d12.2 bridge ethical, legal and social issues: current ... · this deliverable presents an analysis...

Deliverable reference: Date: Responsible partner:

D12.02 23/04/2014 ULANC

Bridging Resources and Agencies in Large-Scale Emergency Management

BRIDGE is a collaborative project co-funded by the European Commission within the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7-SEC-2010-1)

SEC-2010.4.2-1: Interoperability of data, systems, tools and equipment Grant Agreement No.: 261817

Duration: 1 April 2011 – 31 March 2015

www.sec-bridge.eu

Title:

D12.2 BRIDGE Ethical, Legal and Social Issues:

Current practices in Multi Agency Emergency

Collaboration

Editor: Approved by:

Monika Büscher, Michael Liegl, Peter Wahlgren Dag Ausen and Evangelos Vlachogiannis Classification:

PP

Abstract / Executive summary:

Integrating information technology (IT) into emergency response produces complex intended and

unintended, positive and negative consequences, reaching from enhanced efficiencies to new digital

divides. This deliverable presents an analysis of core ethical, legal and social issues that practitioners

and other stakeholders currently encounter in multi-agency collaboration. The report provides a

broad overview and an inventory of international coordination initiatives and standarisation

activities. The focus lies on issues that are relevant to innovation in IT supported forms of multi-

agency emergency response. We examine current approaches and practices of managing these

issues, combining literature review with insights from empirical investigations. The purpose of the

work summarised here is to inform socio-technical innovation in system of system approaches to

large-scale multi-agency emergency response, and this purpose defines the scope of discussions.

Utilization of the document for this purpose is supported by a glossary and an extensive index. The

report concludes with a summary.

Document URL: http://www.bridgeproject.eu/content/d12.2_bridge_elsi.pdf

ISBN number:

Version 1.0: Final M30

D12.02: Ethical, Legal and Social Issues:

Current Practices in Multi Agency Emergency Collaboration of 130

2

Table of Contents

Document Collaboration Notes ......................................................................................... 4

List of Figures and Tables .................................................................................................. 6

List of Abbreviations ......................................................................................................... 7

Glossary............................................................................................................................ 9

Executive Summary .........................................................................................................12

1 Introduction ...............................................................................................................16 1.1 Purpose and Scope of this Deliverable ....................................................................................................... 16 1.2 Methodology .......................................................................................................................................................... 17 1.3 The Structure of this Deliverable .................................................................................................................. 19

2 Emergency Ethics .......................................................................................................20 2.1 From Exceptions to Virtues ............................................................................................................................. 20

2.1.1 The Morality of Exceptions ............................................................................................................................... 20 2.1.2 Should we be bound by principles? Deontology versus Consequentialism ................................ 21 2.1.3 Threshold Deontology: Public and Supreme Emergencies ................................................................ 22 2.1.4 Virtue Ethics – Preparedness for All Hazards ......................................................................................... 24 2.1.5 Beyond the Call of Duty? Liability, Technology, Heroism .................................................................. 26

2.2 Emergency Response & The Ethics of Emergency Technology ........................................................ 31 2.2.1 Informationalizing Emergency Response: (Un-)intended Consequences ................................... 32 2.2.2 Disclosive Ethics and Opaque Technology: The Case of Facial Recognition Systems ........... 39

2.3 Summary ................................................................................................................................................................. 42

3 Codes of Conduct .......................................................................................................44 3.1 Humanitarian Principles in Emergency Response ................................................................................ 44 3.2 Ethical Principles for Disaster Risk Reduction ........................................................................................ 45 3.3 Principles for Effective Response and the Ethics of Teamwork....................................................... 47 3.4 The Ethics of Information Sharing ............................................................................................................... 50 3.5 Computer Professionals’ Codes of Conduct .............................................................................................. 53 3.6 Ethical Codes of Conduct for the Use of Technology............................................................................. 56 3.7 Ethical Principles of the Information Society .......................................................................................... 58 3.8 Summary ................................................................................................................................................................. 59

4 Legal Issues ................................................................................................................61 4.1 A Common Practice? .......................................................................................................................................... 63 4.2 The Constitutional Basis for Disaster Response ..................................................................................... 64 4.3 Legislative Strategies ......................................................................................................................................... 66

4.3.1 General Laws vs. Detailed Regulations ....................................................................................................... 66 4.3.2 Ad hoc Political Response or Long Term Oriented Legislative Reforms? ................................... 68 4.3.3 Proactive, Mitigating or Reactive Legislation? ....................................................................................... 69

4.4 Summary ................................................................................................................................................................. 70

5 International Cooperation ..........................................................................................71 5.1 Emergency Response, Local, Federal, State or Regional? ................................................................... 71 5.2 The EU Legal Framework ................................................................................................................................. 72

5.2.1 The Commission’s European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) .................................... 73




3

5.2.2 The EU Civil Protection Mechanism ............................................................................................................. 74 5.2.3 The European Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERC) .................................................. 74 5.2.4 EU Internal Security Strategy in Action ..................................................................................................... 76 5.2.5 Generic & Cross-sectorial Crisis Coordination: ARGUS, EU-CCA & EU-ICMA ............................ 77 5.2.6 EU Research Initiatives ...................................................................................................................................... 78

5.3 United Nations ...................................................................................................................................................... 78 5.3.1 The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) ................................................. 78 5.3.2 The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) ........................................ 79 5.3.3 The United Nations Human Settlements Programme, UN-HABITAT ........................................... 80 5.3.4 The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction ....................................................................... 81 5.3.5 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) .............................................................................. 81 5.3.6 United Nations Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD) ............................................................ 82 5.3.7 UN sector organs................................................................................................................................................... 82 5.3.8 World Health Organization (WHO) ........................................................................................................... 82 5.3.9 International Organisation for Migration (IOM) ................................................................................. 83 5.3.10 The International Law Commission (ILC) .............................................................................................. 83

5.4 Red Cross and Red Crescent Disaster Law Programme ...................................................................... 83 5.4.1 International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles (IDRL) Programme ................. 83 5.4.2 The Disaster Law Programme ........................................................................................................................ 86 5.4.3 Model Act for the Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance ............................................................................................................................................................ 86

5.5 Summary ................................................................................................................................................................. 87

6 Social Practices or Ethics and Law as Social Practices in Emergency Collaboration .......89 6.1 ELSI in Work Practice ........................................................................................................................................ 89 6.2 Organizational Practice: The Sociality of Multi-agency Collaboration .......................................... 91

6.2.1 Difficulties in Practicing Ethical, Lawful, Socially Responsible Emergency Response ......... 92 6.3 Community emergency response ................................................................................................................. 96

6.3.1 Communities and the Practical Ethics of Inter-Agency Collaboration ........................................ 99 6.4 Societal issues: A Crisis of Information? ................................................................................................. 101 6.5 Summary .............................................................................................................................................................. 104

7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 105

8 References ............................................................................................................... 106

9 Subject Index ........................................................................................................... 122

10 Name Index ............................................................................................................ 128




4

Document Collaboration Notes

Version History

Version Description Date Who

1 Initial Structure 20.7.2011 Monika Büscher (MB)

2 Some Authors assigned 20.7.2011 MB

3 Reformatted added draft paper abstract 3.08.2011 LW

4 Draft ToC and content collection 15.02.2013 LW

5 Revised ToC and content collection, authors 22.03.2013 MB

6 Revised structure and content 29.04.2013 MB & ML

7 Revised structure and content 18.08.2013 ML

8 Legal Section Draft completed, assembled

contributions, outline of missing sections

11.10.2013 PW, MB

9 Draft for 1st Review 8.11.2013 ML, MB, PW

10 Final Draft for 2nd

Review 2.1.2014 ML, MB, PW

11 Final Draft for reviewers’ final comments. 18.2.2014 MB, ML, PW

12 Submission for approval by Project

Coordinator

20.2.2014 MB, ML, PW




5

Authors

ULANC

mobilities.lab

Department of Sociology

Lancaster University

Lancaster,

LA1 4YD, UK

Monika Buscher,

[email protected]

Michael Liegl,

[email protected]

Lisa Wood,

[email protected]

USTOCK

Swedish Law and

Informatics Research

Institute, Faculty of Law

Stockholm University

106 91 Stockholm,

Sweden

Peter Wahlgren,

[email protected]

Reviewers

Fraunhofer-Institut für

Angewandte

Informationstechnik FIT

Schloss Birlinghoven

53754 Sankt Augustin,

Germany

Alexander Boden,

[email protected]

Thales D-CIS Lab

P.O. Box 90

2600 AB Delft

The Netherlands

Bernard Van Veelen,

[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]









6

List of Figures and Tables FIGURE 1 MAP OF ELSI ISSUES (ISCRAM 2013). ..................................................................................................17

FIGURE 2 UNDERSTANDING THE BASIS FOR ‘GOOD’ INNOVATION FOR 21ST

CENTURY EMERGENCY RESPONSE .....19

FIGURE 3 EXCEPTIONAL MEASURES AND MISCONCEIVED ‘MORAL BLACK HOLE’ MYTHS. ...................................23

FIGURE 4 FOUR PHASES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ........................................................................................24

FIGURE 5 WHOSE VIRTUES? CATEGORY I & II RESPONDERS ..................................................................................27

FIGURE 6 ACTORS AND ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE .....................................................27

FIGURE 7 TRACING WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN KNOWN DURING THE 22/7 NORWAY ATTACKS. ...............................29

FIGURE 8 ‘WORKERS AT DAIICHI, FETED AS HEROES, WILL BEAR THEIR BURDEN FOR YEARS’. ...............................30

TABLE 9 ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND VIRTUES..........................................................................................................34

TABLE 10 THE ETHICAL ‘IMPACT’ OF TECHNOLOGICAL AFFORDANCES - PROS .....................................................35

TABLE 11 THE ETHICAL ‘IMPACT’ OF TECHNOLOGICAL AFFORDANCES - CONS .....................................................37

FIGURE 12 FACE RECOGNITION SYSTEMS ...............................................................................................................39

FIGURE 13 SILENT TECHNOLOGY ............................................................................................................................41

FIGURE 14 USER RESPONSIBILITIES (UK POLICE NATIONAL COMPUTER (PNC)) ...................................................56

FIGURE 15 GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION ..........................................................................................57

FIGURE 16 ETHICS, THE LAW AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ARE ENACTED – IN EVERY MOMENT ............................89

FIGURE 17 DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT FLOWCHART ...........................................................................................95

FIGURE 18 ‘NEXT GENERATION ICT FOR THE RESILIENT SOCIETY’ .......................................................................103




7

List of Abbreviations ADNS Animal Disease Notification System

ARGUS European Rapid Alert System

CECIS Common Emergency Communication and Information System

CEP Civil Engineering Planning

CIIP Critical Information Infrastructure Protection

CPM The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection. Facilitates co-operation in civil

protection assistance interventions in the event of major emergencies which may

require urgent response actions. It is a tool that enhances community co-operation in

civil protection matters and was established by the Council Decision of 23 October

2001, updated 8 November 2007. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, it

can provide added-value to European civil protection assistance by making support

available on request of the affected country.

CSCW Computer Supported Cooperative Work

DMP Disaster Management Programme

DPP Disaster Preparedness and Prevention

DRA Dynamic Risk Assessment

DRR Disaster Risk Reduction

EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office

CURIE European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange System

EHR Electronic Health Records

EMIS Emergency Management Information Systems

ERC Emergency Response Coordination Centre (formerly Monitoring and Information

Centre (MIC)) - the operational heart of the Civil Protection Mechanism. ‘Based at

the European Commission in Brussels, the ERCC is accessible 24/7 and can spring

into action immediately when it receives a call for assistance. The ERC works in

close cooperation with national crisis centres throughout the 32 countries

participating in the Mechanism (EU 28, the former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway).’

ENISA European Network and Information Security Agency

ERCC Emergency Response Coordination Centre

ESS The European Security Strategy charts global challenges and key threats to the

security of the European Union and ‘clarifies its strategic objectives in dealing with

them, such as building security in the EU’s neighbourhood and promoting an

international order based on effective multilateralism’. It also evaluates policy

implications from these objectives in the European context.

EU-CCA Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements

EU-ICMA Integrated EU Arrangements for Crisis Management with Cross-Border Effects

EUROPHYT European Network of Plant Health Information Systems

EWRS Early Warning and Response System




8

FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters

GPS Global Positioning System

HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus

IASC Interagency Standing Committee

IOM International Organisation for Migration

IDRL International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles

ILC International Law Commission

ISSA EU Internal Security Strategy in Action

MIC Monitoring and Information Centre

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO Non-Government Organization

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OHCHR The Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

NGO Non Governmental Organization

RAPEX Rapid Alert System for Non-food Products

RAS

BICHAT

Rapid Alert System for Biological and Chemical Attacks and Threats

RASFF Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed

SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

STS Science and Technology Studies

UN United Nations

UN

HABITAT

United Nations Human Settlements Programme

UNCRD United Nations Centre for Regional Development

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund

UNISDR The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction

WFP World Food Programme

WHO World Health Organization




9

Glossary Collaboration in an interdisciplinary team requires some ‘translation’ between domains and academic

disciplines. In this deliverable, we define ethical, legal and other terms as they are introduced, and

provide links to the literature where they are discussed in more depth. The short glossary below

supplements such in-text definitions. An index complements this to support quick reference.

Affordance the perceived qualities of an artifact that suggest how it should or

could be used (Norman, 1988). Affordances are not an inherent

property of an object or technology, they are relational in the sense

that they arise from interactions between people, the material and

design of the artifact, and the context.

All-hazards Approach that acknowledges that there are a multitude of natural

and manmade dangers, and that addresses actual hazards as well as

latent hazard conditions that may give rise to future incidents.

Consequentialism Ethical position where good results for the greatest number are the

most important moral criterion.

Crisis Management The term ‘crisis management’ covers the whole cycle of risk

assessment, preparation, emergency planning, emergency response,

recovery, and evaluation.

Deontology Ethical position of duty ethics, requires that we always follow

certain moral principles, regardless of the results.

Digital divide Economic inequality between groups, in terms of access to, use of,

or knowledge of information and communication technologies (ICT)

and by extension exclusion from participation in large areas of

contemporary society.

Digital

Humanitarian

Organisation

“Volunteer and technical communities” (V&CTs) who build tools

and organize “crowdsourcing” of emergency information.

Disclosive Ethics An approach in the ethics of technology formulated by Lucas

Introna that brings the usually silent and opaque operation of digital

technologies to the surface to open it up to critical scrutiny.

Distributive justice Principles of distributive justice are therefore best thought of as

providing moral guidance for the political processes and structures

that affect the distribution of economic benefits and burdens in

societies. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Emergency

Response

The acute phase of emergency response, including search and

rescue, controlling the cause and effects of an incident.

Ethics Philosophical/political investigation of what constitutes right and

wrong or good and bad behaviour.

Ethics of

Information Sharing

Information sharing is at the heart of effective multi-agency

emergency response, yet concerns about data protection have often

led to inadequate sharing practices. Ethics of Information Sharing

explores and codifies the need for this and ethical ways of going

about it.




10

(Social) Exclusion Processes in which individuals or entire communities of people are

systematically blocked from rights, opportunities and resources that

are normally available to members of society.

Habitus (hexis -

Aristotle)

Acquired ‘character traits’ or set of dispositions, which form the

basis of how an individual will feel and act in a given situation.

Important concept in virtue ethics: virtues need to be trained in order

to be prepared and able to do the right or virtuous thing, when the

situation presents itself.

Indemnity To deal with issues of liability, emergency organizations and

individuals use indemnity insurance to protect themselves against

claims. In response to post-disaster reviews and inquiries, the costs

for such insurance are rising.

Informational self-

determination

The right of an individual to know when and to whom personal data

are disclosed. In some European constitutions, the right to

informational self-determination is understood to be part of basic

rights to freedom, which are inviolable.

Informational self-

determination

The right of an individual to know when and to whom personal data

are disclosed. In some European constitutions, the right to

informational self-determination is understood to be part of basic

rights to freedom, which are inviolable.

Informationalization The intensification of information processing in an ever growing

array of economic and social activities.

Intersubjectivity A concept developed, inter alia by Alfred Schutz. The concept

captures that people do not inhabit ‘private’, entirely subjective

worlds that they can never fully share with others through

communication, but that instead, all human experience is at heart

social and based on shared understandings.

Liabilty In emergency response logging can become an issue discouraging

first responders from certain actions for fear of liability. Using

information from social media can also carry legal liability. subject

digital volunteers to tort liability under U.S. law.

Moral Black Hole The threat that a breakdown of social order would bring about to a

‘second state of nature’, where all morals are dispended

Morality The lived practice of ethical principles. We do not have ethical

behaviour, but moral behaviour.

Practical Ethics The idea that the rules that apply to a situation are not given by its

domain but a matter of ‘discovery’, ‘invention’ and ‘negotiation’ of

those people who act together engaged in this situation.

Social sorting Term coined by David Lyon (2002) the use of data in order to

identify, to classify, to order and to control entire populations.

Threshold

Deontology

Form of deontological ethics, which accepts that moral obligations

hold up to certain thresholds, while under extreme circumstances

exceptions are possible




11

Utilitarianism A form of consequentialism where happiness is seen as the ultimate

goal of all humans and all action must be evaluated on the basis of

whether they increase or decrease human happiness.

Values Cultural, social, political, personal preferences or rules.

Virtual Role

Systems

Organisation principle in emergency response, based on on

intersubjectivity (taking the perspective of the other) where every

crew member simulates all roles in their minds, metaphorically

turning each individual into a group.

Virtue Ethics Ethical position where the moral system is based on the virtues, or

good character of individuals.

Virtues Thought or behaviour guided by high moral standards.

Whole Community

Approaches to

Security

A philosophical approach on how to think about conducting

emergency management, introduced by FEMA in 2011: “As a

concept, Whole Community is a means by which residents,

emergency management practitioners, organizational and

community leaders, and government officials con collectively

understand and assess the needs of their respective communities and

determine the best ways to organize and strengthen their assets,

capacities, and interests” (FEMA 2011, 3)




12

Executive Summary Informationalizing

Emergency Response raises

ethical, legal and social

opportunities and challenges

The 21st Century has been called the ‘Century of disasters’, due

to a rise in the number and frequency of disasters and

heightened vulnerability amongst an ageing, growing, urban

population. This is one of several drivers in an increasing

‘informationalization’ of crisis management. The term refers to

the growing availability and importance of information and its

intimate integration into emergency response organizations and

practices. Many opportunities arise here, including greater

capabilities for risk assessment and public engagement.

However, informationalizing emergency response also creates

ethical, legal and social challenges, ranging from digital divides

to new forms of surveillance and professional accountability,

and they can undermine important European values, from

professional integrity to privacy and other civil liberties.

Understanding current

practices of noticing and

dealing with these

challenges and opportunities

is critical for proactive

socio-technical innovation in

large scale multi-agency

emergency response.

The BRIDGE project is part of international, interdisciplinary

research efforts that aim to enhance understanding of intended

and unintended consequences of system of systems innovation

to identify and pursue ‘good’ design avenues. The overall goal

of this research is to enable qualitative improvement in large-

scale multi-agency emergency response and to identify and

mitigate negative impact. The purpose of this deliverable is to

explore current practices of managing ethical, legal and social

issues. This is important because the ways in which IT are

designed and appropriated are deeply entangled with how

societies conceive of risks, prevent and prepare for crises, and

how they organise, fund and practice crisis management.

Ethical principles and

debates about IT Ethics can

provide some orientation.

Principled ethical positions have been developed by

philosophers and a review can contextualise discussions on

ethical, legal and social issues in IT supported emergency

response. Faced with an overloaded lifeboat, consequentialists

may, for example, sacrifice the lives of some passengers,

because this could save more lives overall. Deontologists, in

contrast, argue that actions can be intrinsically right or wrong

and that it would be wrong to force anyone off the overloaded

lifeboat, even if all passengers could drown. Some observe (a

threat of) a moral black hole at the centre of all major

emergencies and define thresholds for the suspension of normal

morality. Critics argue that this is often done unnecessarily,

inappropriately, and with corrosive consequences for societies.

Virtue ethics demands

preparedness, an all-hazards

approach and ‘virtuous

technology’.

Virtue ethics offers a way out, positing a strong moral

imperative to maintain normal moral rules even in extreme

situations. Moral normality can be supported through

preparation and professional virtues. This approach demands an

‘all-hazards’ approach that addresses all potential causes of

emergencies (not just threats to security). A virtue ethics

approach draws attention to ethical challenges in IT supported




13

Emergency responders do

not have to be heroes to fulfil

their part of the social

contract.

emergency response, such as injustices engendered through

surveillance and social sorting. But it also opens up new

avenues for innovative design, and calls for ‘virtuous’

technologies. These should be part of a broad acknowledgement

that there is a social contract between emergency responders and

society. It is not right for society to expect emergency

responders (or vital support staff) to be heroes. Society has a

duty to put resources and infrastructures in place for all

responders to work as effectively and safely as possible.

Current IT innovation has

unintended, positive and

negative consequences.

Ethics is distributed across

collectives of human actors,

socio-economic

‘environments’ and

technologies.

Technology can engender unintended consequences on many

levels of social equality, justice and human dignity. This is a

function of ‘affordances’ – the relational effects that arise at the

juncture of human users, specific cultural and socio-economic

contexts and technological capabilities. A pros and cons analysis

can map some of the hallmarks of informationalizing emergency

response and ethical, legal and social challenges, risks and

opportunities. However, a focus on pros/cons simplifies the

processes and closes off promising avenues for innovation.

Disclosive Ethics reveals the

distribution of agency and

responsibility across

contemporary socio-

technical collectives in a

way that opens up new

avenues for innovation.

A disclosive ethics approach can deconstruct socio-technical

collectives or networks of human, environmental and

technological agencies to reveal the distributed ‘sources’ of

unintended consequences. Using the example of face

recognition, we show that discriminatory effects may arise

without intention and in ways that are difficult to address. At the

same time disclosive ethics approaches to unpacking ‘silent

technologies’ can present novel innovation opportunities.

Ethical Codes of Conduct

capture central virtues of

emergency response, and

also of IT innovation. They

point to a need for a ‘social

contract’ in IT innovation

for emergency response.

Professional emergency responders, NGOs and associated

professions have devised ethical and professional codes of

conduct to specify which virtues are right for disaster. These

range from humanitarian principles to guidelines for disaster

risk reduction, ethics of teamwork and multi-agency

collaboration, and specific guidelines for information sharing.

These domain specific codes meet with ethical principles

formulated by computer professionals around their social

responsibilities to produce useful technologies, promote

beneficence and do no harm. However, unlike emergency

response, IT innovation has no social contract with society to

share responsibility for ethically, legally and socially

circumspect, pro-active innovation. Technology users do have

duties and responsibilities, but these are ill-formulated and ill-

supported. Moves towards formulating ethical principles for

information societies, where new responsibilities are being

explored, are limited. In any case, critiques show that the very

idea of ‘codes of conduct’ may undermine rather than support

ethical conduct in practice and innovation, because they can

lead to complacency and even cover-up of unethical conduct.

Current Emergency Law is a As a consequence of various traditions and developments in




14

very heterogeneous field of

jurisprudence.

It is highly consequential,

not least because

emergencies can call for the

declaration of a ‘state of

emergency’ and open ‘a

legal black hole’.

different jurisdictions, legislation of relevance for emergency

response is heterogeneous. Similarly, responsibilities and the

arrangement of organisations active in the domain vary a lot.

An analysis of legislative strategies reveals differences in at

least three dimensions: the nature of the rule systems can be

categorised as being more or less general or specific, reform

policies may be primarily long term oriented or of an ad hoc

nature, and the focus of the existing legislation may to various

degrees be set on proactive, mitigating or reactive remedies.

A rich variety of mechanisms are important for effective

emergency management. When the focus is on collaboration,

there is a need to analyse to what extent various types of rules

governing the organisations involved have to be adjusted and/or

complemented to function as an integrated whole. General rules

must be complemented with specific provisions and standards.

Short term solutions and long term objectives should harmonize,

and proactive regulations must be complemented with

mitigating, reactive and restoring measurements.

Legislation around

international cooperation is

particularly diverse and in

flux. There is a vast array of

programmes, guidelines and

model laws to regulate

cooperation and a mapping

exercise reveals that

common practices are rare.

Although disasters usually become extensively documented,

systematic efforts to analyze legal aspects of disaster

management as an integrated whole are rare. Similarly

normative documents stipulating common practices for disaster

management are difficult to find. Efforts to address this have

generated extensive suggestions, guidelines and model laws for

international cooperation.

Existing legal initiatives to develop common practices are

general, primarily defining responsibilities for states (e.g.

concerning mutual assistance and co-operation) or specifically

address one isolated sector (e.g. nuclear risks, food, or water).

At an operative level the responsibilities rest on individual states

and administration and practices vary. Rule systems (acts,

ordinances, standards) may be categorized according to how

they refer to different phases of an incident (e.g. prevention,

response, recovery), whether they are general or specific, or

whether they reflect ad hoc or long term strategies.

The overall conclusion from an extensive review of current

administrative and legislative efforts is that common practices

(internationally accepted and recognized by a large number of

authorities in different sectors of society) are rare. It is also clear

that the responsibilities and the operative management in states

of emergencies vary a lot between different jurisdictions. In the

BRIDE project these aspects will be further addressed in D12.3,

focusing on requirements and potentialities for future practices.

Ethics, law and social

responsibility are practiced.

How information is mobilised in multi-agency emergency

response affects people’s capability for ethical, lawful and

socially responsible conduct. A fundamental insight is that such

conduct is a matter of social and material practices, which are




15

deeply entangled with technologies as well as ‘environmental’

factors of culture, embodiment and situations. This draws

attention to the specificities of how people interact with others

and the subtleties of interaction this enables.

The social and material

specifics of practice matter,

because these shape ethical,

lawful and socially

responsible conduct.

It highlights that the skills and practices involved may be ill-

supported or even undermined by existing technologies, which

challenges people’s abilities to perform practical ethics,

lawfulness and responsibility. Social media and community

emergency response represent a particularly vibrant domain of

social innovation that is changing the landscape for ethical,

lawful and socially responsible emergency response. However,

these transformations are part of wider, societal transformative

trends in a century where ‘knowing capitalism’ is joining forces

with ‘big data’ and ideas of data fusion across different domains

of civil society. The convergence of ‘smart city’ innovation with

IT innovation in emergency response carries great potential, but

also significant danger, especially around an erosion of privacy.

Understanding the Basis for

‘Good’ Innovation for 21st

Century Emergency

Response

The research presented in this report seeks to chart how

practitioners and other stakeholders in multi-agency emergency

response currently encounter ethical, legal and social issues. We

have focused on issues that are relevant to innovation in IT

supported multi-agency emergency response. In a century of

disasters, where emergency response services are under intense

pressures to produce more efficient, collaborative and effective

emergency response with less funding, it is critical to pursue

ethically, legally and socially circumspect IT innovation.

Emergency situations are a breeding ground for exceptions,

including exceptions to fundamental constitutional rights and

suspension of normal moral rules and values, often fueled (but

often unwarranted) by fear of moral disorder. This can erode

important civil liberties, and ‘the wrong kind’ of IT innovation

can amplify detrimental unintended consequences. What should

designers, practitioners, politicians, policy makers, researchers,

and (non-) citizens do? A curbing of informationalizing

innovation in knowing capitalism is unlikely to be possible in

many societies worldwide today, and the twin pressures of

financial cuts and an increase in disasters make it highly

improbable in crisis management. ‘Don’t do IT’ may be a sound

conclusion to draw for some designers, analysts and

practitioners, but it is not easily practicable and – in our view –

not desirable, because much good can come out of integrating

IT more closely into emergency response. ‘Do IT more

carefully’ could be a better maxim, but to specify what ‘more

careful’ might mean, there is a need to better understand how

information is mobilised and shared in crises. This deliverable

contributes to this effort.




16

1 Introduction Informationalizing emergency response produces complex intended and unintended, positive and

negative consequences, reaching from enhanced efficiencies to new digital divides. It raises known

ethical, legal and social issues (abbreviated ELSI), as well as generating new ones.

Informationalization refers to the intensification of information processing in an ever growing array of

economic and social activities (Lash & Urry, 1994). It began with the invention of bureaucracy, but

has leapt into a different dimension with digital technologies. In the first decade of the 21st Century,

which has been called the ‘century of disasters’ following a Royal Society report (eScience, 2012),

disasters have killed 1,149,920 people worldwide (145,774 in Europe), and over 2,167,404 have been

affected; with a total damage of over $ 1,571,681 million (Vinck, 2013:231). At the same time, digital

technologies have become more powerful and numerous. Statistics on mobile phone use, for example

show 6.8 billion subscribers in 2013 and double-digit growth (Vinck 2013:10). In emergency

response, information technologies (IT) can support enhanced risk assessment and increased surge

capacity, data sharing, communication and collaboration between emergency responders, as well as

closer engagement with people affected by disasters. But they can also engender – sometimes far-

reaching – transformations of practices. The use of digital radio in over 121 countries in the world1

and the rise of social media ‘crisis informatics’ (Letouz , Meier, Vinck, 2013; Palen, Vieweg,

Sutton, & Liu, 2007), for example, have changed emergency communications practices. Digital

activity and communications logs provide new opportunities to learn from experience in post-disaster

reviews of response efforts, but they also allow new ways of holding professionals to account. And

when data can be shared more easily and to great effect, exceptions from data protection regulations

may foster surveillance and erode European values of freedom and democracy. The recent scandal

over NSA surveillance starkly highlights the challenges to informational self-determination and

privacy arising in the context of IT use in security policy and practice. Clearly, the ways in which IT

are designed and appropriated are deeply entangled with how societies conceive of risks, prevent and

prepare for crises, and how they organise, fund and practice crisis management.

1.1 Purpose and Scope of this Deliverable

The BRIDGE project develops methods and tools that support run-time intra- and inter-agency

collaboration, a middleware allowing data, system and network interoperability, and advanced human-

computer interaction techniques for exploration of information. These advances support flexible

assembly of ‘systems of systems’ (Ramirez, Buscher, & Wood, 2012), that is, they allow emergency

responders to ‘plug together’ diverse information systems in response to the specific circumstances of

the crisis they find themselves in. This requires ‘emergent interoperability’ between systems or

support for achieving such interoperability (Mendonça, Jefferson, & Harrald, 2007; Ramirez et al.,

2012). The BRIDGE project is part of international, interdisciplinary research efforts that aim to

enhance understanding of intended and unintended consequences of system of systems innovation to

identify and pursue ‘good’ design avenues. The overall goal of this research is to enable qualitative

improvement in large-scale multi-agency emergency response and to identify and mitigate negative

impact. The purpose of this deliverable is to explore current practices of managing ethical, legal and

social issues (Figure 1). The explanations, examples, accounts of rules and descriptions of current

practices, as well as the elaboration of current challenges and opportunities for innovation in IT

supported multi-agency emergency response that arise at these junctures are meant to inform

innovation. A glossary and index support this function.

1 http://www.tetra-applications.com/item.html&objID=17222

http://www.tetra-applications.com/item.html&objID=17222




17

Figure 1 Map of ELSI Issues (ISCRAM 2013). Produced during BRIDGE-led ELSI Track http://itethicsincrisis.wordpress.com/page/2/

As Figure 1 illustrates, ELSI in IT supported emergency response encompass many opportunities,

risks, challenges, and problems. These need to be noticed and addressed by people, and the design of

technologies can help or hinder this. A core purpose of the BRIDGE project is to design technologies

that support good practices of noticing and dealing with ELSI. To achieve this, a good understanding

of current and newly emerging real world practices of multi-agency collaboration is necessary. This

should include an understanding of practices of noticing and managing ethical, legal and social risks,

challenges, and opportunities in this context is necessary.

In the BRIDGE domain analysis deliverables D2.2-2.4, we analyse practices of collaboration, and in

D12.1 we have explored issues of privacy. This deliverable focuses on how a broader range of ethical,

legal and social issues are currently noticed and managed in large-scale emergency response. Ethical,

legal, social and societal issues that arise in this form of IT supported emergency response are varied

and deeply entangled. But while ethics, the law, and social practices are intimately linked, it pays to

discuss these different dimensions separately at the outset, to identify and explore core issues in depth,

so as to be able to trace interdependencies more clearly later on. The report provides an overview and

in-depth discussion of a selection of core issues; through its structure, glossary and index it is designed

to support orientation and targeted reference to specific issues within this complex field.

1.2 Methodology

Understanding and addressing ELSI arising in the context of systems of systems innovation is

challenging, because these issues are often vague, cultural, contextual, distributed, fleeting, and

complex. A mixture of empirical, analytical and design methods is needed. Methods used in the

research for this report include:

http://itethicsincrisis.wordpress.com/page/2/




18

Literature review – review of theoretical and empirical studies of emergency ethics, law,

policy and technology across a range of disciplines (philosophy, sociology, organizational

research, policy research, law, computing, etc.)

Desk study – ongoing review of examples of IT use in emergency response, crisis

management and related areas as they are documented in reports and the media

Observations and interviews during project co-design workshops, demonstrations and

experimental implementations of BRIDGE technologies (Stavanger, April and September

2013) – which generate opportunities to observe existing and emergent future practices,

imaginations and reactions of stakeholders

Mobile methods (Büscher, Urry, Witchger, 2011)

o Go alongs – interviews and observations carried out while moving with emergency

responders through physical and virtual (information) spaces

o Subcam – recording individual’s paths through the physical, social and virtual

(information) spaces of emergencies (in exercises) (Glăveanu Lahlou, 2012;

Lahlou, 2011)

o ‘Following the information’ – an analytical orientation and method assemblage of

empirical (ethnographic) study, review of reports, inventive or designerly methods of

disruption to understand the specifics of data and data flows (Büscher et al. 2014)

Inventive methods (Kimbell, 2013; Lury & Wakeford, 2012) – methods of exploring socio-

technical futures, including

o Value Scenarios - an extension of scenario-based design which can support

envisioning of systemic effects of new technologies and help all stakeholders think

about ‘how the actions we take today will shape the conditions of our future’ (Nathan,

Klasnja, & Friedman, 2007:2)

o Critical Design methods or ‘design noir’ methods - design methods that uncover

hidden assumptions and dark sides of designs (Agre, 1997; Dunne & Raby, 2001)

o Living laboratories and experimental implementations of BRIDGE technologies that

involve stakeholders in analysis and design (Büscher, Kristensen, & Mogensen, 2007)

o Collaborative analysis and design – e.g. video prototyping (Mackay & Fayard, 1999),

where stakeholders sandbox emergency scenarios which use BRIDGE technology

Legal risk analysis – analysis of possible legal risks and legal consequences (Wahlgren, 2013)

Privacy Impact Assessment – Questionnaire-based inquiry into data and data processing used

by BRIDGE systems (De Hert, Kloza, & Wright, 2012; Wright & De Hert, 2012)

Ethical Impact Assessment – collaborative analysis of the ethical impact of BRIDGE

innovation through observations, semi-structured and open interviews with stakeholders.

(Beauchamp & Childress, 2001; Wright & Mordini, 2012; Wright, 2010)

Analytical methods of thick description (Geertz, 1994), ethnomethodological investigations

(Garfinkel, 1967; Luff & Heath, 1998; Suchman, 2007).

Code archaeology and disclosive ethics – analysis of the ‘black boxed’ technology with the

aim of uncovering ethical issues (Gramelsberger & Mansnerus, 2012; Introna, 2007)

These empirical, regulatory and designerly methods are brought together in an iterative experimental

approach in the BRIDGE project, allowing insight into current as well as emergent future practices.

The emphasis in this deliverable is on literature review and desk study, but insights from other




19

inquiries inform these. D12.3 will describe in more detail how these different methods come together

to shape an engaged socio-technical innovation process in the BRIDGE project.

1.3 The Structure of this Deliverable

The chapters in this deliverable extend and draw key insights from our research so far together (Figure

2). Chapter Two begins with an exploration of fundamental debates in emergency ethics, introducing

some of the values and virtues that analysts argue should shape moral conduct, technology design and

use, the law, and social practices. This leads into a discussion of key aspects of IT Ethics. Some of

these challenges are being taken up in professional ethics and codes of conduct, which we review in

Chapter Three.,

Figure 2 Understanding the Basis for ‘Good’ Innovation for 21st Century Emergency Response

Chapter Four, on legal issues, provides a regulatory perspective, exploring the constitutional basis for

IT use in emergencies and legislative strategies. Chapter Five explores frameworks of international

cooperation. In Chapter Six 6, we discuss social dimensions of ELSI in three inter-related areas –

professional work practices, organizational practices and emergency practices of individuals and

communities affected by disasters. The focus is on the specifics of practices of ethical, lawful and

socially responsible conduct, and cumulative effects at societal levels. The report concludes with a

summary and an outlook towards a discussion of emergent practices and design for ethically sound,

lawful and socially responsible 21st Century Emergency Response, which will be developed in D12.3.




20

2 Emergency Ethics Natural disasters like floods or earthquakes, large accidents, explosions or chemical spills,

humanitarian disasters such as famine, or acts of violence disrupt the fabric of the normal, orderly and

ordinary. They disrupt the (social) order which is the very foundation for what we take to be right or

wrong, reasonable, appropriate and proportional. Emergencies can trigger states of exception, where

normal rules are suspended. There has been an ongoing ethical and political debate about what makes

an incident an emergency or disaster (often defined by scale, urgency, severity) and which emergency

measures are justified in which situations. These debates shape multi-agency emergency response.

For instance, when there is a general agreement about a universal right that people are not to be

harmed and consequentially about the duty not to harm other people, can there be circumstances, in

which it is justified or even necessary to inflict harm on some people, for example by allocating scarce

resources of search and rescue or shelter to some but not others, and who under which circumstances

would be justified to do so? In an emergency context this translates into questions like:

Does the end to save lives (resources or public order) justify the means?

Does an emergency justify suspending fundamental human rights?

If an emergency makes it necessary to violate certain rights, what should be the thresholds for

these exceptions and their limits (scope and duration)?

Are there absolute limits of exception? Many societies do not tolerate torture, but when faced

with a threat of a certain magnitude and urgency (a ticking bomb dilemma, Zedner, 2008)

could it become right to consider it?

How much investment of time, energy and resources in preparation should be expected to

avoid the need for exceptions?

When philosophers seek answers to these questions, they begin fundamental debates about the

tolerability of moral exceptions in emergencies, definitions of emergency and the scope of suspensions

of moral rules. In the first part of this chapter, we provide a review of such debates. Following this, we

examine ethical codes of conduct for multi-agency response.

2.1 From Exceptions to Virtues

There is a long tradition of using emergency scenarios to discuss moral systems. For example:

After a ship has sunk there aren’t enough life boats and as a result, one of the life boats is

overloaded and threatens to sink. In such a situation is it morally acceptable to sacrifice the

life of some of the passengers to prevent that everybody will drown?

Life-boat scenarios pose dilemmas that challenge moral systems which are built on absolute principles

such as ‘under no circumstances may the innocent be harmed’. At a larger level, disasters pose similar

questions about whether or not, in extremis, different moral rules than in everyday life should apply. A

call for exceptions is frequently voiced.

2.1.1 The Morality of Exceptions

Philosophers and political scientists test different responses to ethical dilemmas with the extreme case

of an emergency that threatens the state. Carl Schmitt, an influential figure in emergency ethics

scholarship, argues emphatically that the possibility of an exception must be granted:




21

(t)he exception, which is not codified in the existing legal order, can at best be

characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, ... it cannot

be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law. (Schmitt, [1922] 2012)

Schmitt suggests that heads of state must be allowed to place themselves above the law to be able to

safeguard the rule of law. If conditions for the rule of law are threatened, the head of state has to be

able to exempt their power ‘from constitutional rules that would prevent him [sic] from prevailing in a

contest of force with the state’s enemies’ (Ignatieff, [2005] 2012, p. 317).

Many ethics scholars argue strongly against Schmitt, citing evidence that the ability of stepping

outside constitutional law undermines the very essence of constitutional law, namely its capacity to

absolutely enshrine fundamental human rights (Scheppele, 2003). The exception serves as a precedent,

making future exceptions more likely. Michael Ignatieff’s review of the history of emergency

legislation in the U.S., for example, shows that ever since Lincoln suspended habeas corpus – the

right to be protected from unlawful imprisonment – and other liberties during the American Civil War

in 1863, this has been used to justify suspensions of rights in other emergencies. Examples are

Roosevelt’s ordering the detention of German saboteurs as ‘unlawful combatants’ in 1942 and the

Bush administration’s military tribunals to try terrorists: ‘the precedent he [Lincoln] set has provided

subsequent presidents with the warrant to abridge liberty in emergencies’ (Ignatieff, 2012: 305). Other

critics argue that through this turn to exception, politics has ‘contaminated itself with law’, excluding

complete categories of people from society, and thereby eroding human values that are critical to the

‘good life’ (Agamben, 1998, 2005). They propose an alternative position of ‘legal invariance’

(Ignatieff 2012: 317), first voiced in a US Supreme Court ruling from 1866, which said that ‘the

theory of necessity on which [the call for exceptions] is based is false; for the government, within the

Constitution, has all the powers granted to it which are necessary to preserve its existence’ (ibid: 304).

The debate over whether extreme emergencies warrant a state of emergency that allows governments

to suspend constitutional rights matters directly and indirectly to the ethics of IT supported multi-

agency emergency response. On the one hand such decisions will be taken during the response phase

and the emergency agencies’ assessment of the urgency, scale, severity, and likely future course of an

emergency directly play an important part. This adds significance to the ethical requirement that IT

should support as accurate and as rich as possible dynamic risk assessment and risk communication.

On the other hand, emergent interoperability between diverse information systems can exacerbate the

scale and duration of exceptions by setting precedents for data sharing for surveillance. Such indirect

societal effects will be further discussed in Section 6.3.

2.1.2 Should we be bound by principles? Deontology versus Consequentialism

So far we have seen that emergency scenarios provoke debate about whether there are situations, when

our normal moral standards should be suspended or overridden by ‘what needs to be done’. Among

the various schools of moral thought this is an issue that will especially be a problem for

deontologists. Deontology, or duty ethics, requires that we always follow certain moral principles,

regardless of the results. Drawing on Kantian duty ethics, Larry Alexander describes the core principle

of deontology as ‘one may never use another as a resource without his consent’ (Alexander, 2000). So

the deontologists on board the sinking life-boat could ask passengers to sacrifice their lives based on

free, informed consent, but they could not force anyone to do so.

The other major and opposing approach is consequentialism, a category which applies to those ethical

theories that evaluate ‘rightness or wrongness based exclusively on the consequences or effects of an

act or acts’ (Powers, 2005). One of the most well-known varieties of consequentialism is

utilitarianism, a moral theory formulated by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, where what is




22

moral should be determined by what brings the most happiness to the greatest number of people and

minimizes suffering (Crisp, 1997). ‘Consequentialists believe that an action is right if it … maximizes

positive outcomes. It is assumed that [overall] continued human life and well-being should be

maximized and that death and harm should be minimized’, even if this comes at the price of

sacrificing the lives of some (Zack, 2010:33). Consequentialists would be able to force particular

persons to sacrifice their lives in the interest of the other passengers of the life-boat. Consequentialism

is a position that is less concerned with the inviolability of the individual’s physical integrity and

dignity, but rather with the ‘overall’ best outcome or ‘greater good’. In emergency response,

consequentialist positions translate into maxims like ‘Save the Greatest Number (SGN)’ and ‘Save the

Greatest number, who ____ (SGNW)’, where criteria to decide who should be saved may include

gender, age or vulnerability (‘women and children first’) or context dependent variables (such as save

those who can row the life-boat), whereas a deontological position would insist on ‘Fairly Save All

Who Can Be Saved (FSALL).

Naomi Zack argues that, in normal times, Western democratic moral intuitions tend to favour

deontological ethical positions, with principles of fairness and justice, where human beings are to be

treated equally, and must not be harmed. As a thought experiment, life-boat ethics confronts

deontologists with extreme scenarios, challenging the morality of such principles. If deontologists give

up their principles to follow their individual moral compass or a socially negotiated moral decision,

their deontological position is invalidated. But they can define exceptions and take a position of

‘threshold deontology’. This posits that there are moral absolutes, such as a duty to never harm

another, but that this may be suspended or overridden in exceptional circumstances (Sandin & Wester,

2009:293). A strong case for threshold deontology are ‘public’ and ‘supreme emergencies’.

2.1.3 Threshold Deontology: Public and Supreme Emergencies

Tom Sorell provides one of the most widely cited definitions of emergency as ‘a situation, often

unforeseen, in which there is a risk of great harm or loss and a need to act immediately or decisively if

the loss or harm is to be averted or minimised’ (Sorell, 2003, p. 22). He holds that the great dangers

emergencies pose make it excusable for those taking measures to contain them to disregard certain

normally operable moral rules in the process: ‘The more effective one is, the greater the achievement,

and the more can be excused in the means chosen’ (ibid.:25).

He formulates an ethics of threshold deontology specifically for ‘public emergencies’, defined as

‘emergencies facing whole states or large numbers of people, and which are usually the responsibility

of public agencies and their officials’ in contradistinction to ‘emergencies confronting individuals in a

private capacity’ (Sorell, 2003:22). For Sorell, such emergencies threaten a breakdown of social order,

a ‘moral black hole […] that may seem even more repulsive than the desperate measures that

emergencies justify’ (ibid:26). The range of emergencies that can be classed as ‘public emergencies

following these definitions is very broad, which some analysts argue is highly problematic (Tanguay-

Renaud, 2009). Examples where exceptional measures along these lines led to problems include

Hurricane Katrina, where victims were portrayed as a dangerous (looting and raping) mob that needed

to be kept under control through the police and military (Tierney, 2006, Figure 3). Reputable news

agencies such as Associated Press and Agence France Press tagged images of black people as ‘looting’

and virtually identical images of white people as ‘finding’. Such rhetoric underpinned calls for a

switch from humanitarian efforts of search and rescue to policing and military force.

Definitions of a public emergency, amplified by media rumours led to scenes where victims were

harmed, physically and in terms of their human dignity, exemplified by the experience of Clarice

Buter, a nurses’ assistant on the interstate in New Orleans:




23

They tried to kill us. When you keep people on top of the interstate for five days, with no

food and water, that’s killing people. . . . Helicopters at night shining a light down on us.

They know we was there. Policemen, the army, the whole nine yards, ambulance passing us

up like we wasn’t nothing. . . . We was treated worse than an animal. (Zack, 2010:112).

The failures in New Orleans were the result of many factors (ibid.), but to explain why some analysts

argue that such extreme emergency measures should be deemed ethically acceptable, we need to draw

parallels to the extremes of war for a moment. Michael Walzer, perhaps the most prominent political

philosopher in the field of emergency ethics, draws on Churchill’s ‘supreme emergency’ when he

justifies the bombing of German cities and the killing of civilians in WWII. Walzer argues that the

tensions between the principle that innocents must not be harmed and the moral call for saving the

largest number cannot be conciliated. While killing the innocent is morally wrong, in a ‘supreme

emergency’, there is no other choice. Persons who authorize or undertake a breach of normal moral

rules may be ‘culpable but not punishable’ (Kant). Walzer’s ‘supreme emergency’: ‘devalues morality

itself and leaves us free to do whatever is … necessary to avoid the disaster, so long as what we do

doesn’t produce an even worse disaster’ (Walzer, 2004:40).

Things have spiraled so out of control,

that the city’s mayor … has ordered

police officers to focus on looters and

give up search-and-rescue efforts.

(Washington Post, 1st September 2005,

in Tierney, 2006)

Governor Kathleen Blanco called the

looters ‘hoodlums’ and issued a

warning to lawbreakers: Hundreds of

National Guard hardened on the

battlefield in Iraq have landed in New

Orleans. ‘They have M-16s, and they’re

locked and loaded,’ she said. (New

Orleans Times-Picayune, 2nd

Sep. 2005,

in Tierney, 2006)

Figure 3 Exceptional Measures and Misconceived ‘Moral Black Hole’ Myths. Source: Associated Press, Agence France Press

Should there be scope for such threshold deontology outside of war? Sorell argues yes, the choice of

exception should be available in scenarios which threaten to ‘undermine everyday morality itself’, by

producing a moral black hole, even in natural and technical disasters (Sorell, 2003:32). But Sandin and

Wester (2009) challenge Sorrell’s logic. Most importantly, they question the assumption that

emergencies create a ‘moral black hole’, citing empirical research that shows that ‘dissolution of

morals does not seem widespread’ (ibid. p. 295) and that in many disasters public order and morality

are not in danger. In fact, crime rates tend to drop after disasters (Quarantelli, 1994), and a vast body

of sociological disaster research supports observations that emergencies engender solidarity, especially

in the response phase (Drabek, 2007; Dynes & Quarantelli, 1972). Sandin and Wester caution against

‘the insufficiently reflected transfer of the moral-black-hole argument to non-antagonistic situations

(2009: 299), and recommend that, rather than extending responders’ powers to curb rights and police

the crowd, analysts and societies should focus on leveraging solidarities for crisis management.




24

2.1.4 Virtue Ethics – Preparedness for All Hazards

The right virtues will dispose us to do the

right things in disasters. (Zack, 2010:68)

The literature so far reviewed addresses emergency ethics primarily as an area of ethical dilemmas –

asking which measures are morally justified to tackle an emergency, save lives and infrastructure,

preserve social order, etc.. These discussions probe the limits of what can be morally justified, and

whether moral values can or should be weighed against each other. But of course, there is a

background understanding at work, namely that emergencies have to be managed and solved, people

have to be saved. The focus was on principles of non-maleficence (do no harm) and the rationality and

morality of different principled approaches to minimizing harm. While the discussion presented was

mostly about cautioning the threshold and limit-setting of what is allowed to be done – a negative

discussion – what has not been addressed are the fact that ethics is practiced (morality), and the

questions what should be done and how societies can do better. These are issues surfacing in virtue

ethics, often focused on emergency policy and the broader remit of crisis management, which includes

concerns with prevention or mitigation and preparedness (Figure 4).

Figure 4 Four Phases of Emergency Management Source: International Telecoms Union Emergency Telecommunications, International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN)

At this juncture, ideas of beneficence (do good), the original ethical concern, arise more prominently.

Virtue ethics issues a call for action according to moral virtues. In contrast to consequentialist or

utilitarian ethics, where we should do that which maximises good, virtue ethics offers answers as to

how doing good can be done. Zack, for example, argues that:

disaster preparation is an ethical matter, and it is mandatory. The planning of this

preparation must be general enough to allow for unforeseen contingencies and must take

place in normal times, before a disaster occurs or is imminent. Disaster plans must be

consistent with normal planning principles of not intending harm and positively preserving

human well-being. … in an open, democratic society, the general disaster plan(s) should be

public information because the public will be affected. (2010: 19)

This notion is derived from Aristotelian ethics, elevating preparedness to a virtue which must be lived

to become effective. Importantly, and with reference to examples, Zack shows how:

http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/emergencytelecoms/remoteclimate.html

http://www.unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf




25

a preparation plan could restructure the conditions of response so that adequate response

could be envisioned beforehand, as not violating the ethical principles of normal life, for the

reason that resources will be scarce. (ibid.:21)

Thus, if you have prepared yourself, your organisations, tools, polity etc., then – in the case of disaster

– you are not forced to revert to exceptions that go against ordinary morals, integrity and dignity.

Aristotelian philosophers like Zack argue that one would deeply regret having given up one’s

professional integrity, therefore it is better to prepare. This also serves as her main argument against

state of exception and consequentialist ethics, which argue that one has to be ‘realistic’ about what is

possible and necessary in disaster, a stance that not only justifies ‘second best’ solutions but also plans

for ‘second best’ (and ultimately morally unacceptable!) solutions, leaving definitions and criteria up

to experts, politicians and first responders without consulting the public. And these consultations are

near impossible in the heat of an unfolding crisis – that is what preparation is needed for.

A focus on preparation is virtuous, not only because it places societies in the best position to maintain

normal moral codes, but also because it prioritizes a broad, ‘all-hazards’ approach to safety. A hazard

is a dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of

life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social

and economic disruption, or environmental damage. (EU Commission, 2010:9)

An ‘all-hazards’ approach acknowledges that there are a multitude of natural and manmade dangers,

and it addresses ‘actual hazard events as well as the latent hazard conditions that may give rise to

future events’ (ibid:10). This is critical, particularly with a view to the ethics of IT supported multi-

agency response, because a shift from concerns with all hazards and safety (a general concern with

risk) to concerns of security (focused on dangers arising from the illegal actions of others) was already

in progress before, but strengthened by 9/11. It has created significant ethical risks and challenges,

especially with a view to privacy and civil liberties. Initiatives to extend capabilities for data retention

and disclosure of personal data in the interest of security and for the purpose of promoting certain

‘public interests’ started well before the 9/11 attacks (Rauhofer, 2006), but the ‘war on terror’ led to a

‘securitization’ of emergency response in the US and Europe. It weakened data protection,

strengthened command and control approaches and eased activation of police and military. Research

suggests that this has diminished the emergency services’ capability to respond to natural disasters

(Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010; Birkland, 2009; Haddow & Bullock, 2005).

There are many virtues besides preparedness for all hazards, including courage, impartiality, creativity

and loyalty. The review of ethical codes of conduct in Chapter 3 will explore some of these in greater

depth. But there is another important aspect of virtue ethics we would like to discuss.

In contrast to ethical principles, virtues are dynamic and creative. Virtues take on the unique

individuality of those who practice them, whereas consequentialism and deontology yield principles

that remain external to particular individuals and situations. This focus on the individual in a specific

situation opens up fruitful opportunities for considering virtue ethics in relation to innovation in IT

supported emergency response, and this will be a key theme in D12.3, but we will briefly sketch the

argument here. Of all the ethical approaches it can be argued that virtue ethics is the most practical or

pragmatic. Its founder Aristotle defines virtues as ‘dispositions to act in certain ways over time’ (Zack

2009, 49). They are acquired ‘character traits’ (ibid.). He thought about how virtuous habits are

developed and is even the forefather of modern notions of ‘embodiment’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012) and

‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1984), when he talks about hexis, that is, a way of holding oneself or of adopting

a stance that needs to be trained in order to be prepared and able to do the right or virtuous thing, when

the situation presents itself. This philosophical paradigm is highly relevant to the ethical opportunities,

risks and challenges arising from new technologically ‘augmented’ forms of embodiment enabled in

IT supported multi-agency emergency response, and its capacity to transform human physical and




26

mental capabilities, the way we inhabit space and time as well as our capabilities for a ‘practical

ethics’ or morality enacted through social, material and embodied practices (Chapter 6). As

professionals adopt wearable cameras, continuously recording video and audio, location tracking and

numerous devices that allow information to be distributed in networked spaces (including ‘clouds’),

and accept that data can be stored and accessed multiple times without trace, whilst ‘forgetting’ and

‘deleting’ become difficult, ideas, practices and experiences of ‘embodiment’ and ‘situation’ and the

conditions for a practical ethics are transformed (see Buscher, Perng, & Wood, 2013; Buscher &

Wahlgren, 2012 for a discussion in relation to privacy and liberty). For the ethics of emergency

response the question is then not only how institutions and people can act virtuously in crisis, but also

how technology can be designed in ways that support new practical ethics and virtuous conduct that

preserve cherished values. In other words: what is the possibility and nature of virtuous technology?

2.1.5 Beyond the Call of Duty? Liability, Technology, Heroism

It is useful to ask what circumstances and whose virtues we are talking about, and how limits are

defined. Taking the UK as an example, multi-agency response is required in emergencies that range

from ‘major incidents’ to ‘catastrophic emergencies’ (abridged, Cabinet Office, 2013):

Major incidents are routinely handled by the emergency services and other local responders without the need for central government involvement. Such emergencies may include major road crashes, local floods or industrial accidents. The local multi-agency response is co-ordinated through a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG). The chair of the group, whether a police lead or a Local Authority Chief Executive, is colloquially referred to as a ‘Gold Commander’. (See Ramirez et al., 2012 for structures in other EU countries)

A Significant emergency (Level 1) has a wider focus and requires central government involvement from a lead government department (LGD) alongside the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations. There is no requirement for fast, inter-departmental/agency, decision making which might necessitate the activation of the collective central government response, although there may be value in using the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) complex to facilitate the briefing of senior officials and ministers. Examples include most severe weather-related problems. In addition, most consular emergencies overseas fall into this category.

A Serious emergency (Level 2) has, or threatens, a wide and/or prolonged impact requiring sustained central government co-ordination and support from a number of departments and agencies. The central government response would be co-ordinated from COBR, under the leadership of the lead government department. Examples of an emergency at this level could be a terrorist attack, widespread urban flooding.

A Catastrophic emergency (Level 3) has an exceptionally high and widespread impact and requires immediate central government support, such as a major natural disaster, or a Chernobyl-scale industrial accident. Characteristics might include a top-down response in circumstances where the local response had been overwhelmed, or where emergency powers were required to direct the response or requisition assets and resources.

The range of agencies involved can be large, including ‘Category I’ and ‘Category II’ Responders

(Civil Contingencies Act, UK Government, 2004) (Figure 5).




27

Category I responders (‘core responders’)

Category 2 responders (‘co-operating responders’)

Emergency services

Police forces British Transport Police

Fire authorities Ambulance services

Maritime and Coastguard Agency

Local authorities All principal local authorities (i.e. metropolitan, counties, districts)

Port Health Authorities

Health bodies Primary Care Trusts & Acute Trusts

Foundation Trusts Local Health Boards (in Wales)

Welsh NHS Trusts Health Protection Agency

Government agencies Environment Agency

Utilities

Electricity distributors and transmitters Gas distributors

Water and sewage undertakers Telephone service providers (fixed &

mobile)

Transport Network Rail

Train Operating Companies London Underground Transport for London

Airport operators Harbour authorities

Highways Agency

Health bodies Strategic Health autorities

Government agencies

Health and Safety Executive

Figure 5 Whose Virtues? Category I & II Responders

In addition, commercial organizations (such as supermarkets, hotels, and insurances), media, and

volunteer organizations may become involved, as well as members of the public, who are often the

first responders at the scene of an incident, providing first aid, transporting people to hospital or

initiating search and rescue (Dynes, 1970; Fischer, 2008; Palen & Liu, 2007; Tierney, Lindell, Perry,

& Press, 2001; Tierney, 1989) (Figure 6).

Figure 6 Actors and Organisations Involved in Emergency response




28

The more serious the emergency, the more actors are involved. Often faced with overwhelming

complexity and adversity, these emergency responders can come under immense pressure.

Nevertheless, virtually all post-disaster reviews praise examples of exemplary efforts. However, they

focus on mistakes to identify lessons and opportunities for improvement, frequently utilising digital

logs of activities and communications to do so. Moreover, the interpretation of response efforts is

often measured against knowledge of technological potential. Two examples will give a sense of how

liability and (sometimes unrealistic) expectations based on digital logs and assumptions about

technological potential can be problematic. The first follows the L’Aquila trial, where four scientists,

two engineers, and a government official were accused of malpractice. They had participated

in a meeting of an expert panel of Italy’s Civil Protection Department on 31 March 2009 in

the central Italian town of L’Aquila to assess a series of tremors that had shaken the town

over the previous 3 months. After the group adjourned, two members gave a press

conference, accompanied by local officials. Prosecutors in a controversial manslaughter

trial say they downplayed the risk to L’Aquila’s inhabitants (Cartlidge, 2012).

This verdict was based on analysis of recorded conversations, and the accused

were found guilty of manslaughter because of what they said, or didn’t say, or were

reported as saying, shortly before the earthquake that killed 309 people on 6 April 2009.

They were each sentenced to six years in prison, ordered to pay damages of €7.8 million

between them and all permanently barred from public office.(Jones, 2012)

The verdict is controversial not only because it uses evidence of conversations without much concern

for the context, but also because it sets a precedent for prosecution on this basis, and because there is

no parallel effort to establish culpability elsewhere, for example in relation to the use of building

materials in L’Aquila (ibid).

The second example is similarly based on the use of digital logs as evidence during the expert inquiry

into the response to the 22/7 Norway attacks, but it goes beyond asking what was known to the

responders by turning to a consideration of what they could have known. The expert report finds out

that just ten minutes after the explosion in the government quarter in Oslo, at 15:35, a call was

received in the emergency call centre. The caller blurts out a lot of information, including a car

registration number, and the dispatcher asks:

Dispatcher: Just tell me briefly what did you see?

Caller: I saw what I thought was a policeman, but then I was surprised, a man with a protective helmet and police clothes and a drawn pistol who came up behind me, near the government building. I was surprised that he was walking alone and I just followed him out of the corner of my eye. Then he got into a car, a grey van with the following license number ...

(Transcribed from oral presentation of the report (Gjørv, 2012:31minutes))

The call taker realized that this information was important. She wrote a postit note and took it into the

control room, marked as important. But the note was not noticed until 20 minutes later in what was a

very busy control room. And even when it was found, it was not sent out over the radio, and

neighbouring counties were not notified.

The report asks ‘Could things have been different, if this tip-off had found a more interoperating

police force?’ and to explore ‘whether the assumption that an immediate forwarding of the

information could have stopped the Utøya attacks earlier is more than speculation’, the 22nd

July

Expert commission correlated recordings of the GPS tracks of the perpetrator’s’s getaway car with the




29

locations of police vehicles in the area, assuming that officers in these cars could have stopped the

driver if an alert had been sent out. The experts find that the perpetrator (large dot in Figure 7):

passes a police vehicle [small diamond] close to the American embassy [in the centre of

Oslo] as early as 15:41. At Lusaka, he passes an out of town police car at 15:57, and at

16:03 he has just passed the police station at Samvika. (From oral presentation (Gjørv,

2012:33 minutes))

Figure 7 Tracing what could have been known during the 22/7 Norway Attacks. Screenshot from http://tinyurl.com/o59sjah

The inquiry experts argue that vehicle registration and live GPS data could have been instrumental at

this point, but ‘the technical systems both for notification and for sharing information were very poor’

(Gjørv, 2012:33:52 minutes). The report concludes:

The authorities’ ability to protect the people on Utøya Island failed. A more rapid police

operation was a realistic possibility. The perpetrator could have been stopped earlier on 22

July. (Gjørv, 2012, English version:11)

In this example there were no legal liability proceedings, but the report has had significant negative

impact on the reputation of the police and emergency services.

To deal with issues of liability, emergency organizations and individuals use indemnity insurance to

protect themselves against claims. In response to post-disaster reviews and inquiries, the costs for such

insurance are rising. The 2012 inquiry into failings of the Hillsborough disaster response in the UK,

for example, led to a review of indemnity insurance arrangements for the police (Jones, 2012:253).

But in the excerpt from the 22nd

July’s expert commission’s review above, we also witness the lived

transformation of professional obligations that underpins ethical debates about virtues and best

practice. We will discuss social/societal aspects of such transformations in Chapter 4. Here we would

like to note that the report’s experts define virtues of competence in relation to technological potential

not current utilization. They examine not only what was known to the emergency responders, but also

consider information that could have been known and correlated. Such technological imagination is a

critical force not only in post-facto critique, but also in the formation of what constitutes available,

relevant, legitimate information, and what people’s obligations are to obtain and consider it. By

tracing activities retrospectively with digital logs, post disaster reviews also prospectively trace socio-

technical futures onto the drawing boards of policymakers, politicians, and technology designers.

http://tinyurl.com/o59sjah




30

Figure 8 ‘Workers at Daiichi, feted as heroes, will bear their burden for years’. Source: Time World http://world.time.com/2011/03/31/whats-in-store-for-japan’s-embattled-nuclear-workers/

But apart from highlighting mistakes and opportunities for improvement, post-disaster reviews and

perhaps even more so the media, also place a spotlight on the other extreme: heroic efforts by

emergency responders. However, this focus on heroism, too, can be problematic (Figure 8).

In their Ethical Guidance for Public Health Emergency and Response, Jennings and Arras (2008)

begin a discussion of professional obligations with a story of hundreds of Chinese physicians refusing

to return to their posts during the 2002-2003 SARS outbreak, while many more health workers were

faced with ‘anguished choices between serving the ill and protecting themselves and their own loved

ones from the threat of deadly disease’ (p. 108). They explore the capacity of ‘social contract’ and

‘virtue ethics’ approaches to find answers to the kinds of questions these professionals faced. The

social contract idea stipulates that society grants emergency responders a range of benefits in return

for their commitment to save others even in the face of personal risk. Such benefits include ‘social

esteem, comfortable remuneration, and perhaps most importantly, a great degree of professional

autonomy’ (ibid.:110). Moreover, the social contract gives, according to Jennings and Arras, society ‘a

solemn obligation to provide [emergency and] health workers with the protection and tools they need

to subdue the epidemic or blunt the effects of a natural disaster’ (ibid.:114). In the case of public

health, the provision of a well funded and functioning public health service is an integral part of this,

they argue. A virtue ethics approach complements this contract, because it implies that to enter the

emergency professions, certain virtues, such as competence and courage in the face of adversity must

be cultivated. Developing these virtues is part of (learning) the job, so to speak. While the social

contract approach focuses on the entirety of a profession, and thereby allows a loophole for some to

exempt themselves from the duty to accept personal risk as long as sufficient others are willing to do

so, the virtue ethics approach underscores ‘the importance of inculcating the requisite virtues into each

new generation’ (ibid.:112). Together, these two approaches provide a robust concept of a duty to

maintain one’s post even in times of great crisis. However, what about the Chinese physicians, who

withdrew from their posts because they were ‘outraged at what they perceived to be the government’s

ineptitude in handling the early stages of the epidemic, and because they were afraid to engage with

this mysterious new and lethal disease without adequate infection control’ (ibid.: 114)? Where do

http://world.time.com/2011/03/31/whats-in-store-for-japan's-embattled-nuclear-workers/




31

professional duties and obligations end if society does not fulfil its side of the bargain? And what

about non-professional emergency responders like the workers at the Daiichi power plant, or the

hospital secretaries, cleaners, and clerks in SARS hospitals? Jennings and Arras ask:

What duties, if any, are owed by non-professionals?

What does the larger society owe to emergency workers?

Where lies the tipping point between professional duty and what philosophers call the realm of

supererogation, i.e. conduct above and beyond the call of duty? (ibid.)

There are no clear cut answers, but Jennings and Arras conclude that society ‘has no right to insist on

heroism’ (ibid.: 115). Emergency response workers should not:

be expected to plunge into the fray without … appropriate training, resources, protective

equipment, and follow-up support to help perform their job safely. It is the duty of society at

large … to provide these resources. This is true, not only both because society cannot and

should not expect [them] to accept possibly lethal but unnecessary risks, but also because

such workers have a duty to keep themselves healthy so that they can continue to treat

others. … [in the case of health workers] a robust public health infrastructure, including

adequate personal protective equipment for health workers, not exhortations to heroism,

should be the primary focus of disaster preparedness. (ibid: 118)

Health workers are amongst the most active in formulating ethical guidelines to be prepared to make

the kinds of anguished choices demanded of them in times of crises. But they are not the only ones.

Chapter 3 will review a selection of relevant ethical codes of conduct and specify some of the virtues

needed to enact their principles. However, before we consider these, we need to discuss how

technology inserts itself into ethics in emergencies.

2.2 Emergency Response & The Ethics of Emergency Technology

Technology has always played an important role in the ethics of emergency response and the actors,

policies, practices involved. Physical technology such as breathing apparatus for fire-fighters, fire

engines and fire fighting technologies, portable defibrillators for medical personnel, guns and body

armour for police have augmented the capabilities of emergency responders for many decades. Policy

tools, such as incident command systems, too, have shaped the nature of response (Buck, Trainor, &

Aguirre, 2006; Moynihan, 2009; Ramirez, Buscher, & Wood, 2012). What or who can be rescued or

protected changes, as do the processes and practices involved, and therewith the ethics and politics of

emergency response. Information and communication technologies introduce another dimension of

augmentation. They can augment responders’ capabilities to carry out risk analysis, communicate and

coordinate, act accountably, and to gather and process information about an emergency, but they can

also complicate risk analysis, reduce opportunities for face-to-face interaction, undermine existing

practices of professional integrity and accountability, and contribute to information overload. A

number of ethical issues arise from the amalgamation of ever more sophisticated ICT into people’s

imaginaries, practices and policies.

Yet, even recently edited volumes in emergency ethics, law and policy (Legrand & McConnell, 2012;

Viens & Selgelid, 2012) pay little attention to technology, and we find that IT ethics in crisis

management is a new field of study. One of the first publications to tackle the challenge is Jillson’s

chapter ‘Protecting the Public, Addressing Individual Rights. Ethical Issues in Emergency

Management Information Systems for Public Health Emergencies’ in Van de Walle, Turoff and

Hiltz’s Information Systems for Emergency Management (2010). Jillson discusses ethical




32

opportunities, such as the capability of emergency management information systems (EMIS) to extend

surge capacity, to maximize availability and enable more equitable distribution of services, and to

enhance risk communication. But she also shows how the informational and communicative advances

that EMIS can enable can complicate adherence to core ethical principles of non-maleficence and

beneficence, respect for human dignity, and distributive justice (equal access). Jillson specifically

considers public health emergencies and asks how EMIS might support people in:

balancing individual right[s] to privacy with the need for information on which to base

protection of the public health, including defining “confidentiality” in practice – are

infectious diseases included [in the provision of medical confidentiality] or not? Should

public health agencies and other emergency response agencies have access to individual

electronic medical records? How should informed consent ... be applied when records may

be lost and the situation requires urgent decision making?

As we have already discussed, in their current use of IT, emergency responders often air on the side of

caution when faced with such questions, especially in multi-agency collaboration, often choosing not

to share data. Fragmentation of response through ‘silo-thinking’ is a common result and a challenge to

ethical conduct (Cole, 2010). Paradoxically, this is, at least partially, a result of the very capability of

information systems to support data sharing. They also enable others to monitor professional

communications and decisions, including decisions over data sharing. In an environment where such

meta-data can be treated as evidence for malpractice and attract blame and punishment, people are

reluctant to take risks. Since Jillson’s pioneering exploration, some publications considering the

ethical implications of technology in emergency situations, have emerged in a BRIDGE led track on

‘Ethical, Legal and Social Issues of IT Supported Emergency Response’ at ISCRAM 2013 (Buscher,

Bylund, Sanches, Ramirez, & Wood, 2013; Buscher, Perng, & Wood, 2013; Ellebrecht, Feldmeier, &

Kaufmann, 2013; Rizza, Pereira, & Cuervo, 2013; Watson & Finn, 2013) and a BRIDGE led special

issue of the International Journal of Crisis Management and Response (forthcoming).

To relate the affordances of currently used emergency IT technologies to some of the ethical principles

and virtues outlined in the previous sections, we present a ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ analysis below. However,

while this provides a useful overview of issues, it simplifies the ethics of informationalizing

emergency response, and – we will argue – leads to an innovation impasse. To overcome this, we will

delve deeper into questions of technologically augmented ethical agency. A core question here is

‘How does technology become ethically problematic or ‘good?’.

2.2.1 Informationalizing Emergency Response: (Un-)intended Consequences

When new technologies are invented and decisions about whether they ought to be used have to be

taken, the decisive question is: will this technology do good or will it prove dangerous? What are its

risks and can these be contained? If not, do the benefits outweigh the risks? Another question is

whether enough is known about the technology and its interaction with users, other technologies, the

environment, etc. to be able to make a safe assessment of its risk. Might there be unintended and

unfortunate consequences in store and are there ways to predict those, or at least be prepared for them?

Information technologies are amongst a range of technologies where such questions arise particularly

pressingly, others include nuclear power (Wynne, 1982), stem cell research, and genetically modified

crops (Irwin, 2013; Wynne, 2001).

The notion of ‘unintended consequences’ features prominently in the literature on risk, especially on

risk assessment of technology (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1984; Merton, 1936). Yet, it is unclear, whether

these are considered avoidable and expectable. And if they are expectable, what precaution could be




33

taken to avoid them, and is this something that can be done before a technology gets implemented or

need there be an ongoing monitoring process, for detection and managing of such consequences:

For and by whom were these consequences unintended? Does ‘unintended’ mean that the

original intent was not achieved, or that things happened outside the scope of that

imagined intent? The notion also carries an implied exoneration from blame, since

anything ‘unintended’ was implicitly unforeseeable, even if things somehow subsequently

went awry. [...] The narrative of unintended consequences sets aside the possibility of

acting irresponsibly on inadequate knowledge … (Wynne & Felt, 2007, p. 97).

Technology can engender unintended consequences on the level of social equality, justice, and human

dignity. A classical example for this is Langdon Winner’s study of the highway system that links New

York City with the beaches in Long Island (Winner, 1986). Its planner Robert Moses designed some

of the system’s bridges in such a way that buses could not pass underneath. Winner argued that this

played into a contemporary politics of segregation, because the bridges combined with a socio-

economic structure of class and race that meant poor (often black) people, who could not afford cars

and relied on buses for transport, were cut off from direct access to the beaches. Regardless of Moses’

intentions2, this example illustrates how artifacts can have politics, that is, structure social realities in

certain – in this case discriminatory – ways.

To understand how such effects can take root it is useful to bring in the concept of ‘affordances’.

Affordances are the perceived qualities of an artifact that suggest how it should or could be used

(Norman, 1988). Affordances are not an inherent property of an object or technology, they are

relational in the sense that they arise from interactions between people, the material and design of the

artifact, and the context. Thus, had the buses been lower, or the socio-economic patterns, or the

transport culture been different, Moses’ bridges would not have afforded blockage and discrimination.

By combining our review of ethical principles and virtues for emergency response with an exploration

of core affordances offered by information technologies that are currently used in emergency

response, we can start to look into the ethics and politics of IT in emergency response, to map

intended and unintended, positive and negative consequences and begin a ‘stocktaking’ exercise of

what ‘informationalizing’ emergency response entails. This is a complex process in the BRIDGE

project and part of ongoing ethical impact assessment. We first present a summary of 10 core ethical

principles of emergency response as defined by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red

Crescent Societies Code of Conduct in relation to components of emergency services and virtues

needed to accomplish them (Table 9), and then explore selected, particularly significant ethical pros

and cons of current forms of digitally augmented emergency response (Table 10 and Table 11)3.

2 Moses’ intentions are a matter of contestation, see, for example, Joerges, Bernward 1999. Do Politics have

Artefacts? Social Studies of Science, Vol. 29, NO. 3, 411-431.. 3 These matrices are inspired by a similar tabulation of ethical impacts and technological affordances in the 2013

World Disasters Report (Vinck, 2013).




34

Ethical Principle Components of Service Virtues needed most4

Humanity Prevent and alleviate suffering

Respect for and active protection of dignity

Particular attention to the vulnerable

Safeguard and restore environment and social ties

Compassion, charity, hope, empathy, resilience respect, effective communication

Impartiality Non-discriminating

Based on need

With neutrality, that is, without ideological debate

Non-judgement, tolerance, justice

Solidarity Responsibilities and benefits shared equitably

Regardless of political, cultural, economic differences

Respect for sovereignty

Integrity, trustworthiness, respect

Cooperation Integration – e.g. with information sharing agreements

Inform & enable participation from all relevant parties

Direction – clarity of purpose

Subsidiarity

Prudence, improvisation, effective communication, respect, intersubjectivity, resilience

Information Sharing

Appropriate accuracy, precision, depth of detail

Consider effects of not sharing

Collect, process and share lawfully

Data minimization and sharing of aggregated data

Accountability & transparency

Evaluate effects on data subjects and informants

Avoid duplication

Prudence, integrity, trustworthiness, respect, empathy, effective communication

Human Rights Rights to privacy, freedom of movement, association, expression are actively protected

Compulsory evacuation is explained

Prudence, respect, empathy, non-judgement, justice

Preparedness Reduce vulnerabilities

Anticipation – e.g. through risk analysis & training

Continuity – grounded in familiar ways of working

Prepare for interoperability

Attitude of wisdom, prudence, respect, diligence, effective communication

Social contract Accountability to those in need, funders and society

Training and support for emergency responders

Prudence, respect, effective communication

Table 9 Ethical Principles and Virtues

These ethical principles, services and virtues can be pursued in a number of ways and IT can support

or obstruct their realisation. We now try to capture this in a ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ analysis around a

selection of currently used IT. These pros and cons reflect the fact that – as for Moses’ bridges – there

are several dimensions of influence on the ethics of technologically augmented practice:

the technology itself

the economic, social and cultural environment

the ways in which technologies are used

At every level both positive and negative effects can be produced, often simultaneously and in

complex ways. For example, novel communications technologies can support highly productive new

forms of communication and collaboration (e.g. through video-calls and screen-sharing between

remote participants). At the same time, these same technologies can reduce the need for face-to-face

human contact. Thus the pros and cons we list are not inherent, fixed properties of technologies, but

effects that arise in specific socio-political, economic and cultural environments and particular

contexts of use. This will be discussed further after this selective mapping of affordances.

4 Definitions of virtues will be elaborated in Chapter 3.




35

Selected pros of IT use in emergencies

Ethical Principles

Technologies in Use [BRIDGE Technologies]

Augmentation opportunities:

Technology does not tire and it is impartial.

Impartiality Sensors and facial recognition technologies.

Support and augment human perception and reasoning.

Technology can go where people cannot go and detect things people cannot sense.

Preparedness Heat cameras, robots, CCTV. Support and augment human perception and reasoning.

Novel support to obtain, structure, analyse information from many sources, visualization.

Preparedness Cooperation

Expert systems, GIS. [BRIDGE Middleware, Advanced Situation Awareness, Information Intelligence, Master]

5

Enable deeper and broader dynamic risk analysis in the preparation phase and during the response phase.

Capabilities to identify and locate people and resources more quickly and easily.

Humanity Cooperation

Social media, GPS, satellite imagery, EHR, social service records on vulnerable persons, RFID. [BRIDGE HelpBeacons, Information Intelligence]

Enable faster and more targeted search and rescue and relief, provide opportunities for enhanced, dialogic engagement with affected populations and community resilience.

Advanced information management, visualization and sharing.


Disaster Management Systems (e.g. Sahana), Ushahidi, 3D modelling, EU CPM Inventory databases, Tetra data. [BRIDGE Advanced Situation Awareness, Information Intelligence, Master]

Strengthen situation awareness communication, coordination and collaboration, awareness of available resources.

Collection, storage and maintenance of information about experts and authorities.

Preparedness Information Sharing

CECIS Pool of Experts Database. [BRIDGE Federated Control Rooms]

Expanded capability to identify and communicate with trustworthy experts and relevant authorities.

Facilitate communication.

Cooperation Tetra Radio, mobile/smart phones, social media, cloud storage, collaboration systems [BRIDGE Master]

Availability of secure, reliable and selective channels for verbal and non-verbal communication, e.g. with wearable location and sensor signals, video and audio.

Facilitate coordination. Impartiality EU CPM Inventories [BRIDGE Adaptive Logistics, Situation Aware Resource Management, Federated Control Room Support, Master]

Advanced capability to utilise a wider range of resources to maximum capacity.

Facilitate participation. Information Sharing Cooperation

Social media, crisis mapping, [BRIDGE Information Intelligence, Adaptive Logistics]

Enhanced capability to identify trustworthy actors in the affected population and to engage with individuals and communities, possibility for novel partnerships.

Facilitate transparency and accountability

Impartiality Logging, search and visualization technologies [BRIDGE Middleware, Master]

It can be easier to trace communications and identify discrimination

Table 10 The Ethical ‘Impact’ of Technological Affordances - Pros

5 We include, in brackets, BRIDGE technologies in relation to which the respective point is particularly

pertinent. This is not meant to be exhaustive, but to begin to explore the context they may settle into and to

chart how they might amplify positive, but also negative augmentation effects. However, discussion of specific

affordances and effects of BRIDGE technologies will not be provided here. This will be discussed in D12.3.




36

Selected cons of IT use in emergencies

Ethical Principles


Resulting risks, challenges and problems

Technology Dependence


Most technologies, but especially communication, visualization, sensor and alarm technologies. [BRIDGE Adaptive Logistics, Resource Management, etriage, Federated Control Room, Master]

If technologies fail, tasks can be difficult to accomplish because traditional practices and tools have been forgotten or neglected.

Labour Intensiveness Preparedness Cooperation

… especially expert systems, GIS, databases. [BRIDGE Advanced Situation Awareness, Adaptive Logistics, Situation Aware Resource Management]

Large amounts of manpower are needed to design and maintain technologies in good order.

Complexity


… especially expert systems, workflows [BRIDGE Adaptive Logistics, Situation Aware Resource Management, Advanced Situation Awareness]

The operation of digital technologies is difficult to understand and new skills must be learnt continuously. Complexity also means more things can go wrong.

Increased Risk of a Breach of Data Protection Regulations

Sharing Information

… especially communication technologies, databases (e.g. Policing/Health) [BRIDGE Middleware, Adaptive Logistics, Helpbeacons, Master]

Complexity, increasing saturation of work practices with technology and the ‘invisibility’ of data flows make it more likely that data is incorrectly handled.

Limit traditional human interaction

Cooperation Humanity

… especially communication technologies, sensors, databases [BRIDGE Federated Control Rooms, Situation Aware Resource Management]

Computer mediated communication can undermine traditional practices of trust and shared understanding. It can be tempting for responders to ‘hide behind their laptops’. This can reduce humanity of response by reducing interaction with affected populations

Increase digital divides

Humanity … especially communication technologies, databases, GIS, data analytics tools [BRIDGE Middleware, HelpBeacons, Adaptive Logistics]

IT innovation can engender exclusion and render silent individuals or communities with no access or skill to use technology and thereby increase their vulnerability and isolation.

Surveillance Impartiality … especially communication technologies, CCTV and video, sensors [BRIDGE Advanced Situation Awareness, Situation Aware Resource Management]

Making more information systems interoperable during a crisis increases the amount of data that can be known about individuals. This can produce detrimental effects, such as an erosion of privacy.

Social Sorting Impartiality … especially communication technologies, databases, GIS, data analytics tools [BRIDGE Middleware, Adaptive Logistics, Situation Aware Resource Management]

Informationalizing crisis management can engender discrimination on the basis of data about socio-economic factors, health, ethnicity or cultural criteria. This is often unintended and hard to trace to a specific decision, action or person. It can become structural, such as bias in security measures for the war on terror, or the focus of preventive measures on ‘vulnerable’ populations.




37

Table continued:

Selected cons of IT use in emergencies

Ethical Principles


Resulting risks, challenges and problems

Information overload Social Contract

… especially communication technologies, expert systems, sensors [BRIDGE Advanced Situation Awareness, Information Intelligence, Master]

The ability to gather more information means more information must be made sense of, this can be difficult, demand more manpower than is available and be timeconsuming. Too much information can cause stress.

Undermining professional integrity

Social Contract

… especially communication technologies, expert systems, sensors [BRIDGE Situation Aware Resource Management, Advanced Situation Awareness, Adaptive Logistics]

Who is responsible in a technologically augmented decision-making process? IT can make it difficult for people to act creatively, freely and responsibly, and to employ prudent judgement (e.g.if they do not understand how machines make suggestions or workflows).

New negligence lawsuits

Social Contract

… especially communication technologies, CCTV, expert systems [BRIDGE Middleware, Situation Aware Resource Management, Advanced Situation Awareness]

Logging of all communications makes it possible for inquiries to pinpoint ‘wrong’ actions or decisions, inevitably with hindsight and without being able to consider the full context of those actions or decisions.

Bias and manipulation by novel partnerships and vocal social media issue publics.

Impartiality

… especially communication technologies [BRIDGE Information Intelligence]

Through social media individuals and groups can undermine information superiority and information control in the operational process, promote vigilanteeism (Vancouver, Boston) and ideological campaigns.

Increased media influence and/or bias, promotion of disaster myths.

Cooperation Humanity

… especially communication technologies [BRIDGE Advanced Situation Awareness, Master]

The media rely on technology, too (access, network, audio-visual). Their needs may influence emergency response in an era of increased public and political accountability (being seen giving water to smiling children is preferable to clearing mud).

Table 11 The Ethical ‘Impact’ of Technological Affordances - Cons

This exploration of the ethical impact of emergency technology can help to sensitize designers,

prospective users (including the publics and communities emergency responders serve) and policy-

makers to ethical impacts – good and bad – that technology might contribute to in crisis management.

However, while it provides a useful overview of issues, it simplifies the ethics of informationalizing

emergency response and can lead to an innovation impasse. Designers and users can get stuck in a

‘pass the buck’ loop, where one holds the other responsible for undesirable effects. An excerpt from

exchanges between the authors of this report and a BRIDGE designer about the risk of increasing

undermining professional integrity and enabling new negligence lawsuits can illustrate this:

Bernard van Veelen: On both ‘Undermining professional integrity’ and ‘New negligence

lawsuits’: It is a fact that introduction of (any) technology changes well-known processes,

sometimes in an unpredictable fashion (eg introduction of SMS). Therefore tech

introductions should be accompanied by proper training and guidance, preventing (these

two) cons.




38

Monika Buscher: Bernard, we’re not trying to say these issues are caused by or ‘the fault

of’ technology and therefore we shouldn’t build it or use it. We list these effects as likely

effects that need addressing. This is a matter of training and guidance, yes, but it is also a

matter of design. If we are alert to these issues, we can design in a way that will help people

notice them and avoid them. So BRIDGE annotated workflows are a means to help people

maintain professional integrity. And capturing more context or logging communication

anonymously or implementing forgetting in the BRIDGE middleware could be ways of

supporting professional integrity. ‘Graceful augmentation’ can preserve traditional

practices as an option (Jul 2007). That’s why I’ve not changed the text. (Discussion

February 2014, after 2nd

Review of this report)

To understand better how ethics is distributed between people, environments and technology, we will

delve deeper into questions of technologically augmented ethical agency. A core question here is

‘How does technology become ethically problematic or “good”?’. Asking this question reveals three

important short-comings of the matrices above.

First, however much we try to remain alert to the fact that neither technologies nor use in any simple

way cause effects, that, instead, both are implicated in complex ways in multi-layered effects, the

matrices invite search for causes in one or the other. As the exchange above highlights, this is

problematic when ‘the multistable nature of artefacts means that they may become used in ways never

anticipated by the designers or originators’ (Introna 2007:16).6

Secondly, the matrices above focus on technology in isolation, rather than in its socio-economic,

political, cultural and organizational environments and particular contexts of use. As could be seen in

the example of the Long Island Bridges, technologies produce effects (e.g. of exclusion) only within a

complex network of infrastructures (a highway system), social practices (going to the beach at the

weekend), other technologies (cars and buses), socio-economic and cultural structures (a transport

system where wealth translates into car ownership and poverty into public transport use), social

inequalities (where poverty and wealth divide along class and race lines), ideologies and common

sense understandings (that made exclusion associated with race an unnoticed fact of everyday life for

many). If we translate these considerations into crisis management, we must consider ethics across a

whole network of agencies and circumstances. Unless technology is analysed as one element within a

nexus of practices, misconceptions are likely. Introna and Wood argue persuasively that:

the politics of technology is more than the politics of this or that artefact. Rather these

artefacts function as nodes, or links, in a dynamic socio-technical network, or collective,

kept in place by a multiplicity of artefacts, agreements, alliances, conventions, translations,

procedures, threats, and so forth [...] Some are stable, even irreversible; some are dynamic

and fragile. Analytically we can isolate and describe these networks …. However, as we

survey the landscape of networks we cannot locate, in any obvious manner, where they

begin nor where they end. Indeed we cannot with any degree of certainty separate the

purely social from the purely technical, cause from effect, designer from user, winners from

losers, and so on. (Introna & Wood 2004, 179, emphasis added)

Thirdly, ethical values are relative and the matrices above obscure a dynamic process of change and

negotiation. In many European societies, ethics has become pluralized and ethical values change over

time. Values have become objects of debate, and they should be the subject of open democratic debate

(Habermas, 1994; Habermas, 1996; Mouffe, 2000; Rawls, 1971). However, for such debates to

happen, ethical issues have to be noticed and turn from matters of fact, that is, accepted, unnoticed,

taken for granted, common-sense facts of life, into ‘matters of concern’, that is, interrogated,

6 The history of SMS documents a striking everyday example (Taylor and Vincent 2005).




39

dissected, contested objects of critique (Latour, 2005). A challenge for an ethically circumspect

approach to IT innovation in information societies therefore lies in the question of ‘how to make

ethical opportunities, challenges and risks (for example of innovation in IT supported multi-agency

emergency response) public?’ and ‘how to engage and include (which?) stakeholders?’ (Wynne and

Felt, 2007). D12.3 will describe methodologies of value sensitive design, co-realization and ‘design

after design’ to address this challenge.

But if we acknowledge that ethically ‘good’ and ‘bad’ effects are enacted in a manner that is

distributed across people, ‘environmental’ factors and technology, the question of how this happens is

critical and we must ask ‘what role does technology play?’. Introna (2007) suggests ‘disclosive

ethics’, that is, an approach that brings the usually silent and opaque operation of digital technologies

in current practice to the surface to open it up to critical scrutiny. This is a very effective approach that

can help diverse stakeholders and designers understand the ethical impact of IT innovation as it

happens, and his work on facial recognition technologies (with Wood, 2004) is particularly pertinent

in the context of IT innovation in emergency response.

2.2.2 Disclosive Ethics and Opaque Technology: The Case of Facial Recognition Systems

Since 9/11 there has been an increase in investment and implementation of face recognition systems

(Introna and Wood 2004, Gallagher 2013). Face recognition systems can compare images of the faces

of people captured by video or still cameras with a database of images of faces. The aim is threefold:

Verification: “Am who I say I am?”

Identification: “Who am I?”

Watch list comparison: “Are you looking for me?” (Phillips et al. 2003:6)

Figure 12 Face Recognition Systems Source: http://www.biometrics.org/bc2002/Phillips.pdf [accessed 16.2.2014]

The system presents matches to human operators and, when watchlist monitoring, it can highlight

matches to persons who are wanted. The matching is usually based on image analysis algorithms that

calculate similarities and differences between prominent facial features (such as distances between the

eyes). For crisis management and emergency response, Facial Recognition Systems have been used

for preventive policing to avert crises, for example, by monitoring for and identifying suspects at

airports, sports venues or in public spaces. For example, during the London 2012 Olympics, the

‘already famed CCTV infrastructure within London, [was extended with] new number plate and facial

recognition software’ and London became ‘the most watched Olympic Games in modern history, but

http://www.biometrics.org/bc2002/Phillips.pdf




40

not just in the traditional sense of sporting spectators’7. The US Department of Homeland Security is

currently testing the accuracy of Face Recognition Systems with audiences and volunteers at mega

sports events, to explore their capabilities and implication for government and first responders8. This

interest is based on expectations that such systems may be useful in the emergency response phase, for

example for emergency response victim identification (Gevaert & de With, 2013) or to identify

perpetrators during or in the immediate aftermath of violent attacks. In an experiment, researchers at

Michigan State University were able quickly to identify one of the Boston Marathon bombing suspects

from law enforcement video (Klontz & Jain, 2013, although see also Gallagher 2013 for a discussion

on how current facial recognition systems failed in this instance).

Advantages of such systems over human face recognition practices are the number of faces that can be

processed in this way, and the consistent, tireless application of procedures. Indeed, face recognition is

often hailed as less biased than humans. Introna and Woods cite statements not only from

manufacturers and vendors, but also from prominent security forums, such as ‘Face recognition is

completely oblivious to differences in appearance as a result of race or gender differences’ (2004:191).

In light of concerns over social sorting and discrimination against especially Middle Eastern and

Muslim populations in security measures (Vertigans 2010) such promises are powerful incentives for

ethically and socially responsible innovation champions. However, closer inspection reveals bias to be

an integral part of the technology. A 2002 Face Recognition Vendor Test of the most powerful

algorithms found, for example, that males were 6-9%points more likely to be identified than females

(cited in Introna and Woods 2004:190). This is problematic, because while ‘identification’ through a

Face Recognition can correctly identify a ‘good guy’ or a ‘bad guy’, it can also produce false

positives, that is, identify a ‘good guy’ as a ‘bad guy’ or a terrorist suspect, leading to potentially

intrusive investigations. In a study of ‘subject factors’ embedded in a particularly widely used face

recognition algorithm, Givens et al. (2003) also find racial and age bias. Their experiments show that

Asians are easier [to recognize] than whites, African-Americans are easier than whites,

other race members are easier than whites, old people are easier than young people, other

skin people are easier to recognize than clear skin people, and subjects with glasses are

easier to recognize than subjects without glasses.’ (Givens et al. 2003, cited in Introna and

Wood 2004:190)

This bias is not due to any intentionally built in prejudicial weighting, but it is accidental: A function

of the nature of images and their processing by this face recognition system. Amongst other factors, it

is caused by the more accentuated shadows in white and young faces, which create difficulties for

Face Recognition Systems matching processes and mean that they are less likely to be recognized.

Other skintones produce fewer shadows and higher recognition rates.

Being easier to recognize also makes being classed as a false positive and exposed to investigations

more likely. Thus, rather than being neutral, Face Recognition Systems can (unintentionally) amplify

political, cultural, and institutional forms of discrimination. At this juncture it becomes clear that

Morality is no more human than technology, in the sense that it would originate from an

already constituted human who would be master of itself as well as of the universe…

Morality and technology are ontological categories … and the human comes out of these

modes, it is not at their origin” (Latour & Venn, 2002, p. 254).

This highlights two important facts. Firstly, purpose and intentionality are not purely human:

7 http://www.army-technology.com/features/featurelondon-2012-olympics-games-security-strategy/

8 http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20131107-dhs-testing-face-recognition-biometrics

http://www.army-technology.com/features/featurelondon-2012-olympics-games-security-strategy/

http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20131107-dhs-testing-face-recognition-biometrics




41

Purposeful action and intentionality may not be properties of objects, but they are also not

properties of humans. They are properties of institutions [collectives of humans and non-

humans], apparatuses, or what Foucault called dispositifs’ (Latour, in Introna 2007:13).

Secondly, through a disclosive ethical investigation of the collectives of humans and non-humans that

are involved in the potentially exclusionary ethical impact of Face Recognition Systems, Introna and

Wood find that ‘there is often nobody there that “authored” it as such’, prompting reference to

Foucault (1975) and Kafka (1925).

Disclosive ethics is a methodology that seeks to enable analysis of how seemingly trivial details (such

as the light-reflective quality of different types of skins) can turn into a micro- politics and become

tied to, and amplified through other exclusionary practices (such as political and cultural prejudice

stoked by a rhetoric of a ‘war on terror’), so that ‘what seems to be a rather trivial injustice soon may

multiply into what may seem to be a coherent and intentional strategy of exclusion’ (Introna and

Wood 2004:179). The method proceeds by showing that many digital technologies are silent as

opposed to salient technologies and opaque as opposed to transparent (Introna & Wood, 2004:183).

Figure 13 Silent Technology (Introna &Wood 2004:183)

Facial recognition is a particularly striking example of a silent technology since it

can be imbedded into existing CCTV networks, making its operation impossible to detect.

Furthermore, it is passive in its operation. It requires no participation or consent from its

targets – it is “non-intrusive, context-free process” (Introna and Wood 2004:183).

Furthermore, the process is obscure, for two reasons. Firstly, ‘the software algorithms at the heart of

facial recognition systems are proprietary software objects. Thus it is very difficult to get access to

them for inspection and scrutiny’ (ibid.). Secondly, most of the algorithms are based on complex

statistical methods that even experts can struggle to interpret and understand. As a result, ‘for most

ordinary members of society facial recognition systems are an obscure “black box”’ (ibid.).

Using early versions of the current 2012 Facial Recognition Vendor Test, Introna and Wood examine

the operation of two of the most used algorithms and show (with the help of secondary literature on

experiments such as Givens et al.’s (2003)) that while the relatively small biases in recognition-

likelihood might not cause discrimination by themselves, effects are amplified when these ‘become

incorporated into a network of practices’ (ibid:191). For example in ‘face-in-the-crowd’ situations

(such as the Boston Marathon bombing), variations in image quality and a large database of often very

similar faces can increase the number of matches with watchlist faces and thereby the probability for a

match being a false positives. Human operators faced with such a situation can either try to spot and

ignore false positives, thus reducing the system’s functional advantage. Or they can set the threshold

for a match so high that it will barely ever occur. This would not only increase the likelihood of false

negatives (‘bad guys’ slipping through as ‘good guys’), but also undermine the utility of the system.

And, if someone is picked up by the system under these conditions, the human operators:




42

may even override their own judgements as they may think that the system under such high

conditions of operation must ‘see something’ that they do not. This is highly likely as

humans are not generally very good a facial recognition in pressurised situations … Thus,

under these conditions the bias group (African-Americans, Asians, dark skinned persons

and older people) may be subjected to disproportionate scrutiny, thereby creating a new

type of ‘digital divide’. (Introna and Wood 2004: 192)

The lesson from this example of disclosive ethics is that morality is not simply human. Agency,

intentionality and ethics are distributed within socio-technical systems, and it is the particular way of

‘working together’ that makes a certain collective or network of humans, environments and

technologies have (un-)intended, potentially undesirable ethical effects. It would, therefore, be short-

sighted to think of technology as neutral, and to look for the ethics of action solely in the way people

use technology. Indeed, novel innovation opportunities arise out of disclosive ethics analyses, which

will be discussed in D12.3 and other BRIDGE deliverables and publications. In the case of facial

recognition, as we have seen, a technology can be employed with sincere intention, yet turn out to

have undesirable effects. That just this technology in just these circumstances produces discriminatory

effects should be notice-able and it should be possible for it to be made into a matter of concern. This

is in no way a technology deterministic reading, where we claim that technology is a ‘culprit’. Quite

the opposite, it could just as well be the technology correcting human bias (Latour & Venn, 2002;

Latour, 1992, 2004). The consequence however has to be that efforts are made to ‘subject

[technological] artefacts to the same level of scrutiny’ (Introna Wood 2004: 195) as humans and to

find approaches (in best practice, legal regulation and design) to ensure the scrutinizability of

algorithms and other silent and opaque technology, especially in already ethically charged areas such

as security or emergency response.

2.3 Summary

In this chapter we have reviewed key ethical positions to contextualise discussion of ethical, legal and

social issues in IT supported emergency response. Based on scenarios, philosophers and political

scientists have developed principled ethical stances in relation to the core question in emergency

situations: whether the threat to normal, social, political and/or environmental order should justify

exceptions to normal moral systems. For example, it is normally unacceptable to harm other people.

However, if an overloaded lifeboat is sinking, could it be right to throw some passengers overboard?

Consequentialists would say ‘yes’, because overall more lives might be saved. Deontologists, in

contrast, would argue that it is wrong to harm others, whatever the situation. They might ask

volunteers to sacrifice their lives, provided that they can freely give informed consent. However, if the

circumstances are escalated, some deontologists accept that exceptional circumstances could justify

harm to others. To hold on to deontological principles of intrinsic ethics, they propose thresholds and

hold actors may be ‘culpable but not punishable’. Heated debates over thresholds have generated

definitions of ‘public’, ‘extreme’, even ‘supreme emergencies, which are complicated by the media,

which often exaggerate disaster myths. Observing (a threat of) a moral black hole at the centre of all

major emergencies, some analysts extend deontological thresholds to allow far reaching exceptional

suspension of normal morality, including suspension of constitutional rights. This matters directly to

the ethics of IT supported multi-agency emergency response, because such decisions will be taken

during the response phase and the emergency agencies’ assessment of the scale, severity, and future

course of an emergency may play an important part; and it matters indirectly, because interoperability

between information systems in emergencies can set precedents for data sharing for surveillance.

Virtue ethics offers an alternative route, positing a moral imperative to maintain normal moral rules

even in extreme situations. It demands an ‘all hazards’ approach and can be supported through careful

preparation and the development of professional virtues. Virtue ethics draws attention to ethical




43

challenges in IT supported emergency response, such as injustices engendered through surveillance.

But it also opens up new avenues for innovative design, because the exercise of virtues is a matter of

social and embodied practices, which can be augmented through technologies. An examination of who

the agencies in an emergency are, and under what circumstances they must exercise virtues raised

questions about the social contract between emergency responders and society. It is not right for

society to expect emergency responders (or vital support staff) to be heroes. Society has a duty to put

resources and infrastructures in place for responders to work as effectively and safely as possible.

Technology can engender changes in how virtues can be exercised and a pros and cons analysis of

selected ethical impacts around currently used information technologies began to map intended and

unintended, positive and negative consequences and begin a ‘stocktaking’ exercise of what

‘informationalizing’ emergency response entails. However, it raised questions about ‘where the ethics

is’ in technologically supported emergency response, and a discussion of face recognition as an

example revealed the value of a disclosive ethics approach to address this question.




44

3 Codes of Conduct The question now becomes, which virtues are

right for disaster? (Zack, 2010:68)

A virtue ethics approach makes it clear that Zack’s question about emergency responders’ rights and

duties and societies’ obligations like those raised by Jennings and Arras as well as questions about the

ethics of technology must be addressed as part of the preparation for emergencies, because the strains

of a crisis situation will make reasoning about them difficult:

Disaster situations entail serious time exigencies that do not allow for protracted moral

reflection and ethical deliberation; thus, preventive measures and policies that amplify

virtue and ensure ethical corporate practice are warranted. Optimal moral action in a

disaster requires more than an understanding of utility, rationing, and triage. … codes of

ethics and conduct can help provide a moral framework that addresses at least some of the

many micro-, meso- and macro-level disaster challenges. (Larkin, 2010:496)

There are a variety of such codes of conduct and ethics, focusing on humanitarian issues, disaster

response and resilience, matters of work practice, and – more recently – on technology. Many

originate in the US or from international organizations such as the UN, the International Federation of

Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), or the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM),

few have been formulated in the European Union. After a brief examination of humanitarian, disaster

response and resilience and work practice codes of ethics, this review focuses on the ethics of

technology in emergency response.

3.1 Humanitarian Principles in Emergency Response

The most widely used set of humanitarian principles is provided by the IFRC:

1. The humanitarian imperative comes first.

2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone.

3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.

4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.

5. We shall respect culture and custom.

6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.

7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.

8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs.

9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.

10. In our information, publicity and advertizing activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects.

Source: http://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/code-of-conduct/

http://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/code-of-conduct/




45

Many of the principles expressed here for a self-policing code of conduct with humanitarian intention

are echoed by codes that focus more narrowly on disaster and emergency response.

3.2 Ethical Principles for Disaster Risk Reduction

European initiatives highlight that an increase in the frequency and severity of disasters poses risks for

the dignity and safety of individuals and the natural, cultural and environmental heritage within

Europe. The European and Mediterranean Major Hazards Agreement proposes an ethical code of

conduct for all agencies involved in emergency response (Prieur, 2009). This addresses the whole

cycle of Prevention/Mitigation, Preparedness, Response and Recovery (Figure 4). The BRIDGE

project focuses on the response phase, but many ethical issues raised in developing IT support for

emergency response are closely related to ethical issues in recovery, prevention and preparedness

phases, and it is useful to consider ethical codes of conduct across all of these phases. Prieur’s report

lists 10 general and 26 specialised principles to be applied prior to, during, and after disasters. This is

the first attempt to formulate such principles in a European context to our knowledge and it is an

important contribution. We extract an abridged set of general and response phase principles below.

General principles

Solidarity – Societies work together in a spirit of solidarity to strengthen disaster resilience and help victims. Financial costs and burdens, and benefits of preventative measures should be shared equitably. Particular attention is given to the most vulnerable individuals and communities.

Joint responsibility – All parties, emergency services, public authorities, the private sector, agricultural and industrial actors, non governmental organisations (NGO), individuals, the media and other parties share joint responsibility for the prevention of disaster risk and for participating in an efficient response.

Non-discrimination – Measures that aim to prevent, reduce the risk of or prepare for disasters, distribute relief or promote recovery, as well as fundamental rights (e.g. of movement, association and expression) are secured and implemented irrespective of gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, language, religion, political opinion, minority, socioeconomic circumstances, birth, disability, age or other status.

Humanity – All persons are treated humanely, in all circumstances, with respect, tolerance and compassion. Particular attention is paid to the most vulnerable. Dignity and rights is respected and protected in all circumstances.

Impartiality – Disaster prevention, preparedness, relief and recovery are implemented and provided on the basis of genuine needs alone, without any favouritism.

Neutrality – Assistance is provided without ideological debate, with the aims of protecting individuals, their rights, the environment, property, heritage, and to strengthen resilience.

Co-operation – Nations work together, regardless of political, economic, social and cultural differences, according to their capacities, to develop disaster resilience and respect for human rights, especially when there is cross-border impact.

Territorial sovereignty – States have a duty to protect persons on their territory, guaranteeing that, even if a disaster occurs, human rights are fully applied for not only their nationals, but also for foreigners on their territory including humanitarian assistance teams from abroad.

Role of the media – The media have an essential role in informing and raising the public’s awareness to the forecasting of disasters and the way they evolve. Disaster victims should be treated with dignity and full respect of their privacy.




46

Ethical Principles during a Disaster

Humanitarian assistance – Humanitarian assistance is provided swiftly, fairly, impartially, without discrimination, with due regard for the vulnerability of victims and specific needs. Humanitarian assistance meets the needs of the populations concerned, in accordance with international standards and the best existing practices.

Information and participation during disasters – All persons, local and regional authorities and NGO affected are informed of and are entitled to participate in making decisions in response to disasters. They receive, in their own language, understandable information about the disaster and emergency measures planned.

Compulsory evacuation of populations – Compulsory evacuation can only take place if a clear explanation has been given of the risks of non evacuation. Persons who refuse to evacuate do so at their own risk and should not endanger rescue workers.

Respect of dignity – The dignity of all victims is respected, particularly concerning security, safety, access to food, clean water, hygiene, temporary housing, clothing and essential medical and psychological care. Sexual violence and abuse is intolerable.

Respect of persons – Personal rights are respected, particularly the right to one’s own image and the right to privacy. The presence of the media does not result in abuses.

Emergency assistance for the most vulnerable persons - Without prejudice to the priority, assistance is to be given to all who have a chance of survival, priority for humanitarian assistance go in priority to the most vulnerable people, such as pregnant women, children, people with disabilities, the elderly, ill and wounded. States train and provide equipment to members of the emergency services, so that they can search for and provide first aid to the most fragile persons.

The importance of rescue workers:

Measures are implemented in a spirit of humanity, solidarity, hope, impartiality.

Rescue workers behave with dignity, keep their fear under control, keep calm and never infringe the fundamental rights of the people they are rescuing.

Rescue workers, have a moral role as a model for the respect of human rights.

Emergency relief should be provided without discrimination or favouritism.

Rescue workers do not take advantage of exceptional situations. They never exploit the weakness of the persons assisted to force them into acts that infringe their human dignity or their physical and sexual integrity. They refrain from corruption.

Rescue workers of any nationality continue to enjoy all fundamental rights.

Rescue workers have psychological assistance available during & after operations.

States, organisations, institutions take every possible measure to guarantee rescue workers the necessary conditions to carry out their work properly, including conditions needed to protect their dignity, safety, physical, psychological integrity.

States, regional & local authorities and training establishments provide special training to rescue workers on human rights & ethical principles in times of disaster and the special arrangements for dealing with the most vulnerable persons.

Measures to safeguard and rehabilitate the environment – Practical measures are taken to ensure the quickest possible safeguarding and rehabilitation of environmental assets and the re-establishment of environmental quality.

Necessary measures to safeguard and restore social ties – Practical measures are taken to ensure that social ties are restored as quickly as possible, by foreseeing meeting places, places of worship and places for leisure activities.

This first attempt at defining a catalogue of ethical principles for multi-agency emergency

management provides insight into the values aspired to in current practice.




47

3.3 Principles for Effective Response and the Ethics of Teamwork

A number of organizations propose principles for practices of multi-agency collaboration and

coordination. The UK Civil Contingency Act, for example puts forward eight guiding principles for

practicing effective response and recovery (HM Government, 2013, abridged):

October 2013

Emergency response and recovery arrangements should be flexible and tailored to reflect circumstances, but will follow a common set of underpinning principles. These principles guide the response and recovery effort at all levels – from local to national. There are eight guiding principles:

anticipation – ongoing risk identification and analysis is essential to the anticipation and management of the direct, indirect and interdependent consequences of emergencies;

preparedness – all organisations and individuals that might have a role to play in emergency response and recovery should be prepared and be clear about their roles and responsibilities;

subsidiarity – decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level, with coordination at the highest necessary level; local agencies are the building blocks of the response to and recovery from an emergency of any scale;

direction – clarity of purpose comes from a strategic aim and supporting objectives that are agreed, understood and sustained by all involved. This will enable the prioritisation and focus of the response and recovery effort;

information – information is critical to emergency response and recovery and the collation, assessment, verification and dissemination of information must be underpinned by appropriate information management systems. These systems need to support single and multi-agency decision making and the external provision of information that will allow members of the public to make informed decisions to ensure their safety;

integration – effective co-ordination should be exercised between & within organisations and levels (i.e. local, sub-national and national) in order to produce a coherent, integrated effort;

co-operation – flexibility and effectiveness depends on positive engagement and information sharing between all agencies and at all levels; and

continuity – emergency response and recovery should be grounded in the existing functions of organisations and familiar ways of working, albeit on a larger scale, to a faster tempo and in more testing circumstances.

Virtually all of these aims require teamwork and while there are no formal ‘codes of conduct’ for

teamwork, there are proposals for useful criteria from practitioners and theorists. We will discuss

social issues in Chapter 6 and BRIDGE Deliverable 2.4 Domain Analysis III: Collaboration

Technologies (Liegl & Boden, 2014), but some of these considerations have a strong ethical

component and can shed light on the question of the kinds of virtues required for emergency response.

For example, reflecting on the lack of coordination of official and volunteer response in the aftermath

of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, Larkin (2010:495) observes:

it was this writer’s direct observation as an emergency team leader that both convergent

volunteerism (freelancing) and the lack of a coordinated disaster response caused serious

operational and ethical challenges on the ground. At the individual and organizational




48

levels, turf wars ensued; acronyms flew across the satellite phone airways—“PIH, ICRC,

UN, PAHO, …”— reminding us that this was a cluster of volunteer organizations and

generating a new moniker for Western Hispanola: “The Nation of NGOs.”

What unfolded was a massive mismatch and duplication of services, expertise, and

resources. For example, bringing expensive hardware such as $70,000 scoliosis surgical

sets to poor Haitian hospitals made no more sense than the USNS Comfort saving

ventilator-dependent quadraparetics in a nation that seldom has 24 hours of electricity—let

alone chronic ventilator capacity. … Some teams came equipped with yoga instructors,

naturopaths, and Reiki masters. Indeed, Haiti became a sort of Bedlam peep show for

voyeuristic volunteers who, having little legitimate reason to be there, used, as their visa,

gifts they wanted to give, not necessarily gifts that Haiti needed. Coupled with a crippling

corporate chaos, this gross mismatch of motives and medical need revealed an obvious lack

of orchestration. It is not overstating the case to observe that, by their diversion of food,

water, fuel, and other resources—including time—volunteers with nothing to contribute

unwittingly increased morbidity and mortality among the earthquake’s victims.

In his paper and an earlier book chapter, Larkin suggests a set of principles for a ‘virtue-based ethic of

magnanimity and teamwork’, including:

Prudence which is the virtue of practical wisdom and the exercise of discernment, perspicacity,

judiciousness and discrimination. It is needed, for example, in triage, where a balancing of

burdens and benefits, decisions about provision or withholding of treatment, and over when

and how to transfer a patient are required.

Justice which is needed where careful stewarding of scarce resources is necessary It is paramount that

those responsible administer distribution fairly, making sure that basic services are available to

those who need them.

Non-judgement which implies an unconditional positive regard for others, an attitude unbiased and

unprejudiced, regardless of whether those others are intoxicated, have poor hygiene, poor

education or a value system different from one’s own.

Self-effacement/charity which requires genuine caring and selfless giving.

Compassion which brings together capabilities for understanding, empathy, sensitivity, tact,

consideration and gentleness. It is as significant as any technical skill, not only because it

allows technical skills to take effect, but also because it supports perception of efficacy under

emergency conditions.9

Trustworthiness which goes together with integrity. Like all virtues trustworthiness and integrity are

earned, not owned, which means they must be exercised and observed continuously over time.

Intellectual honesty, knowing one’s limits and having the humility and integrity to consult

others are aspects of trustworthiness. Larkin argues that it is the ‘primary prerequisite of all

emergency team workers’ (Larkin, 2001:2013), because it gives ‘the frightened, anonymous

and vulnerable patient and the sometimes mentally exhausted team member something to

believe in when they need it most’ (ibid.).

Resilience which is expressed through flexibility and optimism in the face of adversity. Not taking

insults or recalcitrance personally, being undaunted by aggression or despair, and being able to

9 This could be significant beyond the actual situation. Legal action about perceived malpractice by emergency

responders is a growing concern. Yet, ‘most lawsuits are NOT based on actual negligence, but on Lack of

Common Sense, Poor Communications, and Tiny Instances of Disrespect and Inattention!’ (Wirth, 2009).




49

cope gracefully with disharmonies are aspects of resilience. Humour and socio-emotional

support within a team can enhance resilience.

Communication which ‘is the essence of teamwork’ and fostered through ‘empathy, shared power

and control, self disclosure/ventilation and confirmation’ (Larkin, 2001:214).

Empathy which implies an ability to see the world through the eyes of another, being aware of their

feeling and reasoning and allowing this to influence one’s responses.

The exercise of these virtues can directly enhance people’s ability to cooperate, or do so indirectly, as

each virtue ‘reflects one’s professional competency and is, thus, essential to the development of trust

and respect’ within a team (Larkin, 2001:211). Both direct and indirect contributions change people’s

outlook ‘from Me to We’, allowing them to realize that ‘the total outcome of the team’s larger

enterprise will exceed the sum of the individual members’ efforts’ (Larkin, 2001:497)

Through a close analysis of the tragic death of 13 members of a smoke jumper team during the 1949

Mann Gulch wildfire in Montana, Weick (1993) adds a powerful set of further guiding principles:

Improvisation and Bricolage: When the smoke jumpers realised that a wall of fire behind them was

advancing faster than they could escape, the crew leader stopped half way up a grassy slope

and lit a fire. He told his crew to join him and lie down in the burnt down grass at the centre of

this ‘escape fire’. This was an example of ‘creativity as figuring out how to use what you

already know to go beyond what you currently think’, to ‘create order out of whatever

materials were at hand’. The crew leader knew the famous fire triangle – the need for oxygen,

flammable material and temperature above ignition – and he knew that removing one of these

(flammable material) from the path of the advancing wildfire could save their lives, as it did

for him. However, his crew did not heed his advice.

One of the reasons Weick identifies for the crew’s lack of trust in their leader is that the role structure

within the team had collapsed. A number of factors led to this, but two were particularly significant.

Firstly, when they approached the wildfire, the members of the team became spread out and unable to

communicate with each other, which weakened an already weak chain of command. Secondly, when

the crew leader realised that the crew were trapped, he ordered them to ‘throw away their tools’. This

in effect stripped the members of their professional identity (and their responsibilities towards their

crew), turning each into an individual running for their life: ‘As the entity of a crew dissolved, it is not

surprising that the final command from the crew leader to jump into an escape fire was heard not as a

legitimate order but as the ravings of someone who had “gone nuts”’ (ibid: 637). To counteract such

disintegration, Weick calls for ‘virtual role systems’ and an ‘attitude of wisdom’.

Virtual Role Systems: This is based on intersubjectivity – every crew member simulating all roles in

their minds, metaphorically turning each individual into a group. This supports role

improvisation, i.e. the ability to take on others’ roles, which is a critical capability to cope with

the uncertainties of disasters (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003; Mendonça et al., 2007; Webb,

1998; Webb, 2004). It also has the effect that ‘each person can reconstitute the group and

assume whatever role is vacated, pick up the activities, and run a credible version of the role.

Furthermore people can run the group in their head and use it for continued guidance of their

own individual action’ (ibid.: 640).

Attitude of Wisdom: Emergencies are characterised by their ‘un-ness’ – they are unexpected,

unprecedented and unplanned for in their specific unfolding, however good emergency plans

and scenarios are. This makes uncertainty a defining feature (Crichton 2003, cited in

McMaster & Baber, 2008:6). Against this backdrop it is essential to realise that ‘ignorance and

knowledge grow together’ (Weick 1993:641, see also Gross, 2010). It is not possible to know

all that would be important to know about an emergency, however carefully one prepares, and




50

the complexities of an unfolding situation will always exceed what can be known. This means

just-in-time learning is essential: ‘wise people know that they don’t fully understand what is

happening right now’ and ‘what organizations most need in changing times … [is] curiosity,

openness, and complex sensing’ (ibid: 641). Information technologies can support this.

An appreciation for the crew leader’s role from his team mates and vice versa, and a willingness to

learn through acute sensitivity to as wide a range of factors affecting their situation as possible, may

have saved some of the Mann Gulch crew. However, to make such virtues effective in extremely

stressful situations a social orientation can be powerful, and Weick calls for the ingredient that will

support the strongest social formation in a team: respect.

Respectful Interaction: This entails three virtues – (1) Trust, practiced through respect for the reports

of others and willingness to base action on them. (2) Honesty – practiced through reporting

scrupulously, allowing others to come to valid understandings. (3) Self-respect, practiced

through due regard for one’s own perceptions and judgements, and efforts to integrate them

with reports by others. These virtuous practices foster social interactions that are effective in

emergency response collaboration, including ‘mutual adaptation’, ‘imitation of creative

solutions’ and ‘trusting compliance’ (Weick, 1993:643). They also foster ‘nonstop talk, both

vocal and nonverbal, [which] is a crucial source of coordination’ and dynamic formulation of

‘superordinate goals – goals that transcend the self-interest of each participant’ (ibid.: 644).

Some of the virtues that attempts to formulate guidance for effective teamwork like these extol can be

subsumed under the concept of ‘leadership’. Some of the professional responders involved in the

BRIDGE project elaborate with concrete detail on ethical dilemmas arising here in a way that can

illustrate some of the difficulties. They highlight how such dilemmas are experienced at an individual

level, and how they affect the collaboration between responders and with other agencies. For example,

having been called to a fire in a house with only one troupe of firefighters, a commander was told that

there were two children inside the house, one on the ground floor, one on the first floor. The situation

meant that, in effect, he had to decide, which of the children would survive. In another example, he

had to decide between a mother and a child who had swum out to see and were being swept out by the

current. And, citing an example from colleagues, he recounted how responders were faced with a fire

in an entertainment venue, where smokedivers found two persons – a girl weighing 50kg and a boy

weighing 120kg. The decision to take the lighter girl first spelled death for the boy. In discussions over

how technologies insert themselves into situations such as these, he raised the potential for outsiders

(who may potentially know more than the persons on scene about, for example, backup being under

way) to be consulted. But he also highlighted that technology simply may not be useful in addressing

ethical dilemmas. Leaders have to prioritize life and health of victims, as well as crew safety. In a

situation where they will always ‘know too few facts that really matter and too many about things that

don’t’ (Rake and Njå, 2009). However, it is critical to note that it is not necessarily only designated

leaders who make decisions and practice leadership (ibid.). Everyone involved, not just named leaders,

appointed by seniority, needs to enact the virtues described above to make them effective.

3.4 The Ethics of Information Sharing

At various points, information sharing has been placed at the heart of effective response by these

codes of conduct and guiding principles. However, in a recent communications stocktaking effort

based on an extensive review of post-disaster reviews from across the EU, the European Network and

Information Security Agency (ENISA, 2012) shows that current information sharing practices

between emergency agencies are inadequate. One of the reasons identified is an ‘over-zealous or

incorrect interpretation of the duties imposed on public organisations by the Data Protection Act’

(Armstrong, Ashton, & Thomas, 2007). Observations of barriers to information sharing and a

tendency towards silo-thinking (Cole, 2010) have prompted clarification of the legitimacy of data




51

sharing in emergency contexts both nationally and within the EU as a whole (see BRIDGE D12.1

Privacy Protection and Legal Risk Analysis Buscher & Wahlgren, 2012 for a detailed discussion).

More recently, they have also stimulated the formulation of codes of conduct that encourage and guide

data sharing. In the UK, for example, general guidance by the Information Commissioner’s Office

highlights that emergency situations can override some data protection rules, such as the need to seek

‘informed consent’ from data subjects. The guidance also highlights the importance of preparation:

Where possible, organisations likely to be involved in responding to emergency situations

should consider the types of data they are likely to need to share in advance. This should

help to establish what relevant data each organisation holds and help prevent any delays in

an emergency. For example, the police, the fire service and local councils get together to

plan for identifying and assisting vulnerable people in their area in an emergency situation.

As part of the process they determine what type of personal data they each hold and put in

place a data sharing agreement setting out what they will share and how they will share it

in the event of an emergency. (ICO, 2013)

More specifically tailored principles encourage consideration of the consequences of not sharing:

Abridged from Data Protection and Sharing – Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders. (Armstrong et al. 2007)

1. Data protection legislation does not prohibit the collection and sharing of personal data – it provides a framework where personal data can be used with confidence that individuals’ privacy rights are respected.

2. Emergency responders’ starting point should be to consider the risks and the potential harm that may arise if they do not share information.

3. Emergency responders should balance the potential damage to the individual (and where appropriate the public interest of keeping the information confidential) against the public interest in sharing the information.

4. In emergencies, the public interest consideration will generally be more significant than during day-to-day business.

5. Always check whether the objective can still be achieved by passing less personal data.

6. Category 1 and 2 responders should be robust in asserting powers to share personal data lawfully in emergency planning, response and recovery.

7. The consent of the data subject is not always a necessary pre-condition to lawful data sharing.

8. You should seek advice when in doubt – though prepare on the basis that you will need to make a decision without formal advice during an emergency.

However, the rapid appropriation of information technologies for emergency response, including by

actors such as non-governmental agencies, the media and members of the public has also given rise to

concerns, especially with regard to the processing of sensitive information. Humanitarian and human

rights organizations have been at the vanguard of developing codes of conduct that seek to strengthen

people’s sensitivities and capacities to address the challenges. The 2012 OCHA Report

Humanitarianism in the Network Age (OCHA, 2012) and the 2013 IFRC World Disasters Report:

Focus on technology and the future of humanitarian action (Vinck, 2013) begin to outline ethical

principles of information collection and sharing in large scale multi-agency disaster response efforts

from a humanitarian perspective. The International Committee of the Red Cross (2013) has been the

first to propose a set of standards with a view to the particularly challenging context of protection




52

work in conflict situations. These standards resonate with concerns arising in current practices of

large-scale emergency response, where such codes have not yet been formulated.

Abridged from: Chapter 6 ‘Managing sensitive protection information’ of Professional standards for Protection Work (2013)

36. Protection actors must only collect information on abuses and violations when necessary for the design or implementation of protection activities. It may not be used for other purposes without additional consent.

37. Systematic information collection, particularly when involving direct contact with individuals affected by abuses and violations, must only be carried out by organizations with the capacity, skills, information management systems and necessary protocols in place.

38. Protection actors must collect and handle information containing personal details in accordance with the rules and principles of international law and other relevant regional or national laws on individual data protection.

39. Protection actors seeking information bear the responsibility to assess threats to the persons providing information, and to take measures to avoid negative consequences for those from whom they are seeking information.

40. Protection actors setting up systematic information collection through the Internet or other media must analyse the different potential risks linked to the collection, sharing or public display of the information and adapt the way they collect, manage and publicly release the information accordingly.

41. Protection actors must determine the scope, precision and depth of detail of the collection process, in relation to the intended use of the information.

42. Protection actors should systematically review the information collected in order to confirm that it is reliable, accurate, and updated.

43. Protection actors should be explicit as to the level of reliability and accuracy of information they use or share.

44. Protection actors must gather and subsequently process protection information in an objective and impartial manner, to avoid discrimination. They must identify and minimize bias that may affect information collection.

45. Security safeguards appropriate to the sensitivity of the information must be in place prior to collection of information, to ensure protection from loss or theft, unauthorized access, disclosure, copying, use or modification.

46. Protection actors must undertake an analysis of the associated risks for the interviewees and the interviewer before conducting interviews.

47. When conducting individual or group interviews, protection actors must only collect personal information with the informed consent of the person. Personal information must not be disclosed or transferred for purposes other than those for which they were collected, and for which consent was given.

48. Protection actors must integrate the notion of informed consent when calling upon the general public, or members of a community, to spontaneously send them information through SMS, an open Internet platform, or other means of communication, or when using information already available on the Internet.

49. Protection actors should, to the degree possible, keep victims or communities having transmitted information informed of action they have taken on their behalf – and of results. Protection actors should remain alert to any negative




53

repercussions on the individuals or communities concerned, owing to the actions they have taken, and take measures to mitigate repercussions.

50. Protection actors must avoid, to the extent possible, duplication of information collection efforts, in order to avoid unnecessary burdens and risks for victims, witnesses and communities.

51. Whenever information is to be shared, its interoperability should be taken into account in planning the information collection.

52. When handling confidential and sensitive information on abuses and violations, protection actors should endeavour, when appropriate and feasible, to share aggregated data on the trends they observed.

53. Protection actors should establish formal procedures on the information handling process, from collection to exchange and archiving or destruction.

Source: (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2013)

While the assessment of risks to information sources and other conflict-affected populations arising

from the public sharing of information is of critical importance in protection work, the sensitivities

targeted above also resonate with the broader concerns raised in the OCHA Report (2012) and the

World Disasters Report (Vinck, 2013), which include

the changing notion of informed consent in contexts where people might be unfamiliar with

digital technologies or unaware of the complex nature of digital data mobilities;

the challenges presented by the interpretation of data collected remotely;

the risks of bias and data manipulation;

the existence of digital divides

Codes of conduct in relation to information sharing developed by humanitarian organizations also

include guidelines for the crowdsourcing, production, analysis and use of crisis informatics,

geographical and other community or Big Data (Crowley, 2013; Letouze, Meier, & Vinck, 2013;

Shanley, Burns, Bastian, & Robson, 2013), as well as novel approaches to sharing information with

members of the public, for example through the use of SMS (see the first-ever Code of Conduct for

the Use of SMS in Disaster Response (GSMA, 2013).

3.5 Computer Professionals’ Codes of Conduct

Unlike emergency responders, engineers are often distant from the effects of their work and the

environments, social contexts and people they serve. However, engineers have long been aware of

their responsibility towards society. Within the field of computing, developers came together to

respond to the growing military use of computer technologies in 1981, founding the membership

organization Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, a global initiative to promote the

responsible design and use of computer technology, with a focus on educating policymakers and the

public on a wide range of issues. The Computer Ethics Institute, another non-profit organization,

aiming to provide ‘A moral compass for the ocean of information technology’ was founded in 1985,

and it was the first to formulate a set of ‘ten commandments for computer ethics’:




54

The Ten Commandments of Computer Ethics

1. Thou shalt not use a computer to harm other people.

2. Thou shalt not interfere with other people’s computer work.

3. Thou shalt not snoop around in other people’s computer files.

4. Thou shalt not use a computer to steal.

5. Thou shalt not use a computer to bear false witness.

6. Thou shalt not copy or use proprietary software for which you have not paid.

7. Thou shalt not use other people’s computer resources without authorization or proper compensation.

8. Thou shalt not appropriate other people’s intellectual output.

9. Thou shalt think about the social consequences of the program you are writing or the system you are designing.

10. Thou shalt always use a computer in ways that ensure consideration and respect for your fellow humans.

Source: http://www.computerethicsinstitute.com/images/TheTenCommandmentsOfComputerEthics.pdf

These principles have been developed by computer scientists and professional organizations. One of

the earliest comprehensive discussions is Forester and Morrison’s ‘Computer Ethics’ (1990), which

argues that ethics needs to be integrated deeply into all aspects of development and use of

computation. The Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), the world’s largest educational and

scientific computing society10

has developed a detailed code of ethics and professional conduct that

attempts to facilitate this integration. It contains 24 imperatives that describe general moral principles,

more specific professional imperatives, and principles particularly relevant to leaders and educators in

the profession. The excerpt below lists general moral imperatives and specific principles.

Excerpt from ACM Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct

1. GENERAL MORAL IMPERATIVES. As an ACM member I will ....

1.1 Contribute to society and human well-being. 1.2 Avoid harm to others. 1.3 Be honest and trustworthy. 1.4 Be fair and take action not to discriminate. 1.5 Honor property rights including copyrights and patent. 1.6 Give proper credit for intellectual property. 1.7 Respect the privacy of others. 1.8 Honor confidentiality.

2. MORE SPECIFIC PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. As an ACM computing professional I will ....

2.1 Strive to achieve the highest quality, effectiveness and dignity in both the process and products of professional work.

2.2 Acquire and maintain professional competence.

10

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_for_Computing_Machinery

http://www.computerethicsinstitute.com/images/TheTenCommandmentsOfComputerEthics.pdf

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_for_Computing_Machinery




55

2.3 Know and respect existing laws pertaining to professional work.

2.4 Accept and provide appropriate professional review.

2.5 Give comprehensive and thorough evaluations of computer systems and their impacts, including analysis of possible risks.

2.6 Honor contracts, agreements, and assigned responsibilities.

2.7 Improve public understanding of computing and its consequences.

2.8 Access computing and communication resources only when authorized to do so.

Source: http://www.acm.org/about/code-of-ethics

All of these principles for professional and ethical conduct by engineers and designers of computer

technologies are relevant to the discussion at hand. But perhaps the most interesting with a view to the

ethics in IT supported large-scale multi-agency response are …

Most interesting principles … because

1.1 Contribute to society and human well-being.

In a ‘century of disasters’, improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of disaster response can contribute to well-being.

1.2 Avoid harm to others. The ‘wrong kind’ of emergency response technology – e.g. technology that is unreliable or that fosters expansion of surveillance – can harm individuals and social/political principles that underpin freedom & well-being in communities and societies.

1.4 Be fair and take action not to discriminate.

1. Technologies such as face-recognition, search for vulnerable persons or categorization during triage can be inherently (unintentionally) discriminatory (see Section 2.2.2).

2. Technology can exclude those who lack skill or resources from the provision of emergency services, creating ‘digital divides’.

The call to ‘take action not to discriminate’ should inform innovation that proactively avoids discrimination.

1.7 Respect the privacy of others. This imperative imposes a responsibility to address questions such as: How can emergency responders and response organizations be supported in keeping privacy intrusions proportional and minimal? What happens to data and data sharing affordances after an emergency? Innovative design is needed.

2.3 Know and respect existing laws pertaining to professional work.

This principle applies not only to the laws governing IT design, but also to laws that are relevant to the use of IT in the domain that computer professionals are designing for. In emergency response these include, particularly, liability and data protection.

2.5 Give comprehensive evaluations of computer systems and their impacts, analysis of possible risks.

Such evaluation and risk analysis requires a thorough understanding of the domain and a collaborative design approach with wide ranging stakeholder involvement.

2.7 Improve public understanding of computing and its consequences.

This imperative imposes responsibilities to address questions like: How can responders and populations be supported in understanding the complex intended and unintended consequences of IT supported emergency response? Innovative design is needed to support the apprehension of computational processes and products.

http://www.acm.org/about/code-of-ethics




56

By drawing out the relevance of these principles, it becomes clear that ethical sensitivities need to be

integrated into the products and processes of design. However, the ACM principles above are

strangely silent on questions of use. However, there are strong resonances to the social contract idea

employed in negotiating professional emergency responders’ responsibilities. Computer professionals

cannot effectively address ethical principles alone. They must be supported by society and individual

users of technology, who should carry more responsibility for the beneficence/non-maleficence of IT.

3.6 Ethical Codes of Conduct for the Use of Technology

The users’ responsibility is recognised in codes of conduct that specify how responders are to utilize

information technology. However, the excerpt from the 2012 UK Police National Computer Manual

below, obtained through the public evidence produced by the Leveson inquiry into press ethics,

illustrates that in explicating user responsibilities the focus lies on reference to the law (Figure 14).

Figure 14 User Responsibilities (UK Police National Computer (PNC)) Source: http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Exhibit-KW-NIPA3.pdf

Human rights and data protection laws, too, include complex notions of purpose-binding, fairness,

transparency, purpose limitation and data minimisation (Figure 15).

http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Exhibit-KW-NIPA3.pdf




57

Figure 15 General Data Protection Regulation Source: General Data Protection Regulation. Inofficial Consolidated Version After Libe Committee Vote. By The Rapporteur

22.10.2013 http://www.janalbrecht.eu/fileadmin/material/Dokumente/DPR-Regulation-inofficial-consolidated-LIBE.pdf

Human Rights Law adds further detail, including the notions of

Proportionality – any breach of the right to privacy has to be proportional to the interests of

national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention

of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights

and freedoms of others.

Informational self-determination - the right of an individual to know when and to whom

personal data are disclosed. In some European constitutions, the right to informational self-

determination is understood to be part of basic rights to freedom, which are inviolable.

http://www.janalbrecht.eu/fileadmin/material/Dokumente/DPR-Regulation-inofficial-consolidated-LIBE.pdf




58

As we have shown in an analysis of interviews and observations with users of the PNC in D12.01

Privacy Protection and Legal Risk Analysis (Buscher & Wahlgren, 2012), it is problematic that codes

governing the use of information systems focus almost exclusively on referring users to the law,

because it puts the onus on individuals without providing them with adequate support for establishing

knowledge about and comprehending the effects and visibility of their actions and for understanding

their lawfulness or otherwise in practice. Some expert policing analysts argue, for example, that in

relation to the legality of ‘criminality information sharing’ in the UK, ‘an intolerable level of

uncertainty as to the issue of that legality has now been reached’ (Grace, 2013). At this juncture the

BRIDGE project can make a significant contribution through innovative design that support users in

understanding and controlling how information sharing works in assemblies of advanced information

technologies in IT supported emergency response, as we will discuss further in D12.3.

3.7 Ethical Principles of the Information Society

The importance of educating and involving users in IT innovation has been recognised by

policymakers, too, and it has prompted the formulation of ‘ethical principles for the information

society’. For example, the Riga Global Meeting of Experts on the Ethical Aspects of the Information

Society (UNESCO, 2013) proposes a set of 15 principles to guide emerging practices, placing

particular emphasis on developing the skills and knowledge of ordinary citizens, captured specifically

in guideline No 4:

Raise awareness about the ethical implications of the ICT use and development, particularly

among young people, along with life-long education initiatives to equip all citizens with the

skills and competence to participate actively and knowledgeably in the information society.

New info-ethical and info-civic pedagogical paradigms may be envisaged in this regard to

support new modes of global citizenship fully integrating digital media and virtual political

spaces. (UNESCO, 2013)

And a discussion paper for the 2015 World Summit on the Information Society elaborates

‘Participation’ and ‘Responsibility’ as fundamental ethical values for a global communication ethic.

The Nine ‘Ps of a Global Communication Ethic. World Summit on the Information Society – Global Communication Ethic

1 Principles: Ethical Values

2 Participation: Access to Knowledge for All

3 People: Community, Identity, Gender, Generation, Education

4 Profession: Ethics of Information Professions

5 Privacy: From Dignity to Data Mining

6 Piracy: Intellectual Property and Cybercrime

7 Protection: Children and Young People

8 Power: Economic Power, Technology, Media and Consumers

9 Policy: Ethics of Regulation and Freedom

Participation is the right and ability to participate in societal life and in decisions of concern.

Responsibility is accountability for one’s own actions. The level of responsibility has to correspond to the level of power, capacity and capability. Those with more resources bear greater responsibility.

Source: http://tinyurl.com/qhk6jwk

Sharing the responsibility for intended and unintended consequences of IT innovation in crisis

management as part of a social contract between society at large and the multidisciplinary professional

http://tinyurl.com/qhk6jwk




59

groups involved in IT design and implementation surely is a good thing. However, critics argue that

ethical guidelines and professional codes of conduct are ineffective means for achieving good moral

practices. In his paper The Quest for a Code of Professional Ethics: A Moral and Intellectual

Confusion John Ladd argues that if disciplinary procedures are associated with compliance, the idea of

a ‘code of ethics’ confuses ethics with law and this is a nonsense, because:

ethics consists of issues to be examined, explored, discussed, deliberated, and argued.

Ethical principles can be established only as a result of deliberation and argumentation.

These principles are not the kind of thing that can be settled by fiat, by agreement or by

authority.(Ladd, [1979] 1998:211)

He suggests that what usually is really intended is a ‘code of conduct’ and that these, too, are

ineffective:

Worthy and inspirational though such codes may be, he [Ladd] says that their existence

leads to complacency and self-congratulation – and maybe even to the cover-up of unethical

conduct. “Look, we have a code of ethics,” professionals might say, “so everything we do

must be ethical.” The real objective of such codes, Ladd says, are to enhance the image …

and to protect the monopoly of the profession. (Forester & Morrison, 1990:19).

Perhaps the strongest argument against Ladd is that whilst ethical guidelines and codes of professional

conduct may be ineffective in enforcing moral practice, they can scaffold it. Importantly, they can do

so in advance – anticipating and providing guidance for answering the anguished questions emergency

responders may have to address in case of an emergency, encouraging establishment of information

sharing agreements before disaster strikes, and training moral sensitivities.

3.8 Summary

To translate principled ethical stances into guidelines for professional conduct it is necessary to ask

‘which virtues are right for disaster response?’. The review of ethics guidelines and professional codes

of conduct in this Chapter has shown how humanitarian imperatives, impartiality, and informing and

involving affected communities are critical values. European initiatives also stress training, solidarity,

cooperation and a focus on assistance for the most vulnerable. Moreover, many organisations

recognize the need for multi-agency coordination, because ‘in the initial stages of a large and complex

incident, it is unlikely that any single individual or organisation will be in possession of all of the

information to fully understand the problem and formulate a solution – various organisations will be in

possession of ‘pieces’ of the puzzle (McMaster & Baber, 2008:7). Thus the UK civil contingencies act

highlights the need for subsidiarity, cooperation and information sharing.

Virtually all ethical principles require teamwork and, while there are no formal ‘codes of teamwork’,

practitioners and theorists have formulated key virtues of teamwork, including compassion,

trustworthiness, integrity, empathy, improvisation, intersubjectivity, and an attitude of wisdom that

recognises that ‘ignorance and knowledge grow together’. It is critical for responders to acknowledge

that there is a need to cast the nets of perception and communication widely, without thinking one

already knows. Indeed, communication and respectful interaction are at the heart of success.

Some codes of conduct are inspired by deficiencies in existing practice. Particularly significant are

inadequate use and sharing of information. Again, preparation is a key principle here. There is a call

for information sharing agreements to be sought between actors likely to be involved in all hazards

emergency response. In addition, emergency responders are reminded that data protection does not

prohibit information sharing, it is meant to provide a framework for sharing with confidence. Most

importantly, emergency responders should consider the effects of not sharing. Yet, there are also

concerns over careless use and sharing of information. Humanitarian organizations are at the vanguard




60

of identifying and addressing challenges. Their efforts raise issues and formulate virtuous approaches

that are highly relevant for emergency response, including principles of data minimization, ensuring

the accuracy and reliability of data, and the need for transparent procedures for collection, processing

and destruction of data. Humanitarian organizations have also begun to address ethical challenges of

involving the public and digital humanitarian organizations in emergency response, where the risks of

bias and data manipulation, and the risk of digital exclusion are important considerations.

The chapter draws to a close by considering how these ethical guidelines and codes of conduct from

the domain of emergency response map onto professional ethics in the domain of computer science

and engineering. A shared aim to contribute to society and human well-being unites the parties

involved. In a century of disasters, sensitively designed and appropriated IT may enhance the

efficiency of emergency response to great effect. According to the most authoritative codes of

conduct, computer professionals should bring to this endeavour a commitment not only to avoid

discrimination, but to proactively take steps to minimize discrimination, respect privacy, and support

lawful conduct. They should engage closely with stakeholders and actively seek to improve public

understanding of computing and its consequences.

The last point, and the comparison of professional ethics in emergency response, where a ‘social

contract’ stipulates responsibilities for wider society, highlights a need for society to also take more

responsibility for the beneficence and non-maleficence of IT. There are some codes of conduct that

seek to support such societal responsibility, for example the UK’s police national computer user

manual, which defines user responsibilities in line with the Data Protection Act. However, such codes

of conduct for the use of IT currently place an undue burden on individuals and collaborating teams,

because at present, technologies are not designed to support understanding of complex information

systems. It was noted that this poses a significant challenge and opportunity for the BRIDGE project.

A brief excursus into emerging formulations of ethics in the information society then concluded the

review of codes of conduct, highlighting that these codes of societal ethics all incorporate calls for

more active and knowledgeable public participation in IT innovation in all walks of life. However, the

somewhat blue-eyed vagueness of ideas expressed here led into a critical evaluation of the usefulness

of ethical guidelines and professional codes of conduct. We might add to this doubt over the utility of

philosophically and intellectually principled ethical stances formulated in relation to fictitious

scenarios and end this chapter in an attitude of wisdom. We suggest that, while we might have learnt

much from the investigation so far, we do not fully understand practices of noticing and managing

ethical, legal and social issues in IT supported large-scale multi-agency emergency response. A ‘full’

understanding of these practices will remain elusive, but we can reach a firmer grasp. The next

chapters will explore legal issues and social issues to work towards this.




61

4 Legal Issues Although state responses to disasters have a long history, Emergency Law is not an established sub

field of jurisprudence. A significant part of the contributions have originated during the twenty-first

century11

and published works are of an eclectic nature. The scarcity of legal instruments becomes

even more apparent when it comes to “current practices” and if the focus is narrowed down to “IT-

supported multi agency emergency response” the lack of material is obvious. This does not mean that

the existing legal doctrine can be disregarded however. IT supported emergency management relevant

in the BRIDGE project must take a number of things into consideration.

Most importantly, the acceptance of IT supported tools of this kind in an international setting

presupposes coordination with established rule systems, fragmented as they may be. Likewise, as any

development of a significantly new kind of IT-system is likely to provide new opportunities and give

rise to new demands, there is a need to relate to recognized legal strategies and policies. Consequently,

as a basis for an analysis of future potentialities for common practices and foreseeable standards for

BRIDGE type of systems it is necessary to research the legal context. To present a tool for emergency

management without a good understanding of the administrative framework is not possible. The legal

context must be observed despite whether it is satisfactory or not. In the first situation because the

system must comply to established rules and standards, in the latter case because new problems and/or

the need for legal reforms should be identified.

While Emergency Law12

is a conception in the process of being defined, disasters are not omitted

from the legal discourse. Issues related to disasters have been addressed separately in a variety of legal

contexts for a long time. Relevant material can be found in works dealing with Governmental Law

(e.g. regarding preconditions for declaring states of emergencies), Criminal Law (e.g. concerning acts

of terrorism), Procedural Law (e.g. about legitimate use of surveillance mechanisms), Military Law

(e.g. on the use of military resources in rescue operations), Insurance Law (on the allocation of

responsibilities and liability), International Law and Laws of War (lately restored in the conceived

“war on terror”).

In addition, at detailed level a large number of regulative instruments are related to the effective

managing of disasters and states of emergencies. Most significant are several parts of Administrative

Law. Illustrations are acts and ordinances providing rule bases for rescue organisations such as the

police, fire departments and health care. Of relevance are also laws stipulating that public authorities

and municipalities shall perform risk analysis and provide guidelines with the purpose of protecting

critical infrastructures and preventing accidents for enterprises operating within their area of

responsibility. Developed with the distinct purpose of avoiding mishaps and enhancing security are

furthermore innumerable standards for various types of industrial projects, constructions, energy

production, handling of food products, transports, etc. In this perspective, viewing the legal system as

a means to avoid and handle problems, the legal sub sections that may be relevant to include in a

survey of Emergency Law are difficult to overlook and delimit.

More recently issues relating to privacy and personal integrity have attracted growing attention in this

context. The background being that the ambition to create a secure society easily can result in a

society in which everything and everybody is monitored more or less continuously. In this way

11

Hufnagel, S, Roach, K, Conclusion, in Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012, p. 539 [I]t

would have been difficult to contemplate a volume of 18 chapters being devoted to emergency law before

9/11 [2001]. 12

Sometimes Disaster Law is used as a synonym. See e.g. the International Federation of Red Cross and Red

Crescent Societies “www.ifrc.org/what-we-do/idrl”.




62

security mechanisms may become a threat to an open society and as surveillance technology become

more advanced, this is a growing concern. In this respect Emergency Law can be understood as a

means to balance security initiatives against human rights, privacy and ethical considerations with the

objective to preserve an open society and vindicate democracy. The latter is clearly reflected in the

continuous debate in Government Law about how to regulate states of emergency.

The increased debate about privacy issues is merely one illustration of the dynamics in the field.

Emergency Law in several ways is an open concept. Not only does an increased political focus on

disasters, more resources for security research and technical developments make it necessary to revise

and reformulate legal solutions more or less continuously. Noticeable is also that new events

drastically may alter the picture and recast the agenda. Disasters are per definition unscheduled and

the development in the security sector is to a large extent incident driven. Events like 9/11, the

hurricane Katrina, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the multiphase Fukushima disaster all

significantly changed the understanding of legal requirements and possible legal remedies. In several

cases unpredicted events have initiated substantial reorganisations of agencies responsible for

preventing and minimising consequences of future disasters. An increased need to coordinate various

activities has also lead to the establishment of new authorities with broad responsibilities, replacing

specialised agencies.13

Stakeholders and the categories of people potentially affected by notions of Emergency Law are

impossible to define in advance. Consequences of crises are not only a concern of victims, rescue

personnel, volunteers and media. Emergencies can affect any branch of society and all kind of

enterprises without geographical limitations – we may all in various ways be affected by a multitude

of potential disasters. Legal issues that can be related to Emergency Law are impossible to delimit in

any distinct way.

Another precondition is that the various kinds of regulations that may be related to Emergency Law

are of a multifaceted nature from a formal point of view. Some relevant provisions, e.g. concerning

privacy and the right to declare states of emergences may be found in constitutions. Other sets of rules,

e.g. concerning use of military resources and health care administration, may have been enacted

through specific laws or ordinances. Still other normative instruments may be the result of agreements

on cooperation between various organizations and/or self- and co-regulation. The domain also exhibit

a rich variety of soft law instruments, e.g. memorandums, resolutions, statements and guidelines. In

many incidents it is relevant and necessary to include material from several jurisdictions and interpret

international agreements. The consequence being that it may be difficult to identify, retrieve and

comprise the relevant legal material in actual instances of crises. To amend or revise the material may

be even more problematic as responsibilities, formal competence and interests often are divided.

13

The most noticeable example is the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in the U.S.A.

combining 22 different federal departments and agencies into a unified, integrated cabinet agency established

in 2002. After the September 11 2001, terrorist attacks the original intention was to revise and coordinate a

comprehensive national strategy to safeguard the country against terrorism and respond to any future attacks.

The mission has thereafter been modified and broadened, see “www.dhs.gov”. A similar development can be

seen in Sweden where the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) in 2009 replaced several agencies in

the security sector in order to improve coordination and efficiency. An incentive for this reorganisation was

the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, affecting 20 000-30 000 Swedish citizens in the area. The Swedish rescue

operation was heavily criticised – more than 540 Swedes were killed and over 1.500 injured were in need of

emergency medical help and transportation. See “www.msb.se/en”. An example of a more stable and

distributed rescue organisation is the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) in Germany, founded in

1950, preceded by a similar organization established in the wake of WWI 1919, see “stiftung-thw.de”.




63

4.1 A Common Practice?

From the ambiguous definition of Emergency Law follows that an overview over current practices

must take a number of factors into consideration. To delimit Emergency Law is a complicated task,

and if the ambition is to provide a distinct impression for a region encompassing several jurisdictions

the undertaking becomes even more problematic. Legal rules are often enacted at different points of

time, and laws may have been revised independently of each other, disregarding the fact that they

address the same problem. Noticeable is also that the ways in which these issues are dealt with vary a

lot between different countries, and sometimes also geographically within states. In addition, many

organisations embrace different traditions, and both practical and administrative presuppositions vary.

Use of various languages and lack of standardized terminology impose other kinds of problems.

An important precondition is also that disasters may affect all aspects of society and frequently do so

in unpredictable ways. From this follows not only that emergency responses have to be improvised

and diversified but also that the set of rules that may apply often will be of an ad hoc nature.

Consequently, to claim that there exists a common practice for the employment of Disaster Law would

be false.

Another observation is that within the EU so called “macro-regions” are emerging, partly prompted by

security concerns. Examples are provided by the EUSDR (EU Strategy for the Danube Region)14

and

EUSBSR (EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region).15

Such initiatives may lead to increased

coordination and enhanced efficiency within a region, but may in the long time perspective result in a

fragmentation of the EU framework. Similar negative effects may also be the result of the

development of emergency management at the EU level as such, as the cooperation may duplicate and

in some aspects clash with existing bilateral or regional international agreements or arrangements

which have been established within the UN.16

To establish a common international practice may also be problematic due to that the member states

face threats of various kinds and/or may want to allocate their resources differently.17

The fact that Emergency Law is an open concept is clearly reflected in the literature. The vast majority

of works of relevance for emergency research are case studies analysing specific events. Few such

studies have been initiated with the primary goal of providing a broad inventory of legal aspects.

Analysis of causes, descriptions of how events have unfolded, incidents responses and lessons learned

are the main focus. If addressed at all, legal issues are often dealt with in an unstructured and

superficial manner.

In depth studies of Emergency Law are however not lacking. The material can be structured in various

ways and broad international initiatives exist, aiming to bridge the gap between different traditions. In

this review three areas of concern are highlighted; the constitutional basis for disaster response,

legislative strategies and international cooperation. Each aspect suggested to be important for the

understanding of the preconditions for further development of collaborative practices in multi agency

emergency collaboration. Features relevant because IT-based support tools must not violate

fundamental rights, they must be in-cooperated with national strategies as well as administrative

structures, and preferably integrated with international developments.

14

“www.danube-region.eu”. 15

“www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu”. 16

Olsson, Stefan (ed.), Crisis Management in the European Union: Cooperation the Face of Emergencies,

Springer, Dordrecht 2009 p. 8-9. 17

Olsson, supra note 16.




64

4.2 The Constitutional Basis for Disaster Response

A large portion of the discussion found under the heading Emergency Law deals with the conditions

for declaring states of emergencies. The assumed precondition being that states of emergencies require

powers not usually provided by the legal order. Emergency Law has been described as law “outside

the legal order” as “[t]here exist no norm that is applicable to chaos. For a legal order to make sense a

normal situation must exist…”.18

Is has also been suggested that “legal norms cannot apply in a state

of emergency” and that “a state of emergency is a lawless void, a legal black hole, in which the state

acts unconstrained by law”.19

From the fact that Emergency Law is interpreted as an extraordinary phenomenon follows that a

considerable part of the literature focuses on how a state should respond to emergencies requiring

actions outside the legal order, and at the same time avoid outright dictatorship outside the

constitution. Needless to say this is a fundamental issue and a precondition for upholding democracy

and legitimacy. Beyond doubt is also that use of extraordinary powers is a delicate manner that require

serious attention. History provides countless examples of the opposite – extraordinary power to a

sovereign can easily be used for political purposes, discrimination and abuse, sometimes for indecisive

periods of time. Apparent is also that consequences of the latter can be more severe than the effects of

the event that originally motivated the exception from normal state of affairs.

Consequently, much of the discussion under this heading is about how to “design checks and balances

to ensure … against the normalization of the state of emergency”,20

and how to create a formal

framework that can minimize the risks. A review of the literature thus reveals a multifaceted

discourse, drawing from a long tradition and including analyses of the role of elected parties, courts,

legislature, a free press, etc. References to Greek experiments with variants of democracy, ancient

Roman dictatorships as well as seventeen century philosophers are frequent.21

Contributions also

include in depth analysis of writings by twenty century fascist thinker Carl Schmitt as well as

renowned legal philosophers such as Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart and Richard Dworkin. Theories such

as liberalism, fascism, constitutionalism and bureaucracy are used in order to systemize various lines

of reasoning.

Perhaps the most elaborated contribution on how to create a formal framework for emergencies and

also a frequently referred article is The Emergency Constitution by Bruce Ackerman published in

2004.22

Apart from presenting a broad historical account Ackerman proposes a formal framework

which he refers to as “the supermajoritarian escalator”. In essence a formal set of rules giving power

to the executive “for the briefest period – long enough for the legislature to convene and consider the

matter, but no longer”. It is suggested that “the state of emergency should expire unless it gains

majority approval. But this is only the beginning. Majority support should serve to sustain the

18

Schmitt, Carl, Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität Duncker & Humblot,

Berlin 1922, (trans George Schwab, Political Theology, Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty,

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005 p. 13). 19

Dyzenhaus, David, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order? in

Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012 p. 4. 20

Dyzenhaus, supra note 19, p. 14. 21

See e.g. Ferejohn, J., Pasquino, P, The Law of the Excepton: A Typoplogy of Emergency Powers. In

Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012 p. 63-92. 22

Ackerman, Bruce, The Emergency Constitution. In Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012, p.

307-369.




65

emergency for a short time – two or three months. Continuation should require an escalating cascade

of supermajorities: sixty per cent for the next two months; seventy for the next; eighty thereafter”.23

Closely connected to states of emergencies is the right to go to war and to give extensive powers to a

leader in order to defend the state. The rationale being that military responses usually require rapid

actions in order to eliminate external threats and that democratic mechanisms have to stand back. The

concept of “war” is thus also a frequent reference used in order to legitimate use of extraordinary

powers, Apart from war in the traditional meaning (use of force between independent states) the

notion of religious war has been the basis for various types of acts including use of force against

civilians and crusades. In the beginning of the twenty-first century the “war on terror” has played a

similar role. Critics have pointed out that a continuous broadening of the concept of war eventually

may lead to a situation where extraordinary means are used in order to legitimate almost any type of

state action, e.g. in wars against “environmental pollution”, “poverty”, “crime”, “drugs”, “dangerous

religions” or simply “dangerous thinkers”.24

The debate is in no way fading in intensity, on the contrary. A current example is the on-going

controversy about the legality of covert state surveillance of telecommunications and the internet.25

In

the U.S.A. motivated by the need to fight terrorism in a “war on terror”. The surveillance arguably

legal according to a time limited state of emergency “Patriot Act”,26

but heavily criticised as violating

human rights and the privacy of individuals. The war metaphor has also been a basis for detaining

“illegal combatants” without trial for more than a decade.27

Critical counter arguments being that acts

of terror are criminalized and thus something that should be dealt with by criminal law, and that

anybody accused of committing criminal acts and deprived the freedom have the right to have the case

tried in a court proceeding (the legal principle of habeas corpus).

The design of a formal framework for use of extraordinary powers in states of emergencies is not the

only sub topic that has attracted a lot of attention. Also the constitutional basis for engaging military

forces in rescue operations is a debated issue. In several countries use of military force on its own

territory is prohibited by the constitution based on the principle that no one should engage the military

against its own people. At first sight this restriction may appear unmotivated if the purpose is to assist

in pure rescue activities, but in practice the employment of military resources is often problematic. For

one thing because the concept of emergency lacks a commonly accepted definition. Is it e.g. legitimate

to consider large scale protests, demonstrations, or strikes as emergencies, and further, if such events

bring about riots or counter demonstrations, who is going to decide when and to what extent military

resources can be used? Likewise, if natural disasters bring about violence and looting in peoples

struggle for survival, or if criminals take advantage of disasters, what means can the military use in

order to uphold the order? Other complications lie in fact that chains of command may become

unclear if the engagement expands and interfere with the responsibility of the police and other civil

23

Ackerman, supra note 22 p. 325. 24

See e.g. Steinert, Heinz. 2003. The Indispensable Metaphor of War: On Populist Politics and the

Contradictions of the State’s Monopoly of Force, Theoretical Criminology 7.3 (2003) p. 265-291 “tcr.

sagepub.com/content/7/3/265.full.pdf”. 25

See e.g. 2013 mass surveillance disclosures “en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_mass_ surveillance_disclosures”. 26

See e.g. Scheppele, K.L. North American Emergencies: The Use of Emergency Powers in Canada and the

United States. In Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012, p. 131-161. 27

See e.g. Bring, Ove, De mänskliga rättigheternas väg – genom historien och litteraturen, Atlantis,

Stockholm 2011, p. 570-590.




66

agencies. Recently also uncertainties relating to costs have hampered or delayed decisions of this

kind.28

Although general and sometimes relatively theoretical it is obvious that the constitutional aspect of

Emergency Law is relevant from the perspective of the BRIDGE project. Constitutional Law provides

a necessary framework for all type of emergency responses and in the EU the Directive on personal

data fulfils a similar function stipulating that “if it is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of

the data subject” or if it “is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or

in the exercise of official authority…”29

several provisions concerning prohibition against the

processing of personal data can be overruled. In practice this is a meta norm providing legal ground

for making exceptions in events of disasters.

Other issues that may become relevant in situations where new types of emergency management

systems are being used relate to Human rights. It is for instance easy to see that various governmental

actions in order to mitigate consequences of disasters can be interpreted as over reactions, severely

hampering peoples’ rights, e.g. large scale evacuations, extensive surveillance, use of quarantines, or

other ways of depriving people of liberty or property. In some jurisdictions these things may be

regulated in one way or another but as the technology develops and new emergency management

systems are being presented the need to specify and elaborate an authoritative constitutional

framework may become critical.

Additional components usually regulated by Constitutional Law, indirectly affecting the design of

emergency management systems like BRIDGE are the principles of freedom of information and

freedom of the press. Both of which affect how data processed by the system can be communicated

externally, upholding the balance between transparency and the need to protect sensitive information.

As for other constitutional aspects of Emergency Law, e.g. the formal framework for declaring states

of emergencies, means to delimit the risks of misuse of powers, and the preconditions for the use of

military resources, the discussion cannot be elaborated on here. Although emergency management

relevant to scenarios envisioned in the BRIDGE project in several ways may require extraordinary

powers (e.g. mandate to employ extensive forms of surveillance and processing of personal data,

initiate evacuations, quarantines and/or sealing off personal property ) it is also so that many

situations do not necessarily require formal states of emergencies or actions not provided for in the

constitution. And even if severe events may affect the preconditions for deployment of BRIDGE and

simultaneously call for extraordinary declarations of states of emergencies, any further analysis of

constitutional strategies to manage such scenarios lies outside the scope of this work.

4.3 Legislative Strategies

4.3.1 General Laws vs. Detailed Regulations

Use of various legislative strategies considerably affect the ways in which emergency collaboration

can be carried out in practice. This simply because various types of legislative techniques significantly

determined how systems can be designed and employed. Several differences can be perceived. One

28

See e.g. Head, Michael, The Military Call-out Legislation, in Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate,

Farnham, 2012, p. 195-216, Samek, Joshua, M. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, in p. 255-279

Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012, and Dougherty, Candidus, While the Government

Fiddled Around, the Big Easy Drowned, in Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012,p. 163-193. 29

Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of

individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, Articles 7

d-e.




67

apparent distinction is between regulations addressing all types of emergencies and case specific

regulations30

and in between these extremes a mixture of more or less general regulative approaches

can be found. Goal oriented general legislation may simply state that IT systems in specific domains

must be designed in order to fulfil a certain purpose and/or adhere to a certain standard, and leave it to

the designers to decide how that goal should be achieved. Legislation may however also be very

detailed and explicitly define the functions and procedures that must be included in the system design,

the latter is for instance the case with the currently proposed EU regulation for the processing of

personal data, stipulating requirements concerning e.g. purpose, forms of consent, security, disclosure,

access, retention etc..31

The reasons for variations concerning the level of generality in regulations differ. Adherence to

separate legal traditions like common law (prioritizing case decisions) and civil law (prioritizing

general rules in legislation) is one obvious explanation but differences will in many instances also be a

reflection of how risk- and emergency related activities have been organized. A diversified

organization encompassing many public agencies with limited responsibilities is likely to produce

more specific rules than a more centralized authority. In this respect mandates may be functionally

separated and sometimes also geographically restricted.

To have any distinct opinion about the level of generality that is best suited in emergency management

is not possible. From the functional point of view the most important aspect is that various pieces of

legislation harmonize so that gaps, clashes and confusion is eliminated. In theory, however, general

type of legislation is usually understood as having advantages in the sense that it:32

is flexible with respect to differences in various situations and changing circumstances,

is possible to apply despite shifting values and new information, e.g. concerning

categorization of risks and means to avoid them,

can be applied despite regional and local variances,

allocates more responsibility and motivation to judges and other decision makers,

provides normative guidance despite incomplete knowledge about underlying facts,

conceal political disputes.

General type of legislation can at he same time be criticised as:

lacking precision and being a poor steering instrument,

increasing the risk for variations in practice,

being difficult to understand,

being difficult to predict, e.g. whether it will be implemented passively or used actively,

blurring the separation of powers between legislator and legal decision maker (erodes

democracy).

30

See Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012 Part V: Articles on All risk Emergency Regulation

or Case Specific Regulation. 31

See “ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf”. 32

See Tala, Jyrki, Lagstiftningsforskning – ett nödvändigt perspektiv inom rättsvetenskapen, i Gräns, Minna,

Westerlund, Staffan (red) Interaktiv rättsvetenskap, Uppsala universitet 2006.




68

Specific, detailed legislation, on the other hand, is usually understood as having advantages in

the sense that it:

is a precise steering mechanism,

facilitates the work of the decision maker,

increases predictability and uniformity,

clarifies the responsibility between legislator and legal decision maker,

reflects many ideals of legisprudence, i.e. simplicity and clarity.

Specific legislation can at he same time be criticised as:

domain complexity may require many sets of rules, which increases the risk for overlaps,

contradictions and rule clashes,

it is difficult to avoid gaps and grey zones which should have been covered,

comprehensive sets of rules are difficult to learn and administer,

rapid changes in the domain require frequent amendments of the legislation,

it may in specific cases lead to unacceptable (illegitimate) results, which in turn may require

the decision maker to find means to circumvent the rules.

Although general and specific regulation may have different advantages and consequences, the

decision how to prioritize between them cannot be made in a vacuum. Several factors, e.g. political

disagreements, lack of in-depth knowledge about the problem, few operative agencies and rapid

technical developments in the domain often result in general type of legislation. The consequence

being that it is a risk that the negative effects that can be related to this type of regulation manifest

themselves.

Important to observe is however that general and specific type of regulation do not exclude each other.

The power to specify general legislation may be delegated downwards in a regulative hierarchy, from

constitutions, via acts of law and ordinances to standards and common practices. If this is done in a

consistent and systematic way, general type of legislation reflecting political goals may be specified

by responsible agencies, and to some extent the advantages of both types of legislation may be

combined. In practice this means that sets of rules relevant to emergencies can be of more or less

specific nature and manifest themselves in various constellations depending on the jurisdiction. Such a

strategy however entails proficient coordination, and as indicated above, this is not a trivial

undertaking.

4.3.2 Ad hoc Political Response or Long Term Oriented Legislative Reforms?

As illustrated in the preceding section it is possible to separate between provisions scattered in

complex administrative frameworks on the one hand, and consistent, goal oriented general legislation

on the other. This is in no way unique for emergency legislation, the situation is similar in many

sectors of society and is usually a reflection of how frequent a rule system has been updated. When a

new problem appears there is usually a ministry, authority or agency dealing with similar matters in

place, and to expand the responsibility to the established organization is the obvious first choice. This

in turn often leads to a situation where an already implemented piece of legislation or an ordinance

will be amended in an ad hoc fashion. If such a practice is followed for a longer period of time,

however, there is a risk that regulations that ought to be coordinated become separated.




69

Changes affecting the needs of the domain may e.g. be consequences of new technology,

internationalization or simply a reflection of the fact that the complexity of society increases as more

functions become integrated and interdependent. Eventually such a development may lead to a

situation where the formal allocation of responsibilities will cease to correlate with the requirements of

the domain, and if the legislator continues to issue specific provisions to an outdated administrative

structure, this will eventually result in fragmented and non-functional legislation.

Shortcomings related to outdated administrative structures in emergency management are well

documented in the literature.33

As mentioned, the development of emergency related legislation is

significantly incident driven as new events frequently reveal new needs. From the legislator’s point of

view new demands can be meet either by an ad hoc strategy, adding new provision to an established

set of rules and by giving more resources to an established organization. Alternatively, the legislator

can embrace a functionally oriented tactic, acknowledging the need to continuously revise underlying

administrative structures and, when appropriate, initiate extensive law reforms.

From a functional point of view it is obvious that the preconditions for collaboration in emergencies in

most cases benefit if the latter approach is preferred. From the legislators point of view, however, it

may often be impractical to initiate broad legislative reforms, e.g. because political consensus is

lacking, or there is a need to act vigorously. Ad hoc solutions are comparatively easier to manage and

can usually be implemented more rapidly, but eventually this may lead to a situation in which the

legislation is considered to be an outdated, hampering factor.

4.3.3 Proactive, Mitigating or Reactive Legislation?

Legislative strategies can also be measured on a proactive – reactive scale. The proactive policy

aiming to avoid incidents before they occur by means of implementing legislation with the aim of

enhancing security and eliminating risks, and the reactive approach, focusing on how to determine

responsibilities, impose sanctions for erroneous behaviour, and restore conditions to an agreed

standard so that they are ‘suitable for use’ for their defined future purposes. Between these two types

one can identify legislation intended to be activated during events, i.e. laws with the aim to facilitate

managing and mitigate consequences of on-going events.

Olsson et al, in a recent analysis of EU initiatives decompose the phases related to disaster

management somewhat differently and identifies what they call the “EU Crisis management cycle”

comprising prevention, preparation, response and recovery.34

Traditionally, the legal system can be described primarily as a reactively working phenomena. The

court system being the most forthright illustration. Most court proceedings deal with events that

already have occurred, and the focus is on analysing what has happened and how it should be

interpreted. Often with the explicit purpose of identifying responsible agents and determining whether

or not sanctions or liability should be applied. Indirectly this means that recovery and restoration is a

underlying purpose.

The reactive attitude can be contrasted to many other fields of human activity where reliance on

proactive routines to avoid mistakes is a self-evident feature. In the foregoing respect the legal system

is to a large extent atypical. Lawyers tend to work reactively, i.e. their efforts focus on solving

problems that have already arisen. The proactive approach is not unknown in the legal sphere, but in

33

See e.g. Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012 passim. 34


Springer, Dordrecht 2009 p. 11 with further reference to Drennan LT, McConnell A., Risk and crisis

management in the public sector. Routledge, New York 2007 and Alexander D., Principles of emergency

planning and management. Oxford University, New York 2002.




70

this respect various legal sub domains and jurisdictions reflect differences. Proactive law is a

comparatively recently introduced notion and so far systematic attempts to change the legislation may

have been more or less successful in various settings.35

The legal sector is usually conservative and

traditional paradigms may be difficult to recast. Likewise legislation with the explicit purpose of

facilitating incident management and consequence mitigation may be more or less common among

different agencies involved in emergencies. In a serious analysis of how development of common

practices can proceed it is therefore necessary to clarify to what extent various rule systems correlate

in this manner.

Various degrees of proactive – reactive approaches are also reflected in how public authorities are

organised. Also here it is possible to se a continuous development, from organisations with restricted,

reactive tasks, towards agencies with broader, more proactive obligations.36

Apparent is furthermore

that the situation varies in different countries and jurisdictions, and that effective cooperation is

depending on that differences in this respect are observed and addressed. And although an effective

proactive approach, preventing disasters usually is a better alternative as compared to being dependent

on rescue operations and post disaster actions, it is obvious that there is a need for many types of

regulations, ensuring managing and coordination of proactive/mitigating/reactive/restoring functions.

To recall in this context is also that many disasters are unpredicted and that practical as well as legal

response to some extent therefore always will be of a reactive nature.

4.4 Summary

As a consequence of various traditions and previous developments in different jurisdictions legislation

of relevance for emergency response is heterogeneous. Likewise responsibilities and the arrangement

of organisations active in the domain vary a lot. An analysis of legislative strategies reveal differences

in at least three dimensions: the nature of the rule systems can be categorised as being more or less

general or specific, reform policies may be primarily long term oriented or of an ad hoc nature, and the

focus of the existing legislation may to various degrees be set on proactive, mitigating or reactive

remedies.

Each of the aforementioned approaches reflect adequate requirements and a rich variety of

mechanisms are important for effective emergency management. When the focus is set on

collaboration it is thus apparent that there is a need to analyse to what extent various types of rules

governing the organisations involved have to be adjusted and/or complemented in order to function as

a integrated whole. General rules must be complemented with specific provisions and standards. Short

term solutions and long term objectives should harmonize, and proactive regulations must be

complemented with mitigating, reactive and restoring measurements.

35

See e.g. Wahlgren, Peter, A Proactive Approach, Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law 2006

(Scandinavian Studies in Law Vol 49). 36

Cf note 13 supra.




71

5 International Cooperation

5.1 Emergency Response, Local, Federal, State or Regional?

A fundamental precondition for all types of emergency response and crisis management is

cooperation. In most situations joint efforts by several agencies is the natural procedure. This is

apparent on a local basis, but the magnitude of the crisis, type of consequences, the geographical

preconditions, etc., may also call for international cooperation. In this respect efficient disaster

management is depending on preparedness and extensive planning for joint efforts, and in order to

understand the preconditions for further development of “current practices in emergency

management” it is necessary to investigate international activities. No system in this domain can exist

in a vacuum, trends and actors involved in potential standardisation must be observed. An

international survey of regulative initiatives is of course also necessary in order to identify

organisations and structures that may facilitate a broad dissemination of the BRIDGE system.

International cooperation that can be related to disaster management take many different forms.

Examples are the establishment of common standards and proceedings, coordination, joint training

and educational activities,37

the setting up of specific agencies with its own resources38

and the work

of non-governmental organisations.39

Some efforts encompass a whole region, others are of a bilateral

nature. Cooperation may also be of a more or less all-encompassing nature or be oriented towards a

specific sector and in the following international cooperation is exemplified. The focus is set on

projects in which regulative ambitions are manifest. Three initiatives are addressed, the works of the

European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and the Disaster Law Programme indorsed by the

international Red Cross and the Red Crescent.

The intention is not to provide any in depth description of the selected organizations, nor to present

how the work has been organized in different countries. The latter vary a lot and an overview over the

structure of security related functions in 51 countries can be found in the International CEP Handbook

2009: Civil Emergency Planning in the NATO/EAPC Countries.40

The CEP Handbook presents forms

of government, structures of civil emergency planning (tasks and objectives, organizational

structures), civil-military co-operations and legal frameworks for each country. In addition facts about

what is presented as “the seven most relevant organizations to Civil Emergency Planning” is included,

viz the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),

UN, EU, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe

and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

An even broader inventory, including several hundred organisations working with disaster

management and risk reduction is provided by the so called PreventionWeb.41

The webpage makes it

37

See e.g. for maritime rescue operations the International Maritime Organisation “www.imo.org/Pages/

home.aspx” and the International Maritime Rescue Federation “/www.international-maritime-rescue.org”. 38

See e.g. Interpol, “www.interpol.int/”. 39

See e.g. The International Rescue Committee “www.rescue.org/” providing emergency relief, post-conflict

development and resettlement services for those uprooted or affected by violent conflict and oppression. 40

“www.msb.se/RibData/Filer/pdf/24677.pdf”. 41

“www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/contacts/” PreventionWeb is a project of the UN Office for

Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) (see further below section 5.3.4). It is presented as part of the Hyogo

Framework, “a global blueprint for disaster risk reduction efforts with a ten-year plan”, adopted in January

2005 by 168 governments at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan. See

also, for a list of Organisations involved in disaster management with a global ambition, the webpage of The

World Confederation for Physical Therapy “www.wcpt.org/node/36994”.




72

possible to retrieve information about relevant organisations related to type, various kinds of hazards,

regions, countries and what is called themes, e.g. disaster risk management, early warning etc.

Another ambitious illustration, concentrating on a specific sector, is the International CIIP Handbook

2008/09, providing an inventory of critical information infrastructure protection policies.42

The

handbook focuses on national governmental efforts to protect critical (information) infrastructure (CII)

with the overall purpose to provide an overview of CII protection. For 25 countries and 7 international

organizations43

the handbook identifies critical sectors, related initiatives and policies and the

organizational structure. The study also describes early warning mechanisms and reviews law and

legislation of relevance for information infrastructure protection.

The most comprehensive collection of available legal documents is the Disaster Law Database set up

by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.44

The database contains

legal and policy instruments related to disaster management from the international, regional, national,

provincial and local levels. As of December 2013 the database comprises more than 1000 documents.

At the international and regional levels these include: treaties, resolutions and declarations of

intergovernmental organizations, exchanges of notes and letters, memoranda of understanding,

guidelines, codes, models, and other “soft law”. At the national, provincial and local levels the

database includes disaster-related laws, regulations and policies, relevant portions of national laws

relevant to international disaster assistance. The database also provides references to articles, book

chapters and reports relevant to disaster law.

5.2 The EU Legal Framework

Emergency management within EU is a complex matter. A comprehensive and well researched

survey of the system published in 2009 initially claims that “different types of initiatives exist almost

everywhere, they overlap, they are founded on different types legal documents or different treaties,

and they play different roles in different stages of a crisis, some are operative on a daily basis while

some are sleeping until activated.”45

Some 150 pages later it is concluded that it is “evident .. the crisis

management system of the Union is not the result of one master plan” and that “perhaps even to call it

a ‘system’ is too much since it has no overall administrative logic and since the EU itself has no self-

image of its own crisis management organisation”.46

Activities take various forms, e.g. as policy initiatives, establishment of administrative bodies,

practical efforts with the purpose of pooling resources, risk reducing activities and relief operations.

Initiatives manifest themselves in different sectors and at different levels, between agencies, countries,

42

Brunner, Elgin M., Suter, Manuel, International CIIP Handbook 2008/09: An inventory of 25 national and 7

international critical information infrastructure protection policies. Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich.

“www.isn.ethz.ch/ Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/ ?id=91952” 43

The EU, The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), Group of Eight (G8), NATO,

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), UN, and the World Bank Group. 44

”www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/idrl-database/”. 45

Larsson, P., Hagström Frisell, E., Olsson, S., Understanding the Crisis Management System of the European

Union, in Olsson, Stefan (ed.), Crisis Management in the European Union: Cooperation the Face of

Emergencies, Springer, Dordrecht 2009 p. 1. 46

Olsson, S., Larsson, P., The Future of Crisis Management within the European Union. In Olsson, Stefan

(ed.), Crisis Management in the European Union: Cooperation the Face of Emergencies, Springer, Dordrecht

2009 p. 157 and 167.




73

in regions and in EU as such. Apparent is also that the development of disaster management within the

EU is an ongoing, dynamic process.

Although it is difficult to grasp the initiatives as an integrated whole it is possible to identify several

important initiatives and to some extent provide a picture of the organizational structure, although

incomplete and prismatic.

5.2.1 The Commission’s European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)

Several initiatives and mechanisms of relevance for emergency management have been presented. The

Commission’s European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was created in 1992.47

In 2004

ECHO became the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid. Civil Protection and a better

coordination and disaster response inside and outside Europe were added as responsibilities in 2010.48

ECHO has more than 300 people working in its headquarters in Brussels and more than 400 in 44 field

offices located in 38 countries around the world. In order to implement humanitarian operations,

ECHO cooperates with over 200 partners (14 United Nations agencies, 191 non-governmental

organizations and 3 international organizations: i.e. the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red

Crescent, the International Federation of the Red Cross/Red Crescent and the International

Organisation for Migration).49

ECHO’s response to the increasing number, frequency and intensity of natural disasters, especially

those related to the effects of climate change, has been to incorporate disaster risk reduction (DRR)

into its strategic planning50

and in this respect the work aims to be distinctly proactive. DRR being

defined as:

“The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse

and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards,

lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the

environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events”.

ECHO funding for DRR projects has increased significantly in the last decade, the current DRR

policy prioritizes support for activities that are ‘people orientated’: enabling local communities and

institutions to increase their resilience to disaster by reducing their vulnerability to hazards.51

ECHO

has a limited operational capacity and its financing of humanitarian aid is mainly administrated

through cooperation with non-governmental bodies, such as UN and the Red Cross.52

47

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid (OJ L 163,

2.7.1996, p. 1), (consolidated version of original document), available at “eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/

LexUriServ.do?uri= CONSLEG:1996R1257:20090420:EN:PDF”. 48

“ec.europa.eu/echo/about/presentation_en.htm”. 49


European Commission, Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), Disaster Preparedness and Prevention (DPP):

State of play and strategic orientations for EC policy: Working Paper 2003, ”ec.europa.eu/echo/files/

policies/dipecho/dpp_paper.pdf”. 51

See “ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/prevention_preparedness/dipecho_en.htm” and especially, DG ECHO

Thematic Policy Document n° 5, Disaster Risk Reduction: Increasing resilience by reducing disaster risk in

humanitarian action, September 2013, available at “ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/prevention_

preparedness/DRR_ thematic_policy_doc.pdf”. 52

Åhman, T, Nilsson, C, The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection, in Olsson, Stefan (ed.), Crisis

Management in the European Union: Cooperation the Face of Emergencies, Springer, Dordrecht 2009 p. 89.

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/prevention_preparedness/dipecho_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/prevention_preparedness/dipecho_en.htm




74

5.2.2 The EU Civil Protection Mechanism

Described as the key instrument for European civil protection is the Civil Protection Mechanism

(CPM) which was established in 2001. The Mechanism for civil protection is a complex tool covering

prevention, preparedness and response to disasters, including environmental emergencies. 27 EU

Member States plus, Iceland, Norway, Lichtenstein, and former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

participate. The main role of the Mechanism is to facilitate and support the mobilisation and coordina-

tion of European civil protection assistance in the event of major emergencies threatening people, their

environment, property and cultural heritage. Triggering events may be major natural or man-made

disasters, including acts of terrorism and technological, radiological or environmental accidents, and

accidental marine pollution, occurring both inside and outside the EU. The assistance can take

different forms (e.g. in-kind assistance, equipment and teams, sending experts to carry out

assessments). The work relies on government resources and, if assistance is required in third countries,

usually works in parallel with or hands over to humanitarian aid.53

In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, CPM can provide added value to European civil

protection by making support available on request of the affected country. Any country exposed to a

major disaster that overwhelms its national response capacity can appeal for immediate civil

protection assistance through the mechanism. By combining the capabilities of the participating states,

by facilitating the transport of these capabilities and by enabling access to specific additional assets at

EU level, the CPM can ensure better protection, primarily of people, but also of the natural and

cultural environment as well as property.54

The revised legislation on the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (adopted by the European Parliament

10 December 2013, set to come into force at the beginning of 2014) is designed to better protect and

respond to natural and man-made disasters. It will increase the safety of EU citizens and disaster

victims worldwide with provisions that ensure closer cooperation on disaster prevention, better

preparedness and planning, and more coordinated and faster response actions.55

To ensure better prevention, the Member States will regularly share a summary of their risk

assessments, share best practices, and help each other identify where additional efforts are needed to

reduce the disaster risks. A better understanding of risks is also the departure point for planning an

effective response to major disasters.

In the area of disaster preparedness, there will be more training available for civil protection personnel

operating outside their home countries, more exercising of civil protection response capacities (such as

search and rescue teams and field hospitals) and their cooperation, more exchanges of civil protection

and prevention experts and closer cooperation with neighboring countries; all of which will improve

the cooperation of Member States’ teams on the ground.

5.2.3 The European Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERC)

The operational heart of CPM was initially set up as the European Commission’s Monitoring and

Information Centre (MIC). MIC was in May 2013 upgraded and transformed into the European

Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) and it is accessible 24 hours a day, seven days a

week.56

Any country affected by a disaster - European or not - can request European civil protection

53


”ec.europa.eu/echo/about/presentation_en.htm”. 55

EU Civil Protection Legislation “ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/ thematic/civil_protection_

legislation_en.pdf”. 56

ECHO FACTSHEET Emergency Response Centre, “ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/ countries/factsheets/

thematic/ERC_en.pdf”.




75

assistance through the ERC, which will facilitate and support the response by administrating the

assistance provided by the participating states. ERCC will have the capacity to monitor and respond to

disasters, ensuring that the Member States are fully informed of the situation and decide in a

coordinated way about the provision of financial and in-kind assistance.

As examples of support, mention is made of search and rescue teams or shelters in the case of

earthquakes, water-bombing aircrafts to extinguish forest fires, high-capacity pumps in cases of

floods, marine pollution response equipment in case of oil spills, prompt deployment of civil

protection experts to assess the situation and coordinate assistance on site, technical expertise and

high-tech tools, such as satellite images, etc.

So far CPM has responded to many emergencies outside the EU and the EU has a number of

agreements with third countries, regional initiatives and international organisations intended to

facilitate civil protection assistance and to undertake joint preparedness measures. In the past,

however, the ad-hoc character of the assistance administrated by the MIC sometimes made it difficult

to predict and plan relief operations, which therefore suffered avoidable delays. The new ERC is

therefore designed to manage a pre-identified pool of Member States’ response assets – ‘civil

protection intervention modules’ - that can immediately be deployed to any large scale emergency.

The countries participating in the Mechanism commit some of their core resources on standby in a

voluntary pool – ready to be instantly set in motion as part of a coherent European response when the

need arises. It is envisioned that better planning and the preparation of a set of typical disaster

scenarios will further enhance the ERC´s capacity for rapid response.”57

Of special interest for IT related development of disaster management is the EU Common Emergency

Communication and Information System (CECIS). The system is designed in order to facilitate

“communication between the ERCC with National Authorities, making response to disasters faster and

more effective.” The system has several objectives and is intended to function as a tool in prevention

and preparation as well as response phases, by means of facilitate exchange of information and

experience between responsible authorities. The main task of the system is to host a database on

potentially available assets for assistance, to handle requests for assistance on the basis of these data,

to exchange information and to document all action and message traffic58

From a strategic point of view The European civil protection also acknowledge that risk prevention

and preparedness before a disaster takes place is far more efficient as compared to relying on relief,

recovery and reconstruction afterwards. The focus is set on areas where a common European approach

is more effective than separate national activities. In practice this preventive work aims to create an

inventory of information on disasters, facilitate the sharing of best practices, and reinforcing early

warning tools etc.

Preparatory measures, in turn, intend to allow for rapid mobilisation of assistance teams in case of

emergency, ensure effective response capability and support available resources. The EU also supports

cooperation projects helping to prepare communities and the general population. For this purpose it

organises training programmes, exercises during simulated emergencies, exchange of experts

programmes, cooperation projects, and modules provided on a voluntary basis by Participating States

depending on the type and needs of the particular emergency.59

57

“ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/ERC_en.pdf”. 58

” ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/cecis_en.htm” 59

“ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mic_en.htm”.




76

5.2.4 EU Internal Security Strategy in Action

Currently the overall EU policy of relevance in this context is the EU Internal Security Strategy in

Action60

“Five Steps Towards a more Secure Europe” 61

(ISSA) which was adopted in November

2010 and defines strategic objectives and actions for 2011-2014. One of ISS’s objectives is to enhance

Europe’s resilience to crises and disasters with a focus on solidarity in response and responsibility in

prevention and in preparedness. Including an aim to improve risk assessment and risk management of

all potential hazards at the EU-level.62

The initiative was explicitly motivated by references to recent years “increase in the frequency and

scale of natural and man-made disasters in Europe and in its immediate neighbourhood” which has

prompted a need for a stronger, more coherent and better integrated European crisis and disaster

response capacity. Mentioned is also the need to implement existing disaster prevention policies and

legislation concerning among other things climate change, terrorist and cyber attacks on critical

infrastructure, hostile or accidental releases of disease agents and pathogens, sudden flu outbreaks and

failures in infrastructure.

The ambition to increase Europe’s resilience to crises and disasters is related to a number of objectives

aiming to improve long-standing crisis and disaster management practices in terms of efficiency and

coherence. The strategy is assumed to require both solidarity in response, and responsibility in

prevention and preparedness with an emphasis on better risk assessment and risk management at EU

level of all potential hazards. Each objective specified in the ISSA is supported by a small number of

measurable and concrete actions, pointing out responsible organs and a time plan. For increased

resilience to crises and disasters four such concrete actions have been outlined:

1) Making full use of the solidarity clause in the Lisbon Treaty stipulating a legal obligation on the EU

and its Member States to assist each other when a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or a

natural or man-made disaster.63

2) An all-hazards approach to threat and risk assessment by means of developing EU risk assessment

and mapping guidelines for disaster management, based on a multi-hazard and multi-risk approach,

covering in principle all natural and man-made disasters. The action includes specification of national

approaches to risk management, including risk analyses and a cross-sectorial overview of the major

natural and man-made risks that the EU may face in the future.64

3) Linking up different existing situation awareness centers. An action prompted by the insight that an

effective and coordinated response to crises depends on the ability to quickly pull together a

comprehensive and accurate overview of the situation. The ambition being to reinforce the links

between sector-specific early warning and crisis cooperation functions, including those for health,

civil protection, nuclear risk monitoring and terrorism, and make use of EU-led operational programs

60

See“ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/internal-security/internal-security-strategy/index_

en.htm” and “eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? uri=COM:2010:0673:FIN:EN: PDF#page=2”. 61

Besides resilience to crises and disasters the identified steps are: disruption of international criminal

networks, prevention of terrorism and addressing radicalisation and recruitment, raising the levels of security

for citizens and businesses in cyberspace and strengthening security through border management. 62

“ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/crisis-management/index_en.htm”.

See also Council conclusions on the Commission communication on the European Union internal security

strategy in action “ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/pdf/3_council_conclusions_on_the_

iss_en.pdf”. 63

Article 222 TFEU. 64

Council Conclusions on a Community framework on disaster prevention within the EU, November 2009.




77

in order to improve links with EU agencies and the European External Action Service, including the

Situation Centre, and enable better information sharing and, where required.

4) Development of a European Emergency Response Capacity for tackling disasters based on pre-

committed Member States’ assets on-call for EU operations and pre-agreed contingency plans. An

action based on the assumption that efficiency and cost-effectiveness can be improved through shared

logistics, and simpler and stronger arrangements for pooling and co-financing transport assets.

The Commission annually reports on the implementation of the ISS. Apart from describing the state of

the EU internal security in the five objective areas identified in the ISSA the reports contain

operational recommendations for the way forward. The last report on implementation of the ISS will

be presented in mid-2014. It is expected to assess “whether the objectives of the ISS have been met

and also consider future challenges within the field of internal security”65

.

5.2.5 Generic & Cross-sectorial Crisis Coordination: ARGUS, EU-CCA & EU-ICMA

For the EU as such a rapid alert system - ARGUS - has been created at the commission level. The

objective being to better coordinate the Commission’s response capacity by means of strengthening

the instruments ensuring effective and coordinated management of major multi-sectorial crises. As

incentives for the initiative the document containing the provisions defining this cooperation explicitly

mentions the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, the Madrid 2004 and London 2005 terrorist attacks, as

well as foreseeable threats to human health (Influenza Pandemic). ARGUS brings together all relevant

Commission services to coordinate efforts, evaluate the best options for action and decide on the

appropriate response measures during an emergency.66

At a somewhat more detailed level ARGUS aims at

Allowing each Directorate General in the Commission to inform other Directorates General

and services of a beginning or risk of multi-sectoral crisis via an alert exchange.

Providing a coordination process that can be activated in case of crisis: the crisis coordination

committee.

Providing a common source of information that will be used by the Commission to

communicate in an effective and coherent way with citizens.67

Responsibility for handling and coordinating the response to the crisis including communication

aspects should be taken by the relevant Directorate General, under the responsibility of the relevant

Commissioner whose scope of activities usually includes this type of crisis because of its nature. The

coordination with other directorate general is made via Argus network.

ARGUS phase I consists of an internal communication network enabling (via an IT tool) the

Commission services to share in real time relevant information on emerging multisectoral crises or

foreseeable or imminent threat thereof and to coordinate appropriate response within the domain of

competence of Commission.

65

“ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/internal-security/internal-security-strategy/index_en.

htm”. 66

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE

COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF

THE REGIONS Commission provisions on “ARGUS” general rapid alert system, Brussels, 23.12.2005

COM(2005) 662 final ”eurlex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0662:FIN: EN:PDF”. 67

“ec.europa.eu/health/preparedness_response/generic_preparedness/planning/argus_ en. htm”.

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0662:FIN:EN:PDF




78

Argus phase II provides for coordination in the event of a major crisis. A specific operational crisis

management structure (Crisis Coordination Committee) is established to lead and coordinate the

response to the crisis, bringing together representatives of all relevant Commission services.68

ARGUS is thus made up of and coordinates eight different systems: The European Emergency

Response Centre (ERC, formerly MIC) , the European Community Urgent Radiological Information

Exchange System (ECURIE), The Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS), the European

Network of Plant Health Information Systems (EUROPHYT), the Early Warning and Response

System (EWRS), the Rapid Alert System for Non-food Products (RAPEX), the Rapid Alert System for

Food and Feed (RASFF) and the Rapid Alert System for Biological and Chemical Attacks and Threats

(RAS BICHAT).69

Similar and affiliated are two other crises coordination mechanisms that have been set up to enhance

the EU’s crisis management capacity: The EU emergency and crisis coordination arrangements (EU-

CCA) which define rules for interactions between EU institutions and affected EU States during a

crisis,70

and the integrated EU arrangements for crisis management with cross-border effects (EU-

ICMA)71

which facilitate practical cooperation between EU States. These arrangements provide a

generic arrangement for all types of crises, including natural and man-made disasters. The CCA is

intended to facilitate strategic crisis management on a high political level. It is lead by a Crisis

Steering Group and only intended to be activated in extremely rare, rapidly spreading crisis affecting

several member states.72

5.2.6 EU Research Initiatives

In an overview of EU initiatives on disaster management mentions should also be made of the fact that

EU is funding of a large number of research projects, primarily via the so called Framework 7

programme under the heading Security Research.73

5.3 United Nations

5.3.1 The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Similar to the situation in EU emergency management within UN is a diversified and complex

phenomena. Relevant substantial initiatives are administrated by a number of organs. Most central is

the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)74

which in collaboration with the

Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is responsible for bringing together national and

68

Brussels, 20.7.2010 SEC(2010) 911 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER Taking stock of EU

Counter-Terrorism Measures Accompanying document to the COMMUNICATION FROM THE

COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCILThe EU Counter-Terrorism

Policy: main achievements and future challenges ”ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/malm strom/pdf/

news/communication_counter_ terrorism_annex_en.pdf” p. 21. 69

See for more information about ARGUS, “www.msb.se/Upload/Produkter_tjanster/Publikationer/KBM/

RedovisningavEUsvarningssystem.pdf”. 70


Springer, Dordrecht 2009 71

“consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/WEB15106.pdf”. 72

Larsson,. P., The Crisis Coordination Arrangemens (CCA) in In Olsson, Stefan (ed.), Crisis Management in

the European Union: Cooperation the Face of Emergencies, Springer, Dordrecht 2009 p. 127-138. 73

“cordis.europa.eu/fp7/security/fp7-project-leaflets_en.html”. 74

“www.unocha.org/”.

http://ochaonline.un.org/

http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/malmstrom/pdf/news/communication_counter_%20terrorism_annex_en.pdf





79

international humanitarian providers to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. The objectives of

OCHA is to:

Mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with

national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and

emergencies.

Advocate the rights of people in need.

Promote preparedness and prevention.

Facilitate sustainable solutions.

OCHA’s Strategic Framework consist of three parts, presented as: 75

1. Partnerships: broadening the coalition for multilateral humanitarian action

The scale and scope of global challenges requires working together in new ways, with new partners.

Partnership has always been integral to OCHA’s efforts. Sustained relations, built on trust and mutual

respect, are vital when preparing for and responding to humanitarian emergencies. OCHA has a

unique position within the international humanitarian system to convene and influence agendas. The

intention is to do this more strategically, with the aim of creating a more enabling environment for

humanitarian actions

2. Service provider: building a better system

The aim of OCHA is also to ensure that services and support to partners also evolve and meet clients’

needs. The focus is set on helping partners more predictably through humanitarian coordination

leadership, strengthening coordination mechanisms, and improving the evidence base for humanitarian

decision-making, planning and resource allocation.

3. Reliability and professionalism: creating better staffing and surge solutions to be there when it

counts

In 2010, OCHA introduced surge solutions to ensure the right people are on the ground immediately

after a new disaster. This will be coordinated with longer-term staffing to ensure continuity of OCHA

presence.

OCHA also provides the latest information on emergencies worldwide, and launches international

“consolidated appeals” to mobilize financing for the provision of emergency assistance in specific

situations. 76

The office is headed by the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator which in turn,

in a country affected by a disaster or conflict, may appoint a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) to ensure

response efforts are well organized. The HC works with government, international organizations, non-

governmental organizations and affected communities.

5.3.2 The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC)

The coordination tool of OCHA is The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination

(UNDAC) which is part of the international emergency response system for sudden-onset

emergencies. UNDAC was created in 1993 and designed to help the United Nations and governments

of disaster-affected countries during the first phase of a sudden-onset emergency. UNDAC also

75

For the following section, see“www.unocha.org/about-us/who-we-are”. 76

“www.un.org/en/globalissues/humanitarian/index.shtml”.




80

assists in the coordination of incoming international relief at national level and/or at the site of the

emergency.77

The UNDAC system comprises four components:

1. Staff: Experienced emergency managers made available for UNDAC missions by their

respective governments or organizations. UNDAC members are specially trained and

equipped for their task.

2. Methodology: Pre-defined methods for establishing coordination structures, and

for organizing and facilitating assessments and information management during the first phase

of a sudden-onset disaster or emergency.

3. Procedures: Proven systems to mobilize and deploy an UNDAC team to arrive at the disaster

or emergency site within 12-48 hours of the request.

4. Equipment: Personal and mission equipment for UNDAC teams to be self-sufficient in the

field when deployed for disasters/emergencies.

As of December 2010, UNDAC had conducted 207 emergency missions in over 90 countries. The

UNDAC team also undertake disaster response preparedness missions. Such missions evaluate the

national disaster preparedness and response capacity and plans after specific request from

a Government.

5.3.3 The United Nations Human Settlements Programme, UN-HABITAT

UN-HABITAT Disaster Management programme78

helps governments and local authorities rebuild in

countries recovering from war or natural disasters. UN-HABITAT is mandated, through the Habitat

Agenda, to take the lead in disaster prevention, mitigation, and preparedness and post-disaster

rehabilitation with regard to human settlements. The Disaster Management Programme (DMP) has

been designed to fulfill this mandate through supporting national governments, local authorities and

communities in strengthening their capacity in managing human-made and natural disasters. This

applies both to the prevention and mitigation of disasters as well as the rehabilitation of human

settlements. DMP also creates awareness among decision makers and communities on mitigation

methodologies and adequate rehabilitation in human settlements. It bridges the gap between relief and

development by combining the technical expertise, normative understanding and lessons learned

through UN-HABITAT field operations. DMP provides support to national governments, local

authorities and communities by:

Developing techniques and tools for the management of disaster prevention, mitigation and

rehabilitation;

Designing and implementing training programmes, as well as supporting training activities

executed by other agencies and field projects;

Promoting horizontal cooperation by networking institutions, experts and experience on

disaster related activities in human settlements;

Design, implementation and backstopping of projects at local, national, regional and global

level;

Strengthening coordination and networking among communities, NGOs, governments and

external support organizations in addressing disaster-related activities.

From an operational point of view DMP provides a combination of long term technical and normative

support through ongoing partnerships within and outside UN-HABITAT with a surge facility to allow

77

“www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/undac/overview”. 78

“www.unhabitat.org/categories.asp?catid=286”.

http://www.unhabitat.org/categories.asp?catid=286




81

for the provision of immediate support during emergency phases. A strategy adopted in order to

ensures that DMP is able to impact all phases of post-conflict and disaster management cycles n order

to promote sustainable human settlements development within situations of crisis with maximum

effect.

5.3.4 The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction

The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. UNISDR was created in December 1999 as

part of the UN Secretariat with the purpose of ensuring the implementation of the International

Strategy for Disaster Reduction..79

UNISDR’s mandate is to serve as the focal point in the United

Nations system for the coordination of disaster reduction and to ensure synergies among disaster

reduction activities. Disaster Risk Reduction aims to reduce the damage caused by natural hazards

like earthquakes, floods, droughts and cyclones, through an ethic of prevention. UNISDR publish the

PreventionWeb, which provides contact information to a broad range of actors promoting or working

in disaster risk reduction who have shared at least one example of their work.80

5.3.5 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

The overall objective of UNDP is to help build nations that can withstand crisis, and drive and sustain

the kind of growth that improves the quality of life for everyone. On the ground in 177 countries and

territories, UNDP offer global perspective and local insight to help empower lives and build resilient

nations. The organisation works in several ways with topics such as Poverty Reduction, Democratic

Governance, Environment and Energy. One focus area of UNDP is crisis prevention & recovery. In

this respect UNDP helps countries prevent armed conflict, alleviate the risk and effects of disasters

from natural hazards and build back better and stronger when crises happen. Among the focus areas

are the development of a Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (a fast, flexible

funding mechanism allowing UNDP to respond effectively to crisis prevention and recovery needs.

Also designed for quick action following a natural disaster or violent conflict, or when a unique

opportunity arises to reduce disaster risk or prevent conflict)81

, Disaster Risk Reduction82

(aiming to

develop the capacity of governments countries to respond to disasters and mitigate the risks) and

Crisis Governance83

(aiming to restore state functions and inclusive political process, rebuilding trust

between state and its citizens in terms of crisis) When a crisis strikes, UNDP ensures that while the

humanitarian response focuses on the immediate lifesaving needs of a population, those responsible

also work towards longer-term development objectives. A report of the work Preventing Crisis,

Enabling Recovery: 2012 Review of UNDP’s Work in Conflict and Disaster-affected Countries was

published in October 2013.84

79

“www.unisdr.org/”. 80

Cf above, section 5.1 “www.preventionweb.net/english”/. 81

“www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/crisis_preventionandrecovery

thematictrustfund/”. 82

“www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/focus_areas/climate_disaster_

risk_reduction_and_recovery/”. 83

“www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/focus_areas/Crisis

Governance/”. 84

“www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/crisis-prevention-and-recovery/2012-annual-report-crisis-

prevention---recovery/”.




82

5.3.6 United Nations Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD)

UNCRD, established in 1971 based on an agreement between the Government of Japan and the United

Nations, strives to promote sustainable regional development in developing countries with a focus on

development planning and management in the context of globalization and decentralization trends, and

the growing concern towards global environmental issues and their impacts.

The centre administrates a Disaster Management Planning Programme with the objective to advance

disaster risk reduction globally and support efforts in making local communities, cities and societies

more resilient to the impacts of natural and human-induced hazards and disasters. The Programme

focuses on key elements of self-help, cooperation, and education through activities such as:

Research projects with specific focus on implementation and field experiences;

Dissemination of best practices through workshops, publications, reports and internet

homepage.85

5.3.7 UN sector organs

Important and more designated roles are assigned to several sector organs. The Food and Agriculture

Organisation (FAO)86

provides early warning of impending food crises and assesses global food

supply problems. Part of the United Nations system is also the World Food Programme (WFP)87

which is the principle supplier of relief food aid. The Office of United Nations High Commissioner for

Human Rights (OHCHR)88

provides assistance and advice to governments and other actors on human

rights issues, sets standards and monitors rights violations, the United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP)89

assists disaster-prone countries in contingency planning and with disaster

mitigation, prevention and preparedness measures, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees

(UNHCR)90

provides international protection and assistance for refugees, stateless persons and

internally displaced persons, particularly in conflict-related emergencies, and the United Nations

Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF)91

works to uphold children’s rights, survival, development and

protection by intervening in health, education, water, sanitation, hygiene and protection.

5.3.8 World Health Organization (WHO)

The World Health Organization (WHO)92

provides global public health leadership by setting

standards, monitoring health trends, and providing direction on emergency health issues. WHO’s role

is to reduce avoidable loss of life and the burden of disease and disability and the organisation

provides a range of technical guidelines for health action in crises,93

pre-deployment training courses94

as well as manuals, handbooks, tools and references for emergency health management and logistics.

85

“www.uncrd.or.jp/disaster/goal.htm”. 86

“www.fao.org/home/en/”. 87

“www.wfp.org/about”. 88

“www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcomePage.aspx”. 89

“www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home.html”. 90

“www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home”. 91

“www.unicef.org/”. 92

“www.who.int/en/”. 93

“www.who.int/hac/techguidance/en/”. 94

“www.who.int/hac/techguidance/training/courses/en/index.html”.




83

A set of technical hazard sheets e.g. concerning earthquakes,95

drought,96

floods97

and landslides,98

has

also been made available.

5.3.9 International Organisation for Migration (IOM)

In this context mention should also be made of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)99

which is an intergovernmental agency which helps transfer refugees, internally displaced persons and

others in need of internal or international migration services. Established in 1951 IOM is not formally

a UN organisation. It was set up as a response to the chaos in Europe following from the second world

war. The organisation has expanded extensively and today operates with an annual budget of close to

$1 billion and some 5400 staff working in over 100 countries worldwide.

5.3.10 The International Law Commission (ILC)

The International Law Commission (ILC)100

is a UN body of legal experts elected by states to

promote the “progressive development of international law and its codification.” The work of ILC

include several topics. Of relevance in this context is that the organisation in 2007 began work the on

topic “Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters” and thereafter a number

of draft articles have been published and adopted. Addressed issues include among other things

“purpose”, “definition of disaster”, “role of the affected state”, “human dignity”, ”human rights”,

“cooperation for disaster risk reduction” and “duty to prevent”. The work of ILC on the topic as has

been proceeding in accordance with successive resolutions adopted by the General Assembly.

5.4 Red Cross and Red Crescent Disaster Law Programme

5.4.1 International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles (IDRL) Programme

An ambitious legal project was initiated in 2001 by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Council of

Delegates.101

The explicit purpose of the project, initially presented as the International Disaster

Response Laws, Rules and Principles (IDRL) Programme, was to explore the role of law in the

response to disasters, particularly international disaster relief. More specifically the objectives were to

identify and share key legal instruments, lead efforts to identify gap areas and develop

recommendations to address deficiencies.

The work became concrete in 2007 when the the International federation of Red Cross and Red

Crescent Societies published a comprehensive desk study entitled Law and Legal Issues in

International Disaster Response102

describing the existing international legal frameworks for disaster

response. The study also pointed out major legal problem areas, as identified by the Federation’s

consultation and research, including over two dozen individual country or regional case studies.103

95

“www.who.int/hac/techguidance/ems/earthquakes/en/”. 96

“www.who.int/hac/techguidance/ems/drought/en/”. 97

“www.who.int/hac/techguidance/ems/floods/en/”. 98

“www.who.int/hac/techguidance/ems/landslides/en/”. 99

“www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home.html”. 100

“www.un.org/law/ilc/”. 101

”www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/53419/idrl-cod-2001s.pdf”. 102

“ifrc.org/PageFiles/41194/113600-idrl-deskstudy-en.pdf”. 103

As for background material and the publication activities of the the International federation of Red Cross and

Red Crescent Societies, see also the Disaster Law Database, described in section 5.1 above. The Federation




84

The same year a set of Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of international disaster

relief and initial recovery assistance was adopted by the state parties to the Geneva Conventions and

the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.104

A year later, in 2008, the UN General

Assembly adopted resolutions encouraging states to make use of the guidelines.105

In addition, the

International federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies were invited to continue research

and advocacy efforts, as well as encouraged to develop new tools and models to improve legal

preparedness for disasters.

The Guidelines consist of a set of non-binding recommendations for governments on how to prepare

their disaster laws and plans for common regulatory problems in international disaster relief

management. It is explicitly stated that “the Guidelines are meant to assist governments to become

better prepared for the common legal problems in international response operations,” and that by

means of using the Guidelines “governments can avoid needless delays in the dissemination of

humanitarian relief while at the same time ensuring better coordination and quality of the assistance

provided.”106

Relevant ministries might thus use the guidelines as the basis for designing

implementing regulations, plans and procedures. The intention is furthermore that executive

authorities should be able to draw on them in developing provisional rules enacted under emergency

powers when a state of disaster has been declared, and that governments might use them as a basis for

developing bilateral agreements resources available. To a large extent the recommendations are based

on existing international legal and policy documents, and they also explained and commented on in a

set of annotations,107

which provide references to the many specialized instruments that may be of key

support to governments drafting new laws and policies.

Both the Guidelines and the annotations are available in several languages and so far some 15

countries have adopted new rules or laws reflecting the recommendations in the IDRL Guidelines.108

Addressed problem areas include:

A Unnecessary red tape

Restrictions and delays in customs clearance for relief goods and equipment

Imposition of duties, tolls and other taxes on relief items and activities

Difficulties and delays in obtaining and renewing necessary visas and permits for

humanitarian personnel

Problems obtaining legal recognition of foreign professional qualifications for

specialized personnel (particularly medical staff)

also provide a web based news service compiling relevant new publications “www.ifrc.org/en/ publications-

and-reports/general-publications/”. 104

”www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/idrl-guidelines/”. 105

63/137 Strengthening emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and prevention in the aftermath of the

Indian Ocean tsunami disaster “daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/479/01/PDF/N0847901. pdf?

OpenElement” 63/139 Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United

Nations“www.iom.ch/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_research/un/63/A_RES_63_139_EN.

pdf” and Resolution 63/141. Inter-national cooperation on humanitarian assistance in the field of natural

disasters, from relief to development “daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/479/25/PDF/N08479

25.pdf?Open Element”. 106

“www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/idrl-guidelines/”. 107

”www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/41203/annotations.pdf”. 108

“www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/idrl-guidelines/new-legislation-adopted-on-idrl/”.




85

Difficulties in legal registration for foreign humanitarian organizations, leading to

restrictions in opening bank accounts and hiring local staff

B Poor quality and coordination from some international providers

Importation of unnecessary or inappropriate relief items

Failure to coordinate with domestic authorities and other relief providers

Use of inadequately trained personnel

Failure to consult with beneficiaries

Culturally unacceptable behaviour

Proselytizing

In addition to an introductions describing the purpose and scope, as well as providing an extensive list

of definitions, the guidelines are divided into five parts. The recommendations are categorised under

the following headings:

Part I: Core Responsibilities

Responsibilities of Affected States

Responsibilities of Assisting Actors

Additional Responsibilities of All States

Responsibilities Concerning Diversion and the Intended Use of Resources

Part II: Early Warning and Preparedness

Early Warning

Legal, Policy and Institutional Frameworks

Regional and International Support for Domestic Capacity

Part III: Initiation and Termination of International Disaster Relief and

Initial Recovery Assistance

Initiation

Initiation of Military Relief

Termination

Part IV: Eligibility for Legal Facilities

Facilities for Assisting States

Facilities for Assisting Humanitarian Organizations

Facilities for Other Assisting Actors

Part V: Legal Facilities for Entry and Operations

Personnel

Goods and Equipment

Special Goods and Equipment

Transport

Temporary Domestic Legal Status

Taxation

Security

Extended Hours

Costs




86

5.4.2 The Disaster Law Programme

In 2011 the work continued when the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red

Crescent109

called on states to examine and strengthen their national legal frameworks and consider

making use of the IDRL, and also welcomed efforts to develop a Model Act for the Facilitation and

Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance.110

The Programme thus

broadened its focus to cover legal issues related to disaster risk reduction and recovery. In 2012 IDRL

Programme changed its name to the Disaster Law Programme, to reflect this evolving focus.111

The

Disaster Law Programme works in three areas:

1. Technical Assistance

Collaborating with National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and other partners to assist

governments in strengthening their domestic legal preparedness for disasters.

2. Capacity Building

Building the capacity of National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to advise their

governments on the development of disaster management law.

3. Advocacy, dissemination and research

Building partnerships at the international and regional level on legal preparedness, disseminating

the IDRL Guidelines and fostering new and innovative research.

With the overall objective to reduce human vulnerability by promoting legal preparedness for

disasters, the Disaster Law Programme specifically aims to eliminate to legal gaps in disaster risk

reduction which can have a significant impact on the resilience of communities to disasters. The

ambition being to provide appropriate legal instruments which make it possible to deal with disaster

response and to contributes to more effective disaster preparedness and getting relief to vulnerable

people faster.

Based on the previous work of IDLR Programme a model act was developed over a two-year period as

a collaboration between the IFRC, the United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian

Assistance (OCHA)112

and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU).113

The result, the Model Act for the

Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance was

presented in March 2013.114

5.4.3 Model Act for the Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and

Initial Recovery Assistance

The purpose of the model act is similar as the previously published guidelines and addresses “ -

Delays in the entry if international humanitarian personnel, goods and equipment .. not adapted to a

situation of urgency, - impositions of duties, tolls and taxes …, - problems granting legal recognition

of foreign qualifications for specialised professional personnel, - difficulties in granting legal

recognition for foreign humanitarian organsations. The act is quite comprehensive and consists of 71

Articles covering some 35 pages. It is divided into nine chapters, i.e:

109

“www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/53419/31IC_R7_disaster%20laws_adopted_ 12Dec_clean_ EN.pdf”. 110

“www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/model-act-on-idrl/”. 111

“www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-law/about-idrl/background-on-the-programme/#sthash.

Nq13qLxN.dpuf”. 112

About OCHA, see section 5.3.1 above. 113

“www.ipu.org/english/home.htm”. 114

“www.ifrc.org/docs/IDRL/MODEL%20ACT%20ENGLISH.pdf”.




87

General provision

Initiation and termination of international disaster assistance

Coordination and Preparedness for International Disaster Assistance

General Responsibilities of Assisting Actors

Eligibility for Legal Facilities

Legal Facilities for Eligible Actors

Supervision, Reporting and Sanctions

Transit of International Disaster Assistance

Implementation, Transnational and Final Provisions

In addition the original publication of the model act of 2013 present some 75 pages of commentaries,

providing background information, identifies links between the articles and the relevant sections of the

previously published guidelines, identifies the problems or issues of each chapter, explains the

intentions of the drafters, and provides examples and discusses alternative methods for

implementations.

5.5 Summary

Although disasters usually become extensively documented systematic efforts to analyze legal aspects

of disaster management as an integrated whole are rare. Similarly normative documents stipulating

common practices for disaster management are difficult to find. At an operative level these are

palpable conclusions. At an administrative level the situation is somewhat different. In recent years

many ambitious programs have been presented, often initiated by international organizations. As

illustrated in this chapter some of these efforts have generated extensive suggestions, guidelines and

model laws for international cooperation. Several projects are however still in development phases

an/or regionally restricted. Critics have also pointed out that many initiatives are poorly synchronized.

Thus, to suggest that there exist legally established common practices for disaster management would

be false. This is also true when it comes to applications with operative intentions similar to the

BRIDGE system.

Several factors may explain the lack of coordination. Disaster management must take a number of

variables into consideration, geographical preconditions, different risk scenarios and local traditions

are some of the most compelling ones. Other factors explaining the scarceness of established legal

practices are varying experiences of more or less unique events as well as jurisdictional differences.

The latter illustrated by legal systems prioritizing either general provisions or in casu decision making,

proactive or reactive legislative strategies and more or less frequent reforms.

Apparent is also that regulations affecting detailed operative efforts usually only exist in different

languages, that disaster management often turn out to be a cross-sectorial phenomena and,

consequently, that normative responsibilities as well as administration often remain distributed. A

secondary effect being that legal aspects may become poorly analyzed and unsatisfactory documented.

As for lack of normative information of direct relevance to the BRIDGE system (beyond general

system requirements described in D12:1) the lack of experience from similar tools is an obvious

explanation.

The fact that the legal requirements prompted by disasters are difficult, and sometimes impossible to

identify in advance is an other component to keep in mind – any sector of society and any function

may be affected in unpredictable constellations. As frequently pointed out in the literature this is also a

precondition complicating attempts to analyze disaster management from a theoretical point if view.

Disaster and/or crisis management are not well defined phenomena, and when it comes to effects




88

urging for response and recovery operations the subject matters that may be included in the discourse

are innumerable. Against this background the scarcity of legally enacted common practices is no

surprise.

Existing legal initiatives aspiring to develop common practices are significantly general, primarily

defining responsibilities for states (e.g. concerning mutual assistance and co-operation during

emergencies) or specifically address one isolated sector (e.g. nuclear risks, food, or water protection).

At an operative level the responsibilities rests on the individual states and in this respect

administration and practices varies a lot. Enacted or suggested rule systems (acts, ordinances,

standards, etc.) may tentatively be categorized according to how they refer to different phases of an

incident (e.g. prevention, response and recovery), whether they are general – specific, and whether

they reflect ad hoc or long term strategies.

The overall conclusion from this overview is nevertheless that common practices (common in the

sense that they are internationally accepted and recognized by a large number of authorities in

different sectors of society) are rare. It is also apparent that the responsibilities and the operative

management in states of emergencies vary a lot between different jurisdictions. In the BRIDE project

these aspects will be further addressed in D12.3, focusing on requirements and potentialities for future

practices.




89

6 Social Practices or Ethics and Law as Social Practices in Emergency Collaboration Thinking about social issues of IT in emergency response asks who are the members of the response

collective, how do they belong together, what are their practices, how are they assembled and what

role do technologies? As we have seen in the previous Chapters, technology can engender changes in

what is considered ethical and lawful. Changing the way things are done inevitably has moral and

legal implications. This is the case because actions imply and enact values (especially, but not only in

professions that have to do with health, safety, emergency and security), and they are accountable to

ethical and legal frameworks as well as social and cultural norms. In that sense action is ‘governed’ by

moral, legal, social and cultural rules. However, the practice of being ‘governed’ in this way is

complex. Formal and explicit ethical codes or legal regulations are weak, as are cultural and social

conventions, because what they mean is not altogether clear until they are embodied (in practice) and

practiced (Hester & Eglin, 1992), and this is a social process.

Chapter 2 discussed various ethical positions in their relationship to emergency and emergency

management, formulated by academic philosophers. However, moral investigation is not the exclusive

domain of philosophers, debates about values and principles are also an everyday, mundane practice.

‘Which value should prevail over another?’ is in the last instance always a practical question. Thus,

what is critical for our discussion of ethical, legal and social issues in emergency response is that value

judgements, ethical, lawful and socially responsible conduct are not determined by rules, but orient to

rules through the practical exercises of reasoning, acting, enacting, adjusting, negotiating. This does

not mean that codes of conduct, moral values, plans, rules or laws are unimportant or relative and

negotiable. On the contrary, they are critical, only not in the sense of ‘pulling people’s strings’ but as

being the subject of practical efforts to situate them into particular contexts to define just how these

rules apply here and how actions taken in this context adhere to the rules. In other words, moral, legal

and socially responsible actions are practiced in embodied and situated ways. In this chapter we will

discuss how ethical principles, legal rules and social values become moral, lawful, socially responsible

conduct in, as and through social practices in the context of emergency response. We will do this in

relation to three different dimensions of social practices, which are work practices, organizational

practices, and community emergency response. In addition, we will discuss societal issues around

moral, lawful and socially responsible conduct arising from these social practices. In each case we ask

how morality, legality and social responsibility are practiced, embodied and embedded.

6.1 ELSI in Work Practice

Figure 16 Ethics, the law and social

responsibility are enacted – in every moment Source: http://dougsaunders.net/wp-

content/uploads/2011/07/oslo-bombing-aftermath.jpg

Ethics, the law and social responsibility are enacted

in every moment, in particular ways. In the image

here, ambulance personnel and a police officer as

well as members of the public orient to ethical

principles and values of humanity and dignity, the

professionals enact their legal duty to provide

medical assistance and protect the public, and they

contribute to the benefit of society at large as part of

their activities. They do so in ways that are visible,

albeit often unnoticed. One of the most basic

elements of everyday moral conduct is that, at least

when in the presence of others, one has to coordinate

one’s own behaviour with that of (those) others. As

part of accomplishing this, human cultural practices

have evolved to be intersubjective, that is, to make

http://dougsaunders.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/oslo-bombing-aftermath.jpg

http://dougsaunders.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/oslo-bombing-aftermath.jpg




90

intentions, trajectories of actions, rationales, etc. accountable and observable. This is done mostly as a

natural part of doing what we do, in embodied ways – posture, direction, hand-signals – such as

emergency responders in uniform bending over injured persons or waving away journalists from the

scene. In doing what they do members of a society make observable and accountable what this shared

situation is that they are in, and who they are in this situation, i.e. what the relevant characteristics,

features, roles that they bring to this situation are. Such ‘natural’ accounting for the situation is also a

moral activity for the sheer reason that failure to adequately display ones’ understanding of and role in

a common situation would lead to a breakdown in social interaction or bring others in the

uncomfortable situation where they are unsure about what is and is not appropriate. Misconceptions

about who the other person is or as who they are present in this situation could lead to confusion,

embarrassment and failed coordination. (Harvey Sacks calls this as who a ‘membership category’ and

the ways of showing who or in what relation to ‘membership categorization’ (Sacks & Jefferson,

1995) As Garfinkel (1967, p. 35ff.) showed, it is often the information that is kept implicit in an

interaction that will tell a lot about the relationship of the interactants (e.g. is it familiar or formal?).

Accountability is also the basis for planning and prospection, i.e. having a good idea about what might

come next in the social interaction. Ethnomethodology – a paradigm in social science that specifically

focuses on the making of social order in everyday interaction with other people and the material world

– shows in innumerable studies that part of every activity is the simultaneous accounting for it, that is:

making it observable-and-reportable, i.e. available to members as situated practices of

looking-and-telling’ and that these practices consist of an endless, ongoing, contingent

accomplishment; that they are carried on under the auspices of, and are made to happen as

events in, the same ordinary affairs that in organizing they describe’ (Garfinkel 1967, 1).

It is this accounting, which at the same time is deeply moral (perhaps the moral foundation of social

order) and which allows people to make conduct moral, lawful and socially responsible (or not), since

what is morally right or wrong, always depends on an adequate understanding of the situation. Indeed,

Garfinkel speaks of a practical ethics, where:

what the rules are, whether they are rules, and whether any rules have jurisdiction,

remain[s] to be ‘‘discovered’’ in the course of activities—‘‘discovered’’ not by sociologists,

but by the members whose actions the rules presumably govern. The circularity (or

reflexivity) of that process implicates what counts on a given occasion of activity as ‘‘the’’

relevant system of rules. (Lynch 2012:230)

Understanding the situation and what the rules are is especially important in cooperative work, where

coordination, knowing when to work together, and when to work side by side or in a division of labour

is crucial for the success of the common task, as are methods of working out how to work together.

This process involves methods of ‘discovering agreements by eliciting or imposing a respect for the

rule of practical circumstances, [which] a version of practical ethics (Garfinkel 1967: 73-74).

Example: Close ‘personal’ collaboration in face-to-face setting

An example will serve to illustrate the centrality of practical ethics. In a co-design workshop, we

discussed anxieties about breaching the data protection act when sharing data in multi-agency

collaboration. A dilemma was presented where a policeman needed to do something with a person and

that person was known to a paramedic to be HIV positive. The ambulance representative stated, ‘Now

we’d tell them discreetly “use your gloves”’. Conversely, a Norwegian police officer, described inter-

organizational collaboration between the police and ambulance personnel on the scene of an incident:

If there’s a known violent criminal who might be armed injured on the scene, you’d tell the

medics ‘be careful with him’




91

The paramedic and the police officer use euphemisms. They don’t say: “Before you touch the victim,

beware that he has HIV which can be contagious through blood. Therefore I recommend you wear

gloves when you touch him”. Instead he says “use your gloves”. This is interesting in two regards:

Firstly we see, that in this situation very little has to be said explicitly for the situation and the

coordination to work. The reasons are on one level ‘metaphysically’ social - the police officer will

(hopefully) trust that any paramedic would have good reason to warn him like this, such as knowledge

of this person’s medical history, and follow the recommendation blindly. But on another level the

reasons for this economy of interaction are highly situated. The police officer and the paramedic are

together in a shared situation. The situation offers clues that invite membership categorization (i.e. by

saying ‘gloves’ the paramedic categorizes the person the gloves are worn for as a potential health risk

and relies on common knowledge that gloves are a standard protective measure against infection, and

there might be social or physical signs of being at risk for such a disease (e.g. drug use) (and these can,

of course, be stereotyped). The second interesting aspect is the fact that their euphemisms morally take

account of a) a demand for discretion and b) more importantly, manoeuvring the delicate practice of

data sharing, where it is operationally necessary, but potentially, if not handled with discretion, an

infringement of human dignity and a breach of privacy rights. So there is an ambiguous relationship

concerning sharing knowledge about the patient / victim / offender (which of these categories he falls

into depends on agency relevances) – where ‘respect for the rule of practical circumstances’ demands

to share what is relevant at the moment, and at the same time demands an understanding that what is

shared at the moment is to be treated as fleeting information. No definitive sensitive personal

information has been shared, yet it is at the basis of the collaboration that knowledge about such

information has been shared. The police officer may or may not infer that the person is likely to be

HIV positive, but he does not know. If engaging with this person in the future, he may remember and

act accordingly. He may even ‘inform’ others in a similar way.

The example highlights some of the complexities involved in sharing information, respecting human

dignity and data protection laws. Medical personnel, police, lawyers, priests, many professionals who

are called to exercise confidentiality about sensitive personal data from people they deal with, have to

find ways to manage this knowledge. To have this knowledge will inevitably create ethical dilemmas

in situations where they might want to reveal this knowledge to others, but are not (normally) allowed

to. Emergency situations can allow or even demand suspension of normal moral rules and data

protection laws and create dilemmas, but only for the limited space and time of the emergency. Such

dilemmas are currently delicately and highly skilfully negotiated and deliberated in situ, on the basis

of an understanding of a situation where the audibility, visibility and ‘lifespan’ of information is

determined by analogue technologies, as we see here.

The discrete oral exchange is not in breach of data protection regulations and highly effective for the

safety of emergency response personnel. It is an ethical requirement for information systems to (at

least) respect such delicate and skilful existing ethical practices. The above exchanges are likely to

happen in ‘fleeting moments’, in direct face-to-face interaction or, less likely, via the radio system.

The information would be ephemeral and it is relatively easy to understand who is within reach of this

information spatially, organizationally, and temporally. This situation is seriously changed, when such

communications are logged and the exchange and the implied knowledge are thus turned into data and

open up for retrospective scrutiny. This change of context might make professionals less inclined to

divulge what they know to protect their colleagues, for fear of breaching data protection regulations.

6.2 Organizational Practice: The Sociality of Multi-agency Collaboration

Multi-agency collaboration in emergency response, as we will see in section 6.3, can also include

groups or individuals who are ‘unorganized’. However, many of the agencies involved are formal

organizations with particular functions, goals and tasks and modes of operation, which is expressed in




92

policies, a common skill set, language or culture of the organisation, and codes of conduct, as we have

seen in Chapter 3. Its members form not only a formal organization, but also a community of practice

(Wenger, 1998), that is a lived shared culture, which goes together with a professional identity, sense

of pride, solidarity and belonging for its members (Albert, Ashforth, & Dutton, 2000; Bechky, 2003;

Brown & Duguid, 1991; Thurnell-Read & Parker, 2008). So when looking at collaboration between

organizations during emergencies, it is necessary to take into account that the accomplishment of

ethical, lawful and socially responsible conduct in collaboration between organizations also is a

practical accomplishment. Collaboration itself depends on virtues and values, and as an achievement

(or failure) itself is of ethical importance. In this section we will discuss a selection of particularly

pertinent challenges to ethical, lawful and socially responsible conduct in multi-agency collaboration.

6.2.1 Difficulties in Practicing Ethical, Lawful, Socially Responsible Emergency Response

What does it actually mean that ‘agencies’ or ‘organizations’ are working together? Does work not

always imply individuals doing the job? Unlike in our first example, where inter-organizational

collaboration took place in a shared situation and face-to-face setting where the participants had

experience from former collaboration, multi-agency collaboration is more distributed. Each

organization has rules and procedures that other organizations might not be familiar with, and

accountability – which in the first example is accomplished economically and seemingly effortlessly

through shared situation awareness in a shared space of practice and a literally common operational

picture (COP) (based on being literally in the same situation) – is much harder to achieve. In large

scale emergencies, multi-agency collaboration has to happen ad-hoc in often vastly distributed

settings, between people who may have little understanding of the other organizations’ remit, and

there will be a lack of routine to accomplish the ‘articulation work’ necessary to establish and

coordinate a ‘working division of labour’ (Schmidt and Bannon 1992). Such collaboration then has to

explore possible functional work-arounds to personal acquaintance, work experience, co-present

bodies, a unified and unambiguous chain of command or common membership categorizations that

belong to a shared work context understanding like the gloves in the example above. We will now

present three examples to prepare a discussion of some core difficulties in practicing ethical, lawful,

socially responsible as well as effective and efficient emergency response.

Example: Information is a Matter of Trust

The first example here comes from the London bombings on 7th July 2005. During the 7/7 attacks,

three explosions took place in tube carriages that were either completely or partially inside

underground tunnels. It was necessary for responders to approach the trains by walking along the

underground rail tracks. These tracks carry a live electrical current and standing on them could be

fatal. It should also be noted that, even once the current on the tracks has been turned off, it is possible

for them to become live again through short circuiting or a train arriving onto deactivated lines. In her

inquest report, the Coroner, Lady Justice Hallett, describes how fire fighters and London Ambulance

Service personnel carried out a dynamic risk assessment and sought confirmation that the current had

been switched off from London Underground personnel, before dismounting from the platform and

entering the tunnels. The report recounts difficulties in establishing responder safety. One paramedic:

described how he asked a member of London Underground staff for confirmation, but

received only a vague assurance that a check had been carried out. He was therefore only

prepared to step on the rail once the member of staff had done so. (Hallett, 2011, p. 47)

Some fire fighters were even more reluctant to trust other agencies, waiting for confirmation that the

current had been turned off from their own fire brigade control centre. This took some time. In her

critique of how dynamic risk assessment was enacted here, the Coroner states that the London Fire




93

brigade, like the paramedics, had faster methods of receiving confirmation that the tracks were safe at

their disposal. They could either

seek confirmation locally, speak to the line controller via the ‘head wall’ telephone,

discharge the current by short-circuiting the tunnel telephone wires (and in all such cases

confirm the position to Brigade Control), or request via Brigade control that the traction

current is turned off.” (Hallett 2011: 47)

The Coroner recommends that, once confirmation has been received by one organization, this should

be disseminated rapidly to all emergency personnel.

Example: Perceiving Risk differently

A second example will illustrate important further aspects of the difficulties in inter-agency

collaborations, where new technologies transform the landscape for ethical, lawful, and socially

responsible conduct. ACC Chesterman’s review into a series of shootings which took place in the

North of England in 2010 found that, despite ambulances being requested by members of the public

and Cumbria Constabulary, assistance was not sent. The reason given for this was a concern over the

safety of the ambulance staff. A gunman was on the move, shooting people in various locations,

pursued by police. The head of service for the North West Ambulance service referred to the

responsibility of the police to create a safe environment for the ambulance service to deploy and

provide an escort to the scene. The need to allocate police resources to continue the search for the

gunman meant that some police officers were left at scenes for significant periods of time with

seriously injured casualties. In other areas, police officers had to make the difficult decision of leaving

victims with members of the public in order to continue their chase of the gunman. In one event an

ambulance attended a scene and began to treat one of the victims when the ambulance control centre

instructed the crew to leave the scene. It was only the persistence of the police officer in attendance

which prevented the casualty being left. The refusal of the ambulance service to respond to the

requests for assistance highlights an important connection between interoperability and safety in inter-

agency collaboration. The police review states that the need for continued calls for the ambulance

service had an impact on the operational effectiveness of the police officers at that location. It was

reported during the coroner’s inquest that in some cases it took up to two hours for ambulance

personnel to attend the scene by which time the victims had either been taken to hospital by the police

or were attended to by members of the public (BBC 2011). Chesterman observes:

Interoperability between the police service and ambulance service should be improved. This

is particularly true in relation to differing risk thresholds.

(Chesterman 2011: 40-41 emphasis added)

Chesterman’s recommendations assume that more interoperability, information sharing and procedural

agreement between the different agencies could solve the problems encountered here. However,

observations around the complexities of the practical production of shared awareness between

different actors highlights that the matter is more challenging.

Example: A Clash of Cultures

The third example details how shared situation awareness can become difficult in the orchestration of

multi-agency response. During the summer of 2007, Walham power station in the UK was in danger

of flooding. The station supplies electricity to around 500,000 homes (approx. 2,000,000 people) in

England and Wales and it was ‘reported to provide electricity to Government Communications

Headquarters (GCHQ) and a nuclear establishment’ (McMaster & Baber, 2008). The UK Environment

Agency and the military were called upon to build a barrier to prevent water from breaking in. The

Environment Agency usually work alone and routinely build flood defences. They were confident in




94

carrying out their task. It was a very noisy environment, where floodwater posed a drowning hazard to

personnel. Access to the incident site was limited, not only due to the flooding across a large

surrounding area, but also because the road that provides access to Walham power station was reduced

to a single lane, because emergency service vehicles were double-parked along it. Prioritised traffic

included Fire and Rescue vehicles delivering pumping equipment. The Fire Service Bronze

commander did not have an incident command vehicle, which reduced his capabilities to communicate

and coordinate. Without seeking consultation with the Environment Agency, he was under the

impression that they were able to proceed with their work. But the Environment Agency ‘considered

the Fire and Rescue Service to be ‘in the way’ - having more equipment on site than they needed and

being slow to respond to access requests’ (ibid: 34). The situation became critical, when lorries

delivering Environment Agency’s barrier components were stopped from entering the cordon set up

around the site. As the lorry drivers did not have walkie-talkies, they were unable to tell the

Operations Delivery team that they had arrived. When the Operations Delivery Team Leader finally

found out about their arrival he made direct contact with the Bronze Commander through the

command chain. This resolved the issue, but also provoked resentment. McMaster and Baber explain:

The Environment Agency and Fire and Rescue services work together only infrequently and

do not train together for multi-agency incidents. They are therefore unlikely to have a great

deal of knowledge about each other’s working practices, such as the large size of lorries

used to transport Environment Agency equipment, or the number of resources the Fire and

Rescue Service might send to a Major Incident of this nature. If agencies are not familiar

with each other’s working practices, do not share the same awareness of the situation and

are not actively engaged in discussion about these matters …, then they are likely to come

to misinterpret each other’s actions. The Environment Agency’s perceptions of the problems

they experienced during the incident may have been affected by their impression that it was

their role that was crucial; thus the Fire and Rescue Service’s slower pace is interpreted as

getting ‘in the way’, not listening (“I’ll have to ask my boss”) and even having malign

motives (a public relations exercise). It appears that a low level of awareness of how other

agencies operate can translate into a lack of trust and that their ability and motives may be

called into question when their actions deviate from what they are expected to do. (ibid:35)

McMaster and Baber show that rivalries and differing cultural interpretations and practices can get in

the way of effective, as well as ethically, legally and socially responsible response efforts (see also

Quarantelli, 1966; Drabek & McEntire, 2002; Allen, Karanasios, & Norman, 2013; Scheppele 2003).

All three examples show multi-agency collaboration failing. In the first case we are dealing with a

matter of trust: The assurances from London Underground Staff were not sufficient and confirmation

from trusted sources was sought. In a situation where first responders from fire and ambulance in the

underground had no ways of communicating with their control centres to receive such confirmation

that the tracks were safe, this led to significant delays. A solution to this problem has been sought in a

TETRA radio standard that can link above ground (Airwave) and below ground (Connect) radio

communications. This was one of the key lessons learnt from this incident. However, on closer

inspection, the coroner’s recommendation that confirmation should be disseminated rapidly to all

emergency personnel as soon as received by one organization, does not answer how mere information

‘dissemination’ will make information into trusted information.

The second example provides some explanation why. It shows how currently practiced policies –

defining risk thresholds an agency is prepared to expose their personnel to – might differ between

organizations. As a result in some settings, multi-agency collaboration and ethical, lawful and socially

responsible conduct can become difficult. In practice, dynamic risk assessment must be conducted ‘on

the fly’, both in situ, but also from afar (e.g. by incident commanders in control rooms). This requires

assessment of the situation, a social and practical achievement, encompassing mental assessment (or




95

thinking) but also vision, smell, an awareness of the actions of others amongst many other activities.

While attempts have been made to create a process for dynamic risk assessment to standardise such

assessment (Figure 17, Fire Service Manual), such processes abstract key steps from the practical

actions involved in dynamic risk assessment and chain them in a linear cycle. Critical inquests, like

ACC Chesterman’s report, trace these difficulties back to differing risk thresholds (which, he suggests,

should be ‘adjusted’). However, our analysis suggests that this is not a problem of acceptability or

adjustment. The ambulance and police officers’ reasoning reveals different epistemologies and

rationales. The risk does not just ‘look’ different from their different perspectives (which would make it

a matter of adjusting their optics), it actually is different for them. If there is no objective risk reality

baseline, we must pose the question, “can dynamic risk assessment move between response

organizations?” In other words, is Lady Justice Hallet’s suggestion to disseminated risk assessments

rapidly to all emergency personnel practicable? This is of particular importance in relation to the

design of new information technologies to support risk assessment and socio-technical systems for

collaboration and interoperability during large scale emergency response, which underpin ethical,

lawful and socially responsible conduct.

Figure 17 Dynamic Risk Assessment Flowchart

In this case, the police and members of the public took over, because they could assess the risks

locally, while ambulance service personnel, despite being requested, could not come because they

were instructed not to based on a risk assessment from afar. We see here that virtues and ethical

principles for emergency response outlined in Chapters 2 & 3, derived inter alia from European and

Mediterranean Major Hazards Agreement, the UK Civil Contingency Act and other publications, and

including co-operation, anticipation, information, integration, etc. are hard to practice. More effective

collaboration would require harmonization of procedures, but also support for richer risk

communication.




96

The third example reveals further detail around difficulties in practicing ethical, lawful and socially

responsible as well as effectively coordinated emergency response. In the 2007 UK floods, a large

amount of personnel and equipment from many different agencies (most prominently Fire & Rescue,

the army, and the Environment Agency) had to coordinate their efforts to prevent Walham power

station from being flooded. While in many emergency incidents, the collaboration between agencies is

organized sequentially, one agency carrying out their tasks after the other in a clear defined order,

the flooding incident at Walham substation featured multiple agencies working on the same

tasks simultaneously and towards a common goal (i.e. to save the substation from flooding);

as such it was a truly multi-agency incident. These tend to be rare – the Bronze

Commander had only seen perhaps 2 or 3 in over 25 years of service. (Mcmaster and Baber

2008, emphasis added).

In these rare kinds of incidents there is often little shared history of collaboration to draw on. This

concerns especially knowledge about other people’s and other organizations’ roles, methods and

processes. This makes it ‘difficult to know whether another agency was following a particular course

of action because that is just how they do things, or because they do not have the same understanding

of the incident’ (McMaster and Baber 2008, 44). For even when as in this case, there was agreement

on the ‘high level goal of “save the substation”, ‘this translated into conflicting plans on the ground’

and soon agencies were

competing for use of scarce ‘commodities’ (i.e. access and resources), which is a logistical

planning issue, but which was exacerbated by gaps in their shared understanding of the

situation. (McMaster and Baber 2008:44).

Working at the same location at the same time often also promotes a tendency to assume one ‘owns’

the incident, and viewing the other agencies as ‘playing a supporting (or hindering) role, which again

may compromise the response to large incidents that require the skills and resources from multiple

agencies’ (ibid., 44).

In order to avoid these kinds of misunderstandings, and the misgivings, competition and rejection

between agencies that might ensue, Liaison Officers can play an important role, working as

an interface between different organisations, bridging their different languages, practices

and perspectives on an incident…

Use of the Liaison Officer role demonstrates an understanding that it is necessary to gather

information on the incident from all of the agencies involved and that establishing an

effective working relationship with them is crucial to the swift resolution of the problem

McMaster and Baber 2008: 45)

Together, these examples show that the specifics of human social and cultural practices are central to

how information is mobilized in emergency situations, but these are intricately intertwined with the

affordances (or lack of affordances) of the technologies they use as part of these practices.

6.3 Community emergency response

Traditionally communities have played a major role in emergency response and recovery. This has

changed in recent years, when a) with disasters increasing in numbers and scope, the realisation that

government agencies alone will not be able to handle first response alone is settling in, and in fact, in

recent disasters (Haiti earthquake, Katrina, Sandy) local resources and knowledge have proven to be

invaluable assets for swift and efficient response: “A government-centric approach to disaster

management will not be enough to meet the challenges posed by a catastrophic incident. That is why

we must fully engage our entire societal capacity” (FEMA 2011:2). At the same time, the desired




97

community involvement is already on the rise, using digital tools and forms of organisation. However,

traditional first response is not prepared to deal with the scale and speed of social innovation in crisis

informatics (Palen et al. 2007).

While our discussion of multi-agency emergency collaboration so far only addressed ‘established

organisations’ (mostly the blue light services) (Dynes 1970), in recent years emergency response has

seen a rise of ‘emergent organisations’ (ibid.) which is mainly due to the new possibilities provided by

information and communication infrastructures such as the internet, social media, GPS,

microblogging, etc.. These ‘emergent organisations’ can be as varied in kind as local communities,

digital communities, crowds, networks, but also independent, semi-professional grassroots

organisations that are using web2.0 capabilities to recruit, organise and support ad-hoc digital

volunteer networks, such as Virtual Operations Support Teams (VOST) (St Denis et al 2012).

In this section we will survey the wide and growing landscape of those communities, crowd agencies,

and ad hoc publics. We will show how they emerge, what their forms of organization are, and discuss

the obstacles for collaboration with official (government) first response agencies. We will also point

out legal and ethical uncertainties, which are a significant cause for the difficulties in interfacing with

official organisations.

We term these entities ‘community’ following current conventions in the context of emergency

response while being aware that it is a vague concept. It can mean as many things as ‘a national

population’ (the Haitian community), ‘a community of practice’ (the online volunteer community or

the emergency response community), ‘the inhabitants of a town, village or city’, ‘networks on social

media’ (the twitter community) but also ‘organisations’ such as digital humanitarian organisations,

which are often referred to as “volunteer and technical communities” (V CTs) who build tools and

organize “crowdsourcing” (Howe 2009) of emergency information (Palen et al. 2007, Starbird and

Palen 2013).

FEMA: Whole Community Approach

The most prominent and comprehensive approach to building “effective response networks” (Boin

‘t Hart 2010, 365) is FEMA’s call for a “Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management”

(FEMA, 2011), which envisions local disaster community building that operates along and builds on

the needs and demands and resources and characteristics of local communities. It follows three core

principles: Understanding and meeting the actual needs of the whole community, engaging and

empowering all parts of the community, and strengthening what works well in communities on a daily

basis” (ibid. 23).

While this strategy explicitly mentions social media and encourages its use “to disseminate messages,

create two-way information exchanges, and understand and follow up on communication that is

already happening within the community” (ibid. 20), it does not conceptually extend its notion of

community beyond local geographic notions of the term. At the heart this is an outline of a

communitarian (townhall!) emergency management strategy very much oriented to the actual local

characteristics of the community. If community members communicate through a wiki or a blog, then

this ought to be included, if they meet at the townhall, then this has to be addressed, if they don’t meet

and exchange at all, then disaster management might be a vehicle for community organizing.

Nevertheless there have been attempts to integrate “crowdsourced” digital emergency response in

FEMA’s emergency response efforts. In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in 2012 FEMA

collaborated with the Civil Air Patrol and HOT (Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team – see below) to

provide damage assessment from photographs collected by aircrafts piloted by Civil Air Patrol

personnel (Crowley 2013, 17 & 42).




98

‘Tweeting up a Storm’: Communities and Digital Emergency Response

Social Media has become ever more important as a means and space for organising local communities,

especially after a larger emergency. It is used for reporting about ongoing peril like after a flood or an

earthquake, issuing missing person search requests, reconnecting with dislocated people, organising

get togethers, shelter, distribution of food and other donations. It has been used extensively, for

example, after the Haiti earthquake in 2010, Hurricane Sandy 2012, by communities in Colorado

tweeting about the floods (Vieweg et al 2010), after the explosion in West, Texas in 2013, but also

after the riots in the UK, where people organised for clean up processeses online (Glasgow and Fink

2013).

But Social Media is not limited to local response and organizing. Becoming ever more important in

emergency reporting and response it sometimes travels even faster than the actual phenomenon,

“giving early warning to those beyond the immediate impact zone”, as happened with the 2011

Virginia Earthquake:

Just as light from an exploding firework precedes the boom, a Twitter wave of memes about

the earthquake preceded the buckling of the earth’s surface. Citizens in New York and

Boston knew an earthquake was happening seconds before they felt any shaking, simply by

glancing at the surge of messages. (Crowley 2013:21)

The myriad of tweets triggered by such an incident, vary in content: they inform, report and warn,

request for help, offer help, organise help by putting the right people in touch with each other, or

organise self help by building local networks, starting off fundraisers, etc. There is of course also a lot

of talking, commenting, expression of sympathy, joking, worrying – traffic that from an emergency

response point of view could be categorized as noise. What is however at first glance the most striking

feature about these messages is their sheer quantity.

After the 2010 earth quake, Haitians sent hundreds of thousands of text messages in through

social media sites (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative 2011: 11), while Hurricane Sandy in 2012

“generated more than 20 million tweets, several terrabytes of satellite and aircraft imagery, and

an incalculable number of emails, SMS/test messages, and documents.” (Crowley 2013:22)

The Harvard Humanitarian Initiative’s report “Disaster Relief 2.0” describes this new quality in

disaster response:

For the first time, members of the community affected by the disaster issued pleas for help

using social media and widely available mobile technologies. Around the world, thousands

of ordinary citizens mobilized to aggregate, translate, and plot these pleas on maps and to

organize technical efforts to support the disaster response. In one case, hundreds of

geospatial information systems experts used fresh satellite imagery to rebuild missing maps

of Haiti and plot a picture of the changed reality on the ground. This work—done through

OpenStreetMap—became an essential element of the response, providing much of the street-

level mapping data that was used for logistics and camp management. (Harvard

Humanitarian Initiative 2011:8)

With the Haiti earthquake two important and related things changed in disaster response: the level of

mass-reporting with digital media took on unprecedented volume and at the same time “online

communication enabled a kind of collective [and global!] intelligence to emerge” (ibid. p.11)

Thousands of volunteers from all over the world “aggregated, analyzed, and mapped the flow of

messages coming from Haiti. Using Internet collaboration tools and modern practices, they wrote

software, processed satellite imagery, built maps, and translated reports between the three languages

of the operation [...]“ (ibid.).




99

With these crowdsourced analysis efforts, it is ever easier for people with special skill sets to express

their solidarity and help from wherever they are in the world. And connected with these willing

volunteers, V&CTs, or as they are now (arguably more accurately – Crowley 2013, 28) referred to

‘digital humanitarian organisations’ (DHO). Organisations which support and interface between

affected communities producing data and the online – crowdsourced communities of analysts.

We derived this list of the most important DHOs and their activities from Crowley (2013, 30ff.)

Humanity Road “educate the public before, during and after disasters on how to survive,

sustain and reunite with loved ones”

Standby Task Force (SBTF) “provide live mapping support to humanitarian, human right,

and media organizations” (using Ushahidi)

Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team (HOT) “coordinate the creation, production, and

distribution of free mapping resources to support humanitarian relief efforts in many places

around the world” Principles: open source and open data sharing towards humanitarian

reponse and economic development –trains communities how to map

GISCorps provides short term volunteer GIS services to underserved communities worldwide

both in post disaster, humanitarian relief, capacity building, and other services (2600 GIS

professionals)

MapAction can deploy teams of GIS experts anywhere in the world in a matter of hours.

Official mapping support element of the United Nations OCHA

Crisis Mappers international community of experts at the intersection between humanitarian

crises, technology, crowd source in, and crisis mapping. Critically important coordination

mechanism .

6.3.1 Communities and the Practical Ethics of Inter-Agency Collaboration

While comprehensive and inclusive approaches like “Whole Community” and the new digital

response entities arriving on the emergency response scene are certainly very promising, experience

has shown, that the immense information and support they are able to produce is still difficult to

translate into multi-agency collaborative efforts. In the last section we have seen the many obstacles

hampering collaboration attempts between established formal organisations, where protocols and

formal cooperation mechanisms exist. This gets even more difficult, when some of the participants

that should now play an important role in the response effort are ad hoc, uncertified emergent entities,

which do not adhere to structured and procedural regulated processes as formulated in regulations and

protocols that govern organisations.

The international humanitarian system was not tooled to handle these two new information fire

hoses—one from the disaster-affected community and one from a mobilized swarm of global

volunteers […] [T]he humanitarian system had no formal protocols for communicating with these

volunteer and technical communities (V&TCs). Despite the good will of field staff, their institutions’

policies and procedures were never designed to incorporate data from outside their networks. Some

view this as a lost opportunity; others worry about what this change might mean for humanitarians

who need to protect data about vulnerable populations. (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative 2011, 9 &

11)

While many experts and even government organisations like FEMA, the Department of State and

the U.S. Agency for International Development agree that an integration of emergency efforts

with digital humanitarian organisations (DHOs) is invaluable, and have already started

establishing interfaces to grassroots networks (Crowley 2013, 39ff.), there are also strong

concerns and serious legal barriers still preventing such collaboration on a more general scale.




100

Federal agencies are legally obligated to provide data that are accurate, reliable and

useful. They must take steps to ensure the integrity of information. They must also prevent

the release of data that breach the privacy or security of citizens or organizations, violate

nondisclosure agreements, or endanger national security.(Crowley 2013, 36)

However, using DHOs, despite their efforts of securing and validating the information they work with,

the standards for data accuracy can often not be met. Not because the data is wrong, but because it

cannot always be traced to a trusted person.

It is far easier to mandate data quality controls for machine learning of big data initiatives

than for collective intelligence projects (ibid.)

In contrast, collective intelligence requires a far greater openness around software, data,

and methodology. To harness the capacities of a network, large numbers of individuals must

be trusted to view or edit subsets of the total dataset. (ibid.)

It is issues like differing philosophies around the verification and processes of data accuracy, which

are the main obstacles for interfacing DHOs with government agencies:

The challenge of creating an interface between the grassroots and government is more than

integrating new techniques into federal workflows. It is about building trust around new

methods of generating knowledge in the open. This trust is one of the core challenges of

developing open government. (Crowley 2013, 37).

Shanley et al. (2013) also discuss a broad range of legal and policy challenges that occur with the

attempts of interfacing with crowd produced and community organized emergency information, and

review current research offering solutions

Needle in the Haystack: information overflow and loads of non-essential information in the

myriads of tweets during a large scale emergency. How to separate the useful from the non-

essential information?

Trust and credibility: “Peoples’ lives are at stake in crisis situations, so trust and credibility

play a critical role in what data are used and why. Crowd-generated data does not usually

come with metadata or assurances of its quality” (ibid., 868)

Privacy: “Using social media and collaborative web-based mapping inevitably raises privacy

concerns (Boyd 2011, Boyd and Crawford 2012, Obermeyer 2007). Digital volunteers and

responders sometimes aggregate many disparate datasets. While a single dataset may not

erode privacy, combining several may create greater risk” (Shanley et al 2013: 869)

Security: “Social networking tools and crowdsourcing approaches can be used by response

organizations and digital volunteers for the public good, but also by bad actors to manipulate

the public foment strife and undermine stability” (ibid., 870)

Intellectual Property: “Crowdsourced data production raises several important question

regarding intellectual property.” (870). Crisis mapping often relies on the aggregation of GIS

data, map data and tweets or new reports. Such data procurement can lead to “complex

copyrighting licensing situations” (ibid. 871).

Liabilty: “Providing or acting on crowd-generated information about conditions carries

potential legal liability [...] Crisis mapping, if conducted from or directed to the United States,

can subject digital volunteers to tort liability under U.S. law. Digital volunteers are at risk if

they fail to use reasonable care in making their responses. This could include disseminating

false information, sloppy software development, failing to act in a manner commensurate with

similarly situated individuals or failing to properly vet and supervise volunteers” (ibid., 872).

From these analyses, Shanley et al. conclude that:




101

The greatest barrier to widespread adoption will not be technical: It will be legal and

institutional resistance. How do we build trust? How can government agencies like FEMA

successfully navigate administrative hurdles, such as privacy and procurement or the

Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)? How do they integrate crowd-generated data with official

data? What are the potential implications of using fused data sets for operation decision-

making (Burns and Shanley 2013) (in Shanley et al. 2013, 873).

As the digital volunteer community expands it will need training to better integrate its

efforts with those of the formal response organizations. The American Red Cross’ Digital

Volunteer Program, the Digital Humanitarian Network’s collaboration with UN OCHHA,

and the emerging VOST model offer useful models for trusted collaborations between

informal volunteers and contributors and the formal response community (874)

Current practices of community engagement are part of a ‘new reality’ for emergency services, where

budget cuts115

combine with increased frequency and severity of disasters, ageing infrastructures and

ageing populations, a generation change in the profession, with a lot of experienced officers retiring

followed by young, media-savvy colleagues, as well as increasingly intense and immediate and ‘close-

up’ media coverage, coupled with rising expectations from the public and a more active participation

from members of the public through social media. Good design around ethical, legal and social issues

arising around social media use is critical to being able to leverage crisis informatics for good.

6.4 Societal issues: A Crisis of Information?

The specific enactment (or lack of enactment) of ethical, lawful and socially responsible conduct in

every moment of professional and lay social and material practices around crisis management and

emergency response accumulates at a societal level and this produces ethical legal, and social

challenges, risks as well as opportunities. In this short section, we examine key dimensions of this.

‘Data is the new oil’, perhaps the most vital ingredient for recovery from the current global economic

crisis (McKinsey 2011). But as ‘knowing capitalism’ is generating more personalized products and

services more profitably (Thrift, 2005), a ‘century of disasters’ is taking shape (eScience 2012).

Population growth, migration to cities, and climate change engender greater vulnerability and more

frequent and more severe natural and manmade crises. Under stress from austerity and increasing

demand, crisis management is one area where data-based efficiencies are eagerly sought. In

preparation or response to a storm, pandemic or terrorist attack, data about persons and places affected

can be pivotal for effective and (cost-)efficient response, and better data-sharing between emergency

and other public services is high on many governments’ agenda.

However, this ‘informationalization’ of services has long been recognized as problematic. In 2006

Caspar Bowden, former Chief Privacy Adviser at Microsoft warned that ‘trafffic data’:

constitutes a near complete map of private life: whom everyone talks to (by e- mail and

phone), where everyone goes (mobile phone location co-ordinates), and what everyone

reads online (websites browsed). (In Rauhofer, 2006, 323)

‘Traffic’, ‘transactional’ or ‘communications’ data are personal data116

generated by all but the most

marginalized people as part of everyday living with digital technologies. With growing capacity for

115

For example, in the UK, central government funding for police budgets in England and Wales is being cut by

20% by 2015. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-19455784. See also

http://www.pharmatimes.com/article/13-06-14/Spain_s_austerity_healthcare_cuts_putting_lives_at_risk.aspx 116

According to the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC ‘personal data’ means ‘any information relating to

an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) ... who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in

particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-19455784




102

capture, analysis, sharing and data-driven decision-making, the ‘seas’ of such data are becoming more

navigable and exploitable, increasing the risk of inadvertent disclosure or misuse of personal data.

72% of Europeans are ‘concerned that personal data may be shared without their permission’ (Reding,

2012), prompting a comprehensive reform of the EU’s data protection rules, which will come into

operation in 2014 (European Commission, 2012). Recent disclosures over surveillance through the US

National Security Agency and the UK Government Communications Headquarters are fanning the

debate (MacAskill, Borger, Hopkins, Davies, & Ball, 2013). Sociological analysis has also long

warned that an exchange of personal data for more convenience, efficiency and security is a Faustian

bargain (Urry, 2007), and amongst citizens (and non-citizens! such as tourists and illegal residents),

policy-makers, politicians and academics, concerns over a crisis of information are spreading.

However, there is a dearth of studies of the specifics of data flows, intentions and practices of data

processing and effects in particular contexts (Yar, 2003). In this deliverable we contribute to debates

about a crisis of information through a study of ethical, legal and social issues in informational

mobilities in crises. This is useful because data-based efficiencies can apply across a wide spectrum of

crises, and the pressures that arise in crises often incite intense informational mobilities – for risk

assessment, intelligence and criminal investigations, or for determining the number, status and

specifics of victims, as well as causes and consequences of the crisis. Exceptional license to process

personal data can apply to historical data, utilizing mandatory retention of communications, for

example, during national security operations (Rauhofer, 2006).

In a recent emergency communications stocktaking effort, the European Network and Information

Security Agency (ENISA, 2012) shows that current information sharing practices between emergency

agencies are inadequate. One of the reasons identified is an ‘over-zealous or incorrect interpretation

of the duties imposed on public organisations by the Data Protection Act’ (Armstrong et al., 2007).

After the London bombings, for example, some responders deemed it to be illegal to pass on personal

data collected from victims by the Family Assistance Centre to successor organizations, which

complicated continuity of care.

While these effects are clearly deleterious, sociological research shows that there are often good social

and organizational as well as political reasons for separation between the different agencies

(Quarantelli, 1966; Drabek & McEntire, 2002; Allen, Karanasios, & Norman, 2013; Scheppele 2003).

In the European Union, calls for better technological support acknowledge this, at least partially:

We are not yet at a stage when we can envisage to interconnect information management

systems from different organizations to share situation assessment or automate coordinated

response procedures. For many reasons (political considerations, concern about ..

confidentiality .., competition or conflicting objectives between organisations, human

behaviour, lack of financing, etc.) there is no willingness to establish direct interconnection,

but rather a need to utilise human interfaces between systems (M/487, 2013)

But the ‘yet’ in the above quote also indexes a strong belief in technology as a panacea to overcome

these frictions, to interconnect and even automate response procedures. These hopes resonate strongly

with post-disaster and emergency planning reviews which often combine critique of response

agencies’ current lack of coordination with a vision of opportunities through better use of existing or

new information and communication technology (ICT):

physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity’. The Directive identifies ‘sensitive information’,

such as data concerning racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious and philosophical beliefs, health,

sexual life and criminal activities, and prohibits processing of all personal data without the consent of the

data subject. However, exceptions apply.




103

Norway 22/7 2011: More sophisticated use of ICT has a substantial potential for improving

efficiency and quality … This is a key to better emergency preparedness in future. (Gjørv,

2012, 20)

New York 2012: The City did not immediately have access to accurate, timely data …. As a

result, it took a few days—and in the case of telecommunications, longer—to get an

accurate, comprehensive understanding of the magnitude of power and service outages ...

(Hurricane Sandy, Gibbs & Holloway, 2013, 18)

UK 2013: People aged 65 or over account for over 50% of all fire-related deaths …

Prevention … will need to be facilitated by better data-sharing across public

services.(Review of fire and rescue authorities in England, Knight, 2013, 71)

Innovation eagerly takes its cue from such critiques. But funders, technology developers,

implementing organizations and researchers also recognize that a lack of understanding of the realities

of organizational practices can lead to costly failures (Committee of Public Accounts, 2011; Shapiro,

2005). The BRIDGE project seeks to resolve some of the tensions by integrating ‘domain analysis’ –

qualitative studies of social practices of collaboration – and ELSI assessment with stakeholder

engagement and collaborative design methods to design new technology. Its main aim is to develop

computer infrastructures that can help responders assemble ICT systems to support inter-

organizational interoperability and information sharing in Europe. This research is also inspired by a

current convergence of ‘smart city’ and crisis management systems, powerfully illustrated by Maeda

et al’s vision of ‘Next Generation ICT Services for the Resilient Society’ (2010, Figure 2) in Japan:

Figure 18 ‘Next generation ICT for the resilient society’ Source: adapted from Maeda 2010

Such computer architectures can enable ‘one stop management’ of datasets ranging from personal

activities (diaries, location, photographs, blogs) to employment, taxation and health records,

telecommunications and risk registers. Researchers, organizations and governments in Brazil

(Naphade et al, 2011), the Netherlands (Steenbruggen et al., 2013) and the UK (Johnson, 2012) are

extending similar ‘one stop management’ to security and crisis management. In the European context

interconnections between legislative and executive agencies are governed by strict rules, but secure

information sharing that respects these rules (or is exempt through exceptions) is seen as an important

area for innovation.

However benignly intended, increasing information sharing poses challenges. It is not clear how

‘secure’ direct interconnections, respect for rules and responsible exception management can be




104

supported with the technical, organizational, political and legal means that are being developed. In

fact, eager embrace of technological advances in everyday life, commercial and civic organizations

has so far brought unprecedented levels of surveillance and an erosion of democratic values and civil

liberties (Crang & Graham, 2007; Lyon, 2002). The social sorting that becomes possible with traffic

data can splinter societies (Graham & Marvin, 2001) and allow exceptions to spread (Agamben, 2005;

Scheppele, 2003). The all-pervasive focus on risk and security creates fearful societies (Aradau, Lobo-

Guerrero, & Van Munster, 2008), fostering the enactment of a pervasive securitization of mobility

(Amoore 2006; Adey, 2009). Some analysts observe a militarization of everyday life (Graham, 2008)

and the development of a ‘culture of fear’ (Furedi, 2006), resulting in life ‘lived as the continuous

emergency of its own emergence’ (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2009) subject to increasingly

comprehensively enforced preventative measures in healthcare, justice and disaster management

(Amoore, 2011; Brown & Adams, 2007; Tulich, 2012). While some surveillance studies evoke

Orwell’s ‘Big Brother’ as a metaphor to characterize the dangers, many highlight more ‘disorganized’

forms of surveillance, where many actors rather than one centralized bureaucracy, collect and share

data in ways that are hard to fathom (Lyon, 1994). Daniel Solove (2004) highly effectively evokes

Kafka’s novel The Trial to capture the surreal anxieties, violations, and anxious governmentalities that

an erosion of informational self-determination in this landscape can engender.

What should designers, practitioners, politicians, policy makers, researchers, and (non-) citizens do? A

curbing of informationalizing innovation for knowing capitalism is unlikely in many societies

worldwide (Urry, 2013), and the twin pressures of financial cuts and an increase in disasters make it

highly improbable in crisis management. With reference to information technology, ‘Don’t do IT’ may

be a sound conclusion to draw from surveillance studies, but it is not easily practicable. ‘Do IT more

carefully’ could be a better maxim, but to specify what ‘more careful’ might mean, there is a need to

better understand how information is mobilised and shared in crises.

6.5 Summary

This Chapter provides a sense of how information is mobilised – and what difficulties might be

encountered – in multi-agency emergency response with a particular emphasis on how this affects

people’s capability for ethical, lawful and socially responsible conduct. A fundamental insight is that

such conduct is a matter of social and material practices, which are deeply entangled with technologies

as well as ‘environmental’ factors of culture, embodiment and situations. This draws attention to the

specificities of how people interact with others and the subtleties of interaction this enables. It

highlights that the skills and practices involved may be ill-supported or even undermined by existing

technologies, which challenges people’s abilities to perform practical ethics, lawfulness and

responsibility. Widening the focus to multi-agency response we explored practices of trust, dynamic

risk assessment and organizational cultural differences and discussed how ‘simply’ providing more

information and more standardised organizational interoperability procedures are not enough. This is

in no small part due to the fact that the specific social and material practices of how people make sense

of emergencies and coordinate cooperation are so deeply entangled with technologies, environments

and situations. A focus on community emergency response then showed a particularly vibrant domain

of social innovation that is changing the landscape for ethical, lawful and socially responsible

emergency response. The way in which individuals and communities are appropriating social media to

provide and seek information and to self-organize help is a deeply transformative engine for

emergency response in a ‘century of disasters’. While there are many positive aspects, these

transformations are also part of wider, societal transformative trends in a century where ‘knowing

capitalism’ is joining forces with ‘big data’ and ideas of data fusion across different domains of civil

society. The convergence of ‘smart city’ innovation with IT innovation in emergency response carries

great potential, but also significant danger.




105

7 Conclusion Disaster policy analysts argue that the crises of the future will increasingly be transboundary crises,

which will transcend geographic or political borders, affect multiple vital elements of infrastructure

and will not be contained in time (Ansell, Keller, & Boin, 2009; Ansell et al., 2010; Boin & Ekengren,

2009; Boin & Lagadec, 2000). In response to this, the European Security Strategy (ESS), declares

the EU’s commitment to combat a variety of security threats, including failed states, energy

security, terrorism, global warming, and disasters. The ESS adopts a comprehensive view,

explicitly linking internal and external threats, civilian and military capacities, and natural

and man-made disasters. (Boin and Ekengren 2009:287)

This necessitates cooperation between regional, national and international communities. The EU

Community Mechanism for Civil Protection is developing several tools to support this, including the

European Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERC) in Brussels and a Common Emergency

Communication and Information System (CECIS) that facilitates communication between ERC and

National Authorities. Core values that underpin EU emergency response collaboration include:

Solidarity, subsidiarity, unity in diversity: The EU has a long tradition of deliberative collaboration

that avoids unacceptable centralization and builds on long-term mutual respect and understanding

between partners. This translates into policies that emphasise solidarity and subsidiarity. In the 2004

Solidarity Declaration member states pledge to jointly mobilise civilian and military means to protect

the civilian population in a disaster. The principle of subsidiarity ensures that ‘decisions are taken as

closely as possible to the citizen and constant checks are made to verify that action at Union level is

justified in light of possibilities available at national, regional or local level’ (EU Glossary). Solidarity

and subsidiarity are components of broader values of ‘unity in diversity’, where EU objectives should

always leave sufficient implementation room so as to allow for national diversity and flexibility.

Democratic values and human rights: Proponents of a new security paradigm for the EU argue that

the EU ‘should strive to become a normative or an ethical power in world politics’ (Boin and

Ekengren 2009:289). Translated into innovation in best practice and the design and use of advanced

ICT, this demands careful attention to issues of autonomy, privacy, and citizen engagement.

Informationalizing emergency response produces complex intended and unintended, positive and

negative consequences. A focus on ethical, legal and social ‘issues’ acknowledges that socio-technical

transformations are complex. The research presented in this report seeks to chart how practitioners and

other stakeholders in emergency response currently encounter ethical, legal and social issues. We have

focused on issues related to innovation in IT supported multi-agency emergency response. In a century

of disasters, where emergency response services are under pressure to produce more efficient,

collaborative and effective emergency response with less funding, it is critical to pursue ethically,

legally and socially circumspect IT innovation. Emergency situations are a breeding ground for

exceptions, including exceptions to fundamental constitutional rights and suspension of normal moral

rules, often fueled (but often unwarranted) by fear of moral disorder. This can erode important civil

liberties, and ‘the wrong kind’ of IT innovation can amplify detrimental unintended consequences.

What should designers, practitioners, politicians, policy makers, researchers, and (non-) citizens do? A

curbing of informationalizing innovation in knowing capitalism is unlikely to be possible in many

societies worldwide today, and the twin pressures of financial cuts and an increase in disasters make it

highly improbable in crisis management. ‘Don’t do IT’ may be a sound conclusion to draw for some

designers, analysts and practitioners, but it is not easily practicable and – in our view – not desirable,

because much good can come out of integrating IT more closely into emergency response. ‘Do IT

more carefully’ to change the existing situation into a preferred one (Simon 1969) could be a better

maxim, but to specify what ‘more careful’ might mean, there is a need to better understand how

information is mobilised and shared in crises. This deliverable contributes to this effort.




106

8 References

2013 mass surveillance disclosures. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_mass_ surveillance_disclosures

Adey, P. (2009). Facing Airport Security: Affect, Biopolitics, and the Preemptive Securitisation of the

Mobile Body. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 27(2), 274–295.

Agamben, G. (1998). Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford University Press.

Agamben, G. (2005). State of Exception. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Agre, P. E. (1997). Toward a Critical Technical Practice: Lessons Learned in Trying to Reform AI. In

G. C. Bowker, S. L. Star, W. Turner, & L. Gasser (Eds.) Social Science Technical Systems and

Cooperative Work Beyond the Great Divide, 1–17.

Åhman, T, Nilsson, C (2009). The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection, in Olsson, Stefan

(Ed.), Crisis Management in the European Union: Cooperation in the Face of Emergencies,

Springer, Dordrecht.

Albert, S., Ashforth, B. E., & Dutton, J. E. (2000). Organizational Identity and Identification: Charting

New Waters and Building New Bridges. Academy of Management Review , 25 (1), 13–17.

Alexander D. (2002). Principles of emergency planning and management. Oxford University, New

York.

Alexander, L. (2000). Deontology at the Threshold. San Diego Law Review, 893–912.

Allen, D. K., Karanasios, S., & Norman, A. (2013). Information Sharing And Interoperability: The

Case of Major Incident Management. European Journal of Information Systems. Advance online

publication doi:10.1057/ejis.2013.8

Amoore, L. (2006). Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror. Political

Geography, 25 (May 2005), 336–351.

Amoore, L. (2011). Data Derivatives: On the Emergence of a Security Risk Calculus for Our Times.

Theory, Culture & Society, 28(6), 24–43.

Anderson, R., Sharrock, W., & Hughes, J. A. (1990). The Division of Labour. Réseaux, 8(2), 237–

252. http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/reso_0984-

5372_1990_hos_8_2_3560

Ansell, C, Keller, A., & Boin, A. (2009). Managing Transboundary Crises: Requirements for a

Dynamic Response.

Ansell, Chris, Boin, A., & Keller, A. (2010). Managing transboundary crises: Identifying the building

blocks of an effective response system. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 18(4),

195–207.

Aradau, C., Lobo-Guerrero, L., & Van Munster, R. (2008). Security, Technologies of Risk, and the

Political: Guest Editors’ Introduction. Security Dialogue, 39(2-3), 147–154.

Armstrong, H., Ashton, C., & Thomas, R. (2007). Data Protection and Sharing – Guidance for

Emergency Planners and Responders. Office. London.

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/132709/dataprotection.pdf

Beauchamp, T. L., & Childress, J. F. (2001). Principles of Biomedical Ethics. OUP USA.

Bechky, B. A. (2003). Sharing Meaning Across Occupational Communities: The Transformation of

Understanding on a Production Floor. Organization Science, 14(3), 312–330.

Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage.




107

Birkland, T. A. (2009). Disasters, Catastrophes, and Policy Failure in the Homeland Security Era 1.

Review of Policy Research, 26(4), 423–438.

Boin, A., & Ekengren, M. (2009). Preparing for the World Risk Society: Towards a New Security

Paradigm for the European Union. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 17(4),

285–294.

Boin, A., & Lagadec, P. (2000). Preparing for the Future: Critical Challenges in Crisis Management.

Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 8(4), 185–191.

Boin, A., & t Hart, P. (2010). Organising for Effective Emergency Management: Lessons from

Research1. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 69, 357–371.

Boyd, D., (2011). “Real Names” policies are an abuse of power, Apophenia,

http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2011/08/04/real-names.html. [Accessed 17 February

2014]

Boyd, D., & Crawford, K. (2012). Critical questions for Big Data: Provocations for cultural,

technological, and scholarly phenomenon, Information, Communication & Society, 15(5): 662-

679.

Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Harvard University

Press.

Bring, Ove (2011). De mänskliga rättigheternas väg – genom historien och litteraturen, Atlantis,

Stockholm.

Brown, I., & Adams, A. A. (2007). The ethical challenges of ubiquitous healthcare. International

Review of Information Ethics, 8, 53–60.

Brown, J. S., & Duguid, P. (1991). Organizational Learning and Communities-of-Practice: Toward a

Unified View of Working, Learning, and Innovation. Organization Science, 2(1), 40–57.

Brunner, Elgin M., Suter, Manuel (2009). International CIIP Handbook 2008/09: An inventory of 25

national and 7 international critical information infrastructure protection policies. Center for

Security Studies, ETH Zurich. www.isn.ethz.ch/ Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/ ?id=91952

[Accessed 17 February 2014]

Buck, D. A., Trainor, J. E., & Aguirre, B. E. (2006). A Critical Evaluation of the Incident Command

System and NIMS. Journal Of Homeland Security And Emergency Management, 3(3), 1–27.

Burghardt, M., & Wietek, M. (2013). Validation with the Interoperability Demonstrator.

https://project.sintef.no/eRoomReq/Files/ikt2/BRIDGE/0_33479/D10.1 Validation of

Interoperability.pdf

Büscher, M, Christensen, M., Hansen, K. M., Mogensen, P., & Shapiro, D. (2009). Bottom-up, top-

down? Connecting software architecture design with use. In A. Voss, M. Hartswood, R. Procter,

M. Rouncefield, R. Slack, & M. Büscher (Eds.), Configuring User-Designer Relations:

Interdisciplinary Perspectives, London: Springer-Verlag, 157–191.

Büscher, M, Liegl, M., Perng, S., & Wood, L. (n.d.). How to follow the information? A Study of

informational mobilities in crises. Sociologica, Submitted.

Buscher, M., Wahlgren, P. (2012). D12.1: Privacy Protection and Legal Risk Analysis : BRIDGE

Project. BRIDGE Project Deliverable D12.1. http://www.bridgeproject.eu/en/bridge-

results/deliverables/d121

Buscher, M., Bylund, M., Sanches, P., Ramirez, L., & Wood, L. (2013). A New Manhattan Project?

Interoperability and Ethics in Emergency Response Systems of Systems. In T. Comes, F.

Fiedrich, S. Fortier, F. Geldermann, & L. Yang (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International

http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2011/08/04/real-names.html




108

ISCRAM Conference May 2013. ISCRAM.

http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/62390/1/269_ManhattanProject_Final.pdf

Buscher, M., Perng, S., & Wood, L. (2013). Privacy, Security, Liberty: Informing the Design of

EMIS. In T. Comes, F. Fiedrich, S. Fortier, J. Geldermann, & L. Yang (Eds.), Proceedings of the

10th International ISCRAM Conference – Baden-Baden, Germany, May 2013.

http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/62141/1/ELSI_FP_Privacy_pre_final.pdf

Büscher, M., Urry, J., Witchger, K. (2011). Mobile Methods. (K. Büscher, M., Urry, J., Witchger,

Ed.). London: Routledge.

Büscher, Monika, Kristensen, M., & Mogensen, P. H. (2007). Making the future palpable: Notes from

a major incident Future Laboratory. In International Journal Of Emergency Management (Vol.

5, 1/2, 145-163.

Cabinet Office. (2013). Responding to Emergencies. The UK Central Government Response Concept

of Operations (CONOPS).

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/192425/CONOPs

_incl_revised_chapter_24_Apr-13.pdf [Accessed 17 February 2014]

Cartlidge, E. (2012). Aftershocks in the courtroom. Science (New York, N.Y.), 338(6104), 184–8.

Chalmers, M. (2003). Seamful design and ubicomp infrastructure. Proceedings of Ubicomp Workshop

at the Crossroads The Interaction of HCI and Systems Issues in UbiComp.

http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~matthew/papers/ubicomp2003HCISystems.pdf [accessed 17 February

2014]

Chesterman, S. (2011). Operation Bridge: Peer review into the Response of Cumbria Constabulary Following

the Actions of Derrick Bird on 2nd June 2010. Independent Peer Review Final Report. West Mercia Police

http://www.cumbria.police.uk/Admin/uploads/attachment/files/News_Files/Inquest/Running_Orders/ACC

_Chestermans_report.pdf [accessed 17 February 2014]

Cole, J. (2010). Interoperability In a crisis 2. Human Factors and Organisational Processes.

http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Interoperability_2_web.pdf [Accessed 17 February 2014]

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER Taking stock of EU Counter-Terrorism Measures

Accompanying document to the COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCILThe EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main

achievements and future challenges. Brussels, 20.7.2010 SEC(2010) 911 final.

ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/malmstrom/pdf/news/communication_counter_

terrorism_annex_en.pdf [Accessed 17 February 2014]

Commission’s European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO).

ec.europa.eu/echo/about/presentation_en.htm

Committee of Public Accounts (2011). The failure of the FiReControl Project HC 1397. Public

Accounts Committee - Fiftieth Report. London.

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubacc/1397/139702.htm

[Accessed 15 August 2013]

Committee of Public Accounts. (2011). Public Accounts Committee - Fiftieth Report The failure of the

FiReControl Project HC 1397. London.


COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE

COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE

COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Commission provisions on ‘ARGUS’ general rapid alert

system, Brussels, 23.12.2005 COM(2005) 662 final. eurlex.europa.eu/

LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0662:FIN: EN:PDF [Accessed 17 February 2014]

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/192425/CONOPs_incl_revised_chapter_24_Apr-13.pdf

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/192425/CONOPs_incl_revised_chapter_24_Apr-13.pdf

http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~matthew/papers/ubicomp2003HCISystems.pdf

http://www.cumbria.police.uk/Admin/uploads/attachment/files/News_Files/Inquest/Running_Orders/ACC_Chestermans_report.pdf

http://www.cumbria.police.uk/Admin/uploads/attachment/files/News_Files/Inquest/Running_Orders/ACC_Chestermans_report.pdf

http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Interoperability_2_web.pdf







109

Community Research and Development Information Service. cordis.europa.eu/fp7/security/fp7-

project-leaflets_en.html

Council conclusions on the Commission communication on the European Union internal security

strategy in action. ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-

do/policies/pdf/3_council_conclusions_ on_the_iss_en.pdf

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid (OJ L

163, 2.7.1996, p. 1), available at

eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1996R1257:20090420:EN:PDF


Crang, M, & Graham, S. (2007). Sentient cities: ambient intelligence and the politics of urban space.

Information Communication Society, 10(6), 789–817.

Crisp, R. (1997). Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Mill on Utilitarianism (Routledge Philosophy

Guidebooks) (p. 256). Routledge.

Crowley, J. (2013). Connecting Grassroots and Government for Disaster Response. Commons Lab,

Wilson Center. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/crowley updated2.pdf [Accessed

17 February 2014]

De Hert, P., Kloza, D., & Wright, D. (2012). PIAF Project Deliverable 3: Recommendations for a

privacy impact assessment framework for the European Union.

http://piafproject.eu/ref/PIAF_D3_final.pdf [Accessed 17 February 2014]

Department of Homeland Security. www.dhs.gov [Accessed 17 February 2014]

DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document n° 5, Disaster Risk Reduction: Increasing resilience by

reducing disaster risk in humanitarian action, September 2013, available at

ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/prevention_preparedness/DRR_ thematic_policy_doc.pdf

Dillon, M., & Lobo-Guerrero, L. (2009). The Biopolitical Imaginary of Species-being. Theory,

Culture & Society, 26(1), 1–23.

Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the

protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free

movement of such data

Dougherty, Candidus (2008). While the Government Fiddled Around, the Big Easy Drowned,

Northern Illinois University Law Review 29, 117-47, reprinted in Hufnagel, S, Roach, K, (2012).

Drabek, T. E. (2007). Sociology, Disasters and Emergency Management: History, Contributions, and

Future Agenda. In D. A. McEntire (Ed.), Disciplines, Disasters and Emergency Management.

Springfield, USA: Charles C Thomas.

http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/drabeksociologydisastersandem.pdf

Drabek, T. E., & McEntire, D. A. (2002). Emergent Phenomena and Multiorganizational Coordination

in Disasters: Lessons from the Research Literature. International Journal of Mass Emergencies

and Disasters, 20(Aug), 197–224.

Drennan LT, McConnell A. (2007). Risk and crisis management in the public sector. Routledge, New

York.

Dunne, A., & Raby, F. (2001). Design Noir: The Secret Life of Electronic Objects (p. 176).

August/Birkhauser.

Dynes, Russell R., & Quarantelli, E. L. (1972). When Disaster Strikes (it Isn’t Much Like what You've

Heard and Read About). National Emergency Training Center.

Dynes, Russell Rowe. (1970). Organized Behavior in Disaster. Heath LexingtonBooks

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/crowley%20updated2.pdf

http://piafproject.eu/ref/PIAF_D3_final.pdf

http://www.dhs.gov/




110

Dyzenhaus, David, (2005). Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal

Order? Cardozo Law Review, 27, 2005-39, reprinted in Hufnagel, S, Roach, K, (2012).

ECHO FACTSHEET Emergency Response Centre. ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/

countries/factsheets/thematic/ERC_en.pdf

Ellebrecht, N., Feldmeier, K., & Kaufmann, S. (2013). IT ’ s about more than speed . The impact of IT

on the management of mass casualty incidents in Germany. In Proceedings of the 10th

International ISCRAM Conference – Baden-Baden, Germany, May 2013, 391–400.

Elwood, S., M.F. Goodchild, and D.D. Sui, (2012). Researching volunteered geographic information:

Spatial data, geographic research, and new social practice, Annals of the Association of American

Geographers, 102(3): 571-590.

ENISA. (2012). Emergency Communications Stocktaking. A study into Emergency Communications

Procedures. http://www.enisa.europa.eu/media/news-items/report-looks-at-improving-

emergency-communications

eScience. (2012). Earth faces a century of disasters, report warns. Retrieved November 04, 2012, from

http://esciencenews.com/sources/the.guardian.science/2012/04/26/earth.faces.a.century.disasters.

report.warns

eScience(2012). Earth Faces a Century of Disasters, Report Warns.

http://esciencenews.com/sources/the.guardian.science/2012/04/26/earth.faces.a.century.disasters.

report.warns [Accessed 15 August 2013]

EU Commission. (2010). EU-Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management.

http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST 17833 2010

INIT&r=http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pd/en/10/st17/st17833.en10.pdf

EU Commission. (2012). Directions in Systems of Systems Engineering.

http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/embedded-systems-

engineering/documents/report_system_of_system.pdf

EU emergency and crisis co-ordination arrangements.

consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/WEB15106.pdf

EU Internal Security Strategy in Action. ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/internal-

security/internal-security-strategy/index_en.htm and eur-

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? uri=COM:2010:0673:FIN:EN:PDF#page=2

European Commission (2012). Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the

Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free

Movement of Such Data. Brussels: European Commission, 25.1.2012

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf


European Commission, Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) (2003). Disaster Preparedness and

Prevention (DPP): State of play and strategic orientations for EC policy: Working Paper,

ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/dipecho/dpp_paper.pdf

EUROPEAN UNION. eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri

=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:en:PDF

Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW). stiftung-thw.de

FEMA. (2011). A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and

Pathways for Action. Retrieved March 24, 2013, from http://www.fema.gov/whole-community

http://esciencenews.com/sources/the.guardian.science/2012/04/26/earth.faces.a.century.disasters.report.warns

http://esciencenews.com/sources/the.guardian.science/2012/04/26/earth.faces.a.century.disasters.report.warns

http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf




111

Ferejohn, J., Pasquino, P (2004). The Law of the Excepton: A Typoplogy of Emergency Powers.

International Jounral of Constitutional Law, 2, 210-39, reprinted in Hufnagel, S, Roach, K,

(2012).

Fischer, H. W. (2008). Response to Disaster: Fact Versus Fiction and Its Perpetuation The Sociology

of Disaster (3rd ed.). NY: University Press of America.

Forester, T., & Morrison, P. (1990). Computer Ethics: Cautionary Tales and Ethical Dilemmas in

Computing, Cambridge: MIT Press.

Foucault , M. (1975). Discipline and Punish, The Birth of the Prison. London, UK: Penguin.

Furedi, F. (2006). Culture of Fear. London: Continuum International Publishing.

Gallagher, S. (2013). Why facial recognition tech failed in the Boston bombing manhunt | Ars

Technica. Ars Technica. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/05/why-facial-

recognition-tech-failed-in-the-boston-bombing-manhunt/ [Accessed February 16, 2014]

Garfinkel, H. (1984 [1967]). Studies in Ethnomethodology. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

Geertz, C. (1994). Thick description: Toward an interpretive theory of culture. Readings in the

philosophy of social science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 213–231.

Gevaert, W. J. R., & de With, P. H. N. (2013). Robust face recognition algorithm for identifition of disaster

victims. In K. O. Egiazarian, S. S. Agaian, & A. P. Gotchev (Eds.), Society of Photo-Optical

Instrumentation Engineers (SPIE) Conference Series (Vol. 8655, p. 865503).

Gibbs, L. I., & Holloway, C. F. (2013). Hurricane Sandy After Action. Report and Recommendations

to Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg. New York.

http://www.nyc.gov/html/recovery/downloads/pdf/sandy_aar_5.2.13.pdf [Accessed 15 August

2013]

Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Cambridge,

UK: Polity.

Givens, G., J.R. Beveridge, B.A. Draper and D. Bolme, (2003). A Statistical Assessment of Subject

Factors in the PCA Recognition of Human Faces.

http://www.cs.colostate.edu/evalfacerec/papers/csusacv03.pdf [accessed 16 February 2014]

Gjørv, A. B. (Ed. . (2012). Rapport fra 22 Juli-Kommisjonen. Oslo.

http://www.regjeringen.no/smk/html/22julikommisjonen/22JULIKOMMISJONEN_NO/EN/PRE

SENTATION_OF_THE_REPORT/PUBLICATIONS.HTM

Glasgow, K., & Fink, C. (2013). Hashtag Lifespan and Social Networks during the London Riots. In

A. M. Greenberg, W. G. Kennedy, & N. D. Bos (Eds.), Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural

Modeling and Prediction Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 311–320.

Glăveanu, V., Lahlou, S. (2012). Through the Creator’s Eyes: Using the Subjective Camera to

Study Craft Creativity. Creativity Research Journal 24:2-3, 152-162.

Grace, J. (2013). Too Well-Travelled, Not Well-Formed? the Reform of Criminality Information

Sharing In the UK. The Police Journal, 86(1), 29–52.

Graham, S. (2008). Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism. London: Verso.

Graham, S., & Marvin, S. (2001). Splintering urbanism. London: Routledge.

Gramelsberger, G., & Mansnerus, E. (2012). The Inner World of Models and Its Epistemic Diversity:

Infectious Disease and Climate Modelling. Ways of Thinking, Ways of Seeing.

Greenbaum, J. M., & Kyng, M. (1991). Design at work: Cooperative design of computer systems.

Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/05/why-facial-recognition-tech-failed-in-the-boston-bombing-manhunt/

http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/05/why-facial-recognition-tech-failed-in-the-boston-bombing-manhunt/

http://www.nyc.gov/html/recovery/downloads/pdf/sandy_aar_5.2.13.pdf




112

Gross, M. (2010). Ignorance and Surprise - Science, Society, and Ecological Design. Cambridge, MA:

MIT Press.

GSMA. (2013). Towards a Code of Conduct: Guidelines for the Use of SMS in Natural Disasters.

London. http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/towards-a-code-of-conduct-guidelines-

for-the-use-of-sms-in-natural-disasters

Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of international disaster relief and initial

recovery assistance. www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/idrl-guidelines/

Habermas, J. (1994). Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays. Contemporary Sociology.

Cambridge: MIT Press.

Habermas, J. (1996). Between facts and norms. contributions to a discourse theory of law and

democracy Cambridge: MIT Press.

Haddow, G., & Bullock, J. (2005). The Future of Emergency Management. In The 2005 FEMA

Emergency Management Higher Education Conference. Emmitsburg, MD: Federal Emergency

Management Agency, 11–20.

Hallett, H. (2011). Coroner’s Inquestinto the London Bombings of 7 July 2005. London.

http://7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk/docs/orders/rule43-report.pdf

Harrald, J. R. (2006). Agility and Discipline: Critical Success Factors for Disaster Response. The

ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 604(1), 256–272.

Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (2011). Disaster Relief 2.0: The Future of Information Sharing in

Humanitarian Emergencies. Washington, D. C. and Berkshire, Uk.

http://www.unfoundation.org/assets/pdf/disaster-relief-20-report.pdf [17 February 2014]

Head, Michael (2009). The Military Call-out Legislation (2912), in Calling out the Troops, Sydneay

NSW, The Federation Press, pp 100-21, reprinted in Hufnagel, S, Roach, K, (2012).

Heath, C., & Luff, P. (1992). Collaboration and control: Crisis management and multimedia

technology in London Underground Line Control Rooms. Computer Supported Cooperative

Work, 1(1-2), 69–94.

Hester, S., & Eglin, P. (1992). A sociology of crime. London ; New York: Routledge.

HM Government. (2013). Emergency Response and Recovery Non statutory guidance accompanying

the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253488/Emergenc

y_Response_and_Recovery_5th_edition_October_2013.pdf

Howe, Jeff. (2009). Crowdsourcing: Why the Power of the Crowd Is Driving the Future of Business.

New York: Three Rivers Press.

Hufnagel, S, Roach, K, (2012). Conclusion, in Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham.

Hufnagel, Saskia, Roach, Kent (eds) (2012). Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham

ICO. (2013). Data sharing. ICO.

http://www.ico.org.uk/for_organisations/data_protection/topic_guides/data_sharing

IDC. (2012). Final Study Report: Design of Future Embedded Systems (SMART 2009/0063).

http://www.cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/embedded-systems-engineering/documents/idc-study-final-

report.pdf

Ignatieff, M. (2012). The Ethics of Emergency. In A. Viens & M. J. Selgelid (Eds.), Emergency

Ethics, Vol. I, 301–336. Farnham, UK: Ashgate.

Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). www.ipu.org/english/home.htm

http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/idrl-guidelines/




113

International CEP Handbook (2009). Civil Emergency Planning in the NATO/EAPC Countries.

www.msb.se/RibData/Filer/pdf/24677.pdf

International Committee of the Red Cross. (2013). Professional standards for Protection Work, 1–

115. http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0999.pdf

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. www.ifrc.org/what-we-do/idrl

International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Disaster Law Database.

www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/idrl-database/

International Maritime Organisation. www.imo.org/Pages/home.aspx

International Maritime Rescue Federation. www.international-maritime-rescue.org

International Rescue Committee. www.rescue.org/

Interpol. www.interpol.int/

Introna, L., & Wood, D. (2004). Picturing algorithmic surveillance: the politics of facial recognition

systems. Surveillance Society, 2(2/3), 177–198.

Introna, L. D. (2007). Maintaining the reversibility of foldings: making the ethics (politics) of

information technology visible. Ethics and Information Technology, 9(1), 11–25.

Irwin, A. (2013). Sociology and the Environment. Cambridge, UK: Polity

Jennings, B., & Arras, J. (2008). Ethical Guidance for Public Health Emergency Preparedness and

Response: Highlighting Ethics and Values in a Vital Public Health Service, 1–192.

http://www.cdc.gov/od/science/integrity/phethics/docs/White_Paper_Final_for_Website_2012_4

_6_12_final_for_web_508_compliant.pdf

Jillson, I. (2010). Protecting the public, addressing individual rights. Ethical issues in Emergency

Management Information Systems for Public Health Emergencies. In B. van de Walle, M.

Turoff, & S. Hiltz (Eds.), Information systems for emergency management. New York: Sharpe,

46–61.

Joerges, B. (1999). Do Politics have Artefacts? Social Studies of Science, Vol. 29, No. 3, 411-431.

Joint Informatics Europe & ACM Europe Working Group on Informatics Education. (2013).

Informatics education: Europe cannot afford to miss the boat.

http://germany.acm.org/upload/pdf/ACMandIEreport.pdf

Jones, J. (2012). Hillsborough. The Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel.

http://hillsborough.independent.gov.uk/repository/report/HIP_report.pdf

Jones, T. (2012). Short Cuts. London Review. http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n22/thomas-jones/short-cuts

Jul, S. (2007). Who’ s Really on First ? A Domain-Level User, Task and Context Analysis for

Response Technology. Proceedings ISCRAM2007 B Van de Walle P Burghardt and C

Nieuwenhuis Eds, 139–148.

Kafka, F. (1925). The Trial. London: Penguin Books.

Kendra, J., & Wachtendorf, T. (2003). Creativity in Emergency Response to the World Trade Center

Disaster, in J.L. Monday (Ed.) Beyond September 11th: An Account of Post-Disaster Research,

Boulder, CO: Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, 121-146.

Kimbell, L. (2013). An inventive practice perspective on designing (working title) | Service Design

Research. Lancaster University. http://libweb.lancs.ac.uk

Klontz, J. C., & Jain, A. K. (2013). A Case Study on Unconstrained Facial Recognition Using the

Boston Marathon Bombings Suspects.

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n22/thomas-jones/short-cuts

http://libweb.lancs.ac.uk/




114

http://www.cse.msu.edu/rgroups/biometrics/Publications/Face/KlontzJain_CaseStudyUnconstrai

nedFacialRecognition_BostonMarathonBombimgSuspects.pdf [accessed 16 February 2014]

Knight, K. (2013). Facing the future. Findings from the review of efficiencies and operations in fire

and rescue authorities in England. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/facing-the-future [Accessed 15 August 2013]

Knorr-Cetina, K. (1999). Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge. Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press.

Kristensen, M., Kyng, M., & Palen, L. (2006). Participatory Design in Emergency Medical Service :

Designing for Future Practice. In Organization, Vol. 1, 161–170.

Ladd, J. (1998). The Quest for a Code of Professional Ethics: A Moral and Intellectual Confusion. In

Engineering, Ethics, and the Environment Cambridge, UK: CUP, 210–218.

Lahlou, S. (2011). How can we capture the subject’s perspective? An evidence-based approach for the

social scientist. Social Science Information, 50(3-4), 607–655.

Larkin, G. (2001). Ethics of Teamwork in Emergency and Disaster Management - The Centrality of

Virtue. In P. Dave, S. Gupta, N. Parmar, & S. Kant (Eds.), Emergency Medical Services and

Disaster Management Jaypee Brothers Publishers, 204–217.

Larkin, G. (2010). Unwitting partners in death-the ethics of teamwork in disaster management. The

virtual mentor : VM, 12(6), 495–501.

Larsson, P., Hagström Frisell, E., Olsson, S. (2009). Understanding the Crisis Management System of

the European Union, in Olsson, Stefan (ed.), Crisis Management in the European Union:

Cooperation the Face of Emergencies, Springer, Dordrecht.

Larsson,. P. (2009). The Crisis Coordination Arrangemens (CCA) in In Olsson, Stefan (ed.), Crisis

Management in the European Union: Cooperation the Face of Emergencies, Springer, Dordrecht.

Lash, S., & Urry, J. (1994). Economies of Signs and Space. Theory Culture and Society. Sage.

Latour, B. (1992). Where are the Missing Masses? Sociology of a Few Mundane Artefacts. In W. E.

Bijker & J. Law (Eds.), Shaping Technology, Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical

Change. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 225–258.

Latour, B. (2004). How to Talk About the Body? the Normative Dimension of Science Studies. (M.

Akrich & M. Berg, Eds.) Body Society, 10(2-3), 205–229.

Latour, B.. (2005). From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik or How to Make Things Public. In B. Latour & P.

Weibel (Eds.), Making Things Public-Atmospheres of Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1–31.

Latour, Bruno, & Venn, C. (2002). Morality and Technology: The End of the Means. Theory, Culture

& Society 19(5-6), 247-260

Legrand, T., & McConnell, A. (2012). Emergency Policy: Volume III, Global Influences on National

Crisis Management. (T. D. Campbell, Ed.) (The Librar.). Farnham, UK: Ashgate.

Letouz , E., Meier, P., Vinck, P. (2013). Big Data Will Play Key Role In Security’s Future, Study

Says - Dark Reading. In New Technology and the Prevention of Violence and Conflict. New

York: International Peace Institute, 4–27. http://www.darkreading.com/risk-

management/167901115/security/news/240146467/big-data-will-play-key-role-in-security-s-

future-study-says.html [Accessed 15 August 2013]

Letouzé, E., Meier, P., & Vinck, P. (2013). New oil & old fires: Reflections on Big Data for conflict

prevention. In F. Mancini (Ed.), New Technology and the Prevention of Violence and Conflict.

New York: International Peace Institute.

http://www.cse.msu.edu/rgroups/biometrics/Publications/Face/KlontzJain_CaseStudyUnconstrainedFacialRecognition_BostonMarathonBombimgSuspects.pdf

http://www.cse.msu.edu/rgroups/biometrics/Publications/Face/KlontzJain_CaseStudyUnconstrainedFacialRecognition_BostonMarathonBombimgSuspects.pdf

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/facing-the-future

http://www.darkreading.com/risk-management/167901115/security/news/240146467/big-data-will-play-key-role-in-security-s-future-study-says.html






115

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ipi-e-pub-nw-technology-conflict-

prevention-advance.pdf [Accessed 15 August 2013]

Liegl, M., & Boden, A. (2014). Domain analysis III: Collaboration Technologies.

http://www.bridgeproject.eu/en/bridge-results/deliverables [Accessed 15 August 2013]

Luff, P., & Heath, C. (1998). Mobility in collaboration. In Proceedings of the 1998 ACM conference

on Computer supported cooperative work - CSCW ’98, New York, New York, USA: ACM

Press, 305–314. http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=289444.289505

Lury, C., & Wakeford, N. (2012). Inventive Methods: The Happening of the Social

(CRESC)Routledge.

Luzeaux, D., Ruault, J.-R., & Wippler, J.-L. (2013). Complex Systems and Systems of Systems

Engineering. John Wiley & Sons.

Lynch, M. (2012). Revisiting the Cultural Dope. Human Studies, 35(2), 223–233.

Lyon, D. (2002). Surveillance as social sorting. Privacy risk and digital discrimination. London:

Routledge.

Lyon, D. (Ed.) (1994). The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society. University of Minnesota

Press.

M/487 Mandate (2013). Mandate M/487 to Establish Security Standards Draft Report Phase 2

Proposed standardisation work programmes and road maps.

http://www.cen.eu/cen/Sectors/Sectors/Security/citizens/Pages/default.aspx

MacAskill, E., Borger, J., Hopkins, N., Davies, N., & Ball, J.(2013). June 21 GCHQ taps fibre-optic

cables for secret access to world’s communications. The Guardian.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa


Mackay, W., & Fayard, A. (1999). Video brainstorming and prototyping: techniques for participatory

design. CHI’99, (May), 118–119.

Maeda, Y., Higashida, M., Iwatsuki, K., Handa, T., Kihara, Y., & Hayashi, H. (2010). Next

Generation ICT Services Underlying the Resilient Society. Journal of Disaster Research, 5(6),

627–635.

McKinsey Global Institute (2011). Manyika, J., Chui, M., Brown, B., Bughin, J., Dobbs, R.,

Roxburgh, C., & Byers, A. H. Big data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and

Productivity. McKinsey Global Institute.

McMaster, R, & Baber, C. (2008). Multi-agency operations: cooperation during flooding. (K. A. de

Waard, J.; Godthelp, F.L.; and Brookhuis, Ed.) Human Factors, security and Safety. Shaker

Publishing. http://www.hfidtc.com/research/multi/multi-reports/phase-2/HFIDTC-2-3-1-4-2-

maca-flooding.pdf [17 February 2014]

McMaster, Richard, & Baber, C. (2012). Multi-agency operations: Cooperation during flooding.

Applied ergonomics, 43(1), 38–47.

Mendonça, D., Jefferson, T., & Harrald, J. (2007). Collaborative Adhocracies and Mix and Match

Technologies in Emergency Management. Communications of the ACM, 50(3), 45-49.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). Phenomenology of Perception. New York and London: Routledge.

Merton, R. K. (1936). The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action. American

Sociological Review, 1(6), 894.

Mouffe, C. (2000). The Democratic Paradox. New York, NY: Verso.

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ipi-e-pub-nw-technology-conflict-prevention-advance.pdf

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ipi-e-pub-nw-technology-conflict-prevention-advance.pdf

http://www.bridgeproject.eu/en/bridge-results/deliverables

http://www.cen.eu/cen/Sectors/Sectors/Security/citizens/Pages/default.aspx

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa




116

Moynihan, D. P. (2009). The Network Governance of Crisis Response: Case Studies of Incident

Command Systems. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 19(4), 895–915.

Nathan, L. P., Klasnja, P. V, & Friedman, B. (2007). Value scenarios: a technique for envisioning

systemic effects of new technologies. In Computers and Society . ACM, 2585–2590.

Norman, D. A. (1988). The Psychology of Every day Things. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Obermeyer, N. (2007). Thoughts on volunteered (geo) slavery, Website:

http://www.ncgia.ucsb.edu/projects/vgi/docs/position/Obermeyer_Paper.pdf [Accessed 17

February 2014]

OCHA. (2012). Humanitarianism in the Network Age. http://www.unocha.org/hina

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). www.unocha.org/ [Accessed 17

February 2014]

Olsson, S., Larsson, P. (2009). The Future of Crisis Management within the European Union. In

Olsson, Stefan (ed.), Crisis Management in the European Union: Cooperation the Face of

Emergencies, Springer, Dordrecht.

Olsson, Stefan (ed.), (2009). Crisis Management in the European Union: Cooperation the Face of

Emergencies, Springer, Dordrecht.

Palen, L., & Liu, S. B. (2007). Citizen communications in crisis: anticipating a future of ICT-

supported public participation. In CHI ’07 Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human

factors in computing systems. San Jose, CA: ACM, NY, 727–736.

Palen, L., Vieweg, S., Anderson, K. M. (2010). Supporting “Everyday Analysts” in Safety- and

Time-Critical Situations. The Information Society, 27(1), 52–62.

Palen, L., Vieweg, S., Sutton, J., & Liu, S. B. (2007). Crisis Informatics : Studying Crisis in a

Networked World. Crisis, 7–9.

Phillips, B. (2014). Harnessing disruptive technologies: Quick systems engineering for emergency

response. In A. Badiru & L. Racz (Eds.), Handbook of Emergency Response: A Human Factors

and Systems Engineering Approach. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 55–76.

Phillips, J. P., Grother, P., Micheals, R. J., Blackburn, D. M., Elham, T., & Bone, M. (2003). Face

Recognition Vendor Test 2002. Overview and Summary

http://biometrics.nist.gov/cs_links/face/frvt/FRVT_2002_Overview_and_Summary.pdf


Polanyi, M. (1958). Skills. In M. Polanyi (Ed.), Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-Critical

Philosophy. Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 49–51.

Powers, T. M. (2005). Consequentialism. In Encyclopedia of Science, Technology and Ethics, Vol. 1

A-C. Thomson.

Prieur, M. (2009). Ethical Principles on Disaster Risk Reduction and People’s Resilience.

http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/majorhazards/ressources/pub/Ethical-Principles-Publication_EN.pdf

Quarantelli, E. L. (1966). Organizations under stress. In Bricston, R. (Ed.), Symposium on Emergency

Operations, 3–19. Santa Monica, CA: Systems Development Corporation.

Quarantelli, E. L. (1994). Looting and Anti-Social Behaviour in Disasters. Preliminary Paper #205 ,

1–5. http://dspace.udel.edu/bitstream/handle/19716/590/PP205.pdf?sequence=1

Rake, E., & Njå, O. (2009). Perceptions and performances of experienced incident commanders.

Journal of Risk Research, 12(5), 665–685.

http://www.ncgia.ucsb.edu/projects/vgi/docs/position/Obermeyer_Paper.pdf

http://www.unocha.org/hina

http://www.unocha.org/

http://biometrics.nist.gov/cs_links/face/frvt/FRVT_2002_Overview_and_Summary.pdf

http://dspace.udel.edu/bitstream/handle/19716/590/PP205.pdf?sequence=1




117

Ramirez, L., Buscher, M., & Wood, L. (2012). Domain Analysis - Interoperability and Integration.

Bridge project Deliverable D2.2.

Rauhofer, J. (2006). Just because you’re paranoid, doesn't mean they're not after you: Legislative

developments in relation to the mandatory retention of communications data in the European

Union. SCRIPTed, 3(4), 322–343. http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol3-4/rauhofer.asp


Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Oxford.

Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (2007). Law and Legal Issues in International Disaster

Response. ifrc.org/PageFiles/41194/113600-idrl-deskstudy-en.pdf

Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles

(IDRL) Programme. www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/53419/idrl-cod-2001s.pdf

Reding, V. (2012). The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected

World. European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-

2014/reding/pdf/speeches/data-protection-reform2012_en.pdf [Accessed 15 August 2013]

Rizza, C., Pereira, Â. G., & Cuervo, P. (2013). Do-it-yourself Justice-Considerations of Social Media

use in a Crisis Situation: The Case of the 2011 Vancouver Riots. In Proceedings of the 10th

International ISCRAM Conference – Baden-Baden, Germany, May 2013, 411–415.

Sacks, H., & Jefferson, G. (1995). Lectures on Conversation. Oxford: Blackwell.

Samek, Joshua, M. (2007). The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, University of Miami Law

Review, 61, 441-65, reprinted in p. 255-279 Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham,

2012

Sandin, P., & Wester, M. (2009). The moral black hole. Ethical theory and moral practice, 12(3),

291–301.

Scheppele, K. L. (2003). Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of

9/11. University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, 1001.

Scheppele, K.L. (2012). North American Emergencies: The Use of Emergency Powers in Canada and

the United States. In International Jounral of Constitutional Law 4, 213-43, reprinted in

Hufnagel, S, Roach, K.

Schmidt, K., & Bannon, L. (1992). Taking CSCW seriously. Computer Supported Cooperative Work,

1(1), 7–40.

Schmitt, C. (2012). Definition of Sovereignty. In A. M. Viens & M. J. Selgelid (Eds.), Emergency

Ethics. Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 3–15.

Schmitt, Carl, (1922). Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität Duncker &

Humblot, Berlin 1922, (trans George Schwab, Political Theology, Four Chapters on the Concept

of Sovereignty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

Shanley, L., Burns, R., Bastian, Z., & Robson, E. (2013). Tweeting up a Storm. The Promise and

Perils of Crisis Mapping.

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/October_Highlight_865-879.pdf

Shapiro, D. (2005). Participatory Design: The Will to Succeed. Proceedings of the 4th Decennial

Conference on Critical Computing: Between Sense and Sensibility, 29–38.

Simon, H. (1969). The Sciences of the Artificial. MIT Press.

Sismondo, S. (2008). Science and Technology Studies and an Engaged Program. In E. J. Hackett, O.

Amsterdamska, M. Lynch, & J. Wajcman (Eds.), The handbook of Science and Technology

Studies. The MIT Press, 13–31.

http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol3-4/rauhofer.asp

http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/reding/pdf/speeches/data-protection-reform2012_en.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/reding/pdf/speeches/data-protection-reform2012_en.pdf




118

Solove, D. J. (2004). The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age. New York:

NYU Press.

Sorell, T. (2003). MORALITY AND EMERGENCY. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

(Hardback), 103(2003), 21–37.

St. Denis, L. A., Hughes, A. L., & Palen, L. (2012). Trial by Fire: The Deployment of Trusted Digital

Volunteers in the 2011 Shadow Lake Fire. In Proceedings of the 9th International ISCRAM

Conference – Vancouver, Canada, April 2012, 1–10.

Starbird, K., Palen, L. (2013). Working and sustaining the virtual “Disaster Desk.” In Proceedings

of the 2013 conference on Computer supported cooperative work - CSCW ’13 (p. 491). New

York, New York, USA: ACM Press.

Steinert, Heinz. (2003). The Indispensable Metaphor of War: On Populist Politics and the

Contradictions of the State’s Monopoly of Force, Theoretical Criminology 7.3.

tcr.sagepub.com/content/7/3/265.full.pdf

Suchman, L. (2007). Human-Machine Reconfigurations. Cambridge University Press.

Suchman, L. (2011). Consuming anthropology. In A. Barry & G. Born (Eds.) Interdisciplinarity:

Reconfigurations of the Social and Natural Sciences. London: Routledge.

Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). www.msb.se/en

Tala, Jyrki (2006). Lagstiftningsforskning – ett nödvändigt perspektiv inom rättsvetenskapen, in Gräns,

Minna, Westerlund, Staffan (eds) Interaktiv rättsvetenskap, Uppsala universitet.

Tanguay-Renaud, F. (2009). Making Sense of ‘Public’ Emergencies. Philosophy of Management, 8(2),

31–53.

Taylor, A., & Vincent, J. (2005). An SMS History. In L. Hamill, A. Lasen, & D. Diaper (Eds.), Mobile World

New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 75–91.

The EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR). www.danube-region.eu

The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR). www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu

The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). www.fao.org/home/en

The Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcomePage.aspx

THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE

The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. www.unisdr.org/.

Thrift, N. (2005). Knowing Capitalism. London: Sage

Thurnell-Read, T., Parker, A. (2008). Men, masculinities and firefighting: Occupational identity,

shop-floor culture and organisational change. Emotion, Space and Society, (1), 127–134.

Tierney, K. (1989). Needed innovation in the delivery of emergency medical services in disasters:

present and future. Disaster management, 2(2), 70–76.

Tierney, K. (2006). Metaphors Matter: Disaster Myths, Media Frames, and Their Consequences in

Hurricane Katrina. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,

604(1), 57–81.

Tierney, K. J., Lindell, M. K., Perry, R. W., & Press, J. H. (2001). Facing the Unexpected: Disaster

Preparedness and Response in the United States (Vol. 2001, p. 281). Joseph Henry Press.

Tulich, T.(2012). A View Inside the Preventive State: Reflections on a Decade of Anti-Terror Law.

Griffith Law Review, 209-243.




119

UK Government. Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (2004). UK.

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/36/pdfs/ukpga_20040036_en.pdf [Accessed 17

February 2014]

UN General Assembly resolutions, 63/137 (2008). Strengthening emergency relief, rehabilitation,

reconstruction and prevention in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster.

UN General Assembly resolutions, 63/139 (2008). 63/141. Inter-national cooperation on humani-

tarian assistance in the field of natural disasters, from relief to development

UN General Assembly resolutions, 63/139 (2008). Strengthening of the coordination of emergency

humanitarian assistance of the United Nations.

www.iom.ch/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_research/un/63/A_RES_63_139_

EN.pdf

UN Habitat. www.unhabitat.org/categories.asp?catid=286

UN Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Assistance.

www.un.org/en/globalissues/humanitarian/index.shtml

UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction: PreventionWeb.

www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/contacts/

UNESCO. (2013). Riga Guidelines on Ethics in the Information Society. In Riga Global Meeting of

Experts on the Ethical Aspects of the Information Society, Riga RIGA (Latvia) 16-17 October

2013. Riga: UNESCO Information for All Programme.

http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/news/riga_meeting_ethics

_guidelines.pdf [Accessed 17 February 2014]

United Nations Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD). www.uncrd.or.jp/disaster/goal.htm

United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF). www.unicef.org/

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). www.undp.org/

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home.html

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home

Urry, J. (2007). Mobilities. Polity.

Urry, J. (2013). Societies Beyond Oil: Oil Dregs and Social Futures. Zed Books

US Department of Homeland Security. (2004). The System of Systems Approach for Interoperable

Communications.

http://www.safecomprogram.gov/library/Lists/Library/Attachments/144/SOSApproachforInterop

erableCommunications_02.pdf [Accessed 17 February 2014]

Vertigans, S. (2010). British Muslims and the UK government’s “war on terror” within: evidence of a

clash of civilizations or emergent de-civilizing processes? The British Journal of Sociology,

61(1), 26–44.

Viens, A. M., & Selgelid, M. J. (2012). Emergency Ethics, Vol. I. (T. D. Campbell, Ed.) (The Librar.).

Farnham, UK: Ash.

Vieweg, S., Hughes, A. L., Starbird, K., & Palen, L. (2010). Microblogging During Two Natural

Hazards Events : What Twitter May Contribute to Situational Awareness. Spring, 1079–1088.

Vinck, P. (2013). World Disasters Report: Focus on technology and the future of humanitarian action.

http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/134658/WDR 2013 complete.pdf

Wahlgren, P. (2013). Legal Risk Analysis. A Proactive Legal Method. Stockholm: Stockholm

University.

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/36/pdfs/ukpga_20040036_en.pdf

http://www.safecomprogram.gov/library/Lists/Library/Attachments/144/SOSApproachforInteroperableCommunications_02.pdf

http://www.safecomprogram.gov/library/Lists/Library/Attachments/144/SOSApproachforInteroperableCommunications_02.pdf




120

Wahlgren, Peter (2006). A Proactive Approach, Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law

(Scandinavian Studies in Law Vol 49)

Walzer, M. (2004). Arguing about war. Yale University Press.

Watson, H., & Finn, R. L. (2013). Privacy and ethical implications of the use of social media during a

volcanic eruption : some initial thoughts. In Proceedings of the 10th International ISCRAM

Conference – Baden-Baden, Germany, May 2013, 416–420.

Webb, G. (2004). Role improvising during crisis situations. International Journal Of Emergency

Management, 2(1/2), 47.

Webb, G. R. (1998). Role Enactment in Disaster: Reconciling Structuralist and Interactionist

Conceptions of Role. University of Delaware.

Weick, K. (1993). The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster.

Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(4), 628–652.

Wenger, E. (1998). Communities of practice: Learning, meaning, and identity. Cambridge University

Press.

Winner, L. (1986). Do Artifacts have Politics ? In The Whale and the Reactor- A Search for Limits in

an Age of High Technoloy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19–39.

Winograd, T., & Flores, F. (1987). Understanding Computers and Cognition: A New Foundation for

Design (p. 224). Addison Wesley.

Wirth, S. (2009). Emergency Management Law and Ethics – Strategies to Avoid Liability. Page,

Wolfberg & Wirth, LLC.

World Confederation for Physical Therapy. www.wcpt.org/node/36994

World Food Programme (WFP). www.wfp.org/about

World Health Organization (WHO). www.who.int/en/

Wright, D. (2010). A framework for the ethical impact assessment of information technology. Ethics

and Information Technology, 13(3), 199–226.

Wright, D., & De Hert, P. (2012). Privacy Impact Assessment. (D. Wright & P. DeHeert, Eds.) (p.

516). Springer Netherlands.

Wright, D., & Mordini, E. (2012). Privacy Impact Assessment. In D. Wright & P. Hert (Eds.), Privacy

Impact Assessment Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 397–418.

Wynne, B. (1982). Rationality and Ritual: The Windscale Inquiry and Nuclear Decisions in Britain.

Chalfont St Giles: British Society for the History of Science.

Wynne, B. (2001). Creating public alienation: expert cultures of risk and ethics on GMOs. Science as

Culture, 10, 445–481.

Wynne, B., & Felt, U. (2007). Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously. Economy and Society

(p. 96). http://www.genomicsnetwork.ac.uk/media/TakingSeriously.pdf

Yar, M. (2003). Panoptic Power and the Pathologisation of Vision: Critical Reflections on the

Foucauldian Thesis. Society, 1(3), 254–271.

Yeo, K. T. (2002). Critical failure factors in information system projects. International Journal of

Project Management, 20(3), 241–246.

Zack, N. (2010). Ethics for Disaster (Vol. 2010, p. 143). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Zedner, L. (2008). Terrorism, the ticking bomb, and criminal justice values. Criminal Justice Matters,

73(1), 18–19.




121




122

9 Subject Index

A

Ad hoc publics · 97 Ad hoc solutions · 69 Administrative bodies · 72 Administrative framework · 61, 68 ADNS · 7, 78 Age · 22, 40, 45 Algorithm · 40, 111 All-hazards approach · 12, 25, 42, 59, 76 Analogue technology · 91 Anticipation · 47, 95 ARGUS · 3, 7, 77, 78, 108 Articulation work · 92 Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) · 44, 54 Attitude of wisdom · 49, 59, 60 Augmented practice · 31, 35 Authorization · 53 Autonomy · 105

B

Beneficence · 13, 24, 32, 55, 60 Bias · 36, 37, 40, 42, 51, 53, 60 Big Data · 15, 53, 100, 104, 107, 114 Boston marathon bombing · 40, 41, 113 Bricolage · 49 Bureaucracy · 16, 64, 104

C

Case specific regulations · 67 Catastrophic emergency · 26 Category 1 and Category 2 Responders · 6, 26, 27, 51 CECIS - Common Emergency Communication and

Information System · 7, 35, 75, 105 Century of disasters · 15, 16, 55, 60, 101, 104, 105,

110 Charity · 34, 48 CIS · 71 Citizen · 105 Citizenship · 58 Civil Air Patrol · 97 Civil law · 67 Civil liberties · 12, 15, 25, 104, 105 Cloud · 35 Code archaeology · 18 Codes of conduct · 2, 13, 19, 20, 25, 31, 33, 44, 45, 47,

50, 51, 53, 55, 59, 60, 89, 92, 112

Collaboration · 3, 16, 17, 35, 47, 50, 63, 69, 70, 89, 91, 95, 103, 105, 115

Command and control · 25 Common law · 67 Common operational picture · 92 Common practice · 14, 61, 63, 68, 70, 87, 88 Common sense · 38 Communication · 16, 34, 38, 49, 50, 59, 77, 91, 94, 102 Communication ethic · 58 Community resilience · 35 Compassion · 45, 59 Competence · 29, 30, 54, 58, 77 Complacency · 13, 59 Complex sensing · 50 Compulsory evacuation · 34, 46 Computer Ethics · 53, 54, 111 Computer Ethics Institute · 53 Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility · 53 Confidentiality · 32, 54, 91, 102 Conflict-affected populations · 53 Consent · 21, 41, 51, 67, 102 Consequentialism · 2, 9, 11, 21, 25, 116 Constitution · 64, 65, 66 Constitutional basis · 19, 63, 65 Constitutionalism · 64 Continuity · 47, 79, 102 Cooperation · 7, 14, 27, 34, 59, 62, 63, 70, 71, 73, 74,

75, 76, 77, 80, 82, 83, 84, 99, 104, 105, 115, 119 Coroner · 92, 93, 112 Corruption · 46 CPM · 7, 35, 73, 74, 75, 106 Creativity · 25, 49 Credibility · 100 Crisis Management · 9, 12, 15, 16, 18, 23, 24, 31, 36,

37, 38, 39, 58, 69, 71, 72, 78, 87, 101, 103, 104, 105, 109

Crisis Mappers · 99 Crisis mapping · 35, 99 Critical design · 18 Critical infrastructures · 61, 76 Crowd · 23, 97, 99, 100 CSCW · 7, 112, 115, 117, 118 culpable but not punishable · 23, 42 Cultural interpretation · 94 Culture of fear · 104 Curiosity · 50

D

Daiichi · 6, 30, 31 Data minimisation · 56, 60 Data mining · 58 Data mobilities · 53




123

Data protection · 9, 16, 25, 50, 51, 55, 56, 59, 90, 91, 102

Data Protection Act · 50, 60, 102 Data sharing (see also Information sharing) · 16, 21,

32, 42, 50, 51, 55, 91, 99 Data sharing agreements (see also Information

sharing agreements) · 50 Deleting · 26 Deontology · 2, 9, 21, 22, 25, 106 Dialogic engagement · 35 Dictatorship · 64 Different traditions · 63 Differing risk thresholds · 93, 95 Digital divide · 1, 12, 16, 36, 42, 53, 55 Digital exclusion · 60 Digital volunteers · 10, 100 Dignity · 13, 22, 25, 32, 33, 34, 45, 46, 54, 58, 83, 89,

91 Direction · 47, 82, 90 Disaster Law Database · 72, 83, 113 Disaster Law Programme · 3, 71, 83, 86 Disaster myth · 37, 42 Disaster risk reduction · 13, 71, 73, 81, 82, 86 Disclosive ethics · 13, 18, 39, 41, 42, 43 Distributive justice · 9, 32 DMP · 7, 80 DPP · 7, 73, 110 DRR · 7, 73, 109 Duplication · 34, 48, 51 Duty · 9, 12, 20, 21, 22, 30, 31, 43, 45, 83, 89 Dynamic risk assessment · 6, 7, 21, 92, 94, 95, 104

E

EAPC · 7, 71, 113 Early warning · 72, 75, 76, 82, 98 ECHO · 2, 7, 73, 74, 108, 109, 110 ECURIE · 78 Effectiveness · 7, 9, 13, 15, 22, 24, 34, 39, 47, 50, 61,

70, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 86, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 101, 105, 106

Efficiencies · 1, 16 ELSI · 1, 3, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 42, 60, 89, 101,

102, 103, 105, 108 Embodiment · 14, 25, 104 Emergency ethics · 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 31 Emergency response · 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15,

16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 25, 31, 32, 33, 37, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 50, 51, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 66, 70, 71, 74, 77, 78, 79, 89, 91, 92, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 104, 105, 107, 110, 112, 113, 116

Emergent interoperability · 16, 21 Emergent organisation · 97 EMIS · 7, 31, 108, 113 Empathy · 49 Employment · 63, 65, 103 Environment · 46 ERC · 3, 7, 74, 75, 78, 105, 110

ERCC · 7, 74, 75 Escape fire · 49 Ethical challenge · 12, 43, 47, 60, 107 Ethical conduct · 13, 32, 54 Ethical considerations · 18, 31, 38, 45, 62 Ethical dilemma · 20, 24, 91 Ethical opportunities · 25, 32, 39 Ethical practices · 91 Ethical principles · 10, 13, 25, 32, 33, 34, 46, 51, 55,

58, 59, 89, 95 EU Civil Protection Mechanism · 3, 74 EU Community Mechanism for Civil Protection · 105 EU Crisis management cycle · 69 EU Glossary · 105 EU-CCA · 3, 7, 77, 78 EU-ICMA · 3, 7, 77, 78 European and Mediterranean Major Hazards

Agreement · 45, 95 European Network and Information Security Agency ·

7, 50, 102, 110 European Security Strategy · 7, 105 Evacuation · 66 EWRS · 7, 78 Exception, State of Exception · 20, 21, 23, 25, 64, 103 Extraordinary powers · 64, 65, 66 Extreme Emergency · 21

F

Face Recognition Systems · 2, 13, 39, 40, 41, 43, 111, 113

Face-to-face interaction · 31, 34, 90, 91, 92 Fairly Save All Who Can Be Saved · 22 Fairness · 54, 55 False information · 100 False witness · 53 Family Assistance Centre · 102 FAO · 8, 82, 118 Fascism · 64 Favouritism · 45, 46 FEMA · 8, 11, 96, 97, 99, 101, 110, 112 Fleeting moments · 91 Forgetting · 26, 38 Formal competence · 62 Freedom · 10, 16, 34, 55, 57, 65, 66 Fukushima · 62 Fundamental rights · 45, 46, 63

G

GCHQ · 8, 93, 102 GISCorps · 99 GPS · 8, 28, 29, 35, 97 Guidelines · 13, 14, 31, 53, 59, 60, 61, 62, 72, 76, 82,

84, 85, 86, 87, 119




124

H

Habeas corpus · 21, 65 Habitus · 25 Haiti · 47, 48, 96, 98 Harm · 13, 20, 22, 24, 42, 51, 53, 54, 55 Harmonization of procedures · 95 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative · 98, 99, 112 Hazard · 9, 25, 83, 94 Health records · 103 Heroism · 2, 26, 30, 31 Hexis · 10, 25 Hillsborough Disaster · 29, 113 HIV · 8, 90, 91 Honesty · 54 Human contact · 10, 11, 13, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32, 33,

34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 51, 54, 55, 60, 62, 65, 69, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 89, 91, 96, 99, 102, 105

Human perception · 35 Human reasoning · 35, 44, 49, 64, 89, 95 Human rights · 20, 21, 45, 46, 51, 62, 65, 82, 83, 105 Humanitarian assistance · 22, 46 Humanitarian imperative · 44, 59 Humanitarian OpenStreetMap · 97, 99 Humanitarian principles · 2, 44 Humanity · 34, 35, 36, 37, 45, 99 Humanity Road · 99 Hurricane Katrina · 22, 62, 66, 96, 117, 118 Hurricane Sandy · 96, 97, 98, 103, 111

I

IASC · 8, 78 IDRL · 3, 8, 83, 84, 86, 117 Ignorance · 49, 59 ILC · 3, 8, 83 Impartiality · 35, 51 Indemnity · 10, 29 Indemnity insurance · 10, 29 Inefficiency · 59 Information

Abuses and violations · 51 Access · 54 Audibility · 91 Copying · 51 Disclosure · 25, 49, 51, 67, 102 Information superiority · 37 Integrity · 100 Loss · 22, 25, 51, 82 manipulation · 53, 60 Modification · 51 One stop management · 103 Reliability · 51, 60 Theft · 51 Unauthorized access · 51 Visibility · 91

Information and participation during disasters · 46 Information collection · 51 Information Commissioner’s Office · 50 Information overload · 31, 37, 100 Information sharing · 13, 29, 34, 47, 50, 53, 58, 59, 77,

91, 93, 102, 103 Information sharing agreements (see also Data

sharing agreements) · 34, 59 Information society · 58, 60 Information subjects

Associated Risks · 51 Informational self-determination · 10, 16, 57, 104 Informed consent · 21, 32, 42, 50, 51, 53 Integrity · 22, 25, 34, 38, 48, 59, 100, 113 Intellectual property · 53, 54, 100 Intentions · 33, 87, 90, 102 Interdisciplinary research · 12, 16 International CEP Handbook · 71, 113 International CIIP Handbook · 72, 107 International cooperation · 2, 14, 19, 63, 71, 74, 78, 87 International initiatives · 63 Intersubjectivity · 11, 34, 49, 59 Inventive methods · 18 IOM · 3, 8, 83 ISSA · 8, 76, 77 IT ethics · 12, 19, 31

J

Joint responsibility · 45 Jurisprudence · 13, 61 Justice · 9, 13, 22, 33, 34, 48, 67, 92, 95, 104, 110, 117,

120

K

Knowing capitalism · 15, 101, 104, 105

L

Law Administrative · 61, 120 Criminal · 61, 120 Emergency · 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 19, 20, 24,

27, 30, 31, 32, 44, 46, 47, 51, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 72, 74, 77, 78, 79, 82, 91, 92, 97, 98, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120

Governmental · 61 International · 2, 3, 8, 24, 32, 33, 44, 51, 52, 61, 71,

72, 73, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 99, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 117, 118, 120

Military · 61, 66, 85, 111, 112 Procedural · 61

Leadership · 26, 50, 79, 82




125

Legal black hole · 13, 64 Legal instruments · 61, 83, 86 Legal risk analysis · 18 Legal system · 61, 69, 87 Legality · 58, 65, 89 Legislation

General type of legislation · 67, 68 mitigating · 13, 70 proactive · 12, 13, 69, 70, 73, 87 reactive · 13, 69, 70, 87

Legislative Reforms · 2, 68 Legislative strategies · 13, 19, 63, 66, 70, 87 Legisprudence · 68 Legitimacy · 50, 64 Leveson inquiry · 56 Liability · 2, 26, 120 Liberalism · 64 Life-boat ethics · 22 Limits of Exceptions · 20 Lisbon Treaty · 76 Lives at stake · 100 Location tracking · 26 Logs and Logging · 10, 16, 28, 29, 38 London 2012 Olympics · 39 London bombing 2005 · 92, 102 London riots · 98 Looting · 22, 65 Loyalty · 25

M

Macro-regions · 63 Major incident · 26, 108 Mann Gulch · 49, 50, 120 MapAction · 99 Media · 10, 15, 16, 18, 22, 27, 30, 35, 37, 42, 45, 46, 51,

58, 62, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 104, 106, 110, 118, 120 Members of the public · 27, 47, 51, 53, 89, 93, 95, 101 Memoranda · 62 MIC · 7, 8, 74, 75, 78 Middleware · 16, 38 Militarization · 104 Military · 21, 22, 25, 53, 61, 62, 65, 66, 93, 105 Military force · 22, 65 Military resources · 61, 62, 65, 66 Mitigation · 24, 45, 70, 80, 82 Mobile methods · 18 Moral absolutes · 22 Moral black hole · 12, 22, 23, 42, 117 Moral disorder · 15, 105 Moral imperative · 12, 42, 54 Morality · 12, 22, 23, 24, 26, 42, 89 Morality of Exceptions · 2, 20 Morbidity · 48 Mortality · 48 Multi-agency collaboration · 1, 3, 13, 16, 17, 32, 47, 90,

91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99

Multi-agency emergency response · 1, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 25, 26, 39, 42, 46, 54, 60, 93, 97, 104, 105

Mutual adaptation · 50

N

NATO · 8, 71, 72, 113 Neutrality · 45 New Reality · 101 Non Governmental Organizations · 8, 45, 46 Non-discrimination · 45 Non-Professional responders · 31 Non-verbal communication · 35 Normal moral codes · 25 Norway attacks · 28, 29

O

OCHA · 3, 8, 51, 53, 78, 79, 86, 99, 116 OHCHR · 8, 82, 118 Openness · 50, 100 OpenStreetMap · 98 Oral exchange · 91 OSCE · 8, 71

P

Partnerships · 35, 37, 80, 86 Patriot Act · 65 Personal data · 10, 25, 50, 51, 57, 66, 67, 91, 101, 102,

109 Personal integrity · 61 Policy initiatives · 72 Poverty · 38, 65 Practical ethics · 15, 26, 90, 104 Preparation · 9, 12, 20, 24, 25, 35, 42, 44, 50, 59, 69,

75, 101 Preparedness · 2, 7, 12, 24, 25, 31, 34, 35, 36, 45, 47,

71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 103, 109, 110, 113, 118

Prevention · 7, 14, 24, 45, 57, 69, 73, 74, 75, 76, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 88, 103, 109, 110, 114, 118

PreventionWeb · 71, 81, 119 Preventive approaches · 36, 39, 44, 45, 75, 104 Privacy · 12, 15, 16, 17, 25, 26, 32, 34, 36, 45, 46, 51,

54, 55, 57, 60, 61, 62, 65, 91, 100, 101, 105, 109 Privacy impact assessment · 18, 120 Privacy intrusion · 55 Pro-active · 13 Pro-active approach · 69, 70 Professional autonomy · 30 Professional integrity · 12, 25, 31, 37, 38 Professional obligations · 29, 30 Professionalism · 79




126

Proportionality · 20, 55, 57 Proprietary software · 41, 53 Prudence · 34, 48 Psychological assistance · 46 Psychological integrity · 46 Public authorities · 45, 61, 70 Public Health · 30, 31, 113 Public interest · 25, 51, 66 Public understanding · 54, 55, 60 Purpose limitation · 56 Purpose-binding · 56

R

Race · 33, 38, 40, 44, 102 RAPEX · 8, 78 RAS BICHAT · 8, 78 RASFF) · 8, 78 Recovery · 3, 9, 14, 45, 47, 51, 69, 75, 81, 84, 85, 86,

88, 96, 101, 111, 112 Red Crescent · 3, 33, 44, 61, 71, 72, 73, 83, 84, 86, 113,

117 Red Cross · 3, 33, 44, 51, 52, 61, 71, 72, 73, 83, 84, 86,

101, 113, 117 Regulative instruments · 61 Resilience · 34, 44, 45, 48, 73, 76, 86, 109, 116 Resilient Society · 103, 115 Resolutions · 62, 72, 83, 84, 118, 119 Respect · 32, 34, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 60, 62,

67, 69, 70, 71, 73, 79, 81, 88, 90, 91, 103, 105 Respect of persons · 46 Rights and duties · 44 Risk · 9, 12, 16, 21, 22, 25, 28, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37,

45, 46, 47, 55, 60, 61, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 81, 87, 91, 94, 95, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 109, 115, 120

Risk analysis · 31, 34, 35, 55, 61 Risk communication · 21, 32, 95 Risk register · 103 Role improvisation · 49 Role structure · 49 Rules · 3, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 42,

50, 51, 61, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 78, 83, 84, 89, 90, 91, 92, 102, 103, 105, 117

Rumours · 22

S

Safety · 25, 27, 45, 46, 47, 57, 74, 89, 91, 92, 93, 115, 116

SARS · 8, 30 Save the Greatest Number · 22 Saving lives · 20, 24 Science and Technology Studies · 8, 117 Search and rescue · 9, 20, 22, 27, 35, 74, 75 Securitization · 25, 104

Security · 3, 7, 8, 12, 16, 25, 36, 40, 42, 46, 50, 51, 57, 61, 62, 63, 67, 69, 71, 72, 76, 77, 78, 85, 89, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 114, 115, 119

Security mechanisms · 62 Security research · 62 Self-effacement · 48 Self-respect · 50 Sensitive information · 51, 66, 102 Serious Emergency · 26 Sexual integrity · 46 Shared situation · 90, 91, 92, 93 Significant Emergency · 26 Silent technology · 41 Silo-Thinking · 32, 50 Situation awareness · 35, 76, 92 Smart city · 15, 103, 104 SMS · 37, 38, 51, 53, 98, 112, 118 Social contract · 12, 13, 30, 34, 43, 55, 58, 60 Social Media · 98, 117 Social sorting · 10, 12, 40, 104, 115 Social ties · 46 Socio-economic factors · 13, 33, 36, 38 Socio-political factors · 34 Socio-technical · 1, 12, 13, 18, 19, 29, 38, 42, 95, 105 Socio-technical futures · 18, 29 Soft law · 62, 72 Solidarity · 23, 34, 45, 46, 76, 92, 99, 105 Sovereign · 64 Specialised agencies · 62 Standards · 11, 13, 14, 21, 46, 51, 61, 68, 70, 71, 82,

88, 100, 113 State of emergency · 13, 21, 64, 65 Statistical method · 41 Steps Towards a more Secure Europe · 76 Stress · 37, 50, 59, 101, 116 Subsidiarity · 7, 47, 59, 74, 105 Supererogation · 31 Superordinate goal · 50 Supreme emergency · 22, 23, 42 Surveillance · 12, 16, 21, 36, 42, 43, 55, 61, 62, 65, 66,

102, 104, 106, 113, 115 Surveillance technology · 62 System of Systems · 1, 12, 16

T

Taxation · 103 Teamwork · 2, 13, 47, 48, 50, 59, 114 Technological imagination · 29 Technological potential · 28, 29 Technology as a panacea · 102 Technology dependence · 36 Territorial sovereignty · 45 Terrorism · 25, 39, 61, 62, 65, 117 TETRA · 35, 94 Thick description · 18 Threshold Deontology · 2, 10, 22, 23




127

Thresholds · 22, 23, 24, 41 Training · 31, 34, 37, 38, 46, 59, 71, 74, 75, 80, 82, 101,

109 Transformation · 29 Transparency · 34, 35, 56, 66 Triage · 44, 48, 55 Trust · 36, 49, 50, 79, 81, 91, 92, 94, 100, 101, 104 Turf war · 48 Twitter · 98, 119

U

UK Civil Contingency Act · 47, 95 UK Environment Agency · 93 UK Police National Computer Manual · 55 UN · 3, 8, 24, 44, 48, 63, 71, 72, 73, 78, 81, 82, 83, 84,

101, 118, 119 Uncertainties · 49, 66, 97 UNCRD · 3, 8, 82, 119 UNDAC · 3, 79, 80 UNDP · 3, 8, 81, 82, 119 Unethical conduct · 13, 59 UN-HABITAT · 3, 80 UNHCR · 8, 82, 119 UNICEF · 8, 82, 119 Unintended consequences · 12, 13, 15, 16, 32, 33, 55,

58, 105 UNISDR · 8, 71, 81 User responsibilities · 6, 56

V

V&TCs · 9, 99 Value scenarios · 18 Values · 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 21, 24, 26, 38, 46, 58, 59,

67, 89, 92, 104, 105, 113, 120 Victim · 40, 91 Violence · 20, 46, 65 Virginia Earthquake · 98 Virtual role system · 49 Virtue ethics · 2, 10, 11, 12, 24, 25, 30, 44, 48, 49 Virtuous habits · 25 Virtuous technology · 12, 26 Volunteer organizations · 27, 47, 48, 97, 99, 101 VOST · 97, 101 Vulnerability · 12, 22, 36, 46, 73, 86, 101 Vulnerable person · 35, 46, 55

W

War · 23, 25, 36, 41, 61, 65, 80, 83, 119 War on terror · 25, 36, 41, 61, 65, 119 Wealth · 38 Wearable cameras · 26 Well-being · 22, 24, 54, 55, 57, 60 West, Texas · 98 WFP · 8, 82, 120 WHO · 3, 8, 82, 120 Whole Community Approaches to Security · 11, 97, 99 Wisdom · 34, 48, 49 Witnesses · 29 Working division of labour · 92




128

10 Name Index

A

Adey, P. · 104, 106 Agamben, G. · 21, 104, 106 Agre, P. E. · 18, 106 Åhman, T. · 73, 106 Albert, S. · 92, 106 Alexander · 5, 21, 69, 106 Allen, D. K. · 94, 102, 106 Amoore, L. · 104, 106 Anderson, R. · 106, 116 Ansell, C. · 25, 105, 106 Aradau, C. · 104, 106 Aristotle · 10, 25 Armstrong, H. · 50, 51, 102, 106

B

Beauchamp, T. L. · 18, 106 Bechky, B. A. · 92, 106 Beck, U. · 32, 106 Bentham, J. · 21 Birkland, T. A. · 25, 107 Boin, A. · 25, 97, 105, 106, 107 Bourdieu, P. · 25, 107 Bowker, G. · 106 Boyd, D. · 100, 107 Bring, O. · 65, 107 Brown, I. · 92, 104, 107, 115 Brown, J. S. · 92, 104, 107, 115 Brunner, E. · 72, 107 Buck, D. A. · 31, 107 Burghardt, M. · 107, 113 Büscher, M. · 1, 4, 5, 16, 18, 26, 31, 32, 38, 50, 58, 107,

108, 116

C

Cabinet Office · 26, 108 Cartlidge, E. · 28, 108 Chalmers, M. · 108 Chesterman, S. · 93, 95, 108 Churchill · 23 Cole, J. · 32, 50, 108 Committee of Public Accounts · 103, 108 Community Research and Development Information

Service · 109 Crang, M. · 104, 109 Crisp, R. · 22, 109 Crowley, J. · 53, 97, 98, 99, 100, 109

D

De Hert, P. · 18, 109, 120 Department of Homeland Security · 62, 109 Dillon, M. · 104, 109 Dougherty, C. · 66, 109 Drabek, T. E. · 23, 94, 102, 109 Drennan L.T. · 69, 109 Dunne, A. · 18, 109 Dynes, R. · 23, 27, 97, 109 Dyzenhaus, D. · 64, 110

E

Ellebrecht, N. · 32, 110 ENISA · 7, 50, 102, 110 eScience · 16, 101, 110 EU Commission · 1, 7, 25, 73, 74, 102, 110, 117

F

Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) · 62, 110 FEMA · 8, 11, 96, 97, 99, 101, 110, 112 Ferejohn, J. · 64, 111 Fischer, H. W. · 27, 111 Forester, T. · 54, 59, 111 Foucault, M. · 41, 111 Furedi, F. · 104, 111

G

Gallagher, S. · 39, 40, 111 Garfinkel, H. · 18, 90, 111 Geertz, C. · 18, 111 Gevaert, W. J. R. · 40, 111 Gibbs, L. I. · 103, 111 Giddens, A. · 32, 111 Givens, G. · 40, 41, 111 Gjørv, A. B. · 28, 29, 103, 111 Glasgow, K. · 98, 111 Glăveanu, V. · 18, 111 Grace, J. · 58, 111 Graham, S. · 104, 109, 111 Greenbaum, J. M. · 111 Gross, M. · 49, 112 GSMA · 53, 112




129

H

Habermas, J. · 38, 112 Haddow, G. · 25, 112 Hallett, H. · 92, 93, 112 Harrald, J. R. · 16, 112, 115 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative · 98, 99, 112 Head, M. · 66, 112 Heath, C. · 18, 109, 112, 115 Hester, S. · 89, 112 HM Government · 47, 112 Howe, J. · 97, 112 Hufnagel, S. · 61, 109, 110, 111, 112, 117

I

ICO · 50, 112 IDC · 112 Ignatieff, M. · 21, 112 Interpol · 71, 113 Introna, L. · 9, 18, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 113 IPU · 86, 112 Irwin, A. · 32, 113

J

Jennings, B. · 30, 31, 44, 113 Jillson, I. · 31, 32, 113 Jones · 28, 29, 113 Jul, S. · 38, 113

K

Kafka, F. · 41, 104, 113 Kendra, J. · 49, 113 Kimbell, L. · 18, 113 Klontz, J. C. · 40, 113 Knight, K. · 103, 114 Knorr-Cetina, K. · 114 Kristensen, M. · 18, 108, 114

L

Ladd, J. · 59, 114 Lahlou, S. · 18, 111, 114 Larkin, G. · 44, 47, 48, 49, 114 Larsson, P. · 72, 78, 114, 116 Lash, S. · 16, 114 Latour, B. · 39, 40, 41, 42, 114 Legrand, T. · 31, 114 etou e , . · 1 , 11 Liegl, M. · 1, 5, 47, 107, 115 Luff, P. · 18, 112, 115

Lury, C. · 18, 115 Luzeaux, D. · 115 Lynch, M. · 90, 115, 117 Lyon, D. · 10, 104, 115

M

MacAskill, E. · 102, 115 Mackay, W. · 18, 115 Maeda, Y. · 103, 115 McKinsey Global Institute · 115 McMaster, R. · 49, 59, 93, 94, 96, 115 Mendonça, D. · 16, 49, 115 Merleau-Ponty, M. · 25, 115 Merton, R. · 32, 115 Mill, J.S. · 21, 109 Moses, R. · 33, 34 Mouffe, C. · 38, 115 Moynihan, D. P. · 31, 116

N

Nathan, L. P. · 18, 116 Norman, D.A. · 9, 33, 94, 102, 106, 116

O

Obermeyer, N. · 100, 116 OCHA · 3, 8, 51, 53, 78, 79, 86, 99, 116 OHCHR · 8, 82, 118 Olsson, S. · 63, 69, 72, 73, 78, 106, 114, 116

P

Palen, L. · 16, 27, 97, 114, 116, 118, 119 Perng, S. · 26, 32, 107, 108 Phillips · 39, 116 Polanyi, M. · 116 Powers, T. M. · 21, 64, 65, 111, 116, 117 Prieur, M. · 45, 116

Q

Quarantelli, E. L. · 23, 94, 102, 109, 116

R

Ramirez, L. · 16, 26, 31, 32, 107, 116 Rauhofer, J. · 25, 101, 102, 116 Rawls, J. · 38, 117




130

Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies · 33, 44, 61, 72, 83, 84, 86, 113, 117

Reding, V. · 102, 117 Rizza, C. · 32, 117

S

Sacks, H. · 90, 117 Samek, J. · 66, 117 Sandin, P. · 22, 23, 117 Scheppele, K. L. · 21, 65, 94, 102, 104, 117 Schmidt, K. · 92, 117 Schmitt, C. · 20, 21, 64, 110, 117 Shanley, L. · 53, 100, 101, 117 Shapiro, D. · 103, 107, 117 Simon, H. · 105, 117 Sismondo, S. · 117 Solove, D. J. · 104, 117 Sorell, T. · 22, 23, 117 St. Denis, L.A. · 118 Starbird, K. · 97, 118, 119 Steinert, H. · 65, 118 Suchman, L. · 18, 118 Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency · 62, 118

T

Tala, J. · 67, 118 Tanguay-Renaud, F. · 22, 118 Taylor, A. · 38, 118 The Food and Agriculture Organisation · 82, 118 Thrift, N. · 101, 118 Thurnell-Read, T. · 92, 118 Tierney, K. · 22, 23, 27, 118 Tulich, T. · 104, 118

U

UK Government · 26, 102, 118 UN General Assembly · 84, 118, 119 UN Habitat · 119 UN Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Assistance · 119 UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction · 71, 119

UNCRD · 3, 8, 82, 119 UNDP · 3, 8, 81, 82, 119 UNESCO · 58, 119 UNHCR · 8, 82, 119 UNICEF · 8, 82, 119 Urry, J. · 108, 114, 119 US Department of Homeland Security · 40, 119

V

Vertigans, S. · 40, 119 Viens, A. M. · 31, 112, 117, 119 Vieweg, S. · 16, 98, 116, 119 Vinck, P. · 16, 33, 51, 53, 114, 119

W

Wahlgren, P. · 1, 5, 18, 26, 50, 58, 70, 107, 119 Walzer, M. · 23, 119 Watson, H. · 32, 120 Webb, G. · 49, 120 Weick, K. · 49, 50, 120 Wenger, E. · 92, 120 WFP · 8, 82, 120 WHO · 3, 8, 82, 120 Winner, L. · 33, 120 Winograd, T. · 120 Wirth, S. · 48, 120 Wright, D. · 18, 109, 120 Wynne, B. · 32, 33, 39, 120

Y

Yar, M. · 102, 120 Yeo, K. T. · 120

Z

Zack, N. · 22, 23, 24, 25, 44, 120 Zedner, L. · 20, 120

d12.2 bridge ethical, legal and social issues: current ... · this deliverable presents an analysis...

Documents