cuba's impact in southern africa

Cuba's Impact in Southern AfricaAuthor(s): Owen Ellison KahnSource: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Autumn, 1987),pp. 33-54Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of MiamiStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/165843 .

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CUBA'S IMPACT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA*

by OWEN ELLISON KAHN

THIS ARTICLE ASSESSES the impact of the Cuban military on strategic, diplomatic and political relationships in southern Africa. It does not deal with why Cuba and its Soviet benefactor have interested themselves in the region, nor does it discuss Soviet influence on Cuban foreign policy.1 The aspects covered here include: (1) how Cuba and Angola fit into the complex pattern of regional relations in southern Africa; (2) an outline of the region's main territorial actors and guerrilla movements, along with a brief history of Cuban involvement in the area; (3) the response of South Africa to this foreign spoiler of its regional hegemony; (4) regional cooperation in southern Africa inso- far as it is a response to South Africa's militancy in the face of international communism as represented in the region by Cuba; and (5) Cuba's effect upon the economy and polity of Angola and Mozambi- que.

I. BACKGROUND

NEARLY 500 YEARS elapsed between the founding of Portugal's first trading post in southern Africa and the granting of independence to Portugal's colonies. At the end of that period Portugal suffered a military coup which gave rise to a domestic turmoil that made its new government even more hasty to jettison colonies than had been the case with the other European colonizers. In Angola, Portugal was determined to transfer power to whatever contending anti-colonial movement controlled the capital that day (11 November 1975).

One of the Angolan independence movements, the Movimento Popular de Libertagao deAngola (MPLA), was able to call on Cuba to help it win the day. The Soviets had begun backing the MPLA in the early-1960s, in keeping with Khruschev's policy of support for national liberation movements. Part of that assistance consisted of military training provided by Cuban advisors.2 Since then, Cuba has continu- ously supported the MPLA. The Soviets, by contrast, twice let their

Owen Ellison Kahn is Assistant Professor of Politics and Public Affairs at the University of Miami. He currently is working on a book on international trade in strategic minerals.

*The author wishes to thank Yorick Fonseca, Robyn Pekelny and, especially, Evan Koster for assistance in research for this article, Janet Cooper for editorial help, and anonymous reviewers for their useful comments.

33



34 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

support lapse: the first time in 1963-64, in support of the Organization of African Unity's (OAU's) recognition of a rival movement, the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertagao de Angola); and the second time in 1973-74, due to differences with the MPLA leadership. In early 1975, the Soviets began airlifting arms to the MPLA, while Cuba sent military advisors. By midyear the MPLA controlled the capital and much of the country. However, when aid from the United States, South Africa and China to a coalition of rival groups began to turn the tide, the MPLA requested further assistance from Cuba, and the Soviet Union airlifted Cuban troops into Angola. With their help, the MPLA prevented the rival coalition from taking Luanda, the capital city

The US has supported one of the MPLA's rivals, the Frente Nacional de Libertagao de Angola (FNLA), for about as long as the Soviets have supported the MPLA. The FNLA had based itself in neighboring Zaire. As the struggle for succession intensified, the US decided to help Zaire assist the FNLA. Indeed, Zairean troops were active in Angola several months before the Cubans arrived. But neither Zaire nor the FNLA had the muscle to dislodge the MPLA. The one military force that was willing and able to do the job could not be openly supported by the US. South Africa's domestic policy had made her such an international outcast that overt support for any South African-led regional venture was thought likely to amount to diplomatic suicide for the United States in sub-Saharan Africa.

With quiet encouragement from the United States, South Africa eventually invaded Angola in support of Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total deAngola (UNITA), the third contending liberation movement - but by then the Cubans had arrived in force. It was too late to oust the MPLA without a large-scale war, which the US Congress would not contemplate, and which South Africa was unwill- ing to conduct in diplomatic and logistical isolation.3

Angola is one of the continent's larger countries, with an area about the same as South Africa or Peru. Infrastructure is poor. Three uncon- nected rail lines traverse the country eastwards from the coast. One of these is the famed Benguela line, which extends from Lobito, on the coast, through Zaire to Zambia. It used to carry a good deal of both Zaire's and Zambia's copper to the coast. However, sabotage by UNITA has put it out of service for the last decade.4 Led by Jonas Savimbi, UNITA was initially supported by Zambia, other moderate African states, and China. Today it is backed openly by South Africa and, increasingly, by the United States, which has recently (1985) reversed its position banning the use of US funds for military purposes in Angola.



KAHN: CUBA'S IMPACT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Constant civil war has cost Angola's economy dearly. Gross domestic product (GDP) plummeted by40% between 1974 and 1975, and has remained at much the same level ever since. Economic development opportunities, foregone by the need to pay for the civil war (which includes the cost of Cuban protection), explains some of this economic decay.5 The MPLA is reluctant to send Cuba's garrison home because of the threat still posed by UNITA and its backers, chiefly South Africa.

Angola, Cuba and South Africa connot be discussed without including Angola's southern neighbor, the territory of Namibia (formerly called South-West Africa). South Africa continues to administer the territory despite universal consensus that Namibia should be independent. South Africa would comply were it first able to install a government to its liking. This would mean a government not controlled by the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO), the most prominent of the independence movements, whose partly social- istic rhetoric feeds South Africa's fear of being surrounded by regimes hostile, not only to her domestic racial policy, but also to her capitalist economic credo.

For years, SWAPO has used Angola as its home base for launching guerrilla attacks on Namibia. For almost as long, South Africa has attacked SWAPO bases in Angola. To complete the tangle: South Africa assists UNITA against the MPLA and its Cuban protectors, while UNITA assists, or at least doesn't oppose, South Africa's campaign against SWAPO. In effect, South Africa has substituted UNITA for the Por- tuguese, who used to assist her against SWAPO.

South Africa's concerns over the make-up and policies of neighboring governments depend, ultimately, on the attitudes of those governments towards the African National Congress (ANC), the best-known and longest-lived opponent of white minority rule in South Africa. South Africa is determined to force surrounding states to deny refuge to ANC guerrillas. Installing a government in Namibia which would commit itself to this position following independence would suit the South African government best. Least desirable would be a militantly anti-apartheid Namibia under a SWAPO government assisted into power by the Cubans now based in Angola. Cooperation between ANC guerrillas and Cuban troops anywhere in southern Africa constitutes one of the worst fears of the South African military. Indeed, there is little doubt that the present South African regime could be defeated mil- itarily only if its adversaries received major outside assistance.

Most countries in the subcontinent have joined two groups of states

35




designed largely for the purpose of pooling their resources against South Africa. The first group, made up of the so-called frontline states, includes Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Tanzania (see Figure 1). It has never organized itself formally, but its major aim has been to foster majority rule throughout the region. Begun by Tanzania, Zambia, and Botswana, the group had expanded to 6 countries by 1980, as the founding states were joined by Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe after the latter gained their independence. Namibia and South Africa are the only holdouts of minority rule. While some of the frontline states may have their reservations about a large Cuban military presence in the neighborhood, for the most part any support against the South African colossus is welcomed.

The frontline states have common goals despite differences in their respective histories and current situations. Like Angola, Mozambique received its independence from Portugal in 1975 and has suffered economic stagnation and civil strife ever since. Both countries pro- claim themselves socialist. Botswana, which used to be a British protectorate, gained its independence in 1966 and has sustained one of the most democratic polities and fastest growing economies in Africa. Zimbabwe, formerly called Rhodesia, gained majority rule in 1980 through a protracted guerrilla conflict, after which Ian Smith was replaced by Robert Mugabe. Though bitterly opposed to the apartheid system, Mugabe's hands are tied by his country's economic dependence on its southern neighbor. Zambia's long economic slide down- ward has been hastened by the low world price for copper, the commodity which earns almost all of its foreign exchange. Zambia has also become dependent on South African rail lines and ports because of closure of the Benguela line through Angola and the unreliability of the line through Tanzania. Partly because it has the fewest economic links with the Republic of South Africa, Tanzania has long been one of the most vocal of that country's critics worldwide.

The frontline states are all members of the second group, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which aims to reduce the economic dependence of its members on South Africa by coordinating communication, transport, food production, energy, industry, trade and overall development efforts. Other members include Malawi, the only African state to have official diplomatic relations with South Africa, and Lesotho and Swaziland, tiny countries dominated economically by South Africa.




Lobito ANGOLA

INDIAN OCEAN

km 200 400 600 s 200 400

fI I 4 I I

mis 200 400

Southern Africa

37




II. CUBA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

THE RAPIDITY WITH WHICH the Portuguese withdrew from their colonies fulfilled one of the worst fears of the South African government: the creation, overnight, of a political and military vacuum on its doorstep, which the SWAPO in Namibia, and local and foreign communist forces in Mozambique and Angola, would rush to fill. Hostile governments in these countries would permit the African National Congress to launch armed attacks on South Africa.

Cuba has been far less active in Mozambique than in Angola. Anti- colonial activity in Mozambique was dominated by the Frente Liber- taQao de Mozambique (FRELIMO), supported early on by China, and later by the USSR, Eastern Europe, and Cuba. In the mid-1980s there were some 700 Cuban military and 700 Cuban civilian personnel in Mozambique, not enough to affect the balance of power in south- eastern Africa, but enough to worry the South Africans.

Curiously, South Africa did little to stop FRELIMO from gaining power in Mozambique. Pretoria refused to back militant Mozambican whites who, unilaterally, sought to declare Mozambique independent under their rule. Pretoria probably assumed it could use its economic leverage to keep a FRELIMO government compliant. However, Angola's economywas not tied in to South Africa's, making punishment and reward within a relationship of economic dependence unavailable. Consequently, South Africa escalated from occasional raids, originating from Namibia into Angola in pursuit of SWAPO, to large- scale invasion, while simultaneously increasing its support to non- Marxist UNITA and FNLA. The Cubans then responded by sending troops to preserve the MPLA's fragile grip on power. In the face of US vacillation over support for South Africa, international pressure, and mounting military costs, the South Africans withdrew into Namibia in March 1976.

Cuba's involvement in the region did not end there.6 Cuban troops (and advisors) in Angola jumped from 5,000 in 1975 to perhaps 18,000 in 1976, subsequently rising to 35,000 by 1986 (see Table 1). 35,000 Cuban troops and military advisors are roughly as many as are in the regular Angolan army (excluding the militia, navy, air force and border guards) and amount to about one third of the country's total armed forces.7 South Africa's regular army has about 100,000 troops. Com- pared with the number of Cuban troops in Angola, the ratio is about 2.8 South Africans to 1 Cuban, a dramatic display of Cuban strength against the most powerful country in the region. Moreover, in recent years,




TABLE 1

FOREIGN TROOPS AND MILITARY ADVISORS IN ANGOLA

A) CUBANS

1975- 5,000

1976- 15-18,000(March) 12-13,000(Nov ) d

1977- 19.000

1978- 18-20,000

1979- 18-20,000

1980- 19,000

1981- *

1982- 18-20,000

1983- 25,000

1984- 25,000

1985- 20,000(& 6,000 adv.)

1986- 27,000(& 8,000 adv.)

Others: (Bulgarians, Palestinians, Portuguese, et.c )

B) Sovi eth C)GDR

200

700

700

3-5,000

700

950-1500

450

450

1,000

500

500-3000

1984- 1,500 1985- 1,600

a: Troops and advisors are counted toget.her until 1985 b: Soviets and East Germans include milit.ary advisors and technicians c: * = not. available d: low point after Cuban withdrawal

SOURCES: William M. Leogrande, "Cuba's Policy in Africa", Inatitute of International Studies (Univeraity of California, Berkeley, 1980.) p- 20; Africa Cont.emporary Record, 1982-83, 1983-84, 1984-85; Defense and Foreiqn Affairs Handbook, 1985 (Perth Corporation, Washington, D.C.); The Military Balance 1985-86, 1986-87, (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London); Fred Bringland, Savimbi (Mainstream Publishing: Edinburgh, 1986).

39

*




several thousand Soviet and East German military personnel have also seen service in Angola. The number of Cuban, Soviet, and East Euro- pean economic advisors has also increased, averaging about 9,000 in the late 1970s to mid-1980s. Four-fifths of these are Cuban (Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, 1985). While figures cannot be exact, there is good evidence that nearly 45,000 Cubans are currently serving in Angola.

III. CUBA'S EFFECT ON SOUTH AFRICA A. South Africa's Perception of "Total Onslaught"

THE WITHDRAWAL of the South African Defense Force (SADF) from Angola in 1976, and the inauguration of FRELIMO in Mozambi- que and the MPLA in Angola ended an era: no longer did a cushion of friendly, white-ruled colonial states separate South Africa from Black Africa. South Africa now had to deal with black neighbors who disap- proved of apartheid, and who not only styled themselves Marxist, but also received Soviet, East European and Cuban support (Davies and O'Meara, 1985:188-189). It was also clear that the winds of change had not yet spent themselves in the region: Rhodesia would not last much longer under white rule; the global clamor for the independence of South West Africa (Namibia) from South African control would get ever louder; and exclusive white control of South Africa would become more and more difficult for its Western allies to justify.

Realignment of forces in the region and the certainty of more to come provoked a "siege" mentality in South African policy-making circles: a conviction that external, as well as internal, pressures for domestic political change were manifestations of a "total onslaught" directed against the South African state from Moscow. Cuba's presence in the sub-continent was simply the most telling evidence of the total onslaught.8 How much of the total onslaught theory is genuinely believed, and how much whipped up to justify South African actions, both internationally and internally, is not known. Clearly, however, the perception of a total onslaught did lead to substantive changes in South Africa's foreign policy, not least in its regional policy, changes designed in good part to counter Cuba's penetration of the region. B. South Africa's Implementation of "Total Strategy"

The arrival of the Cubans precipitated South Africa's reconsidera- tion of its objectives in participating in the Angolan civil war. Many in the Department of Foreign Affairs had believed that the wisest course was to adhere to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs




of other nations (a principle which South Africa constantly invokes on its own behalf), that Angola should be treated with the same restraint as Mozambique, and that the gains from invasion were not worth the likely international repercussions.

However, the SADF had long feared that conflict among Angolan liberation movements would create opportunities for foreign communist involvement and for SWAPO penetration of Namibia. It viewed the MPLA as ideologically inclined to arm and support opponents of the South African government in Namibia and, even, in South Africa itself. Therefore, the Cubans had to be ejected from the region immediately because of the damage they could do South Africa's policy for Namibia, and because of the likelihood of their assisting the ANC. The military's hard-line approach was adopted, and the invasion of Angola soon mounted (Geldenhuys, 1984: 79, 295 and passim).

Subsequently, a 1977 Defense White Paper, commonly thought to have been authored by then Defense Minister PW Botha, brought together the various strands of regional policy under the rubric of a "total national strategy."9 Since the nation was facing a "total onslaught," from both within and without, the only appropriate response was a correspondingly comprehensive mobilization of economic, political, psychological, social and military resources to counter the danger. While it would be going too far to suggest that the Cuban presence elevated PW Botha from Defense Minister to Prime Minister, it is certain that foreign military activity in the region elevated the importance of the SADF in national decision-making and strengthened Botha's bid for the premiership. The effect on South Africa's sense of security of a large Communist military force in formerly allied Angola can scarcely be exaggerated.

"Total strategy," in the regional context, pursued three sets of objectives, corresponding to South Africa's long, medium and short term goals (Price, 1984).

Long term, the aim was to develop a "constellation" of friendly buffer states on South Africa's perimeter, thereby creating a new genera- tion of pro-South African satellites. They would be kept compliant through economic dependence, to be achieved by economic induce- ment (such as loans), and/or by destabilization. The theory was that economic and political chaos would make cooperation with the desta- bilizer more inviting. Ensuring the dependence of neighbors also meant impeding any attempts to reduce this dependence through increased regional cooperation, such as that provided by the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

41




Medium term, the aim was to impose neutrality on neighboring states: to ensure the internal security of South Africa by preventing unfriendly neighbors from harboring ANC guerrillas. In practice, this meant both defense of South Africa's borders as well as attacks on ANC facilities and personnel in neighboring states, supplemented by the threat - and use - of economic punishment to obtain compliant behavior.

The primary short-term aims of the total strategy are, first, to contain the spread of Soviet/Cuban influence in southern Africa and, second, to eliminate the foreign communist presence altogether. Some ambiv- alence is attached to these aims. On the one hand, South Africa fears the Cuban presence and wants to find ways to bring about its withdrawal. The Cubans have prevented South Africa from having its way in Angola and have provided moral, if not material, support to both SWAPO and the ANC. On the other hand, Soviet and Cuban penetration works to the advantage of South Africa by providing an anti-communist justification for its long-range objectives of destabilizing the Angolan and Mozambican regimes, of retaining control of Namibia until instal- lation of a compliant government, and of preventing Angola from realizing its economic potential as co-leader, with Zimbabwe, of SADCC.

Equally important, the Cuban presence enables the West to justify its own tolerance of South African actions in the region. At the same time that the US government instituted sanctions against South Africa, (over the President's veto), it reinstituted aid to UNITA in Angola as a means of containing communism. Ironically, both South Africa and Cuba find each other to be convenient ideological rivals. While South Africa justifies its aggression by referring to godless communists, so Cuba lends legitimacy to its adventuring by reference to wicked racists and capitalists. Further, Black African criticism of Cuba's excursions on the continent has been muted, in part because of Cuba's stand against apartheid. 10 C. The Making of South African Policy: The "Cuban Factor"11

South Africa's total strategy emerged to counter the hostility of newly independent black states in the region, increasing ANC activity at home, and increasing diplomatic isolation abroad. International communism was perceived as the source of this total onslaught. The presence of Cubans in Angola facilitated adoption of the total strategy, increased the voice of the SADF in strategy conception and implementation, and further justified the results. A large, well-equipped, openly hostile, foreign military force assisting one's enemy and promoting a




rival ideology could hardly have elicited any other response. A key tactical consideration in the total strategy was the appropriate

mix of military punishment and economic reward in keeping neighboring governments compliant. Military means could be counter- productive if punishment damaged a neighbor's economy so much that promises of economic assistance became meaningless. The constellation of states contemplated requires the South African business community to invest in its neighbors. However, no investment could be expected in countries whose infrastructures had been destroyed by the SADE

In Angola's case, however, South Africa had virtually no economic cards to play. Angola had never been integrated into the regional economy dominated by South Africa. The country had its own ports, was independent of South African Railways, no longer sent migrant workers to South Africa and, with the exception of diamonds, had received very little direct investment from South African firms. More- over, Angola's oil made her relatively well-off. Largely immune from economic pressure, but harboring apparent military threats (SWAPO bases, ANC training camps, Cuban troops), Angola seemed more susceptible to the stick than the carrot. So South Africa's military acquired an increasingly loud voice in foreign policy-making, first toward Angola, and then toward other neighboring countries.

In the 1975 Angolan conflict, decisions were made ad boc. Regu- larized decision-making on regional security was mandatory for total strategy to work. The State Security Council (SSC), which advises the government on "national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic" (Geldenhuys, 1984: 92), was the obvious institutional choice. It is directly under the control of the State President and enjoys an extremely broad mandate. The SSC's permanent members include the Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Police, the heads of the National Intelligence Service, Police, and Defense Force, and the Directors General of Foreign Affairs, and Justice (Geldenhuys, 1984: 92).

The SSC presides over a pervasive apparatus known as the "national security management system.' Some view that system as a conduit for the prudent inclusion of security information in national decision- making at a variety of levels. Others see it as virtually a shadow government in the wings, making sure that the normal institutions of government hear what the military thinks should be heard.12 Whether benign or disquieting, the rise to prominence of the military in national decision-making suggests how seriously the total onslaught is taken.

43




Table 2

MILITARIZATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY SINCE 1973

Military Expenditurea

(ME) Const.ant 1983 US 8

1670

1964

2454

3268

3489

Armed Forces Thousand

45

45

50

59

67

ME as ME as

percent percent. of of GNP Central

Government Expenditures

2.8

3.0

3.7

4.9

5.2

78 3257

3132

3896

3364 (eat..)

2907 (eat.)

3737 (et..)

3422 (eat.)

70

70

78

77

4.4

5.2

4.3

3.7

4.9

4.2

11.5

11.4

13.1

16.5

17.7

16.0

15-4

19.3

15.3

12.7

15.6

13.2

SOURCE: Defense Program and Analysis Division, US Arms Control and Disarmamelnt Agency World Military Expendit.ures and Arms Transfers--1986 (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C.: 1987).

The effect of the Cuban presence extends beyond its effect on South African strategy/decision-making. Cuban success in limiting the destabilization of Angola, despite adoption of the total strategy, convinced the South African government that a change in weapons production and procurement was necessary. Priority was given to developing a highly mobilized conventional force to be used against neighboring countries, while also raising counterinsurgency capa- bility. Enhanced conventional forces were augmented by reconnais- sance commando units for hit-and-run operations. The SADF acceler- ated its weapons development program in response to the shortcomings in armaments (such as counter-insurgency weapons and mobile troop carriers) evident in the Angolan campaign, as well as to the long-standing UN arms embargo the West was starting to take

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984




more seriously. Under the direction of ARMSCOR, the state owned armaments company, the drive for near self-sufficiency became a national priority.

Table 2 shows the substantial expansion in resources and man- power devoted to the armed forces since the Angolan conflict. From 1973 to 1984, the number of troops more than doubled and the proportion of GNP devoted to the military increased from 2.8% to 4.2%, averaging 4.6% between 1976 and 1984. Much of this money went to the local arms industry. As a result, by 1982, only 15% of the defense budget was spent on imports (quoted in Geldenhuys, 1984: 142).

IV SOUTH AFRICA'S REGIONAL RELATIONS SINCE 197513

IN 1978 AND 1979, the South African government energetically pro- moted its "constellation of southern African states." The aim was to render neighboring states so economically dependent on South Africa that any type of political opposition would be unthinkable. The primary means was a privately funded South African Development Bank to finance the regional infrastructure on which the constellation of states was to be based. The plan failed on several counts: the emer- gence of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) reduced the incentives to join South Africa's constellation; the defeat of Bishop Muzorewa, South Africa's candidate to lead Zim- babwe to independence and into the constellation; and the lack of enthusiasm of the South African private sector for the plan.

By 1982 South Africa had scaled down its aims, but still relied on destabilization as the primary means to achieve its policy. Its first aim was to coerce surrounding states (especially Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Swaziland) to deny refuge to the ANC. South Africa was particularly anxious to forestall effective cooperation between the ANC and the Cuban military in Angola. South Africa pursued an aggressive campaign there which was presented to its western allies as one designed to contain communism. Second on the agenda was the effort to frustrate attempts by neighboring states (via SADCC) to reduce their reliance on South Africa. This frustration policy extended as far as economic sabotage.

Bythe end of 1982, the SADF virtually occupied the southern part of Angola. The aim was to force the MPLA to form a coalition government with UNITA, as well as to raise the costs of the Angolan government's support for SWAPO.

Destabilization did succeed in neutralizing neighboring states to

45




some degree. In 1984, South Africa and Angola signed the Lusaka Agreement, a partial non-aggression accord. South Africa agreed to disengage from Angola in exchange for MPLA restraint of SWAPO. Also in 1984, South Africa and Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord, in which both states pledged not to allow use of their territories - by any state, government, or foreign military power - for purposes of aggression on the territory of the other, and which, further, required Mozam- bique to expel the ANC.

At first these agreements raised South African hopes of putting its constellation plan back on track and, even, of breaking out of its international isolation. However, South Africa had underestimated the price of its destabilization strategy: unexpectedly forceful international condemnation, potential escalation of the conflict by Cuban troops, plus the direct economic costs of waging a large campaign far from home. In addition, the Soviet Union warned South Africa, late in 1983, that it would not tolerate the fall of the MPLA (Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 206). Finally, not only did South Africa's western allies become increasingly critical of the pace of the Botha government's promised domestic changes, but they also found it more difficult to ignore its incursions into neighboring states.

Increased western pressure, at the same time that several front-line states renewed contacts with the ANC and called openly for sanctions against South Africa, reinforced the "total onslaught" mentality. This, in turn, strengthened the hand of Pretoria's foreign policy hawks. For now even South Africa's Western friends were perceived as ignoring, or even joining, the total onslaught. If the presence of the Soviets' Cuban surrogates could not move the West to see the danger to their own interests in the region, then South Africa would simply have to stand alone. South African commando teams and warplanes have raided each of the frontline states, except Tanzania, in the last year; and Pretoria has given notice that pressure on its neighbors will increase. The SADF has strengthened its forces in Namibia, has recently acquired new attack helicopters and fighter planes, has extended military service requirements for white South Africans, and has received a large budget increase.

V REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

IN THE 12 YEARS since Cuban troops were introduced into the region, the frontline states have tried to defend themselves against South Africa's policy of regional de-stabilization and domination. This




policy cannot be attributed to the Cuban presence directly. Rather, Cuba added fuel to the regional fire of South Africa's total strategy - a strategy to which the smaller countries found themselves forced to respond. While most neighboring states have little recourse from a belligerent South Africa, Cuban assistance to Angola did demonstrate that South Africa could at least be thwarted, if not defeated.

Established in 1979, SADCC believes regional cooperation will reduce South African control over member economies and, thus, over their sovereignty. SADCC challenges one of South Africa's fundamental insurance policies: that international sanctions against the Republic of South Africa will, or will be made to, damage her neighbors. Mere establishment of SADCC and statement of its goals have thwarted the grandiose constellation initiative of South Africa. Indeed, most of the countries South Africa expected would join its constellation became members of SADCC.

It is too early to tell whether SADCC will be able to reduce economic dependence on South Africa. Mozambique's and Zim- babwe's susceptibility to South African economic sabotage and punishment seem unchanged, and Angola appears to have been too preoc- cupied with its civil war to give any great consideration to the SADCC program. The Nkomati Accord with Mozambique was viewed by South Africa as a blow to SADCC because it included talks on reviving and increasing economic links between the two countries, giving South Africa's constellation-of-states initiative another glimmer of hope.

VI. CUBA'S EFFECT ON ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE A. Economic Consequences

ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE have had dismal economic perfor- mances since independence (see Table 3). Much of the failure is attributable to the massive withdrawal of Portuguese capital and skills, combined with little economic control by the indigenous population.

Angola's economic decline, which began even before independence, has been greater than Mozambique's. This may be attributed to the fact that civil war in Angola has been more intense (at least until recently).14 Ironically, another reason may be that Angola had no South African economic or technological connections on which to fall back once the Portuguese left.15 The civil war is estimated to consume anywhere from two-thirds to three-quarters of the Angolan budget. Military purchases from the Eastern Bloc totalled close to $2 billion over the 1984-85 period (Brooke, 1986). However, it is unclear whether the larger number of Cuban troops and advisors there has made for

47




Table 3

EVOLUTION OF GDP IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE SINCE INDEPENDENCE

ANGOLA MOZAMBIQUE

GDP in change GDP in change million in % from million in X from conatant previous constant previous 1983 US S year 1983 US S year

1973 12328 6.8 6940 5.6

1974 11712 -5.0 6415 -7.6

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

7220

6481

6631

6914

7072

7469

1981 7297

1982 6931

1983

1984

6731

6731

5378

-10.2

4.3

2.3

5.6

-16.2

5121

5161

5203

5276

5406

1.4

2.5

2.3 -2.3

-5.1

-2.9

0.0

5000

5338

-7.0

6.8

SOURCES: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Defense Program and Analysis Division, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfera--1986 (United Statea Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C.: 1987); World Bank, World Tablea Third Edition Volume 1: Economic Tables (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore: 1983); African Development Bank, African Development Fund, Annual Report.--1984 (Abid3an, Ivory Coast: 1985).

Note: Unlike the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, African Development Bank and World Bank sources calculate gross product figurea for Angola which are lower than those for Mozambique. This may be because different techniques are used for factoring exchange rates. However, there are no significant differences in the rates of economic growth derived from these sources.

additional economic hardship. Angola must pay for Cuban room and board, and may be paying for Cuban military services, possibly with hard currency. This expenditure denies resources to economic development. On the other hand, were it not for the Cubans, Angola might have had its oil fields shut down by UNITA and South Africa, which would certainly have brought complete economic breakdown.

Perhaps the biggest economic impact of the Cuban presence in Angola is in prolonging the civil war, making the MPLA and UNITA less




willing to negotiate a settlement: the MPLA thinks that, with enough Cuban support, it can still win; UNITA thinks that, once the Cubans leave, it will prevail. Continuation of the civil war, persistent South African incursions, and UNITA's hold over one-fourth of the country, result not only in severe logistical problems, but also in sabotage of economic development efforts.

However, with all these factors operating, Cuba's effect on Angolas economic woes is difficult to isolate. Moreover, the loss of Portuguese capital and skills would have been devastating under any circumstances. It is even possible that Cubans made up some of that shortfall, particularly in the area of health and education. Sufficient information to evaluate accurately Cuba's positive economic contribution to Angola is, unfortunately, unavailable.

The net result is that Angola, which at independence had balanced exports of coffee, oil, diamonds, and food, now imports food (with just 2% of the arable land under cultivation), produces only half the diamonds it did before independence, grows a mere one-twentieth of the coffee it once did, no longer mines iron ore at all, and spends a good deal of what it does earn on maintaining Fidel Castro's troops.

Cuba has never been very influential in Mozambique. It played a marginal role, at most, in FRELIMO's acquisition and consolidation of power. Though FRELIMO still relies on the Soviet/Cuban bloc mil- itarily, it has repeatedly expressed its disappointment with the quantity and quality of Soviet/Cuban aid. Indeed, Mozambique refuses to grant the Soviets any permanent military bases.16 Recently, FRELIMO has sought to strengthen its links with the West, a move which has paid off in more Western credits and grants. In short, Mozambique's ties to the Soviets and Cubans have become weaker without the country suffering any obvious disadvantage; its dependence was actually quite lim- ited.17 Because Cuban involvement in Mozambique has been mini- mal, so has their economic impact. B. External Relations

The Cuban presence has strained relations of both Angola and Mozambique with the West. In fact, the United States has never officially recognized the Angolan government. While US-Mozambi- que relations have warmed somewhat, US-Angolan relations have recently worsened: under the Reagan Doctrine, US support for UNITA has increased; and US oil companies doing business in Angola have been criticized (rightly or wrongly) by the Administration for support- ing war - rather than peace - by helping Angola to pay for its arms and Cuban help (Brooke, 1986).

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In 1986, approximately $15 million in covert US aid was channeled to UNITA (Gwertzman, 1986). The Reagan administration insists that only a strengthened UNITA can push the MPLA to negotiate an end to the civil war and, hence, an end to the need for Cuban troops. This parallels South Africa's public position of linking support for UNITA to the need to counter the Cubans. Cuba, then, has put the US in an embarrassing position: it stands accused of unwarranted interference in a Third World country; its anti-communism appears to support South Africa in that both countries assist UNITA; and US association with South Africa, in turn, alienates a number of important African states.

A decade ago, the United States, Great Britain, France, West Ger- many and Canada formed a "contact group" to try to resolve the question of Namibian independence. Though not originally stated as an objection, South Africa now insists on the removal of Cuban troops (who support SWAPO) before plans for Namibian independence proceed. Angola accepts the idea of linkage, but reverses the sequence: South Africa must end its illegal occupation of Namibia and its attacks on Angola, which, Luanda claims, are the reasons why the Cubans were originally invited.

Surprisingly perhaps, most African states do not view the Cuban presence as neo-colonialism. Cuba's credibility stems from its aid in fighting the hated South African regime. By pitting itself against South Africa, Cuba has gained legitimacy for its foreign adventuring, in Angola and elsewhere. The Soviet Union has similarly muted international condemnation of its policy in southern African by aligning itself on the "correct" side in the regional conflict.

VII. CONCLUSION

IN 1986 ANGOLAAND SOUTH AFRICA seemed willing to negotiate over the Cuban presence. President Botha agreed to abide by the 1978 United Nations plan for Namibian independence in exchange for withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola (New York Times, 1986b: A-7). The plan mandates a ceasefire in Namibia, followed by withdrawal of South African forces and free elections in Namibia, super- vised by a UN peacekeeping force. However, a deal has since proved to be as elusive as ever.

Meanwhile, the Reagan administration decided to send stinger missiles and other aid to UNITA in an effort to put further pressure on the MPLA to seek a negotiated settlement to the civil war (New York Times, 1986a: A-30). However, the MPLA's tenuous hold on Angola,




continued pressure from South Africa, US hostility, and a rejuvenated UNITA may have prompted further Cuban assistance. Table 1 shows a substantial increase in Cuban (and Soviet and East German) troops and military advisors once aid to UNITA was resumed. While cause- and-effect cannot be proved, this sequence fits a long-standing pattern of the MPLA seeking Cuban aid when threats to its survival mount.

Cuba has propped up the MPLA government in Angola for the last dozen years and actively supported the MPLA, in opposition, for a dozen years before that. While clearly in no hurry to do so, there are circumstances in which the Cubans might leave Angola: if asked by the MPLA; if they decided to leave for reasons of their own; if ordered to leave by Moscow; or if forced out by enemies of the MPLA. None of these alternatives seems likely at the present time.

First, if Cuban troops came in response to a genuine call for help, they will presumably leave when the MPLA announces it no longer needs their services; for example, if the MPLA gains nation-wide control, and thereby feels sufficiently secure to dispense with Cuban assistance, or if the warring factions in Angola reach a modus vivendi.

Secondly, Cuba could decide to withdraw her forces unilaterally for any number of (unlikely) reasons: the troops are needed elsewhere, the army finds the assignment demoralizing, the MPLA is no longer deemed worthy of support, the Castro government makes a major concession in order to mend fences with the US.

Third, if one assumes that Moscow exerts ultimate control over Cuban foreign policy, then the Cubans would leave if Moscow should order them out: as part of a detente deal with the West or, on the contrary, because Luanda had ceased being sufficiently Marxist to earn Soviet support.

Fourth, the Cubans might leave if pushed out by some combination of forces from UNITA, FNLA, South Africa and, though scarcely think- able, the United States.

To sum up:first, Cuba's military assistance has enabled the MPLA to cling to power, but not to consolidate its control over the whole of Angola. Cuba's presence has precipitated (or provided a pretext for) South African support of UNITA, which opposes the Cuban-backed MPLA government. Cuba and South Africa, then, contribute to Angolan instability and economic decline. Second, Cuba has prevented South Africa from getting its way in Angola. South Africa wanted UNITA in power, believing that UNITA would deny SWAPO bases in Angola.18 South Africa wants to prevent SWAPO from gaining control of Namibia, its last buffer state. Third, for Pretoria, the presence

51




of Cubans in Angola is clear evidence of a "total onslaught" orches- trated by international communism. From her neighbors' perspective, of course, South Africa's response to the "total onslaught" amounts to the region's giant having run amok. In turn, South Africa's neighbors have tried to reduce their economic links with that country, in the hope of becoming less vulnerable.

NOTES 1. These questions have been addressed by Valenta (1980 and 1981);

Deutsch (1980); Grabendoff (1980); and LeoGrande (1980a). 2. Earlier Cuba had aided not only revolutionary movements in Portu-

gal's other African colonies of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, but also guerrillas in Latin America and the Middle East as well.

3. In February 1976, the Clark Amendment became law, which banned spending US funds for any military purpose in Angola, except to gather intelligence.

4. This has required both Zambia and Zaire to route much of their rail traffic through South African ports, giving South Africa additional leverage within the region. So UNITA's cutting of the rail line serves its own purpose of destabilizing the MPLA regime as well as South Africa's wider purposes of regional domination.

5. Whether Cuba gets paid in hard currency earned from oil exports is unclear. The Angolan government insists that, since the fall in oil prices, all payments for Cuban civilian assistance have been suspended. Neither does Angola admit to any payments for military aid, past or present. Conse- quently, it is unclear whether Castro has ever been paid for his military help and, if so, whether he was paid in hard currency. There is little doubt that Angola does pay local costs for feeding and housing Cuban troops.

6. See further, Cuban Studies (1980). 7. Computed from US Department of State (1986), and US Central

Intelligence Agency (1978). 8. The phrase "total onslaught" is widely believed to have been coined

by State President PW Botha while he was Minister of Defense in the 1970s. 9. Earlier White Papers had referred to the "total strategy" idea, but the

1977 White Paper was devoted to spelling it out. 10. During his trip to Angola in September 1986, Fidel Castro linked

the withdrawal of Cuban troops to the ending of apartheid; such rhetoric makes good public relations (see FBIS-MEA, 1986).

11. See Geldenhuys (1984:91-96 andpassim) and Grundy (1983). 12. Compare Geldenhuys (1984: 92) with The Weekly Mail (1986:

12-13). 13. See Davies and O'Meara, 1985: 197-207.




14. In the last two years Mozambique and its economy have suffered terribly from civil war.

15. For example, South Africa has been assisting (and at times interfer- ing with) the operation of Mozambique's ports and railroads since shortly after independence. Mozambique still sends many thousands of miners to work in South African mines. Angola had no such links with its immediate neighbors.

16. So, for that matter, does Angola. 17. Whether the death of President Machel in October 1986 will

reverse this trend is unknowable. For the moment there is little evidence that Mozambique is courting either the Cubans or the Soviets. Mozambique has always reserved the right to call for outside aid should the country be unable to defend itself against banditry, meaning the South African-backed MNR.

18. Before independence, UNITA actually helped SWAPO. One can only guess whether Angola run by UNITA, alone or in a coalition, would continue to cooperate with South Africa against SWAPO.

REFERENCES Africa Contemporary Record, 1984-85 (1987) New York, NY: Holmes and

Meier. Africa Contemporary Record, 1983-84 (1985) New York, NY: Holmes and

Meier. Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-83 (1984) New York, NY: Holmes and

Meier. African Development Bank (1985) Annual Report, African Development

Fund, 1984. Abidjan, Ivory Coast: African Development Bank.

BRINGLAND, E (1986) Savimbi. Edinburgh, Scotland: Mainstream Publish- ing.

BROOKE, J. (1986) 'Angola's Economic Struggles." New York Times (31 January): D-1,3.

Cuban Studies (1980) 10, 2 (July). DAVIES, R. and D. O'MEARA (1985) "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An

Analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978" Journal of Southern African Studies 11, 2 (April): 183-211.

Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook (1985) Washington, DC: Perth Corporation.

DEUTSCH, R. (1980) "The Cubans in Africa." Africa Report 25, 5 (Septem- ber-October): 44-49.

Foreign Broadcasting Information Service - Middle East and Africa (FBIS- MEA) (1986). "Castro to Keep Troops in Angola during Apartheid," SAPA Johannesburg, 2 September. FBIS-MEA-170, 3 September: L-11.

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GELDENHUYS, D. (1984) The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African For- eign Policy Making. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

GRABENDORFF, W (1980) "Cuban Involvement in Africa" Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 22,1 (February): 3-30.

GRUNDY, K. (1983) The Rise of the South African Security Establishment (Bradley Lecture Series). Johannesburg, South Africa: The South African Institute of International Affairs.

GWERTZMAN, B. (1986) "President Decides to Send Weapons to Angola Rebels." New York Times (19 February): A-1,3.

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (1986) The Military Balance, 1986-87. London, England: IISS.

(1985) The Military Balance, 1985-86. London, England: IISS.

LEOGRANDE, W (1980a) "Cuban-Soviet Relations and Cuban Policy in Africa." Cuban Studies 10,1 (January): 1-36.

(1980b) Cubas Policy in Africa, 1959-1980 (Policy Papers in Interna- tional Affairs No. 13). Berkeley, CA: University of California Institute of International Studies.

New York Times (1986a) "Who Gets Stung in Angola?" (8 April): A-30. (1986b) "South African Leader in an Offer on Namibia'" (5 March):

A-7. PRICE, R. (1984) "Pretoria's Southern African Strategy." African Affairs 83,

330 (January): 11-32. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (US-ACDA) (1987) World

Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1986. Washington, DC: US- ACDA, Division of Defense Programs and Analysis.

US Central Intelligence Agency (US-CIA) (1979) Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1978. Washington, DC: US-CIA.

US State Department (US-DS) (1986) Warsaw Pact Aid to Non-Communist LDCs, 1984. Washington, DC: US-DS, Bureau of Intelligence Research.

VALENTA,J. (1981) "The Soviet-Cuban Alliance in Africa." World Today 37,2 (February): 45-53.

(1980) "The Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angola" US Naval Institute Proceedings (April): 52-57.

Weekly Mail (South Africa) (1986) Volume 2, No. 39 (3 October): 12-13. WHITAKER,J. (1986) "How to Assist Moscow in Africa?" New York Times (7

April): A-27. World Bank (1983) World Tables: Volume I: Economic Tables (3rd ed.).

Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.



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