University of Calgary

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Graduate Studies Master of Public Policy Capstone Projects

2018-09-11

Decentralizing TVET in a Federal Philippines

Cuenco, Glecy C.

Cuenco, G.C. (2018). Decentralizing TVET in a Federal Philippines (Unpublished master's project).

University of Calgary, Calgary, AB.

http://hdl.handle.net/1880/109316

master thesis

Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca

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MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY CAPSTONE PROJECT

Submitted by:

Approved by Supervisor:

Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of PPOL 623 and completion of the requirements for the Master of Public Policy degree

Decentralizing TVET in a Federal Philippines

Glecy C. Cuenco

Dr. Beverly G. Dahlby, 11 September 2018

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Acknowledgements I wish to thank Dr. Beverly Dahlby for his supervision and expert guidance that helped me to understand how fiscal federalism principles can be applied to the situation in the Philippines – now at a crossroads: should it remain a unitary system or test the unchartered waters of federalism? I am also grateful to Ms. Ma. Susan de la Rama, TESDA Director, for her invaluable support in my research; And to my husband, Sonny, and our three children – Justine, Michael and Dominique, I thank them for for their constant love and support.

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Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………………………….......................1

Rationale of the Study…………………………………………………………………………………………………..1

The Philippines: A Backgrounder…………………………………………………………………………………. 3

FEDERAL SYSTEM…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….10

Characteristics of a Federal Government…………………………………………………………………….10

Expenditure Assignment……………………………………………………………………………………………..11

Revenue (Tax) Assignment………………………………………………………………………………............16

TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING (TVET)…………………………………………21

Importance of TVET……………………………………………………………………………………………………21

Current TVET System in the Philippines……………………………………………………………………..22

TVET System in Federal Countries………………………………………………………………………………25

METHODOLOGY……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..31

FINDINGS……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….32

Patterns of TVET Decentralization in Eight Federal Countries……………………………………32

Summary of Findings………………………………………………………………………………………………..36

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, CONSULTATION,

COMMUNICATION & IMPLEMENTATION………………………………………………………………….38

REFERENCE LIST…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….45

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Capstone Executive Summary

By 2022, a change in the form of government from unitary to federal will likely happen in

the Philippines, a nation of 104 million. Although decentralization is not new to the country owing

to the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991, the transition will have major policy

implications on the assignment of expenditure and revenue (taxation) responsibilities for

government functions. This study focuses on the technical and vocational education and training

(TVET), an important component of the Philippine Government’s national strategy for economic

development and poverty alleviation.

TVET governance in the Philippines is placed under the authority of the Technical

Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), an agency attached to the national

government which operates a network of over a hundred TVET training schools and institutes.

With the impending shift to a federal system, TESDA needs to formulate a decentralization

strategy, determining which sub-functions of TVET governance should be retained at the national

level, devolved/transferred to subnational governments, and shared between the two levels

government.

This paper maintains that in addressing these policy issues, the Philippine Government

should be guided by the principles of fiscal federalism and informed by existing TVET

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decentralization models in federal countries worldwide. This paper utilizes comparative

institutional analysis, an analytical framework that examines existing institutional arrangements

in some jurisdictions to inform policy formulation elsewhere.

TVET governance in eight federal countries are analyzed by answering this question:

Which sub-functions are assigned to what level of government? The sub-functions of the TVET

system are: a) policy formulation and planning, b) standard-setting and regulatory, c)

financing/contracting and d) provision of TVET services to clients.

Based on the findings of the study, policy makers in the Philippines are enjoined to

consider the following policy recommendations on decentralizing TVET under the proposed

federal system:

a. TVET policy formulation, planning, standard-setting and regulatory functions

should be assigned solely to the national government so that TVET governance is

harmonized across jurisdictions, and to be consistent with the national

government’s equity goals;

b. Financing/contracting for TVET can initially be assigned as a “shared function”

between the national and subnational governments; however, in the long term,

the subnational governments should develop their local revenue generation

capacity and eventually be responsible for TVET financing/ contracting in their

jurisdictions. Policy makers should also explore alternative models for TVET

financing such as inclusion of TVET in the existing Special Education Fund (SEF) and

establishing a TVET Training Fund;

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c. Provision of TVET training services can initially be a “shared function” between the

two levels of government; however, as experiences of federal countries clearly

show, the primary responsibility of providing TVET services to clients should rest

with the subnational governments.

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V. INTRODUCTION

A. Rationale of the Study

The Proposed Shift to Federalism in the Philippines. Decentralization is not new to the

Philippines owing to the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991 which devolved four

national government functions to provinces, cities/municipalities and “barangay” or villages -

collectively referred to as “local government units” (LGUs). The devolved functions are

agriculture, environment, health and social services. The Code grants power to LGUs to create

their own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges. The LGUs share in the national

taxes which are automatically released to them from the annual national budget, and are called

internal revenue allotments (IRA). They are also entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds

of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas.

(Brillantes, 2017).

Citing gains from the Local Government Code, proponents of decentralization are advocating

a shift from the current unitary presidential to a federal system (debating yet whether it should

be presidential or parliamentary). Since the election of Rodrigo Duterte as President of the

Philippines in 2016, the national government has launched a vigorous campaign to inform and

persuade Filipinos to be open to the idea of a federal Philippines which was part of Duterte’s

campaign platform. In his campaign speeches, Duterte argued that the country’s highly

centralized system had resulted in inequitable distribution of public resources among

administrative regions and contributed to the long-running Muslim secessionist rebellion in

Mindanao Island in the south (Ranada, 2016).

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In September 2017, Duterte appointed a 25-member constitutional commission (Con-

Com) which will serve as the advisory body to Congress in drafting a new charter for a federal

government (Valente, 2017). Inevitably, the Duterte administration has to contend with some

hard policy choices as the country prepares for transition, for example: a) delineation of

geographic boundaries for federated (subnational) regions, b) determination of how to divide

government responsibilities and allocate taxation powers between federal and subnational level

of government, and c) determination of federal grants to impoverished regions, among other

transition issues (Araral, 2017).

Due to the sheer complexity of the transition process, this paper focuses on just one area of

study, i.e. the determination of how to assign government responsibilities between federal and

subnational government – and how this policy issue impacts a national agency, the Technical

Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), which is mandated by law to oversee and

regulate the technical and vocational education and training (TVET) system in the country.

Policy Implications of Decentralizing TVET under a Federal System. This paper will examine

how the shift to a federal system will impact TESDA’s governance functions, specifically

addressing the following questions:

1. What functions of TESDA should be retained at the national level, and why?

2. What functions should be assigned to subnational governments, and why?

3. What functions should be concurrent or shared by both national and subnational

governments, and why?

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By addressing the foregoing questions, this writer hopes to contribute to an evidence-based

policy process on decentralizing TVET in the Philippines under a federal system.

B. The Philippines: A Backgrounder

B.1. Country Profile

Located in Southeast Asia, the Republic of the Philippines is an archipelago of over

7,000 islands spanning more than 300,000 square kilometers of territory. It comprises three main

island groups: Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. The country’s population of 104 million (as of 2017)

is predominantly young, with a median age of 23.5 years. Population growth rate is 1.6 per cent,

one of the highest in the Asia Pacific Region. There are over a hundred different ethnic groups

and dialects in the country.

The Philippines is a unitary presidential constitutional republic. The President of the

Philippines serves as both the head of state and the head of government. The country proclaimed

its independence from the Spanish Empire in 1898, following the culmination of the Philippine

Revolution. It is a founding member of both the United Nations (UN) and the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (National Government Portal, 2017).

The Philippines is considered one of the fastest growing economies in Asia with an annual

GDP growth rate of 6.8 per cent in 2017. However, despite an impressive economic performance,

the country has a relatively high poverty incidence rate at 21.6 per cent of the population

(Philippine Statistics Authority, 2016). The Asian Development Bank (2009b) cites inequality

across income brackets, regions and sectors, as well as unmanaged population growth, as part of

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the reasons why the Philippine Government’s poverty reduction efforts have not been quite

effective in recent years.

B.2. The Current Unitary Presidential System

The Philippines has a unitary presidential system. Executive powers are vested in the

President and Vice President who are elected by direct popular vote and serve a term of six years.

The legislative branch is a bicameral system composed of the Senate and the House of

Representatives. The judicial branch is made up of the Supreme Court and lower courts. These

three branches of government are co-equal and have strict separation of powers.

Power is centralized at the national government. All administrative divisions or local

government units (LGUs) exercise only the powers that the central government chooses to

devolve. The national government has the power to create, abolish, broaden or narrow the

powers of local government units (National Government Portal, 2017).

Local government units (LGUs) are divided into three levels: province, city/municipality

and “barangay” (village). The province is the primary political unit (not a subnational

government) in the Philippines. There are currently 81 provinces. A province is further

subdivided into cities and municipalities. As of 2016, there are 145 cities (35 highly urbanized,

5 independent component, 105 component) and 1,489 municipalities encompassing the entire

nation. A city or municipality, in turn, is further subdivided into “barangay” or villages, the

smallest unit in the political system. There are presently over 42,000 villages. Below is a chart of

the country’s political subdivisions:

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Figure 1. Philippine Local Government

Source: Department of Interior and Local Government (2018)

For planning and de-concentration purposes, the Philippines is divided into administrative

regions. In Philippine context, “regions” are not sub-national governments. They are merely

administrative designations to enable the national government to effectively manage an

archipelagic and ethnically diverse nation. There are currently 17 administrative regions in the

country. The seat of national government is in Metro Manila or National Capital Region (NCR).

Due to a long-running Muslim secessionist rebellion, the only region that was granted autonomy

and additional political power is the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in the

south. (Department of Interior and Local Government, 2018). Below is a map depicting the

Philippine administrative regions:

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Figure 2. Philippine Administrative Regions

Source: Department of Interior and Local Government (2018)

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B.3. Federalism: The Proposed Philippine Model

Weaknesses of the Current Unitary System. Advocates of federalism in the Philippines

blame the inherent weaknesses of the current unitary government for serious problems that

have plagued the country for decades. According to Araral (2017), government resources are

over-concentrated in the central government. In 2015, the national government accounted for

82 percent of total government expenditures (net of debt service) while the share of local

government units (LGUs) was a mere 18 per cent.

Another source of discontent is the highly unequal economic development across

administrative regions. In the same year, 3 out of 17 administrative regions accounted for 62 per

cent of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Further, there is a correlation between GDP

and poverty incidence, with 3 regions exhibiting the lowest poverty incidence rates (ranging from

3.0 to 6.8 per cent), in stark contrast with the remaining 14 regions (ranging from 54 to 72 per

cent). The national average poverty incidence rate for the same period was 22 per cent.

The highly centralized government in the Philippines had failed to solve the long-running

Muslim secessionist rebellion in the south. During the 2016 presidential campaign, Duterte

pledged to correct the historical injustices done to Filipino-Muslims in Mindanao. It is undisputed

in Philippine history that decades of uprising in Mindanao can be traced to the unitary

government’s failure to address the Filipino-Muslims’ deeply rooted economic and political

grievances, notably land-grabbing and discrimination based on religion. The Philippines is

predominantly a Catholic country, with 85 per cent of the population belonging to the Roman

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Catholic Church. Filipino Muslims are a minority, accounting for only 5 per cent of the population

(Chen, 2015).

Due to the foregoing reasons, the federalism movement in the Philippines has gained traction

particularly upon the assumption to power by Duterte, the first President of the Philippines to

hail from Muslim-dominated Mindanao Island.

Proposed Philippine Federal Model. Fulfilling his electoral promise, Duterte formed a 25-

member constitutional commission (Con-Com) in September 2017 with a mandate to draft a

federal charter for the Philippines. In July 2018, the Con-Com unanimously approved the draft

charter proposing a federal system patterned after the United States model (presidential

federal). Within the same month, the draft charter was transmitted to Duterte who in turn,

endorsed it to Congress for study. The plan is for members of Congress, sitting as a constituent

assembly, to call for a plebiscite in mid-2019 (coinciding with the mid-term elections) where

Filipinos can vote for or against the proposed federal charter (Ilas and Santos, 2018).

In a press conference organized by the Con-Com, the features of the proposed federal

government were disclosed to the public. Ranada (2018) reported that the Con-Com draft charter

provides for the executive power to be vested in the President. There shall be a bicameral

legislature with senators elected by region, not nationwide. The judiciary shall be composed of

four high courts, including the Federal Supreme Court. Sixteen new federated regions (i.e.

subnational governments) shall be created while the two existing asymmetrical regions,

Bangsamoro and Cordillera, shall be retained.

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The federated regions shall be led by a regional governor and deputy regional governor

elected as a team. They are to be elected by majority of the regional assembly from among its

members. The deputy governor will serve as the assembly's presiding officer. Each region will

have a regional supreme court and lower courts.

The federal government shall have exclusive powers for the following functions: defense,

security of land, sea, and air territory; foreign affairs; international trade, customs and tariffs;

citizenship, immigration, and naturalization; monetary policy and federal fiscal policy, banks,

currency; inter-regional infrastructure and public utilities including telecommunications and

broadband networks; postal service, basic education, social security benefits and elections,

among others.

On the other hand, the federated regions shall have the following exclusive powers viz.

their respective regions: creation of sources of revenue, financial administration and

management, tourism, investment, and trade development, infrastructure/ public utilities and

public works, economic zones, land use and housing, local government units, business permits

and licenses, municipal waters, parks and recreation and other similar functions.

Government functions not mentioned as “exclusive” to either the federal or the

subnational governments will then be “shared” by the two levels of government. Shared powers

include higher education and TVET.

With regards the allocation of fiscal powers and financial administration, the federated

regions shall collect the following taxes and fees: real property tax, estate tax, donor's tax,

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professional tax, franchise tax, games and amusement tax, environmental /pollution tax, road

users' tax, vehicle registration fees and other local taxes.

For its part, the federal government shall collect the following taxes: income taxes,

(personal and corporate), value added taxes (VAT), customs duties, excise taxes and natural

resource taxes. Further, there shall be an equalization fund which shall shall be distributed based

on the needs of each region to be determined by a federal intergovernmental commission.

VI. FEDERAL SYSTEM

A. Characteristics of a Federal Government

There are 25 known federal countries in the world today representing approximately 40

per cent of the world's population. They include some of the largest democracies such as India,

the US, Canada, Germany and Australia. Their system of government, while it can be complex,

has contributed to these countries’ progress and high standards of living (Gerring, Thacker and

Moreno, 2012).

The federal system is characterized by the following features: (a) at least two orders of

government (i.e. national and subnational) acting directly on their citizens, (b) allocation of

revenue resources between the two levels of government that ensures some areas of autonomy

for each order, (c) provision for the designated representation of distinct regional views within

the federal policy-making institutions, (d) a supreme constitution that can not be unilaterally

amended, (e) an umpire, usually in the form of courts or provision for referendums to rule on

disputes over constitutional powers of governments, and (f) processes and institutions to

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facilitate intergovernmental collaboration in those areas where governmental powers are shared

(Watts, 1996).

In designing federal systems, policy makers are guided by a body of knowledge known as

“fiscal federalism,” a sub-field of public economics that examines how competencies

(expenditure side) and fiscal instruments (revenue side) are allocated across different (vertical)

levels of government. Another important aspect of fiscal federalism is the system of

intergovernmental transfers by which the federal government shares its revenues with lower

levels of government. This arrangement allows the federal government to exercise its

redistributive role and can be done through individual tax sharing, general revenue sharing, and

grants (Miral, 2017).

B. Expenditure Assignment

B.1. Principles

Citing the works of Oates (1972) and Watts (1996) in fiscal federalism, Manasan (2017)

states that the functions of government should be assigned to the jurisdiction with control over

the minimum geographic area that would internalize the benefits and costs of such provision of

public goods. Following this basic principle, functions and competencies whose benefits are

national in scope should be assigned to the federal government. For example, such functions as

national defense, foreign affairs, functions related to economic stabilization and macroeconomic

management (e.g. monetary policy) and the preservation of internal common market (e.g.

regulation of interstate trade) should be assigned to the federal government.

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In contrast, public services with little or no benefit spill-over (i.e. local benefits) are best

assigned to subnational governments. These include public works, land use and housing, local

government units, business permits and licenses, municipal waters, parks and recreation, among

others. However, in line with “equity” goals, the federal government may be involved to enforce

some degree of uniformity in the delivery of quasi-public goods and merit-goods (e.g. basic

education, health and social insurance). Moreover, Shah (1994) proposes other important

principles when assigning expenditure functions between federal and subnational governments,

namely:

Fiscal Efficiency - Decentralized decision-making in a federation results in differential net

fiscal benefits (imputed benefits from public services minus tax burden) being realized by

citizens depending on the fiscal capacities of their place of residence. Thus, resource

allocation would be inefficient, because people in their relocation decisions would compare

gross income (private income plus net fiscal benefits minus cost of moving) at new locations,

whereas economic efficiency considerations warrant comparing private income minus

moving cost. In this case, the national government should have a role in correcting such a

fiscal inefficiency;

Regional (Horizontal) Equity - Differential net fiscal benefits across various jurisdictions also

lead to unequal treatment of citizens with identical private incomes depending on their place

of residence. This is because their after−tax income inclusive of NFB would be different

depending on their residence. Likewise, this calls for the national government to play a role

in dealing with these fiscal inequities;

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Redistributive Role - The national government has a redistributive role, exercised through a

tax and transfer system or through the joint provision of such public services as education

and health; it may also provide compensatory grants to cover the spillovers of benefits from

provincial−level services;

Provision of Quasi−Private Goods - Public provision of quasi- private services (e.g. health and

education) is justified on grounds of equity; since benefits accrue mainly to residents of

separate jurisdictions, such services would be better provided by subnational governments –

while national government's involvement is limited to ensuring horizontal equity and

minimum standards of service in all jurisdictions; and

Spending Power - In a federation, there is always some degree of conflict among priorities

established by various levels of government; one way to induce lower level governments to

follow priorities set by the higher level government is for the higher level government to use

its spending power or what is known as “powers of the purse.”

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Based on the abovementioned fiscal federalism principles, Shah (1994) constructed a conceptual

basis in the assignment of expenditures for major public services, as follow:

Table 1. Conceptual Basis of Expenditure Assignment

B.2. Implications of Expenditure Assignment for TVET in a Federal Philippines.

Assignment of TVET Expenditure to National Government. Historically in the Philippines,

the function of education (which is categorized into basic, higher and technical/vocational or

“TVET”) falls under the jurisdiction of the national government. In the case of TVET, the national

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agency mandated to oversee its governance is the Technical Education and Skills Development

Authority (TESDA).

A study by Orbeta (2016) indicates that 33 per cent of TVET financing came from the

general appropriation allocation (GAA) by the national government, 29 per cent from trainees’

fees, 23 per cent from private firms and non-government organizations (NGOs) and 14 per cent

from the local government units (LGUs). In 2010, the share of the national government in TVET

financing increased to 51 per cent (Syjuco, 2010).

It must be recalled that the Local Government Code of 1991 has devolved to the local

government units 4 government functions, namely: agriculture, health, environment and social

services. In spite of this development, the national government has continued to dominate

government spending in the Philippines.

Prior to the implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991, the national

government accounted for 87 per cent of general government expenditures net of debt service,

while the LGUs’ share was 13 per cent. In 2015, the national government’s share in the general

government expenditures net of debt service was 83 per cent, while the LGUs’ share accounted

for 17 per cent. Thus, more than two decades later since the passage of the Code, nothing much

has changed in the government’s spending pattern (Manasan, 2017).

The Challenge of Shifting TVET Expenditure to Local Government Units. Given the

historical spending ratio between the national and local government units, it would be

challenging for the national government to decentralize TVET as an expenditure function, if and

when the Philippine shifts to a federal system.

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In the next section, data will be presented to support the claim that despite the passage of

the Local Government Code of 1991, the local government units (LGUs) have not really stepped

up to maximize taxation powers granted them by the Code. In other words, the LGUs’ weak

revenue generation capacity has stifled their self-reliance to deliver public goods and services in

their jurisdictions. The LGUs have remained over-dependent on the national government for

resources.

C. Revenue (Tax) Assignment

C.1. Principles

Reviewing the works of other authors, Manasan (2017) summed up the key principles in

assigning revenue powers to different levels of government under a federal system, namely: a)

economic efficiency, b) equity, c) administrative feasibility and d) revenue autonomy.

The economic efficiency criterion states that subnational taxes should be related to the

benefits that local taxpayers receive from local services. For example, taxes on immobile factors

(e.g., taxes on real property, local business) are appropriately assigned to subnational

governments while taxes on international and inter-jurisdictional trade are best assigned to the

federal government.

On the other hand, equity considerations indicate that progressive taxes (e.g., taxes on

personal income and wealth) are best assigned to the federal government. Meanwhile, the

administrative feasibility criterion prescribes that taxes are best assigned to the jurisdiction that

is able to collect said taxes more efficiently, in terms of both collection and compliance costs.

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Lastly, the revenue autonomy criterion provides that each level of government must be

assigned sources of “own” revenues whose level they have the power to control at the margin.

This implies that voters can hold their elected officials more accountable if local public services

are financed to a significant extent from locally imposed taxes, as opposed to where financing is

primarily done through national government transfers.

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Based on the abovementioned fiscal federalism principles, Shah (1994) formulated the following

conceptual matrix for tax assignment:

Table 2. Conceptual basis for tax assignment

C.2. Implications of Revenue (Tax) Assignment for a Decentralized TVET in Federal

Philippines

Weak revenue generation at the local level. Despite the passage of the Local Government

Code of 1991, revenue autonomy at the local government level has remained weak as evidenced

by a low “local tax- to-GDP ratio” and own-source revenue or “OSR-to-GDP ratio” of all local

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government units or LGUs – i.e. comprising all provinces, cities/municipalities, and villages in

the aggregate.

According to a study done by Manasan (2017), the improvement in the OSR effort of LGUs

under the Local Government Code of 1991 is fairly modest, with own-source revenues (OSR) for

all LGUs in the aggregate increasing only by a slim margin, from 0.7 per cent of GDP for the period

1985 to 1991, as compared to 1.2 per cent of GDP for the period 1992 to 2016. Undoubtedly, the

LGUs have continued to rely heavily on fiscal transfers from the national government, particularly

the internal revenue allotment (IRA) which was provided for in the Local Government Code of

1991.

According to Manasan (2017, pages 13-14), the foregoing problem is attributed to the

“limited local taxing authority particularly with respect to rate setting, limited revenue

productivity of assigned local tax bases, and less than optimal utilization of local taxing powers

by LGU officials.” For example, although the Local Government Code of 1991 has raised the

ceiling rate for real property taxation at the provincial level from 0.5% to 1%, the Code removed

the power of municipalities to impose such tax, thus maintaining the effective real property tax

rate in municipalities at the pre - 1991 level. Moreover, out of 11 taxes collected by LGUs as

mandated by the Code, only two have significant impact in revenue generation, namely, real

property tax (RPT) and local business tax.

Poor implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991. Further, earlier studies

indicate that LGUs have not fully maximized the utilization of local taxing powers assigned to

them under the Local Government Code of 1991. For example, a high percentage of cities have

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not revised their local tax codes since 1992 despite the fact that rates of some taxes are not

indexed to inflation. This problem is due to the resistance of some local executives/ politicians to

increase tax rates in their jurisdictions for fear of backlash from voters during election. In

addition, many LGUs have weak institutional capacity as evidenced by inadequate staffing and

non-computerization of tax data base (Manasan, 2017).

Local government units (LGUs) in the Philippines derive their revenues from local and

external sources. Local sources include tax revenues from real property tax and business tax,

while non-tax revenues come from fees and charges, receipts from government business

operations and proceeds from sale of assets. External sources, on the other hand, include the

internal revenue allotment (IRA) which are cash transfers from the national government as

mandated by the Local Government Code of 1991, and other shares from special laws, grants and

borrowings.

Data from the national Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) indicate that locally sourced

income of 70 per cent of LGUs in the aggregate accounted for less than 15 per cent of their regular

income in 2015. Thus, it can be concluded that more than two decades of decentralization under

the Local Government Code of 1991 has failed to develop the LGUs’ fiscal capacity to raise locally-

sourced income. Consequently, LGUs have remained over-dependent on transfer payments (i.e.

internal revenue allotments or IRA) from the national government (National Tax Research

Center, 2016).

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VII. TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING (TVET)

A. Importance of TVET

Definition of TVET. The term “Technical and Vocational Education and Training” (TVET) is

defined by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 2006,

p.15) as “aspects of the educational process involving, in addition to general education, the study

of technologies and related sciences, and the acquisition of practical skills, attitudes,

understanding and knowledge relating to occupants in various sectors of economic and social

life.” TVET is delivered through formal or informal instruction in public and private learning

institutions.

Different terminologies have been used to describe essential elements of TVET, such as:

Apprenticeship Training, Vocational Education, Technical Education, Technical-Vocational

Education (TVE), Occupational Education (OE), Vocational Education and Training (VET), Career

and Technical Education (CTE), Workforce Education (WE) and Workplace Education (WE).

However, participants at the world congress held in Seoul in 1999 decided that the most

comprehensive term to use is “Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) (UNESCO,

2006).

Role of TVET in Economic Development and Poverty Alleviation. According to the Asian

Development Bank (2009a), TVET contributes to “productivity, poverty alleviation and

development of human capital in the region.” TVET promotes economic growth by enhancing

productivity at the individual, enterprise, and national level. Higher individual and enterprise

productivity lead to increased competitiveness and employment, or in a shift of employment

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from low to higher productivity sectors. As economies move from agricultural production to

manufacturing and service industries, workers and enterprises must be able to adapt and acquire

new skills (i.e. technical, entrepreneurial, and social). Inability to learn new skills for the

workforce slows the transfer of all factors of production from lower to higher value-added

economic activities.

B. Current TVET System in the Philippines.

Locating TVET in the Philippines’ Education Sector. Education in the Philippines is provided by

public and private schools, colleges, universities, and technical and vocational institutions.

Funding for public education comes from the national government. At the basic education level,

the Department of Education sets the overall educational standards and oversees the

implementation of the “K to 12” basic education system. By law, education is compulsory for

thirteen years (kindergarten and grades 1–12) which are categorized into three levels:

elementary school (kindergarten to grade 6), junior high school (grades 7 to 10), and senior high

school (grades 11 to 12).

At the higher education level, the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) supervises and

regulates colleges and universities while TESDA oversees TVET governance in the country.

(Department of Education, 2017).

TVET Legal Mandate. The Philippine Constitution of 1987 provides for the right of every

Filipino to education. Republic Act No. 7796 (also known as the Technical Education and Skills

Development Act 1994) provides the legal basis for the creation of the TESDA. Every five years,

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TESDA is required to prepare the “National Technical Education and Skills Development Plan”

(NTESDP) which sets out a course of action for all relevant TVET stakeholders (TESDA, 2018a).

Classification of TVET Programs. There are three delivery modes for the implementation

of TVET in the Philippines: centre-based, community- based and enterprise-based. Centre- based

programs are delivered by TESDA through its network of 120+ schools and training institutions

nationwide. Community-based training is conducted in coordination with local government units

(LGUs) and non-government organizations (NGOs). The third category is the enterprise-based

training which includes apprenticeship and the Dual Training System (DTS) that range from three

to six months. Apprenticeships can only be offered by TESDA-accredited private firms.

In 2014, center-based training accounted for 51 per cent of TVET enrollment. A close

second (46 per cent) was community-based training, while enterprise-based programs accounted

for only a very small proportion of total training programs implemented (3 per cent) (Orbeta,

2016).

TVET Governance. The highest policy making body is the 22-member TESDA Board chaired

by the Secretary of Labor and Employment and with representations from the government,

private firms and workers’ organizations. The Director-General is the chief executive officer of

the agency. At the central office, there are seven bureaus which comprise the national

secretariat. Moreover, TESDA maintains regional offices whose directors report directly to the

Director-General. Under the jurisdiction of the regional offices are provincial and district offices.

TESDA operates its own network of schools nationwide. As of 2015, TESDA administers

122 training institutes (TTIs) consisting of 16 regional training centers (RTCs), 45 provincial

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training centers (PTCs), 18 agricultural schools, 7 fishery schools, 31 trade schools and 5

specialized institutions. Below is TESDA’s organizational structure (TESDA, 2018b).

Table 3. TESDA Table of Organization (2018)

Source: TESDA (2018)

TVET Financing. A study by Orbeta (2016) found that in 2008, 33 per cent of TVET

financing came from the general appropriation allocation (GAA) by the national government, 29

per cent from trainees’ fees, 23 per cent from private firms and non-government organizations

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(NGOs) and 14 per cent from the local government units (LGUs). In 2010, the share of the

national government in TVET financing increased to 51 per cent (Syjuco, 2010).

Philippine TVET Qualification and Certification System (PTQCS). This system ensures that

TVET graduates and skilled workers have the necessary competency to perform the tasks

consistent with the required standards in the workplace. It involves the process of gathering

evidence to prove possession of competencies according to industry standards. The two types of

competency assessment are the National Certificate (NC) and Certificate of Competency (CO).

Quality Assurance. TESDA enforces a “Unified TVET Program Registration and

Accreditation System” (UTPRAS), a regulatory mechanism by which TVET programs are quality-

assured. All TVET providers are required to comply with a set of standards in curriculum design,

qualification of trainers, facilities and tools and equipment. Training regulations are being

developed in consultation with industry leaders and promulgated by the TESDA Board.

TESDA Accomplishments. In 2017, the TVET sector recorded a total of 2.3 million

enrollees where community-based training accounts for the largest share (51 per cent) with 1.2

million enrollees (51%), followed by Institution-based training with 1.1 million enrollees (46%)

and enterprise-based- training with 73,300 enrollees (3%) (TESDA, 2018b).

C. Existing TVET System in Federal Countries

Models of Decentralized TVET in Federal Countries. Given the context of this paper which is

the proposed shift by the Philippine Government from the current unitary to a federal system, it

is important to examine the policy implications of such a shift on the governance of TVET in the

country. Specifically, this paper will examine how federal countries decentralize their TVET

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system by asking this question: Which TVET sub-functions are assigned to what level of

government?

This paper will examine TVET institutional arrangements in 8 federal countries using an

analytical framework called “Comparative Institutional Analysis” (CIA), a detailed description of

which is presented in the section on Methodology. Such analysis can provide evidence for

effective public policies in the decentralization of TVET in the Philippines.

Moreover, this paper is informed by a similar study done by the British Council (2017) which

analyzed the assignment of TVET sub-functions between national and subnational governments

in the United Kingdom. The British Council report identified 4 TVET sub-functions, namely: 1)

planning and policy-setting, 2) regulatory/ enforcement of quality standards, 3) funding and

contracting, and 4) provision or delivery of TVET training services to clients. This paper adopts

the same categories of TVET sub-functions as basis for analyzing TVET systems in the 8 sample

federal countries.

UNESCO TVET World Database. The source of data for TVET analysis are the country

profiles found in the “World Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Database” -

an online repository developed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization (UNESCO). The 8 country TVET profiles chosen for this study are Pakistan, India and

Australia (Asia-Pacific region); Nigeria and South Africa (Africa); Canada (North America); and

Brazil and Mexico (South America).

Based on the foregoing TVET data by country, we were able to determine the assignment

of specific TVET sub-functions by level of government. To the extent possible, concerned

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government agencies by level of government were identified. Then, this information was

formatted in table forms to reflect where a particular TVET sub-function is assigned: national,

subnational or shared between the two levels of government. Below are tables representing our

analysis of TVET system by country (UNESCO, 2017).

Table 4. Pakistan TVET System

TVET Sub-Function National Government Subnational Government

Policy-Setting & Planning National Vocational & Technical Commission (NAVTTC)

Provinces may or may not adopt national policies and set their own

Regulatory/ Enforcement of Quality Standards

NAVTTC provides national guidelines

Devolved authority at subnational, through Technical Education and Vocational Authorities (TEVTAS) & Provincial Exam and Certification Bodies

Funding & Contracting Support to provinces through transfer of payments

Provinces are primary sources of funding within own jurisdiction

Delivery of TVET Services Through (TEVTAS)

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Table 5. India TVET System

TVET Sub-Function National Government Subnational Government

Policy-Setting & Planning Ministry of Human Resource Development; Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship (MSDE)

Regulatory/ Enforcement of Quality Standards

National Skill Development Agency under MSDE; All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE)

Funding & Contracting MSDE; National Skill Development Fund

Delivery of TVET Services Industrial Training Institutes under the State Governments or Union Territory Administrations.

Table 6. Australia TVET System

TVET Sub-Function National Government Subnational Government

Policy-Setting & Planning Department of Education & Training ; Council of Australian Governments; Australia Industry and Skills Council

State & Territory Governments plan for their respective jurisdictions

Regulatory/ Enforcement of Quality Standards

Department of Education & Training ; Australian Skills Quality Authority; Australian Industry and Skills Committee

Devolved to subnational governments in the case of Victoria and Western Australia

Funding & Contracting Department of Education and Training (increasing trend since 2012)

State Government Education Departments (decreasing trend since 2012)

Delivery of TVET Services TAFE Colleges & Institutes managed by State education authority

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Table 7. Nigeria TVET System

TVET Sub-Function National Government Subnational Government

Policy-Setting & Planning Ministry of Education (MOE) & National Board for Technical Education (NBTE)

Regulatory/ Enforcement of Quality Standards

National Board for Technical Education

Funding/ Contracting Federal funding

State-level funding

Delivery of TVET Services Network of federally owned universities, polytechnics, technical colleges

State level through Innovation Enterprise Institutions (IEIs) and Vocational Enterprise Institutions (VEIs)

Table 8. South Africa TVET System

TVET Sub-Function National Government Subnational Government

Policy-Setting & Planning Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET)

Regulatory/ Enforcement of Quality Standards

DHET & Quality Council for Trades and Occupations (QCTO)

Funding & Contracting National Skills Fund only for priority TVET skills

Provincial education departments fund and administer TVET colleges.

Delivery of TVET Services Provincial TVET colleges & institutes

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Table 9. Brazil TVET System

TVET Sub-Function National Government Subnational Government

Policy-Setting & Planning Ministry of Education (MEC) in cooperation with the National Council for Education (NCE)

Regulatory/ Enforcement of Quality Standards

National Institute for Educational Studies ( Anisio Teixeira - Inep)

Funding/ Contracting National funding for network of TVET schools/ universities

State governments allocate funds but need support from federal government

Delivery of TVET Services MEC supports a network of federal universities, technical and agro-technical schools and technological education centers/

Department of Technical and Vocational Education in each State (26 states or subnational governments)

Table 10. Mexico TVET System

TVET Sub-Function National Government Subnational Government

Policy-Setting & Planning Federal Ministry of Public Education or Secretaria de Educacion Publica (SEP)

State Ministry of Education

Regulatory/ Enforcement of Quality Standards

National Council for Normalization and Certification (CONOCER) under SEP

Funding & Contracting SEP & Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare

State governments allocate funds for TVET

Delivery of TVET Services Colegio Nacional de Educacion Profesional Tecnica (CONALEP) operates 300+ campuses nationwide

State Centers for Scientific and Technological Studies (CECyTE) and Institutes of Training for Work (ICAT)

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Table 11. Canada TVET System

TVET Sub-Function National Government Subnational Government

Policy-Setting & Planning Provincial & territorial ministries of education

Regulatory/ Enforcement of Quality Standards

Provincial & territorial ministries of education

Funding/ Contracting Federal Government provides support to provinces/ territories thru cash transfers (equalization fund)

Provincial & territorial governments are primary sources of funding

Delivery of TVET Services For First Nations (on-reserve) only

Provincial & territorial ministries of education thru technical and vocational colleges/ institutes

VIII. METHODOLOGY

The conceptual framework devised by Shah (2014) on the assignment of expenditure and

revenue (tax) functions between the national and subnational governments serves as a

theoretical guide for this study. This paper is also informed by a study done by the British Council

(2017) which identified 4 TVET sub-functions in the UK and determined their assignment between

the federal and subnational governments. The secondary data used in this paper come from the

TVET country profiles published online by UNESCO (2017).

Further, this study employs an analytical framework called the Comparative Institutional

Analysis (CIA) model. According to Mintrom (2012, page 210), the CIA framework is “predicated

on the view that effective policy responses to current problems are most likely to be struck on

when policy design is closely informed by knowledge of actual working policy settings found

elsewhere.” He cited a classic research done by Chubb and Moe in the U.S. in 1990 to find out

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whether private schools produced better student outcomes, measured by test scores, than

traditional public schools. Based on their findings that private schools performed better at lower

cost, the researchers proposed a radical plan for the overhaul of the American public school

system.

Applying the CIA analytical tool for this study, this writer examines existing TVET

decentralization models in 8 federal countries in Asia-Pacific, North America, South America and

Africa. The analysis provides qualitative data that can inform the design of a decentralized TVET

in the Philippines under a federal system. It must be noted however, that this study provides a

cursory review of TVET systems in selected federal countries and is by no means, exhaustive. For

example, it does not determine political, social and economic factors that shape the development

of TVET system in these federal countries. In the same manner, a determination of key success

factors that could guide TVET decentralization in countries like the Philippines were not tackled

in this paper.

Further, TVET is such a complex sector that it is important to examine the relationships

and dynamics among public and private stakeholders to distill important lessons for an effective

policy formulation on TVET decentralization.

IX. FINDINGS / CONCLUSION

A. Patterns of TVET Decentralization in Selected Federal Countries

Data gathered from the analysis of TVET systems in 8 federal countries are summarized below:

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Table 12. Assignment of TVET Policy-Setting/Planning By Level of Government

Country National Government Subnational Government

Pakistan X X

India X

Australia X X

Nigeria X

South Africa X

Brazil X

Mexico X X

Canada X

Analysis: The majority of TVET systems included in this study (4 out of 8, or 50 per cent) assign

TVET policy-setting and planning solely to the national government; only 1 out of 8 (13 per cent)

assigns it solely to the sub-national governments (i.e. Canada); while 3 out of 8 (37 per cent)

assign it as a “shared sub-function” between the national and sub-national governments.

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Table 13. Assignment of TVET Regulatory/ Standard-Setting By Level of Government

Country National Government Subnational Government

Pakistan X X

India X

Australia X X

Nigeria X

South Africa X

Brazil X

Mexico X

Canada X

Analysis: The majority of TVET systems surveyed in this study (5 out of 8, or 63 per cent) assign

the regulatory and standard-setting sub-functions solely to the national government; only 1 out

of 8 (13 per cent) assigns them solely to the sub-national governments (i.e. Canada); while 2 out

of 8 (25 per cent) assign them as “shared sub-function” between the national and subnational

governments.

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Table 14. Assignment of TVET Funding/ Contracting By Level of Government

Country National Government Subnational Government

Pakistan X X

India X

Australia X X

Nigeria X X

South Africa X X

Brazil X X

Mexico X X

Canada X

Analysis: Only 1 out of 8 (13 per cent) of TVET systems surveyed assigns the sub-function of

funding and contracting TVET solely to the national government; likewise, only 1 out of 8 (13 per

cent) assigns it solely to the sub-national governments (i.e. Canada). The majority, or 6 out of 8

(75 per cent) assign it as a “shared sub-function” between the national and subnational

governments.

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Table 15. Assignment of Delivery/Provision of TVET Services By Level of Government

Country National Government Subnational Government

Pakistan X

India X

Australia X

Nigeria X X

South Africa X

Brazil X X

Mexico X X

Canada X

Analysis: None of the 8 TVET systems surveyed (0 per cent) assigns the provision or delivery of

TVET training services solely to the national government. The majority or 5 out of 8 (62 per cent)

assign this sub-function solely to the sub-national governments, while 3 out of 8 (38 per cent)

assign it as a “shared sub-function” between the national and subnational governments.

B. Summary of Findings

There is no single model in designing a decentralized TVET system in federal countries. An

analysis of TVET systems surveyed in this study shows that there are different ways of

decentralizing TVET in a federal setting. For example, subnational governments have assumed

greater responsibilities in managing TVET in countries like Pakistan and Australia. But in Brazil

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and India, the national government is assigned more powers in governing TVET, although some

sub-functions are shared with subnational governments. Then, Canada has the most

decentralized TVET system where provinces are solely responsible for TVET implementation in

their jurisdictions.

Policy-setting, planning and enforcement of a regulatory system are TVET sub-functions

commonly assigned to the national government. This observation is true for all the TVET systems

surveyed in this study, except for Canada. The importance of having a centralized TVET plan and

uniform set of policies across all jurisdictions can be attributed to the role of TVET in developing

countries, i.e. TVET being an essential component of national strategies for economic growth and

poverty alleviation (ADB, 2009b).

TVET funding/ contracting is generally a shared sub-function between the national and

subnational governments. While this is true in the 8 TVET systems surveyed, there are variations

on how the “sharing” of TVET financing is done across countries. For example, Pakistan’s

subnational governments are assigned greater responsibilities in funding TVET while the contrary

is true in Australia. Of the 8 countries surveyed, only Canada assigns TVET financing/contracting

solely to the subnational governments (with the exception of First Nations’ reserves). Education

in general is highly decentralized in Canada.

The delivery or provision of TVET services to clients is commonly assigned to the

subnational governments, but in some cases, may be shared with the national government. This

finding is consistent with Shah’s conceptual framework in assigning the provision or delivery of

educational services to subnational governments. Shah (1994) also suggests that education in

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general (with TVET being a sub-sector of education) is considered a quasi-private good which the

national government may provide on grounds of equity. Since benefits accrue mainly to residents

of separate jurisdictions, such services would be better provided by subnational governments.

IX. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, CONSULTATION, COMMUNICATION & IMPLEMENTATION

Status quo or Decentralization for TESDA? The Introduction section of this paper

established the context of this study, which is the Philippines’ impending shift to a federal system

and the subsequent need for policy study in determining government functions to be retained

by the national government, shared with or devolved to the subnational governments. In the

case of TVET, TESDA is the national agency mandated by law to oversee and manage TVET in the

Philippines.

In the course of our research, we were shown a position paper which TESDA Central Office

is considering to submit to the Office of the President of the Philippines. The paper proposes for

the elevation of TESDA from its current status as a “government- owned and controlled –

corporation” (GOCC) to a full-fledged Department with a Cabinet portfolio under the proposed

federal government, thereby expanding the organizational scope of TESDA.

Moreover, the position paper calls for TESDA to retain its current centralized structure,

with additional bureaus to upgrade the central office’s capacity to do secretariat functions and

retaining administrative supervision over the agency’s network of TVET schools and training

institutions nationwide. The paper states that TESDA should contribute to the country’s

economic development and poverty alleviation goals which it can only perform if TVET is retained

as a function solely of the national government.

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We disagree with the above-mentioned position of TESDA because it runs counter to the

very nature of federalism which in principle, favors granting of greater autonomy to subnational

governments. Instead of proposing that TESDA be elevated to a full-fledged Department under

the national government, the Agency should be asking the question -- How should it be

restructured following the principles of fiscal federalism and informed by examples of

decentralized TVET systems in federal countries? In other words, TESDA as a national agency

should be prepared to decentralize its power and resources in favor of subnational governments

that will be created under a federal system.

At the beginning of this paper, we posed 3 questions that hopefully can guide policy-

makers in designing a decentralized TVET system for the Philippines, namely:

a) What sub-functions of TESDA should be retained at the national level, and why?

b) What sub- functions should be assigned to subnational governments, and why?

c) What sub-functions should be concurrent or shared by both national and subnational

governments, and why?

A. Policy Recommendations

1) Retain the sub-functions of policy setting, planning and regulation of TVET at the national

level. By doing so, the Philippines would be adopting a model that is commonly practiced in

federal countries covered in this study. The underlying reason here is the need for a national

TVET framework plan and regulatory mechanism that will harmonize the provision of TVET

services across all jurisdictions. This approach reinforces the national government’s equity

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concerns as TVET is considered a crucial strategy to achieve economic development and poverty

alleviation in developing countries like the Philippines.

This is not to say however, that subnational governments should not be involved in the

planning of TVET in their respective jurisdictions. On the contrary, we believe that the current

practice of TESDA regional offices being asked by central office to formulate their respective

regional TVET plans for consolidation at the national level should continue. But the primary

responsibility of harmonizing TVET plans and policies for the country should remain with the

national government.

On the matter of TVET regulation, it is recommended that the national government retain

this TVET sub-function which is the common practice by the majority of the countries included in

this study. Having a uniform set of TVET regulatory guidelines and quality standards across all

jurisdictions would help the national government ensure the attainment of its economic

development and social equity goals.

2) Funding/ contracting for TVET can be a “shared function” by the national and

subnational governments. The majority of TVET systems included in this study assign the

financing/contracting sub-function to both the national and subnational governments. In the

Philippines, the local government units (LGUs) have not maximized their capacity to raise local

revenue despite the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991. Therefore, it might not be

feasible to expect the subnational governments to assume the responsibility of financing TVET

training services in the initial stage of federalism in the Philippines.

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In addition to the general appropriation allocation (GAA) which is the dominant source of

public sector funding for TVET, the national and subnational governments could explore new and

innovative financing schemes, such as:

- Piggyback TVET expenditure on the existing Special Education Fund (SEF). Local

government units (LGUs) in the Philippines have access to the Special Education Fund

(SEF), a sustainable mechanism intended by law to augment financing for the basic

education sub-sector. The SEF comes from an additional 1 per cent tax on real

property that LGUs are mandated to impose and collect under the Local Government

Code of 1991. The SEF is intended primarily for the “construction, repair, and

maintenance of school buildings and other facilities of public elementary and

secondary schools” (Orbeta, 2016).

A study in 2008 found that there was a relatively large surplus in the SEF. In 2006,

the surplus was 30 percent of SEF collections nationwide. (Manasan et al, 2011). This

unexpended SEF represents resources that could have been put to better use in the

education sector. Thus, decision makers could determine if it would be feasible to

divert these surpluses to finance TVET. There might be a need however, to amend

the Local Government Code to make a portion of SEF accessible for TVET financing.

- Establish a TVET Training Fund similar to other federal countries. Other countries have

set up a TVET Training Fund outside the normal budgetary channel. Some training

funds are financed by levies (taxes) on enterprises. For example, South Africa has

established a National Skills Fund (NSF) financed by a levy mandated by the Skills

Development Act. All employers who have an annual payroll of more than 250,000

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rand are required to pay 1 per cent of their total payroll to the NSF. Subsequently, 80

per cent of these funds are distributed back to skills education and training authorities

and the remaining 20 per cent are paid into the fund (UNESCO, 2014). Policy-makers

should study if this financing option is applicable to TVET in the Philippines.

3) Provision or delivery of TVET training services can initially be a “shared function”

between the two levels of government; however, as the subnational governments improve their

administrative and fiscal capacity under a federal system, this sub-function can be solely assigned

to them. The majority of TVET systems surveyed in this study assign this sub-function solely to

the subnational governments, although there are a few cases when this sub-function is “shared”

between the two levels of government.

This paper recommends that in the early stage of federalism in the Philippines, this

particular sub-function should be shared between the national and subnational governments.

This is because TESDA continues to fund and administer a network of over a hundred training

centers/ institutions nationwide, and it will take time for these training facilities to be devolved

or assigned to the subnational governments. Another concern is the prevailing weak capacity at

the local government level to generate revenue and administer public institutions. Thus, it might

not be feasible for the national government to abandon at once its current responsibility in the

provision of TVET training services.

However, the long-term goal should be to upgrade the financing and administrative

capacity of the subnational governments to provide TVET services in their jurisdictions. This

recommendation is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity which prescribes that public

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services with no or little benefit / spill-over should be assigned to the subnational level of

government.

B. Consultation Strategy The policy recommendations of this study shall be presented to representatives of various

TVET stakeholders such as TESDA (central and regional offices), partner government agencies,

industry boards, accredited TESDA private training providers and clients. There are presently

ongoing government–sponsored consultation workshops on federalism and these assemblies can

be appropriate platforms as well for TESDA to use for consultations purposes. The purpose of

consultation is to engage these stakeholders so they can validate the findings of this study and

through a consensual process, arrive at some kind of agreement on which policy

recommendations to move forward.

C. Communication Strategy

The key messages to be communicated among TVET stakeholders during he consultation

process shall include: the importance of undertaking an evidence-based policy process in

designing a decentralized TVET system for a federal Philippines; key principles of fiscal federalism;

current models of TVET system in selected federal countries to inform the policy process; an

assessment of the current TVET sector in the Philippines, and the key policy recommendations

set forth in this study.

Targeted audience includes: TESDA officials and stakeholders, lawmakers, Office of the

President of the Philippines, firms/ industry boards involved in TVET and the general public.

TESDA can use various platforms in communicating its policy recommendations such as: personal

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briefings to government officials, town halls, social media (mainly facebook and twitter) and

traditional media composed of print, radio and TV.

D) Implementation Strategy

TESDA may draft an executive order (E.O) embodying the key policy recommendations of

this study to be submitted to the Office of the President of the Philippines, or any designated

agency tasked to re-organize the executive branch under a federal system. It is also crucial that

members of the House of Representatives and Senate be provided a copy of the draft E.O. as

they will be involved in passing a law on the re-organization of the bureaucracy, if and when the

country shifts to a federal system.

Further, TESDA stakeholders in the private sector (e.g. industry boards, private training

institutions and NGOs) may engage in some form of policy advocacy to push for the

implementation of this paper’s policy recommendations.

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