data interpretation in nuclear forensics...iaea nuclear security symposium – vienna, 30 march –...

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IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius, A. Schubert Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) Karlsruhe, Germany http://itu.jrc.cec.eu.int

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Page 1: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1

Data Interpretation in Nuclear

Forensics

K. Mayer, M. Wallenius, A. Schubert

Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU)Karlsruhe, Germany

http://itu.jrc.cec.eu.int

Page 2: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 2

Nuclear

Forensics

Methodology–

From

evidence

collection

to data

interpretation•

Interpretation Concepts

Examples•

Comparative

Evaluation

Conclusion

Contents

Page 3: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 3

Traditional Forensics –

Serves Prosecution

Relation between•

Evidence

Incident (crime) •

Individual (criminal)

Nuclear Forensics–

Serves Nuclear Security

Serves Non-Proliferation–

Relation between

Nuclear Material•

Intended Use

Origin (place of theft/diversion)

Objectives of Nuclear Forensics

Page 4: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 4

Nuclear Forensics Approach

ConceptualResponse Plan

OperationalCrime

Scene

AnalyticalLaboratory

Interpretation

AttributionCredible

Conclusion

Appropriate

Sampling

QualityControl

Expert

knowledge

Reference

Data

Page 5: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 5

Material History

Nuclear Forensics

Processing

Source

Material

Production

Nuclear Forensic Analysis

Nuclear Material

Characteristic Parameters

Page 6: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 6

Clues on the history of material

IdentificationR&D

ApplicationCase

Work

Grouping

of parameters•

Relating

parameters

to

Source

material•

Processes

Application

Classification•

Statistical

Methods

Expert

knowledge

Statistical

Methods•

Cluster analysis

Principal

Component

Analysis•

Decision

Trees

Expert

knowledge

30

31

32

28

29

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

(h /h 0 )

(v /v 0 ) In

Out

Crit

Characteristic Parameters

Page 7: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 7

Data Acquisition

Data Interpretation (1)

Data Interpretation

• Systematic• Structured• Adapted• Multiple Parameters• Multi-dimensional data set

• Data pre-processing• Data processing• Data evaluation• Attribution

• Comparison against database• Comparison sample

Mechanistic Approach using Comprehensive Data Set

Attribution

Page 8: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 8

Data Acquisition

Data Interpretation (2)

Data Interpretation

• Prioritize Parameters• Measurement of most

relevant parameters

• Data evaluation• Data base query

Iterative Approach using Prioritized Data

• Prioritize Parameters• Measurement of next

relevant parameter(s)

• Data evaluation• Data base query

Attribution

Page 9: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 9

Data Interpretation (Example 1)

Seizure of uranium fuel pellets

1.

Origin

of the

material ?2.

Intended

use

of the

material?

Page 10: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 10

Data Acquisition

Data Interpretation (Example 1)

Data Interpretation

• Enrichment• Diameter

• Data evaluation• Data base query

Seizure of uranium fuel pellets

• Exclude all non-matching records

• Identify parameters for subsequent measurement

Page 11: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 11

Data Acquisition

Data Interpretation (Example 1)

Data Interpretation

• Chamfer• Dishing• Land

• Data evaluation• Data base query

Seizure of uranium fuel pellets

Attribution

• Exclude all non-matching records

• Identify parameters for subsequent measurement

Page 12: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 12

Data Interpretation (Example 1)

Measured Database Record [1] Database Record [2]

Average StDev Nominal Tolerance Nominal Tolerance

Diameter mm 9.26 0.02 9.11 0.02 9.11 0.02

Dishing mm 6.71 0.08 6.7* 0.3* 6.73 0.05

Land mm 1.22 0.16 1.2 0.3 1.2* 0.1*

Chamfer Width mm 0.44 0.04 0.4 0.2 0.61 0.05

Siemens (RBU) Brennelementfabrik Hanau

Page 13: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 13

Data Interpretation (Example 2)

Natural uranium (UF4 )

Absence

of Database information•

Non-numeric

information

Page 14: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 14

Microstructure

7,230E-037,235E-037,240E-037,245E-037,250E-037,255E-037,260E-037,265E-037,270E-03

1 2 3

Sample No.

n(23

5 U)/n

(238 U

)

5,270E-05

5,320E-05

5,370E-05

5,420E-05

5,470E-05

n(23

4 U)/n

(238 U

)

Isotopic composition

Data Interpretation (Example 2)

Page 15: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 15

Dy Er Hf

Ho La M

o Nb Tb Tl Y C

r Zr B

0,0

2,0

4,0

6,0

8,0

10,0

12,0

14,0

Con

cent

ratio

n [p

pm]

Chemical Element

Data Interpretation (Example 2)

Chemical Impurities

Page 16: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 16

Sample

Reference A

Data Interpretation (Example

2)

Reference BReference CReference D

Reference E

Attribution

by

Comparison

Merck Chemical Reagent

Page 17: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 17

Comparative

Evaluation

Parameter Comparison against Evaluation MethodU isotope ratios Data base Simple statisticsPu isotope ratios Model calculations Simple statistics, graphical eval.

Data base Simple statisticsChem. Impurities

(concentrations, patterns, ratios)

Process knowledge Expert judgment, consistencyData base, known samples Advanced statistics

Isotope ratios (of minor constituents)

Data base, known samples Simple statistics

Macroscopic appearance Process knowledge Expert judgmentDatabase, known samples Simple statistics

Microscopic appearance Process knowledge Expert judgment, consistencyDatabase, known samples Advanced statistics

Radioisotopes Model calculations Simple statistics, graphical eval.

Page 18: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 18

Nuclear Forensics is a powerful tool providing–

Sample History or Attribution

Sustainability–

Deterrence

Credible Nuclear Forensics requires–

Identification of characteristic parameters

Reliable sampling–

Validated measurements

Careful data interpretation

Conclusions (1)

R&D

R&D

Page 19: Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics...IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 1 Data Interpretation in Nuclear Forensics K. Mayer, M. Wallenius,

IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium – Vienna, 30 March – 3 April 2009 19

Data interpretation is based upon–

Tacit Knowledge

Access to Reference Data–

Statistical testing

International collaboration –

Enable possibilities for data base queries

Access to reference data/comparison samples–

Exchange expert knowledge

Training/Exercises

Conclusions (2)