crossing the line(s): a dual threshold model of anger...

CROSSING THE LINE(S): A DUAL THRESHOLDMODEL OF ANGER IN ORGANIZATIONS

DEANNA GEDDESTemple University

RONDA ROBERTS CALLISTERUtah State University

We present a theoretical model of contextualized anger expression to challengeprominent antisocial, aggression, and individual actor perspectives reflected in thecurrent literature, and we assert that organizational observers’ judgments and reac-tions help determine whether anger results in more negative or positive outcomes.The dual threshold model includes an expression threshold, which is crossed whenindividuals communicate rather than suppress anger, and an impropriety threshold,which is crossed if expressed anger violates organizational emotion display norms.

Anyone can get angry—that is easy. . . . but to dothis to the right person, to the right extent, at theright time, with the right motive, and in the rightway, that is not for everyone, nor is it easy(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics: 1109a25).

Scholars and philosophers have pondered thevalue and risk of anger expression for centuries(cf. Aristotle, 1992). Recent trends in organization-al scholarship increasingly have focused onspecific emotions, including anger, to explainvarious workplace phenomena (Allred, 1999;Brief & Weiss, 2002; Domagalski, 1999; Fitness,2000; Glomb & Hulin, 1997; Morris & Keltner, 2000;Pillutla & Murnighan, 1997). A number of empir-ical studies report negative outcomes from an-ger expression for both individuals and organi-zations, such as raised blood pressure and heartdisease (Begley, 1994), decreased productivity(Jehn, 1995), reduced job satisfaction and in-creased job stress (Glomb, 2002), and reciprocalanger responses (Friedman et al., 2004).

Less frequent has been research that specifi-cally examines the potential benefits of anger

expression. However, studies show that positiveoutcomes from expressed anger include prob-lem resolution, increased mutual understand-ing, improved relationships, enhanced statusand power, increased work motivation, and im-proved attitudes (Averill, 1982; Callister, Gray,Schweitzer, Gibson, & Tan, 2003; Fitness, 2000;Glomb & Hulin, 1997; Kassinove, Sukhodolsky,Tsytsarev, & Solovyova, 1997; Tiedens, 2000;Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000). Scholarsconsidering adaptive change and continuousimprovement also suggest that anger expressedabout organizational problems can highlightcritical areas requiring transformation and canprovide opportunities to gain competitive ad-vantage by increasing organizational knowl-edge and learning capacity (Huy, 1999; Kiefer,2002; Nonaka, Toyama, & Byosiere, 2001).

Despite acknowledgment that both favorableand unfavorable results from anger are possi-ble, less is known about the circumstances thatenable either to occur. Models addressing angerexpression typically equate these emotionaldisplays with aggression and organizationaldeviance (Fox & Spector, 1999; Funkenstein,King, & Drolette, 1954; Neuman & Baron, 1998;Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Spielberger et al.,1985), emphasizing only its harmful effects. Thedual threshold model presented here is uniquein that it distinguishes multiple forms of work-place anger, including nonaggressive expres-sions, and it offers a theoretical framework thatidentifies conditions likely to increase the prob-ability of negative outcomes along with those

This paper benefited significantly from the efforts andinsights of three anonymous reviewers and associate editorRandall Peterson. We thank them and also gratefully ac-knowledge the advice and generosity of Linda Putnam, Bar-bara Gray, and Don Gibson, as well as support from valuedcolleagues at Temple University. Different early versions ofthis model were presented at the Brigham Young UniversityConference on Organizational Behavior (2002), the Interna-tional Association of Conflict Management (2004), and theEuropean Academy of Management (2006). Our thanks toboth participants and reviewers who contributed helpfulcomments.

� Academy of Management Review2007, Vol. 32, No. 3, 721–746.

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that may generate a higher probability of posi-tive outcomes from anger expression.

Extant models examining workplace angeralso focus primarily on individuals expressinganger, resulting outcomes that those individualsreport (Allred, 1999; Fitness, 2000), and the impor-tance of their own emotion management (Gross,2002; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004). Such in-dividualistic approaches to anger expressionfail to acknowledge the interpersonal nature ofemotion episodes or to consider how anger tar-gets and other impacted participants might in-fluence subsequent outcomes (Averill, 1982;Cote, 2005). The dual threshold model adds per-spective to existing models by emphasizing thekey role observers play in determining whethermore or less favorable outcomes will emergefollowing anger expression at work. We broadlydefine observers as anger targets and otherinvolved organizational members, including co-workers, subordinates, and/or superiors—as in-dividuals or groups—who judge the appropri-ateness of anger expression at work. Theirassessments, we propose, help generate out-comes that may or may not prove beneficial foreither individuals or the organization.

Further, we argue that observers, as well asthe angry individual, are influenced by the so-cial context in which they operate—namely, thecultural norms, values, and emotion displayrules (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Kramer & Hess,2002; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989) that help individu-als determine whether or not anger should beexpressed and what constitutes an acceptableexpression. Rafaeli and Sutton’s (1989) seminalmodel of emotion expression acknowledges thatorganizations try to teach and maintain certaindisplay rules, but it does not articulate themechanisms or processes by which organization-al members evaluate rule compliance nor theconsequences that may result if such norms areperceived to be violated. The dual thresholdmodel proposes that organizational norms es-tablish emotion thresholds that may be crossedwhen employees feel anger. Viewing angernorms from a threshold perspective introduces anew and useful way to explain how organiza-tional members determine display rule compli-ance and the likelihood they will respond toobserved anger with support or sanctions.

Finally, our model draws on a social construc-tionist perspective of emotion and expression asacquired, socioculturally determined patterns

(Armon-Jones, 1991; Fineman, 2000; Hochschild,1983) and proposes that organizations can alteremotional display norms in ways that result inmore positive outcomes from anger expression.We argue that adopting individual and organi-zational practices toward expressed anger, suchas supportive communication (Gibb, 1961; Red-ding, 1972), compassionate responses (Frost,1999; Kanov et al., 2004), and bounded emotion-ality (Martin, Knopoff, & Beckman, 1998; Mumby& Putnam, 1992; Putnam & Mumby, 1993), cancreate cultures infused with social awarenessand responsibility that provide sufficient spaceto listen to, support, and learn from anger ex-pressions.

THE DUAL THRESHOLD MODEL OF ANGER INORGANIZATIONS

The dual threshold model of anger in organi-zations proposes that two thresholds exist whenindividuals experience anger in the workplace(see Figure 1). The first, “expression threshold,”is crossed when an organizational member con-veys felt anger to individuals at work who areassociated with or able to address the anger-provoking situation. The second, “improprietythreshold,” is crossed if or when organizationalmembers go too far while expressing anger suchthat observers and other company personnelfind their actions socially and/or culturally in-appropriate. Crossing this threshold is a func-tion of both actor behavior and observer percep-tions; thus, there is a type of actor-observerinteraction inherent in the model. The thresh-olds and their placement in relation to eachother represent emotion display rules andnorms operating formally or informally withinthe organizational context. The thresholds alsodemarcate three forms of workplace anger: sup-pressed, expressed, and deviant.

We argue that anger at work is likely to gen-erate a mix of favorable and unfavorable out-comes for organizations and their members;however, a higher probability of negative out-comes from workplace anger likely will occur ineither of two situations. The first is when orga-nizational members suppress rather than ex-press their anger—that is, they fail to cross theexpression threshold. In this instance personnelwho might be able to address or resolve theanger-provoking condition or event (e.g., man-agement, human resources, operations, and/or

722 JulyAcademy of Management Review

those responsible for provoking the anger) re-main unaware of the problem, allowing it tocontinue, along with the affected individual’sanger. The second is when organizational mem-bers cross both thresholds—“double cross”—displaying anger that is perceived as deviant(meaning that one has deviated from the normaland/or acceptable mode of behavior). In suchcases the angry person is seen as the problem—increasing chances of organizational sanctionsagainst him or her while diverting attentionaway from the initial anger-provoking incident.In contrast to the two previous scenarios, ahigher probability of positive outcomes fromworkplace anger likely will occur when one’sexpressed anger stays in the space between theexpression and impropriety thresholds. Here,one expresses anger in a way fellow organiza-tional members find acceptable, prompting ex-changes and discussions that may help resolveconcerns to the satisfaction of all parties in-volved.

This space or “zone of expressive tolerance”(Fineman, 1993: 218) varies and can be expandedor reduced as a result of organizational mem-bers’ reinforcing or altering norms that supportanger displays—expanding the space—or sup-press them—reducing the space (see Figure 2).Thus, the thresholds and their relative proximityrepresent emotion display rules, norms, andpractices that influence an actor’s expressed an-ger, as well as organizational observers’ percep-tions and responses to such displays. Thresh-olds that are closer together will promptorganizational members to view colleagues’ an-ger expressions primarily as deviant acts re-quiring punitive responses. Many organizations’emotion display rules implicitly or explicitlyproscribe exhibition of negative emotions whileperforming one’s job (Diefendorff & Richard,2003). When thresholds are farther apart, thisallows a more generous space for expressingnegative emotion with less fear of formal or in-formal organizational sanctions. In these envi-

FIGURE 1The Dual Threshold Model of Anger in Organizations

2007 723Geddes and Callister

ronments one might find higher levels of angerexpression and/or organizational norms thatpromote supportiveness, compassion, and toler-ance for emotional displays.

The model also identifies factors that influencethe likelihood organizational member anger willor will not cross either of the two thresholds. Theseinclude various individual, situational, and rela-tional characteristics among organizational ac-tors and observers. Those highlighted in themodel include felt anger intensity, emotional ex-pressivity, organizational cynicism, messagecharacteristics, observer attributions, group mem-bership, perceived legitimacy, and emotional in-telligence.

Finally, the model includes feedback loopswithin suppressed, expressed, and deviant an-ger spaces, suggesting these forms of workplaceanger may regenerate, becoming cyclic and re-petitive. For instance, deviant anger may gener-ate “spirals of incivility” (Andersson & Pearson,1999), increasing the likelihood of aggression;suppressed anger may foster “spirals of silence”(Perlow & Williams, 2003) that maintain or in-

crease felt anger; and expressed anger may per-petuate ongoing, emotionally animated, or even“hot” exchanges among organizational mem-bers (Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999).

Overall, the dual threshold model of organi-zational anger provides a unique theoreticalframework that complements and extends exist-ing models of emotion displays in the work-place. This model, for instance, focuses on out-comes associated with workplace anger, incontrast to existing models that focus primarilyon antecedents of anger (Gundlach, Douglas, &Martinko, 2003; Tiedens, 2000). Further, the dualthreshold model builds on previous models ofgeneral emotion expression (Clore, Gasper, &Garvin, 2001; Cote, 2005; Morris & Keltner, 2000;Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989), but refines the focus toreflect specific conditions and considerationsassociated with the emotion of anger. This al-lows us to offer more refining detail and to pro-pose more definitive relationships (see Cote,2005).

In summary, our model offers a theoreticalexplanation for why some anger expressions

FIGURE 2The Dual Threshold Model of Anger with Reduced Space Between Thresholds


are more likely to engender negative outcomesand others to result in more positive outcomes.We do this by differentiating anger expressions,acknowledging the impact of organizational ob-servers, and introducing a threshold perspectivefor explaining the impact of emotion displaynorms on anger expressions. In the followingsections we elaborate on the model and distin-guish three forms of workplace anger in relationto the two thresholds; identify relevant individ-ual, interpersonal, and organizational out-comes; discuss factors that influence crossing ofthresholds; and propose ways of expanding thespace of acceptable anger expression.

Suppressed Anger: Not Crossing theExpression Threshold

According to the model, employee anger thatdoes not cross the expression threshold is sup-pressed so that the full extent of anger is heldback or concealed from others, or it is communi-cated only to those not in a position to helpchange the situation. Consequently, the variousacts of suppression associated with workplaceanger are categorized into one of two levels:silent and muted. Silent anger is an intraper-sonal phenomenon, in which anger is hidden,unspoken, and more fully suppressed. Mutedanger is an interpersonal phenomenon in whichanger is expressed, but not to those who couldmake a difference.

Silent anger. Silent anger is felt anger inten-tionally kept quiet and unspoken. Suppressionby silencing one’s anger is a form of emotionregulation that involves the “conscious inhibi-tion of emotional expressive behavior whileemotionally aroused” (Gross & Levenson, 1993:970). This intrapersonal phenomenon is similarto the notion of “anger-in” in the psychologicalliterature (Funkenstein et al., 1954; Spielberger,Krasner, & Solomon, 1988), and it may promotecycles of rumination (Tice & Baumeister, 1993) inwhich employees rehearse the anger-provokingevent over and over, but only in their minds.Lower-status employees, in particular, appear tobe more prone to conceal or mask their angerfrom potential observers (Conway, DiFazio, &Mayman, 1999; Tiedens, 2000) and may be soinclined especially if a higher-status employeewas involved in the initial anger-provoking in-cident.

In some instances, keeping anger hidden maynot be an individual’s preferred response butmay nevertheless be a job requirement, as in thecase of service encounters associated with emo-tion laborers (Hochschild, 1983; Kruml & Geddes,2000a,b; Rafaeli, 1989; Van Maanen & Kunda,1989; Waldron, 1994). Here, organizational mem-bers are hired to manage their emotions to cre-ate and maintain desirable customer responsesas prescribed by management. In situations thatmay provoke anger, such as when customers arerude, demeaning, and/or inappropriately de-manding, employees are required to refrainfrom exhibiting any of the anger they may befeeling. This form of suppressed anger typicallyis exacerbated by the added requirement to dis-play organizationally prescribed feelings, suchas happiness and enthusiasm, requiring em-ployees to “fake it” or to engage in surface act-ing during frustrating encounters with clients.

Individuals inclined or required to silence an-ger often engage in various cognitive “self-manipulations” or “reappraisals” to try to talkthemselves out of feeling anger and to focus onmore pleasant thoughts (Stearns & Stearns, 1986;Tangney et al., 1996; Tice & Baumeister, 1993). Inthese situations individuals may simply desireto avoid negative judgments and emotions to-ward those with whom they associate or towardthe organization to which they are financiallybound and/or psychologically identified. For ex-ample, individuals may attempt to distractthemselves away from perceived offenses by re-framing the situation, convincing themselvesthat the problematic event is not particularlysignificant or that the target of their anger mayhave just been “having a really bad day.” Trans-formed anger (Lively & Heise, 2004)—angereventually replaced with another emotion and,thus, eliminated through reframing—is also atype of silent anger if the individual’s initiallyfelt anger is kept hidden from others.

Outcomes. There may be some immediatebenefits associated with silencing one’s anger,including the “walking away” effect, which re-duces anger’s intense physical arousal (seeGross & Levenson, 1993). Organizations mighteven benefit if frustrated and angry employeesthrow themselves into their work and resolve to“just do their jobs.” Other advantages may in-clude the generation of more pleasant emotionsassociated with transforming one’s angerthrough cognitive reframing and reappraisal


(Gross & John, 2003). Reframing the provocationby changing one’s perceptions regarding the in-tentions or culpability of the offending individ-ual or situation may completely eliminate thisnegative emotional response. With situationsless critical to organizational well-being orevents that appear to be an isolated incident,calming oneself may even be preferable for bothoneself and the organization. Keeping silentwhen angry may reduce the likelihood and con-cern that one might have to engage in poten-tially unpleasant exchanges with individualsliked or respected, as well as those who arefeared, such as workplace bullies or volatilebosses. To these employees the perceived ben-efits of silence outweigh the costs of speakingup or challenging others who might not respondfavorably.

Research suggests, however, that efforts tohide or mask negative emotion have detrimen-tal cognitive and physiological consequences,such as impaired incidental memory and in-creased cardiovascular activation (Richards &Gross, 1999). Silent anger also proves to be aless effective emotion management practice inemotion-relevant situations, especially if it is aregular response rather than one of several op-tions one might consider when angry at work(Gross & John, 1998). Pennebaker’s (1990) signif-icant work on the benefits of expressing emotionargues that the most important determinant ofwhether silencing emotional expression ishealthy or unhealthy to individuals is their con-flict over its expression. He asserts that detri-mental outcomes to individuals are more likelywhen they have a desire to talk about an eventbut consciously and actively hold back and donot disclose their feelings. This suggests thatoutcomes may be even more negative when in-dividuals want to express but feel compelled byfear of negative organizational or personal con-sequences to silence their anger, in contrast towhen the silence comes from individuals’ ownpreference or strategic choice.

Further, when angry employees remain silentand responsible parties never learn of a signif-icant and/or ongoing anger-provoking situation,it is unlikely that the circumstances will im-prove. Consequently, employee anger is morelikely to recur and may actually increase in in-tensity if the individual continues to recall andrelive the initial incident (Tice & Baumeister,1993), if the offending party repeats the provoc-

ative behavior, or if the problematic situationresurfaces. In the case of workplace bullying, forexample, remaining silent under constant ha-rassment enables such individuals, allowingtheir actions to continue and spread unsanc-tioned, creating toxic work environments andreducing productivity (Ayoko, Callen, & Hartel,2003; Einarsen, 1999; Salin, 2003; Vega & Comer,2005). Over time, silent anger is shown to gener-ate feelings of humiliation, resentment (Perlow& Williams, 2003), demoralization (Vega &Comer, 2005), frustration and tension (Callisteret al., 2003; Gibson et al., 2002), and emotionalpain (Frost, 2003), taking a serious toll on orga-nizational members’ work performance and psy-chological and physical well-being (Begley,1994; Gross & John, 2003; Julius, Schneider, &Egan, 1985; King & Emmons, 1990).

By silencing one’s anger over organizationalconflicts, one also prevents necessary discus-sions and valuable upward information flow(Waldron & Krone, 1991). Thus, the more seriousthe initial and/or ongoing offense, the moreproblematic this suppression becomes. Becausefellow organizational members remain unawareof this anger, its impact on organizational out-comes may be less obvious. Nevertheless, em-ployees who are repeatedly angered likely con-tribute to the statistical figures connected withhigh turnover and absenteeism rates, as well aslow employee organizational citizenship behav-iors, commitment, morale, and overall organiza-tional productivity.

Proposition 1: When organizationalmembers silence felt anger, the prob-ability of more negative than positiveoutcomes for individuals and the or-ganization increases.

Muted anger. In contrast to silent anger,which is intrapersonal and hidden, muted angeris interpersonal and considered an organization-ally silent phenomenon. This means one’s angeris hushed or quieted at work so as not to reachthe ears of organization members responsiblefor or able to redress the situation (Milliken,Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003; Perlow & Williams,2003; Pinder & Harlos, 2001). Such a response tofelt anger has been called “displaced dissent”(Kassing & DiCioccio, 2004) and “indirect expres-sion” (Morrill, 1989), since it is not directed to-ward the source of the anger but emerges, in-stead, as venting complaints to supportive and


trustworthy individuals who are, nevertheless,unrelated to the situation.

Angry organizational members who seekemotional support engage in what Lively (2000)calls “reciprocal emotion management” andwhat Fineman refers to as “the social sharing ofemotions” (1993: 217). Complaining privately ornot so privately to trusted and sympatheticpeers, family, or friends allows individuals tovent their anger to those they believe cannot orwill not hurt them. Rather than confront the sit-uation or individual who prompted their anger,these employees deal with their anger by vent-ing to those who will likely accept their inter-pretation of the situation (Gohm & Clore, 2002).Studies confirm the predominance of this strat-egy, reporting that most individuals prefer torecount their anger-provoking incident publicly(Fitness 2000; Rime, 1995b; Simon & Nath, 2004),especially in the company of those who sympa-thize with their cause and feelings (Tice &Baumeister, 1993).

Outcomes. Although some may argue thatventilating anger is cathartic for the individualand helps reduce felt anger intensity, scholarsincreasingly contend that social venting islargely ineffective in eliminating or reducingnegative emotion (Tavris, 1982; Tice & Brat-slavsky, 2000). From experiments examining thepotentially cathartic affects of expressing angerto unrelated others, scholars found that individ-uals who vented to an interviewer became morehostile toward the cued target after the exit in-terview (see Tice & Baumeister, 1993). Never-theless, given the pervasive tendency to sharenegative emotion—often repeatedly—with indi-viduals who make up our social networks, it islikely that a potential and powerful benefit ofmuted anger is emotional support (Rime, 1995a),including ego validation and self-validationand timely reassurance from one’s significantothers (Burleson, 2003).

Fineman argues that social sharing of emo-tion is more than a simple venting of frustra-tions or a gripe session; it can substantiallyredefine “emotional material” and contribute tothe “emotional texture” of the organization (1993:217). Unforeseen consequences of muted angerfor organizations may include transferring oneemployee’s anger to many individuals origi-nally uninvolved or unaware through emotionalcontagion (Barsade, 2002; Hatfield, Cacioppo, &Rapson, 1992; Neumann & Strack, 2000). This, in

turn, may negatively impact the broader workenvironment, such as reducing productivityamong fellow workers as they become dis-tracted from their own tasks, focusing attentionand actions in defense of their offended cohort.Further, socially shared anger may generate“repeated reproduction” or the serial transmittalof messages detailing the employee’s emotionalepisode—often contributing to more exagger-ated, negative, and dramatic portrayals of theinitial anger-provoking incident (Bartlett, 1932;Rime, 1995b). Interviews with senior executivesand employees indicate that “angry gossip” re-garding, for example, organizational insensitiv-ity can spread quickly among employees, con-tributing to heightened and skewed perceptionsof an uncaring, unresponsive management andgenerating high employee turnover (Perlow &Williams, 2003).

Proposition 2: When organizationalmembers mute felt anger, the proba-bility of more negative individual out-comes is somewhat reduced becauseof perceived social support, whereasthe probability of more negative thanpositive organization outcomes in-creases.

Advocacy and surrogacy. There is an impor-tant caveat to expressing muted anger to sup-portive colleagues at work. Employees indi-rectly expressing anger to their coworkers ormentors may at times promote a discussion ofways to resolve the situation and/or to approachan influential party or source of the problem. Inthis situation supportive confidants are morethan a sounding board—they emerge as advi-sors or coaches to help the individual confrontthe crisis. Advisors may help the angry personsee the situation differently or perhaps take aparticular stance in generating a solution or ex-pressing his or her frustration. Low-status em-ployees may particularly benefit from this ex-change, since they are less likely than high-status organizational members to directlyexpress anger to a target (see Sloan, 2004). Re-latedly, the individual(s) to whom the employeevents anger may choose to act as his or hersurrogate and/or advocate in addressing the an-ger-provoking situation. In other words, he orshe (or they) may speak up on behalf of theangered individual to those relevant to the prob-lem.


In these instances we argue that the anger isnot organizationally silent. It has indeedcrossed the expression threshold because it hasreached individuals able to help address theproblematic situation. Thus, we propose the fol-lowing.

Proposition 3: When individuals ex-press anger to organizational mem-bers who act as advisors, advocates,and/or surrogates, the expressionthreshold is crossed, thereby increas-ing the probability of more positivethan negative outcomes.

Factors that influence crossing/not crossingthe expression threshold. Whether or not indi-viduals silence or express their anger is a func-tion of various individual, relational, and situa-tional conditions. For instance, the “Big 5”approach to personality highlights the central-ity of negative affect to neuroticism, neurotics’tendency to experience anger, and their in-creased likelihood to use anger expression (in-cluding hostility) as a coping response (McCrae& Costa, 1987). In contrast, individuals’ prefer-ence for privacy or a desire to hide the fact thatsomething or someone upset them may be re-flected in their decision to remain silent whenangry. Fear of repercussions as well may causeindividuals to suppress rather than expresstheir anger in an attempt to preserve their joband dignity, or to avoid additional exposure toindividuals or circumstances that make themangry and, thus, uncomfortable. Rather thanlose their job, face a bully’s wrath, or risk dam-aging a relationship, they endure silently, tryingto physically avoid and/or placate those whoprovoke their anger. Organizational status alsoinfluences whether or not an individual crossesthe expression threshold such that lower-levelemployees are more likely to suppress angerthan higher-level administrators (Tiedens, 2000).Beyond these and other considerations, how-ever, we offer three specific factors that we be-lieve play key roles in determining whether ornot one crosses the expression threshold, includ-ing felt anger intensity, emotional expressivity,and organizational cynicism.

Felt anger intensity. Although anger anteced-ents are outside the purview of our model, weacknowledge that the more critical or importantthe event that provokes anger (Weiss & Cropan-zano, 1996), the more likely it will move an indi-

vidual to express negative emotions (Rime,1995a). Thus, intertwined with the significanceof the initial anger-provoking event is the inten-sity of anger it arouses in the individual (Doma-galski & Steelman, 2005). Felt anger, also called“state anger” (Spielberger, Jacobs, Russell, &Crane, 1983), may vary in intensity from minorirritation to intense rage (Banse & Scherer, 1996),based on the additive effects of four classes ofvariables: concern strength, appraisals, regula-tion, and individual propensities (Sonnemans &Frijda, 1995).

Concern strength is the relative importance ormagnitude of an event as it relates to an indi-vidual’s goals, desires, or motives. Appraisalsare perceptions that a problematic situation ispersonally relevant and pertinent to an individ-ual’s “need and means to deal with the event”(Sonnemans & Frijda, 1995: 486). Regulation re-fers to an individual’s inclination to enact emo-tion control or regulation activities in anticipa-tion of problematic responses. And individualpropensities reflect individual differences in thedegree people generally experience a particularemotion, such as anger. Thus, greater concernstrength and perceptions of event relevancy,higher propensity to experience emotion, andlower inclinations to control anger producegreater felt anger intensity. We expect felt angerintensity will significantly impact whether ornot organizational members cross the expres-sion threshold by expressing their anger, andwe offer the following proposition.

Proposition 4: Felt anger intensity im-pacts whether or not an individual’sanger crosses the expression thresholdsuch that higher intensity will in-crease the likelihood anger is ex-pressed while lower intensity will in-crease the likelihood anger issuppressed.

Emotional expressivity. Typically cast as anenduring individual trait (Gross & Levenson,1993), emotional expressivity is defined as theextent to which people will outwardly displaytheir emotions in a social context (Kring, Smith,& Neale, 1994). This individual difference is be-lieved to reflect the relative success individualshave had expressing emotions and, thus, con-tributes to their confidence and inclination toemerge as “externalizers”—emotionally expres-sive—versus “internalizers”— emotionally un-


expressive (Gross & John, 1998; Gross & Leven-son, 1993). Consequently, emotional expressivityreflects a degree of social learning from emotiondisplay rule encounters and reveals an organi-zational member’s general tendency to expressvarious emotions at work, including anger.

We recognize as well that there may be emo-tion-specific expression tendencies as a resultof certain personality traits. For instance, neu-roticism is often linked with hostile expressionsof anger, whereas extraversion is seen as pro-moting positive emotion expressions (McCrae &Costa, 1987; Tellegen, 1985). For our model wedo not limit anger expression tendencies to pri-marily aggressive anger, likely interpreted asdeviance, but instead propose the value of ex-amining one’s general comfort level with orga-nizational emotion expression. Consequently,we expect that internalizers will naturally bemore inclined to silence anger at work whileexternalizers will be more inclined to expresstheir anger. Thus, in the dual threshold model,we propose the following.

Proposition 5: Emotional expressivityimpacts whether or not an individual’sanger crosses the expression thresholdsuch that an individual classified asan external will be more likely to ex-press anger while an internal will bemore likely to suppress anger.

Organizational cynicism. Employee cynicismis often characterized as individuals’ sense ofhopelessness and disillusionment (Andersson,1996). It is also portrayed as an organizationalresistance strategy (Fleming & Spicer, 2003).This characteristic of individuals’ attitudeand/or relationship to their organization helpsexplain why some employees remain silentrather than cross the expression threshold. Forinstance, angry, disillusioned employees maybelieve or even hope that keeping quiet is thebest way for organizational parties other thanthemselves to experience negative outcomes.Given philosophical differences, previous ob-servations, or personal experience, individualsmay decide expressing anger is not worth thetime, risk, or the effort—especially if manage-ment has been unresponsive in the past (Morri-son & Milliken, 2000; Wanous, Reichers, & Aus-tin, 2000) and employee distrust is high. Weanticipate that organizational members withhigher levels of cynicism will be less inclined to

speak up when angry, and we propose the fol-lowing.

Proposition 6: Employee cynicism im-pacts whether or not an individual’sanger crosses the expression thresholdsuch that an employee with a lowerdegree of organizational cynicism willbe more likely to express anger whilean employee with a higher degree oforganizational cynicism will be morelikely to suppress anger.

Expressed Anger: Crossing the Expression andNot the Impropriety Threshold

When individuals cross the expression thresh-old and communicate their anger to organiza-tional members who are able to take appropri-ate action and help resolve the problematicsituation, we refer to this action in the dualthreshold model simply as expressed anger. Ourmodel suggests that in the space between theexpression and impropriety thresholds one’s an-ger is apparent to organizational observers butcommunicated in a way perceived as legitimateor socially acceptable; in other words, it doesnot cross organizational boundaries of propri-ety. Within this frame we propose that ex-pressed anger emerges as an emotion-basedform of employee voice.

Although conceptualizations of voice in themanagement literature have varied consider-ably over the years to include such acts as griev-ance filing, participation in decision making,complaining, and external protests (Premeaux &Bedian, 2003), our view of expressed or “voiced”anger is consistent with Hirschman’s classicdefinition as an expression of dissatisfactionthat “attempt[s] to change, rather than escapefrom, an objectionable state of affairs” (1970: 30;see also Farrell, 1983). It is also compatible withdefinitions that characterize voice as a chal-lenging, proactive, extrarole behavior in whichissues and ideas are brought up with the inten-tion of promoting positive organizationalchange (Van Dyne, Cummings, & McLean Parks,1995; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998). Further, we alsosee expressed anger as a manifestation of or-ganizational dissent (Graham, 1986; Kassing,1997; Kassing & Armstrong, 2002) in which a trig-gering event sufficiently moves an employee toexpress disagreement with or challenge exist-ing organizational policies or practices.


Most research examining voice’s impact onorganizational outcomes does not assess or ac-knowledge any emotional component or dimen-sion. Further, research on voice as a way tochallenge and change problems at work issomewhat limited, although generally linkedwith positive results associated with organiza-tional citizenship behavior (Deckop, Cirka, &Andersson, 2003; Stamper & Van Dyne, 2001; VanDyne & Pierce, 2004). The most extensive empir-ical studies of employee voice can be foundamong organizational justice scholars, who seethis construct as input into salient decision mak-ing and problem resolution—again withoutspecifying the relative emotionality of theseemployee contributions. However, their studiesconfirm that opportunities to express one’s opin-ion are generally associated with enhancedperceptions of interpersonal, procedural, anddistributive justice, group status, and instru-mental participation in decision making, as wellas improved relationships with management(Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001;Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Van den Bos, 1999).Research on upward organizational dissent—inwhich employee expressions more obviously re-flect dissatisfaction and negative affect—reports its connection to higher-quality relation-ships with supervisors, along with enhancedemployee satisfaction and organizational iden-tification (Kassing, 2000a,b, 2001). While organi-zations may be less tolerant of employee voiceor principled dissent expressed as anger, if suchexpressions do not cross the impropriety thresh-old, the dual threshold model proposes that theprobability of more positive (versus negative)results will increase for both the individual andthe organization.

Proposition 7: When organizationalmembers’ anger expressions areviewed as appropriate such that theyremain between the expression andimpropriety thresholds, the probabil-ity of more positive than negative out-comes for the individual and the orga-nization increases.

While there are many possible factors thatdetermine organizational observers’ views ofacceptable anger expression, in this section weidentify three message characteristics that webelieve impact whether or not the anger expres-sion remains in the space between the two

thresholds. Specifically, we propose that ex-pressed anger intensity, frequency, and focus ofaccounts impact the likelihood expressed angerwill not cross the impropriety threshold and,thus, lead to more favorable outcomes. We ac-knowledge their collective impact in Figure 1 as“Message characteristics.”

Expressed anger intensity. A relatively ne-glected area of study (Jones, 2001; Laukka, Juslin,& Bresin, 2005), emotional intensity is perhapsthe most salient and managed dimension asso-ciated with anger expression. In our model wenecessarily differentiate between expressed an-ger intensity and felt anger intensity (see alsoSpielberger et al., 1985). As noted previously,significant events that provoke anger will likelyenhance felt anger and may ultimately influ-ence the degree of expressed anger. However, insocial and organizational settings, expressedanger intensity is often reduced from what is felt(Frijda, Ortony, Sonnemans, & Clore, 1992; Pruitt,Parker, & Mikolic, 1997; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989) inan effort to conform to organizationally pre-scribed norms. We argue that anger expressionsthat are not judged as “too intense” stay in thespace between thresholds, where more produc-tive exchanges and dialogues are possible.

Scholars assert that for a negative emotionsuch as anger to function in positive, adaptiveways, its intensity needs to be controlled so as toreflect genuine emotion, without being so exces-sive it interferes with receptivity of the message(Holt, 1970; Parrott, 2002). Angry individuals re-flect and control the intensity of their anger pri-marily through vocal and facial markers (Banse& Scherer, 1996; Planalp, Defrancisco, & Ruther-ford, 1996). Nonverbal cues are seen as particu-larly helpful in identifying emotion intensity(Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002a), including paralin-guistics—pitch, rate of speech, and volume—and oculesics—eye contact and facial expres-sion (Laukka et al., 2005). Indirect verbal cues(i.e., words or verbal statements that do not di-rectly state the emotion, such as swearing andranting), body movements and positioning (i.e.,tense posture, stomping, jerking limbs), andphysiological cues (e.g., crying, flushing, rapidbreathing) are also noted by observers (Planalpet al., 1996).

Although research on the implications of an-ger intensity and outcomes is limited, recentstudies show that intense and more physicalnonverbal displays, such as slamming doors


and pounding tables, increase the likelihood ofmore negative outcomes, in contrast to more ver-bal, less physical, and less intense anger ex-pressions (Gibson et al., 2002). While it appearsthat reducing intensity promotes more positiveoutcomes, maintaining some degree of angerintensity may prove to be an asset. For instance,individuals making a serious complaint, point-ing out an organizational injustice, or repri-manding a poorly performing subordinate willlikely “lose their desired effect if [such actionsare] performed with good humor or casual indif-ference” (Tice & Baumeister, 1993: 402). Thus,displaying a limited amount of intensity cueswill likely produce more favorable outcomes,whereas the absence or overabundance of in-tensity cues will be less effective—the lattercondition likely being perceived as crossing theimpropriety threshold.

Proposition 8: Expressed anger thatexhibits lower levels of intensity willbe more likely to remain between thethresholds and increase the likelihoodof more positive outcomes than higherlevels of intensity.

Frequency. Although workplaces are amongthe most interpersonally frustrating contexts forpeople (Fitness, 2000), anger expressions typi-cally appear as an occasional experience ratherthan a frequent occurrence (Averill, 1982). Withincreased frequency of individual anger expres-sion, however, observers may respond in differ-ent ways. Observers may find the frequency ofanger expression increasingly intolerable suchthat they will ultimately perceive the individualas having crossed the impropriety threshold.Observers may also believe the high frequencyof expressed anger by fellow employees is char-acteristic of their personality—for example,proneness to experience anger (Spielberger etal., 1985)—rather than a marker of serious orga-nizational concerns. When expressed anger isrelatively infrequent, observers will more likelyattribute such expressions to a problematic sit-uation, rather than personality traits. Tavris rec-ommends that “each of us must find our owncompromise between talking too much— ex-pressing every little thing that irritates, and nottalking at all, passively accepting the injusticeswe feel” (1982: 134). Researchers report that fre-quent anger expression correlates with poor in-dividual health (Keinan, Ben-Zur, Zilka, & Carel,

1992); however, we assert it also negatively im-pacts one’s standing and acceptance at work.Thus, when anger is expressed infrequently, theexpresser’s message is likely given more credi-bility among organizational members.

Proposition 9: Anger expressed lessfrequently will more likely remain be-tween thresholds and increase thelikelihood of more positive outcomesthan frequently expressed anger.

Focus of accounts. When expressing anger,organizational members may provide an expla-nation or “account” of their anger. Accounts are“discursive constructions of reality that provideorganizational members with ordered represen-tations of previously unordered external cues”(Maitlis, 2005: 23), and causal accounts, in par-ticular, are explanations for behavior (Antaki,1994; Bies, 1989; Sitkin & Bies, 1993). Researchshows that accounts explaining one’s decisionor behavior mitigate potentially negative re-sponses by others (Bies, Shapiro, & Cummings,1988; Weiner, Amirkhan, Folkes, & Verette, 1987;Zillman, Cantor, & Day, 1976), and good accountsor explanations are better than weak or no ac-counts. In the context of the dual thresholdmodel, we suggest that when expressing anger,what will most distinguish a good from a weak(or no) account is the apparent focus of its con-tent—whether it is primarily alter-centric or ego-centric.

Anger-based accounts with an alter-centric fo-cus imply a concern for others, including theorganization as a whole. We expect that casualaccounts of anger expressions that involve analter-centric (or more altruistic) focus will in-clude concerns relevant to the organization’smission or values, such as failures in customerservice or safety, wasted materials, illegal orunethical conduct by organizational members,and the production of poor-quality products. Incontrast, accounts with an egocentric focus re-flect primarily personal concerns, such as incon-venience, preventing the accomplishment ofpersonal goals, or blocking professional ad-vancement.

When anger expressions occur with egocen-tric accounts, we expect the expresser morelikely will be seen as self-centered—someoneprimarily concerned with furthering his or herown interests, career, and well-being—whichmay influence observers to respond negatively.


When anger expressions are accompanied byalter-centric accounts, we expect that the ex-presser will be seen in a more positive light,possibly as a team player and protector of oth-ers or the organization. Therefore, we expectorganizational observers to respond more posi-tively to anger expressions associated with analter-centric account.

Proposition 10: Expressed anger with agreater alter-centric than egocentricfocus will more likely remain betweenthresholds and increase the likelihoodof more positive outcomes.

In summary, expressed anger that remainsbetween the thresholds is more likely to reflectcharacteristics of employee voice or dissent,rather than employee aggression. We anticipatethat when the messages angry individualstransmit to organizational observers containlower levels of intensity, are relatively infre-quent, and reflect an alter-centric focus, theprobability of positive outcomes increases forboth the individual and the organization.

Deviant Anger: Crossing the ImproprietyThreshold

According to the dual threshold model, ex-pressed anger viewed as inappropriate, damag-ing, and/or unacceptable given the circum-stances—in other words, anger displays thatdeviate from organizational norms—crosses notonly the expression threshold but also the im-propriety threshold. Crossing both thresholdswill occur simultaneously whenever the expres-sion intensity or particular anger display is be-yond the bounds of perceived propriety. Forinstance, anger-driven acts considered unac-ceptable by organizational members or society,in general, such as violence or covert aggres-sion (e.g., sabotage or character assassination),fall into this category. Crossing both thresholdsmay occur also as a result of progressive orepisodic expressions of anger. For instance,what starts as an animated and assertive dis-cussion regarding a problematic situation atwork may eventually escalate to inappropriateexpressions, such as screaming, foul language,throwing objects, or threatening words and ac-tions.

“Crossing the line” is synonymous with devi-ance, meaning that one has deviated from the

normal and/or acceptable mode of behavior.Thus, deviant anger exceeds or moves past asocially constructed threshold or standard. De-viant behavior at work, in general, has increas-ingly received scholars’ attention, generating asubstantial constellation of undesirable em-ployee activities. The broadest constructs re-flecting this research include “counterproduc-tive work behavior” (Fox, Spector, & Miles, 2001;Viswesvaran & Ones, 2000) and “deviant work-place behavior” (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Rob-inson & Bennett, 1995).

However, in calling any behavior deviant,Warren (2003) argues that one must ask, “Devi-ant compared to what?” According to the dualthreshold model, deviant anger or expressed an-ger that crosses the impropriety threshold mayinvolve actions as seemingly benign as raisingone’s voice, giving someone the silent treat-ment, or sending an all-caps email. Such actstypically will not fall under traditional defini-tions and pursuits of workplace deviance. Thus,in order to better understand what organization-al members would consider deviant anger, weneed to specify two related factors: the referencegroup and the standard of comparison or norm,since norms “summarize the behavior of the ref-erence group” (Warren, 2003: 624).

Organizational observers and norms. Numer-ous reference groups—what we call “organiza-tional observers”—exist within the workplace,each with respective norms regarding appropri-ate emotional displays. Observers may include,for example, targets of the expressed anger, theworkgroup or team, immediate and higher-levelsupervisors and managers, and members of thedepartment or division, as well as overall orga-nization membership. These organizational ob-servers are also influenced by norms estab-lished in broader contexts that include uniquecultural, societal, and industry groups. Salientemotion display norms of organizational observ-ers are represented symbolically in our modelby the thresholds. Their placement influencesanger expression and impacts how these ex-pressions are perceived and judged by organi-zational members.

We argue that organizational observers’ oper-ating value systems and subsequent formal orinformal norms significantly impact the waysemotions are experienced, expressed, judged,and managed in the workplace (Markus &Kitayama, 1991; Mesquita, 2001). Informal norms


are practiced behaviors, or those regularly ex-hibited in the workplace, whereas formal normsare expected behaviors that correspond with or-ganizational rules, policies, procedures, andcodes of conduct (Warren, 2003). When organiza-tional norms forbid or severely limit anger dis-plays, we argue the dual thresholds are spacedmore closely (see Figure 2), whereas if angerdisplays are more tolerated or accepted by aparticular group, the thresholds are spaced far-ther apart (see Figure 1). Thus, according to ourmodel, the placement of the impropriety thresh-old in relation to the expression threshold sym-bolizes emotion display norms or rules and,thus, reflects the degree of tolerance affordedanger displays at work.

If an individual’s expressed anger crosses theline of impropriety and is found to be deviant byorganizational observers, we believe that morenegative than positive outcomes will emerge. Insome cases an individual who expresses exces-sive or deviant anger will later experience feel-ings of shame or guilt, characterized as “meta-emotions” (Gottman, Katz, & Hooven, 1997),which generate further distress and/or causepersonal embarrassment. In addition, unaccept-able anger displays often result in angry re-sponses (Friedman et al., 2004; Tavris, 1982),where others are more inclined to strike back atthe individual expressing anger. An angry indi-vidual whose expressions are considered im-proper is more likely to be labeled as volatile,out of control, aggressive, or unprofessional,thus damaging his or her reputation and per-haps his or her ability to function effectively atwork. Once the impropriety threshold is crossed,attention and effort may be directed toward con-trolling and reprimanding the angry individualand away from issues that may have producedthe employee’s ire. This response, in turn, in-creases the likelihood that the initial problemwill remain unaddressed and unresolved.

Proposition 11: When the improprietythreshold is crossed, the probability ofmore negative than positive outcomesincreases.

Factors that influence crossing/not crossingthe impropriety threshold. Certain individualswho express anger may be given more leniencyby organizational observers who perceive andjudge the appropriateness of their emotionaldisplay. These include those whose anger dis-

plays are attributed more to external circum-stances than internal traits, fellow referencegroup members, and individuals with perceivedlegitimacy owing to formal or informal status. Inother words, we propose that these factors willinfluence whether or not individuals’ expressedanger is perceived as crossing the line of impro-priety. In addition, while our model emphasizesthe important role organizational observers playin determining whether or not expressed angercrosses the impropriety threshold, we also ac-knowledge organizational actors’ role in regu-lating anger and managing its expression (Mas-tenbroek, 2000; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989), and wediscuss how an actor’s emotional intelligence(Mayer et al., 2004) impacts the likelihood ex-pressed anger will cross both thresholds.

Observer attributions. When organizationalmembers witness unexpected or undesirablebehavior by others, such as displays of intenseanger, attribution theory suggests that they lookfor ways to explain such conduct (Bradfield &Aquino, 1999; Struthers, Eaton, Czyznielewski, &Dupuis, 2005; Struthers, Miller, Boudens, &Briggs, 2001; Wong & Weiner, 1981). Unique bi-ases exist in determining the cause of someevent, depending on whether an individual isthe actor or observer in the incident. In the dualthreshold model, reference group members actas observers of expressed anger. Researchshows causality attributions by observers typi-cally focus on the actor’s disposition (Heerwa-gen, Beach, & Mitchell, 1985; Jones & Nisbett,1972; Ross, 1977). Actors, in contrast, tend to ex-hibit a self-serving bias, taking personal creditfor successes or positive events and blamingnegative behaviors on situational or externalfactors outside their control (Campbell &Sedikides, 1999; Larson, 1977; Tyler & Devinitz,1977). Research suggests observers’ initial incli-nations will be to focus on actors’ individualtraits for explanations of untoward behavior, inwhich case individuals are more likely to beperceived as having crossed the improprietythreshold unless other factors help counter thistendency.

Proposition 12: Expressed anger thatorganizational observers attribute toindividual traits or dispositions morelikely will be seen as crossing the im-propriety threshold than expressed


anger attributed to situational or ex-ternal factors.

Group membership. Empirical findings tied tosocial identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1985)show a consistent ingroup bias toward individ-uals in one’s own social group. This reflects abasic motivational mechanism among groupmembers to positively evaluate actions of a val-ued social group in an effort to enhance theirown self-concept (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, &Hume, 2001). Ingroup favoritism and outgroupdisapproval are common and create perceptionsthat another’s communication style is compara-tively dysfunctional to one’s own referencegroup (Dunkerley & Robinson, 2002). Thus, groupmembership may promote an enhanced sense ofcomfort with one’s own communication prac-tices (Gallois, 1994), as well as a greater accep-tance of expression tendencies by fellow groupmembers. In the dual threshold model we pro-pose that an observer’s judgments of whether ornot someone has expressed anger inappropri-ately will be influenced by group affiliation. Inother words, when observers consider angry in-dividuals their fellow group members, these in-dividuals will be afforded more leniency whenexpressing anger at work.

Proposition 13: Anger expressed byoutgroup members more likely will beseen as crossing the improprietythreshold than anger expressed by fel-low or ingroup members.

Perceived legitimacy. Other factors that mightprevent organizational members’ expressed an-ger from being judged as deviant and unaccept-able include their character and “likableness”(Bradfield & Aquino, 1999), perceived compe-tence (Tiedens, 2000), unique value to the work-place (Hollander, 1985), and, in particular, theirformal or informal standing (i.e., status) in theorganization or group (Conway et al., 1999;Crawford, Kippax, Onyx, Gault, & Benton, 1992;Lewis, 2000; Lovaglia & Houser, 1996; Sloan, 2004;Tiedens et al., 2000). All such social recognitions(Averill, 1997) help generate credibility, or whatwe refer to as perceived legitimacy (see Such-man, 1995). Thus, when employees are givenlegitimacy within an organization or socialgroup through reputation, contribution, compe-tence, and/or status, it is more likely that, whenthey express anger, observers will attribute

their emotional outbursts to significant situa-tional provocations. As a result, these individu-als are much less likely to experience the pen-alties commonly associated with violatingemotion display rules. In contrast, those whohave not established some degree of legitimacywithin the organization (e.g., are new to the or-ganization, disliked, or seen as incompetent orhaving low status) will not have this benefit,and their anger expressions more likely will bejudged as deviant emotional displays.

Proposition 14: Anger expressed by or-ganizational members with less per-ceived legitimacy more likely will beseen as crossing the improprietythreshold than anger expressed bythose with a greater degree of per-ceived legitimacy.

Emotional intelligence. Whether or not angryorganizational members cross both thresholdsis a function of their own actions in response tofelt anger, as well as the previously discussedobserver perceptions. Emotion management isconsidered a special case of self-regulation orself-control in that an angry individual over-rides initial impulses, learned behaviors, and/orinnate tendencies by substituting another, oftenmore socially desirable response (Tice &Bratslavsky, 2000). Socially appropriate man-agement of emotions when communicating isincreasingly discussed in relation to an individ-ual’s emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1998;Salovey, Hsee, & Mayer, 2001; Salovey & Mayer,1990). Although scholars of emotional intelli-gence continue to debate whether this constructreflects an ability (i.e., a set of emotion-processing skills) or a set of traits, competen-cies, and personality, emotional intelligence isoften differentiated according to how well indi-viduals (1) perceive emotions in themselves andothers; (2) generate, use, and feel emotion tocommunicate feelings or facilitate thought; (3)understand emotional information and interpretits meaning; and (4) manage emotions in waysthat promote understanding and growth(Salovey & Pizzaro, 2003: 264). This last charac-teristic is considered the pinnacle of a hierarchyof emotional intelligence characteristics and isseen as an attempt to regulate and express emo-tion in prosocial ways (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso,& Sitarenios, 2001; Salovey & Pizarro, 2003).


Empirical evidence continues to emerge re-garding emotional intelligence’s favorable con-sequences for both individuals and organiza-tions (Jordan, Ashkanasy, & Hartel, 2003),although some argue more research is neededto overcome an abundance of hyperbole associ-ated with this theoretical framework (Zeidner,Matthews, & Roberts, 2004). Recent studies, how-ever, suggest a negative association betweenemotional intelligence and displaying strongnegative emotion. For instance, high emotionalintelligence correlates with lower levels of vio-lence and other deviant behaviors (Cobb &Mayer, 2000; Mayer, 2001), whereas lower emo-tional intelligence is associated with more neg-ative emotional reactions when individuals re-spond to environmental demands and pressures(Jordan et al., 2003; Matthews, Zeidner, & Rob-erts, 2002). With regard to the dual thresholdmodel, we propose that individuals who man-age and display anger for the purpose of pro-moting understanding and growth—the highestlevel of emotional intelligence—are more likelyto express anger in a way that remains betweenthresholds (i.e., does not cross the improprietythreshold).

Proposition 15: Emotional intelligenceimpacts whether or not an individual’sanger crosses the impropriety thresh-old such that higher emotional intelli-gence will increase the probabilitythat expressed anger will remain be-tween thresholds while lower emo-tional intelligence will increase theprobability that expressed anger willcross the impropriety threshold.

Observer responses to deviant anger. Whenan individual’s anger expression is classified asdeviant organizational behavior, it is more oftendeemed harmful and/or destructive than helpfuland/or constructive to the organization and itsmembers (Warren, 2003). Actions characterizedas deviant are often challenged and actors pun-ished in an attempt to reestablish order, behav-ioral standard compliance, and the status quo.Consequently, individuals whose anger isviewed as crossing the impropriety thresholdmay have various formal or informal sanctionsimposed by organizational observers who con-sider their anger expression deviant. However,since various organizational observers perceiveand judge an angry colleague’s anger expres-

sion differently, we expect that sanctionsagainst angry employees will be imposed onlyby those interpreting their emotional expressionas deviance.

Both formal and informal sanctions may resultwhen organizational members’ anger expres-sion crosses the impropriety threshold. Formalsanctions, imposed by organizational adminis-trators, might range from oral warnings, writtenwarnings, probation, and suspension to dis-missal (O’Reilly & Weitz, 1980). Other examplesof formally imposed sanctions may consist ofalterations to organizational status, placement,or responsibility, such as demotions, transfers,alteration of job duties, and other punitive ac-tions. We propose, however, that formal sanc-tions will follow an individual’s expressed an-ger only when organizational members ofhigher status believe that such actions havecrossed the impropriety threshold.

Proposition 16: Formal sanctions willbe imposed more frequently followingorganizational members’ anger ex-pression when higher-status observersdeem the expression crosses the im-propriety threshold.

Organizational observers unable or unwillingto formally sanction deviant anger expressionmay nevertheless respond with informal sanc-tions against the individual. Informal or socialsanctioning (Goss, 2005), from either managersor fellow employees, emerges in the form of ob-vious disapproval, avoidance, withdrawal, un-flattering gossip, and various disrespectful oraggressive behaviors (Geddes & Baron, 1997).Although many of these may not appear as se-rious as formal sanctions, such responses to in-dividuals who display unacceptable anger canirreparably harm their ability to function effec-tively at work. For instance, managers can reas-sign employees to undesirable projects or elim-inate previously available resources (Morrill,1989). In some cases individuals may be un-aware of either the sanctions or the damage totheir reputation and/or their ability to functioneffectively; in other instances it may be pain-fully apparent.

Proposition 17: Informal sanctions willbe imposed more frequently followingorganizational members’ anger ex-pression when observers deem the ex-


pression crosses the improprietythreshold.

We have argued that anger is not synonymouswith hostility, and, thus, people can expresseven intense anger without a hostile or malev-olent intent as a way to challenge some aspectof organizational life they found offensive (Aver-ill, 1982; Mikulincer, 1998). In such cases thisdeviant anger may ultimately prove construc-tive in implementing necessary changes in com-pany personnel, practices, or policy (Huy, 1999;Warren, 2003). However, deviant forms of angerexpression can, in fact, be aggressive or, worse,physically violent—meant primarily to be harm-ful and destructive to the organization and/or itsmembers. Thus, we expect that anger expres-sion seen as aggressive or violent will mostlikely produce both formal and informal sanc-tions. Aggression and violence in the workplaceare typically condemned by both organizationaland societal norms; consequently, targets andother observers likely will be more unified indenouncing such acts. Aggressive anger shouldnot only increase the likelihood the angry indi-vidual will receive sanctions but also the sanc-tions’ severity. The common “zero tolerance” pol-icy toward aggressive and especially violentacts of anger typically will produce the mostsevere outcomes for violators, including ostra-cism by colleagues and/or termination from thecompany.

Proposition 18: Both the likelihood andseverity of formal and informal sanc-tions will increase toward individualswho express anger that observers findaggressive or violent.

Organizational observers may not alwayschoose to sanction an individual who crossesboth thresholds. They may, in fact, fail to react—perhaps in the hope that the situation will re-solve itself and the person’s anger will subside.Observers, however, may choose instead to ac-tively respond to the angry employee, but with asupportive rather than sanctioning strategy. Asupportive response would essentially entailactions and comments that attempt to bring thediscussion back into the space between thresh-olds—to diffuse the anger to the point that moremeaningful dialogue may ensue (Gibb, 1961;Gordon, 1988; Redding, 1972). Thus, supportiveresponses to anger expressions bring the emo-

tional communication away from deviance,helping produce more positive results for theindividual and the organization.

Proposition 19: More supportive re-sponses to deviant anger by organiza-tional observers help bring anger ex-pression back into the space betweenthresholds, increasing the probabilityof more positive than negative out-comes.

In summary, our model’s dual thresholds helpdistinguish three forms of organizational an-ger—namely, suppressed, expressed, and devi-ant. The placement of the expression and impro-priety thresholds determines the relative spaceor tolerance afforded expressions of employeeanger and reflects organizational emotion dis-play norms. With greater space between thethresholds, there is more opportunity for individ-uals to express anger without the label of devi-ance, which reduces the possibility of organiza-tional sanctions. Although responses toemployees’ anger expression that crosses boththresholds can include formal or informal sanc-tions, observers may choose to respond support-ively and retrieve rather than ostracize them orignore their angry outbursts. In the followingsection we build on this notion and discussways organizational members may generate oralter existing norms to increase the space inwhich anger expression at work is tolerated.

REPOSITIONING THE EXPRESSION ANDIMPROPRIETY THRESHOLDS: EXPANDING THE

SPACE BETWEEN

The dual threshold model suggests that orga-nizational emotion display norms can changesuch that the positions of the two thresholdsmay shift and the space between them expand.Whether an organization starts with thresholdsclose together, as illustrated in Figure 2, or moremoderately spaced, as in Figure 1, the modelproposes that the thresholds can still move far-ther apart. This phenomenon might actually in-crease anger expressions, since fewer would beseen as inappropriate (or punishable) by orga-nizational observers. Thus, there are potentialrisks associated with expanding this space, in-cluding the possibility that expressed anger willgenerate reciprocal responses and increasenegative felt and displayed emotion among em-


ployees and workgroups. Nevertheless, we pro-pose that the potential benefits of supportinganger expression make these risks more tena-ble. For example, an increase in organizationalknowledge (Argote, McEvily, & Reagans, 2003;Nonaka et al., 2001) and enhanced organization-al learning capabilities (Argote, 1999; Argyris &Schon, 1978) may result from norms that encour-age listening to anger expressions and allowangry employees the opportunity to share poten-tially valuable information about problematicorganizational policies, practices, or structures.This could ultimately reduce the likelihood an-ger-provoking incidents will continue. Such fa-vorable outcomes are much more likely in envi-ronments that promote the expression, ratherthan the silencing or sanctioning, of organiza-tionally generated employee anger. Therefore,we suggest specific ways organizations andtheir members might influence the space be-tween thresholds.

Norms of Compassion

Organizations are likely to benefit more fromexpanding the space between thresholds whenthey develop norms that include compassion fordistressed and angry individuals. Compassion-ate responses may include listening empathi-cally, encouraging honest expression, and/or re-framing anger messages from employees beforepassing them on to intended recipients so as toreduce the possibility of retaliatory actions(Frost & Robinson, 1999). These compassionateacts can potentially defuse anger while enhanc-ing its beneficial effects. Organizational schol-ars increasingly write about how compassion-ate responses—actions that reflect empathy anda will to ease an individual’s anguish or make itmore tolerable—prove beneficial for both indi-viduals and organizations (Frost, 1999; Frost,Dutton, Worline, & Wilson, 2000; Kanov et al.,2004).

Nevertheless, not all anger episodes will ben-efit the organization, and compassionate re-sponses to anger can drain emotional energyresources (Frost, 1999) as responders try to in-hibit a common inclination to respond angrily toanger (Friedman et al., 2004), and to preventcycles of incivility (Andersson & Pearson, 1999)or negative emotional contagion (Barsade, 2002).Frost (2003) refers to these responders as toxichandlers and cautions that they may be at risk

for burnout and serious health consequences iffrequently called on to respond to anger (Frost &Robinson, 1999). Therefore, it is more desirablefor organizations to promote and encouragenorms of responding compassionately amongtheir entire membership. The collective compas-sionate responding suggested by Kanov andcolleagues (2004) refers to a coordinated behav-ioral response to emotions within an organiza-tion so that feelings of concern are more widelyshared. This tendency to respond with compas-sion toward others can be enhanced as individ-uals develop stronger feelings of connectednessamong coworkers and fellow organizationalmembers (Kanov et al., 2004).

Proposition 20: Responses to angerthat more frequently include compas-sion alter norms and expand the spacebetween thresholds, increasing theprobability of more positive outcomeswhen anger is expressed.

Cultures of Connection

We suggest that the theory of bounded emo-tionality (Mumby & Putnam, 1992) outlines char-acteristics of organizational cultures that en-able strong connections among their members,furthering the opportunity to express honestemotion in a supportive environment. This the-ory emphasizes concepts traditionally associ-ated with emotional/feminine characteristics(versus rational/masculine traits), including“nurturance, caring, community, supportive-ness, and interrelatedness” (Mumby & Putnam,1992: 474). We propose that norms generatedfrom this orientation will help expand the spacebetween the expression and impropriety thresh-olds.

Bounded emotionality norms reflect compo-nents such as intersubjective limitations, inwhich organizational members commonly exer-cise emotional constraint (but not silence) out ofa commitment to others and a concern for theirsubjective well-being. Such constraints emergefrom a sense of individual responsibility, notbecause of managerial dictates. Higher levels ofambiguity tolerance allow for recognition of di-verse viewpoints and perspectives among orga-nizational members (Martin et al., 1998) and arelikely to reduce negative reactions when differ-ing opinions are expressed—even if those view-


points are expressed with anger. In organiza-tional settings that encourage naturallyemerging feelings, organizational membersmanage anger expression on the basis of needs(both their own and others) in the relational con-text, rather than as a result of their occupationalstatus or identity.

These factors collectively contribute to astronger sense of community (Mumby & Putnam,1992) so that when individuals express anger,more attempts will be made to understand andempathize with them, rather than to coordinateefforts to sanction or silence them. These at-tempts to understand may provide favorableoutcomes for the anger expresser and the orga-nization, including a higher level of employeecamaraderie and organizational commitment.

Proposition 21: Organizations thatbuild community and show commit-ment to the well-being of others bysupporting emergent feelings, exercis-ing emotional constraint, and tolerat-ing diversity of perspectives amongtheir members will expand the spacebetween thresholds and increase theprobability of more positive outcomeswhen anger is expressed.

RESEARCH AND THEORETICALIMPLICATIONS

The dual threshold model emerges as an al-ternative to the antisocial, aggression, and actoremphasis reflected in the majority of the litera-ture on anger expression. That is, we feel themodel’s robust yet parsimonious framework willhelp generate a more balanced understandingof organizational anger, incorporating both itsantisocial and prosocial potential and illustrat-ing when anger is and is not aggressive or de-viant and whether anger expression is poten-tially constructive or destructive. The modeladds organizational observers into the discus-sion of social responsibility surrounding angerdisplays, moving beyond a focus on individualscharged with displaying an appropriate emo-tion to those who judge and sanction their dis-plays. It also answers requests for more contex-tualized research on emotion, especially anger(Fitness, 2000). Both thresholds and their relativeplacement symbolize emotion display rules andnorms that establish socially constructed

spaces or environments that prevent, permit, orpunish employee anger expression. The posi-tioning of these thresholds and resulting size ofthe space of allowable anger expression mayprove useful for categorizing organizations andcultures, ranging from expansive to restrictive,with regard to emotion displays. This feature ofthe model also may be useful in studying otherspecific emotions in the social context of orga-nizations. For instance, the model may help ex-plain when fear, envy, pride, happiness, or sad-ness is suppressed versus expressed, supportedversus sanctioned, and helpful versus harmfulto the organization.

Overall, we offer the dual threshold model tostimulate empirical research and enhance un-derstanding of workplace anger. For instance,the model helps differentiate three types ofworkplace anger—suppressed, expressed, anddeviant—that could also be viewed and re-searched as stages or sequences of anger epi-sodes. Scholars could examine the conse-quences when anger expression transitions toother forms of expression—when suppressedanger escalates to deviant anger, deviant angerbecomes suppressed anger, deviant anger sub-sequently is expressed appropriately, and ex-pressed anger escalates to deviant anger. Theseanger expression transitions are likely to havedifferent triggers and outcomes, all of whichcould be investigated. Research could also fur-ther examine the effects of formal and informalsanctions and could uncover possible benefitsthat may result when tolerance and compassionare shown to those whose expressions cross es-tablished boundaries of appropriate organiza-tional behavior.

Future research could focus on the role of an-ger, as well as other emotions, in promptingcommunication in the organization. For in-stance, it would be interesting to determinewhat proportion of unsolicited upward commu-nication is emotion based or what percentage ofmanager-employee interaction is motivated byanger. Relatedly, to what degree does anger andemotion-based communication actually pro-mote organizational change? Fineman has pro-posed that examining the differences in zones ofemotion expression among organizations andreference groups could help scholars “discoverhow people come to know they’ve hit a bound-ary, what happens when the socially con-structed boundaries are breached, and what


happens to the breacher” (1993: 219). We believethat the model described here can facilitate thistype of empirical research and redress the ten-dency of organizations to judge anger (espe-cially anger expressed deviantly) as somethingproblematic about the individual rather than asa signal of an objectionable organizational sit-uation and/or an opportunity to acquire valu-able information and perspective.

The dual threshold model is built on availableempirical studies of emotion expression largelyconducted in North America and Western coun-tries. Nevertheless, we believe it will proveequally beneficial to cross-cultural research onwork-centered emotional episodes in countriesaround the world, as well as in multinationalorganizations operating globally. Classic stud-ies by Ekman (1973, 1982) and Harre (1986), re-spectively, established the universality of an-ger, as well as the role culture and socializationpractices play in its relative frequency, inten-sity, expression, and social desirability (Mes-quita & Frijda, 1992; Tavris, 1982). Significantempirical research verifies high cross-culturalaccuracy in recognition of anger (Elfenbein &Ambady, 2002b) and shows that felt anger inten-sity remains somewhat constant across coun-tries, whereas reported anger frequency, expres-sion, and acceptance vary significantly (Eid &Diener, 2001; Fischer, Mosquera, van Vianen, &Manstead, 2004). These cross-cultural differ-ences are often attributed to display and decod-ing rules (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Elfenbein &Ambady, 2002b; Matsumoto, 1993; Matsumoto &Kupperbusch, 2001) and reflect culture-specificappraisal propensities, regulation processes,and anger behavior repertoires (Mesquita &Frijda, 1992; Matsumoto & Kupperbusch, 2001).

Our model should prove useful in examiningsuch cultural display norms and the compara-tive “restrictiveness” influencing expressed,suppressed, and deviant anger. Researchersconsidering culture’s impact on generating rel-atively narrow or expansive spaces for sociallyacceptable displays of anger could explore sim-ilarities and differences in both the quantity andquality of culture-specific anger expressions.For instance, studies of East-West communica-tion styles at work found that anger “indirect-ness”—messages with content discrepant fromthe speaker’s intentions (Grice, 1968)—occurredless among Americans than Koreans or Chinese(Sanchez-Burks et al., 2003). This raises interest-

ing empirical questions about whether culturesinclined or skilled in manipulating anger ex-pressions for cultural purposes, such as facesaving or social harmony preservation, mayhave lower instances of anger episodes classi-fied by organizational observers as deviant—orwhether this effect is negated in those culturesthat also score high in power distance (Hofstede,2001), which can allow high-status managers toexpress extreme anger without sanctions.

Individualism/collectivism remains the mostwidely used theoretical dimension to explaindifferences in interpersonal behavior cross-culturally and should prove useful in researchadopting this model (Ting-Toomey et al., 1991).However, other cultural dimensions could be in-vestigated further to explain cross-cultural dif-ferences in emotional expression tendenciesand social desirability norms, including uncer-tainty avoidance and power distance (Hofstede,2001) and emotionality versus neutrality(Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998). Futureresearch applying this model also could exam-ine how status within an individual’s cultureimpacts the frequency and consequences of theorganizational member’s anger expression (seeRafaeli, Fiegenbaum, Foo, & Hoon, 2004) andcould explore how cultural differences in theconstrual of self may lead to more compassion-ate versus punitive responses to anger thatcrosses the line of impropriety (see Markus &Kitayama, 1991).

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

The necessity to interact at work has risendramatically with the increase in team-basedprojects, matrix and decentralized organiza-tional structures, enhanced customer serviceexpectations, expanded job requirements, andparticipative management afforded many or-ganizational members. Ironically, a recentanalysis of job characteristics and angershows a significant correlation between theamount of time spent interacting with othersat work and the frequency with which individ-uals experience anger (Sloan, 2004; see alsoFitness, 2000).

The dual threshold model provides a usefultool organizations can use to better orient andsocialize employees, enhance managementtraining and development, and establish policyregarding emotion expression, including anger,


at work. First, many organizations rely on infor-mal socialization of newcomers to transfer emo-tion display norms (Bauer, Morrison, & Callister,1998; Scott & Myers, 2005). If employees learnearly, both through formal orientations and in-formal socialization, that their organization willaccept emotion and passion directed toward or-ganizational issues and problems (Meyerson,2000), they may be more inclined to express con-cerns quickly and honestly, provide useful up-ward feedback, participate actively in meaning-ful dialogues, and respect their associates byexercising appropriate emotion managementand supportive responses.

Second, effective management training anddevelopment in an increasingly informal andemotional work environment (Mastenbroek,2000) could help reframe management percep-tions of subordinate anger displays. Specifi-cally, managers can be taught that anger maysignal organizational changes are needed—thatanger may not necessarily be a sign of disre-spect. Managers also need to understand thattheir role and status give them emotional privi-leges (Averill, 1997) that lower-status employeesare not often afforded. Minimizing sanctionsagainst employees who express their angerabout organizational problems, even if extremeat times, and addressing concerns regarding theanger-provoking situation might not only lead toa fairer distribution of emotional privilege(Averill, 1982) but might also demonstrate a will-ingness to accept and act on employee concerns.This may increase employee trust and reducecynicism (and silence) toward management.

Third, the dual threshold model proposes thatthere is potential value in establishing or alter-ing emotion policies and standards (e.g., griev-ance procedures, codes of conduct, ethics codes,civility statements, etc.) that expand the spacebetween the expression and impropriety thresh-olds. Although a zero tolerance policy for certaintypes of anger expression (e.g., violence) islikely appropriate, we suggest that even deviantanger displays may ultimately promote proso-cial change (see Huy, 1999, and Warren, 2003).Promoting cultures of connection and compas-sion further enhances the possibility of positiveoutcomes for both individuals and organiza-tions.

In conclusion, we assert through our explana-tion of the dual threshold model that when or-ganizational members are afforded sufficient

space to express their felt anger without fear ofsanctions by colleagues or management, oppor-tunities may emerge for productive and proso-cial outcomes, including the possibility of mean-ingful dialogue, necessary change, increasedorganizational learning and knowledge, andmutual respect and understanding. Anger andcompassion may ultimately prove to be comple-mentary mechanisms promoting positive orga-nizational outcomes.

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Deanna Geddes ([email protected]) is an associate professor of human resourcemanagement at Temple University. She received her Ph.D. from Purdue University.Her research interests include performance appraisal practices, emotions in the or-ganization, reactions to negative feedback (i.e., workplace aggression and justiceperceptions), and pedagogical benefits of information technology.

Ronda Roberts Callister ([email protected]) is an associate professor of man-agement and human resources at Utah State University. She received her Ph.D. fromthe University of Missouri–Columbia. Her research focuses on conflict and conflictmanagement in organizations, dispute resolution in other cultures, anger in organi-zations, and gender role stereotypes in organizations.


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