; the nets are set out and then collected after few hours. The boats are equipped with hydraulic winches for hauling the nets. Most lumpfish fishermen fish for other species as well. For example, it is common to conduct lumpfish fishing in the spring and cod fishing during summer and fall.

Historically, almost all of the female lumpfish has been processed aboard the boats, where the fish belly is cut open; the roe sac emptied into a barrel and the flesh then discarded as it has been of little commercial value. This though changed in 2012, when the Ministry of fisheries and agriculture issued a regulation that made it obligatory to land the whole lumpfish (Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture, 2011). As results a new industry has been created i.e. processing of lumpfish meat. The lumpfish males are caught in some extent for local consumption; however, the only statistics available on lumpfish catches before 2012 are on these fisheries for the roe. Therefore, there are no statistics available for male lumpfish catches.

The lumpfish fishery is managed by a fishing effort restriction, licensure and gear restrictions. There is no fishing quota as in other Icelandic fisheries, however, only fishing vessels that have a special permit, issued by the Directorate of Fisheries of Iceland, are allowed to fish for lumpfish. The permit is only issued to vessels that had the right to conduct lumpfish fishing in the fishing season of 1997, according to regulation no. 58/1996, and vessel that have replaced those vessels. The fishing permit is issued to a vessel for a fixed amount of continuous days each season, currently 50 days, and is bound to a particular fishing season and ground, but the fishing grounds are divided into seven areas as seen in Figure 1 (Directorate of Fisheries, 2012).

30

Figure 3-1: Lumpfish fishing grounds around Iceland

Each vessel can only hold one permit per season. The fishing grounds are generally open for approximately four months, as the first one opens in beginning of March and the last one closes in middle of August.

The lumpfish fishing rights can and have been transferred between vessels over the years, however under certain restrictions according to regulation. The rights cannot be transferred from a vessel unless it has held the permit for one season or more. It cannot be transferred to a vessel that is more than 2.5 gross tonnages larger and never to a vessel larger than 15 GT (gross tonnages) (Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture, 2012). The same applies to modifications of vessels. If a vessel that has a lumpfish fishing right is modified so that the tonnage increases by more than 2.5 GT, a permit cannot be issued to that vessel unless the fishing right have been transferred from a vessel that is at least as large in gross tonnage as the modified vessel. Fishing permits cannot be issued to a vessel that has been modified so it exceeds 15 GT.

Lumpfish is only caught with gillnets restricted to a minimum mesh size of 267 mm. The numbers of nets per vessel are restricted as well. For each fishing season, the allowed number of gillnets per vessel is 100 per each legally registered crewmember, however, the maximum number is restricted to 300. This limitation on the number of nets applies to a 60 fathom unfolded hose (ísl. ófellda slöngu). If a 120 fathom unfolded hose is used, the restricted number of nets is half of the above limitations.

It is forbidden to conduct lumpfish fishing and gillnet fishing of cod or angler fish at the same time. Also, vessels that have hook fishing licenses are forbidden to conduct lumpfish fishing and line fishing and/or fishing tackle by hand in the same fishing trip.

31

The female lumpfish catch in Iceland has been fluctuating over the last few decades, as can be seen in Figure 2 (Sigurdsson Th., 2012). The average catch of female lumpfish amounted to 6.2 thousand tonnes for the period 1971-2011 with a maximum of 13 thousand tonnes in 1984 and a minimum of 2.5 thousand tonnes in 2000. For the first half of the period, that is 1971 to 1990, the lumpfish catch was considerably higher on average than the latter part, or around 7.4 thousand tonnes versus 4.9 thousand tonnes of lumpfish catch in the period 1991-2011. *

Figure 3-2: Landings of female lumpfish and roe production in Iceland 1971 - 2011

According to data available from 1980, the effort in the lumpfish fisheries has been fluctuating from year to year as seen in Figure 3 (Sigurdsson Th., 2012). Effort peaked around 1984-1987 and again in 1994-1997. The minimum effort was in 2007. It is interesting to observe that when effort increases, catch per unit effort seems to decrease.

Figure 3-3: Effort and catch per unit effort in female lumpfish fishery 1980-2011

* For iteration, 1 barrel equals 0.105 tonnes of roe production according to The National Association of Small

Boat Owners, Iceland (email 27th October 2011).

32

Effort has been increasing since 2007, which is in accordance with number of fishing permits issued by the Directorate of Fisheries. In 2007 there were issued 139 permits, but had increased to 425 in 2010, as can be seen in Table 1 (Directorate of Fisheries, E-mail, 2011).

Table 3-1: Number of lumpfish fishing permits issued by the

Directorate of Fisheries for each fishing ground in the years 2007-2010.

For the period 2007-2010, most permits were issued for fishing grounds E, north-east of Iceland, and fishing grounds A and B, west of Iceland (see Figure 1). Most female lumpfish is caught in those fishing grounds as well on average, according to data on roe landings for the years 2008 to 2010 from the Directorate of Fisheries in Iceland (Table 2) (Directorate of Fisheries, E-mail, 2011).

Table 3-2: Roe landings reported to the Directorate of Fisheries for

the 2007 to 2010 categorized by fishing ground.

It can be clearly seen by comparing Tables 1 and 2 that substantial parts of licenses are not actually being used. This can largely be contributed to market conditions, as vessel owners in possession of licenses often choose to select other fisheries that they think are more profitable.

Some level of by-catch is unavoidable in the lumpfish fishery. According to data from the Directorate of Fisheries for the years 2007 to 2011, the total by-catch has been increasing each year. In 2007 it amounted to 152 tonnes while in 2011 it had increased to 826 tonnes. The majority of by-catch is that of cod, amounting to 546 tonnes in the year 2011. Other common species are anglerfish, plaice, male lumpfish and saithe, as can be seen in Table 3 (Directorate of Fisheries, E-mail, 2011).

Fishing Ground 2007 2008 2009 2010

A 15 56 54 63

B 20 64 84 97

C 6 25 29 27

D 11 36 38 47

E 59 111 126 127

F 23 49 52 50

G 5 24 17 14

Total 139 365 400 425

Year

Fishing ground Roe (tonnes) No. of vessels Roe (tonnes) No. of vessels Roe (tonnes) No. of vessels

A 82.16 20 52.85 24 289.89 40

B 240.13 40 242.34 58 636.75 76

C 60.81 10 64.40 17 156.36 17

D 131.11 20 208.61 29 252.09 39

E 564.18 78 540.29 91 590.09 105

F 255.79 35 208.95 40 157.39 40

G 9.52 3 14.12 6 45.89 8

Unknown 0 0 0.17 2 0 0

Total 1,343.70 206 1,331.73 267 2,128.45 325

2008 2009 2010

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Table 3-3: Bycatch (tonnes) in the lumpfish fishery by species for the period 2007-2011.

Almost all Icelandic fisheries are managed with fishing quotas. According to law it is forbidden and punishable to land without quota in the species. Therefore, all lumpfish vessels must own quota for landed by-catch. Most lumpfish fishermen fish for other species as well and therefore own quota in those species. It is for example common to conduct lumpfish fishing in the spring and cod fishing during summer and fall.

A biomass index from annual groundfish survey has been used to assess the lumpfish stock status. The biomass index estimations are based on bottom trawl surveys, but as the lumpfish is believed to be more of a mid-water species than a bottom-species it is disputed how accurate these estimations are. There are also many other unknowns in the assessment, as little is known about the lumpfish’s habitat for most of its lifespan, age, maturity and how often they spawn. It is therefore not known if a big spawning stock one year will be followed by a big stock in the following year. Despite these unknowns, the correlation between the biomass index estimations and catch has shown a rather consistent correlation in the long-term.

The index decreased substantially in 1991 and stayed at a lower level for the period 1991 to 2000. The index increased in the year 2000 and again in 2006 but has since been decreasing, as can be seen in Figure 4 (Sigurdsson Th., 2012).

Figure 3-4: Lumpfish biomass index of females from annual groundfish survey (1985-2011).

The index for relative fishing mortality, catch divided by the biomass index, for female lumpfish has been increasing as well for the last few years, as can be seen in Figure 5 (Sigurdsson Th., 2012).

Year Cod Haddock Saithe Catfish Leopardfish Anglerfish Plaice Male lumpfish Other Total

2007 132.59 1.21 4.21 0.81 1.05 0.04 7.20 4.58 0.22 151.92

2008 191.97 6.12 11.07 7.91 2.54 17.24 17.48 5.13 0.50 259.95

2009 212.44 11.04 14.09 6.12 2.33 62.87 25.86 12.54 2.72 350.00

2010 309.76 12.61 29.47 8.47 2.90 144.55 72.02 21.74 2.25 603.77

2011 545.74 16.14 22.65 11.60 3.08 128.65 66.46 26.03 5.67 826.03

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Figure 3-5: Female lumpfish relative fishing mortality 1985-2010 (catch/biomass index)

According to the MRI, the increasing number of issued permits and effort, in combination with declining female biomass index are causes for concern and state, on those grounds, that the lumpfish fishery seems to be in the need of a more purposeful management. For the quota year 2012/13 the MRI recommends that female catch does not exceed 1,700 tonnes.

Lumpfish is only caught with special gillnets using small fishing boats from 1-25 GT. For the years 2008 to 2010, about 89% of the boats with lumpfish fishing permits were between 4 and 15 GT. Most were between 4 and 6 GT or 44% on average, 26% were between 6 and 10 GT and 20% from 10 to 15 GT. Only around 7% were smaller than 4 GT and 4% larger than 15 GT, as can be seen in Table 4 (Directorate of Fisheries, E-mail, 2011).

Table 3-4: Number of vessels with lumpfish fishing permits in the years

2008 to 2010, categorized according to size (GT).

Source: The Directorate of Fisheries, Iceland (email June 30th, 2011).

According to the National Association of Small Boat Owners in Iceland the main cost factors in the lumpfish fishing are that of salaries, nets and buoys, salting expenses, commission, catch fee and oil costs, as can be seen in Table 5 (Pálsson, 2011). Salaries are by far the biggest cost factor or between 33%-35% of total catch value. However, depreciations and maintenance costs were not available which skews the cost picture.

GT 1 - 4 4 - 6 6 - 10 10 - 15 15 - 20 20 - 26

2008 22 168 87 65 13 4

2009 25 174 103 75 13 4

2010 33 174 117 85 12 4

35

Table 3-5: Cost factors in Icelandic lumpfish fishery

Cost factor Amount

(ISK) %

Fishing permit 22.000 0,3% Nets, buoys and more 1.000.000 12,9% Fishing fee (2.023 ISK per barrel) 141.610 1,8% Catch fee (1,66% of the value of catch) 220.780 2,8% Weighing fee (25 landings) 30.000 0,4% Garbage fee 4.000 0,1% Inspection fee 21.500 0,3% Housing rent 77.000 1,0% Salting expenses 574.000 7,4% Appraisal 56.000 0,7% Commission (3% of the value of catch) 399.000 5,1% Barrels 336.000 4,3% Boat insurance 60.000 0,8% Crew insurance 12.000 0,2% Inspection fee processing 30.000 0,4% Oil costs (~2% of the value of catch) 266.000 3,4% Salaries (~33-35% of the value of

catch) 4.522.000 58,2%

Depreciations ?

Maintenance cost ?

Total 7.771.890 100%

Since nets and buoys are a substantial cost factor for the lumpfish boats it is important for lumpfish fishermen to carefully choose the fishing days since the nets can get damaged in bad weather, which can be costly to replace or repair. It is also important since the number of nets is limited per season according to regulation.

3.2 Indicators and outcome targets

This chapter identifies the key management objectives and outcome targets (OT) set for the Icelandic lumpfish fishery, and the indicators used to keep track of whether the OTs are obtained or not. Outcome targets are specific and measureable performance goals defined for a fishery on the basis of agreed and appropriately authorized general goals, standards and principles, as defined by the authorities based on the policy objectives. The key management objectives for the lumpfish fishery are “Sustainable and profitable utilisation of the lumpfish stock, which strengthens employment and settlement in the country.” Outcome targets are:

The relative fishing mortality (landings/biomass index, or Fproxy) shall not exceed 0.75

Fishing pressure shall be distributed on areas so that catch correlates the presumed distribution of the stock

36

The authorities rely on that profits within the fishery will be secured automatically i.e. fewer vessel owner will start fishing when market conditions are poor and vice versa. This has been the case in the past as many vessel owners that have valid permits choose not to fish for lumpfish when market situations are difficult.

The authorities also rely on that employment and settlement will be addressed with distributing licenses on areas, as these are small vessels that cannot travel far to reach their fishing grounds.

3.3 Harvest strategies

The ministry of fisheries and agriculture is the authority that decides on harvest strategies for lumpfish. The MRI gives advice on harvest strategies. The Directorate of fisheries and the coastguard is responsible for monitoring. All of the vessel owners are members of NASBO (National Association of Small Boat Owners), which represents them when negotiation on harvest strategies for lumpfish. The MRI issues a TAC advise on April 1st each year, which the authorities refers to when deciding on number of permits issued and number of days allowed for fishing. Current harvest strategy has been explained in the fishery overview chapter. But the regulation can also be viewed at: http://www.reglugerd.is/interpro/dkm/WebGuard.nsf/lookByNumer/1652012?OpenDocument The regulation includes the following articles (main points):

1. Fishing for Lumpfish in Icelandic waters is only allowed if the vessel has a special permit issued by the Directorate of fisheries.

2. Only vessels that had licenses to fish for lumpfish in 1997, or are derived from those vessels, are eligible to apply for licenses. Each vessel can only have one license per season allocated a specific time (start) and area.

3. The fishery is divided into 7 areas, which have variable fishing seasons. First one opens 1st of March and the last one closes in August 2nd.

4. Changes in the size of vessels are restricted to 2.5 TG increase between seasons in order to keep their license. Vessels over 15 GT are not eligible for lumpfish licenses.

5. Lumpfish licenses can be bought and sold, given that the seller and buyer meet all legal requirements.

6. Vessels that are fishing for lumpfish are not allowed to target other species and/or use other fishing gear at the same time they are using their lumpfish license.

7. It is not allowed to lay the lumpfish nets before 8:00 on the morning of the first day, as stated in the license. All fishing gear must be properly labelled before going out at sea.

8. Lumpfish nets may not be left in the sea for more than 4 days without hauling. 9. Each vessel is allowed to have up to 100 nets per each crewmember. Number of nets may

not exceed 300 per vessel. Nets may not be laid within 250 fathoms from shore, where protected bird nesting areas are by the sore.

10. Mesh size of lumpfish nets must be between 10.5” (267 mm) and 11.5” (292 mm). 11. Boyes must be properly labelled with the number of the vessel and the number of net

(consecutive numbering, starting from 1) 12. Abnormal amount of by-catch will result in suspension of licenses. This for example means

that monkfish catch cannot exceed the lumpfish catch (measured in cod equivalent). 13. Logbooks supplied by the Directorate of fisheries need to be accurately and conscientiously

entered.

37

14. The Directorate of fisheries and the coast guard are responsible for monitoring. Vessel owners are required to assist them to the best of their capabilities.

15. Failing to apply to this regulation may result in fines or temporary suspension of licenses. A major change was made on the harvest strategy for lumpfish in 2012, as discarding of lumpfish was forbidden (historically, only the roes have been harvested and the meat discarded at sea) with a regulation issued by the ministry of fisheries and agriculture (Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture,

2011).

3.4 Monitoring, compliance, sanctions

Monitoring of the lumpfish fishery is currently as follows: MRI conducts a stock assessment surveys during the fishing season and then issues a provisional advice in June for the following year. MRI then does another stock assessment survey during winter and spring, which is used for issuing final advice on April 1st. The Directorate of fisheries collects landing notes and final weighing notes from harbours and processors. Captains on the vessels are required to submit electronic logbooks to the directorate of fisheries. Vessel owners and processors are also required send the Directorate weighing reports.* The coast guard and the Directorate of fisheries monitor compliance to regulation by going on-board the lumpfish vessels out at sea or at dock. All vessels need to be equipped with automatic positioning system (VS maritime alert control) that is used to track the vessels and make sure that they are not surpassing the maximum 50 days at sea. Compliance sanctions are dealt with by either monitory fines or revoking of permits. There is currently not in place any monitoring regarding social or economic objectives of the management plan.

3.5 Documentation

The objective of this chapter is to identify relevant documentation and to determine how reliable information is mobilized so that the authority can be confident that the management plan is appropriately constructed and carried out and the outcome targets achieved. Documentation regarding biological outcome targets is:

a) MRIs stock assessment/advice that is issued two times a year (April 1st for the season that is starting and June 15th for next year’s season)

b) Automatic GPS reports (VS maritime alert control) supplied to the Icelandic Maritime service c) Electronic logbooks d) Landing notes supplied electronically to the Directorate of fisheries, weighing on official

harbour scales (GAFL) e) Weighing reports from auction markets or processors that have permission to re-weighing. f) Allocation reports (ráðstöfunarskýrslur) sent to the Directorate of fisheries each month from

processors g) Production report (afurðaskýrsla)

c-g is all used for the same purpose i.e. to double-check catch volumes.

* http://www.fiskistofa.is/media/eydublod//vigtarskyrsla_A.PDF

38

Documentation regarding economic outcome targets is:

Not used specifically for decisions on the management plan at present, but there are some data available that authorities can benefit from when taking decisions; such as:

– Export figures from the Directorate of Customs and Statistics Iceland – Financial accounts of fisheries from Statistics Iceland

Documentation regarding social outcome targets:

N/A

3.6 Planning process

Planning process when deciding on management plan for Icelandic lumpfish is that the Ministry of

fisheries and agriculture circulates a draft of a regulation and all stakeholders are then able to

comment on it. Meetings are also held with specific stakeholders, such as NASBO, MRI, Directorate

of Fisheries, the coastguard, the food and veterinary agency (MAST), Icelandic Food Research

(MATIS) and more.

The ministry of fisheries and agriculture evaluates all comments and then issue a regulation that

includes the MP.

3.7 References

C.W., C. (1985). Bioeconomic Modelling and Fisheries Management. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Directorate of Fisheries. (2011, June 30). E-mail. Directorate of Fisheries. (2011, June 15). E-mail. Directorate of Fisheries. (2011, August 8). E-mail. Directorate of Fisheries. (2012). Retrieved August 2012, from

http://www.fiskistofa.is/fiskveidistjorn/veidisvaedi/grasleppuveidisvaedi/ Directorate of Fisheries. (2012). Retrieved from

http://www.fiskistofa.is/fiskveidistjorn/stjornfiskveida/grasleppa/grasleppuleyfi/ Madsen. (2008). Time Series Analysis. Chapman & Hall. Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture. (2011). Retrieved 2012, from

http://stjornartidindi.is/DocumentActions.aspx?ActionType=Open&documentID=522ba6f9-bd3e-45be-807e-d96f89d03f7e

Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture. (2012). Retrieved 2012, from http://www.reglugerd.is/interpro/dkm/WebGuard.nsf/key2/196-2009

Pálsson, Ö. (2011). E-mail. Sigurdsson Th., M. A. (2012). State of Marine Stocks in Icelandic Waters 2011/2013. Retrieved from

www.hafro.is: http://www.hafro.is/Astand/2012/Astandsskyrsla_hafrannsoknastofnunarinnar_2012_lokaprentun.pdf

Winston, & Albright. (2011). Practical Management Science. South-Western College Pub.

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4 Management Plan Invitation

The MP invitation is presented in this chapter, but that is a formal invitation from the authority to the operator to enter negotiations on the basis of RFMS. It explains basic components that will have to be addressed in a MP under RFMS and serves as a starting point for discussions between the authority and the operator. A management plan (MP) is a formal arrangement between a management authority17and operators that specifies the partners in the fishery and their respective roles, the agreed objectives for the fishery, the management rules and regulations that apply, and provides other relevant details about the fishery. The management plan should be seen as a contract between the authority and the operator/s. In a Responsive Fisheries Management System (RFMS)18, the formal responsibility for developing the management plan is delegated to the operator/s in the management plan invitation. This management plan invitation is based on discussions between the “authority” (WP4) and the “operator” (WP5-Icelandic case) in a pre-management plan invitation meeting19. The authority has tried to apply the suggestions and wishes put forward by the operator. However, the requirements of the invitation are in the end set by the authority in the form of a list of outcome targets. Outcome targets are specific and measureable performance objectives, which are defined by the authorities, and which reflect the management goals of the resource management system in question. In the MP proposal, the operator is required to establish how the outcome targets will be achieved. The MP also needs to establish how information will be collected that, once the MP is implemented, will allow for independent assessments of whether or not the outcome targets have indeed been achieved. As the outcome targets comprises a focal element in the MP invitation it is important to note that the listed outcome targets should only be considered as a plausible starting point for “simulating” a RFMS. In order to implement RFMS in practice, the authority in question (here the Icelandic ministry of fisheries) would need to invest work in a thorough development of outcome targets based on its established management goals. In practice we have based this MP invitation on the management goals that were stated in a new bill that the minister of fisheries in Iceland recently put before the parliament20 . The outcome targets that have here been taken to reflect these management goals have been derived from relevant available information sources and policy documents (see appendix).

Note that MPs suggested by the operator/s will be subjected to a public hearing conducted by the authority before a final decision is made on whether the plan can be approved by the authority. This is in order to invite feedback from other stakeholders than those invited to submit the MPs (e.g. NGOs, the association for fish processing plants, fish sales organisations and Icelandic municipalities).

17Management authority: Organizational entity enacting authority in pursuit of the management objectives

decided for a fishery. Authority could be a coastal state or the European Commission.

Operator: Organizational unit with delegated authority to develop management plans and oversee or conduct

fishing operations within the standards decided by a management authority. 18Responsive Fisheries Management System (RFMS): RFMS is a term generated for use in the EcoFishMan

project, and it is used to refer to the new system that we are proposing to develop. The RFMS is an adaptive

management system that is results-based and ecosystem-based. The RFMS attempts to reduce micro-

management by involving stakeholders and may (or may not) include elements of rights-based management and

co-management, as appropriate. 19 This meeting, which included members from WP4 (the authority) and members from WP5 representing the

Icelandic case (the operator), was held on Skype 13.04.2012. 20 The bill in Icelandic: http://www.althingi.is/altext/140/s/1052.html; Press release from the Ministry in English:

http://eng.sjavarutvegsraduneyti.is/news-and-articles/nr/10907

40

4.1 Identification of fishery

We hereby invite prospective operators to formulate and seek approval of a management plan for the Icelandic lumpfish fishery.

Eligible Operators Operators eligible to respond to this invitation include representative organizations of individuals that (temporary or permanently) hold commercial fishing permit in the Icelandic lumpfish fishery21. It is left to the operators to decide if they will submit a common MP or separate MPs for each of the seven established fishing grounds. However, it is recommended that one common MP is strived for.

Planning period: 2014 - 2024

Target species: Icelandic lumpfish (Cyclopterus lumpus)

Geographical range: Within Icelandic EEZ, as divided in seven separate fishing grounds (Letters A-G in Figure 1).

Figure 4-1: Lumpfish fishing grounds around Iceland

Fleets: All Icelandic commercial fishing vessels holding for a permit for the target species. Not included: The plan shall not include tourist and leisure fisheries. The plan shall not include incidental catch by fleets licensed for different target species (e.g. pelagic fleets).

21National Association of Small Boat Owners (http://smabatar.is/sida/7.shtml).

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Conditions for approval To be eligible for approval by authorities, a MP must include a convincing strategy for a) achieving the outcome targets defined in section 3 below; b) obtaining information in a documentation system that allows for assessments of whether or not the outcome targets are (or will be) achieved; c) Ensuring that the planning process is in accordance with “good governance” principles. Acceptance or rejection of management plans will be based on an assessment of the f the above conditions approval. The authorities may seek expert advice regarding specific issues in order to support this assessment.

4.2 Outcome Targets

Outcome targets are specific and measureable performance goals defined for a fishery on the basis of agreed and appropriately authorized general goals, standards and principles, as defined by the authorities based on the policy objectives. Outcome Targets are to address biological and ecological-, economic-, social & cultural and governance dimensions.

4.2.1 Biological and ecological OTs:

Sustainable utilization of the resource is imperative for the fishery. OT addressing Biological and ecological dimensions are:

a. OTs defined for target species: Target species: Icelandic lumpfish Cyclopterus lumpus: The relative fishing mortality index (as established by MRI (MRI 2012) shall not exceed 0.75 within any of fishing areas defined in Figure 1.

b. OTs defined for commercial bycatch species22

For stocks where commercial quotas are defined, bycatch is not allowed unless the vessels have a quota.

c. OTs defined for vulnerable bycatch species23:

The Management Plan shall contain measures to minimize bycatch of the following species:

Halibut (Hippoglossushippoglossus)

Blue ling (Molvadypterygia)

All other species that are red-listed during the planning period24. Vulnerable bycatch species shall not be utilized for commercial purposes.

d. Discards A general discard ban is valid for the fishery. All live exemplars of species defined as vulnerable shall be released immediately.

22 Commercial bycatch species include those for which analytical assessments are difficult but where there is

little reason to expect that they are vulnerable. 23 Vulnerable species include the red-listed species and other species identified as vulnerable. 24http://www.iucnredlist.org/

42

Uncertainty, information and relative exploitation levels There is uncertainty about the present stock size and the stock structure. In particular, little is known about the male fish and about bycatch of lumpfish in other fisheries. In this situation, the allowed exploitation level will be set low in order to reduce the risk of harvesting the stock unsustainably. A higher level of fishing may be accepted if it is linked to improved knowledge of the stock. The Management Plan may hence suggest measures to improve the knowledge of the resource, i.e. through collection of relevant data from fishing operations in the lumpfish fisheries as well as in other fisheries that have lumpfish as bycatch.

4.2.2 Economic OTs:

One of the overall objectives of the Icelandic fisheries management system is ensuring profitable fishing industry. Historically, the lumpfish fishery has automatically taken into account the economic feasibility of the fishery i.e. many boat owners holding a license to fish for lumpfish have chosen not to take part in the fishery when they feel that they will not profit from the fishery. It is therefore a question if a specific economic OT is needed, as the fishery is self-regulatory in that aspect?

4.2.3 Social & cultural OTs

One of the overall objectives of the Icelandic fisheries management system is to secure employment and settlement in the country. If OTs contributing to settlement and employment by the operator can be derived from the existing Icelandic management framework, the list of OTs should be extended with socio-economic outcome targets to reflect management socio-economic management goals25. For instance, limits to quota aggregation or ties on where the catch is landed and processed can function as, and be reformulated as, social targets.

4.3 Implementation strategy

When basic RFMS conditions are not ideal, the MP invitation must include a suggestion for: a. How a RFMS type model may be realized given the existing institutional and legal conditions b. A transition process by which ideal RFMS conditions can be realized

An implementation strategy can involve an initial stage based on a HCR for example and an incentive scheme which makes it likely that operators want to join the RFMS on a voluntary basis. The RFMS model can be extended to increasing share of the fishery. An important part of implementing RBM is reversing the burden of proof and placing increased reasonability for documentation on resource users. It is also expected that with RBM the cost of running the MP, documentation, monitoring and more will be paid by the operator. In the case of the Icelandic lumpfish fishery, the operator is already paying fees for issuing of licenses and a catch fee that is meant to pay for monitoring, stock assessment and other tasks that the government is presently doing. By redistributing parts of these fees to NASBO is would be possible to have NASBO taking these tasks over, without imposing new fees on NASBO members.

25I.e. the management goals b-e in the bill on fisheries management that was recently put before the Icelandic

parliament (see footnote nr 4).

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5 MP1: Management Plan for the Icelandic lumpfish fishery

based on RFMS

The actual management plan (MP) for the Icelandic lumpfish fishery based on RFMS26, is presented in this chapter. The MP is a formal arrangement between a management authority27 and operators that specifies the partners in the fishery and their respective roles, the agreed objectives for the fishery, the management rules and regulations that apply, and provides other relevant details about the fishery. The management plan should be seen as a contract between the authority and the operator/s.

The management plan for Icelandic Lumpfish has the key goal to ensure that an appropriate balance exists between the need to ensure long term ecological sustainability of the lumpfish resources and the optimum utilisation.

The authority responsible for the MP is the Ministry of fisheries and agriculture. Monitoring and assessment of performance is in the hands of the MRI (Icelandic marine research institute), Directorate of fisheries and the Icelandic coast guard. All of the operators are members of NASBO (National Association of Small Boat Owners).

5.1 Fishery overview

Lumpfish is found all around Iceland, but some fishing grounds are though richer than others. Since the lumpfish is almost entirely fished for its more valuable roe, used in caviar production, the lumpfish fisheries are conducted in late winter - early spring when the stock migrates to shallow water to spawn. Lumpfish is caught with special gillnets, simply named lumpfish gillnets, using small fishing boats from 5-15 meters (Directorate of Fisheries, 2012). The crew size varies from 1 to 3 persons per boat, but most often there are 2-3 crewmembers. The fishing vessels are operated on day trips, the net are set out and then collected after few hours. The boats are equipped with hydraulic winches for hauling the nets. Most lumpfish fishermen fish for other species as well. For example, it is common to conduct lumpfish fishing in the spring and cod fishing during summer and fall.

Historically, almost all of the female lumpfish has been processed aboard the boats, where the fish belly is cut open; the roe sac emptied into a barrel and the flesh then discarded as it has been of little commercial value. This though changed in 2012, when the Ministry of fisheries and agriculture issued a regulation that made it obligatory to land the whole lumpfish (Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture, 2011). As results a new industry has been created i.e. processing of lumpfish meat. The lumpfish males are caught in some extent for local consumption; however, the only statistics available on lumpfish catches before 2012 are on these fisheries for the roe. Therefore, there are no statistics available for male lumpfish catches.

26Responsive Fisheries Management System (RFMS): RFMS is a term generated for use in the EcoFishMan

project, and it is used to refer to the new system that we are proposing to develop. The RFMS is an adaptive

management system that is results-based and ecosystem-based. The RFMS attempts to reduce micro-

management by involving stakeholders and may (or may not) include elements of rights-based management and

co-management, as appropriate. 27Management authority: Organizational entity enacting authority in pursuit of the management objectives

decided for a fishery. Authority could be a coastal state or the European Commission.

Operator: Organizational unit with delegated authority to develop management plans and oversee or conduct

fishing operations within the standards decided by a management authority.

44

The lumpfish fishery is managed by a fishing effort restriction, licensure and gear restrictions. There is no fishing quota as in other Icelandic fisheries, however, only fishing vessels that have a special permit, issued by the Directorate of Fisheries of Iceland, are allowed to fish for lumpfish. The permit is only issued to vessels that had the right to conduct lumpfish fishing in the fishing season of 1997, according to regulation no. 58/1996, and vessel that have replaced those vessels. The fishing permit is issued to a vessel for a fixed amount of continuous days each season, currently 50 days, and is bound to a particular fishing season and ground, but the fishing grounds are divided into seven areas as seen in Figure 5-1 (Directorate of Fisheries, 2012).

Figure 5-1: Lumpfish fishing grounds around Iceland

Each vessel can only hold one permit per season. The fishing grounds are generally open for approximately four months, as the first one opens in beginning of March and the last one closes in middle of August.

The lumpfish fishing rights can and have been transferred between vessels over the years, however under certain restrictions according to regulation. The rights cannot be transferred from a vessel unless it has held the permit for one season or more. It cannot be transferred to a vessel that is more than 2.5 gross tonnages larger and never to a vessel larger than 15 GT (gross tonnages) (Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture, 2012). The same applies to modifications of vessels. If a vessel that has a lumpfish fishing right is modified so that the tonnage increases by more than 2.5 GT, a permit cannot be issued to that vessel unless the fishing right have been transferred from a vessel that is at least as large in gross tonnage as the modified vessel. Fishing permits cannot be issued to a vessel that has been modified so it exceeds 15 GT.

45

Lumpfish is only caught with gillnets restricted to a minimum mesh size of 267 mm. The numbers of nets per vessel are restricted as well. For each fishing season, the allowed number of gillnets per vessel is 100 per each legally registered crewmember, however, the maximum number is restricted to 300. This limitation on the number of nets applies to a 60 fathom unfolded hose (ísl. ófellda slöngu). If a 120 fathom unfolded hose is used, the restricted number of nets is half of the above limitations.

It is forbidden to conduct lumpfish fishing and gillnet fishing of cod or angler fish at the same time. Also, vessels that have hook fishing licenses are forbidden to conduct lumpfish fishing and line fishing and/or fishing tackle by hand in the same fishing trip.

The female lumpfish catch in Iceland has been fluctuating over the last few decades, as can be seen in Figure 5-2 (Sigurdsson Th., 2012). The average catch of female lumpfish amounted to 6.2 thousand tonnes for the period 1971-2011 with a maximum of 13 thousand tonnes in 1984 and a minimum of 2.5 thousand tonnes in 2000. For the first half of the period, that is 1971 to 1990, the lumpfish catch was considerably higher on average than the latter part, or around 7.4 thousand tonnes versus 4.9 thousand tonnes of lumpfish catch in the period 1991-2011. *

Figure 5-2: Landings of female lumpfish and roe production in Iceland 1971 - 2011

According to data available from 1980, the effort in the lumpfish fisheries has been fluctuating from year to year as seen in Figure 5-3 (Sigurdsson Th., 2012). Effort peaked around 1984-1987 and again in 1994-1997. The minimum effort was in 2007. It is interesting to observe that when effort increases, catch per unit effort seems to decrease.

* For iteration, 1 barrel equals 0.105 tonnes of roe production according to The National Association of Small

Boat Owners, Iceland (email 27th October 2011).

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Figure 5-3: Effort and catch per unit effort in female lumpfish fishery 1980-2011

Effort has been increasing since 2007, which is in accordance with number of fishing permits issued by the Directorate of Fisheries. In 2007 there were issued 139 permits, but had increased to 425 in 2010, as can be seen in Table 5-1 (Directorate of Fisheries, E-mail, 2011).

Table 5-1: Number of lumpfish fishing permits issued by the

Directorate of Fisheries for each fishing ground in the years 2007-2010.

For the period 2007-2010, most permits were issued for fishing grounds E, north-east of Iceland, and fishing grounds A and B, west of Iceland (see Figure 5-1). Most female lumpfish is caught in those fishing grounds as well on average, according to data on roe landings for the years 2008 to 2010 from the Directorate of Fisheries in Iceland (Table 5-2) (Directorate of Fisheries, E-mail, 2011).

Fishing Ground 2007 2008 2009 2010

A 15 56 54 63

B 20 64 84 97

C 6 25 29 27

D 11 36 38 47

E 59 111 126 127

F 23 49 52 50

G 5 24 17 14

Total 139 365 400 425

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Table 5-2: Roe landings reported to the Directorate of Fisheries for

the 2007 to 2010 categorized by fishing ground.

It can be clearly seen by comparing Tables 5-1 and 5-2 that substantial parts of licenses are not actually being used. This can largely be contributed to market conditions, as vessel owners in possession of licenses often choose to select other fisheries that they think are more profitable.

Some level of by-catch is unavoidable in the lumpfish fishery. According to data from the Directorate of Fisheries for the years 2007 to 2011, the total by-catch has been increasing each year. In 2007 it amounted to 152 tonnes while in 2011 it had increased to 826 tonnes. The majority of by-catch is that of cod, amounting to 546 tonnes in the year 2011. Other common species are anglerfish, plaice, male lumpfish and saithe, as can be seen in Table 5-3 (Directorate of Fisheries, E-mail, 2011).

Table 5-3: Bycatch (tonnes) in the lumpfish fishery by species for the period 2007-2011.

Almost all Icelandic fisheries are managed with fishing quotas. According to law it is forbidden and punishable to land without quota in the species. Therefore, all lumpfish vessels must own quota for landed by-catch. Most lumpfish fishermen fish for other species as well and therefore own quota in those species. It is for example common to conduct lumpfish fishing in the spring and cod fishing during summer and fall.

A biomass index from annual groundfish survey has been used to assess the lumpfish stock status. The biomass index estimations are based on bottom trawl surveys, but as the lumpfish is believed to be more of a mid-water species than a bottom-species it is disputed how accurate these estimations are. There are also many other unknowns in the assessment, as little is known about the lumpfish’s habitat for most of its lifespan, age, maturity and how often they spawn. It is therefore not known if a big spawning stock one year will be followed by a big stock in the following year. Despite these unknowns, the correlation between the biomass index estimations and catch has shown a rather consistent correlation in the long-term.

Year

Fishing ground Roe (tonnes) No. of vessels Roe (tonnes) No. of vessels Roe (tonnes) No. of vessels

A 82.16 20 52.85 24 289.89 40

B 240.13 40 242.34 58 636.75 76

C 60.81 10 64.40 17 156.36 17

D 131.11 20 208.61 29 252.09 39

E 564.18 78 540.29 91 590.09 105

F 255.79 35 208.95 40 157.39 40

G 9.52 3 14.12 6 45.89 8

Unknown 0 0 0.17 2 0 0

Total 1,343.70 206 1,331.73 267 2,128.45 325

2008 2009 2010

Year Cod Haddock Saithe Catfish Leopardfish Anglerfish Plaice Male lumpfish Other Total

2007 132.59 1.21 4.21 0.81 1.05 0.04 7.20 4.58 0.22 151.92

2008 191.97 6.12 11.07 7.91 2.54 17.24 17.48 5.13 0.50 259.95

2009 212.44 11.04 14.09 6.12 2.33 62.87 25.86 12.54 2.72 350.00

2010 309.76 12.61 29.47 8.47 2.90 144.55 72.02 21.74 2.25 603.77

2011 545.74 16.14 22.65 11.60 3.08 128.65 66.46 26.03 5.67 826.03

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The index decreased substantially in 1991 and stayed at a lower level for the period 1991 to 2000. The index increased in the year 2000 and again in 2006 but has since been decreasing, as can be seen in Figure 5-4 (Sigurdsson Th., 2012).

Figure 5-4: Lumpfish biomass index of females from annual groundfish survey (1985-2011).

The index for relative fishing mortality, catch divided by the biomass index, for female lumpfish has been increasing as well for the last few years, as can be seen in Figure 5-5 (Sigurdsson Th., 2012).

Figure 5-5: Female lumpfish relative fishing mortality 1985-2010 (catch/biomass index)

According to the MRI, the increasing number of issued permits and effort, in combination with declining female biomass index are causes for concern and state, on those grounds, that the lumpfish fishery seems to be in the need of a more purposeful management. For the quota year 2012/13 the MRI recommends that female catch does not exceed 1,700 tonnes.

0

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88

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89

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90

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92

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93

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94

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49

Lumpfish is only caught with special gillnets using small fishing boats from 1-25 GT. For the years 2008 to 2010, about 89% of the boats with lumpfish fishing permits were between 4 and 15 GT. Most were between 4 and 6 GT or 44% on average, 26% were between 6 and 10 GT and 20% from 10 to 15 GT. Only around 7% were smaller than 4 GT and 4% larger than 15 GT, as can be seen in Table 5-4 (Directorate of Fisheries, E-mail, 2011).

Table 5-4: Number of vessels with lumpfish fishing permits in the years

2008 to 2010, categorized according to size (GT).

According to the National Association of Small Boat Owners in Iceland the main cost factors in the lumpfish fishing are that of salaries, nets and buoys, salting expenses, commission, catch fee and oil costs. Salaries are by far the biggest cost factor or between 33%-35% of total catch value. However, depreciations and maintenance costs were not available which skews the cost picture.

Table 5-5: Cost factors in Icelandic lumpfish fishery

Cost factor Amount

(ISK) %

Fishing permit 22.000 0,3%

Nets, buoys and more 1.000.000 12,9%

Fishing fee (2.023 ISK per barrel) 141.610 1,8%

Catch fee (1,66% of the value of catch) 220.780 2,8%

Weighing fee (25 landings) 30.000 0,4%

Garbage fee 4.000 0,1%

Inspection fee 21.500 0,3%

Housing rent 77.000 1,0%

Salting expenses 574.000 7,4%

Appraisal 56.000 0,7%

Commission (3% of the value of catch) 399.000 5,1%

Barrels 336.000 4,3%

Boat insurance 60.000 0,8%

Crew insurance 12.000 0,2%

Inspection fee processing 30.000 0,4%

Oil costs (~2% of the value of catch) 266.000 3,4% Salaries (~33-35% of the value of

catch) 4.522.000 58,2%

Depreciations ?

Maintenance cost ?

Total 7.771.890 100%

Since nets and buoys are a substantial cost factor for the lumpfish boats it is important for lumpfish fishermen to carefully choose the fishing days since the nets can get damaged in bad weather, which

GT 1 - 4 4 - 6 6 - 10 10 - 15 15 - 20 20 - 26

2008 22 168 87 65 13 4

2009 25 174 103 75 13 4

2010 33 174 117 85 12 4

50

can be costly to replace or repair. It is also important since the number of nets is limited per season according to regulation.

5.2 Indicators and outcome targets

This chapter identifies the key management objectives and outcome targets (OT) set for the Icelandic lumpfish fishery, and the indicators used to keep track of whether the OTs are obtained or not. Outcome targets are specific and measureable performance goals defined for a fishery on the basis of agreed and appropriately authorized general goals, standards and principles, as defined by the authorities based on the policy objectives.

The key management objectives for the lumpfish fishery are “Sustainable and profitable utilisation of the lumpfish stock, which strengthens employment and settlement in the country.”

Outcome targets are:

The relative fishing mortality (landings/biomass index, or Fproxy) shall not exceed 0.75

Fishing pressure shall be distributed on areas so that ratio of licenses per area does not fluctuate more between years than shown in Table 5-7 (areas A-G)

Table 5-6: The outcome targets in MP1

Management

goal

Management

objective Outcome target Indicator

Sustainable

ecosystem

Sustainable

fishery

landings/biomass

index =

Fproxy < 0.75

Landings and biomass

index

Socio-economic

sustainability &

sustainable

ecosystem

Fishing pressure

distributed to correlate

distribution of stock &

secure fair share for all

operators in fishery.

See table 5-7

Landing data, VMS

data, Number of issued

licenses pr. area

To ensure a fishing effort that correlates the believed distribution of the stock the ratio of fishing permits allocated to each fishing area should be in accordance to values in Table 5-7. To obtain the values, the average ratio of permits for each fishing ground during 1997-2011 was calculated along with two standard deviations. Since the stock seems to have been rather healthy during these years and no information about viability of the stock in each fishing ground is available this approach to setting an OT seems to be logical.

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Table 5-7: OT describing distribution of permits to fishing grounds

Fishing ground Ratio

A 11% - 25%

B 13% - 23%

C 3% - 7%

D 8% - 11%

E 20% - 40%

F 11% - 17%

G 3% - 9% It is not necessary to specify economic OTs for the lumpfish fishery. The fishery is largely self-regulatory, as many vessel owners holding a license to fish for lumpfish chose not to use them when conditions are not favourable i.e. stock size and market conditions.

Specific outcome targets addressing social issues i.e. settlement, employment, average wages etc. are not deemed necessary as a part of a MP. The distribution of fishing areas ensures that lumpfish is landed in the small harbours close to the fishing grounds. Maintaining the fishing ground borders as they are now has favourable social side effects.

There is no need to have a recruitment plan in the MP. Licenser can be bought and sold and the prices for licenser fluctuate with stock size and market conditions. It is quite possible for new people to enter the fishery by buying licenses.

5.3 Harvest strategies

Authority: Ministry of fisheries and agriculture Operator: National Association of Small Boat Owners (NASBO Assessor: Vottunarstofan Tún (accredited certification body) http://www.tun.is/Default.asp?Page=244 The fishery is subjected to the following management measures:

1. Fishing for lumpfish in Icelandic waters is only allowed if the vessel has a special permit issued by NASBO.

2. Only vessels that had licenses to fish for lumpfish in 2012, or are derived from those vessels, are eligible to apply for licenses. Each vessel can only have one license per season, allocated to a specific area (A-G).

3. The fishery is divided into 7 areas (A-G) where fishing is allowed during the following time-frame:

A. March 15 – May 28 B. March 15 – August 2 C. March 15 – May 28 D. May 20 – June 2 E. March 15 – May 28 F. March 15 – May 28 G. March 1 – May 14

4. Vessels over 15 GT are not eligible for lumpfish licenses. 5. Lumpfish licenses can be bought and sold, given that the seller and buyer meet all legal

requirements. 6. Vessels that are fishing for lumpfish are not allowed to have other fishing gear on-board.

52

7. All fishing gear must be properly labelled before going out at sea. Boyes must be properly labelled with the number of the vessel and the number of net (consecutive numbering, starting from 1)

8. Each vessel has a permit to have a specific number of nets in the sea for a predetermined number of days per season, counting from first day at sea. A special NASBO lumpfish management council decides in the beginning of each season how many nets are allowed per vessel, based on the available stock assessment, number of licences, number of crewmembers on board and market conditions. The NASBO lumpfish management council consists of one representative from each of the 15 member associations*, the chairman of NASBO and the managing director of NASBO; 17 people in total, each with equal voting power.

9. The NASBO lumpfish management council decides before issuing of licenses how many licenses are to be granted for each fishing area. That decision is to be based on how fishing pressure has been distributed in the past (historic data in Table 5-7), on the most recent scientific advice and on input from NASBO members. Vessels that are eligible to apply for a license (according to previous articles) are to be allocated a license, but they will not necessarily be allocated a license in the area they preferred. If number of applications within fishing area does not fit within Table 5-7, vessels with most fishing experience in the area will have priority and the NASBO lumpfish management council will then invite the rest to apply for a different area.

10. Representative of NASBO is required to count the nets into the boat when it starts fishing and replacement of nets needs to be reported to the representative or NASBO.

11. Nets may not be laid within 250 fathoms from shore, where protected bird nesting areas are by the sore.

12. Mesh size of lumpfish nets must be between 10.5” (267 mm) and 11.5” (292 mm). 13. Lumpfish vessels need to have quotas for their by-catch. 14. Logbooks must be kept by all lumpfish vessel captains and each entry has to be sent to

NASBOs representative within 24 hours of landing. 15. Processors and auction markets that sell/buy fish from lumpfish vessels are required to send

representative of NASBO information on volume and value of each species they sold/bought from lumpfish vessels. They are also required to enter number of lumpfish, total volume and proportion of roes.

16. Each lumpfish vessel must be equipped with VMS (Vessel Monitoring System) that relays information on location to NASBOs representative every hour.

17. Failing to apply to this regulation may result in fines or temporary suspension of licenses.

5.4 Monitoring, compliance, sanctions

NASBO will hire a competent person that will be in charge of issuing licenses, monitoring the fishery, receiving logbooks and VMS data, making sure that each vessel has the correct number of nets and does not surpass the maximum number of days allowed for the fishery. This person will be assisted by representatives from each regional association, but NASBO is made up by 15 regional associations. Vottunarstofan Tún, which is an accreditation certification body, will be assessing performance of the management plan and reporting to both the Ministry of fisheries and NASBO. NASBO will carry the cost of hiring Vottunarstofan Tún.

* To be elected for one year at a time by majority of votes (>50%) at the annual meeting of each member

association. Each member that holds a lumpfish license has a voting power; each with equal voting power. If the

person with most number of votes does not reach >50% of votes in the first round of the elections, a second

round will be required between the two persons with the most number of votes.

53

NASBO will cover the cost of implementation of the MP, documentation, monitoring and other associated costs. In return NASBO will receive the payments currently charged for issuing of licenses (22.000 IKR per license) and half of the catch fee (0.83% of the value of catch), which should render revenues of around 50 million IKR.

5.5 Documentation

The following documentation will be provided by NASBO 1. Licences are issued by NASBO and will be available online at an open web-page, 2. Representatives of NASBO will make unscheduled visits on-board vessels to make sure that

all requirements are being met. 3. NASBO will update daily on an open web-page how many days have been used by each

vessel 4. NASBO will update weekly on an open web-page data from logbooks 5. NASBO will use data from processors to double check logbooks and to gather data that can

possibly later provide information that can be used to assist in stock assessment. 6. NASBO will keep VMS data that includes a track of where nets were laid. This will be

considered privileged information which will not be made publically available. 7. NASBO will hire the MRI to provide the current biomass index and recommend TAC (as

presently being done). Data for the assessment is collected in MRIs groundfish survey’s, which means that the data collection is being done in association with other work of MRI. NASBO will pay MRI a fee of 1 million IKR for data collection and 1.5 million IKR for analysing the data and publishing of results.

Data collected by NASBO and MRI, together with knowledge gained from other sources will be used in order to find more advanced methods of assessing stock size. Such methods, along with associated documentation, will be incorporated into the MP when appropriate (subjected to agreement between operator and authority).

5.6 Planning process

Planning process, according to RFMS, when deciding on MP for Icelandic lumpfish is that the

Authority (Ministry of fisheries and agriculture) establishes key objectives of the MP. The operator

(NASBO) then suggests OT, harvest strategies, monitoring & compliance sanctions and how this

should be documented. The Authority then has the final word in approving/refusing their

suggestions.

An independent assessor will evaluate the documentation provided by the operator and other

sources, such as the MRI. If the assessor comes to the conclusion that OTs are not being met, the

authority and the operators must reconsider the entire MP.

5.7 References

C.W., C. (1985). Bioeconomic Modelling and Fisheries Management. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Directorate of Fisheries. (2011, June 30). E-mail. Directorate of Fisheries. (2011, June 15). E-mail. Directorate of Fisheries. (2011, August 8). E-mail. Directorate of Fisheries. (2012). Retrieved August 2012, from

http://www.fiskistofa.is/fiskveidistjorn/veidisvaedi/grasleppuveidisvaedi/

54

Directorate of Fisheries. (2012). Retrieved from http://www.fiskistofa.is/fiskveidistjorn/stjornfiskveida/grasleppa/grasleppuleyfi/

Madsen. (2008). Time Series Analysis. Chapman & Hall. Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture. (2011). Retrieved 2012, from

http://stjornartidindi.is/DocumentActions.aspx?ActionType=Open&documentID=522ba6f9-bd3e-45be-807e-d96f89d03f7e

Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture. (2012). Retrieved 2012, from http://www.stjornartidindi.is/DocumentActions.aspx?ActionType=Open&documentID=3aca9c4e-20d8-41de-b7ca-2bc911e85d47

Pálsson, Ö. (2011). E-mail. Sigurdsson Th., M. A. (2012). State of Marine Stocks in Icelandic Waters 2011/2013. Retrieved from

www.hafro.is: http://www.hafro.is/Astand/2012/Astandsskyrsla_hafrannsoknastofnunarinnar_2012_lokaprentun.pdf

Winston, & Albright. (2011). Practical Management Science. South-Western College Pub.

55

6 Certified documentation system for the Icelandic Lumpfish

fishery

The documentation systems that have been agreed up on by the operators and the authorities are presented in this chapter. The MP requires the operators to gather data in a “certified” manner i.e. format and content documented in a standardized manner. The following documentation and who are responsible for providing them has been identified in MP1 for the Icelandic lumpfish fishery:

1. Lumpfish licences are issued by NASBO and will be available online at an open web-page, 2. Representatives of NASBO will make unscheduled visits on-board vessels to make sure that

all requirements are being met. 3. NASBO will update daily on an open web-page how many days have been used by each

vessel 4. NASBO will update weekly on an open web-page data from logbooks 5. NASBO will use data from processors to double check logbooks and to gather data that can

possibly later provide information that can be used to assist in stock assessment. 6. NASBO will keep VMS data that includes a track of where nets were laid. This will be

considered privileged information which will not be made publically available. 7. NASBO will hire the MRI to provide the current biomass index and recommend TAC (as

presently being done). Data for the assessment is collected in MRIs groundfish survey’s, which means that the data collection is being done in association with other work of MRI. NASBO does therefore only have to hire MRI to analyse the data.

56

6.1 Lumpfish licenses

Vessel owners will apply to NASBO for licences. Only vessels that had licenses to fish for lumpfish in 2012 are eligible and the vessel must be no more than 15 GT. Only one license is allowed for each vessel, specifying license number, vessel name & number, GT, area & time frame where license applies to (number of licenses per area subjected to requirements set in MP1, Table 8), number of nets and days allowed. The licenses will be made publically available on-line at a web-page hosted by NASBO. Day of setting the nets for the first time and associated expiration date of the license will be added to the on-line license. The licenses will be purely web-based and presented as follows:

Issuing of a license will cost 22.000 IKR, which will cover NASBOs cost of issuing the license, presenting it on the web-page and updating the information.

License

no Vessel name & number GT Area & time-frame

No. Nets

allowed

Days

allowed

First day of

fishing

Last day of

fishing

1 Bót HF 81 (2782) 8,42 Area A valid 04.04.2012 - 23.05.2012 200 50 5.4.2012 25.5.2012

2 Jói Brands GK 517 (6991) 8,72 Area A valid 05.04.2012 - 04.05.2012 200 50 6.4.2012 26.5.2012

3 Guðbjörg Kristín KÓ 6 (1765) 8,28 Area A valid 07.04.2012 - 26.05.2012 200 50 7.4.2012 27.5.2012

4 Leifi AK 2 (6976) 7,23 Area A valid 07.04.2012 - 26.05.2012 200 50 8.4.2012 28.5.2012

5 Óskar AK 130 (7120) 5,19 Area A valid 07.04.2012 - 26.05.2012 200 50 9.4.2012 29.5.2012

6 Jakob Leó RE 174 (6823) 5,06 Area A valid 07.04.2012 - 26.05.2012 200 50 10.4.2012 30.5.2012

7 Ver AK 27 (1764) 14,78 Area A valid 09.04.2012 - 28.05.2012 300 50 11.4.2012 31.5.2012

8 Bjargfugl RE 55 (6474) 7,00 Area A valid 09.04.2012 - 28.05.2012 200 50 12.4.2012 1.6.2012

9 Siggi Afi HU 122 (2716) 5,94 Area A valid 09.04.2012 - 28.05.2012 200 50 13.4.2012 2.6.2012

10 Sigrún AK 71 (2495) 8,33 Area A valid 10.04.2012 - 28.05.2012 200 50 14.4.2012 3.6.2012

11 Vöttur RE 250 (1733) 11,87 Area A valid 11.04.2012 - 28.05.2012 300 50 15.4.2012 4.6.2012

12 Máni AK 73 (6824) 6,95 Area A valid 12.04.2012 - 28.05.2012 200 50 16.4.2012 5.6.2012

13 Sæmi AK 13 (6627) 4,11 Area A valid 13.04.2012 - 28.05.2012 200 50 17.4.2012 6.6.2012

14 Ási RE 52 (5843) 3,88 Area A valid 15.03.2012 - 01.05.2012 200 50 15.3.2012 4.5.2012

15 Reynir Þór SH 140 (7243) 14,30 Area A valid 15.03.2012 - 03.05.2012 300 50 15.3.2012 4.5.2012

16 Bóti HF 84 (2579) 13,90 Area A valid 15.03.2012 - 03.05.2012 300 50 15.3.2012 4.5.2012

17 Jón Pétur RE 411 (2033) 13,42 Area A valid 15.03.2012 - 03.05.2012 300 50 15.3.2012 4.5.2012

18 Kvika SH 23 (2145) 10,76 Area A valid 15.03.2012 - 03.05.2012 300 50 15.3.2012 4.5.2012

19 Vala HF 5 (6982) 9,16 Area A valid 15.03.2012 - 03.05.2012 200 50 15.3.2012 4.5.2012

20 Kiddi RE 89 (2488) 8,70 Area A valid 15.03.2012 - 03.05.2012 200 50 15.3.2012 4.5.2012

21 Már RE 87 (7011) 5,07 Area A valid 15.03.2012 - 03.05.2012 200 50 15.3.2012 4.5.2012

22 Gári AK 5 (5890) 4,12 Area A valid 15.03.2012 - 03.05.2012 200 50 15.3.2012 4.5.2012

23 Lennon AK 18 (6804) 4,96 Area A valid 15.03.2012 - 30.04.2012 200 50 15.3.2012 4.5.2012

24 Úlfur AK 25 (6957) 5,03 Area A valid 16.03.2012 - 04.05.2012 200 50 16.3.2012 5.5.2012

25 Sindri RE 46 (1500) 11,49 Area A valid 21.04.2012 - 28.05.2012 300 50 24.4.2012 13.6.2012

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6.2 Inspections by NASBOs representatives

Representatives of NASBO will make unscheduled visits on-board vessels to make sure that all requirements are being met. They will fill out the following form.

Date

Harbour

Inspection performed by

Vessel name

Vessel no

license no

Crewmembers No

Crewmembers name and position

Crewmembers name and position

Crewmembers name and position

Crewmembers name and position

When was first day of fishing

Size of nets

How many nets

Is marking on boyes in order

Is logbook correctly filled out

Is VMS system working correctly

Other

Signature of inspector and captain

Form for inspections on-board lumpfish vessels

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6.3 Logbooks

Logbooks are required to be on-board all lumpfish vessels, either paper issue or electronic version. All vessels must fill out an electronic logbook that shall be sent to NASBO no later than 24 hours after landing. The logbooks will show the following:

Logbook for lumpfish vessels

Gutted

yes No

Total

Price (kr./kg.) Total value (kr.)Area

IS-Nr.:Processor

Fish species

Buyer of catch

Licence no.:

Landing harbour

Location (Coordinates of nets)

Nets (no and size)

Iced

Vsk. nr. útg.:

IS-Nr.:

DateName and number of vessel

Vessel ow ner:

Volume (kg.)

59

6.4 Reports from processors

NASBO will use data from processors to double check logbooks and to gather data that can possibly later provide information that can be used to assist in stock assessment. This data will be collected electronically in the following format:

Logbook for lumpfish vessels

Gutted

yes No

Fish species Area Iced Volume (kg.) Price (kr./kg.) Total value (kr.)

Processor IS-Nr.:

Buyer of catch IS-Nr.: Landing harbour

Licence no.: Vsk. nr. útg.: Location (Coordinates of nets)

Name and number of vessel Date

Vessel ow ner: Nets (no and size)

60

6.5 VMS data

NASBO will receive VMS (vessel monitoring system) data that includes a track of where nets were laid. This will be considered privileged information which will not be made publically available. There is already a VMS system up and running on all Icelandic vessels. The data is currently only being sent to the Maritime Alert Center, but vessel owners can have the system sending data to NASBO.

6.6 Biomass index

NASBO will hire the MRI to provide the current biomass index and recommend TAC (as presently being done). Data for the assessment is collected in MRIs groundfish survey’s, which means that the data collection is being done in association with other work of MRI. Similar to the current practise the MRI will issue a preliminary TAC in July and a final TAC on April 1st.

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7 Simulation model for the Icelandic lumpfish fishery

The simulation model developed for the lumpfish case, its components, inputs and outputs along with explanations on what was being aimed for and what were the results are presented in this chapter.

7.1 Objectives and Outcome Targets

When designing the simulation model the overall management objectives and primary Outcome Targets (OT) needed to be established before further work could be started.

The key management objectives for the lumpfish fishery are “Sustainable and profitable utilisation of the lumpfish stock, which strengthens employment and settlement in the country.” These are in fact the overall objectives that apply to all fisheries in Icelandic waters.

Currently there are no concrete Outcome Targets defined for the lumpfish fishery, but there are recommendations and general guidelines available. They suggest that fishing pressure should be controlled with the aim to keep the Fproxy (landings/biomass index) below 0.75 and that fishing pressure should be distributed between fishing areas. In MP1 these OT have been formulated further so that they can now be considered official OTs.

The OTs are:

The relative fishing mortality (landings/biomass index, or Fproxy) shall not exceed 0.75

Fishing pressure shall be distributed on areas so that ratio of licenses per area does not fluctuate more between years than shown in Table 7-2 (areas A-G)

Table 7-1: Outcome targets and indicators

Management

goal

Management

objective Outcome target Indicator

Sustainable

ecosystem

Sustainable

fishery

landings/biomass

index =

Fproxy < 0.75

Landings and biomass

index

Socio-economic

sustainability &

sustainable

ecosystem

Fishing pressure

distributed to correlate

distribution of stock &

secure fair share for all

operators in fishery.

See table 7-2

Landing data, VMS

data, Number of issued

licenses pr. area

Table 7-2: Distribution of fishing permits

Fishing ground Ratio

A 11% - 25%

B 13% - 23%

C 3% - 7%

D 8% - 11%

E 20% - 40%

F 11% - 17%

G 3% - 9% The model keeps track of the first OT, but there is no need to model the allocation of permits as foreseen in a new RFMS. The permits will be issued in a similar manner as before, except that NASBO will now issue them instead of the Directorate of Fisheries.

62

To further assess the management plan, especially the difference between the old policy and the non-discard policy the following indicators were implemented in the model.

Number of jobs in the fishery

Profit margin of the fishery: 𝑅(𝑞, 𝑝) − 𝐶(𝐸, 𝑞)

𝑅(𝑞, 𝑝)

where R is the yearly revenue from the fishery and C the cost of the fishery.

7.2 The model

A model of the Icelandic lumpfish fishery was constructed and simulated for 20 years to compare MP0 to MP1* in terms of the following indicators:

1. The profitability margin of the fishery:

𝑅(𝑞, 𝑝) − 𝐶(𝐸, 𝑞)

𝑅(𝑞, 𝑝)

where R is the yearly revenue from the fisheries, and C the cost of the fishery.

2. Number of man-years in the fishery Fproxy = catch/biomass index is also a part of the model although the change between MP0 and MP1 does not involve a change in effort. In future, with possibly better data that could be used to improve the stock assessment; there might be a reason to change the outcome target that is supposed to ensure a biological sustainability. For now, the aim is to keep the average of Fproxy at around 0.75. One could foresee that if Fproxy for some reason became too high, number of issued permits, allowed days at sea or allowed number of nets in the sea should be limited in the following year. The lumpfish model is based on the following functions: Natural biomass growth function, harvest function, cost function and revenue function.

* A discard policy was adopted into the lumpfish fishery in 2012 and should therefore be a part of MP0. For the

purpose of making the comparison more „interesting“ it was however decided to have the discard policy only

active in MP1.

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7.2.1 Natural biomass growth function

Very limited biological data can be found on the female lumpfish stock. As a consequence, a simple standard bio-economic biomass model is applied. It accounts for no age structure and the population dynamics are described with a logistic function:

𝐺(𝑥) = 𝑟 ∙ 𝑥𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑝 ∙ (1 −𝑥𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑝

𝐾) = 𝛼 ∙ 𝑥𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑝 − 𝛽 ∙ 𝑥𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑝

2

where 𝑥𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑝is the stock size of female lumpsucker, K is the carrying capacity and r the intrinsic

growth rate of the stock.

7.2.2 Harvest function

The harvest is described by a generalized Schaefer function (C.W., 1985):

𝑞𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑝 = 𝑌(𝑒, 𝑥) = 𝜌 ∙ 𝑒 ∙ 𝑥𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑝

Where 𝑞𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑝 is the volume of lumpfish catch, 𝜌is the catchability coefficient, e is the fishing effort

and 𝑥𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑝is the lumpfish stock size as before. The unit of fishing effort used in the model is number

of active fishing permits. Since the roes are the most valuable part of the lumpfish catch, a parameter, 𝜎 is needed to describe the ratio of roe that can be processed from a given amount of harvested lumpfish. According to the Directorate of Fisheries this value is 30%.

7.2.3 Cost function

The cost is assumed to be described by the function

where fc is fixed costs, E, is effort, vc is variable cost and R(q,p) is the revenue. When a new management plan is implemented, the cost increases changes due to the processing cost. The cost function becomes:

where w is processing cost per ton of lumpfish catch and qlump are tons of lumpfish caught.

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7.2.4 Revenue function

The most valuable part of the lumpfish are the roes. The average export value (fob) for the period 1999-2011 is around 7.14 EUR/kg which is around 1150 ISK/kg according to the ISK/EUR average exchange rate of 2011. The lumpfish itself is only worth around 60 ISK/kg. Therefore, the fishermen primarily target the roe and discard the lumpfish, allowed according to current regulations, i.e. before 2012. Hence, the revenue function is assumed to have the following form

R(q,p)=P(q,t)·Y(e,x)=proe·qroe·=proe ·η·qlump

proe is price of roe, proe is the amount of roes harvested, η is the ratio of roes and qlump is the lumpfish harvest. A more representative revenue function after the legislation changed in 2012 would be:

( , ) (1 ) ( )roe lump lump lump lump roe lump lumpR q p p q p q q p p p

7.3 Input modelling (parameter estimation)

Once the bio-economic model had been established, the next task was to fit the various data sets to the model. This chapter describes the parameter estimation needed in order to implement the model in the simulation software.

7.3.1 Growth function

Major challenges were involved in the process of fitting the available data to the chosen biological model. The available biological data consisted of a biomass index which is obtained from yearly groundfish surveys carried out by the Marine Research Institute. It should give an idea of the trend in the stock status but does serve as an index of stock size. That is obvious when comparing the biomass index to catch numbers (see Figure 7-1) because the catch numbers account for as much as 125% of the biomass indicated in the biomass index during some years.

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Figure 7-1: From this figure it can be clearly seen that the biomass index is not equivalent to a time series

describing stock size. However it serves as an indicator of the trends in change of biomass.

The following steps were taken to get a fair estimate of the size of the stock: 1. 3pt moving average smoothing was carried out on the biomass index 2. An initial value for the stock size at year 1985 was chosen as the first reference point. 3. A new time series was created using the changes in the smoothed biomass index – 4. The new biomass time series was fitted to the growth function, using ordinary least squares

method in Excel. 5. The parameters were tested with catch data since 1971.

Given stock size of 40.000 kg stock size in the year 1985, the following model was obtained with ordinary least square method:

𝐺(𝑥) = 0.316 ∙ 𝑥𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑝 ∙ (1 −𝑥𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑝

76.289) − 0.00101 ∙ 𝐸 ∙ 𝑥𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑝

The stock estimate along with catch volumes can be seen in Figure 7-3. The model obtained with this stock estimate does not give accurate information about historic stock size or provide a forecast on development of stock size. It can however certainly serve as a basis for a simulation model comparing the effects of the two different management plans on the chosen indicators.

66

Figure 7-2: A three point moving average smoothing of the biomass index compared with the actual index.

Figure 7-3: Stock estimate used to fit parameters in the model and real catch numbers from 1985-2011.

67

7.3.2 Effort and price

The unit of effort used in the model is the number of active permits in the lumpfish fishery. That number was estimated from landing records from 2000-2011, since the number of issued fishing permits does not reflect the effort because many fishers choose not to use it if the prices of roes are low. Active permits account for around 60% of issued permits on average. Monthly price data from Statistics Iceland were modelled with an AR(1) process (autoregressive process) :

𝑝(𝑡) = 𝜇 + 𝑎 ∙ (𝑝(𝑡 − 1) − 𝜇) + 𝑒𝑡 (Madsen, 2008)

where μ is the mean price, and et is the error term. The following model was obtained and Figure 7-4 shows the fit.

𝑝(𝑡) = 8.725 + 0.8697 ∙ (𝑝(𝑡 − 1) − 8.725) + 𝑒𝑡~𝑁(0,1.911)

Figure 7-4: The graph shows the actual data (in blue), the AR(1) model with actual data (in red) and

finally the AR(1) process simulated with initial price chosen with respect to data.

The effort was modelled as a linear function of the price, as the correlation between the two is clear (correlation coefficient of 0.93). The data was fitted to the following function:

y = 0.0267x, R2 =0.8

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7.3.3 Cost and number of jobs

The cost for a typical boat was obtained from representatives from the Association of Small Boat Owners (Pálsson, E-mail, 2012):

NASBO also provided information about the number of jobs per boat. To estimate how many jobs are created due to processing of the catch on shore, the number of jobs in Drangsnes in summer 2010, where all catch was processed onshore, were raised for the whole fishery.

2011 2011 2011

Lumpfish licence 22.000 kr. 17.000 kr. 17.000 kr.

Nets, buoys and more 1.750.000 kr. 1.625.000 kr. 1.575.000 kr.

Fishing fee (2023 kr/barrel in 2011) 141.610 kr. 136.163 kr. 104.896 kr.

Catch fee (1,66% of landing value) 220.780 kr. 223.104 kr. 174.300 kr.

Weighing fee 27.500 kr. 25.750 kr. 25.000 kr.

Garbage and water fee 10.000 kr. 10.000 kr. 10.000 kr.

Inspection Fees 42.000 kr. 42.000 kr. 42.000 kr.

Fuel 399.000 kr. 403.200 kr. 315.000 kr.

Housing rent 69.580 kr. 69.020 kr. 67.410 kr.

Maintenance 111.510 kr. 110.670 kr. 108.080 kr.

Salting expenses 345.380 kr. 332.640 kr. 311.710 kr.

Appraisal 47.110 kr. 47.110 kr. 47.110 kr.

Commission (3%) 399.000 kr. 403.200 kr. 315.000 kr.

Barrels 392.000 kr. 392.000 kr. 392.000 kr.

Boat insurance 165.000 kr. 165.000 kr. 165.000 kr.

Crew insurance 100.000 kr. 100.000 kr. 100.000 kr.

NASBO membership fee 66.500 kr. 67.200 kr. 52.500 kr.

Operation costs 4.308.970 kr. 4.169.057 kr. 3.822.006 kr.

Wages 5.320.000 kr. 5.376.000 kr. 4.200.000 kr.

Total costs 9.628.970 kr. 9.545.057 kr. 8.022.006 kr.

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7.4 Dynamics of the lumpfish fishery

Before the model was implemented in Stella™, a causal loop diagram describing the dynamics of the system was constructed.

Figure 7-5: System dynamics representation of the Icelandic lumpfish fishery

How the model was implemented in Stella™ can be seen in Figure 7-6, demonstrating how each factor contributed to the simulation.

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Figure 7-6: Model implemented in Stella

7.5 Results from simulation

Output from 1.000 runs gave the following results:

Table 7-3: Results from simulating the system

Indicator MP0 (discard) MP1 (non discard) Change

Average number of

man-years in fishery

110 ± 8 165 ± 12 50%

Average profitability

margin

12.3 ± 4.3 % 8.9 ± 4.0 % -30%

landings/biomass index

= Fproxy No change in effort due to management plan

Distribution of licenses No change due to management plan

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The basic outcome was that average number of man-years in the fishery would increase by 50% in MP1 with non-discards policy. The reason for this is increased labour intensive processing of lumpfish meat on-land. The simulation also suggests that average profitability margin would decrease by 30%, which is mainly because of high labour costs on-land, going into processing of rather inexpensive products i.e. lumpfish meat. In short; value creation in the fishery increases, but costs increase more. The simulation does not consider any changes in Fproxy, as there are no changes expected in fishing effort due to MP1. Distribution of licenses are also not affecting the results of the simulation, as boundaries are based on historic data so it is natural to expect that there will not be significant changes in distribution of fishing effort according to fishing areas.

7.6 References

C.W., C. (1985). Bioeconomic Modelling and Fisheries Management. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Directorate of Fisheries. (2011, June 30). E-mail. Directorate of Fisheries. (2011, June 15). E-mail. Directorate of Fisheries. (2011, August 8). E-mail. Directorate of Fisheries. (2012). Retrieved August 2012, from

http://www.fiskistofa.is/fiskveidistjorn/veidisvaedi/grasleppuveidisvaedi/ Directorate of Fisheries. (2012). Retrieved from

http://www.fiskistofa.is/fiskveidistjorn/stjornfiskveida/grasleppa/grasleppuleyfi/ Madsen. (2008). Time Series Analysis. Chapman & Hall. Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture. (2011). Retrieved 2012, from

http://stjornartidindi.is/DocumentActions.aspx?ActionType=Open&documentID=522ba6f9-bd3e-45be-807e-d96f89d03f7e

Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture. (2012). Retrieved 2012, from http://www.stjornartidindi.is/DocumentActions.aspx?ActionType=Open&documentID=3aca9c4e-20d8-41de-b7ca-2bc911e85d47

Pálsson, Ö. (2011). E-mail. Pálsson, Ö. (2012, March 16). E-mail. Sigurdsson Th., M. A. (2012). State of Marine Stocks in Icelandic Waters 2011/2013. Retrieved from

www.hafro.is: http://www.hafro.is/Astand/2012/Astandsskyrsla_hafrannsoknastofnunarinnar_2012_lokaprentun.pdf

Winston, & Albright. (2011). Practical Management Science. South-Western College Pub.

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8 Conclusion and discussion

The work presented in this report has taken over a year to develop and has been subjected to a steep learning curve. The methodology applied has been developing as the project goes along and it is the believe of those who have contributed to this work, that a framework for further work in the following case studies has now been established. The following case studies will be able to draw upon the experience in this case study, which will make their work more focused and precise.