Cyber Threats/Security and System Security of Power Sector

Workshop on Crisis & Disaster Management of Power Sector

P.K.Agarwal, AGMPower System Operation Corporationpk.agarwal@posoco.in

SECURITY 2

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Security Acronyms• Threat –• Cyber Space • Cyber Threat• Security• Vulnerability• Risk • Risk Management• Vulnerabilities • Security vs Cyber Security• Information Security vs System Security • Defense-in-depth

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What is Security

ConfidentialityConfidentiality

IntegrityIntegrity

AvailabilityAvailability

AuthenticationAuthentication

Unauthorised access to

Infomation

UnauthorisedModification or Theft

of Infomation

Denial of Service orPrevention of

Authorised Access

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Non-RepudiationAccountability: Denial of Action

That took place, or claim ofAction that did not take place

The individual is who he claims to be.

SECURITY CONCERNS FOR POWER SECTOR

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Concerns

• Current power grid depends on complex network of computers, software and communication technologies.

• If compromised, have the potential to cause great damages.

• A cyber attack has the unique in nature that it can be launched through • public network• from a remote location • Form any where in the world.• Coordinated to attack many locations

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More Concerns

• The legacy communication method used for grid operations also provide potential cyber attack paths.

• Many cyber vulnerabilities in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) System have been surfaced.

• Level of automation in substations is increasing, which can lead more cyber security issues.

• Recent study have shown that the deployed components have significant cyber vulnerabilities.

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Still More Concerns

• Increasing use of standard and open system – “Security by Obscurity” is no more valid.

• Efforts of energy sector to • uncover system vulnerabilities develop effective

countermeasures have prevented serious damages to electric supply chain.

• Some of these vulnerabilities are in the process of being mitigated.

• However, attack on energy control systems have been successful in many cases.

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What is Security? Some Key Concepts 1. For power systems, keeping the lights on is the primary focus. Therefore the key

security requirements are Availability and Integrity, not Confidentiality (AIC, not CIA)2. Encryption, by itself, does not provide security. 3. Security threats can be deliberate attacks OR inadvertent mistakes, failures, and

natural disasters.4. The most dangerous “attacker” is a disgruntled employee who knows exactly where

the weaknesses are the easiest to breach and could cause the worst damage.5. Security solutions must be end-to-end to avoid “man-in-the-middle” attacks or failed

equipment from causing denial of service6. Security solutions must be layered, so that if one layer is breached, the next will be

there. Security is only as strong as its weakest link.7. Security will ALWAYS be breached at some time – there is no perfect security solution.

Security must always be planned around that eventuality.8. Security measures must balance the cost of security against the potential impact of a

security breach

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CYBER SECURITY IN POWER SYSTEM

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To maintain power system reliability, need to manage both the Power System Infrastructure and its supporting Information Infrastructure

Central GeneratingStation

Step-Up Transformer

DistributionSubstation

ReceivingStation

DistributionSubstation

DistributionSubstation

Commercial

Industrial Commercial

Gas Turbine

DieselEngine

Cogeneration

CogenerationTurbine

Fuel cell

Micro-turbine

Wind Power

Residential

Storage

Photovoltaic systems

Control Center

Operators,Planners & Engineers

2. Communications and Information Infrastructure

1.Power System Infrastructure

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Traditional Security Measures Cannot Meet All Power System Security Requirements

• Two key security issues for utilities are power system reliability and legacy equipment:• Power systems must continue to operate as reliably as possible

even during a security attack. • It is financially and logistically impractical to replace older power

system equipment just to add security measures. • Layered security is critical not only to prevent security attacks, but

also to detect actual security breaches, to survive during a security attack, and to log all events associated with the attack. • Most traditional “IT” security measures, although able to

prevent and/or detect security attacks, cannot directly help power systems to continue operating.

• For legacy systems and for non-critical, compute-constrained equipment, compensating methods may need to be used in place of these traditional “IT” security measures.

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Use of Power System SCADA and Energy Management Systems for Certain Security Solutions

• One method for addressing these problems is to use existing power system management technologies as a valid and very powerful method of security management, particularly for detecting, coping with, and logging security events. • Add sensors, intelligent controllers, and intrusion-detection

devices on “critical” equipment• Utilize and expand existing SCADA systems to monitor these

additional security-related devices• Expand the SCADA system to monitor judiciously selected power

system information from AMI systems.• Expand Power Flow analysis functions to assess anomalous

power system behaviors such as unexpected shifts of load and generation patterns, and abnormal power flow contingency analysis results to identify unexpected situations.

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CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES.

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Challenges

Increasing NumberOf Systems and

Size of Code Base

Control Systems

Not Designed with

Security in Mind

Increasing Use ofCOTS Hardware

and Software

New CustomerTouch Points into

Utilities

New 2-WaySystems

(e.g. AMI, DSM)

IncreasingInterconnectionand Integration

Increased Attack Surface

Increased Risk to Operations

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Barriers• Cyber threats are unpredictable and evolve faster than

the sector’s ability to develop and deploy countermeasures

• Security upgrades to legacy systems are limited by inherent limitations of the equipment and architectures

• Threat, vulnerability, incident, and mitigation information sharing is insufficient among government and industry

• Weak business case for cyber security investment by industry

• Regulatory uncertainty in energy sector cyber security

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Strategies

• Build a culture of security.

• Access and Monitor Risks.

• Develop and Implement New Protective Measures to reduce Risks.

• Manage Incidence.

• Sustain Security Improvements.

• Use of emerging new security technologies like data-diode.

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Adoption of Security Standards and Framework• ISO/IEC 27001 - Information Security

Management System.• NERC-CIP Standards-Critical Infrastructure

Protection Standard.• NIST IR 7628 – Guidelines for Smart

Grid Cyber Security. • IEC 62351 Series Security Standards Standards

Cyber Security Requirements of

Indian Power Grid, 27th May

2012, Mumbai

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Road Map for Cyber Security of Grid

• Information Security Management System have been adopted by every regional load dispatch center.

• Each RLDC has been certified by International Certifying Body (BSI) for ISO 27001:2005.

• SCADA system up gradation is being done with:-

• Adoption of Secure ICCP.• Secure connection between SCADA network and

Enterprise network for cyber security.• Use of air-gap technology like data-diode at interfacing

point between secure and non-secure network.

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Points to Ponder• There is nothing like absolute security

• Every requirement is unique and every solution is unique.

• Security comes at a cost – need optimization.

• Secure real-time information is a key factor to reliable delivery of power to the end-users.

• Commoditization of electricity means increased players – increased exchange of power – increased requirement of security solution.

• Emerging technology like data-diode is an exciting technology for ensuring cyber security of critical infrastructure.

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