Cryptography: Review Day

David Brumleydbrumley@cmu.eduCarnegie Mellon University

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Cryptonium Pipe Goals: Privacy, Integrity, and Authenticity

Alice Bob

Public Channel

Eve

E Dc c’

m

ke

m or error

ke

read/write access

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Privacy and Encryption

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Perfect Secrecy [Shannon1945]

(Information Theoretic Secrecy)

Defn Perfect Secrecy (informal): We’re no better off determining the plaintext when given the ciphertext.

Alice Bob

Eve1. Eve observes everything but the c. Guesses m1

2. Eve observes c. Guesses m2

Goal:

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The One Time PadMiller, 1882 and Vernam, 1917

m: 0 1 1 0 1 1 0

k: 1 1 0 1 0 0 0

c: 1 0 1 1 1 1 0

k: 1 1 0 1 0 0 0

m: 0 1 1 0 1 1 0

M = C = K = {0,1}n

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Block Ciphers

• Modes of operations– CBC, CTR, etc.– What modes do for security, e.g., why ECB is bad,

why randomize an IV for CBC, etc.

• Definitions– Is a block cipher a PRP or PRF

• Attacks

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Exhaustive Search for block cipher key

Goal: given a few input output pairs (mi, ci = E(k, mi)) i=1,..,n find key k.

Attack: Brute force to find the key k.

Homework: What is the probability that the key k found with one <m,c> pair is correct? For two pairs?

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Meet in the middle attack• Define 2E( (k1,k2), m) = E(k1 , E(k2 , m) )

key-len = 112 bits for 2DES

Idea: key found when c’ = c’’: E(ki, m) = D(kj, c)

m c'

…

…c

…

…c’’

m E(k2, )⋅ E(k1, )⋅ c

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Semantic Security Game

E

2. Pick b=03. k=KeyGen(l)4. c = E(k,mb)

A1. Picks m0, m1, |m0| = |m1|

5. Guess and output b’

m0,m1

c

World 0

E

2. Pick b=13. k=KeyGen(l)4. c = E(k,mb)

A1. Picks m0, m1, |m0| = |m1|

5. Guess and output b’

m0,m1

c

World 1

A doesn’t know which world he is in, but wants to figure it out.

Semantic security is a behavioral model getting at any A behaving the same in either world when E is secure.

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Semantic security under CPAModes that return the same ciphertext (e.g., ECB, CTR) for the same plaintext are not semantically secure under a chosen plaintext attack (CPA) (many-time-key)

if cb = c0 output 0else output 1

m0, m0 M∊C0 ← E(k,m)m0, m1 M∊Cb ← E(k,mb)

Challenger

k ← K

Adversary A

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Semantic security under CPAModes that return the same ciphertext (e.g., ECB, CTR) for the same plaintext are not semantically secure under a chosen plaintext attack (CPA) (many-time-key)

if cb = c0 output 0else output 1

m0, m0 M∊C0 ← E(k,m)m0, m1 M∊Cb ← E(k,mb)

Challenger

k ← K

Adversary A

Encryption modes must be randomized or use a nonce (or are vulnerable to CPA)

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Hashes and MACS

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Message IntegrityGoal: integrity (not secrecy)

Examples:– Protecting binaries on disk.

– Protecting banner ads on web pages

Security Principles: – Integrity means no one can forge a signature

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PRF Security Game(A behavioral model)

E

2. if(tbl[x] undefined) tbl[x] = rand()return y =tbl[x]

A1. Picks x

5. Guess and output b’

x

y

World 0

E

y = PRF(x)

A1. Picks x

3. Outputs guess for b

x

y

World 1

A doesn’t know which world he is in, but wants to figure it out.

For b=0,1: Wb := [ event that A(Wb) =1 ]AdvSS[A,E] := | Pr[ W0 ] − Pr[ W1 ] | [0,1]∈

Always 1

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Secure PRF: An Alternate Interpretation For b = 0,1 define experiment EXP(b) as:

Def: PRF is a secure PRF if for all efficient A:

ChallengerF Adversary

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Secure MAC Game

Security goal: A cannot produce a valid tag on a message– Even if the message is gibberish

Challenger1. k = KeyGen(l)

3. Compute i in 0...q: ti = S(mi, k)

5. b = V(m,t,k)

Adversary A

2. Picks m1, ..., mq

4. picks m not in m1,...,mq

Generates t

m1,...,mq

t1,...,tq

m,t

b = {yes,no} existential forgery if b=“yes”

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Birthday Paradox Rule of Thumb

Given N possibilities, and random samples x1, ..., xj, PR[xi = xj] ≈ 50% when j = N1/2

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Generic attack on hash functionsLet H: M {0,1}n be a hash function ( |M| >> 2n )

Generic alg. to find a collision in time O(2n/2) hashes

Algorithm:1. Choose 2n/2 random messages in M:

m1, …, m2n/2 (distinct w.h.p )

2. For i = 1, …, 2n/2 compute ti = H(mi) {0,1}∈ n

3. Look for a collision (ti = tj). If not found, got back to step 1.

How well will this work?

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Brute ForceOnline Brute Force Attack:

input: hp = hash(password) to crackfor each i in dictionary file

if(h(i) == hp)output success;

Time Space Tradeoff Attack:precompute: h(i) for each i in dict file in hash tbl

input: hp = hash(password) check if hp is in hash tbl “rainbow tables”

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SaltsEnrollment:

1. compute hp=h(password + salt)2. store salt || hp

Verification:3. Look up salt in password file4. Check h(input||salt) == hp

What is this good for security, given that the salt is public?

Salt doesn’t increase security against online attack, but does make tables much bigger.

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Authenticated Encryption

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Motivating Question: Which is Best?

E(kE , m||tag)S(kI, m)

m

Encryption Key = KE; MAC key = kI

Option 1: SSL (MAC-then-encrypt)

m tag m tag

S(kI , c)E(kE, m)

m

Option 2: IPsec (Encrypt-then-MAC)

m m tag

S(kI , m)E(kE, m)

m

Option 3: SSH (Encrypt-and-MAC)

m m tag

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An authenticated encryption system (E,D) is a cipher where

As usual: E: K × M × N C⟶ but D: K × C × N M { }⟶ ∪ ⊥

Security: the system must provide– Semantic security under CPA attack, and– ciphertext integrity. The attacker cannot create a

new ciphertext that decrypts properly.

reject ciphertext as invalid

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CCA Game DefinitionLet ENC = (E,D) over (K,M,C). For b = {0,1}, define EXP(0) and EXP(1)

b Chal.k K

Adv.

b’ {0,1}

mi,0 , mi,1 M : |mi,0| = |mi,1|

ci E(k, mi,b)

for i=1,…,q: (1) CPA query:

ci C : ci {c∉ 1, …, ci-1}

mi D(k, ci)

(2) CCA query:

Ex: could query a

changed ci

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Public Key Cryptography

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Eve observes: g, ga, gb

Goal: compute a (or b) (i.e., calculate the discrete log) or compute gab

3. ga mod p

4. gb mod p

1. Pick a from [0,p-1) 2. Pick b from [0,p-1)

5. Compute (ga)b mod pas secret key

6. Compute (gb)a mod pas secret key

Alice Bob

Eve

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MITM AdversaryAs described, Diffie-Hellman is insecure against active Man In The Middle (MITM) attacks

Alice BobMITM

ga mod p gm mod p

gb mod pgm mod p

gma mod p gmb mod p

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Public Key EncryptionDef: a public-key encryption system is a triple of algorithms (G, E, D)

• G(): randomized alg. outputs a key pair (pk, sk)

• E(pk, m): randomized alg. that takes m M and outputs c ∈C∈

• D(sk,c): determisitic alg. that takes c C and outputs m ∈ ∈M or ⊥

Consistency: (pk, sk) output by G : ∀

∀m M: D(sk, E(pk, m) ) = m∈Note: Without randomization, an attacker can determine E(pk,m1) = E(pk,m2) when m1=m2

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Semantic SecurityFor b=0,1 define experiments EXP(b) (i.e., EXP(0) and EXP(1)):

Def: Enc =(G,E,D) is sem. secure (a.k.a IND-CPA) if for all efficient A:

AdvSS [A,Enc] = |Pr[EXP(0)=1] – Pr[EXP(1)=1] | < negligible

Chal.b Adv. A

(pk,sk)G() m0 , m1 M : |m0| = |m1|

c E(pk, mb) b’ {0,1}

EXP(b)

pk

No query encryptions of messages. Why?

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Easy and Hard Problems

• Factoring• Discrete Log• Exponentiation

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Questions?

END

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Thought