data interpretation in nuclear forensics...iaea nuclear security symposium – vienna, 30 march –...
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IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1
Data Interpretation in Nuclear
Forensics
K. Mayer, M. Wallenius, A. Schubert
Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU)Karlsruhe, Germany
http://itu.jrc.cec.eu.int
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 2
•
Nuclear
Forensics
Methodology–
From
evidence
collection
to data
interpretation•
Interpretation Concepts
•
Examples•
Comparative
Evaluation
•
Conclusion
Contents
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 3
•
Traditional Forensics –
Serves Prosecution
–
Relation between•
Evidence
•
Incident (crime) •
Individual (criminal)
•
Nuclear Forensics–
Serves Nuclear Security
–
Serves Non-Proliferation–
Relation between
•
Nuclear Material•
Intended Use
•
Origin (place of theft/diversion)
Objectives of Nuclear Forensics
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 4
Nuclear Forensics Approach
ConceptualResponse Plan
OperationalCrime
Scene
AnalyticalLaboratory
Interpretation
AttributionCredible
Conclusion
Appropriate
Sampling
QualityControl
Expert
knowledge
Reference
Data
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 5
Material History
Nuclear Forensics
Processing
Source
Material
Production
Nuclear Forensic Analysis
Nuclear Material
Characteristic Parameters
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 6
Clues on the history of material
IdentificationR&D
ApplicationCase
Work
•
Grouping
of parameters•
Relating
parameters
to
•
Source
material•
Processes
•
Application
•
Classification•
Statistical
Methods
•
Expert
knowledge
Statistical
Methods•
Cluster analysis
•
Principal
Component
Analysis•
Decision
Trees
Expert
knowledge
30
31
32
28
29
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(h /h 0 )
(v /v 0 ) In
Out
Crit
Characteristic Parameters
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 7
Data Acquisition
Data Interpretation (1)
Data Interpretation
• Systematic• Structured• Adapted• Multiple Parameters• Multi-dimensional data set
• Data pre-processing• Data processing• Data evaluation• Attribution
• Comparison against database• Comparison sample
Mechanistic Approach using Comprehensive Data Set
Attribution
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 8
Data Acquisition
Data Interpretation (2)
Data Interpretation
• Prioritize Parameters• Measurement of most
relevant parameters
• Data evaluation• Data base query
Iterative Approach using Prioritized Data
• Prioritize Parameters• Measurement of next
relevant parameter(s)
• Data evaluation• Data base query
Attribution
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 9
Data Interpretation (Example 1)
Seizure of uranium fuel pellets
1.
Origin
of the
material ?2.
Intended
use
of the
material?
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 10
Data Acquisition
Data Interpretation (Example 1)
Data Interpretation
• Enrichment• Diameter
• Data evaluation• Data base query
Seizure of uranium fuel pellets
• Exclude all non-matching records
• Identify parameters for subsequent measurement
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 11
Data Acquisition
Data Interpretation (Example 1)
Data Interpretation
• Chamfer• Dishing• Land
• Data evaluation• Data base query
Seizure of uranium fuel pellets
Attribution
• Exclude all non-matching records
• Identify parameters for subsequent measurement
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 12
Data Interpretation (Example 1)
Measured Database Record [1] Database Record [2]
Average StDev Nominal Tolerance Nominal Tolerance
Diameter mm 9.26 0.02 9.11 0.02 9.11 0.02
Dishing mm 6.71 0.08 6.7* 0.3* 6.73 0.05
Land mm 1.22 0.16 1.2 0.3 1.2* 0.1*
Chamfer Width mm 0.44 0.04 0.4 0.2 0.61 0.05
Siemens (RBU) Brennelementfabrik Hanau
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 13
Data Interpretation (Example 2)
Natural uranium (UF4 )
•
Absence
of Database information•
Non-numeric
information
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 14
Microstructure
7,230E-037,235E-037,240E-037,245E-037,250E-037,255E-037,260E-037,265E-037,270E-03
1 2 3
Sample No.
n(23
5 U)/n
(238 U
)
5,270E-05
5,320E-05
5,370E-05
5,420E-05
5,470E-05
n(23
4 U)/n
(238 U
)
Isotopic composition
Data Interpretation (Example 2)
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 15
Dy Er Hf
Ho La M
o Nb Tb Tl Y C
r Zr B
0,0
2,0
4,0
6,0
8,0
10,0
12,0
14,0
Con
cent
ratio
n [p
pm]
Chemical Element
Data Interpretation (Example 2)
Chemical Impurities
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 16
Sample
Reference A
Data Interpretation (Example
2)
Reference BReference CReference D
Reference E
Attribution
by
Comparison
Merck Chemical Reagent
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 17
Comparative
Evaluation
Parameter Comparison against Evaluation MethodU isotope ratios Data base Simple statisticsPu isotope ratios Model calculations Simple statistics, graphical eval.
Data base Simple statisticsChem. Impurities
(concentrations, patterns, ratios)
Process knowledge Expert judgment, consistencyData base, known samples Advanced statistics
Isotope ratios (of minor constituents)
Data base, known samples Simple statistics
Macroscopic appearance Process knowledge Expert judgmentDatabase, known samples Simple statistics
Microscopic appearance Process knowledge Expert judgment, consistencyDatabase, known samples Advanced statistics
Radioisotopes Model calculations Simple statistics, graphical eval.
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 18
•
Nuclear Forensics is a powerful tool providing–
Sample History or Attribution
–
Sustainability–
Deterrence
•
Credible Nuclear Forensics requires–
Identification of characteristic parameters
–
Reliable sampling–
Validated measurements
–
Careful data interpretation
Conclusions (1)
R&D
R&D
IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 19
•
Data interpretation is based upon–
Tacit Knowledge
–
Access to Reference Data–
Statistical testing
•
International collaboration –
Enable possibilities for data base queries
–
Access to reference data/comparison samples–
Exchange expert knowledge
•
Training/Exercises
Conclusions (2)