delay in close air support vietnam

7/27/2019 Delay in Close Air Support Vietnam

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McNamara Kills the Pilatus Porter

By Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Naval History, June 2005

Pages 12Next Page>>

Riverine forces fighting in the Mekong Delta depended on helicopters for airsupport, but there weren't enough to go around. Enter the short takeoff andlanding (STOL) Pilatus Porter.

The concept of civilian authority over the military has been a hallmark ofdemocracy in the United States. Military leadership has never questioned itseriously, although in some instances it has been irksome, particularly incombat. Authority is the essence of the military profession, because it hassuch an impact on loss of life and winning battles. Leaders with great

responsibility seek as much authority as they can to implement their plansfor action rapidly.

With the arrival of Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of Defense in January1961, the nature and degree of civilian control changed dramatically. Heexpanded his staff with a cadre of bright young intellectuals.Micromanagement became the norm, with more control being usurped by

U.S. NAVY
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the new incumbents. Initially, they were fascinated with the details ofnuclear warfare plans and the Cold War. Then came the Vietnam War, andthey were faced with the problem of stopping the advance of communismwith the use of military force, many miles from the homeland. Often, resultswere questionable.

For example, an elaborate "electronic fence," based on the use of Navysonobuoys for the detection of movement on the Vietcong logistic trails,received a tremendous amount of support but failed. 1 Further, naval leadersdeliberately ignored at least one order from the civil authority for the use ofnaval air. They were certain it would fail and would result in unnecessaryloss of life had the idea been implemented.2

But some weapon systems were winners in the Vietnam War. The scope ofthe campaign provided opportunities and funding for development ofseveral. The helicopter, for example, was introduced to combat during theKorean War but matured in Vietnam, particularly for the U.S. Army andMarine Corps. The B-52 strategic bomber, which just a few years before hadbeen declared "off-limits" for conventional warfare, became a master in "ironbomb" missions and has continued to gain effectiveness in the conventionalwarfare mission, having become a significant element in the delivery oftoday's precision weapons.

One new tactic for naval warfare evolved in Vietnam from the need toprotect the beleaguered South Vietnamese in the watery areas of thesouthern Mekong Delta. That requirement caused the creation of the "brown

water" Navy, something quite foreign to the traditional "blue-water" forces.It centered around small 29-knot patrol boats (PBRs), "31-foot fiber-glassboats powered and steered by turnable water-jet nozzles. Their basicarmament consisted of two .50-caliber guns, one M-60 machine gun, and a40-mm grenade launcher."3

They were high-speed, maneuverable, low-draft vessels, manned by acouple of commissioned officers and an enlisted crew. They were part of anorganization designated as Task Force 116 (TF-116) and received air supportfrom a small contingent of borrowed Army helicopters manned by Navycrews. By early 1966, this force consisted of 120 PBRs, supported by 20large personnel craft, one amphibious transport (dock), and one landing shiptank (LST).4 In a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander-in-chief of the Pacific Command (CinCPac) expressed his desire to increase thenumber of PBRs to at least 200, because the PBR/helo operations had "beeneffective in disrupting enemy control and use of major waterways in theDelta Region."5 In the same message, however, CinCPac pointed out that the
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effectiveness could not be "optimized without a concomitant increase innumber of helos." More close air support was needed.

The PBRs plied the inland waters of South Vietnam, protecting the localinhabitants who were under constant pressure from the Vietcong. They

made some major contributions to the war. The tempo of their operationsand effectiveness increased markedly in the late 1960s, when Admiral ElmoZumwalt was promoted to three stars and sent to Vietnam to take commandof all in-country naval forces. His aggressive inspirational leadership wasreflected in the actions of this young brown-water Navy. It was an unusualrole for blue-water sailorsand it was hazardous.

This new Navy needed close air support. The PBR crews soon knew theirbusiness, but as with any surface combat operation, air support wasrequired for reconnaissance and firepower in a firefight. The Navy inWashington had not anticipated this air support requirement and the normalacquisition process for a suitable air-support vehicle would take a lot of time.Makeshift actions came into play. Some Huey helicopters were borrowedfrom the Army, which really had none to spare. Machine guns were anchoredto the floor of the helos, and they became "gunships" manned by Navycrews. On 1 April 1967, the existing helo detachments in country wereorganized into Helicopter Attack (light) Squadron Three or HAL-3.6 Thissquadron provided helicopter close air support to the boats. It was dividedinto nine detachments scattered throughout the delta. These detachmentsoperated from five airfields and three specially configured LSTs. "A typicaldetachment consisted of two helicopters, a lieutenant commander as officer-

in-command, with seven additional pilots, eight aircrewmen (door gunners),and an assortment of maintenance technicians."7

No one had to view this operation very long to be aware of some of thedeficiencies. The helos were old, with many maintenance problems. Thehigh-temperature and -humidity operating conditions in the area made itdifficult for the helos to realize their full payloads and lift potential. Further,rapid response depended on distance from the firefight area. Time on stationwas limited by the helos' fuel and payload status. Also, the noise of the helowas a dead giveaway to the enemy.

As the PBRs moved through the waters of the delta, they were oftenambushed, needing air support immediately. That meant a call for helosfrom the nearest operating base. Sometimes the delays in response werefrustrating. Even after arriving on station, the helos still lacked the firepowerand time to provide the desired protection. Of greatest significance,however, was the lack of numbers. Helos were in great demand by bothArmy and Marine Corps forces. The shortage was real, and this new Navy
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mission did not generate enough priority to provide all the assets needed tosupport this rapidly expanding brown-water force. So the responsibleauthorities in the Pentagon searched for a quick solutionsomething asgood as or better than the rotary wing helo, something that would meet theneed, at least on an interim basis, until a more permanent solution could be

implemented. Enter the Pilatus Porter fixed-wing aircraft.

The Pilatus Porter, which wasdesignated initially as the OV-12A,originated in Switzerland, meeting arequirement for high-altitudemountain flying with a short take-offand landing (STOL) capability. Itlooked something like a junky Spirit ofSt. Louis; but looks can be deceptive.It was a high-wing monoplane with awingspan of about 50 feet, length of37 feet, and weight of 6,100 pounds(maximum gross). Armament couldvary, but in later versions it consistedof one 20-mm side-firing Gatlingcannon plus up to 1,925 pounds ofexternal stores on five pylonstwo oneach wing and one on the centerfuselage. It could carry a variety of

ordnance, including forward firing gun pods, 500-pound and 250-pound

bombs, napalm units, cluster bomb units, flares, rockets, smoke grenades,and propaganda leaflet dispensers. Various combinations of machine gunsand ordnance were tested and proved feasible. A Garrett turboprop enginedelivering 650 horsepower propelled the aircraft and it had a reversiblepropeller. Maximum speed was 148 knots at take-off power, range was morethan 400 nautical miles, and endurance was almost five hours. With portableoxygen for the crew, it could go to high altitude. With its engine shut down,it could glide silently for long distances and was an excellent reconnaissanceplatform. It could carry at least six passengers or an equivalent number oftroops with field gear. Medical evacuation capabilities were one litter patient,

three ambulatory patients, and one medical attendant.

8

The reversible prop and relatively high power gave it the short landingcapability. Immediately on touching the ground, or even a bit before, theprop could be reversed and the aircraft would come to a halt on the width ofa normal runway. With the exceptional amount of power available, it couldtake off in short distances, again the width of a runway. Most appropriate forthe brown-water Navy, the plane was a jewel on floats. The reversible prop

FAIRCHILD PORTER

Air America was already operating Pilatus Porters inSoutheast Asia when the Navy got interested.Modified versions could carry 1,925 pounds ofordnance on five external stations; stores includedforward-firing gunpods, bombs, rockets, and flares.Cost was $150,000 for a combat-ready aircraft.
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provided what all floatplanes need: the ability to "back up." One could parkthe aircraft alongside a pier or small boat more easily than parallel parking acar in a crowded metropolis. Further, the procurement cost was relativelyminorless than $150,000 for a combat-ready airplane.

The Central Intelligence Agency already had procured some of the aircraftand was operating them in Vietnam as "Air America," with major supportcapabilities in Taiwan. This in-country operation could provide a majorsupport capability if needed.

In the mid-1960s the U.S. Air Force became interested in the Porter. Two ofthe birds were configured with bomb stations and automatic weapons. Testsindicated that for certain missions, the plane could be a winner. SeveralNavy officials reasoned that, as an interim emergency measure, it could addmuch to the brown-water Navy. Its speed, endurance, payload, and ability totake damage compared to the helo made it a natural for air support of thePBR task force. On floats, it could remain with the boats at all times. Theydid not have to be based at some shore facility several miles away, but couldremain physically with the boats serving as an integral part of the firefighting team. When missions were conducted, the birds could take off withthe PBRs and remain with them from start to finish of a mission, providingreconnaissance and fire support as needed. It could be close air support atits ultimate bestcontrol in the hands of the customer, with instant andconstant availability.

As one experienced helo pilot and Navy Cross awardee in HAL-3

commented: "I would have given my eye-teeth to have had a fixed wingfloat/land capable machine to cover brown-water operations. To have hadthe Pilatus Porter would have reduced maintenance man-hours over rotary-wing aircraft, permitted more time on patrol/station and with the payloadcapability, we could have blown the socks off any enemy. And we haven'teven touched on beans/bullets/mail/ and passenger movements that wouldhave boosted morale greatly throughout the TF-116 operations theater."9

So the Navy moved out smartly. Several leaders tested the aircraft, on bothwheels and floats. Then-Lieutenant Colonel Robert Purcell, a combat-experienced Marine officer, was assigned as program coordinator. Purcellhad been an enlisted Marine with infantry combat experience in the KoreanWar before he ever entered flight training with the rank of captain. Hisqualifications for his assignment are reflected in his combat awards, whichinclude 2 Distinguished Flying Crosses, the Silver Star, a Bronze Star, 2Purple Hearts, 28 Air Medals, and unit commendations. He was notparticularly happy with being assigned to the Pentagon, duty often viewed asdrudgerya necessary experience for career advancement but not much
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fun. It was the fall of 1967 and he took action to clear all the procurementwickets in the Department of Defense, with a deployment date set for thespring of 1968. Initial support for the idea was almost unbelievably positive.

Next came the congressional wicket, with the need to gain authority for

funding and procurement on a sole source basis, which meant nocompetition and no delays. The aircraft was in production, and several wereavailable "off the shelf" on the parking ramp at Fairchild Aircraft north ofBaltimore, Maryland. All that was needed was the modification to incorporatethe armament features, and the bird would be on its way to a combat role.Deployment could be started in about 100 days from the word "go." Theinitial program, approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and withCongressional support, was for procurement of 19 aircraft at a cost of $3million. Support funds would come from the regular operating budgetallocation.

Recognizing the urgent need and the wisdom of the proposal, congressionalstaffs were supportive of the sole source authority, a major milestone forprompt action. Everyone seemed to recognize the need and the value of thePorter in answering the call for close air support of the brown-water Navy, atleast as an interim measure.

The Navy identified the commanding officer of the first unit, modifying hiscareer pattern to take on this new challenge, something about which hebecame very excited. Then-Commander Jack French was an outstandingofficer, commanding a propeller attack squadron. He knew about props,

bombs, close air support, and staying on station. He was beginning to fingersome pilots to join in the fun. "We got the word of the Pilatus Porter, andthere were 13 airframes in Hagerstown, Maryland. We . . . were to proceedwith six of my pilots and transition accordinglyout of the parking lot. Veryexciting."10 It looked like a winner.
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This was not a major expensiveprocurement of a high-tech, exoticfighter or bomber. It was a programthat had so many obvious benefits, allinvolved felt good, especially since the

cost was relatively minor. It was agreat way to get "more bang for thebuck." And then, the bubble burst.Suddenly, the program was dead.

The Navy/Marine Corps officers involved in implementing the acquisitionprogram found that all support in the Office of the Secretary of Defense hadevaporated. The non-competitive program came to a screeching halt underorders from Secretary McNamara, the highest civil authority in the Pentagon.Subsequent research of the files revealed that he had received to pressurefrom a former associate, Lynn Bollinger, who headed the Helio AircraftCorporation, which produced a light liaison aircraft for the Air Force.Bollinger wrote a simple "Dear Bob" letter to McNamara protesting the non-

competitive aspects, contending that he had a plane under development thatcould do the job, and wanted support.11 As for his development aircraft,Lieutenant Colonel Purcell went to the trouble of flying the Helio aircraft andfound it completely unacceptable, a "dog" in the vernacular of combat pilots.When contacted, the former Secretary said that he did not recall the incidentalthough he did vaguely remember meeting someone named Bollinger atHarvard in the early 1940s. He expressed doubt that such a small programwould have risen to his level for a decision unless it involved some wideningof the war. This one did not.

Bollinger's actions also involved traditional lobbying with Congress, and hewas effective, convincing at least one congressman to question the non-competitive procurement action officially. Bollinger kept Secretary McNamarainformed of his actions by phone.12 Obviously, he reasoned that if the Navyprocured the Pilatus Porter, even as an interim emergency measure, his ownaircraft program would be in jeopardy for future orders. This probably wascorrect. He took advantage of his personal association with the Secretary ofDefense to try to kill the competition, and he was successful. The official

NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE

Lynn Bollinger, Helio Aircraft Corporation'spresident, thought his Helio Stallion would becompetitive with the Pilatus Porter and wrote a

"Dear Bob" letter to a friend . . . Secretary ofDefense Robert McNamara.
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demise came in a memo to the Secretary of the Navy from the Secretary ofDefense on 20 December 1967, when the sole source procurement actionwas terminated.13

The Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to support the program and tried to keep

it alive with a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense in early February1968 that he "approve sole-source procurement to permit the fastestpossible deployment of the OV-12A to SVN [South Vietnam] for support ofGame Warden" (the brown-water Navy).14 But sole source was denied again,and the program was dead.

Understandably, Lieutenant Colonel Purcell was perturbed. The cancellationaction contributed to his early voluntary retirement from active duty, in spiteof the fact that he was about to be selected for promotion to the rank ofcolonel. Captain Jack French, the prospective commanding officer of theplanned squadron, missed out on an assignment that would have kept hiscareer moving forward, as he eagerly anticipated command of this specialunit that many believed would have made major contributions to this newkind of naval warfare. Ironically, following retirement, he spent quite a bit oftime flying floatplanes in the Alaskan theater. But those were minorconsiderations. The real issue was the loss of a significant war-fightingcapability for the PBR task force when it was desperately needed. The entirebrown-water Navy lost more than 2,500 men during the Vietnam campaign.How many lives might have been saved with the implementation of thisprogram action? To quote one leader of the brown-water Navy whocommanded a Task Group in the latter phases of the war, "To think of how

many of these young warriors could have been spared if we would have hadfixed wing assets two years earlier just blows my mind!"15

The late Admiral Thomas Moorer was the Chief of Naval Operations at thetime. A hallmark of his career was his intense concern about "his crew." Hepreached that with authority comes responsibility and the first responsibilityof one with authority is to "take care of your crew." He knew about thePilatus Porter program and when it was cancelled, he sent for LieutenantColonel Purcell, asking for a detailed debrief of the case. Then he asked for awritten report, to be delivered directly to him, not through any chain ofcommand. The report was delivered as ordered. On 21 March 1968, AdmiralMoorer sent a memorandum to Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze, appealingthe case and recommending procurement of the OV-12A.16 Admiral Moorerwas the highest military authority in the Navy, destined to become theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and yet he could not reverse thecombined action of the civil authority in the executive and legislativebranches of the government for an interim emergency procurementrequiring an outlay of $3 million. It is a sad chapter in the civil/military
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authority history of our armed services, particularly when compared to theauthority vested in Admiral Ernest King during World War II.

Facing the denial for sole-source procurement, the Navy struggled on withits existing helo assets. Eventually, a larger fixed-wing close-supportaircraft, the OV-10 Bronco, arrived on the scene, but long after the PilatusPorter opportunity had been negated.

In spring 1972, almost five years after the emergency had come and gone,the Air Force completed a competitive evaluation of the Porter, then termedthe Fairchild AU-23A "Peacemaker" and the Helio Aircraft's AU-24A"Stallion." Both aircraft were rejected because they did not meet the needsof the Air Force, which were certainly different from those of the brown-water Navy. Eventually, the few military Peacemakers acquired for test andevaluation went to Thailand under the Military Assistant Program, for use inborder surveillance and counter infiltration roles. The Stallions went toCambodia for a similar mission.17 The Porter remains in production, withmany in service around the world performing a multitude of missions.18

There are still naval persons alive who will never forgive the civil authorityfor the cancellation of this program. It did not improve the relations betweensome naval aviation leaders and the civil authority in the Pentagon. But evenso, those leaders would undoubtedly fight to preserve the traditional civil

authority concept. After all, not all members of the civil authority in thePentagon and the Congress have turned their backs on military judgment,especially in time of war.

1. Robert S. Greeley, "Stringing the McNamara Line," Naval History, August 1997,p. 60. back to article

2. Project Trim: the coupling of an experimental target detection system with theaging Lockheed P2V Neptune aircraft. back to article

U.S. NAVY

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamaraat right,watching carrier operations with President Lyndon

Johnsoneffectively ended the Navy's PilatusPorter program.
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delay in close air support vietnam

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