cultural influences on disaster management: acase study of

International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters

August 2004, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 31–58

Cultural Influences on Disaster Management:A Case Study of the Mt. Pinatubo Eruption

C. Dominik GüssUniversity of North FloridaDepartment of Psychology

4567 St. Johns Bluff Road, SouthJacksonville, FL 32224-2673, U.S.A.

Email: [email protected]

and

Oliver I. PanganAteneo de Manila UniversityDepartment of PsychologyQuezon City, Philippines

Email: [email protected]

Disaster management teams composed of experts from dif-ferent countries will be more and more common in the future.As natural disasters are most frequent in Central America andSoutheast Asia (developing countries with limited human andfinancial resources), their disaster-management organizationswill more frequently seek help from the international commu-nity. This article analyzes disaster management before,during, and after the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption in thePhilippines. This was one of the biggest eruptions in the pastcentury and one with important lessons for present-day dis-aster management. Different ethnic groups in the Philippineswere affected by this disaster. Filipino experts worked togetherwith foreign experts in solving problems that came prior toand after this disaster. This paper argues that disaster man-agement was affected by the cultural norms and values of thepeople working together to manage the disaster. It is con-cluded that intercultural competence, like cultural awarenessand sensitivity, are important factors for the successful plan-ning and implementation of disaster management effortsamong multi-cultural expert groups.

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Key Words: Disaster management, culture, Filipino values, decision-making, intercultural communication, intercultural competence

Introduction

Disaster management has received much attention in recent decadesdue to nations recognizing the need to reduce the impact of disasters onproperty and more so on people. Its importance was highlighted whenthe United Nations declared the 1990s as “The International Decade forNatural Disaster Reduction.” It might seem ironic that in 1991, duringthis decade, the Philippines and the world experienced one of the largestvolcanic eruptions in the last century, the eruption of Mount (Mt.)Pinatubo (see e.g. Newhall and Punongbayan 1996).

This disaster brought together disaster managers from differentcountries to lessen its impact on communities and people. In a devel-oping country such as the Philippines, although protection of its citizensis a primary role of the government, other countries are often asked togive assistance in terms of basic commodities like food and clothing,and in terms of financial support. In an increasing number of cases, thePhilippines invites foreign disaster management experts to share theirknowledge or provide technical support. The 1991 Mt. Pinatubo erup-tion was one of those cases.

This paper discusses, through an analysis of key events that tran-spired, how differences in cultures affect disaster management. The unitof analysis will mainly be individuals and their psychological func-tioning (for a debate about the appropriate unit of analysis seeQuarantelli and Dynes 1977). Our focus lies on problems related tointercultural communication during the disaster management process.Specifically, we will try to answer the following research questions:How does culture influence disaster management? What problems ariseif people of different cultures interact in a disaster situation? And finally,what suggestions can be given to disaster management groups com-posed of people from different cultures?

Method

To answer these questions, we have chosen the case study approachon the Mt. Pinatubo eruption for three main reasons. First, disaster man-agement in all its complexity, process, and dynamics cannot be studiedin the laboratory. Second, each disaster is unique, occurs at a certaintime, in a certain place, and affects certain people. Third, a case study

32 International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters

allows for a deep analysis of many factors on the individual, organiza-tional, and societal levels.

Our data is based on existing research and publications of peoplewho were involved and directly affected by the disaster. Our analysisalso includes oral communication with people involved in the disastermanagement process. In order to maintain confidentiality, all namesreferred to in this study are pseudonyms. By using and comparing dif-ferent sources in the analysis, we are attempting to get a more coherentpicture of the situation. Our discussion of disaster management relatedto Mt. Pinatubo’s eruption is influenced by Clifford Geertz’s (1973, p.3) approach of “thick description”, a term Geertz borrowed from GilbertRyle. Geertz describes the ethnographer’s aim to observe, record, andanalyze a culture. More specifically, he or she must interpret signs togain their meaning within the culture itself. Ultimately, Geertz hopesthat the ethnographer’s deeper understanding of the signs will openand/or increase the dialogue among different cultures. In the currentstudy, we gathered detailed oral and written information to analyse theFilipino and US American cultures, i.e. how people from both culturesinteracted and dealt with the Mt. Pinatubo disaster. From this thickdescription, interpretations and inferences were made in explaining thebehaviours that were influenced by culture.

Disaster Management

The term “disaster” has been defined in many different ways, andconsequently there has been no consensus on defining it in disasterresearch (Quarantelli 1995). The following examples of Eastern andWestern definitions show how differently disasters can be defined. TheAsian Disaster Preparedness Center defines disaster as “an event, eitherman-made or natural, sudden or progressive, the impact of which is suchthat the affected community must respond through exceptional mea-sures” (Jegillos 1997, p. 19). The Philippine National DisasterCoordinating Council (NDCC) (2003), Office of Civil Defense, definesdisaster as “a situation usually catastrophic in nature, in which a num-ber of persons are plunged into helplessness and suffering, and as a resultmay be in need of food, clothing, shelter, medical care and other basicnecessities of life.” The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agencydefines a disaster as “an occurrence that has resulted in property dam-age, deaths, and/or injuries to a community” (FEMA 1990). The firstdefinition from the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center includes thesource of disasters, the time frame, and the consequences. It also relates

Güss and Pangan: Culture and Disaster Management 33

the disaster to the affected “community”, i.e. it stresses the collectiveaspect of disaster management. The second definition from the NDCCand the third definition from the U.S. Federal Emergency ManagementAgency focus on the needs of the affected population. However, the thirddefinition also includes economical consequences. Admittedly, the sec-ond definition emphasizes the survivors’helplessness. The Philippines’adherence to this specific definition is possibly related to its experienceof disasters as frequent and powerful, and acknowledging the country’slack of resources and infrastructure. The wide range in definitions of dis-aster shows the complexity of the topic, but also the cultural focus of theresearcher or institution. The way we define problems in turn defines theway we look for solutions and what we even consider to be a solution.According to these definitions, under an anthropomorphic perspective,an earthquake in an unpopulated desert cannot be called a disaster sinceno one is affected by it and no resources necessary for the survival of thecommunity are destroyed.

Similar to the heterogeneity of the definitions of disaster, we also finda wide range in the definitions of disaster management. This term issometimes used interchangeably with other terms like disaster pre-paredness or crisis management. In any case, these terms refer to plannedand organized actions to survive natural or human-made disasters.Disaster management consists of, for example, an extended form of reas-surance, an anticipated way of saving lives and property (Casillan-Garcia1997), and a redistribution of resources (Herbosa 1997).

The use of the term “management” in the context of disasters mightlead to false expectations because of implicit assumptions about man-agement. Management is often ideally associated with optimal problemsolving. In a disaster situation, optimal solutions rarely exist. Only thegoal of mitigating the negative effects of the disaster, primarily thosethat affect people, their property, and the environment, can be seen asrealistic expectations.

Difficulties in Disaster Management

Clearly, the work of disaster managers is difficult (Rosenthal,Charles, and t’Hart 1989). Disaster managers often have to act undertime pressure and with much uncertainty in a complex natural and socio-cultural environment (Oliver-Smith 1999). Research in complexproblem solving (Brehmer 1992; Frensch and Funke 1995) and naturaldecision-making (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Pruitt 1996; Klein et al.1993) shows how people act in these situations and what errors are


likely to occur (Dörner and Schaub 1994). Expertise in dealing withcomplex and uncertain situations, defining goals, gathering informa-tion as a basis for decisions, building mental models of the situation,cooperation, planning, monitoring decisions, and controlling actionsare important competencies of disaster managers (Reason 1990; Dörner1996). It is crucial for disaster managers to have enough informationon which to base their decisions. It is also crucial for them to be able tocommunicate and cooperate with other institutions and organizations,such as law enforcement, health services, fire fighting units, and mili-tary services. Given the different institutions involved and the differenteffects of disasters, disaster management is obviously an interdiscipli-nary process.

Disaster management at the scene of an expected volcanic eruptionincludes the stages of preparedness (involving intense data gathering,prediction of the event, and planning); the emergency response phase(including warning and evacuation of the population); the recoveryphase (including resettlement); and the reconstruction phase (includingrebuilding infrastructure). Although these stages have been identified,in an actual disaster, there is no clear cut succession or order amongthese stages. Besides, the stage model of disaster management is a clas-sic, reactive, model of disaster management that has often beencriticized (see also Alexander 1997; Neal 1997). More recentapproaches highlight the importance of community based disaster man-agement in the current discussion (Rosales, 2003).

The Mt. Pinatubo Eruption in 1991

Mt. Pinatubo is located in west-central Luzon, almost 90 km (55miles) north of Manila, within the provinces of Tarlac, Pampanga, andZambales. The name Pinatubo means “made to grow” or “allowed togrow”. Standing at 1,780 meters (5,840 ft.) in height, Mt. Pinatubo wasconsidered inactive because its last eruption had been more than 500years ago.

On June 12, 1991, the first major eruption occurred and claimed itsfirst victim. This was followed by minor eruptions over the next fewdays. The largest eruption occurred on June 15, 1991 which registeredan estimated five to seven cubic kilometers of disgorged volcanic mate-rial accompanied by multiple shallow earthquakes as the Mountainsettled into the void created by its ejecta. Millions of tons of tephra, i.e.rock fragments and other volcanic material, ejected during the volcaniceruption were spread into the atmosphere. Tephra fell beyond the 20-km


danger zone declared by the Philippine Institute of Volcanology andSeismology (PHIVOLCS), which subsequently expanded it to 40 km.In some areas the tephra piled up more than 3 m (10 ft) deep, trans-forming the landscape into one like the moon. Pyroclastic flows, i.e.hurricanes of hot volcanic gas and debris, cascaded down rivers in thearea. The human mind can hardly imagine the energy of such a hugeeruption. Mt. Pinatubo’s eruption released over a million times moreenergy than the atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima at the endof the Second World War (Rodolfo 1995, p. 81). In July 1991 the situa-tion deteriorated, as monsoon and typhoon rains in the days, weeks andyears after the eruption transformed the loose debris into lahars1. Houses,roads, and bridges were destroyed by these lahar flows. It was suggestedto detonate local explosives or bombs to control and redirect the flow oflahar (Tangbawan 1991, p. 1). According to some scientists from PHIL-VOLCS, this would not have been an appropriate solution to the problemin the case of Mt. Pinatubo due to its specific geological and geograph-ical conditions. Eventually, dikes were built to control lahars.

The Mt. Pinatubo eruption in 1991 is one of the largest and mostdamaging natural disasters in Philippine history. About 550 people losttheir lives (Almario, Baquiran, and Habulan 1992). The damage tohouses, farmland, fishponds, bridges and infrastructure reached a totalof 10.6 billion pesos or around 230 million US dollars (NDCC, 1993).According to the Department of Social Welfare and Development thetotal damage in property exceeded US $400 million in 1993. The dam-age, however, continued in the following years. Mt. Pinatubo was oftencalled a continuing disaster because of the lahars.

In a country where there are more than 200 volcanoes, of which morethan 20 are considered to be active (Reodica 1997, p. 35), the eruption ofMt. Pinatubo should not have been a surprise occurrence. In fact, in the last400 years there has been on average, one major destructive volcanic erup-tion in the Philippines every decade (Rantucci 1994). The Mt. Pinatuboeruption was the true test of disaster management in the Philippines.

According to Padolina (1997), the Philippines has the scientific capa-bility to anticipate volcanic eruptions. PHIVOLCS with the help ofAmerican, Japanese and French scientists, uses earthquake datarecorders to monitor seismic activities, active fault movements, tectonicmovements, and aftershocks (Padolina 1997). In spite of all these capa-bilities, disaster management was put to a test not only because of thegravity of the disaster, but also because of the cultural plurality of thepeople involved. Experts from the Philippines with their American coun-terparts, people of totally different cultures, had to work together to lessen


the effects of the eruption keeping in mind the groups of people livingin the affected provinces around Mt. Pinatubo. These people were theFilipino residents in Tarlac, Pampanga, and Zambales; thousands ofAmerican soldiers living in Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station,two of America’s largest bases outside the U.S.A.; and an indigenoustribe that has lived on Mt. Pinatubo for centuries—the Aetas.

Culture

Disaster managers and affected communities have particular cul-tural backgrounds that affect the way they relate to people from theirown and other cultures. Although the need to study cultural or cross-cultural aspects of disasters and disaster management has long beenarticulated (Oliver-Smith 1986), only in recent years has research inthis area increased (e.g., Marincioni 2001; Webb, Wachtendorf, andEyre 2000).

Culture refers to the “man-made part of the environment”(Herskovits 1948) and consists of knowledge that is shared by a groupof people (von Cranach 1995) and useful for adaptation to a certain eco-logical environment (Berry 1993). This knowledge is transferred fromgeneration to generation and consists of rules, norms, values, beliefs,and problem-solving strategies that make living together possible(Triandis 1995). It determines how people perceive the environmentand how they act in it. Culture sets boundaries, shows what the indi-vidual can do and is allowed to do. People are often not aware of theircultural background, since cultural knowledge is “normal” to them andmostly is part of an unconscious knowledge. It is when people from dif-ferent cultures interact that they often realize how different they arefrom each other, not only because of the language, but also because oftheir different cultural worldviews (Cushner and Brislin 1996).

Cross-cultural psychological studies highlight, for instance, differ-ences in the way people are educated (e.g. Trommsdorff 1995), theirvalue systems (e.g. Hofstede 2001; Schwartz 1994), interaction patterns(e.g. Smith and Bond 1998), and their problem solving and planningstrategies (e.g. Strohschneider and Güss 1999; Güss 2000).

The Influence of Cultural Values on Behavior

Although no theory currently exists to completely explain the linkbetween cultural values and decision making and action, several psy-chological theories describe the link between values, attitudes, goals,


and decision making behavior. Rokeach (1973) for example distin-guishes between terminal values as end-states or goals, and instrumentalvalues as means to reach end-states. Examples for terminal values areequality, happiness, or self-respect. Examples for instrumental valuesare ambition, courage, or honesty. Thus, differences in values are relatedto different goals and actions. Another theory that could explain the linkbetween values and behavior is the Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzenand Fishbein 1980) which was further developed in the Theory ofPlanned Behavior (Ajzen 1991; Netemeyer, Burton, and Johnston1991). The Theory of Reasoned Action highlights how attitudes influ-ence decisions. It was quite often tested in applied settings and hassubstantial empirical support (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). One keyassumption of this theory is that intentions drive behavior. Intentionsare results of subjective norms and attitudes towards the behavior. Onecan argue that values influence subjective norms and attitudes and there-fore influence intentions and behavior (see Braithwaite 1998; Feather,Norman, and Worsley 1998 for empirical support).

Disaster Management at the Mt. Pinatubo Eruption

Before the Eruption: Cultural Influences on Information Collection

Before a disaster, the goal of disaster management consists of devel-oping measures, such as earthquake-resistant architecture, to mitigatethe possible negative effects of the coming disaster. Traditional houseswith low ceilings to reduce the impact of typhoons (Blong 1978) orhouses made out of light material to minimize earthquake damage(Repetti 1946) are examples of adaptive architecture in the Philippines,in an environment prone to natural disasters. The severity of theexpected disaster could also be reduced through certain actions, fol-lowing the maxim that proactive measures are better and less expensivethan reactive measures. Immediately after seeing signs of an impend-ing disaster, disaster managers have to make quick and critical decisionswhether to warn or evacuate people when a disaster, such as a volcaniceruption, seems imminent. Accuracy of forecast as to the possible dateand magnitude of eruption is crucial for successful action planning anddecision-making.

Methods that help to predict volcanic eruptions have advanced inthe last century; however, PHIVOLCS had to focus its limited resourceson five volcanoes known to be active. Only after a missionary whoworked with the Aetas in Zambales, reported volcanic activity on


August 4, 1990, ten months before the eruption, did PHIVOLCS startto observe Mt. Pinatubo. PHIVOLCS sent a helicopter to the volcano.Pictures were taken, but were hard to interpret, and no more attentionwas paid to Pinatubo until April 5, 1991.

Why was PHIVOLCS so slow to start collecting necessary data fromPinatubo? Why did PHIVOLCS not focus on Mt. Pinatubo? There areseveral possible reasons: Lack of resources; focus on the Taal Volcano;weight of the actual motive and the role of decoys (see below); and thecultural attitude toward fieldwork and social hierarchies. Taal volcanowhich is located about 50 km south of Manila, showed volcanic unrestand drew all the attention of PHIVOLCS. Rich suburbs around Taalvolcano and the population in Manila were in danger and even ifPHIVOLCS had wanted to observe Mt. Pinatubo, they lacked the finan-cial and human resources to do so (Rodolfo 1995). In developingcountries, funds to support disaster management organizations are oftenlimited and insufficient.

The neglect of Mt. Pinatubo could be psychologically attributed tothe “weight of the actual motive” (Dörner and Wearing 1998, p. 95).For a smoker, the immediate satisfaction of smoking a cigarette is astronger motive than the concern for his or her future health. The actualmotive occupies the whole mind. Anticipated problems don’t have theweight of current problems. In our case, PHIVOLCS concentrated allits efforts on the Taal volcano, which is geographically close to Manila.Taal Volcano is one of the most active volcanoes with a record of 32eruptions between 1571 and 1977, killing nearly 1,500 people in theJanuary 30, 1911 eruption (Bankoff 2003, p. 40). The actual motive ofPHIVOLCS was to protect Manila from a possible eruption of TaalVolcano. Major problems related to Mt. Pinatubo were not expected.Thereby, resources and attention were “decoyed” (Turner and Pidgeon1997) away from Mt. Pinatubo. Not paying attention to potentially haz-ardous developments is a crucial factor that can influence failure duringdisaster management.

Another possible reason for neglect is cultural in nature and con-cerns the need for more active fieldwork in the Philippines. Propergeological data about a volcano cannot be gathered without fieldwork;without going to the volcano, walking around, observing, and measur-ing many parameters. Mt. Pinatubo, however, is not very accessible,thus making fieldwork difficult. In the Philippines, fieldwork is nothighly valued. It is work that dirties the hands and the pay is poor. Aplausible explanation for this dislike for fieldwork may have come fromMalay-Spanish influences (Rodolfo 1995, p. 67). In those cultures, sci-


ence was, and is still, seen as thinking in lofty atmospheres, very muchremoved from empirical data gathering and a pragmatic approach toscience.

The final reason refers to the view of social hierarchies. PHIVOLCSreceived the information about volcanic activity from local people.Ignoring this information may be related to the high power distance thatoccurs between experts and novices, between subordinates and super-ordinates in the Filipino culture. The Philippines is characterized as acountry with values of extreme power distance (Hofstede 2001; Acuñaand Rodriguez 1995-1996); power in organizations is centralized in toppositions. Superiors give orders and subordinates are not asked abouttheir opinion, but are supposed to carry out those orders. Subordinatesaccept this hierarchical structure, don’t question authority, and expectthe superiors to know everything. High power-distance in thePhilippines might be another reason why PHIVOLCS did not take thewarnings from local people seriously at first.

Shortly Before the Eruption: Cultural Influences on Evacuation,Filipino Values

Mt. Pinatubo started to show signs of unrest on April 12, 1991. After2 months of precursory activity, PHIVOLCS on June 8, 1991 predictedan eruption within the next 24 hours. In most cases in the Philippines, sci-entists predict an eruption, and then governmental organizations give theorder to evacuate. The trail of information before a volcanic eruption isfrom the geological data to PHIVOLCS, from PHIVOLCS to other gov-ernmental organizations and then to the media. The endangered populationis informed via the media. When and how to warn the population, are trickytasks. Often, the difficulty is in making sure that the warning is taken seri-ously. Due to the eruptions and the lahars in the following months andyears, over 1,000,000 people were displaced (Abaño 1993). About 150,000to 200,000 people stayed for a while in more than 300 evacuation camps(Janda et al. 1996, p. 130). These numbers show both the importance andthe difficulty of warning the people of the eruption. Does the warning reachthe population at the right time? Do people believe these warnings? Whatalternatives are offered to the affected communities?

A warning means that the concerned population is in high dangerand should move to safer grounds. In the case of Mt. Pinatubo, therewere several contradictory public announcements as to when the vol-cano would erupt and as to when lahars would occur. Many Filipinosdid not take warnings to evacuate seriously (Janda et al. 1996). Studies


show (Ketterer and Spada, 1993) that only if the same warning isrepeated through different information channels by credible authorities,are people likely to heed it. The more detailed and specific the warn-ing, the more credible it is and the more accepted it will be.

During the Mt. Pinatubo disaster, the concerned population hesitatedto evacuate. Cola (1996, p. 144), for example, asked 143 people inPampanga if they received a lahar warning and how many days afterthe warning they actually evacuated. Of those polled, 119 people heardthe warning and 24 did not hear the warning. Only 38 of those whoheard the warning moved out the same day or one day later. Twenty-nine people moved out between 2 and 3 days later. Forty-nine movedout more than 4 days later. Reasons for not evacuating were related, forexample, to issues of safety, the chaotic situation in evacuation centers,or traffic. One of Cola’s respondents said (1996, p. 148):

“The barangay captain urged us to move out but we insistedon staying. The heat in the evacuation center is unbearable,and there is not enough space for my six children. Besides wefeel secure [mapalagay ang loob] in this village becauseeveryone knows how to deal with us and we know how to dealwith them. My children can play outside our yard, and myneighbors can keep an eye on them. The house can be left openwhen we are away and nothing is lost, because my neighborscan recognize any stranger that might come in. Most of ourneighbors are related to us by blood or by affinity. We all grewup here, as did my parents and my neighbor’s parents andgrandparents.”

Another person decided to stay and said (Cola 1996, p. 147):“The warning was too short. My family could not move outbecause the road to the highway was clogged with vehicles.Everybody tried to get out from the barangay. Besides, wehave a number of goats and ducks that we could not bring withus. The evacuation site is too crowded. I was confident, if theworst situation occurred, I could bring my family to my roof,which is made of galvanized iron. The lahar came about 7:15in the evening, while we were watching a Filipino actionmovie. We heard a rambling sound and we all run to the roofas the lights went out. But my neighbors also climbed ontomy roof because it was higher than theirs. I estimated the laharmust have been 15 feet high…”

To understand the behaviors of people during an evacuation it is help-ful to look at psychology and cultural values. When people evacuate, they


do not know if they will return to find their property intact, or if they willbe exposed to diseases or hunger in resettlement camps (Bautista 1993).People do not know where they will have to stay and what the living con-ditions would be like. Consequently, they often prefer the risk of the actualsituation to the uncertainty of an unfamiliar situation. They know that gov-ernmental support is low and in many other past emergencies, familieswere not adequately supported. They had to live in misery and poverty.Some of the people in evacuation centers preferred to return to their buriedhouses than to continue to stay under the horrible conditions in the evac-uation centers. It is because of such factors that Filipinos resort in somesituations to the “Kanya-kanya syndrome”, i.e., each man for himself. Theyfeel that the government cannot or will not do anything about their situa-tion and that they have only themselves and their families to rely on.

When people are under extreme pressure, when their lives are threat-ened, and when resources are scarce, they might rely on kanya-kanyaas a coping strategy. Another form of coping in such an extreme situa-tion is “pakikipagkapwa” (Jocano 1997), i.e., being in harmony withanother person, helping or connecting with him or her. Pakikipagkapwais the basis on which social support is constructed and gives strengthand hope to the concerned population. Experienced social support leadsto “utang na loob”, a sense of reciprocal social obligation (Jocano 1997,p. 81). This term is often translated as debt of gratitude, which can belife-saving in disaster situations. Pakikipagkapwa and utang na loobcreate strong and long-lasting relationships and help people to rely oneach other. The interview examples above show how people in smallvillages around Mt. Pinatubo rely on each other.

Another reason why some residents hesitate to leave their homes isthe often described Filipino attitude of “Bahala na”. This means to accepta given situation, to trust in God, that he will make the best out of it. Byforeigners, this is sometimes viewed as a “passive, fatalistic Filipino atti-tude” that helps Filipinos to cope with unpredictable disaster. However,this can be also viewed as courage, confidence, and risk-taking since peo-ple stay in their homes in spite of the risk to their lives (Bankoff 2003, p.167). In this sense, Bahala na is associated with another Filipino valuecalled “Pagkaya”. Pagkaya is a coping mechanism and implies courageand a will to survive despite the odds. This acceptance of a given situa-tion, this will to survive, and the strong family support (Licuanan 1994;Wong-Fernandez 1997), enable Filipinos to adapt to their environment—an environment characterized by enormous changes in nature and society.

Mistrust in governmental institutions because of corruption, the sit-uation in evacuation camps, and certain Filipino values influence the


way people believe warnings, their decision to follow the warning ornot, and the way they behave in a predicted disaster situation.

During the Eruption: Intercultural and IntraculturalCommunication and Hierarchies

During a disaster, communication between all concerned people andorganizations is crucial (Covello, Slovic, and Winterfeld 1988).Communication problems are not only a result of the collapse of infor-mation channels (e.g. telephone or television) but also because ofunclear competencies and responsibilities (Ketterer and Spada 1993)and—in the case of the Mt. Pinatubo disaster—the different culturalbackgrounds of the disaster managers. We will discuss three examplesof miscommunication to show the influence of culture on communica-tion and disaster management.

Bureaucratic Rules. The first case is the quarrel between a gov-ernment official in Olongapo, Mr. O., and a military leader of the U.S.Subic Naval Base, Mr. N. Olongapo is a small city located next to thebase, around 20 miles south of Mt. Pinatubo. As predictions changedabout whether or not Mt. Pinatubo would erupt, the possible evacua-tion of 200,000 people of Olongapo was planned. In the meantime,tephra falls accumulated on the roofs of the houses in Olongapo. Someroofs collapsed, including the roof of the hospital in Olongapo wherenine patients died. Most of the streets were covered by tephra and themain highway led into the danger zone of the volcano. Mr. O. thoughtthat the only way to evacuate Olongapo was to pass through the U.SSubic Naval Base. When he asked for permission to do so, Mr. N.denied the request. How could Mr. O. be denied? In his view, he wasnot being allowed to save the people in his own country. However, theUS military leader did not know exactly what Mr. O. wanted. Was Mr.O. asking for a place for his family? Did Mr. O. want to move the wholecity into the US military base (Rodolfo 1995)? Probably the most impor-tant reason for denying the proposal was bureaucratic. By law, thePhilippine marines were responsible for giving the orders and commu-nicating with the Americans. Mr. O. knew this and tried to contact thePhilippine marines, who seemed to have disappeared for several days.In this case, bureaucratic rules of communication hindered quick andappropriate decision-making between the involved disaster managers.

Communication in Low- and High-context Cultures.Communication patterns differ between cultures and one cross-culturaldimension distinguishes between communication in low- and high-con-


text cultures (Hall 1976; Nisbett et al. 2001). Direct and explicit com-munication is predominant in low-context cultures such as the UnitedStates. In low-context cultures, the message intended is largely con-veyed by the words spoken. Messages are more consistent and stableacross contexts. High-context cultures, however, place little value onconsistency across contexts. In high-context cultures, such as thePhilippines, communication and behavior differ according to context.Communication is often more indirect, holistic, and subtle. The listeneroften has to infer what the speaker really means. Small non-verbal signshave to be observed carefully.

Cross-cultural differences in communication due to low- and high-context cultural background can be observed during a misunderstandingbetween an American member of the Pinatubo Lahar Hazards TaskForce (PLHT), Mr. A., and some Filipino geologists. The goal of thistask force was to return to Mt. Pinatubo from Manila to assess the dan-ger of lahars and to inform other organizations and cities of possibledangers. Mr. A. asked four Filipino geologists from a governmentagency if they were willing to work with him under those hazardousconditions. The Filipino geologists answered that they would acceptwhatever work was assigned. The team started the fieldwork togetherand after one month, three of the four Filipino geologists left. What hadhappened? What were the reasons for this miscommunication?

When Mr. A. talked to the Filipino geologists, he expected an opendiscussion where everyone would be able to talk about their personalconcerns and opinions. This is expected in low-context cultures. In thePhilippines as a high-context culture, however, verbal statements haveto be understood in the context. A simple “yes” of the geologists canhave quite different meanings according to the differences in contexts.As Jocano (1997, p. 72) says “Most Filipinos will say ‘yes’, when they:(1) do not know, (2) want to impress, (3) are annoyed, (4) want to endthe conversation, (5) half-understood the instruction or what is beingsaid, or (6) think they know better than the one speaking”. Mr. A., com-ing from a low-context culture, interpreted the “yes” as a “real” yes.

The geologists may have felt that they had to go with Mr. A. to Mt.Pinatubo out of a sense of politeness or shame, called “hiya” in Tagalog.To maintain social harmony, Filipinos often feel obliged to comply withrequests of other people without giving their own opinion.

Communication and power-distance. Still another case of mis-communication is related to cross-cultural differences inpower-distance. Power distance, as discussed earlier, refers to theamount of respect between superior and subordinate and whether power


stratification is accepted or not (Hofstede 2001). High power distancemeans that a culture embraces a more hierarchical social structure. Lowpower distance means that a culture embraces a more egalitarian socialstructure. The United States is often characterized by values of lowpower distance between superior and subordinate. The Philippines,however, is one of the countries with the highest power distance inHofstede’s study (2001). This was validated in Acuña and Rodriguez’study on Filipino managers (1995-1996).

When Mr. A. and the team of geologists were on their way to ClarkAir Force Base because of a potential lahar crisis, they had to cross ariver before reaching the base. The bridge was barricaded by the policeheaded by a military official, Mr. M.. Mr. A. asked if he and his teamcould cross the bridge. He argued that there was an emergency due tothe lahar crisis. His request was denied. Everyone without exceptionhad to take the long way around. When Mr. A. tried to continue argu-ing, Mr. M. turned and walked away. A way that would have taken tenminutes took more than two hours! Why did Mr. M. not allow the teamof geologists to pass? Mr. A. did not behave in an appropriate manneraccording to Filipino standards and expectations. With his Americanvalues of low power distance and egalitarian power structure, Mr. A.thought that problems are solved and negotiations are done in a task-oriented and direct way. He was more assertive than a Filipino wouldhave been. This is not an efficient way to negotiate in the Philippines,especially with a person of authority. If Mr. A. had treated Mr. M. withmore respect, explained his mission in more detail, and referred tonames of authoritative people in PHIVOLCS, the negotiations wouldhave followed a different direction.

Due to high values of power distance Mr. M. did not want to talk toMr. A. any more. Additionally, Mr. M. did not know what lahars wereand therefore he could not estimate their potential danger. Lack ofknowledge, lack of cooperation, and selfish interests are the most com-mon causes for misunderstandings between professionals (Arboleda1997, p. 272).

The extreme time pressure that Mr. A. felt was certainly another rea-son for the misunderstanding. Time pressure makes a person focus onlyon the immediate objective and makes a person less sensitive to otherpeople and other aspects of the situation. Time pressure leads to a low-resolution level of thinking, and to errors or failures. This may havebeen the reason why Mr. A. was unaware of being insensitive, and whyMr. A. did not explain his mission in enough detail, in words that a non-geologist would understand.


These are some examples of misunderstandings due to differencesin culture, knowledge, concepts and expectations in a situation charac-terized by time pressure.

Shortly After the Eruption: Cultural Influences on Post DisasterRehabilitation: The Aetas

After the disaster, the emergency response phase is the next stage ofdisaster management. The goals are to save lives and property(Decenteceo 1997), and to guarantee security. Basic needs for food,water, shelter, and medical care have to be provided. Psychologicalassistance is often necessary, as many victims suffer from post-trau-matic stress disorder (Goto et al. 2002; Mitchell et al. 2004; Yang et al.2003). The goals and measures shortly before and shortly after the dis-aster are often short-term oriented.

For some people disasters are opportunities for making profit. TheMt. Pinatubo eruption occurred in 1991, and elections were to be heldin 1992. This prodded many politicians to come to the disaster area. Butas Rodolfo mentioned (1995, p. 87), they would “hand out some goods,take some pictures with devastation in the background, and go, neverto return.”

The people who suffered most from the eruption of Mt. Pinatuboand the lahars were the Aetas, a local indigenous tribe who have livedfor centuries on Mt. Pinatubo, pushed into the mountains by foreigncolonizers and lowlanders. They are dark-skinned and curly-haired, andare referred to as Negritos or “mga kulot” (the curly ones) by otherFilipinos. They live mainly by hunting, gathering, fishing and shiftingcultivation (Ignacio and Perlas 1994). They have adjusted very well tothe natural environment and their knowledge about nature is extensive.They have an animist religion and believe in the Superior mountain godcalled Apo Namalyari who lives in Mt. Pinatubo. According to them,their God sometimes shows herself directly through a possessedmedium in special prayer sessions (Fondevilla 1991, p. 33). In theworldview of the Aetas, the government is responsible for the eruptionbecause engineers drilled into the mountain in search of geothermalenergy in 1989, hurting the sleeping God (Rodolfo 1995, p. 89; Usasa2001, p. 172).

The lack of cultural knowledge about the Aetas and the insensitiv-ity of disaster managers, of governmental institutions, and of healthorganizations towards them were demonstrated in the followinginstances. One instance was the “western” medical treatment by nurses


and doctors in the refugee camps. One Aeta said (Ignacio and Perlas1994, p. 104):

“I got nervous when the woman in white dress approached. Sheinjected something into my armpit. I got scared! I jumped as ifI was not sick. I got scared! I moved away from her and ranoutside. Suddenly, my weakening was gone. I shouted—I don’tlike it anymore! I will die with what you are doing to me.”

Aetas believe that illness is punishment by the spirits or gods fortheir wrongdoing. They have traditional healers (“albularyos”) withtheir own healing procedures and preferred not to allow foreign doc-tors to treat their children (Alvarez-Castillo 1997).

The Aetas suffered in the evacuation sites. They were not used toliving in limited space sharing it with many other Filipinos from dif-ferent ethnicities. The tents were hot and the food provided wassometimes inedible. Melicia (2001, p. 181) describes his experience insuch an evacuation site. Once, he and other Aetas received cans of sar-dines. These cans were rusty inside. When he threw a can away, itexploded. It exploded because the sardines were over five years old.

Sometimes prayer groups brought food to the Aetas. In one instance,a girl from such a prayer group was asked to jump on the top of a jeeplike a monkey holding the food boxes for the Aetas in her hand. Pictureswere taken. The Aetas refused the goods, as they felt insulted saying,“We are not monkeys. We have God-given dignity which no calamitynor emergency situation should degrade” (Fondevilla 1991, p. 43).Other examples of disrespect towards the Aetas are popular jokes like“They sell bows and arrows in Dau and have an earthy smell”; “Theyeat a lot and are lazy.” (Esplanada cited in Shimiszu 2001, p. 46). Thesesad examples show the difference between the cultures, and in somecircumstances the disrespect towards and stereotypes against Aetas.

Many evacuation sites had no sanitation facilities. Many Aetas gotsick from measles, diarrhea, and hypothermia, some died (Shimizu2001). When they finally got resettlement areas, they had to adjust to anew and completely different natural environment and they had to shareit with people who were strangers to them. When Aetas were asked tobuild houses according to the designs of houses of lowlanders, theyrefused. They normally built their lean-tos only with branches of treesand without walls, “because those with walls may be carried away bystrong winds” (“ay parang tutumba sa malakas na hagin”) (Ignacio andPerlas 1994, p. 95). Aetas were culturally disoriented. They lost theirhomeland and they had to resettle in a different environment with dif-ferent people, far from their superior God, Apo Namalyari.


After the eruption: The Building of Dikes

The last stage of disaster management is the reconstruction phase,during which infrastructure is rebuilt and basic services return to nor-mal, if it is ever possible to talk about normalcy in the midst of suchdisasters. The experiences throughout the different phases of disastermanagement from preparedness over emergency response to recoveryand reconstruction can now be used for preparations for future disas-ters (Atsumi 1997).

One of the measures during the reconstruction phase was to builddikes. These dikes were intended to protect towns from possibleapproaching lahars. The usefulness and efficacy of this measure wascontroversial. For example, in 1997, PHIVOLCS scientist Perla de losReyes (Malig 1997a) warned the population, that the mega-dike hadnot yet been tested by lahars. The mega-dike is a 59-kilometer long dikealong the Pasig-Potrero River and cost 1.4 billion Pesos. Building andmaintaining such dikes along nine river systems in the region cost thePhilippines 12 Billion Pesos through 1997 alone (Malig 1997b). Thisequates to more than US $350 million. Nettles & Coombs (1998)showed that some dikes have already begun to fail. Janda et al. (1996,p. 131) evaluated the dike situation. They said of the dikes “…all havebeen breached at their weakest points or points with the lowest free-board during actual lahars.”

To summarize the effectiveness we can state that millions were spenton dikes and dams, ignoring moral, scientific, and common sense(Bankoff 2003, p. 98, 101). “Political and money-making considera-tions sometimes seemed to overweigh morality, ethics, and humanwelfare.” (Rodolfo, 1995, p. xxv).

Summary

We described several disaster management steps in relation to Mt.Pinatubo in 1991, the problems related to disaster management, andtheir psycho-cultural causes. We showed how the scarce resources ofPHIVOLCS limited the gathering of information. We also described,as one critical cultural attitude, the neglect of field-research.Furthermore, we showed how warnings are not listened to when peo-ple do not trust their politicians and governmental institutions. Wedescribed how typical Filipino value orientations (kanya-kanya-syn-drome, pakikipakapwa, utang na loob, bahala na, pagkaya,) influencedtheir coping behavior. We illustrated misunderstandings in communi-


cation between Americans and Filipinos due to different value orienta-tions and cultural experiences in low- and high-context cultures. Wecharacterized the problems that arise when disaster managers and healthcaretakers deal with victims from a different ethnicity and culture. Andwe described problems related to the building of dikes. All of the exam-ples highlight how culture influences the disaster management processand its success.

Implications of Mount Pinatubo’s eruption for disastermanagement in the Philippines

After the Mount Pinatubo eruption, many recommendations weregiven on how to improve disaster management. Those recommenda-tions refer to the need for more accurate and reliable warnings; moreresponsibility at the local level; improving the situation in evacuationcamps; and the unnecessary spending of millions of Pesos for dikes(Newhall and Punongbayan 1996). One could compare these recom-mendations to current initiatives in improving disaster management.Has disaster management changed in the Philippines? Are the disastermanagement experiences related to Mt. Pinatubo’s 1991 eruption incor-porated in new strategies of disaster management? Future researchstudies could include, for example, a comparison of standard operatingguidelines in several Filipino disaster management organizations beforeand after the Pinatubo eruption to see if such recommendations wereincorporated in newer guidelines. Another recommendation is a studycomparing recent actual disaster management in the Philippines to theone undertaken during the Mt. Pinatubo eruption.

Evaluating disaster management in the Philippines, an optimistmight say that the occurrence of so many disasters in the Philippinesand the Filipino experiences with disasters should naturally lead toimprovement and greater expertise in disaster management.PHIVOLCS for example was often praised for its work during and afterthe Mt. Pinatubo eruption. Another positive example is the current trendto promote community based disaster management in the Philippinesas described by the Director of the Center for Disaster Preparedness(Victoria 2003). On the other hand, a skeptic might highlight that moneysupposedly spent for disaster management often simply disappears asit passes through different levels of government. A skeptic might referto the incompetence, inefficiency, insufficient funding, or rivalrybetween different disaster management groups (Bankoff 2003).Unfortunate support for the skeptic’s viewpoint is related to the Mt.


Mayon eruption in 1993, two years after the Mt. Pinatubo eruption. Onemight expect that lessons had been learned from Mt. Pinatubo’s erup-tion. However, disaster management related to Mt. Mayon’s eruptionwas quite unsuccessful (Tamayo 1993). To be fair, incompetence, inef-ficiency, insufficient funding, or rivalry related to disaster managementare not only problems in the Philippines, but may also be found in othercountries. However, these problems might have more serious conse-quences for affected Filipinos due to their poverty.

Conclusions: Culture and Disaster Management

Our analysis focused on cultural influences on disaster management.Probably now more then ever, there is a need for international cooper-ation related to natural and human-made disasters. As natural disasters,such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, will continue to be part ofthe lives of citizens, especially in Third-World countries, multi-culturalexpert groups will become more and more common. The lack ofresources and expertise in Third-World countries is the main reasonwhy experts and aid organizations from other countries are often askedfor assistance in times of disaster. Inevitably, certain problems, espe-cially related to cultural influences on warning, evacuation,reconstruction, and communication arise. Even in recent years theFilipino Government asked for foreign personnel and financial support;for example, US military support in the fight of the Abu Sayaff and theMoro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao. This further jus-tifies the necessity for a continued effort in mutual culturalunderstanding.

However, as recent history has shown, problems related to multi-cultural expert groups in disaster management are not only limited toThird World countries but also affect western industrialized countries.These countries are confronted more and more with human-made dis-asters related to terrorist attacks and are also seeking internationalsupport and alliances. Thus, the understanding of each other’s culturebecomes a crucial factor in successful disaster management.

And lastly, we hope to have emphasized the need to train disastermanagers in strategic and also intercultural competence. Strategic com-petence refers to the ability to deal successfully with novel, uncertain,complex and dynamic situations (Dörner 1996) and to deal successfullywith human errors in such situations (Reason 1990). Intercultural com-petence includes (Cushner and Brislin 1996; Gudykunst 1994; Landisand Bhagat 1996; Sue et al. 1998) an awareness of one’s own cultural


background, an interest in the cultural background of others, the sensi-tivity to realize cultural similarities and differences, and the ability totolerate these cultural differences, thus leading to a more successful andsatisfying interaction between people of different cultures. Disastermanagement that incorporates strategic and intercultural competenciesoffers a better chance of coping with disasters in the future—not onlyin the Philippines.

Notes

1. “Lahar” is an Indonesian term and refers to a mixture of water,fresh ash, rock fragments, and other volcanic material, flowing downthe sides of a volcano. Lahars are like a mass of concrete slurries. AtPinatubo lahars consist mainly of sand and coarser volcanic debris, andshould not be confused with mudflows.

Acknowledgements

We are greatly indebted to Ramona Panis, Greg Bankoff, TeresaTuason, Kelvin Rodolfo, anonymous reviewers, and the editor for theirthoughtful comments on earlier versions of this article. The recom-mendation from this research led to a study currently funded by theNational Science Foundation (Grant # 0349997 of the first author) oncultural influences on dynamic decision-making. Correspondence con-cerning this article should be addressed to Dominik Güss, Departmentof Psychology, University of North Florida, Jacksonville, FL 32224-2673, U.S.A. Electronic mail may be sent to [email protected]

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